DISPOSITION OF SENSITIVE GVN-USG DOCUMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01066A001100090009-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 11, 2006
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: June 3, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
34` JUN 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: The 1 onorable Henry A. Kissinger
assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT. Disposition of Sensitive
GVN-TUSG Documents
1. The following represents our best estimate as to the disposi-
tion of sensitive documents, relating to GVN-USG affairs, that were
in Vietnamese hands at the time of the fall of the Republic of South
Vietnam.
2. 1 1:] 25X1
1
-1 bias retrieved and taken
the i mer can rnbassy. In the final hours of the V. S. Mission
in Vietnam there was no way securely to evacuate these files and
they therefore were destroyed.
W. E. Colby
Director
Deputy Director for Operations
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SUBJECT: Disposition of Sensitive GVN-USG Documents
ORIG:C/VNO (29 May 1975)
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
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DCI
1 -
DDCI
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ER
1 -
DDO
1 -
ADDO
1 -
CEA
1 -
DCEA
1 -
C/VNO
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C/VNO
II
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Secr it
NATIONAL.
I NTELLI GENC:
ESTIMATE
Short-Term Prospects for Vietnam
Secr A
NIE 53 14.3-2-74
23 Dee amber 1974
N2
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NI E 53 / 14.3-2-74
SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR VIETNAM
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT
AS NOTED IN THE TEXT, AS FOLLOWS:
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of
the estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Depart-
ments of State, Defense, and Treasury, and the National Security Agency.
Concurring:
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence representing the Central Intelligence
Agency
The Director of Intelligence and Research representing the Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, National Security Agency
The Assistant General Manager for National Security representing the Atomic
Energy Commission
The Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury representing the Department
of the Treasury
Abstaining:
The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
ALSO PARTICIPATING:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
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CONTENTS
Page
PRECIS .............................................................. 1 _
DISCUSSION ......................................................... 3
1. INTRODUCTION ...................... . ......................... 3 .
II. THE NORTH-SOUTH BALANCE ................................. 3 .
The Communists ................................................... 3-
The South Vietnamese ............................................. 5-
III. WHAT NEXT? .................................................. 7
Hanoi's Options .................................................. 7
The Forecast ...................................................... 9.
IV. IN SUM .......................................................... 10
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SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR VIETNAM
PRECIS
- Communist military forces in South Vietnam are more powerful
than ever before.
- The South Vietnamese Armed Forces (RVNAF) are still strong and
resilient and have generally acquitted themselves well since the
ceasefire, but the decline to the present level of US military aid
threatens to place them in a significantly weaker logistic posture
than the Communists.
- Hanoi has a variety of military options, but the evidence points
toward a marked increase in military action between now and mid-
1975 designed to:
- defeat the GVN pacification program;
- inflict heavy casualties on the RVNAF;
- gain control of many more South Vietnamese; and
- force the GVN into new negotiations at disadvantage.
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-- At a minimum the Communists will sharply increase the tempo of
fighting by making greater use of their in-country forces and fire-
power.
In this case, their gains would be limited, but RVNAF stockpiles
of ammunition and other critical supplies would probably be de-
pleted by April or May below the 30-day reserve required for inten-
sive combat.
We believe that the Communists will commit part of their strategic
reserve to exploit major vulnerabilities in the South Vietnamese
position or to maintain the momentum of their military effort.
- Such a commitment would carry a greater risk of major defeats
for top RVNAF units and a further compounding of GVN man-
power and logistic problems.
- Without an immediate increase in US military assistance, the
GVN's military situation would be parlous, and Saigon might ex-
plore the possibility of new negotiations with the Communists.
- It is even possible-in response to a major opportunity-that the
Communists would move to an all-out offensive by committing all
or most of their strategic reserve. But our best judgment now is
that they will not do so.
- Hanoi prefers to achieve its dry season goals through a military-
political campaign that avoids the risks and losses of an all-out
offensive.
