THE PARACEL ISLANDS INCIDENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01048A000800330009-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2004
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: January 21, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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the growing importance of the islands in the South
China Sea as a potential source of oil.
1. Our information on the sequance of events that
led to this weekend's clash between Chinese and South
Vietnamese forces in the Paracels is extremely sketchy.
The available record, however, suggests that it was
Saigon that took the key initiatives last week. Both
sides clearly have been motivated in large measure by
2. The Paracels are a group of small coral islets,
reefs, and rocks--none more than one square mile in
area. Sovereignty over them, as well as over other
island groups in the waters bounded by China, Vietnam
and the Philippines, has been a subjact of dispute
since early this century. Japan occupied all these
islands during the second World Saar. With the signing
of the 1951 peace treaty Tokyo renounced claims to,both
the Paracels and the Spratly Isl.3nds, which lie south-
east of the Paracels; at that time Taipei claimed
sovereignty over the Spratlys and the Paracels, the
colonial government in Vietnam claimed the Paracels,
and the Philippines claimed the Spratlys. Shortly
thereafter Peking claimed the Paracels, the Spratlys,
and the Macclesfield bank, which lies between them.
The South Vietnamese have subsequently claimed that
France turned the Spratlys over to them. The Re-
public of China maintained a smaLl garrison of
islands of the Amphitrite subgroup, the northernmost
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section of the Paracels, but withdrew its forces in
1950. Since 1955 Peking has garrisoned most of the
Amphitrite group, concentrating on Woody Island,
which it may intend to develop into a forward base
for its southern naval forces. n recent months the
Communist Chinese have also constructed. an oil rig on
Woody Island.
3. The present trouble dates from a South Vietnam-
ese statement issued in September, which reiterated a
claim to the Spratlys. Initially Pe}.ing chose to ig-
nore this claim, but on January 11 iL: responded with
a foreign ministry statement realfirrling the Chinese
claim to the Spratlys, the Paracels and the Maccles-
field Bank. For the first time Peking also formally
claimed the "natural resources in thE! sea around" the
islands. At about this time the Chinese also sent
some fishermen to the Crescent group, where according
to the South Vietnamese, they set up huts and raised
the Chinese flag. This apparently was a low-key
move designed to assert Pekinq's claim to the Crescent
group.
4. At this point Saigon switched its attention
from the Spratlys to the Paracels. Early last week it
sent a naval force to the Crescent group, with small
contingents of marines that landed on islands not
normally garrisoned by South Vietnam. These moves
apparently forced the withdrawal of the fishermen. The Chinese were evidently prepared for this contin-
gency and may well have anticipated it. Following
South Vietnamese firing on Chinese fishermen on Dun-
can Island on January 16 they dispatched military
units south, intervening with sizablE naval and ground
forces, as well as with air strikes. On January 18
the South Vietnamese were forced to pull out their
naval units, abandoning the marines (who were accom-
panied by a US citizen from the Deferse Attache's
Office in Da Nang) on the islands.
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5. In large part the clash clearly is an outgrowth
of the gradually increasing importance of all these is-
land groups--an importance based la-gely on the possibility
that significant oil deposits may lie in the waters off
Indochina. Saigon granted its ;Firs exploratory conces-
sions last year for the seas near South Vietnam; Hanoi
has been dickering with the Japanese and the Italians on
the exploration of the Tonkin Gulf; the Chinese have
been moving on their own to net into the offshore oil
business. Exploration in disputed areas of the South
China Sea will obviously be held up as long as the
sovereignty issue is up in the air. All the parties had
been moving gingerly up to the :.ast week, however. The
real question is which side, through calculation or
miscalculation, upset the delicate balance in the Para-
cels.
6. The question is somewhat moot, since both
sides were becoming more assertive and both clearly were
ready to move. The key step in the escalation, however,
appears to have been Saigon's military response to the
move of Chinese fishermen into the Crescent group.
Until this point, although Chinese =orces could (and did)
move quickly to the Paracels, Chinese military communi-
cations did not reflect an increased; state of alert.
Peking did not step up its communications until January
17--the day after the South Vietnamese forced 'the with-
drawal of the fishermen. Moreover, Saigon's military
activities have been accompanied from the start by a
heavy output of public commentary, whereas the Chinese
did not comment publicly at all unt:_1 January 19.
7. If the key initiative was Ln fact Saigon's,
we can only speculate on South Vietnamese motives.
Saigon may simply have decided that even a civilian
presence in the Crescent group was ntolerable and
that now was the time to make good its claim. It may
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WHAT CAUSED THE CLASH?
5. In large part the clash clearly is an outgrowth
of the gradually increasing importance of all these is-
land groups--an importance based largely on the possibility
that significant oil deposits may lie in the waters off
Indochina. Saigon granted its first expLoratory conces-
sions last year for the seas near South Vietnam; Hanoi
has been dickering with the Japanese and the Italians on
the exploration of the Tonkin Gulf;- the Chinese have
been moving on their own to get int3 the offshore oil
business. Exploration in disputed areas of the South
China Sea will obviously be held.up as long as the
sovereignty issue is up in the air., All the parties had
been moving ginaerly up to the last week, however. The
real question is which side, th.rougt calculation or
miscalculation, upset the delicate-)alance in the Para-
cels.
