DDCI ADDRESS TO AIR WAR COLLEGE 26 OCTOBER 1971

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01066A001400380001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 26, 1971
• Content Type: SPEECH

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A FORMER SENATOR WHO KNEW A GREAT DEAL ABOUT
U.S. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS BUT NEVER DISCUSSED
THEM--ONCE EXPLAINED TO HIS CONSTITUENTS THAT IN AN
OPEN SOCIETY LIKE OURS, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO INFORM
THE PUBLIC WITHOUT INFORMING OUR ENEMIES, WHO MAKE
IT A PRACTICE TO READ OUR NEWSPAPERS VERY CAREFULLY,
THAT IS WHY I WELCOME OPPORTUNITIES LIKE THIS
INVITATION TODAY TO SPEAK TO YOU IN CLOSED FORUM,
PARTICULARLY ON THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
ON THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, AND ON THE RELATION-
SHIP BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY FORMULATION.
OUR CRITICS ARE NEITHER HAMPERED BY SECURITY
REGULATIONS, NOR RESTRAINED BY FEAR THAT WE MIGHT
REFUTE THEM WITH FACTS. IF WE WERE TO BEGIN TO
REPLY WITH SOME RELATIVELY HARMLESS ANSWERS, THE
QUESTION OF JUST WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE AND SHUT
UP MIGHT BE EVEN MORE DAMAGING THAN THE ORIGINAL
CRITICISM, SO WE JUST HAVE TO LIVE WITH SOME HIGHLY
Auk Qu,TE MIS/EAbi,VG-
IMAGINATIVEA DESCRIPTIONS OF OUR WORK.
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BECK E'`
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WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, IT IS VITAL
THAT WE ALL HAVE A CLEAR AND COMPREHENSIVE UNDER-
STANDING OF THE EXACT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE IN-
TELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE REST OF THE GOVERNMENT
SPECIFICALLY, HOW INTELLIGENCE SUPPORTS THE POLICY-
MAKER, AND HOW THE POLICY-MAKER CONTROLS INTELLI-
GENCE ACTIVITIES$
LEMEN b A ?BE fJ CHO
TO ATT~E`ND THE i 4'R WAR C{ LEGE /ENTIFIS YOU
OFFICERS WH ARE GOI TO B OING CONSI RABLE
AMOUNT OF JOINT ST F AND JOINT MMITT WORK
YOUR F URE CAR R ASSI MENTS- A SU TANTI POR--
TIO 'OF YOUR TIES W> L INV~LVE SP IAL SK F ES
A D INTER-A NCY GR UPS WH E YO SWILL
WITH--AND1POSSIBLI, EVEN FOR--TH INTELLIGE
MUNITY
I THINK IT WILL BE HELPFUL
T'? X^"R SERVICES AND TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
*&Etf TO DISCUSS THE CONCEPT, THE ORGANIZATION,
AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS IN OUR
GOVERNMENT WHICH WORK TOGETHER TO PRODUCE NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE.
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FIRST, I AM GOING TO DISCUSS THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY, THEN THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE POLICY-
MAKERS--INCLUDING CIA's PARTICIPATION IN THE CURRENT
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS FOR U.S. POLICY. NEXT I
WILL DISCUSS THE CONTROLS UNDER WHICH INTELLIGENCE
OPERATES, AND CONCLUDE BY DESCRIBING BRIEFLY THE
ORGANIZATION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION ABOUT
THE TERM "INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY," WHICH IS SIMPLY
A HANDY WAY OF REFERRING TO ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF
THE GOVERNMENT WHICH ARE CONCERNED WITH COLLECTING,
ANALYZING, AND DISSEMINATING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE.
IT IS A FRAMEWORK--FORMALIZED IN THE UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE BOARD--WITHIN WHICH ALL OF THESE COM-
PONENTS CAN WORK TOGETHER.
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 DID NOT
CREATE THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT. WE HAD INTELLIGENCE AGENTS--AND GOOD
ONES, TOO--IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR. BEFORE THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WAS ESTABLISHED, OUR
GOVERNMENT WAS GETTING INTELLIGENCE FROM THE ARMY
AND THE NAVY, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AND THE FBI,
AND THESE SAME ORGANIZATIONS ARE STILL PROVIDING IT.
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THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 WAS WRITTEN
AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF PEARL HARBOR. ALL OF THE
~-i3,4c L ~
INVESTIGATIONS OF THAT HK' SHOWED THAT THE
NECESSARY INTELLIGENCE WAS THERE. IT HAD BEEN
GATHERED. BUT THE FAILURE WAS THAT ALL OF THE BITS
AND PIECES IN THE HANDS OF VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE
GOVERNMENT WERE NOT PUT TOGETHER, EVALUATED, COOR-
DINATED, AND DISSEMINATED fli TIME TO THE PEOPLE
WHO NEEDED THE INFORMATION IN ORDER TO TAKE PROPER
ACTION.
THE OBVIOUS REMEDY WAS TO ENSURE THAT OUR IN-
TELLIGENCE AGENCIES WORK TOGETHER, EXCHANGE AND
ILLEGIB COMPARE INFORMATION AND PROVIDE THE MEN O HAVE
TO MAKE THE DECISIONS WI H THE BEST OMBINED, AGREED
INTELLIGENCE THAT IS AVAILABLE. IN A NUTSHELL, THIS
IS THE DEFINITION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, AND THE
CONCEPT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
WHEN THE ARMED SERVICES, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, AND CIA, AND THE FBI ARE ALL ENGAGED IN COL-
LECTING INTELLIGENCE,
%=11MW THERE AREA TWO GREAT DANGERS:
THE FIRST AND GREATEST IS THAT SOME VITAL AS-
SIGNMENT WILL FALL BETWEEN THE STOOLS--THAT EACH
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AGENCY WILL THINK SOMEBODY ELSE HAS THE RESPONSI-
BILITY.
THE OTHER DANGER IS DUPLICATION OF EFFORT--AND
THIS IS NOT MERELY A QUESTION OF EXTRAVAGANCE. IN
THE COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE, UNCOORDINATED EFFORTS
AGAINST THE SAME TARGET CAN LEAD TO DISASTERS.
To COPE WITH BOTH OF THESE PITFALLS--TO ENSURE
ENOUGH COORDINATION SO THAT THERE WILL BE NEITHER
IMPORTANT GAPS NOR UNDESIRABLE DUPLICATION--THE
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 AND SUBSEQUENT PRESI-
DENTIAL ORDERS GAVE THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLI-
GENCE TWO RESPONSIBILITIES. HE IS BY LAW THE HEAD
OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WHICH HAS THE
STATUTORY FUNCTION OF PRODUCING COORDINATED NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE. HE IS ALSO, BY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE,
THE PRINCIPAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER OF THE GOVERNMENT.