Hanoi probably hopes that by setting limits on its military opera-
tions there would be less likelihood of a strong reaction from
Washington and that frictions with Moscow and Peking would be
minimized.
At currently appropriated levels of US military assistance, how-
ever, the level of combat that we do anticipate in the next six
months will place the Communists in a position of significant advan-
tage over RVNAF in subsequent fighting.
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vow
DISCUSSION
1. INTRODUCTION
1. Our estimates on the Vietnam problem
over the past year have focused on the prob-
ability of a Communist offensive against the
South that involved the commitment of NVA/
VC forces now in South Vietnam and a ma-
jority of Hanoi's strategic reserve divisions in
North Vietnam. The principal judgment in our
last full-dress review (made in May 1974) was
that such an offensive was unlikely through
June 1975, although the risk would grow as
June 1975 approached.' We also judged that
such an offensive would be the only thing that
could produce a decisive Communist victory.
II. THE NORTH-SOUTH BALANCE
The Communists
3. Military. The Vietnamese Communists
now have their strongest military force in
' NIE 53/14.3-1-74: "The Likelihood of a Major
North Vietnamese Offensive Against South Vietnam
Before June 30, 1975," dated 23 May 1974 (S/C
(=. This Estimate was updated by Interagency
(CIA/DIA/State) Memorandum entitled "An Assess-
ment of the Current Military Situation in Vietnam,"
dated 9 August 1974 (S/U. The key judgment, how-
ever, was unchanged.
South Vietnam in the history of the war. That
force is better trained and equipped than
it was at the time of the 1972 offensive. In
North Vietnamese military writings the em-
phasis on preparing for renewed large-scale
conventional warfare that appeared in 1973
has been followed in 1974 by an emphasis on
those aspects of combined-arms tactics that
were found wanting in 1972. Also in 1974, the
training cycle for new North Vietnamese con-
scripts was extended by several months.
4. At the same time, NVA inventories and
continuing military assistance from the USSR
and China have proven adequate to replace
expenditures and losses in the South. In addi-
tion, the receipt since 1972 of jet fighters,
SAMs, AA guns, and associated radars, and the
reconstruction and modernization of airfields
in the North Vietnamese panhandle have given
Hanoi a more than adequate air defense ca-
pability against the South Vietnamese air
threat to North Vietnam and to Communist
base areas in the South.
5. In South Vietnam, there has been little
change in the numerical strength or composi-
tion of NVA/VC combat forces over the past
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year, but the rehabilitation and modernization
of combat and support elements have con-
tintued apace. The NVA/VC's ability to adapt
to chaneing situations is at an all-time high,
and they can be resupplied and reinforced
faster than ever. Enough replacements have
been infiltrated from the North to offset the
past year's combat losses. Armor levels have
been kept essentially constant in the past
year, and artillery levels have been increased.
Sufficient supply stockpiles are available in-
counrry to support country-wide combat op-
erations at the 1972 offensive level for an
extended period. Moreover. the Communists
are sending additional large quantities of mili-
tary supplies to the South. Infiltration thus
far in the dry season has been heavier than
last year, and we expect this pattern to
eof ctinue.
ec I'our new NVA corps headquarters have
been identified since late 1973---one in central
North Vietnam, two in South Vietnam's MR-1,
and one in MR-3. Controlling several infantry
division equivalents each, these headquarters
are designed to give the NVA High Command
greatly improved command and control. Also,
during 1974 the capability of North Vietna-
mese: MIGs to mount limited attacks against
fixed installations was extended south of the
principal South Vietnamese Air Force
(VNAF) airhase at L>anang. The presence
of some 22,(XX) Communist air defense person-
nel in South Vietnam and the upgrading of
equipment and weapons has resulted in an
NVA SAM and AAA capability to defend
base areas and key personnel infiltration and
supply routes in the northern and western
border regions from VNAF air strikes and
reconnaissance.
