CURRICULUM FOR DEFENSE STRATEGY SEMINAR, 1960

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01009A001502660004-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 55
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 1, 2013
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 18, 1960
• Content Type: MISC

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TH:77, NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
Washington 25, D. C.
DRAFT/LIED/18 May 60
'CURRICULUM
F OR
DEPL'N.SE S 11A E GY SE ViliisTAR., 1960
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THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
Washington 25, Do Co
18 May 1960
This E.,yllabus is approved and promulgated hereby for the guidance
of the Steff, Faculty and pcxticipanks of the Defense Stratec Seminar
for 1960?
THOMAS L. H.LRROLD
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commandant
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A...e SCOPE OF TUE COURSE 6't 'Ca ?-?0 0?-? ? 41
Pace
1
B. ORGANIZATION OF THE COURSE -.0 a 3
Ce DETAILED PROGRAM ? ?.00.? 80..00 000*(104*e
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DEFENSE STR.A.TE-GY SEMINAR.
A. SCOPE OF THE COURSE
Introduction,
This course is entitled, "Defense Strategy Seminar - 1t360." It
deals with the major issue facing the United States and its allies today:
t%se conflict with World Communism. It considers the causes of this
conflict, the objectives of the combatants, the techniques by which the
conflict is sustained, and the measures which the Free World may
take in order to maintain and increase its security, while preseeiag
its traditioral liberties for the individual.
2. Scope and Purpcee.
a0 To provie(, a specially selected roup of personnel with a
better understanding of the world c-milv.A and of the organization,
resources and metrices used by the adversaries to accomplish their
aims.
? b, To enable this group to understand the requirements for
successful US strategy, plans, and action in support of Free World
security.
c. To present to this group ideas and programs for creating a
resolute and informed US climate of opinion by which the above re-
quirements can best be reinforced.
30 Subject Matter.
a. The initial part of the seminar is designed to outline our
revolutionary env:ronment at mid-twentieth century; the nature of
the struggle in which we a?ne engaged; the revolutionary forces which
have transfigured the glob; and the objectives of the United States in
a world in rapid transition.
b. Part II of the seminar deals with the nature of our opponent--
his objectives, strategies, tactics, operating techniques and guiding
philosophy. Particular emphasis is placed on those misccnceptions
which continue to clona,our understanding of the Communist threat.
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c? Part III is an analysis of the spectrum of conflict. The
theme underlying these presentations is that conflict is no longer an
isolated pienonsenon which Mutts the "normal" peacefcl p.7-ocess of
history, Rather, theonflict of our time is total and encompasses
the entire range of human activities, from such "non-violent" forms
of conflict as economis and diplomacy to the weapons and delivery
systems of total der:-traction.
d?, Part IV considers some specific forward strater,ies which,
in concert with her allie.s, the United States C ail -adapt in order to
close the gaps in her defctrzes and take the initiative in the g,lobel
conflict, .
e, The final part oZ the seminar is devoted to an exploration
of courses of action open to the individual in a free society in the
tasks of: (a) ale;,-ting his community to the dangers of communism;
and (b) creating the necessary national climate of optIton in which
a parposeful policy can be formulated and carried out.
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Dai w Tonic
B. ORCANOZATION? OF THE COURSE
Nr.
PART L THE PRESENT WORLD ENWEONMENT
Mon 11 Jul
(AG MG )
(Po )
Te 12tlrul
(P. 11?)
1 The Natlre of the C=rent Covalct
Page
5
2 The Revoltrdon in the. Developing World 7
3 The Technological Revolution
4 Objectives and Vital Interests of
taaTh4tdSties
10
/2
-P.A.= 11,
(P0 M,)
COMMUNISM: ITS 3TRA..TEGY AND TA.C17C',S
44
5
Objectives ond Strategies e N.Plor.I.d ?
Commartisln
Wed
13 Jul
6
Cor.Q.,..marblt Tactles auji Operating
16
Te.n=;b45.ques
(Po MO
7
Soviet Russiats Foreign Policy
13
(Evening)
8
Corntn;v43i: Cb.inals Foretgn Policy
20
Thu
14 Jul
9
The Nature .of Cernrnux-lionl ?
23
(A, MG)
PART El.