HE GUIDES AND COORDINATES ALL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES--
ANYWHERE IN THE GOVERNMENT--RELATING TO THE NATIONAL
SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND HE ACTS
AS PRINCIPAL INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT. m,5 lr
TURNING TO THE COMPOSITION OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY, THE FIRST ELEMENT MOST PEOPLE THINK OF IN
THIS CONTEXT IS THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WHICH
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OPERATES UNDER THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.
SECOND,ATHERE IS THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
WHICH REPORTS TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND--
THROUGH THE JOINT CHIEFS--TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.
THE INTELLIGENCE UNITS OF THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE
CONTINUE TO SERVE THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE RESPECTIVE
SERVICES. WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, THE THREE
SERVICE INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS ARE CLOSELY COORDINATED
BY THE DIRECTOR OF DIA,
THERE IS AN INTELLIGENCE COMPONENT IN THE DEPART-
MENT OF STATE--THE BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH--
WHICH SERVES THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND HIS POLICY
PLANNERS. ALL OF OUR DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL ARE INTEL-
LIGENCE GATHERERS IN A SENSE, BUT THERE IS ALSO A
SPECIFIC REQUIREMENT FOR MEN WHO APPLY THEMSELVES
PROFESSIONALLY TO THE ANALYSIS OF THAT INFORMATION,
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY.
THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION HAS AN INTELLIGENCE
COMPONENT WITH A SPECIALIZED CHARTER DEVOTED TO THE
VITAL FIELD OF INFORMATION ABOUT NUCLEAR ENERGY DE-
VELOPMENTS.
THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION IS CONCERNED
PRIMARILY WITH INTERNAL SECURITY, BUT THE CONNECTION
BETWEEN INTERNAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IS
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OBVIOUS, SO THE FBI, TOO, IS A MEMBER OF THE INTELLI-
GENCE COMMUNITY. THE FBI AND THE CIA WORK CLOSELY
TOGETHER, BECAUSE THEY BOTH MUST CONTEND WITH NETWORKS
OF FOREIGN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS WHOSE AGENTS MOVE
BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN
COUNTRIES WITH LITTLE REGARD FOR BOUNDARIES OR NA-
TIONALITIES. IT SHOULD BE STRESSED HERE THAT BY LAW
CIA HAS NO DOMESTIC INTERNAL SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY
1
AND IS FORBIDDEN BY LAW TO REPORT ON U
S
CITIZENS
.
.
.
(-jwT4 ~R w r rH ~
THESE AGENCIES, THEN, THE NSA, winnu
Now C ~t.4 TIM' d V'C94ki- wke4 t7 y sFRv icy,
E-#A , ARE THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS
OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY--CIA, DIA AND THE SERVICE
COMPONENTS, STATE, AEC AAND S THE FBI.
ROUNDING OUT THE PICTURE OF THE COMMUNITY, ARE
A NUMBER OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ASSETS--ACTIVITIES
WHICH SERVE THE ENTIRE GOVERNMENT RATHER THAN ANY
PARTICULAR DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY. ONE AGENCY MAY
MANAGE THEM, AND EVEN PROVIDE MOST OF THE PERSONNEL
AND EQUIPMENT, BUT THEY ACTUALLY OPERATE DIRECTLY
FOR THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
THE OLDEST AND LARGEST OF THESE IS THE NATIONAL
ea-47-MML S?CURI TY S ~flltF ,
SECURITY AGENCYn WH-LCI-I I -
ITS COLLECTION COMPONENTS,
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SCATTERED ALL OVER THE WORLD. ARE PROVIDED BY THE
ARMED SERVICES.
ANOTHER NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ASSET IS THE NA=
TIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER, WHICH
DEALS WITH INTELLIGENCE ACQUIRED BY PHOTOGRAPHIC
MEANS, EXAMINING THE FILMS IN DETAIL. AND INTER-
N PI -
PRETING WHAT IS SEEN.
I NEED ONLY MENTION THE DETECTION OF THE SOVIET
MEDIUM RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES IN CUBA IN OCTOBER
1962, TO SHOW HOW ESSENTIAL NPIC IS TO OUR INTELLI-
GENCE EFFORT. YOU MAY ALSO HAVE HEARD OF THE TECH-
A FOURTH SUCH NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ASSET IS
THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES, WHICH I WILL DIS-
CUSS A BIT LATER.
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ILLEGIB
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NOW, THESE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND ORGANIZA-
TIONS I HAVE JUST ENUMERATED ARE TIED TOGETHER, FOR
GUIDANCE PURPOSES, BY THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE
BOARD, WHICH WE OFTEN REFER TO AS USIB.
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, BY PRESI-
DENTIAL DESIGNATION, IS THE CHAIRMAN OF USIB--AND
THIS, BY THE WAY, IS ONE PLACE WHERE THE DIRECTOR'S
TWO JOBS--OR HIS "TWO HATS"--ARE VERY CAREFULLY
DIFFERENTIATED. WHEN HE CHAIRS THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE
BOARD, HE IS THEE AS THE PRESIDENT'S PRINCIPAL IN-
TELLIGENCE OFFICER, JQJ AS THE HEAD OF CIA. USIB
ACTS ON AND APPROVES THE AGREED, COORDINATED JUDG-
MENTS OF THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, AND IT
WOULD NOT BE PROPER OR EFFECTIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR
SIMULTANEOUSLY TO CHAIR THE MEETING AND TO PRESENT
THE VIEWS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. FOR
THIS REASON, CIA HAS SEPARATE REPRESENTATION ON THE
BOARD IN THE PERSON OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CEN-
TRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE OTHER PRINCIPALS ARE:
THE STATE DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH:
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THE DIRECTOR OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY;
THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY;
THE ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER OF THE AEC;
_c&!gym
- 'N 5
/I/
.
TH ASSISTANT TO THE DIREC R OF THE FBI
~q72~
J SINCE THE CONSOLIDATION OF~INT LLAGENCE UNDER
DIA IN THE PENTAGON, THE INTELLIGENCE CHIEFS OF THE
ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE ATTEND AND PARTICIPATE, BUT
AS OBSERVERS RATHER THAN AS OFFICIAL MEMBERS OF USIB.
THEY RETAIN THE RIGHT, AND IN FACT THE DUTY, TO EX-
PRESS ANY DISSENT THEY MAY HAVE ON MATTERS UNDER DIS-
CUSSION. IF YOU HAVE SEEN THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATES, WITH THEIR FOOTNOTES, YOU KNOW THAT THIS
IS A RIGHT THEY DO NOT HESITATE TO EXERCISE.
USIB MEETS REGULARLY ONCE A WEEK--SOMETIMES
MORE OFTEN. IT IS CONCERNED WITH A WIDE VARIETY OF
MATTERS, BUT I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT TO EMPHASIZE
THAT USIB OPERATES AS AN ADVISORY BODY TO THE DIREC-
TOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THERE ARE THREE PRINCIPAL FUNCTIONS.
