THE INTELLIGENCE ROLE IN POLICY FORMULATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01066A001400320001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 25, 1968
• Content Type: SPEECH

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25 SEPTEMBER 1968
THE INTELLIGENCE ROLE IN POLICY FORMULATION
GENERAL BREITWEISER, AND GENTLEMEN:
ANY CHILD CAN TELL YOU THAT IF YOU TALK ABOUT
THE WISH YOU MA'K-E WHEN YOU BLOW OUT THE CANDLES
IT WON'T COME TRUE. A BIT LATER IN LIFE, WE LEARN
z7
THAT ANY MENTION OF THE FACT THAT A PITCHER IS WORKING
ON A NO-HIT GAME IS LIKELY TO RUIN HIS CHANCES.
THOSE ARE SUPERSTITIONS, BUT IT HAPPENS TO BE---=
A FACT THAT AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE TENDS TO LOSE
SOME OF ITS SECURITY EVERY TIME IT IS TALKED ABOUT.
IN PUBLIC, AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE SIMPLY DOES NOT
CROW ABOUT ITS SUCCESSES, ALIBI ITS FAILURES, RESPOND
TO CRITICISM, OR DISCUSS ITS BUSINESS TO SATISFY PUB-
LIC CURIOSITY.
SENATOR SALTONSTALL, WHO KNOWS A GREAT DEAL ABOUT
U.S. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, ONCE EXPLAINED TO HIS
CONSTITUENTS THAT IN AN OPEN SOCIETY LIKE OURS, IT
IS IMPOSSIBLE TO INFORM THE PUBLIC WITHOUT INFORMING
OUR ENEMIES, WHO MAKE IT A PRACTICE TO READ OUR
NEWSPAPERS VERY CAREFULLY.
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THAT IS WHY WE WELCOME OPPORTUNITIES LIKE THIS
TO SPEAK IN PRIVATE, PARTICULARLY ON THE RELATION-
SHIP BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY FORMULATION.
OUR CRITICS ARE NEITHER RESTRICTED BY SE-
CURITY REGULATIONS, NOR RESTRAINED BY THE PROSPECT
THAT WE WILL REFUTE THEM WITH FACTS, AS A RESULT,
THEY HAVE PUT FORTH SOME WEIRD AND MISCHIEVOUS VER-
SIONS OF THE ROLE AND THE NATURE OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES, AS FAR AS OUR PUBLIC IMAGE IS CONCERNED,
THIS IS UNFORTUNATE, BUT IT IS NOT FATAL AND WE JUST
HAVE TO LIVE WITH IT, WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT, HOW-
EVER, IT IS VITAL THAT WE ALL HAVE A CLEAR AND COM-
PREHENSIVE UNDERSTANDING OF THE EXACT RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND THE REST OF THE GOVERNMENTAL
APPARATUS--SPECIFICALLY, HOW INTELLIGENCE SUPPORTS
THE POLICY-MAKER, AND HOW THE POLICY MAKER CONTROLS
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES,
THE FACT THAT YOU ARE HERE, ATTENDING THESE
COURSES, IDENTIFIES YOU AS MEN WHO ARE GOING TO BE
DOING A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF JOINT STAFF AND JOINT
COMMITTEE WORK IN YOUR FUTURE CAREER ASSIGNMENTS.
A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF THAT WORK IS GOING TO INVOLVE
SPECIAL TASK FORCES AND INTER-AGENCY COMMITTEES, WHERE
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YOU WILL BE WORKING WITH--POSSIBLY FOR--THE INTELLI-
GENCE COMMUNITY.
ACCORDINGLY, I THINK IT WILL BE HELPFUL TO YOU,
TO YOUR SERVICES, AND TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
ITSELF, FOR YOU TO BE FAMILIAR WITH THE CONCEPT, THE
ORGANIZATION, AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE VARIOUS ELE-
MENTS IN OUR GOVERNMENT WHICH WORK TOGETHER TO PRO-
DUCE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
FIRST, I AM GOING TO DISCUSS WHAT WE CALL THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. WITH ALL THE ATTENTION THAT
INTELLIGENCE HAS BEEN RECEIVING FROM THE INFORMATION
MEDIA, IT IS SURPRISING THAT THERE IS STILL A GOOD
DEAL OF CONFUSION ABOUT THE PRECISE MEANING OF THE
PHRASE, "INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY,"
THIS IS SIMPLY A HANDY WAY OF REFERRING TO ALL
ELEMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT WHICH ARE CONCERNED WITH
OBTAINING, ANALYZING, AND DISSEMINATING FOREIGN IN-
TELLIGENCE, IT IS A FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH THEY
CAN WORK TOGETHER,
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 DID NOT. CREATE
THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE U.S, GOVERNMENT,
WE HAD INTELLIGENCE AGENTS--AND GOOD ONES, TOO--IN
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR. BEFORE CIA WAS ESTABLISHED,
OUR GOVERNMENT WAS OBTAINING INTELLIGENCE FROM THE
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ARMY AND THE NAVY, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AND THE
FBI, AND THESE SAME ORGANIZATIONS ARE TI L PROVIDING
IT.
