LETTER TO THE HONORABLE WILLIAM PROXMIRE FROM W. E. COLBY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01009A003100010018-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2006
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: March 2, 1974
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved.Gor Release 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP80M'G4009A003100010018,-3-
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
2 March 1974
The Honorable William Proxmire
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
It is true that a background briefing was given to certain newsmen
on February 27th which resulted in the article in the New York Times
you cited in your letter of March 1, 1974. The reporter made certain
errors in his article which have been raised with him separately and
which can be clarified below.
The briefing contained nothing of a truly classified nature. You
will note from the attached excerpts of the public hearing on my nomina-
tion before the Armed Services Committee of the Senate the gist of what
was stated in this briefing. Specifically, I described in that hearing and
the journalists were told that CIA solicits from American citizens any
information they may have of value on foreign matters. I am pleased to
say that a large number of American citizens, institutions, and firms
provide us such information as a patriotic act. Contrary to the. reporterts
mistaken assertion, we do not pay for such information, but we do make
arrangements to classify or otherwise protect our sources of such infor-
mation from possible exposure or from possible misuse of any proprietary
interest they may have in the information.
This testimony also referred to the fact that CIA personnel appear
abroad not as CIA employees but as representatives of "some other
entity. t' The discussion with the newsmen indicated that in some instances
these arrangements are made with U. S. business institutions which pro-
vide this assistance as a patriotic act. As noted in the article, we do not
pay such business enterprises any return for this beyond reasonable sums
for the administrative overhead and similar costs involved. In the course of
Approved For Release 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO03100010018-3
 Approved For Release 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP80MG4009AO03100010018-3
the discussion with the newsmen, an obvious fact was mentioned that a
business that has one of our officers among its staff can benefit inci-
dentally from his knowledge and expertise of the foreign country, but we
do not provide these companies the kind of direct assistance mentioned
in the first question you raised.
Your second question reflects a second error in the reporter's
account. At the briefing it was stated that it would be quite improper
for an intelligence service to spend nonappropriated funds and that CIA
does not do this. The incident involving the ITT, in which CIA refused
such a proffer, was mentioned, and the fact that CIA had not accepted
any such funds in at least the last ten years or so but that an answer was
not available about the period of the 1950's. I can assure you that CIA
will not spend any such nonappropriated funds, as I feel it essential that
CIA's expenditures be under the control of and pursuant to the annual
appropriations provided by the Congress.
With respect to your third question, the miniscule number of CIA
individuals under business cover as compared to the total number of
American businessmen abroad does not in my opinion cast suspicion on
legitimate business activity. CIA obviously takes considerable pre-
cautions to ensure that the entities providing assistance are protected
against exposure.
With respect to your fourth question, the intelligence community
has no different relationship with the oil industry than it does with any
other industry or institution. The intelligence community has benefited
from information received from the oil industry, in the forms noted above.
The intelligence community, however, does not rely solely on such infor-
mation in making its assessments. As indicated to the journalists, there
is a certain natural exchange of views and comments with business repre-
sentatives as well as with journalists, academic experts and others in the
course of discussing foreign intelligence matters, but this is no different
in the intelligence community than it is in the normal American Embassy,
Government department, or private American institution interested in
making the best possible assessment of a foreign situation.
Approved For Release 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO03100010018-3
 Approved4or Release 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP80MQJ009A003100010018-3
I hope these comments satisfy the concern expressed in your
letter. As indicated in my confirmation hearings and you noted in your
letter, I indeed wish to be responsive to Congress to the maximum
degree feasible within the Congressional charge laid upon me in the
National Security Act to protect intelligence sources and methods. I
have appeared before several Committees in an effort to do this. Ex-
cept for my confirmation hearing, these have been in executive session
in order that I may respond fully with classified as well as with un-
.classified information to the questions posed. It has also been the prac-
tice of the Senate that CIA respond with respect to the operational details
of its activities only to the designated subcommittees of the Armed
Services Committee and Appropriations Committee. Unless the Senate
wishes to change this arrangement, therefore, I would respectfully re-
quest that any questions which would involve such operational matters
follow that procedure.
Sincerely,
WEC:blp
Distribution:
Original - Addressee (handcarried by LC on 4 Mar 74)
1 - Mr. Braswell for Senator Stennis (handcarried
1 - Mr. McConnell for Senator McClellan
(handcar
1 - Mr. Nedzi (handcarried
1 DDCI
1 - DCI
1 - OLC
1 - DDO
1 - Mr. Thuermer
rieq
on 4 Mar 74)
4 Mar 74) 25X1
14 Mar 74) 25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP80M01009A003100010018-3
 Excerpts from Hea- '*ig Before the Senate Armed Se -rites Committee on
the Nominat rofieW FAtaFizWelilseC280166O tk9 7bp-C3 i. #taRbWv QGA131l dW*63Lc e
Seiiatbii= S cro c. Right.
rn general, What 'do you consider to be the proper scope ?of your
agency activities witl ntheUnited States?
Mr. Corsr. Mr. Chairman, we obviously have to run a headgna:rters
here; We havo to recruit people for our staffs, and so fdrth;: we have
to cbh:dt ct investigations on those peo~ile ; we have to biotebt, Our -own
intelligence sources and. methods within the Agency; we hare-to con-
tract with a large number of American firms for the various. kinds
of eecquipmeat that we might have :need for abroad. We also- I believe
Pages quite properly, 'can -collect foreign intelligence -in the' United Stag
25-26 iiicluding requesting American citizens. to share with. their. -Govern.