FIRST, THE USIB ESTABLISHES--AND PERIODICALLY
REVIEWS--THE NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR THE GUIDANCE
OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN CHOOSING INTELLI-
GENCE TARGETS, AND IN RECOMMENDING ASSIGNMENT OF
ASSETS TO COVER THOSE TARGETS.
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SECOND, THE USIB CONTINUOUSLY REVIEWS OUR
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES TO DETERMINE WHETHER
THEY ARE IN ACCORD WITH THOSE PRIORITIES, AND TO
MAKE SURE THAT WE ARE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO
CLOSE IMPORTANT GAPS, AND TO AVOID UNNECESSARY
DUPLICATION. PLEASE NOTE THAT I HAVE MODIFIED THE
WORD "DUPLICATION" EACH TIME I HAVE USED IT. WHEN
WE ARE TRYING TO GET HOLD OF THE OTHER FELLOWS
SECRETS IN THE INTERESTS OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY,
A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF DUPLICATION IS NOT ONLY DESIR-
ABLE, BUT EVEN MANDATORY FOR THE SAKE OF CONFIRMA-
TION.
THIRD, THE USIB REVIEWS IN DRAFT FORM AND IN
GREAT DETAIL THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
WHICH THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SUBMITS
TO THE PRESIDENT.
THE ACTUAL WORK OF DRAFTING AND RE-WORKING
THESE PAPERS IS GENERALLY DONE IN THE OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES, WHICH IS A PART OF CIA, BUT
THE FINAL PRODUCT IS A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATE, AND MUST, THEREFORE, REFLECT THE CON-
SIDERED JUDGMENT OF THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COM-
MUNITY. THIS IS ENSURED THROUGH THE PARTICIPATION
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OF ALL APPROPRIATE ELEMENTS OF THE COMMUNITY, THROUGH
THE CONTRIBUTION OF FACTS AND JUDGMENTS, IN THE REVIS-
ING OF THE PAPERS IN DRAFT, AND BY THE USIB REVIEW OF
THE FINAL PRODUCT. THE OBJECTIVE OF EACH ESTIMATE IS
A CAREFUL AND THOUGHTFUL SET OF JUDGMENTS WHICH WILL
BE OF THE GREATEST POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE TO THE POLICY-
MAKER.
I WANT TO STRESS THAT THE MEN ENGAGED IN ARRIVING
AT AN ESTIMATE ARE NOT STRIVING FOR UNANIMITY per..
IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE UNANIMITY BY OVER-
RIDING THE DISSENTING MINORITY, OR BY WATERING DOWN
THE ESTIMATE TO THE LEAST COMMON DENOMINATOR--A NARROW
AREA OF COMPLETE AGREEMENT BY THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY. SUCH UNANIMITY, HOWEVER, WOULD BE A DIS-
SERVICE TO THE POLICY-MAKER AND THE PLANNER.
WHAT ,Ja ASKED IS THAT THE DISSENTS SHALL BE
BASED ON HONEST DIFFERENCES OF OPINION OVER HOW THE
AVAILABLE FACTS ARE TO BE EVALUATED AND INTERPRETED--
NOT ON PERSONAL CONVICTIONS, HUNCHES, OR PAROCHIAL
INTERESTS. WITHIN THIS FRAME OF REFERENCE, WE EN-
COURAGE WELL-FOUNDED DISSENTS.
THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES, WHICH I RE-
FERRED TO A BIT EARLIER, DESERVES SPECIAL MENTION.
UNTIL
RECENTLY MOVED TO SET UP A SIMILAR
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GROUP, THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES WAS THE ONLY
INSTITUTION OF ITS KIND IN ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
WE KNOW OF1 AS ESTABLISHED BY GENERAL BEDELL SMITH
WHEN HE WAS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IN 1950,
IT IS A BODY OF SENIOR. KNOWLEDGEABLE MEN OF VARIED
EXPERIENCE. WHO HAVE NO OTHER DUTY THAN TO STUDY AND
SEEK ANSWERS TO THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF NATIONAL
SECURITY, THE BOARD IS COMPOSED OF ABOUT FIFTEEN MEN
WITH EXTENSIVE BACKGROUNDS IN THE MILITARY, DIPLOMATIC,
LEGAL, ACADEMIC, AND INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONS. THEIR
SOLE FUNCTION IS TO HEAR AND CONSIDER EVIDENCE AND
ARGUMENT FROM THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
THESE JUDGMENTS ARE THEN PRESENTED TO THE DIRECTOR
AND TO USIB, AND NORMALLY HAVE GREAT WEIGHT IN THE
ESTIMATES THE DIRECTOR SUBMITS TO THE PRESIDENT AND
HIS ADVISORS ON MATTERS OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE TO
NATIONAL SECURITY.
A WORD ABOUT THE NATIONAL ESTIMATES THEMSELVES.
SINCE NOVEMBER 3RD OF 1950, WHEN THE FIRST NIE WAS
ISSUED ON THE PROSPECTS FOR COMMUNIST ARMED ACTION
LN THE PHILIPPINES DURING NOVEMBER, MORE THAN ELEVEN
HUNDRED ESTIMATES HAVE BEEN PREPARED. THEIR SCOPE
AND TIMEFRAME HAVE BECOME STEADILY MORE EXTENSIVE
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OVER THE YEARS, AND THE COMPLEXITY OF THEIR SUBJECTS
HAS GROWN. SOME ESTIMATES STILL DEAL WITH THE OUTLOOK
FOR INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES: THESE ARE USUALLY ABOUT
COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE ALREADY BECOME HOT SPOTS, OR ARE
LIKELY TO CAUSE SERIOUS CONCERN OVER THE NEXT TWO OR
THREE YEARS. MANY NIEs, HOWEVER, NOW CONSIDER BROADER
PROBLEMS AND TRENDS WHICH CUT ACROSS NATIONAL BOUND-
ARIES--FOR EXAMPLE, SOUTHEAST ASIA AFTER VIETNAM,
SOVIET POLICIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN BASIN, OR I.E.
POTENTIAL FOR REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA.
THE ESTIMATES ON SOVIET AND COMMUNIST CHINESE
MILITARY MATTERS ARE A CASE ALL TO THEMSELVES. THESE
HAVE ALWAYS BEEN BUILT ON A SOLID BASE OF HARD EVIDENCE
AND HAVE LOOKED FURTHER AHEAD THAN MOST OTHER ESTIMATES--
USUALLY FIVE YEARS. SINCE 1970, THEY HAVE BEEN MUCH
MORE DETAILED AND COMPREHENSIVE THAN BEFORE--AND COM-
PLETE WITH TECHNICAL APPENDICES AND ALTERNATE INTER-
PRETATIONS OF KEY DATA. THE TIMING OF THESE MILITARY
HIES WILL CONTINUE TO BE KEYED TO THE PLANNING CYCLE
FOR OUR U.S. DEFENSE FORCE LEVELS AND BUDGETS. PRESI-
DENT NIXON HAS CONGRATULATED THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE ON THE EXCELLENCE OF THE FIRST OF THESE
MAJOR NEW MILITARY NATIONAL ESTIMATES, NIE 11-8-70,
"SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK."