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 WAS WRITTEN
AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF PEARL HARBOR. ALL INVESTIGA-
TIONS OF THAT BLACK DAY SHOWED THAT THE INTELLIGENCE
WAS THERE. IT HAD BEEN GATHERED. BUT THE FAILURE
WAS THAT ALL OF THE BITS AND PIECES IN THE HANDS OF
VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT HAD NOT BEEN BROUGHT
TOGETHER IN ONE PLACE--THE SIGNIFICANT SIFTED OUT
FROM THE INSIGNIFICANT--AND A UNIFIED, COORDINATED
WARNING, PROVIDED IN TIME TO THE PEOPLE WHO COULD ACT
ON IT.
THE OBVIOUS REMEDY WAS TO INSURE THAT OUR IN-
TELLIGENCE AGENCIES WORK TOGETHER, EXCHANGE AND COM-
PARE INFORMATION, AND PROVIDE THE DECISION-MAKERS
WITH THE BEST COMBINED, ,AGR-U INTELLIGENCE THAT IS
AVAILABLE. IN A NUTSHELL, THIS IS THE CONCEPT OF
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. THE NATIONAL SECURITY
ACT OF 1947 CREATED THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FOR THIS PURPOSE: TO ENSURE THAT ALL OF THE INTELLI-
GENCE IN GOVERNMENT HANDS WOULD BE ASSEMBLED,
EVALUATED, AND DISSEMINATED AS FINISHED INTELLIGENCE
TO THOSE WHO NEED TO HAVE IT.
THERE ARE AT LEAST TWO DEFINITIONS OF "NATIONAL"
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INTELLIGENCE. YOU MAY BE MORE FAMILIAR WITH THE DIS-
TINCTION BETWEEN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE--INFORMATION
OF INTEREST TO THE ENTIRE GOVERNMENT--AND DEPARTMENTAL
INTELLIGENCE, WHICH SERVES THE NEEDS OR FALLS WITHIN
THE COMPETENCE OF ONE PARTICULAR SERVICE DEPARTMENT
OR AGENCY. FOR THE PURPOSES OF MY DISCUSSION, HOWEVER,
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE IS "ALL INTELLIGENCE WHICH IS
REQUIRED FOR THE FORMULATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY....AND WHICH TRANSCENDS THE EXCLUSIVE COMPETENCE
OF ANY OJE.DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY." PUT MORE SIMPLY,
IT IS THE INFORMATION WHICH NATIONAL LEADERS NEED
TO MAKE STRATEGIC POLICY.
IT FOLLOWS THAT FINISHED NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE,
AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, MUST PROVIDE THE PRESIDENT AND
HIS ADVISORS WITH THE GIST OF ALL INFORMATION AVAIL-
BLE FROM ANY SOURCE AND SERVICE, AND AN AGREED EVALUA-
TIONOF THAT INTELLIGENCE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE. THIS
IS WHY IT IS SO IMPORTANT TO TALK IN TERMS OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, AND NOT THE CENTRAL INTELLI-
GENCE AGENCY ALONE.
IF THE SERVICES, AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT, AND
CIA, AND THE FBI ARE ALL ENGAGED IN GATHERING IN-
FORMATION, ANY GOOD BUREAUCRAT CAN TELL YOU THAT
THERE ARE TWO GREAT DANGERS:
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THE FIRST AND THE GREATEST DANGER IS THAT SOME
VITAL ASSIGNMENT WILL FALL BETWEEN THE STOOLS--THAT
EACH AGENCY WILL THINK SOMEBODY ELSE HAS THE
RESPONSIBILITY.
THE OTHER DANGER IS DUPLICATION OF EFFORT--AND
THIS IS NOT MERELY A QUESTION OF EXTRAVAGANCE. IN
INTELLIGENCE, UNCOORDINATED EFFORTS IN THE SAME FIELD
CAN LEAD TO DISASTERS.
To COPE WITH BOTH THESE PITFALLS--TO ENSURE
ENOUGH COORDINATION SO THAT THERE WILL BE NO IMPORTANT
GAPS Al NO UNDESIRABLE DUPLICATION--THE NATIONAL
SECURITY ACT OF 1947 AND SUBSEQUENT PRESIDENTIAL
INSTRUCTIONS GAVE THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLI-
GENCE TWO RESPONSIBILITIES. HE IS BY LAW THE HEAD
OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. WHICH HAS THE
STATUTORY FUNCTION OF PRODUCING COORDINATED NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE. HE IS ALSO. BY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE.
THE PRINCIPAL OR SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICER OF THE
GOVERNMENT. HE GUIDES AND COORDINATES ALL INTEL-
LIGENCE ACTIVITIES--ANYWHERE IN THE GOVERNMENT--RE-
LATING TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE
UNITED STATES. AND HE ACTS AS PRINCIPAL INTELLIGENCE
ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT,
LET'S TAKE A LOOK AT THE COMPOSITION OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY,
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THE FIRST ELEMENT MOST PEOPLE THINK OF IN THIS
CONTEXT, OF COURSE, IS THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
SECOND, THERE IS THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
WHICH REPORTS TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, AND THROUGH
THE JOINT CHIEFS, TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. THE
DIA IS RESPONSIBLE FOR INTELLIGENCE ESSENTIAL TO THE
DISCHARGE OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE, THE JOINT CHIEFS, THE UNIFIED AND SERVICE
COMMANDS, AND THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS.