THE SP:S.VISUM: OF CONFLICT
(A..MG)
10
The Range e Conflict
23
(P0M.,)
11
The Psycho-PoliUcal Confiict
27
Fri
15 Jul
12
The Economic Conflict
29
.(A. MG)
(PG. MO
13
The Te.cbnological Conflict
Sat
13 Jul
Repervecl for Discussion and Con,-
sultaUon
35
3
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Mon
16 Jul
14
The 11174.i.ry Conflict "General War.'
06
,
(iko )
(Pt Mo)
15
The Military Conflict Limited and
38
Giw..*rilla War
Tue
19 Jul
The Diplomatic Ccrs.fi::0;
40
(AGM.)
PART Pio
MEE NG rraE SOVE T CIIALLENGE
(A- Ittio.)
17
Soviei: Mllitaley Capabilities
442
Wed
ivj
20 *nu
(-At414)
18
/9
US IVIIIE.t.'44.7 Capabilities
Ex2lolting tie VulnerFtbriLLEPF: of
the Communist World
4446
20
Free Wcz-id Alliances
49
(Ev,:fatiag)
21
Economic and Strategy
Thu
21 Jul
(Ao1v.1?)
22
Foreign,tkssistarce as an. Tnetrun-ient
ot American Foreign Policy
53
(A.,?11)
43
R.ttie 'Cnrrent Streggle
.511
PART V
YOUR ROLF, IN THE COLT) WAR
Fri 22 Jul
(A0 M)
(Pc, M.)
The Role of the Militlry fn No-)-
milit--.4,ry Woxfare
25 Your Action on the Community Level
26 The Private Citizen and tae Dynarain
Annericzn System
4
t?,
00
62
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C. DETAILED PROGRAM
* * *
511ritST DAY
NON 1-54.IDDYULY
* *
PART I. THE PRES7,NT WORLD ENVIRONMENT
Topic #1
THE NATURE OF THE CURRENT CONFLICT
10 Introductiono.
a. In the revolutionary environment of the raid-twentieth cen-
tury, two systems are Locked in a conflict which is protracted in --
time, ubiquitous in space and embraces the forces currently domi-
nant in politics, economics, culture, science and technology.
b. The salient characteristic of this struggle is its multi-
dimensietal nature. While armed power may prove to be 1;:c final
arbiter, the conflict rages today on the shadowy battlefields of po-
litical, psyeiological, ideological and economic warfare? punctuated
by intermittent "breele'l'ee" encounters. Essentially it is a contest
between two opposing systems: the Open ant.1 the Closed Societies.
c. The very strengths of the Open Society constitute, at the
same time, its weaknesses. The tolerance of the Open Society for
diversity tends to accord sanctuery to those very men whose purpose
it is to destroy it. Accommodation is the guiding principle of the Open
Society; yet its very penchant foe- compromise places it at a potentially
fatal disadvantage in dealing with an enemy who will accept no compro-.
mice in his objective of world domination.
d. A main weakness of the Open Societ:, in this conflict is that
itreacts rather than acts, or responds rather than initiates. Diver-
gent interests and opinions often tend to preclude agreement on the
nature of the danger as well as programs for countering it. Historically--
even as long as 2500 years, ago when the Greek City States were
threatened and later overcome by Philip of Macedon?the Open Society
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has taken resolute e.,cten only 'when confronted with an immediate
and clearly deflect threat to its ex.:stance? Tcday, however, the
West faces an enemy who has mastered the strategy of ambiguity?
2,, Scope and Purpose of t1,0 Topieo
To analyze the various InaZZ25tations and aspects of the cur-
rent conflict and to evaluate the nature of the oppong world sys-
tems and their advantages and disadvantages in ila2 protracted con-
flict,
3. S aa,ge Ent:0.d Topics for Consideration.
The Co:lowing questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal
lecture, hut to stimulate individual study and analysis and for possible
use in discussion groups:
ao Is time on the side of the West or of the Sino-Seviet Empire?
ho What is the nature of the Cold War and the means with
which it is being waged?
co Bow do the West's traditional concepts of. "war" and "peace"
contrast with the Comrounlet view of conflict?
do. What are vte principal di.iferenees between an Open and a
Closed Society, Grld how do these affect the conduct of the conflict?