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YET ANOTHER TYPE, THE SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLI-
GENCE ESTIMATE, OR SNIE, INCLUDES AQ HC PAPERS ON
IMPORTANT QUESTIONS OF THE MOMENT, SUCH AS THE EX-
PECTED REACTION TO SOME PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION BY
THE U.S. THEREFORE, THE SNIEs MAY GET INTO SOME
RATHER SENSITIVE AREAS.
OTHER ACTIVITIES OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD
ARE CARRIED ON BY COMMITTEES WITH SPECIALIZED FUNC-
TIONS. SOME OF THEM ARE REGULAR STANDING COMMITTEES,
SUCH AS THE JOINT ATOMIC ENERGY INTELLIGENCE COMMIT-
TEE, WHICH FOLLOWS NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET
UNION, FRANCE, COMMUNIST CHINA, AND OTHER COUNTRIES
WITH THE POTENTIAL OF BECOMING NUCLEAR POWERS. A
SIMILAR COMMITTEE, THE GUIDED MISSILE AND ASTRO-
NAUTICS INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE, CONCENTRATES ON
FOREIGN SPACE AND MISSILE ACTIVITY.
THEN THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF AD. HOC . COM-
MITTEES TO DEAL WITH SPECIFIC CRISES OR RECURRENT
HEADACHES--A BERLIN COMMITTEE, AN ARAB-ISRAELI COM-
MITTEE, A TAIWAN STRAIT COMMITTEE, TO GIVE YOU SOME
EXAMPLES OUT OF THE PAST.
THE WATCH COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLI-
GENCE BOARD CONCENTRATES ON THE HIGHLY SPECIALIZED
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FIELD THAT WE CALL INDICATIONS INTELLIGENCE. THERE
IS LOCATED IN THE PENTAGON A FULLTIME ACTIVITY KNOWN
AS THE NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER, WHICH IS STAFFED
JOINTLY BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. THE FUNCTION
OF THE NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER IS TO MAINTAIN AN
AROUND-THE-CLOCK INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WATCH FOR IN-
DICATIONS OF FOREIGN PREPARATIONS TO ATTACK THE U.S.,
ITS FORCES OVERSEAS, OR ITS ALLIES. THIS CENTER AND
THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES REPORT TO THE WATCH COM-
MITTEE ON INDICATIONS WHICH MAY BE SIGNIFICANT--OR
ON THE ABSENCE OF ANY SIGNIFICANT INDICATORS. THE
WATCH COMMITTEE HAS A REGULAR WEEKLY MEETING, TIMED
SO THAT THE CONCLUSIONS WILL BE READY FOR THE WEEKLY
USIB MEETING, BUT IN TIME OF CRISIS THE WATCH COM-
MITTEE MAY MEET ONE OR MORE TIMES A DAY.
AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, I WOULD LIKE TO DE-
SCRIBE HOW THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MAKES ITS CON-
TRIBUTION TO THE DECISION-MAKERS IN OUR GOVERNMENT.
LET ME SAY FIRST OF ALL THAT WHEN IT COMES TO
DECISION-MAKING, IT IS A FIRMLY ESTABLISHED RULE
THAT OUR ONLY ROLE IS ONE OF SUPPLYING OBJECTIVE,
SUBSTANTIVE INTELLIGENCE. IT MAY BE HARD FACT.
IT MAY BE AN INTELLIGENCE APPRECIATION--THE BEST
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JUDGMENT OF THE SITUATION; OR IT MAY BE ESTIMATIVE--
AGAIN, A CONSIDERED JUDGMENT OF HOW THE SITUATION IS
LIKELY TO DEVELOP THE INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS NEITHER
MAKE NOR ADVOCATE POLICY WHILE THEY ARE FUNCTIONING
AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
NOW, A MAN WHO SITS IN USIB AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF
AN AGENCY WHICH HAS A RESPONSIBILITY FOR POLICY FOR-
MULATION MAY WELL LEAVE THE USIB CONFERENCE ROOM OUT
AT CIA HEADQUARTERS IN LANGLEY, GO BACK TO HIS OWN
OFFICE, AND ENGAGE IN A MEETING AT WHICH THE POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS OF HIS DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY ARE FOR-
MULATED. AS LONG AS HE IS SITTING IN USIB, HOWEVER,
HE IS NOT A POLICY-MAKER.
As YOU CAN READILY UNDERSTAND, AN INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE HAS NO VALUE, NO PURPOSE, AND NO FUTURE, IF
IT IS NOT BELIEVED BY THOSE IT SERVES.
THIS IS WHAT DICTATES THAT AN INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE SHALL ONLY SUPPORT--NOT PARTICIPATE IN--THE
POLICY-MAKING PROCESS.
SUPPOSE THAT THE PRESIDENT AND HIS ADVISERS
FACE A CHOICE BETWEEN COURSE A AND COURSE B: INTEL-
LIGENCE WILL ONLY PROVIDE THE FACTS--AND THE WHOLE
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RANGE OF KNOWN FACTS--RELEVANT TO THE CHOICE. IN-
TELLIGENCE WILL NOT RECOMMEND ONE COURSE OR THE
OTHER. THE MOMENT INTELLIGENCE ADVOCATES COURSE A,
THE PROPONENTS OF COURSE B ARE GOING TO SUSPECT--
IF NOT BELIEVE--THAT INTELLIGENCE HAS RIGGED ITS
REPORTING TO SUPPORT THAT ADVOCACY. CREDIBILITY
GOES OUT THE WINDOW.
THE ESTIMATIVE FUNCTION, OF COURSE, INCLUDES
CONTINGENCY PAPERS. THESE ARE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS,
POSED BY THE POLICY-MAKERS, AS TO THE PROBABLE CON-
SEQUENCES OR REACTIONS TO SPECIFIC PROPOSED COURSES
OF ACTION BY THE UNITED STATES. THIS IS INDEED THIN
ICE FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, AND I MUST ADMIT
THAT THE RESPONSIVE CONCLUSIONS ARE SOMETIMES SO
CLEAR-CUT AND SO DEFINITIVE THAT THEY ARE TANTAMOUNT
TO TACIT POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS. A WEATHER FORECAST
OF RAIN IS OBJECTIVE, BUT IT IS ALSO IN EFFECT A
TACT'T RECOMMENDATION TO TAKE A RAINCOAT.
THESE PAPERS ARE UNDERTAKEN, HOWEVER, AT THE
SPECIFIC REQUEST OF THE POLICY-MAKER. THE CONCLU-
SIONS ARE BASED ON A REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF ALL THE
FACTS AVAILABLE. RIVAL ADVOCATES AMONG THE POLICY-
MAKERS CAN ALWAYS CHECK WITH THEIR OWN INTELLIGENCE
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REPRESENTATIVES TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE QUESTION HAS BEEN
GIVEN OBJECTIVE AND IMPARTIAL REVIEW IN THE ESTIMATIVE PRO-
CESS.