THE INTELLIGENCE UNITS OF THE ARMY, NAVY, AND
AIR FORCE CONTINUE TO SERVE THE PARTICULAR MISSIONS
OF EACH ONE OF THE SERVICES. WITHIN THE DOD, THE
THREE SERVICES COMPONENTS ARE CLOSELY COORDINATED BY
THE DIRECTOR OF DIA.
AN INTELLIGENCE COMPONENT IN THE STATE DEPART-
MENT SERVES THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE POLICY
PLANNERS. ALL OF OUR DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL ARE IN-
TELLIGENCE GATHERERS IN A SENSE. IN ADDITION, HOW-
EVER, THERE IS ALSO A REQUIREMENT FOR MEN WHO APPLY
THEMSELVES PROFESSIONALLY TO THE ANALYSIS OF THAT
INFORMATION, AND ITS BEARING ON PRESENT AND FUTURE
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY.
THERE IS AN INTELLIGENCE COMPONENT IN THE ATOMIC
ENERGY COMMISSION, WITH A SPECIALIZED CHARTER DEVOTED
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TO THE VITAL FIELD OF INTELLIGENCE ON NUCLEAR ENERGY.
DEVELOPMENTS.
THE PRIMARY FUNCTIONS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION ARE CONCERNED WITH INTERNAL SECURITY,
BUT YOU CAN EASILY IMAGINE THE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY, SO THE
FBI, TOO, IS A MEMBER OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
THE FBI AND THE CIA WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER, BECAUSE
THEY ARE BOTH COMBATTING AN OPPONENT WHOSE OPERATIONS
AND AGENTS MOVE BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN THE U.S. AND
FOREIGN COUNTRIES.
THOSE, THEN, EXCEPT FOR THE NSA WHICH IS IN A
UNIQUE CATEGORY, ARE THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY--CIA, STATE, DIA AND THE
SERVICE COMPONENTS, AEC, AND FBI,
ROUNDING OUT THE PICTURE OF THE COMMUNITY, THERE
ARE A NUMBER OF NATIONAL NTELLIGENCE ASSETS--ACTIVITIES
WHICH DO NOT SERVE ANY PARTICULAR DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY,
BUT SERVE THE ENTIRE GOVERNMENT. ONE AGENCY MAY MAN-
AGE THEM, AND EVEN PROVIDE MOST OF THE PERSONNEL AND
EQUIPMENT, BUT THEY ACTUALLY OPERATE DIRECTLY FOR THE
ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
THE LARGEST OF THESE IS THE NATIONAL SECURITY
AGENCY, WHICH IS ALSO A MEMBER OF THE INTELLIGENCE
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NOW1 THESE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND ORGANIZA-
TIONS I HAVE JUST ENUMERATED ARE TIED TOGETHER, FOR
GUIDANCE PURPOSES, BY THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE
BOARD, WHICH WE OFTEN REFER TO AS USIB.
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, BY
PRESIDENTIAL DESIGNATION, IS THE CHAIRMAN OF USIB--
AND THIS, BY THE WAY, IS ONE PLACE WHERE THE DIRECTOR'S
TWO JOBS--OR HIS "TWO HATS'--ARE VERY CAREFULLY DIF-
FERENTIATED, WHEN HE CHAIRS THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE
BOARD, HE IS THERE AS THE PRESIDENT'S PRINCIPAL IN-
TELLIGENCE OFFICER, NOT AS THE HEAD OF CIA. USIB
ACTS ON AND APPROVES THE AGREED, COORDINATED JUDGMENTS
OF THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, AND IT WOULD
NOT BE PROPER OR EFFECTIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR SIMULTANE-
OUSLY TO CHAIR THE MEETING AND TO PRESENT THE VIEWS
OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, FOR THIS REASON,
CIA HAS SEPARATE REPRESENTATION ON THE BOARD IN THE
PERSON OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE OTHER PRINCIPALS ARE:
THE STATE DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH:
THE DIRECTOR OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY;
THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY;
THE ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER OF THE AEC; AND
THE ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE FBI
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SINCE THE CONSOLIDATION OF INTELLIGENCE UNDER
DIA IN THE PENTAGON, THE INTELLIGENCE CHIEFS OF THE
ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE ATTEND AND PARTICIPATE,
BUT AS OBSERVERS RATHER THAN AS OFFICIAL MEMBERS OF
USIB. THEY RETAIN THE RIGHT, AND IN FACT THE DUTY,
TO EXPRESS ANY DISSENT THEY MAY HAVE ON MATTERS UNDER
DISCUSSION. IF YOU HAVE SEEN THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATES, WITH THEIR FOOTNOTES, YOU KNOW THAT THIS
IS A RIGHT THEY DO NOT HESITATE TO EXERCISE.
USIB MEETS REGULARLY ONCE A'WEEK--SOMETIMES
MORE OFTEN. USIB IS CONCERNED WITH A WIDE VARIETY
OF MATTERS, BUT I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT TO EMPHASIZE
THAT USIB OPERATES AS AN ADVISORY BODY TO THE DIRECTOR
OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
USIB HAS THREE PRINCIPAL FUNCTIONS.