6. The question is somewhat moot, since both
sides were becoming more assertive and both clearly were
ready to move. The key step in the escalation, however,
appears to have been Saigon's military response to the
move of Chinese fishermen into the Crescent group.
Until this point, although Chinese..Lor_ces could (and did)
move quickly to the Paracels, Chine.-,e military communi-
cations did not reflect an increase-Al state of alert.
Peking did not step up its communications until January
17--the day after the South Viet:narmose forced 'the with-
drawal of the fishermen. MoreotJer, Saigon's military
activities have been accompanied from the start by a
heavy output of public commentary, whereas the Chinese
did not comment publicly at all unt!l January 19.
7. If the key initiative was in fact Saigon's,
we can only speculate on South Vietnamese motives.
Saigon may simply have decided that` even a civilian
presence in the Crescent group was intolerable and
that now was the time to make good its claim. It may
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have been gambling that once South Vietnamese forces
were committed the US would feel constrained to back up
its ally. Thieu may possibly ha'?e also felt that action
in the Paracels would help divert domestic attention
from the measures to strengthen the ,resident that were
then before the legislature.
8. The South Vietnamese obviously lack the ability
to move back into the Paracels withait Chinese acqui-
escence, and we see little possibility that, having
gained control, the Chinese will relinquish it. We do
not believe, however, that Pekinq will attempt to move
into the Spratlys or other islands i'i the area, where
the. status quo has not been distzrbel and where the
situation is complicated byPhilippi'ie and Nationalist
presences. Chinese treatment of the incident has
stressed the line that Pekin-c's moves were defensive;
now that the Chinese position hay bean assured, Peking
will probably stand pat.
9. This judgment is reinforced by Chinese handling
of the dispute over the Senkaku islands north of Taiwan,
which flared up in late 1971 and early 1972. Many
parallels between that dispute and the present one can
be found, including the sovereignty question (in this
case involving the Japanese and Koreans as well as the
Nationalists), and the potential of.large oil reserves
beneath the sea. In that instance tae Chinese con-
tented themselves with a restatement of their claim
to sovereignty, hinting broadly that the issue should
be resolved through negotiations delimiting concession
areas on the ocean floor.
10. Throughout the whole incident the North Viet-
namese have not issued any commentary--even though
propaganda from Saigon explicitly invited them to do
so and pointed to Hanoi's silence as proof of its lack of
independence. Hanoi's reticence is likely to continue,
since any line the North Vietnamese take would either
offend Peking or undermine North Vietnamese pretensions
to sovereignty, or both.
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11. At Annex is a detailed chronology on the
incident from DIA.
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The Paracel Islands in the South China Sea
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC C3= CHINA
CHINA
,Taipei
:EPUBLIC
OF
CFI INA
TAIWAN
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MALAYSIA
((WEST) /
i ~ONESIA
ioo spo Mue
~$UMATRA
SEA
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Paracel Islands
S O U T H
CRESCENT GROUP
South
China Sea
Pattie
Robert.,,y r
,) Triton
?~yurummunu
Moneyyi Duncan
' Discovery Reef
martrn
Passu Kea
.Tree
AMPHITRITE
r~x GROUP
R Rocky
Woody-*
C-11 h", I /V A
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that they are accomplices of -Communist China.,,
British radar at Hong Kong at 0345 EDT
reported the movement of some 17 probable
BEAGLE jet light bombers from Leiyang Air-
field in the.western sector of Kuangchou
to probable Siliihsi, the southernmost
airfield on the China mainland. Altitudes
ranged from 24,000-48,000 feet with ground
speeds computed as 300 knots (350 mph).
This movement was reported complete by
0550 EDT. .
At 0407 EDT CCOMSEVENTBFLT ordered all units
to stay "well clear" of the Paracel area
and "avoid actions which could be-construed
as participating in or providing support.
for that action."
As of 0800 EDT news of the actual military
conflict had not reached the Saigon press.
? Even so some GIN newspapers condemned the
NVN for keeping silent about the- Chinese
encroachment into the Paracels "while
proclaiming that they were struggling for
independence and sovereignty -- this shows
At 0815 EDT DACE Saigon reported GVN ships
HQa 4, 5 and 16 proceeding toward Da Nang.
with damaged main gun mounts, while HQs 11
(Patrol Craft Escort) and three unidentified
patrol boats remained in the Crescent Group
area. Total casualties were set at eight
KIA, 39 WIA, ani. 79 MIA.
At-1021 EDT SIG ENT sources disclosed that
the US Recon platform providing collection
on the Paracel island situation aborted due
to on board egu".pment malfunction noting
that no other collector would be available
to resume surveillance until 1645 EDT.
By 1045 EDT the DAO placed HQs 11 and her
three patrol boats patrolling three to
16 kilometers off Pattie Island with
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MEMORANDUM FOR: _,DDdi
Attached is the response to Dr.
Kissinger's request for information
on the Paracels. It was LDX'd to
the White Hduse at noon today.
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FORM GN 54 IDI WHICH REPLACES
1 AU
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