40 Lecture?
The title of the lechwebr this morning is "THE NATURE OF
THE CURRENT CONFLICT"
5. References?
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rmsT DAY
1103q5AY, 1 1- JULY
; * *
Topic #2
THE REVOLUTION 11S.T THE DEVELOPING WORLD
-
1. Iritrocluetion.
a. Succeeding pericdo or? history hare swept away the political,
social and eeovomic systems of the previous era in what-znay be
termed a useel.;:ernatic revolution." Thus, the Greek city-state gave
way to the universalism of the Roman Empire, whose disintegration,
in turn, created the base upon which the, feudal system of the Middle
Ages was built The netion-tate organization of the modern world
emerged from the breakdown of the feudal structure of medieval
society.
Today the world is engulfed in another systemic revolotion,
whose dimensions are comparable to the earlier upheavals. It is,
in part, the product of powers unleashed by the natural sciences, the
spread of industrialization, progress in communicaliono and trans-
portaidone and the extsion of Western ideas of liberalism and na-
tionalism to the refacia: corners of the earth. One of the most impor-
tant manifestations of thAs broad "systemie -evolution" is the revolt
of the underdeveloped areas of the world against the old order.
c. The roe of the "new nationalism, "the demand for racial
equality, and the "revolution of rising expectations" are some of the
forces propelling this revolution in the underdeveloped world. These
areas, historically, have been tied to the West today many are in
psychological, as well as political, rebellion against the West, thus
creating conditions of instability and disorder which the revisionist
force of international Communism seeks to exploit for its own pur-
poses.
d. A factor common to most underdeveloped countries is a low
standard of living with its accompanying social and economic ills.
The growing realization in these countries that economic and social
betterment can be achieved has made "progress" a vital political
Issue, Their governments, when unable to show concretely that they
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are fostering this economic development, tend to be unstable and
unpopular, and ripe for a Communist take-over through. violence
or the ballot-box, For economic reasons alone, the ro.nderaeveloped
world will continue to be an unstable factor in the balance of power.
e.? Economic instability .".n she underdeveloped world is matched
by political instability. By and large, the initial enthusiasm and pre-
ference for Western representative institutions by the indigenous,
Western-trained elites has waned because thee Wtmstern political
institutions have not been successfully transplanted bate alien social
and cultural climates. Hemel% today there is a tendency to experi-
ment with authoritarian forms of government, as nationalist leaders
attempt to find more effective solutions to the growing problems of
economic stagnation, social ehange, national disunity, corrupt
bureauc:racies and Communist sube-ersien.
fe The general politieal, economic and military weakness of
the underdeveloped areas may be expected to continue during the
foreseeable future, offering numerous opportunities for Communist
expansion
2. Scope and Purpose of the Topic.
To analyze the forces direetng the -eevei utionary changes occur-
ring in the underdeve7eysec1 world and the Impact of this revolution on
the struggle betwem the Cc.snmuniet Bloc and the Free World.
3. Suggested Topics for Consideration.
The following questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal
lecture, but to stimulate individual study and analysis and fez pos-
sible use in discussion groups:
au How have the Soviets exacerbated tensions created by the
systemic revolution in the underdeveloped areas?
b. What characteristics of underdeveloped areas hinder efforts
of the United States to influence the course of the systemic revolution?
c. As new nations emerge from the initial revolutionary phase
of their development into modern nation-states, are they likely to
lose some of their antieWestorn tendencies and become more aware
of the threat posed by the new colonialism of international Commu-
nism?
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d. Is economk. I.)rc.:gress and pclitical stability possible in
most tinderdevelod ammo under rep.?escn.i.ative forms or govern-
ment?
4. Lecture.
Tha title fo3.7 the le-at:are this afternoon is "THE REVOLUTION
IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD."