FIRST, THE USIB ESTABLISHES--AND PERIODICALLY
REVIEWS--THE NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR THE GUIDANCE OF
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN CHOOSING INTELLIGENCE
TARGETS AND IN RECOMMENDING ASSIGNMENT OF ASSETS TO
COVER THOSE TARGETS.
SECOND, THE USIB CONTINUOUSLY REVIEWS OUR FOR-
EIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES TO DETERMINE WHETHER
THEY ARE IN ACCORD WITH THOSE PRIORITIES, AND TO
MAKE SURE THAT WE ARE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO
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CLOSE IMPORTANT GAPS, AND TO AVOID UNNECESSARY DUP-
LICATION, PLEASE NOTE THAT I HAVE MODIFIED THE
WORD "DUPLICATION? EACH TIME I HAVE USED IT. WHEN
WE ARE TRYING TO GET HOLD OF THE OTHER FELLOW S
SECRETS IN THE INTERESTS OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY,
A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF DUPLICATION IS NOT ONLY DESIRABLE,
BUT EVEN MANDATORY FOR THE SAKE OF CONFIRMATION.
THIRD, THE USIB REVIEWS IN DRAFT FORM AND IN
GREAT DETAIL THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES WHICH
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SUBMITS TO THE
PRESIDENT,
THE ACTUAL WORK OF DRAFTING AND RE-WORKING THESE
PAPERS IS GENERALLY DONE IN THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL
ESTIMATES, WHICH IS A PART OF CIA, BUT THE FINAL
PRODUCT IS A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE, AND
MUST, THEREFORE, REFLECT THE CONSIDERED JUDGMENT OF
THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, THIS IS ENSURED
THROUGH THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL APPROPRIATE ELEMENTS
OF THE COMMUNITY, THROUGH THE CONTRIBUTION OF FACTS
AND JUDGMENTS, IN THE REVISING OF THE PAPERS IN DRAFT,
AND BY THE USIB REVIEW OF THE FINAL PRODUCT. THE
OBJECTIVE OF EACH ESTIMATE IS A CAREFUL AND THOUGHT-
FUL SET OF JUDGMENTS WHICH WILL BE OF THE GREATEST
POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE TO THE POLICY MAKER.
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I WANT TO STRESS THAT THE MEN ENGAGED IN ARRIVING
AT AN ESTIMATE ARE NOT STRIVING FOR UNANIMITY PER
.. IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE UNANIMITY BY
OVERRIDING THE DISSENTING MINORITY, OR BY WATERING
DOWN THE ESTIMATE TO THE LEAST COMMON DENOMINATOR--
A NARROW AREA OF COMPLETE AGREEMENT BY THE ENTIRE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. SUCH UNANIMITY, HOWEVER,
WOULD BE A DISSERVICE TO THE POLICY MAKER AND THE
PLANNER.
WHAT .L$ ASKED IS THAT THE DISSENTS SHALL BE
BASED ON HONEST DIFFERENCES OF OPINION OVER HOW THE
AVAILABLE FACTS ARE TO BE EVALUATED AND INTERPRETED?
NOT ON PERSONAL CONVICTIONS, HUNCHES, OR PAROCHIAL
INTERESTS. WITHIN THIS FRAME OF REFERENCE, IT IS
POLICY TO ENCOURAGE WELL-FOUNDED DISSENTS.
THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES, WHICH I REFERRED
TO A BIT EARLIER, DESERVES SPECIAL MENTION. UNTIL
THE BRITISH RECENTLY MOVED TO SET UP A SIMILAR GROUP,
THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES WAS THE ONLY INSTITU-
TION OF ITS KIND IN ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THE
WORLD. AS ESTABLISHED BY GENERAL BEDELL SMITH WHEN HE
WAS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IN 1950, IT IS.
A BODY OF SENIOR, KNOWLEDGEABLE MEN OF VARIED EXPER-
IENCE, WHO HAVE NO OTHER DUTY THAN TO STUDY AND SEEK
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ANSWERS TO THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF NATIONAL
SECURITY. THE BOARD IS COMPOSED OF ABOUT FIFTEEN
MEN WITH EXTENSIVE BACKGROUNDS IN THE MILITARY,
DIPLOMATIC, LEGAL, ACADEMIC, AND INTELLIGENCE PRO-
FESSIONS. THEIR SOLE FUNCTION IS TO HEAR AND CON-
SIDER EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT FROM THE ENTIRE INTELLI-
GENCE COMMUNITY. THESE JUDGMENTS ARE THEN PRESENTED
TO THE DIRECTOR AND TO USIB, AND NORMALLY HAVE GREAT
WEIGHT IN THE ESTIMATES THE DIRECTOR SUBMITS TO THE
PRESIDENT AND HIS ADVISORS ON MATTERS OF CRITICAL
IMPORTANCE TO NATIONAL SECURITY.
A WORD ABOUT THE NATIONAL ESTIMATES THEMSELVES.