7. Viet Cong guerrilla forces contribute
v+'i v little to the overall Communist military
strength in South Vietnam. The Viet Cong
guerrillas and guerrilla support structure have
been in a weakened state since the Tet 1968
offensive, and they have not regained much
strength since January 1973. Today more than
ever NVA main forces are the principal threat
to the RVNAF.
8. Other Considerations. We know of no op-
position on the part of the North Vietnamese
people that is strong enough to affect Hanoi's
ability to continue its quest to gain control
over South Vietnam or that would require
any significant modification of its strategy.
North Vietnam basically remains a unified
slate run by a tightly knit party and technical
elite with the dedication to pursue chosen op-
tions even in the face of great adversity.
9. There are domestic factors which could
impact on Hanoi's freedom of action in the
South, but we know little about their relative
Weight. The regime places a high priority on
economic reconstruction and development,
and there is a vocal element within the leader-
ship that wishes to concentrate on these mat-
ters at the expense of the struggle in the South.
The limited intelligence available on this sub-
ject, however, does not allow us to determine
the depth and extent of debate over national
priorities, or its probable future course and
consequence.
10. Other areas of uncertainty are the
weight carried by the counsels of the USSR
and China in Hanoi and the degree to which
either Moscow or Peking is willing to press
Hanoi on the question of military action in the
South. The USSR and China may see their
larger interests in detente advanced by a pe-
riod of relative peace in Indochina, but there
is no convincing evidence that they view
detente with the US as necessarily requiring
them to take major steps to keep Hanoi in
line. There is similarly no convincing evidence
that the Soviets and Chinese have withheld
or tailored their aid to North Vietnam in an
effort to influence North Vietnamese strategy.
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In any event, whatever Moscow's and Pe-
king's intentions, they could not restrict North
Vietnam's short-term military options, although
Hanoi would have to consider the longer-
range implications of a Soviet and Chinese un-
willingness to replace equipment and supplies
lost in combat.
11. A final factor affecting Hanoi's calcula-
tions is its assessment of the US position. On
the one hand, Hanoi must be encouraged that
the Paris agreements not only ended direct
US participation in the war, but also brought
about a further reduction in the American mili-
tary presence throughout Southeast Asia. In
addition, the North Vietnamese leadership
probably interprets recent political develop-
ments in the US as further reducing Washing-
ton's support for Saigon. On the other hand,
Hanoi probably considers President Ford
something of an unknown quantity on the
Vietnam issue and is unsure about how he
would react to a dramatic Communist mili-
tary effort to upset the balance in Vietnam.
There is almost certainly still some concern in
Hanoi that as long as the US retains military
forces in Southeast Asia, Washington would
intervene to prevent a South Vietnamese mili-
tary collapse.
The South Vietnamese
12. Military. The military performance of
the RVNAF has been reasonably effective
since the ceasefire agreement. At present,
South Vietnamese military forces are capable
of providing security sufficient to protect the
bulk of the populace, despite ammunition,
fuel, and equipment stringencies. Throughout
this period, government forces demonstrated
sophisticated command and control procedures
and a high degree of tactical flexibility. This
competence was evident in such diverse op-
erations as the May 1974 MR-3 cross-border
operation into Cambodia and the six-hour de-
ployment in the late summer of 1974 of a di-
vision headquarters and a regiment from the
central highlands to coastal Binh Dinh Prov-
ince, where the regiment was immediately
committed to open an interdicted section of
Route 1.
13. Nevertheless, the quality of many
RVNAF commanders is still marginal, espe-
cially at company and field-grade levels. This
failing was especially evident in several units
of the 1st Division in the fighting southeast
of Hue in August. In addition, the RVNAF
is plagued by the perennial problems of re-
duced manning levels in many units, a prob-
lem aggravated by high casualties, a slow re-
placement process, and in many cases poor
quality replacements.
14. South Vietnamese military shortcomings
are most apparent within the territorial
forces-about half of the troops under arms.