5,, rtefeityai'..eacack
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SECOND DAY
TUESDAY, 12 JULY
*
Topic #3
THE TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION
1, Introduction?
ao The world is in a rapidly maturing crisis. The technology
that is now developing and that will dominate the next decades seems to
be increasingly in conflict with traditional geographical and political
unite il.nd concepts.
b? Technological advances are having an Increasing impact on
political institutions and processes, eccnomic dayclopmen{t, the na-
ture of warfare, and tric struggle for the minds of men, Indeed, to-
day technology cuts across the entire speccrum of national strategy
and has become a proper and necessary subject around which secondary
strategies should be shaped?
c, The exploitation of basic scientific research and technological
empiricism has application in every phase of the world .struggle:
for instance, agricifitural improvements are affected by advances
in chemistry, farm tools, irrigation and fertilizers; manufacturing
is tied to progress in machine tools, automatic data processing,
transportation systems; military power is dependent upon metallurgy,
electronics, vehicular mobility and meterology,
d, A skillful teehnological and scientific strategy during the
next decade or two is essential in order to provide the United States
with effective tools to accomplish its international aims; to defeat
the ambitions of international Communism and to meet the challenge
of the revolution of rising expectations in the underdeveloped world,
2 Scope and Purpose of the Topic,
To assess the extent to which technology has altered the configura-
tion of the globe and to assess the impact of this force upon the forrnu-
lation of strategy?
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3. Suggested Topics for Consideration,
The following questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal
lecture, but to stimulate individual study arid analysis and for pos-
sible use :7n discdssion groups1
a, To what eXtent can technological progress in the form of
atomic energy, hydrology and agricultural improvements speed the ?
proe.esi3 of economic development in the Afro-Asian-Latin American
world? -
b. What will be the impact in the next decade or two of the
specd,,,1T)in dissen-Anc.tion of scientific knowledge and technological
kacw-how to China, India and other areas in the underdeveloped
world?
c. What are the military implications of this rapid technologi-
cal progress?
d. Is the technological revolution likely to bring a trend toward
political or at least economic integration in the underdeveloped world,
as it has in Western Europe'?
4. Lecture,
The title for the lecture this morning is "THE TECHNOLOGICAL
REVOLUTION."
5. Rete;rences.
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SECOND DAY
TUESDAY, 12 eIULY
* * * *
Topic f4
0.{3,TEC'fIVES AND VITAT, INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES
Intreduetiene
ao Within the cirele of those in the US government responsible
for the formulation and execution of foreign policy there is general
agreement on basic objective% These include the protection of
the territorial domain of the United States and its dependencies from
attack by unfriendly powers; the building of a strong alliance system
as a 6etense against the world-wide threat of the Sino-Soviet Bloc;
the maintenance of friendly relations with the underdeveloped coun-
leAes and the promotion of their economic growth and political sta-
bility as a measure in our own enlightened self-ineerest; and the
ultimate estahliehment of a world order based on law and justice.
bo The relative order of importance of these objectives and the
means for ecuring them remain issues upon which opinion is dee7ly
divided?
c. The success of the American experiment has led us to take
a pragmatic approach toward the problems presented by revolution-
ary change in the twentieth century? Americans tend to regard their
society as one of the elements in the process of change rather than
as a potential master or moderator of the forces stimulating cheng.,e.
do A growing number of Americans recognize, however, that
if our resources are to be applied successfully in the current iner-
natonal struggle, tbez'e must be a greater purposiveness than we
have exhibited in the x,str, This sense of purpose, moreover, must
inspire, not only the US, hut the entire Free World, whom we are
seeking to attract to our cat?,,eo
2. Scope and Purpose of the Topic.
To examine United States objectives and the development of
United States interests.
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30 Suggested Topics' for Consideration.
The following questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal
lecture, but to stimulate individual study and enalysis and for pos-
sible we in disci:Iasi:mi. grr_sups'.;
a, What are the positive values which free peoples shsre th
.corn ?
b. How can the areas of shared interests be expanded while
the. area of. conaicting interests are prevented fre.?..n spreading? ,
4. Lecture.
Thett1of the lecture for this morning is. "OBJECTIVES AND
VITAL INTEAESTS OF THE UNITED STATES,"
5, References&
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SECOND DAY
TUESDAY, 12 JULY
* * * *
PART fl, COMMUNISM, ITS STRATEGY AND TACTICS
Topic #5
OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES OF WORLD COMMUNISM
10 Introduction,
-.a. The ultimate objective of Communism is world domination,
Non-violent methods precede, accompany and follow military opera-,
tions, Communists will forsake open military conflict if they can
achieve their objective by non-violent methods, In that event, ex-
termination of the oppoaition will follow rather than precede conquest..