MORE THAN 1,000 ESTIMATES HAVE BEEN PREPARED IN THE
LAST 18 YEARS. THEY INCLUDE THE STANDARD PAPERS ON
SUCH TOPICS AS, "THE OUTLOOK ON COUNTRY A, OR AREA
B," WHICH LOOK AHEAD TWO OR THREE YEARS, AND DEAL
WITH BROAD TRENDS AND EXPECTED LINES OF POLICY BY
THE COUNTRY OR IN THE AREA IN QUESTION.
THERE ARE THE MORE SPECIALIZED ESTIMATES ON
THE SOVIET MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. THESE PAPERS
ARE BUILT ON A SOLID BASE OF HARD EVIDENCE; THEY
GO INTO GREATER DETAIL AND LOOK FURTHER AHEAD--
USUALLY FIVE YEARS. THEY FOCUS ON SUCH SUBJECTS
AS THE SOVIET STRATEGIC ATTACK FORCES, OR THE GEN-
ERAL PURPOSE FORCES. THE PRODUCTION OF THESE PAPERS
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IS TIMED TO ASSIST PLANNING OF DEFENSE FORCE LEVELS
AND BUDGETS.
A THIRD TYPE, THE SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATE, SNIE, INCLUDES ADI HOC PAPERS ON IMPORTANT
QUESTIONS OF THE MOMENT, SUCH AS THE EXPECTED RE-
ACTION TO SOME PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION BY THE U.S.
THEREFORE, THE SNIE's MAY GET INTO SOME PRETTY
SENSITIVE AREAS.
THERE IS A RELATED SERIES OF PAPERS, CALLED NA-
TJ N L. INTELLrGENC ANNING PROJECTIONS. WHICH ARE
NOT VERY WELL KNOWN. THESE PROJECTIONS ARE WRITTEN
BY CIA WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF DIA FOR THE USE OF THE
LONG-RANGE PLANNERS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.
IN THESE PROJECTIONS, HARD FIGURES ARE SET DOWN ON
JUST HOW MANY POLARIS-TYPE SUBMARINES, OR ANTI-BALLISTIC
MISSILE SITES, OR A CERTAIN TYPE OF BALLISTIC MISSILE,
THE SOVIET UNION COULD HAVE UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS
IN1 SAY, OCTOBER 1976 OR JUNE 1978. PROJECTIONS THIS
FAR INTO THE FUTURE LEAVE THE CURRENT BASE OF EVIDENCE
QUITE FAR BEHIND AND ARE, IN EFFECT, A SETTING FORTH
OF DETAILED PLANS FOR THE SOVIET DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT
SEVERAL YEARS BEFORE THE RESPONSIBLE RUSSIANS HAVE TO
FORMULATE SUCH PLANS. I MIGHT ADD THAT THESE PRO-
JECTIONS HAVE BEEN WELL RECEIVED.
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OTHER ACTIVITIES OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD
ARE CARRIED ON BY COMMITTEES WITH SPECIALIZED FUNCTIONS.
SOME OF THEM ARE REGULAR STANDING COMMITTEES, SUCH AS
THE JOINT ATOMIC ENERGY INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE, WHICH
FOLLOWS NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION5
FRANCE, COMMUNIST CHINA, AND OTHER COUNTRIES WITH
THE POTENTIAL OF BECOMING NUCLEAR POWERS. A SIMILAR
COMMITTEE, THE GUIDED MISSILE AND ASTRONAUTICS
INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE, CONCENTRATES ON SOVIET SPACE
AND MISSILE ACTIVITY.
THEN THERE ARE A NUMBER OF HOC COMMITTEES TO
DEAL WITH SPECIFIC CRISES OR RECURRENT HEADACHES--A
BERLIN COMMITTEE, AN ARAB-ISRAELI COMMITTEE, A TAIWAN
STRAIT COMMITTEE, TO GIVE YOU SOME EXAMPLES OUT OF
THE PAST.
THE WATCH COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED STATES INTEL-
LIGENCE BOARD CONCENTRATES ON THE HIGHLY SPECIALIZED
FIELD THAT WE CALL INDICATIONS INTELLIGENCE. ITHE
NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER, LOCATED IN THE PENTAGON,
IS STAFFED JOINTLY BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. IT
KEEPS TRACK OF INDICATORS WHICH MIGHT GIVE US EARLY
WARNING OF HOSTILE INTENTIONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
OR ITS ALLIES. THIS CENTER AND THE INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES REPORT TO THE WATCH COMMITTEE ON INDICATIONS
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WHICH MAY BE SIGNIFICANT--OR ON THE ABSENCE OF ANY
SIGNIFICANT INDICATORS. THE WATCH COMMITTEE HAS A
REGULAR WEEKLY MEETING, TIMED SO THAT THE CONCLUSIONS
WILL BE READY FOR THE WEEKLY USIB MEETING, BUT IN
TIMES OF CRISIS THE WATCH COMMITTEE MAY MEET ONE OR
MORE TIMES A DAY .J
AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, I WOULD LIKE TO DESCRIBE
HOW THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MAKES ITS CONTRIBUTION
TO THE DECISION-MAKERS IN OUR GOVERNMENT.