In some areas of the country the Regional
Forces (RF) have performed creditably-in
coastal MR-2, MR-3, and the northern delta.
In southern MR-1 and in the northern high-
lands of MR-2, however, the territorials have
performed poorly as a result of inadequate
leadership, discipline, and unit manning. In
the southern delta provinces of MR-4, mainly
defended by territorial forces, security has
deteriorated markedly since early this year,
in large part because of the interplay of two
major factors-increased Communist aggres-
siveness and a sharp rise in South Vietnamese
desertions from the territorial forces and a de-
cline in recruitment. In the delta as a whole,
there was a 30 percent decline in the present-
for-duty strength of RF battalion line com-
panies during the first ten months of 1974.
Another factor contributing to the spotty per-
formance of the territorials is that they have
in recent years been confronted with main
force Communist units and not just VC guer-
rillas. The GVN is implementing plans to re-
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train and upgrade the territorial forces, but
it remains to be seen whether the action will
be effective.
15. The most unsettling development af-
fecting the RVNAF, however, derives from
the decline in US military aid available to the
GVN. In FY 1974, the RVNAF received about
$1.2 billion in US military assistance, as com-
pared with $2.3 billion in FY 1973. Funding
at the $1.2 billion level was insufficient to re-
place all RVNAF consumption and losses of
supplies and equipment.
16. Barring a supplemental appropriation,
no more than $700 million in US military
aid will be available to the GVN in FY 1975.
In the best case, that is, combat at an overall
level no greater than the average for 1974,
the RVNAF could prevent Communist gains
in vital population areas over the next six
months or so only at the cost of drawdowns
of ammunition, POL, spare parts stocks, and
equipment inventories. Even at the 1974 level
of combat, we would thus expect the RVNAF
to be in a significantly weaker logistical posi-
tion by the end of the dry season (and
the Communists relatively stronger). The
RVNAF's ability to cope with a subsequent
sustained increase in the tempo of fighting
would depend increasingly on whether the
GVN received timely and large-scale US lo-
gistic support beyond presently programed
levels.
17. RVNAF combat capabilities appear in
retrospect to have peaked in the year or so
following the ceasefire. There has been some
decline in RVNAF effectiveness in recent
months, but this decline has not yet reached
significant proportions. The RVNAF has been
forced into an increasingly defensive and re-
active posture, however, and even now
RVNAF shortages are limiting combat oper-
ations in some areas. It is likely that heavier
combat would force the GVN to dilute fur-
ther the strategy and tactics that have stood
it in good stead since the ceasefire. These have
included an aggressive forward posture and
generous employment of air and artillery fire
to break up Communist military formations
and to blunt attacks.
18. As important as the current level of US
assistance is the GVN's faith in a continuing
US commitment to provide military .assistance
in the future when it is needed. A loss of con-
fidence in the US commitment to South Viet-
nam would seriously affect the GVN's morale
and will to continue the struggle regardless
of the actual level of stocks on hand.
19. Other Considerations. Within the GVN
there is firm commitment to maintaining South
Vietnamese independence. President Thieu
has used his power base-the military and the
bureaucracy-to retain a strong hold on the
governmental apparatus, and this apparatus
has relatively little trouble in countering Com-
munist political and clandestine subversion
efforts. Moreover, the vast majority of thL
Vietnamese people are aware that they would
fare badly under the Communist alternative.
20. But Thieu's hold on power may be some-
what less secure now than it was a year ago
for three major reasons:
- The South Vietnamese reading of the
US political situation, especially with re-
gard to what is seen in Saigon as a de-
clining US commitment to Vietnam.
- The escalation of the fighting and attend-
ant higher casualties.
-The economic reverses since the 1972 of-
fensive and the concomitant increases in
urban unemployment and declines in liv-
ing standards.