b, The Communists do not .7v:'4Ei s tr le t themselves in their choice
of method, Their strategy is multidimensional, In a given situation,
all approaches, direct or indirect, are used successively or si-
multaneously?
c, Communism thrives on the inevitable tensions of societies
living in the grip of a revolutionary era. Communism is a method
of highly organized conflict over a sustained period of time,
d, Communist strategy combines Russian conspiratorial and
imperialistic traditions in a great variety of approaches, These
include techniques of direct, indirect, overt, and covert opposition,
military as well as nonmilitary attack against the opposing system,
and subversion and infiltration.
e, Maintaining the strategic initiative, exaggerating strength,
minimizing weaknesses, use of deception and distraction, neutraliz-
ing the opposition if it cannot be overcome?all these methods are
characteristic of Communist protracted conflict strategy, if the
Communists are to secure a stable base for their strategies, they
must enforce strict internal security, They take advantage of all
opportunities regardless of ideological considerations
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2. Scope and Purpose of the Tic.
To examine the objectives and vital interests of World Commu-
nism and to develop an understanding of basic Communist strttegy
and teebniques.
3. Suggested Topics for Consideration.
The following questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal
lecture, but to stimulate individual study and analysis and for pos-
sible use in discussion groups:
a. What are the devices of Communist conflict management
and in what circumstances have they been employed?
b. What has been the role of military action in bringing about
Communist successes in the past?
? c. Why do the Soviets have reason to believe that they may
win the struggle without resort to open military conflict?
d. Does the spectrum of Soviet strategy exclude a pre-emptive
nuclear strike against the United States?
e. What hinders the carrying out of a strategy of protracted
conflict more vigorously by the Free World in general, and by the
United States in particular?
4. Lectwe.
The title a the lecture for this afternoon is entitled "OBJECTIVES
AND STRATEGIES OF WORLD COMMUNISM."
5. References.
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TR130 DAY
13 JULY
* * * *
Topic #6
COMMUNIST TACTICS AND OPERATING TECHNIQUES
Introduction,
a. The Communists have the .advantage of unrestroe7 tee!, operat.
ing techniclues. They exploit many situations in different ways. -
Organizational procedures include highly centralized conaict opera-
tions, carried forward by the Communist parties of the world func-
tioning Clot3 P ?Hilo al armies or combat parties, a world-wide network
for pollee c.:ontrol, espione.ge? propaganda, semantics exel agitation
to divide the opposition and destroy its will to resist.
Communlzts inaintain speeial training centers for foreign
agents and Communist cadres. A okeleton "government in exile"
or ce...dres oi exiles may be created to re-enter eed infiltrate their
countries of origin.
co In Communist strategy, the indireet method for gaining \
power and control is of par a MO ?Zit mport?aace, Indigenous groups
op-poscd to their own governments, fronts, fellow traveleree and
sympathizers are employed to deceive, divide, distte.ct and demoral-
12.-e the defenders of the established order. Priztelpal targets of
these tactics Et7 e elite groeps, labor unions and ethnic as -well as
religious te,roups.
2. Scope and Purpose of the Topic.
To develop se understanding of the means by which Communists
translate their operational principles into everyday action.
3. Suggested Topics for Corsideration.
The following questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal
lecture, but to stimula.te individual study and analysis and for pos-
sible use in discussion groupsg
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Wilmt are some cf the methods by which Communists a,. loft
the natural differences between variou.s groups?
b, What types of differences between groups in the United
States lend them Y:' rarticulariy to Communist manipulation?
c, What role do, fellow travelers and sympathizers abroad
play in Communist straLegy?
de What are some themes of Communist p11.-opaganda which are
cnt in the United States and which tend to weaken our will to re-
sist?
e? What is the role of tho Communist party, the pollee and
the armed forces within a political system?
Coxr.rore the functioning of the Communist poTty of any na-
tion with a e,,ofigentional Wostern political party.
4. Lecture..
The title of the lecture for this mornin4 'COMMUNIST
TACTICS AND OPERAUNG TECIiNIQUES.."