MY POINT IS THAT IF THERE IS CONTROVERSY OVER WHAT
THE U.S. POLICY OR COURSE OF ACTION SHOULD BE, THE OPPOSING
ADVOCATES MUST HAVE AN IMPARTIAL SOURCE OF OBJECTIVE INFOR-
MATION WHICH ALL CAN TRUST. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CAN
FURNISH THAT OBJECTIVE FOUNDATION, AND COMMAND THE NECESSARY
CREDIBILITY ONLY IF IT NEVER ENGAGES IN ADVOCACY.
To ILLUSTRATE THIS POINT I WOULD LIKE TO DESCRIBE IN
SOME DETAIL HOW CIA PARTICIPATES IN THE U.S. POLICY-MAKING
PROCESS. UNDER CURRENT PROCEDURES, THIS PROCESS STARTS WITH
A NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDUM, OR NSSM.
THE NSSM ORIGINATES IN THE NSC STAFF UNDER DR. HENRY
A. KISSINGER, THE PRESIDENT'S ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS, WHO STATES THE PROBLEM AND OUTLINES WHAT IS TO BE
DONE, BY WHOM, AND WHEN.
THE BASIC DOCUMENT IS DRAFTED, USUALLY BY THE DE-
PARTMENT OF STATE, IN THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP. ONE
OF THESE, CALLED THE POLITICAL-MILITARY GROUP, DEALS
WITH PRIMARILY MILITARY MATTERS. THERE ARE FIVE OTHERS
BROKEN DOWN BY GEOGRAPHIC AREASf EM:
?lAi"-RE1TE-rALtEH- -NTERDEPARTMENTAL REGIONAL GROUPS I-N T-&&
4H-NSON ADMTN_HT*A,Z:QN X CHAIRED BY THE APPROPRIATE
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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE. THE CIA REPRESENTATIVE
IS USUALLY THE APPROPRIATE DIVISION CHIEF FROM OUR
OPERATING SIDE, THE DIRECTORATE OF PLANS, BUT HIS
FUNCTION IS LIMITED TO INTELLIGENCE INPUT.
THE NSSM ITSELF STATES THE PROBLEM. LAYS OUT
THE FACTS, AND THEN LISTS A SERIES OF OPTIONS, WITH
PROS, CONS, AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES, BUT WITHOUT
MAKING A FINAL RECOMMENDATION AMONG THE OPTIONS.
WHEN THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP IS SATISFIED
WITH THE NSSM, IT IS FORWARDED FOR REVIEW AT A
HIGHER LEVEL. IN THE CASE OF DEFENSE POLICY, IT
GOES TO THE DEFENSE POLICY REVIEW GROUP, CHAIRED
BY DR. KISSINGER AND COMPRISING THE DEPUTY SECRE-
TARY OF DEFENSE, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS,
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE, THE DIRECTOR OF CEN-
TRAL INTELLIGENCE, THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGE-
MENT AND BUDGET, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDENT'S
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS.
NSSMs WHICH ARE NOT PRIMARILY MILITARY GO TO
THE NSC SENIOR REVIEW GROUP, ALSO CHAIRED BY DR.
KISSINGER. THE DIRECTOR AND I ARE THE CIA REPRE-
SENTATIVES, AND OUR ROLE IS LIMITED TO INTELLIGENCE
INPUT; OTHER MEMBERS ARE SENIOR REPRESENTATIVES
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FROM STATE, DEFENSE, AND JOINT CHIEFS, AND THE OF-
FICE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING. THE HEAD OF USIA USUALLY
ATTENDS.
THE PAPER MAY SHUTTLE BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN THE
INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP AND THE REVIEW GROUP SEVERAL
TIMES BEFORE IT IS CONSIDERED READY FOR PRESIDENTIAL
CONSIDERATION, ULTIMATELY, IT COMES BEFORE THE NA-
TIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AS A DOCUMENT STATING A PROB-
LEM AND EVALUATING ALL THE POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION.
IT IS A POLICY DOCUMENT WHICH STOPS SHORT OF MAKING
A RECOMMENDATION: THE DECISION IS UP TO THE PRESIDENT.
WHEN THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETS AROUND
THE LONG OVAL TABLE IN THE CABINET ROOM, THE DIRECTOR
OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IS USUALLY SEATED ALL BY HIM-
SELF AT ONE END OF THE TABLE, MAY I REPEAT--AS AN
ADV/ SOR. HE GENERALLY OPENS THE MEETING WITH A
SHORT, CONCISE BRIEFING ON THE INTELLIGENCE ASPECTS
OF THE SUBJECT UNDER CONSIDERATION.
Now, THERE HAS BEEN, AS I SAID, AN INTELLIGENCE
INPUT ALL THE WAY THROUGH, AT EVERY STAGE OF THE
NSSM PROCESS. IT COMES NOT ONLY FROM THE CIA PEOPLE
ON THE VARIOUS PANELS, BUT FROM THE DEPARTMENTAL
INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS SUPPORTING THE REPRESENTATIVES
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OF THE OPERATING DEPARTMENTS SUCH AS DEFENSE AND
STATE. IT CONTRIBUTES TO THE STATEMENT OF THE
PROBLEM, AND TO THE EVALUATION OF THE VARIOUS
OPTIONS.
THIS INTELLIGENCE INPUT, HOWEVER, IS ORIENTED
TO POSSIBLE U.S. COURSES OF ACTION, AND IT IS SUB-
ORDINATED TO A DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVE POLICIES.
THE DIRECTOR'S BRIEFING TO THE NSC, ON THE
OTHER HAND, IS ORIENTED TO THE PROBLEM--NOT TO
THE ANSWERS--AND I THINK IT IS RELEVANT TO OUR
EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN DETACHMENT FROM POLICY THAT,
WHILE WE ARE REPRESENTED IN THE NSSM PROCESS BY
OUR OPERATING AND COLLECTION PEOPLE, THE DIRECTOR
NORMALLY CALLS ON THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION
SIDE, AND SPECIFICALLY THE OFFICE OF CURRENT IN-
TELLIGENCE, TO HELP IN THE PREPARATION OF HIS
BRIEFING FOR THE NSC.
IN THE BACK-AND-FORTH DISCUSSION WHICH FOL-
LOWS, THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE PAR-
TICIPATES ONLY WHEN HE IS ASKED FOR HIS OPINION
OR FOR SOME ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE DETAIL. THERE
IS, OF COURSE, NOTHING LIKE A FINAL VOTE, AND THE
PRESIDENT'S DECISION NORMALLY IS MADE KNOWN AT
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SOME LATER POINT IN A NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
MEMORANDUM DIRECTING THE HEADS OF APPROPRIATE DE-
PARTMENTS OR AGENCIES TO TAKE SPECIFIC ACTIONS.
