PRESS CONTACTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE CUBAN CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01048A001500100042-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2006
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: October 29, 1962
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2006/08/30: CIA-RDP80MO1048A001500100042-1
C!A INTERNAT. 'USE ONLY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (INTELLIGENCE)
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (RESEARCH)
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (SUPPORT)
COMPTROLLER
INSPECTOR GENERAL
GENERAL COUNSEL
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
FOR NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Col. Grogan
Distribution: TO ALL ADDRESSEES
1 - Col. Grogan
1 - ER via DCI, DDCI
NOTE: Copies to DD/I and Col. Grogan were fwd'd 26 Oct.
This memorandum contains informaflon for the addressees
Ad-
.
dressees may give this memorandum additional circulation within
their components as required. All copies should be destroyed not
filed, upon completion of circulation. A master file will be kept in
the Executive Director's Office and will be available upon request.
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
 Approved For Release 2006/08/30: CIA-RDP80MO1048AO01500100042-1
0
October Z6, 1962
MIMORANDUM,FOR: General Carter
i DJECT: Press Contacts in Connection with the Cuban Crisis
I note a growing amount of press comment indicating that the
Cuban situation developed precipitously for one or two reasons;
(a) information was withheld from the public, or (b) intelligence
was faulty or inadequate.
Our line therefore should be about as follows;
The M1(BM and IRBM areas were surveyed on August 29th
and eptember 5th and there was no evidence of any construction
activity or unusual movements of materiel, etc. >ubsequent
reconnaissance efforts in late September and early October were
ineffective because of bad weather and the flights that were success-
ful concentrated on developing essential information on known
installations such as ;AM sites, cruise missile sites, etc. In-
formation was obtained in mid-September on the arrival of large
crates suspected of containing fuselages of IL-280 but the planes
themselves could not be detected as no crates were opened.
The first effective flight revealing significant information
occurred on October 14th after several days' delay because of
weather and this flight revealed the fuselage of one IL-28 which
had been tin rated, the location of the remaining crates, and the
evidence of some MRBM sites. The most advanced apparently had
been under construction for a few days. ubsequest flights revealed
progressive construction of the MRBM sites, additional MRBM sites
being commenced and initial construction on the first of the IRBM
sites, also a substantial number of MIG 219 (crates of which had
been previously noted and reported) in being on the runway and
one crate unloaded and the plane being placed in operational status.
 Approved For Release 2006/08/30: CIA-RDP80MO1048AO01500100042-1
0 , 0
One can only conclude that what we observed had been care-
fully planned for execution in a very minimum time in the interests
of avoiding detection.
I am told there are a number of articles in preparation, some
of which wish to deal with the role of intelligence in the findings and
subsequent decision. .3ome writers have expressed a desire to do a
profile on me personally. I would like both my personal role and
the rote of intelligence played down.
'No might confine ourselves to the following:
On the evening of l day, October 15th, analysis of photographs
taken on . unday, October 14th. rov aled the probable evidence of
medium range missiles in Cuba. This probability was reported to
the White House Tuesday morning and McCone, who was on that day
in eattle to attend the funeral of his stepson who had been killed on
the 14th in an accident, was advised and returned to Washington on
the first available plane.
The Central Intelligence Agency and the entire Intelligence
Community worked continuously on analyzing the photographic product
and preparing the necessary appraisals and estimates needed for
proper policy consideration and decisions. The United tates
Intelligence Board made up of senior intelligence officers from CLs,
.:)Late, Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force and Atomic Energy Commis-
sion met every day and sometimes more often to consider current
intelligence and estimates as they lved. ubcommitteas of the
Board were in continuous session. As a result the President and
his policy advisors were currently supplied with a coordinated and
considered judgment of the critical situation. McCone personally
attended all meetings of the senior Government officials and with
the National Security Council and with the i-'resident in considering
the alternative courses of action and reaching final decision as to
the course we have followed. McC.one, as a principal intelligence officer of
the Government. continues to meet daily as a member of the Presidential
appointive Executive Committee of the N,::C.
John A. McCone
Director
Dist: DD/I; ExDir; Col. Grogan