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21. Political opposition groups have at-
tempted to harness these popular frustrations
in their intensified attacks against the GVN
for high-level corruption, press censorship, and
Thieu's and the army's monopoly of real politi-
cal power. Although active political dissension
is now largely limited to small groups, these
issues could spur more widespread popular
opposition, particularly in the upcoming elec-
tion year.
22. The economic problems facing South
Vietnam are not likely to lead to acute pres-
sures on the government over the next year
or so, unless the security situation markedly
deteriorates. Since mid-1972, for a variety of
reasons, the urban industrial and services sec-
tors of the economy have been stalled at well
below capacity, and rapid inflation has se-
verely eroded real incomes of military person-
nel, civil servants, and city dwellers in general.
In particular industries, such as cement and
electricity, output has remained high, but the
overall unemployment rate of the urban work
force is at 15 to 20 percent. On the other hand,
particularly in agriculture, which is the heart
of the South Vietnamese economy, there have
been some positive signs over the past few
months. The rice crop now being harvested
appears larger than last year's bumper crop
because of good weather conditions and a
fairly high overall use of chemical fertilizers.
Stocks are large enough to assure adequate
supplies without US PL-480 rice shipments
for the first time in about ten years. Foreign
exchange reserves are up $55 million over the
start of the year to $218 million, although ex-
port growth is diminishing.2 Reflecting the im-
proved supply conditions, the consumer price
level has held steady since August 1974, reduc-
2 The most important factors in the reserve increase
have been a $30 million inflow from oil exploration
fees and reduced import payments as a result of the
urban recession.
ing the annual rate of inflation to about 40
percent. Over the longer term, the economic
pressures on Thicu clearly will depend heavily
on the availability of foreign aid. But they will
also depend in part on how effectively the
government can shift additional manpower
and resources to agriculture and other indus-
tries which will, over time, make the country
less dependent on foreign aid.
Hanoi's Options
23. There has been little change in Hanoi's
options from those of a year ago. Broadly
speaking they include:
- Maintaining the 1974 strategy and level
of activity in the South, in the hope that
such activity would be sufficient to erode
the GVN's military and political base.
- Sharply increasing military action in the
South, but to a level below that of an
all-out offensive.
- Launching an all-out "general" offensive
in an effort to win an immediate "total"
victory.
24. The GVN has demonstrated a capabil-
ity to cope with the first option, and evidence
of Hanoi's intentions points primarily to the
second option. Reliable clandestine and overt
reports over the past 12 months or so indicated
that neither North Vietnam nor its fighting
forces were confident of their ability to de-
feat the GVN militarily. Much of the evidence,
however, reflected a view in Hanoi that the
stage for Thieu's ouster could be set by in-
creasing the level of military pressure on the
GVN while exploiting internal dissension.
25. More recently, a considerable volume
of reliable reporting has provided details on
Communist dry season intentions; these were
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outlined in a COSVN resolution which laid out
Communist goals for 1975. According to the
resolution the Communists hope to achieve
their political goals primarily by military
means. In so doing, the Communists hope to
wise their forces to gain such objectives as:
defeating the GVN pacification program;
inflicting heavy casualties on RVNAF;
airing control of large numbers of South
Vietnamese in contested or Lrovernment-
controlled territory:; and
forcing the GVN into new negotiations
under circumstances favorable to the
Communists.
As would be expected in any COSVN docu-
ment, Communist plans for the northern half
of South Vietnam were not detailed. Never-
theless, enough reliable reports have been re-
ceived from other areas to indicate that a
country-wide effort is planned. Any CVN vul-
nerabilities that are exposed will he exploited
in follow-up action.