SO FAR, I HAVE BEEN DEALING WITH THE CONTEN-
TION OF OUR CRITICS THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COM-
MUNITY--AND CIA IN PARTICULAR--SOMEHOW "MAKES"
POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. THERE
REMAINS THE ALLEGATION THAT INTELLIGENCE OPERATES
WITHOUT ANY CONTROLS, THAT IT MAKES AND IMPLEMENTS
ITS OWN POLICY, SOMETIMES IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE
PROFESSED POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.
THERE IS ANOTHER-SIDE OF THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY: THE CONTROLS
WHICH THE POLICY-MAKERS--THE ELECTED AUTHORITIES
OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT--HAVE AND EXERCISE OVER
EVEN THE MOST SECRET OF OUR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVI-
TIES
ESSENTIALLY, WE ARE NOW TALKING ABOUT FUNC-
TIONS WHICH, WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY,
ARE PECULIAR TO CIA. I WANT TO DISCUSS BRIEFLY
WHERE WE GET OUR CHARTER FOR THESE ACTIVITIES,
AND HOW THEY ARE GENERATED, PLANNED, ORGANIZED,
AND CONTROLLED.
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THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 GAVE CIA
FIVE FUNCTIONS:
ONE, TO ADVISE THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL--
AND OF COURSE THE PRESIDENT--ON INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY;
Two, To SUPPORT AND ADVISE THE NATIONAL SECU-
RITY COUNCIL IN THE COORDINATION OF ALL FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF OUR GOVERNMENT;
THREE, To PRODUCE AND DISSEMINATE FINISHED
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT;
FOUR, To PROVIDE THOSE SERVICES OF COMMON
CONCERN FOR INTELLIGENCE WHICH CAN BEST BE UNDER-
TAKEN CENTRALLY; AND
FIVE, To PERFORM SUCH OTHER SERVICES AS THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MAY DIRECT.
FIVE PRESIDENTS AND 2EARS LATER, THE LAN-
GUAGE OF THE STATUTE REQUIRES A COUPLE OF BRIEF
FOOTNOTES.
FOR ONE THING, IT IS OFTEN STATED THAT THE
CIA WAS CREATED TO COORDINATE THE INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT. STRICTLY SPEAKING,
THIS IS NOT CORRECT. THE ACT OF 1947 DIRECTED THE
CIA TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY
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COUNCIL ON COORDINATION; THE CIA RECOMMENDED, AND
THE NSC ORDERED, THAT THIS COORDINATION WOULD BE
EFFECTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INDIVIDUALLY, AS THE PRESIDENT'S PRINCIPAL INTELLI-
GENCE OFFICER THIS THE DIRECTOR DOES, TO A LARGE
EXTENT THROUGH THE USIB MACHINERY. TO DEAL WITH
ANOTHER ASPECT OF COORDINATION--THE PROBLEM OF RE-
SOURCES--IN 1968 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLI-
GENCE ESTABLISHED A THREE-MAN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
RESOURCES BOARD, CHAIRED BY THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. HITHERTO, ITS OTHER MEMBERS
HAVE BEEN THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
ADMINISTRATION (WHO HAS BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR COOR-
DINATING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE) AND
THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH,
REPRESENTING THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. IT HAS RE-
CENTLY BEEN ANNOUNCED BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THAT THE POSITION OF AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DE-
FENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE WILL BE ESTABLISHED TO COOR-
DINATE, AT A MORE SENIOR LEVEL, THE VARIOUS INTELLI-
GENCE ACTIVITIES WITHIN DOD. THIS NEW ASSISTANT
SECRETARY MAY BECOME THE DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVE ON
NIRB
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NIRB WAS ESTABLISHED AT THE BEGINNING OF A PERIOD
WHEN INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS WERE GROWING AND THE
RESOURCES TO DEAL WITH THEM SHRINKING AT THE SAME
RATHER UNCOMFORTABLE PACE. THIS BOARD HAS THE DIF-
FICULT TASK OF MATCHING RESPONSIBILITIES WITH ASSETS
AND TRYING TO DO SO ON THE MOST COST EFFECTIVE BASIS.
THE BOARD MAKES RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, AS WELL AS TO THE PROPER AU-
THORITIES AT DEFENSE AND STATE, ON THE MOST EFFICIENT
METHODS OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION.
FINALLY, THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
HAS A SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICER WITH A SMALL BUT
EXPERIENCED STAFF WITHIN CIA, ASSIGNED TO CONTINUING
REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF THE MAJOR NATIONAL INTELLI-
GENCE PROGRAMS. SO MUCH FOR THE MACHINERY OF COOR-
DINATION.
THE SECOND FOOTNOTE CONCERNS STATUTORY THEORY
AND PRACTICE. THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
PLACES THE CIA DIRECTLY UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. THE NATIONAL SECU-
RITY COUNCIL WAS CREATED BY STATUTE: IT IS LISTED
IN THE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION MANUALS: AND A SUC-
CESSION OF STATUTES HAS SPECIFIED ITS MEMBERSHIP.
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ATTENDS AS AN
OBSERVER AND ADVISOR, NOT AS A MEMBER.
THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS THAT SUCCESSIVE PRES-
IDENTS HAVE DIFFERED IN THEIR USE OF THE NSC--DIF-
FERED FROM EACH OTHER, AND EVEN CHANGED CONCEPTS
WITHIN A PRESIDENTIAL TERM.
LEST ANYONE SHOULD ARGUE THAT THE CIA IS THERE-
FORE CONTROLLED ONLY BY A SOMETIMES INACTIVE OR DOR-
MANT BODY. LET ME STATE THAT WHETHER THE STATUTORY
NSC WAS MEETING DAILY, WEEKLY, OR INFREQUENTLY,
UNDER ANY GIVEN ADMINISTRATION, EACH PRESIDENT HAS
HAD CONTINUING MACHINERY WITHIN HIS CABINET OR HIS
WHITE HOUSE STAFF TO DEAL WITH NSC QUESTIONS, AND
THESE QUESTIONS HAVE INCLUDED CONTINUING CONTROL
OVER THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
WITH THESE TWO FOOTNOTES, LET US LOOK AT THE
ORGANIZATIONS AND FUNCTIONS OF CIA ITSELF.
THE PRIMARY FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY CIA FALL
INTO THREE BROAD CATEGORIES:
COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE:
PRODUCTION OF FINISHED INTELLIGENCE; AND
COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS.
WE FIND IT CONVENIENT TO DIVIDE CIA's INTELLI-
GENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES INTO THREE GROUPINGS
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THAT REFLECT DIFFERENT MEANS OF ACQUISITION. THE
FIRST IS OVERT COLLECTION WHICH, AS THE NAME SUG-
GESTS, COVERS INFORMATION SECURED BY OPEN OR NON-
CLANDESTINE MEANS. OVERT COLLECTION INCLUDES THE
MONITORING OF FOREIGN RADIOS, SUCH AS RADIO MOSCOW,
RADIO PEKING, AND THE VOICE OF THE ARABS IN CAIRO.