LET ME SAY FIRST OF ALL THAT WHEN IT COMES TO
DECISION-MAKING, IT IS A FIRMLY ESTABLISHED RULE
THAT THE QN.LY. ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IS TO SUPPLY OB-
JECTIVE, SUBSTANTIVE INTELLIGENCE.. IT MAY BE HARD
FACT. IT MAY BE AN INTELLIGENCE APPRECIATION--THE
BEST JUDGMENT OF THE SITUATION; OR IT MAY BE ESTIMA-
TIVE--AGAIN. A CONSIDERED JUDGMENT OF HOW THE SITUA-
TION IS LIKELY TO DEVELOP. BUT THE IMPORTANT QUALITY
THIS INTELLIGENCE MUST POSSESS IS ORLE.CTIVITY. IT
MUST ( BE WARPED BY POLICY INTERESTS, BUDGETARY
CONCERNS, OR DEPARTMENTAL PAROCHIALISM.
THE ANCIENT GREEK POLICY MAKERS USED TO GET
THEIR ESTIMATIVE INTELLIGENCE FROM THE DELPHIC ORACLE.
SOME OF THESE ESTIMATES HAVE BEEN PRESERVED FOR US
BY THE HISTORIANS AND PLAYWRIGHTS OF THE TIME, AND
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THEY OFFER A TEMPTING PATTERN. THEY WERE SO WORDED
THAT NO MATTER WHAT HAPPENED, THE ORACLE COULD LATER
CLAIM TO HAVE BEEN RIGHT. THE GIMMICK, OF COURSE,
WAS THAT EACH PREDICTION PERMITTED AT LEAST TWO
DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSITE INTERPRETATIONS.
THE ORACLE HAD, HOWEVER, DISCOVERED THE BASIC
ESSENTIAL FOR AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE: CREDIBILITY,
AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE HAS NO VALUE, NO PURPOSE,
AND NO FUTURE, IF IT IS NOT BELIEVED BY THOSE IT
SERVES.
THIS IS WHAT DICTATES THAT AN INTELLIGENCE SER-
VICE SHALL ONLY SUPPORT, IIQI PARTICIPATE IN1 POLICY
MAKING,
THE PRESIDENT AND HIS ADVISERS FACE A CHOICE
BETWEEN COURSE A AND COURSE B. INTELLIGENCE WILL
ONLY PROVIDE THE FACTS--AND THE WHOLE RANGE OF KNOWN
FACTS--RELEVANT TO THE CHOICE. INTELLIGENCE WILL
lQI. RECOMMEND ONE COURSE OR THE OTHER. THE MOMENT
THAT INTELLIGENCE BEGINS TO ADVOCATE COURSE A, THE
PROPONENTS OF COURSE B ARE GOING TO SUSPECT--IF NOT
BELIEVE--THAT INTELLIGENCE HAS RIGGED ITS REPORTING
TO SUPPORT THAT ADVOCACY. CREDIBILITY GOES OUT THE
WINDOW.
THE ESTIMATIVE FUNCTION, OF COURSE, INCLUDES
CONTINGENCY PAPERS. THESE ARE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS,
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POSED BY THE POLICY MAKERS, AS TO THE PROBABLE CON-
SEQUENCES OR REACTIONS TO SPECIFIC PROPOSED COURSES
OF ACTION BY THE UNITED STATES. THIS IS INDEED THIN
ICE FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, AND I MUST ADMIT
THAT IT COMES CLOSE TO POLICY RECOMMENDATION TO CON-
CLUDE THAT SUCH-AND-SUCH A COURSE OF ACTION WOULD
PROBABLY BE CONSIDERED A CASUS BELLI BY POWER X OR
POWER Y. THESE PAPERS ARE UNDERTAKEN, HOWEVER, AT
THE SPECIFIC REQUEST OF THE POLICY MAKER. THE CON-
CLUSIONS ARE BASED ON A REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF ALL
THE FACTS AVAILABLE. AND IF THERE ARE RIVAL ADVOCATES
AMONG THE POLICY MAKERS, THEY CAN ALWAYS CHECK WITH
THEIR OWN INTELLIGENCE REPRESENTATIVES TO DETERMINE
WHETHER THE QUESTION HAS BEEN GIVEN OBJECTIVE AND
IMPARTIAL REVIEW IN THE ESTIMATIVE PROCESS.
MY POINT IS THAT IF THERE IS CONTROVERSY OVER
WHAT THE U.S. POLICY OR COURSE OF ACTION SHOULD BE,
THE OPPOSING ADVOCATES ( LSI HAVE AN IMPARTIAL SOURCE
OF OBJECTIVE INFORMATION WHICH ALL CAN TRUST. THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CAN FURNISH THAT OBJECTIVE
FOUNDATION, AND COMMAND THE NECESSARY CREDIBILITY
ON Y,IF IT NEVER ENGAGES IN ADVOCACY.
I HAVE BEEN TALKING MAINLY ABOUT ESTIMATIVE
INTELLIGENCE, BUT SUPPORT FOR THE POLICY MAKER IS
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NOT LIMITED TO TELLING HIM WHAT IS GOING TO HAPPEN,
OR LIKELY TO HAPPEN, IN THE FUTURE.