5. Refer
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THP.D DAY
WEDNESDAY0 iT JULY
Topic #7
SOVIET III/SSKAN FOR,EIGN POLICY
lo Introducticla.
a. The Soviet Union it:3 the main power base and the guiding in-
telligence of the global Communist movement, The fundamental ob-
jectives, therefore, of the Soviet Union and world Communiwn are
synonymons; these objectives are the progressive degmciation of the
non-CommQuist world, leading to the undisputed sway VF COthrltarliGITI
throttgl-?ot2 the globe.
b., There have.1,7,ec.,n times, however, when the Soviets found it
expedient to acrfoe the fortunes of Communist parties abroad to
the Russian II a: :Li oi -a I tra;e7este Thus, Stalin 1,,oncluded a pact with
H1t3.er despite the latter4s persectAtion of German Communists. Thus,
also, Igatr.lashchev continues to render support to cevfain leaders in
the M.Eddle East, despitz..- thi.alr hostility toward iuetti, Communist par
,-
ties. While the moves represent in part tactical accommodations,
they reflect also the traditkaial ?.::;trusts of Soviet foreign policy; he.r
drive for great power status ay,ad 4:?..rritorial expansionpartici.xlarly
socethward to the Persian Gulf arid the Middle Easto
c. Before World War LI, Soviet policy was overizly defensive.
Its objective was to safeguard the Soviet 151,1/012 against premature
military encounters, while the experiment of "Socialism in one
country" VILi3 being pressed, and while the USSR was gradually
building a military establishment. World War broke the "capi-
talist encirclement" and ushered in a new "flow period" of Soviet
power.
do A main short-term objective of the Soviets is the "lcgitimi-
zatkm" of Soviet conquests, This objective underlies Sovist efforts
to induce the West to recognize the .status quo in Europe, partictigArly
the di-Aeon. of Germany.. It is implicit, also, in the attempt to drive
the Western powers from Berlin.
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c? ?The Soviets seek to iselate the United States through the
systematic dissolution of the Free Worlds defensive alliances.
This explains their coneristent policy of directing threats and blandidhe
merits at major allies of the United S'Wes, especially those that host
the forward base of US strategic ,power,
f, Parallel with the Soviet& divisive strategy is their endeavor
to 04:1e:et the disarmament ol the United S'eatee, The Soviets seek to
accomplish this objective through the "evatralization" of US nuclear
capabilities, the physical nrolleback" of US strategic power overseas
aeld a variegated carnpaige of disarmament,
2, Scope and Purpose of the Topic,
Te extelyze Soviet foreign policy toward the Free World, with
emphasie epen the United States,
Suggested Topics for Corsidereticte?
The following qeereelons are paled, net az a guide for the formal
lecture? but to stimulate individuel study and ana/ysis and for pose
Bible use in discussion groups:
a, What do the Soviets mean by "peaceful coexistenec"? }low
does this concept fit into tradlti.vaal Communist conflict doctrine?
b, How have the policies of Mirashchev differed from those of
Stalin?
co What were the principal reasons behind the dissolution of
the Comintern and, later, the Cominform?
d, Do the Soviets regard the Free Workits military .alliances
as aggressive arrangements directed at the Soviet Union or as
barriers to Soviet expansion?
4, Lecture.
The title of the lecture for this afternoon is "SOVIET RUSSIA,S
FOREIGN POLICY."
5, References,
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THARD.D.A.Y
WETVESD7C--i'4....TULY
* 4,, *
Topic #8.
COMIVIUNIST CHINtitS FOREIGN POL7CY
I, Introduction.
a? The most persistent feature of Communist Chines foreign
policy is denberate hostility toward the United States, The United
States st,Tecds as the only major obstacle to the attainment of her-
major policy objeetivesg tne seimere of Taiwan to ratify the sac.-
cess of the COMM antGt revolution on the rnainlond; the establishment
of Chinese Cone/mullet primacy in all of East Asia; and the eventual
overthrow of the entire Free World, a goal shared by the Seviet
Union.
b? These objectives of Peking are dictated by its Communist
ideology and conflict doctrine and reinforced by Chinese history.
Traditienally, Chine ee expansionism has pushed to the, son.% and west.
