THE FAILURES OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01048A000800160027-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: December 23, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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23 December 1974
The Failures of Soviet Foreign Policy
It is undeniable that the USSR's international
position has vastly improved over the three decades
since World War II. The Soviet Union now presides
over a socialist empire, has become one of the .
world's two superpowers, enjoys substantial influence
in. Western Europe and the Middle East, and has some
voice in most other regions. These gains are, in
very large measure, the product of the USSR's growing
military power. Where Soviet foreign policy has had
to operate beyond the limits of this military power,
its record has been marked by numerous failures.
In Eastern Europe, Moscow has found no basis for
maintaining its alliance except military occupation.
Yugoslavia and Albania, free of Soviet forces, soon
freed themselves of Soviet control. Romania, having
negotiated Soviet troops out of the country.in the
1950s, has subsequently become a perennial problem
for Moscow. Soviet troops had to be reintroduced
into Czechoslovakia in 1968 and remain the fundamental
factor securing the obedience of that country, Poland,
Hungary, and East Germany. The USSR has not been able
to build a genuine political' loyalty or a sense of
shared objectives in this region.
In Asia, Moscow has suffered a defeat of the first
magnitude. It has been unable to prevent China's
change from key ally to major opponent, and the clumsiness
of its own policies in the late 1950s even contributed
to this process. In any open political system, it would
have been Moscow which was torn apart over the question:
who lost China? This failure has had many ramifications:
North Korea and North Vietnam have been able to follow
independent policies; Soviet influence has been blocked
in the belt of states lying between Vietnam and India.
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Soviet foreign policy toward Japan has been
particularly unsuccessful; in part because of a re-
fusal to give up a few trivial islands in the Kuriles,
Moscow ranks far below Washington and Peking in its
influence upon Japan and, indeed, is little better
off now than it was right after the war.
In Western Europe, fifteen years after Khrushchev
called it a bone in my throat" that could not be
tolerated, West Berlin stads free deep inside East
Germany. In retrospect, it seems almost incredible
that the USSR has been unable to translate its over-
whelming local predominance of force into anything
better than the present Quvidripartite Agreement on
Berlin. Soviet relations with West Germany, France,
and Italy have improved, but the USSR is still regarded
with distaste and suspicion in Western Europe. The
local Communist parties art dubious assets: the closer
the Italian party comes to'legitimate political power,
the more it distances itself from the USSR; the bigger
the vote that the French party obtains-, the cooler
other Frenchmen grow toward Moscow.
In the Middle East, the USSR has created a sub-
stantial position for itself. This position, which is
almost entirely dependent upon the Soviet role as arms
supplier to the Arabs, is unstable on several counts.
It is largely dependent upon continued Arab-Israeli
conflict, and would erode if a settlement were reached.
Furthermore, it is subject-to the vicissitudes of local
Arab politics, as evidenced in the unceremonial
ejection of Soviet military units from Egypt in 1972.
Soviet arms, supplied an a large scale and unlikely to
be repaid, proved insuffici-ent in 1967 and only a little
better in 1973. Meanwhile the USSR has established no
base of real basis of friendship in the area, has
earned precious little gratitude from its clients, has
made virtually no headway in the conservative Arab
states, and plays no role in its o-il policies.
In India, the USSR has done well. Its progress
has rested on one wise choice: to back India against
Pakistan. Nevertheless, although the Soviets stand
better in New Delhi than do'other major powers, the
concrete benefits have been small. Despite repeated
requests, India still refuses to provide shore facilities
to the Soviet Navy. In framing its position on inter-
national issues, India pays; some attention to Soviet
sensitivities, but by and large follows its own interests.
Meanwhile Moscow has fallen into the role of an aid
supplier who is increasingly seen as tight-fisted.
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The Soviets are still largely excluded from the
Western Pacific. They enjoy little standing in the
Philippines or Australia. They suffered a major
disaster, from which they have not recovered, in
Indonesia when the fall of Sukarno cost them their
entire position in that country, despite a previous
military aid program of major scale.
Two decades of effort in Africa have left the
Soviets with positions in Soma "nand Guinea that are
limited and subject to the durability of individual
local leaders. Moscow has already seen such gains
evaporate overnight in the case of Ghana, where its
investment was considerable. Most of its other efforts,
such as the attempt to exploit the Nigerian civil war,
have come to very little, and the level of activity
has now slacked off, amounting primarily to the main-
tenance of competition with China in individual African
countries. The entire trauma of the black liberation
movements in Southern Africa, despite the obvious
strains and vulnerabilities it entailed, has not yielded
to Soviet policy interventions.
Latin America remains an area in which the Soviets
have achieved only peripheral and spotty gains, with
Chile standing forth as a notable loss. The exception
is Cuba, which is a mixed blessing for the USSR. Cuba
was the occasion and the scene of the USSR's most criti-
cal.cold war defeat; the missile crisis of 1962. Eco-
nomically, it is a burdensome responsibility. Cuban
Communism has cost the USSR over $400 billion in aid,
plus another billion in subsidized sugar purchases; C:71
aid today is running a little under $1 million a day.
Politically, it is rewarding to have achieved a
Communist foothold in the Western Hemisphere, but
nothing has come of early Soviet hopes that this would
set off a succession of advances in Latin America. On
the strategic side, Cuba has not contributed to Soviet
naval capabilities to the degree that was originally
expected (because of US reactions).
All told, Soviet foreign policy during the postwar
period has shown no special trilliance. Perhaps its
major successes have come in Western Europe, which has
formally accepted the USSR's overlordship in Eastern
Europe (including East Germany) and treats Moscow as
a responsible and legitimate. interlocutor. But here
as elsewhere the USSR still lacks true allies; its
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ideology remains largely unattractive to the rest of
the world; as a country it is feared, admired to some
extent, but generally unloved and distrusted. It has
thus been forced to rely primarily on the reach of
its military power for an extension of its influence
abroad. This limitation will not be easily overcome.
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Office of the erector
of Central Intelligence
~~acu;ivtr F,'Sutzy
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Colby
Carey to pass,-.t\he along.. ,
Here are some thoughts on the
failures of postwar Soviet foreign
policy, as requested by Senator
Nunn. I presume you will want GRorge
25X1
a ions Intelligence Officer
for USSR/EE
7 7G `f
23 December 1974
Attachment
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