REVITALIZATION OF U.S. COUNTERSUBVERSIVE EFFORTS ABROAD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01048A001500030006-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2005
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 31, 1972
• Content Type: MF

SECRET
3 : JAN 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller
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SUBJECT: Revitalization of U. S. Counter subversive
Efforts Abroad
A Continuing CIA Responsibility
REFERENCE: Memo for DDP, et al., dated 3 January 1972
1 with attachment, Draft Memo
for the Director, Subject: Counter subversion -
1. The Chief,
Counterintelligence Staff have assisted me in the preparation of
the following comments on your appreciation of the counter-
subversion problem and suggested courses of action.
2. First, we are in general agreement with:
a. Your estimate of the continuing threat of subversion
to U. S. interests in many countries throughout the world, and of
the need for a selective, low key, low cost but effective response
to that threat based on a coordinated strategy.
b. Your view that while there are in fact ongoing counter-
subversion and counterinsurgency programs, there is room for
improved coordination and direction at the Washington level.
There are established means at the Washington and Mission levels
for coordinating both overt and covert responses to specific situations --
IRG's, CASP, WSAG, and so on. There is also a measure of exchange
of views and sharing of doctrine in orientation and training programs.
c. Your assertion that CIA should continue to play an
important but not an exclusive role, and that it would be useful to /
define more clearly the responsibilities of the several U. S. depart-
ments and agencies concerned with counter subversion.
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d. Your view that there should be an updated intelligence
community analysis of the threat in order (1) to identify and describe
in suitable order of priority those countries in which a serious
subversive threat exists and which are of continuing importance to
the U. S. interest, and (2) to re-evaluate the capabilities of each of
these countries to recognize and cope with the threat of their will,
their means, their organization for management of their counter-
subversion effort, and their relationships with the U. S. and other
countries with regard to possible assistance and/or cooperation.
e. Your definition of countersubversion in terms of six
areas of effort -- collection of intelligence, assessment of sub-
versive forces and their capabilities and intentions, institutional
barriers to subversion, counter subversion forces and programs,
information, and the rule of law.
f. Your identification of the central role and special
potentials of foreign police services not only for purposes of counter-
subversion but also for information collection, counterintelligence
and covert political action.
3. While we agree in large measure with your overview, we
do have reservations as to the real practicability at this time of
raising the politically tender issue of subversion and counter-
subversion as a priority problem at the NSC or even interagency
level. Our reasoning is based on the following:
a. After nearly ten years of "counterinsurgency" involve-
ment it seems to us that the national inclination nowadays is to turn
away from this subject and all its elements and forms. While this may
be due to the frustration of Vietnam, we find U. S. support of
"repressive" foreign police forces generally being challenged as
counter to the national interest and heritage and U. S. Government
sponsored "stability operations" often characterized by the media
as "support to military dictatorships. "
b. In our experience, the promulgation of a broadly com-
prehensive NSC action and "doctrine" for counter subversion will
not necessarily and of themselves guarantee coordinated (much less
integrated) and successful program accomplishment. Very much the
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same route has been taken in the past without lasting effect, even
to changing the name of the game from counterinsurgency to
internal defense to stability operations. We believe many countries
see in Vietnam a failure of U. S. counter subversion and do not
welcome our long-advertised "expertise" in this field; others judge
U. S. assistance politically inexpedient or counterproductive.
c. With regard to U. S. relationships with foreign
police forces, there appears to be no current need for the NSC
to task U. S. Mission Chiefs for a special, comprehensive report.
The requisite information is or should be readily available in
Washington as a consequence of regular reporting by the intelligence
community and various assistance programs and which have been
reflected in the various NIE's, SNIE's, NIS chapters, special
studies, memoranda, and reports.
d. With respect to intelligence information collection,
the proposed new DCID 1/ 2, "U. S. Intelligence Objectives and
Priorities, " contains specific requirements relating both to
"pre-insurgency situations" and "active insurgencies, " as well
as other relevant political and military reporting objectives.
e. Since in the final analysis successful counter-
subversion is a function of adequate operational intelligence and
its timely and effective exploitation, we perhaps should -- before
going outside the Agency -- look at our own capabilities for
collection, for counteraction, for coordination, and for the
exercise of leadership in this field.
f. While we share your appreciation of the first lesson
of Vietnam, to defeat subversion before it erupts into insurgency
and military action, we view counter subversion as practically
inseparable from intelligence collection and counterintelligence
in the broadest sense. We also believe that counter subversion must
be conducted within a country essentially "by its own forces in
their own way consistent with the national character and situation, "
and this impinges directly on our peculiar operational relationships
and liaisons with foreign police and security services.
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5. While there is still room for improvements in the CS
counter subversion program (see attached), this is largely a function
of people and training. In terms of people, we are -- in my opinion --
already fully extended. We are still heavily engaged in Southeast
Asia, and at the same time are in the throes of readjusting our
manpower both to reductions in overall personnel strength and to
realignments to meet new requirements and new ways of doing our
overseas job in an increasingly hostile operating environment. In
terms of possible future increases in our counter subversion effort,
25X
6. With regard to doctrine and training, we have sought to
learn from the "counterinsurgency" experience and to improve our
operational capabilities, not only to cope with subversion but also
to anticipate it, and have over the past few years published a number
of briefs and Special Operations Notes for field use. In addition,
individuals programmed for assignments to Southeast Asia have
usually received an introduction to internal security forces operations.
All of these measures recognize the need for increased sophistication
and for giving primary attention to the pre-insurgency phase of
counter subversion and to the identification and penetration of
subversive targets both for purposes of intelligence collection and
neutralization of the subversive forces. We recognize that more
needs to be done, and= and our Senior Staffs and Area Divisions
are keenly aware of the problem. We are also giving special heed
to the related problems of urban terrorism, our new responsibilities
in the field of narcotics and dangerous drugs, and also certain
/' aspects of coordination of U. S. relationships with foreign police
and internal security services which need tidying up.
7. In sum, then, while I agree in principle with your
estimate of the subversive threat and the need for a U. S. response
to it, I suggest that we defer for the moment taking this to the NSC,
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and that we concentrate our efforts on a systematic improvement
of our capabilities in this field, calling upon DDI assistance as
appropriate, and balancing these counter subversion efforts with
other Clandestine Service operational requirements.
25X
Thomas H. Karame s sine s
Deputy Director for Plans
Attachment
As stated
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
EXTENSION
NO.
Deputy Director for Plans
DATE
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1
.
Chief,
Concur:
2.
3. Chief, Counter Intellig
2C43
ence St
2g
aff
pN197
Concur
4.
5? Deputy Director for Pl
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ans
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Signature
6.
Executive Direct r-Co
mptroll
er
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3O 2R M 610 USEDITIO IONS
SECRET ^ CONFIDENTIAL 1:1 USE ONLY ^ UNCLASSIFIED
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