THIS IS DONE BY THE FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION
SERVICE.
STILL ANOTHER TYPE OF OVERT COLLECTION CONSISTS
OF THE PROCUREMENT, THROUGH OPEN CHANNELS, OF FOREIGN
PUBLICATIONS, INCLUDING NEWSPAPERS, BOOKS, SCHOLARLY
JOURNALS, MAPS AND UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS.
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THE NEXT PRIMARY MISSION OF CIA IS TO PRODUCE
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND TO PROVIDE FOR ITS DISSEM-
INATION.
THIS INCLUDES BOTH INTELLIGENCE ANALYSES PREPARED
SOLELY WITHIN CIA AND OTHERS PRODUCED WITH THE ASSIST-
ANCE OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE EmMATES., WHICH I MENTIONED
EARLIER, ARE OF THE LATTER TYPE.
ANOTHER CATEGORY OF FINISHED INTELLIGENCE IS
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE, SOME OF WHICH IS PRODUCED IN
CONSULTATION WITH DIA AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH. As WITH THE HIES,
THIS COMBINED PRODUCT WE CALL "NATIONAL" INTELLIGENCE.
MOST OF YOU ARE PROBABLY FAMILIAR WITH CURRENT INTELLI-
GENCE. IT IS DESIGNED TO ENSURE THAT THE DECISION
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MAKER IS WELL INFORMED ON THE BASIS OF THE LATEST
AVAILABLE INFORMATION FROM ALL SOURCES, ON SIGNIFI-
CANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS WHICH MAY AFFECT THE INTER-
ESTS OF THE UNITED STATES. IT IS ALSO DESIGNED TO
ALERT THE POLICY-MAKER TO AN INCIPIENT CRISIS. CIA
MAINTAINS AN OPERATIONS CENTER WHICH IS MANNED AROUND
THE CLOCK SEVEN DAYS A WEEK. THIS MAKES IT POSSIBLE
TO ALERT OUR PEOPLE TO PRODUCE SPOT CURRENT INTELLI-
GENCE OR TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION ON A 24-HOUR BASIS
IN CRITICAL SITUATIONS. THE OPERATIONS CENTER IS ALSO
CONNECTED BY RAPID AND SECURE COMMUNICATIONS TO THE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER AND THE NATIONAL IN-
DICATIONS CENTER IN THE PENTAGON, THE STATE DEPART-
MENT OPERATIONS CENTER AND THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION
Room,
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE HAS OFTEN BEEN COMPARED
TO A NEWSPAPER. I BELIEVE THERE IS ONE SIGNIFICANT
DIFFERENCE. CIA's CURRENT INTELLIGENCE IS PRODUCED
BY A GROUP OF ANALYSTS WHO ARE EXPERTS IN THEIR
FIELDS AND WHO HAVE ALL SOURCES OF INFORMATION OPEN
TO THEM, INCLUDING EXPERTS IN SPECIALIZED DISCIPLINES
SUCH AS ECONOMICS, FOREIGN TRADE, OR TECHNICAL WEAP-
ONS DEVELOPMENTS. CIA's CURRENT INTELLIGENCE IS
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DISSEMINATED IN DAILY AND WEEKLY PUBLICATIONS, SPE-
CIAL MEMORANDA, AND SITUATION REPORTS ON CRISIS
TOPICS, SPECIAL ALL-SOURCE PUBLICATIONS ARE PRE-
PARED FOR THE PRESIDENT AND HIS SENIOR POLICY-MAKING
ADVISORS,
ANOTHER TYPE OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION COM-
PRISES THE RESEARCH STUDY. THESE STUDIES COVER A
WIDE VARIETY OF TOPICS--FOR EXAMPLE, AN ANALYSIS OF
THE VARIOUS SECTORS OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY, THE OIL
INDUSTRY IN IRAN, OR THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE STUDIES ARE OFTEN PRODUCED IN RESPONSE
TO SPECIFIC REQUESTS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE, THE SEC-
RETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE, OR THEIR SENIOR OFFI-
CERS.
FINALLY, OUR PRODUCTION INCLUDES WHAT WE CALL
BASIC INTELLIGENCE. THIS IS A DURABLE TYPE OF BREAD-
AND-BUTTER FACT YOU FIND IN THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
SURVEY--THE RAILROAD SYSTEM. THE CAPACITY OF THE PORTS.
THE POLICE MACHINERY, THE MILITARY FORCES OF A PAR-
TICULAR COUNTRY. AS THE NAME IMPLIES, THE NIS IS
THE RESULT OF A WIDE COLLABORATION OF DIFFERENT PARTS
OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
YOU WILL RECALL THAT THE FIFTH FUNCTION ASSIGNED
TO CIA WAS TO PERFORM SUCH OTHER SERVICES AS THE
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MAY DIRECT. THIS IS OUR
CHARTER FOR COVERT ACTIONS, THE THIRD GENERAL CATE-
GORY OF CIA ACTIVITIES.
IN PURSUING ITS INTERESTS IN THE REAL WORLD
THE UNITED STATES IS AT TIMES CONFRONTED BY FOREIGN
ADVERSARIES ADEPT AT CONSPIRACY AND SUBVERSION, WITH
WORLD-WIDE CLANDESTINE ASSETS, SKILLED AGENTS, AND NO
COMPUNCTION ABOUT UNDERMINING INTERESTS THAT THE U.S.
POLICY-MAKERS MAY WISH TO PROTECT.
THERE ARE APT TO BE OCCASIONS WHEN IT IS IM-
PORTANT FOR THE UNITED STATES, IN ORDER TO COUNTER
THESE COMMUNIST EFFORTS, TO HAVE ITS OWN CAPABILITY
TO RESPOND BY COVERT OR CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.
THIS IS THE CATEGORY OF GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
THAT CONGRESS HAD IN MIND WHEN IT DIRECTED CIA TO
PERFORM "SUCH OTHER SERVICES" AS THE NATIONAL SECU-
RITY COUNCIL MIGHT DIRECT.
OUR CRITICS WOULD HAVE YOU BELIEVE THAT EVER
SINCE CONGRESS GAVE THIS AUTHORITY IN 1947, CIA HAS
DONE AS IT PLEASED, WITHOUT REGARD TO OFFICIAL POL-
ICIES OR OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,
AND SOMETIMES IN DIAMETRIC OPPOSITION TO THOSE POLI-
CIES.
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WHENEVER THE CIA CARRIES OUT A COVERT OPERATION
OVERSEAS, IT IS WITH THE PRIOR APPROVAL OF A SPECIAL
COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.
EACH COVERT OPERATION WHICH THE AGENCY PROPOSES
TO CONDUCT OVERSEAS, WHETHER IT IS POLITICAL, PSYCHO-
LOGICAL, ECONOMIC, OR PARAMILITARY, IS PRESENTED TO
THIS COMMITTEE. IT EITHER WINS THE APPROVAL OF THE
COMMITTEE, OR IT DOES NOT TAKE PLACE.