Pages
26 - 27
nient certain information they may know about forei situations.
We have a service that does this, and I am happy to say, a very large
.number of American citizens have given us some very important in
formation. We do not pay for that information. We can protect their
proprietary interest and even protect their names if necessary, if they
world rather not be exposed as the source of that information.- -
We also, I- believe, have -certain support activities that we must
conduct in the United States in order to conduct foreign intelligence
operations abroad. Certain structures are necessary in this country
to give our People abroad perhaps a reason for operating. abroad' in
some respects so that'they, can- appear not as CIA. employees but as
representatives of some- other entity. Lastly, I think that there are a
number of activities in the United States where foreicrn intelligence
can be collected from' foreigners, and as Ion- as this is oreign intelli-22
gence; 'I thins it giute proper that -we- do so, I can certainly, into
more detail?-on? this 'in -executive session any time you would 1 ; dlr.
Chairman, 'but I* reiterate that-the focus should and must be foreign
intelligence only, and that' all the: other. activities, are only supportive
of that major function.
Senator S TlR waro e. What tivould be your position 'regarding CIA,
collaboration with private American corporations overseas t
Mr. Co=.BY. Well, I think that in many respects there are perfectly
legitimate ways .in which we can collaborate with American corpo-
rations overseas.iirterms of the exchange of information and in some
situations corporations overseas Can help the intelligence: activityand
However,'--I'think your: reference -is-rather to-the situation that de-
veloped with FIT in .Chile and ?I think that our position there is, that
we are-not goino to be a conduit forcorporate policies -and that we:will
not allow ourserves to be controlled by some corporation.;
Senator?SYnrmdrox.' There would 'appear no reason; from the stand,
for-
point of logic; that prevents you utilizing American citizens in.a.for:
eign -country-to the best of your ability to obtain information.-You
would awe, would sou not?
1enntor SY3i1 oTo . On the other hand, you would riot want that
corporation to take advantage of your request by in turn obtaining
special favors from the Government?
Mr. Coi ar. Right. I think we have only one source of our authority
and that is the statute, and the President, and that we should make
decisions on what we do overseas based on the best interests' of the
United States as articulated by the Congress and the President, and
not by any individual company.
Approved For Release 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP80M01009A003100010018-3
 Qiie?rtiolc. Mir. ')y. your previou.t te. tinnony about lloulc.tic 'ivies of CIA
has pfcp s t~~~~,>s~~(~~$~ 9k.aF~-u 80 00e~et01W1O0010018
examples-hypothetical erampics if you like-nf the kind of ('IA inquiries and
interviews which you would new as proper within the United Statcsf
Answer. Provided that CIA's activities within the U.S. are In the prosecution
of foreign Intelligence and do not contravene U.S. law, I believe they do not cou-
flict with the statutory restriction against CIA involvement In domestic affair:
Examples of this kind of activity are :
Page (a) interviewing American citizens who knowinty and willingly share their
157 information about foreign subjects with their government.
(b) Collect foreign intelligence from foreigners temporarily within the U.S.
(c) Establish support structures within the U.S. to permit CIA operations
abroad.
(d) Recruiting. screening and training our own personnel.
(e) Contracting for supplies essential to foreign Intelligence operations.
(f) Providing training to foreigners in the U.S.
(g) Passing the results of foreign intelligence operations to appropriate U.S.
agencies luiving a legitimate Interest therein, e.g., the FBI.
(b) Under the economy act, providing assistance or service to other U.S. agen-
cies for activities within their statutory authority which do not involve CIA in
activities outside its statutory authority. .
Pages
183 -
184
Question. Moving to the question of 'domestic CIA- operations,' ecould Von
please describe the full eztcnt of CIl operations Acre in the. US..including
tho*e that relate to overseas program.t
Answer. CI L's operations in the US can be summarized as follows:
(a) headquarters and administrative activities, to Include proctire>nent, re-
cruitmeut, security clearances, experimentation, training, etc. .?'? -
(b) Domestic eollertton. American citizenLq are interviewed' on a knowing
voluntary bash for their knowledge of foreign intelligence which they will share
with their Government.
(c) Foreigners-operations are conducted to collect foreign Intelligence from
forelgners temporarily resident in the US.
(d) Mrrhanisms. rrlatfanships and faculties are required within the US
to support foreign Intelligence operations abroad.
(e?l Analysis and researrh of foreign intelligence matters by PIA staff and
contractors, consultants and Institutions. - _ ?
Question. Would you csplain the role of the Domestic Contact Serrice?
Answer.?Domestic collection-American citizens are interviewed on a know-
Ing and voluntary basis for their knowledge of foreign intelligence which they
will share with their Government.
Question. In it true that the Domestic Contact Service now has been placed
under the organizational authority of the clandestine services? If so, why?
Answer. Yes; In order to Improve the. coordination of its collection activities
with those of the Agency abroad.
?
Question. Have covert programs or personnel ever been run out of or in co-
operation with DCS operations or ofcca? If so, under what conditions?
Answer. Covert programs are not ran out of DCS offices but DCS contributes
from time to time to the Identification- of operational opportunities.
Approved For Release 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP80MOl009AO03100010018-3