26. There are various levels of military pres-
sure the Communists could apply under Op-
tion 2 within the guidelines of the COSVN
resolution for 1975. At the lower end of the
spectrum the Communists could rely exclu-
sively on their in-country units. Under this
scenario, GVN vulnerabilities would be most
acute in the northern half of SVN and in por-
tions of the delta. Specifically, RVNAF forces
are spread thinly along Route 1-the vital
supply line for Hue and other major cities
near or on the coast. The road could be inter-
dicted, and the GVN would be hard-pressed to
keep it open. The central highlands would be
an area in which at least initial Communist
successes would be almost assured. Kontum
City, for example, remains especially vulner-
able to an NVA strangulation campaign. Com-
munist gains in the southern part of the coun-
try-vital to the survival of the GVN-would
probably be more limited. Some additional
expansion of Communist control, however,
would likely occur in the provinces north and
northwest of Saigon and particularly in the
southern delta where an erosion in security
,as already occurred.
27. Even so, under this scenario, we would
r'xpect Communist gains this dry season to be
iimited. The RVNAF retains sufficient strength
and resiliency to contend with Communist
military activity that depends only on the force
structure now in-country. both sides would
the hurt, however, and the key question would
'hen be the regenerative capability of the op-
nosing forces. The RVNAF would be in an
extremely precarious logistic position, and its
ability to bounce back would depend prin-
cipally on the level and timeliness of US as-
istance. At the level of combat called for
under this scenario and at current levels of
US assistance, IiVNAF consumption of arn-
Munition and other critical supplies would
probably result by April or May in a depletion
,f stockpiles below the 30-day reserve re-
quired for intensive combat. In addition,
RVNAF capabilities would doubtless be fur-
ther degraded by shortages of spare parts
and replacement equipment.
28. The Communists, on the other hand,
would be in a far better relative logistic posi-
don. They would also still have their strategic
reserve-or most of it at least-from which
o draw new personnel if they so choose. Thus,
by the end of this dry season a situation would
be created in which the Communists would
have a significant advantage over BVNAF for
subsequent fighting.
29. At the upper range of military action
under Option 2, Hanoi could choose during
the dry season to deploy some units from its
strategic reserve to the South in response to
new opportunities or difficulties encountered
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during the fighting. For example, up to a divi-
sion might be sent to MR-1 from the reserve
to exploit local successes there. A similar op-
portunity could emerge in the central high-
lands.3 The objective of such reinforcement,
however, would be limited and consistent
with present Communist strategy as expressed
in the COSVN resolution for 1975. Even so,
there would be a risk that once embarked on
this course, particularly if RVNAF appeared
highly vulnerable, Hanoi might decide to com-
mit most of its reserve forces in an effort to
achieve a decisive victory over the GVN.
30. A limited commitment of the North
Vietnamese strategic reserve of itself would
not make the GVN's situation untenable, but
it would result in greater strains on RVNAF.
For example, there would be a greater danger
that top RVNAF combat units might suffer
major defeats, particularly since the South
Vietnamese strategic reserve is already com-
mitted. Moreover, by utilizing part of their
reserve force, the North Vietnamese would be
in a better position to maintain a high level of
combat throughout the dry season, thereby
compounding RVNAF's logistic and man-
power problems. In such a situation, the GVN
would probably look to the US for an imme-
diate increase in assistance. If this were not
forthcoming, the GVN's military situation
would be parlous, and Saigon might explore
the possibility of new negotiations with the
Communists.
31. Under either variant of Option 2, much
will turn on RVNAF's morale and willingness
to persevere. Not only will South Vietnamese
forces be faced with heightened Communist
aggressiveness, but they will also face the pos-
sibility that supply stringencies will constrain
_8 These particular deployment scenarios are illustra-
tive only and are not meant to place arbitrary restric-
tions on North Vietnamese military flexibility.
their ability to counter the Communist effort.
Initial RVNAF successes in fending off the
Communists despite these adversities would
buoy morale and give the South Vietnamese
increased confidence that they could stay the
course. On the other hand, a series of battle-
field setbacks-even if not strategically im-
portant-could set in train a feeling of de-
featisin which would adversely affect the
RVNAF's future performance.