WHEN COVERT OPERATIONS ARE APPROVED IN ADVANCE
BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY
OF STATE, AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, IT IS OB-
VIOUS'THAT THESE OPERATIONS ARE NOT GOING TO BE
CONTRARY TO--OR OUTSIDE OF--THE GUIDELINES ESTAB-
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OUR UNDERTAKINGS MUST ALSO HAVE THE APPROVAL
OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET. CERTAIN
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OFFICIALS OF THAT OFFICE HAVE BEEN GIVEN FULL CLEAR-
ANCE TO INQUIRE INTO ALL OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN DETAIL--AND BELIEVE
ME, THEY MAKE FULL USE OF THAT AUTHORITY.
IN ADDITION TO SUCH PRIOR APPROVALS, THERE ARE
OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH WHICH HAVE
THE SAME FULL CLEARANCE TO MONITOR OUR CONTINUING
OPERATIONS, AND CONDUCT POST-MORTEMS ON THOSE WHICH
HAVE BEEN COMPLETED.
SOME OF THESE HAVE BEEN AQ HOC GROUPS APPOINTED
BY PAST PRESIDENTS--SUCH AS THE CLARK COMMITTEE, THE
DOOLITTLE COMMITTEE, AND THE HOOVER COMMISSION TASK
FORCES.
ON A PERMANENT BASIS, ALL OF THE INTELLIGENCE
OPERATIONS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ARE UNDER THE
CONTINUING SCRUTINY OF THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN IN-
TELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD. THIS BOARD WAS FORMED
IN JANUARY 1956, UNDER DR. JAMES KILLIAN OF M.I.T.
IT IS NOW HEADED BY RETIRED ADMIRAL GEORGE W.
ANDERSON. IT IS A VERY KNOWLEDGEABLE ASSEMBLAGE OF
DISTINGUISHED PRIVATE CITIZENS, APPOINTED BY AND
REPORTING TO THE PRESIDENT. IT MEETS FOR A COUPLE
OF DAYS EVERY TWO MONTHS TO EXAMINE--IN DEPTH AND
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IN DETAIL--THE WORK, THE PROGRESS, AND THE PROBLEMS
OF THE ENTIRE U.S. INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM. BETWEEN
REGULAR MEETINGS, SUBCOMMITTEES CARRY ON CONTINUING
INVESTIGATIONS OF OUR SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN
INTELLIGENCE.
OVER THE YEARS, THE BOARD MEMBERSHIP HAS NOR-
MALLY BEEN A MIXTURE OF RETIRED SENIOR OFFICERS FROM
BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN BRANCHES OF THE GOVERNMENT,
FIGURES FROM THE ACADEMIC WORLD, AND PROMINENT LEAD-
ERS IN BUSINESS AND TECHNOLOGY.
THE PRESENT BOARD INCLUDES GOVERNOR NELSON
ROCKEFELLER; AMBASSADOR ROBERT MURPHY, THE FORMER
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE; MR. FRANK PACE, JR., FORMER
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY AND DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET;
MR. GORDON Y WHO WAS PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S SPE-
CIAL ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS; DR.
WILLIAM 0. BAKER OF BELL TELEPHONE LABORATORIES;
DR. EDWIN LAND, HEAD OF POLAROID; DR. FRANKLIN D.
MURPHY, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF THE Los ANGELES
TIMES-MIRROR; AND MR. FRANKLIN B. NC , JR., OF
PRESIDENT NIXON'S LAW FIRM OF MUDGE, ROSE, GUTHRIE
& ALEXANDER; AND DR. EDWARD TELLER, NUCLEAR PHYSICIST.
WE ARE NOT ONLY UNDER EFFECTIVE CONTROL BY THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH, WE ARE ALSO UNDER THE CONTINUING
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SCRUTINY OF THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH.
EVER SINCE CIA WAS FIRST ESTABLISHED, THE DI-
RECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED
BY THE PRESIDENT, AND IN FACT INSTRUCTED, TO MAKE
COMPLETE DISCLOSURE OF CIA ACTIVITIES TO SPECIAL
SUBCOMMITTEES IN BOTH THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES.
THE CONGRESS HAS CREATED SUBCOMMITTEES OF THE
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES IN BOTH THE HOUSE AND
SENATE TO HEAR THESE REPORTS.
ALSO, AS YOU MAY HAVE SURMISED FROM MY REFER-
ENCES TO THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, OUR
OPERATIONS REQUIRE MONEY. OUR HEADQUARTERS ARE IN
LANGLEY, ""IRGINIA, NOT AT FORT KNOX, AND OUR AP-
PROPRIATIONS REQUESTS ARE DISCUSSED IN FULL WITH
SPEC.IAL SUBCOMMITTEES OF SENATE AND HOUSE APPRO-
PRIATIONS,
SOME OF THE CONFUSION OVER CIA'S RELATIONS
WITH CONGRESS ARISES FROM THE FACT THAT THESE FOUR
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEES, AND ONLY THESE--ABOUT 30
LEGISLATORS IN ALL--HAVE BEEN CLEARED BY THE PRESI-
DENT TO INQUIRE IN DETAIL INTO OUR ACTIVITIES AND
OPERATIONS.
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WE WILL, OF COURSE, BRIEF ANY CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEE HAVING A JURISDICTIONAL INTEREST IN OUR
SUBSTANTIVE INTELLIGENCE FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD.
IN THE COURSE OF A YEAR, THERE MAY BE 20 OR 30 SUCH
COMMITTEE HEARINGS--AND SOME OF THEM RUN AS LONG AS
THREE FULL DAYS. WE ALSO BRIEF INDIVIDUAL CONGRESS-
MEN FREQUENTLY AT THEIR REQUEST.
BUT DISCUSSION OF CIA ACTIVITIES, METHODS, AND
SOURCES IS ANOTHER MATTER. IT INVOLVES THE LIVES OF
PEOPLE WHO WORK WITH US, AND THE EFFICACY OF OUR
METHODS. THESE MATTERS ARE DISCUSSED ONLY WITH THE
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEES DESIGNATED FOR THESE PURPOSES.
THIS IS NOT ARBITRARY OR BUREAUCRATIC: IT IS SIMPLY
RECOGNITION THAT THE RISK OF INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE
RISES WITH THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO HAVE ACCESS TO
SENSITIVE INFORMATION OF THIS TYPE.
WHERE DISCLOSURE IS AUTHORIZED, IT IS COMPLETE.
WITH THE SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEES, WE DISCUSS COVERT
OPERATIONAL MATTERS AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE ASPECTS
WHICH ARE SO SENSITIVE THAT EVEN WITHIN CIA ONLY A
SMALL PERCENTAGE OF OUR PERSONNEL ARE AUTHORIZED
TO BE INFORMED.
I AM HAPPY TO SAY THAT THE MEMBERS OF THESE
SUBCOMMITTEES, OVER THE YEARS, HAVE ESTABLISHED AN
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