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ALSO PROVIDES BASIC
INTELLIGENCE--THE TYPE OF BREAD-AND-BUTTER FACTS
YOU FIND IN THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEYS. THIS
IS THE BEST AND MOST COMPREHENSIVE INFORMATION WE CAN
GATHER ABOUT A COUNTRY: ITS SOCIOLOGICAL AND DEMO-
GRAPHIC MAKEUP, THE RAILROAD SYSTEM, THE PORTS,
RIVERS, COMMUNICATIONS, LAWS, POLICE, ECONOMY, MILI-
TARY FORCES.
IT IS DESIGNED TO TELL THE READER MORE THAN HE
MAY THINK HE WILL EVER WANT TO KNOW ABOUT A COUNTRY,
ABOUT COUNTRIES WITH WHICH HE MAY FEEL HE WILL NEVER
BE CONCERNED, FROM EVERY SOURCE AVAILABLE TO OUR
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. IT IS IN EFFECT A GIANT
WORLD ALMANAC, WHICH ALREADY COMPRISES MORE THAN 10
TIMES THE VOLUME OF INFORMATION IN THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA, AND IS STILL GROWING,
IN THIS DAY AND AGE, THE CURRENCY OF INTELLIGENCE
IS NOT A QUESTION OF THIS WEEK'S INFORMATION, OR
TODAY'S INFORMATION--IT COMES DOWN TO A QUESTION OF
HOURS. AND EVEN MINUTES. A REPORT WHICH IS CURRENT-
AT THE CLOSE OF BUSINESS IS LIKELY TO BE WELL OUT OF
DATE BY DAYBREAK. THE FIRST PUBLICATION THE PRESIDENT
READS IN THE MORNING, THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF, IS
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UPDATED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS LITTLE MORE THAN AN HOUR
BEFORE HE RECEIVES IT.
ACCORDINGLY, CURRENT INTELLIGENCE HAS TO BE A
RESPONSIBILITY 24 HOURS A DAY, SEVEN DAYS A WEEK,
DRAWING ON EVERY AVAILABLE AND EVERY CONCEIVABLE SOURCE
OF INFORMATION--WHAT WE CALL THE ALL-SOURCE BASIS. IT
IS HANDLED BY INSTANTANEOUS BUT SECURE COMMUNICATIONS
WHICH LINK THE OPERATIONS CENTERS OR DUTY OFFICES OF
ALL OF THE INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS WITH THE OPERATIONS
CENTERS OR SITUATION ROOMS OF ALL OF THE PRINCIPAL
POLICY MAKERS. AND CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MUST RELY ON
THE FASTEST POSSIBLE PASSAGE OF CRITICAL INFORMATION,
FROM THE FIELD, INTO WASHINGTON FOR THE ESSENTIAL
EVALUATION PROCESS, AND THEN ONWARD TO ALERT GOVERN-
MENT LEADERS TO EMERGENCIES, CRISES, AND OTHER SIGNI-
FICANT DEVELOPMENTS ON A REAL-TIME BASIS. IN ESSENCE,
THE ULTIMATE DEADLINE FOR CURRENCY IN INTELLIGENCE RE-
PORTING TODAY IS THE HALF-HOUR OR SO IT TAKES AN ICBM
TO ARCH HALF-WAY AROUND THE WORLD.
MUCH OF WHAT I HAVE SAID SO FAR ABOUT OUR INTEL-
LIGENCE PRODUCTION WAS INTENDED TO DISPEL THE IDEA THAT
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, OR THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY, SOMEHOW "MAKES" .,POLICY. NOW LET ME
TURN TO THE ALLEGATION THAT CIA OPERATES WITHOUT ANY
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CONTROLS, THAT IT MAKES AND IMPLEMENTS ITS OWN POLICY.
SOMETIMES IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE PROFESSED POLICY OF
THE UNITED STATES.
THIS IS THE OTHER SIDE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BE-
TWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY: THE CONTROLS WHICH
THE POLICY MAKERS, THE ELECTED AUTHORITIES OF THE
U.S. GOVERNMENT, HAVE AND EXERCISE OVER EVEN THE
MOST SECRET OF OUR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
ESSENTIALLY, WE ARE NOW TALKING ABOUT FUNCTIONS
WHICH, WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, ARE PECULIAR
TO CIA. I WANT TO DISCUSS BRIEFLY WHERE WE GET OUR
CHARTER FOR THESE ACTIVITIES, AND HOW THEY ARE GEN-
ERATED, PLANNED, ORGANIZED, AND CONTROLLED.
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 GAVE CIA FIVE
FUNCTIONS:
ONE, TO ADVISE THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL-
AND OF COURSE THE PRESIDENT--ON INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY:
Two, To SUPPORT AND ADVISE THE NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL IN THE COORDINATION OF ALL FOREIGN INTELLI-
GENCE ACTIVITIES OF OUR GOVERNMENT;
THREE, To PRODUCE AND DISSEMINATE FINISHED
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT;
FOUR, To PROVIDE THOSE SERVICES OF COMMON
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CONCERN FOR INTELLIGENCE WHICH CAN BEST BE UNDERTAKEN
CENTRALLY; AND
FIVE, To PERFORM SUCH OTHER SERVICES AS THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MAY DIRECT,
FOUR PRESIDENTS AND 21 YEARS LATER, THE LANGUAGE
OF THE STATUTE REQUIRES A COUPLE OF BRIEF FOOTNOTES;
FOR ONE THING, IT IS OFTEN STATED THAT THE CIA
WAS CREATED TO COORDINATE THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
OF THE GOVERNMENT. STRICTLY SPEAKING, THIS IS NOT
CORRECT. THE ACT OF 1947 DIRECTED THE CIA TO MAKE
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON
COORDINATION; THE CIA RECOMMENDED, AND THE NSC ORDERED,
THAT THIS COORDINATION WOULD BE EFFECTED BY THE DI-
RECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS THE PRESIDENT'S
PRINCIPAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. THIS THE DIRECTOR
DOES, TO A LARGE EXTENT THROUGH THE USIB MACHINERY.