32. We expect at a minimum a sharp escala-
tion in the fighting this dry season, with the
Communists making greater use of their in-
country forces and firepower than in 1974.
They clearly have the flexibility to commit a
portion of their strategic reserve, and we be-
lieve that they are likely to base their decisions
on how the fighting evolves during the dry
season. We believe that they will make such
a commitment to exploit major vulnerabilities
in the South Vietnamese position or to main-
tain the momentum of their military effort.
33. An All-Out Offensive. We estimate that
an all-out offensive is unlikely this dry season,
although there is a risk that Hanoi might move
in this direction if it perceived an opportunity
where it could score a decisive victory. If the
Communists should choose this option there
would be a major increase in Communist in-
filtration and most of the strategic reserve
would be deployed to the South. The offensive
would probably begin in the spring of the
year when weather favors combined-arms op-
erations throughout most of the country, with
the major effort once again occurring in MR-1
and secondary actions elsewhere to keep the
GVN from redeploying forces to meet the
threat in the north. The fighting would be
characterized by intense artillery duels and
conventional set-piece battles extending into
populated areas.
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34. The South Vietnamese would be able
o withstand the initial impact of an all-out
Communist offensive only by trading space
l'or time. They would probably lose all of MR-1
north of llanang, Pleiku and Kontum prov-
inces in MR-2, and some territory in MR-3
And MR-4. The RVNAF would be unable to
a~ontain a sustained Communist offensive un-
less the US provided early and large-scale lo-
gistic assistance. Casualties and equipment
losses would run high on both sides, and the
RVNAF would doubtless lose more than they
did during the 1972 offensive. The final out-
come of a Communist general offensive, even
with extensive US logistic support to the
South, would hinge on such intangibles as the
resourcefulness and effectiveness of ARVN
mmit leaders and the psychological impact of
the probable early Communist successes.
35. The adverse psychological impact of
Communist successes in the initial stages of
he offensive might be more significant than
the actual effect on the military balance.
Therefore, in the worst case, a situation could
develop in which the Saigon government
would be unable to stabilize the situation or
regain the initiative without the reintroduc-
3_ion of US air and naval support. If this were
only a symbolic commitment, e.g., using only
a small number of carrier-based aircraft, it
would not have a significant impact on the
Communists, but might stiffen RVNAF suffi-
ciently to prevent a collapse in their morale
and willingness to keep fighting. But a massive
commitment of US airpower in the South dur-
ing the early stages of the fighting would
probably blunt the offensive.
IV. IN SUM
;36. We believe that Hanoi prefers to
achieve its goals through a political-military
campaign which avoids the risks and losses of
an all-out offensive. We nonetheless believe
that the RVNAF will be severely tested over
the next six months. Moreover, at currently
appropriated levels of US military assistance.,
the level of combat we anticipate this dry
season will place the Communists in a position
of significant advantage over RVNAF in sub-
sequent fighting.
37. Hanoi probably sees much to be gained
by stepping up its efforts to inflict punishment
on the RVNAF whenever and wherever it can
in hope of overcoming the present military
deadlock and pushing Saigon into renewed
negotiations at a disadvantage. At the same
time, however, Hanoi may estimate that in-
lernal problems in South Vietnam portend
ia~creasing trouble for President Thieu and
therefore be reluctant to jeopardize this trend
by the application of too high a level of mili-
tary pressure too soon. Finally, Hanoi may
1'alculate that by setting certain limits on its
military operations in the South this dry
season there would be less likelihood of a
strong reaction from Washington. This course
of action would also minimize friction with
Moscow and Peking.
38. If the Communists were later to become
dissatisfied with the results of such a course
of action, they could always step up the pres-
sure. An all-out offensive, however, would
probably not occur at least until early 1976, in
part because Hanoi would likely need time
to gear up for such action following heightened
'ombat in 1975 and in part because Hanoi
would probably regard a US presidential year
as a particularly favorable time to launch an
offensive.
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