TO DEAL WITH ANOTHER ASPECT OF COORDINATION, THE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE RECENTLY ESTABLISHED
A THREE-MAN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES BOARD,
WHICH I, AS DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CHAIR. ITS OTHER MEMBERS
ARE THE DIRECTOR OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
AND THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE. IN A PERIOD WHEN INTELLIGENCE
REQUIREMENTS APPEAR TO BE GROWING AND THE RESOURCES
TO DEAL WITH THEM SHRINKING AT ABOUT THE SAME PACE,
THIS BOARD HAS THE UNENVIABLE TASK OF MATCHING
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RESPONSIBILITIES WITH ASSETS. THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS
HELP THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE TO DETERMINE,
ALONG WITH THE PROPER AUTHORITIES AT DEFENSE AND STATE,
THE MOST DESIRABLE AND ECONOMICAL METHODS OF INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTION.
FINALLY, WE HAVE A SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
WITH A SMALL BUT EXPERIENCED STAFF WITHIN CIA, AS-
SIGNED TO CONTINUING REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF THE
MAJOR PROGRAMS ENCOMPASSING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. SO MUCH FOR THE MACHINERY
OF COORDINATION.
THE SECOND FOOTNOTE CONCERNS STATUTORY THEORY
AND PRACTICE. THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
TIES THE CIA IN DIRECTLY UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. THE NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL WAS CREATED BY STATUTE; IT IS LISTED IN
THE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION MANUALS; AND A SUCCESSION
OF STATUTES HAS SPECIFIED ITS MEMBERSHIP. THE DI-
RECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, BY STATUTE, ATTENDS
AS AN ADVISOR.
THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS THAT SUCCESSIVE
PRESIDENTS HAVE DIFFERED IN THEIR USE OF THE NSC--
DIFFERED FROM EACH OTHER, AND EVEN CHANGED CONCEPTS
WITHIN A PRESIDENTIAL TERM.
LEST ANYONE SHOULD ARGUE THAT THE CIA IS THERE-
FORE CONTROLLED BY A SOMETIMES INACTIVE OR DORMANT
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BODY, LET ME STATE THAT WHETHER THE STATUTORY NSC
WAS MEETING HOURLY, DAILY, WEEKLY, OR INFREQUENTLY,
UNDER ANY GIVEN ADMINISTRATION, EACH PRESIDENT HAS
HAD CONTINUING MACHINERY WITHIN HIS CABINET OR HIS
WHITE HOUSE STAFF TO DEAL WITH NSC QUESTIONS, AND
THES QUESTIONS HAVE INCLUDED CONTINUING CONTROL OVER
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
WITH THOSE TWO FOOTNOTES, I THINK WE CAN PASS
OVER THE FIRST FOUR FUNCTIONS ASSIGNED TO CIA, AND
CONCENTRATE ON THE CRUX OF THE PROBLEM, THE FIFTH
ASSIGNMENT: TO PERFORM SUCH OTHER SERVICES AS THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MAY DIRECT.
THIS IS OUR CHARTER FOR COVERT ACTIONS. I
PROPOSE TO TELL YOU WHY THEY ARE NECESSARY, AND
HOW THEY ARE CONTROLLED. I WILL LEAVE IT UP TO
YOU, IF YOU WISH, TO CONSIDER WHETHER THERE IS, OR
SHOULD BE, OR COULD BE, SOME OTHER AGENCY OF THE
GOVERNMENT WHERE THESE RESPONSIBILITIES MIGHT BETTER
BE ASSIGNED.
IN THE "COLD WAR," WHICH HAS EXISTED LONGER
THAN THERE HAS BEEN A CIA, WE FACE AN ENEMY ADEPT
AT CONSPIRACY AND SUBVERSION, WITH WORLDWIDE
CLANDESTINE ASSETS, SKILLED AGENTS, AND NO COM-
PUNCTION ABOUT UNDERMINING OR OVERTHROWING ANY
GOVERNMENT WHICH RESISTS THE SPREAD OF COMMUNISM.
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THERE ARE APT TO BE OCCASIONS WHEN IT IS IMPORT-
ANT FOR THE UNITED STATES, IN ORDER TO COUNTER THESE
COMMUNIST EFFORTS, TO HAVE ITS OWN CAPABILITY TO
RESPOND BY COVERT OR CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS. THIS
IS NOT NECESSARILY BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES WOULD
BE ASHAMED OF EITHER THE OBJECTIVES OR THE METHODS.
IT IS PRIMARILY BECAUSE IT SOMETIMES TAI