Chine.ae aggoessiveeee;z is spurred also by such internal tactors as
the population erp:1/2.,,see.n communitration and the continuing attempt
to consolidate tote3.-ilar4en control?
co Chinese policies toward her southern neighteers have alter-
nated between aggression and subversion on the one hand, to attrac-
tion and the d4eiornacy cZ "peaceful coexistence" on the other,, The
use of force or of threats is doeigned to instill fear into the leaders
and peoples of weak and exposed nel.ghboring states; the policies of
attraction serve to lull the suspicions of netelrelisi*. leaders.
de Alternating Chinece policies of attraction and pross.ere are
likely to be continued through the decade of the 1980vs, unless or
until the Chinese Communists believe they are in a position to gain
their ends by pursuing the one policy to the exclusion of the other.
Overt aggression cannot be ruled cut, should Peking conclude that
the weakness of the area assures a swift Chinese victory.
e. Chinese and Soviet leaders believe they are riding the crest
of history and the "future" in human affairs, Their alliance assures
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each considerable military, strategic, economic and political ad-
v-aniages--adva,ntages which are likely to outweigh varlous differ..
encss between them. Any rupture in Sino,-Soviet relationsvo?d
affect adversely the political prostlge and power of boVA partners.
Despite these important reasons for meotaining the unify of the
alliance, there are p.-.;x:4iiailities for future conflict over ideology,
timing and tactics, tRi??3:aation pressures, bloc leadership, border
issues and growing Chl.ntize power.
2. Scope and Purpose of ilia7 Topic.
To analyze Communist Chinas aggressive policies in Asia and
MOScow-Peking
3. Suggested To;...)ies for Consideration,
The following questions are posed, not as a gulde for the formal
lecture, but to stimeate irklMdual study and analysis and for pos-
sible use in discussion groups:
a. What are the various forms of limited and unconventional
aggression employed by Communist China to overthrow both neutral
and pro-Western gc.vernmonts in South and Southeast Asia?
b. How successful have US military and economic assi..nce
programs 73eon in improving the ability of these new nations o cope
with Chins:Jo aggression?
c. What impact would US recognition of Commuclst China have
on the neu1ral and pro-Wertern nations in the area?
d. Given Fekingvs posture of host:Ulf/ .eward the US, is there
any chance that US recognition of Peking would be reciprocated,
short of complete US withdrawal from East Asia.?
,e In what ways can Peking, together with Moscow, bring pres-
sure to bear on Japan in ardor to weaken the US-Japanese partner-
ship and force japan into a neutralist position and eventual absorp-
tion into the Communist blo0
f. Are Chinese and Soviet national objectives incompatible in
the long run?
4. Lecture.
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4110
'The tifx, of the lecture for this evening is COMMUNIST CHINAS
FOREIC'N POLICY."
5 References.
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FOURTH DAY.
THriii.RVT,?!. ad, JULY
Topic #9
TIM NATURE OF COMM.MSM
Fallacies regarding the nature of Communism are widely
accepted az truth, a..A perpetuating these :myths is a central Com-
inunisl: objective. EtT;;tetive action aFT;inst Communism is impossible
ur.less its true MtWe taaders, tood,,
b? Communism is not hKimunitArianisr:i; f,,t is not devoted to ir.
piing the comation a the masses, nor is it "1.7xJT,.ez-.).k.:Vie" in its con- .
cept of man or history. Cornmunism in practice is not a synonym
Cor social egaltarianism., hut, in many ways, its very a:atithesis,
Cor.unannists are 'let sircer wb.m they initiate and pose as protectors
01:::19.0.onal revolutions in coloniai. areas. The actions of the Com.
2./WiliStE; belie their claims to being "peace.lovivo?." Economic growth
..ite.te monopoly is not necessarily greater than under a free
enterprise sysix,rn regulated by equitable governmemt actions. The
Communists pvfess an unyielding adherence to useicatc" dogma,
but repeatedly Ideology has bei.:A. sacr.ificed to e4Tediency, The USSR
long ago abaudoned Marxian econornics?
c, Communism is not the "wave of. the future. " It is not the
highest form of political evolution, nor is it inevitable. Nowhere
has Communism been the product of spontaneous historical forces.
In all countries where Communism has triumphed, it has bsen im-
posed and maintained by terror and force of arms.
2,, Scope and Purpose of the Topic,
To gain an understanding a Communism and to prevent and
correct misconcepCions regarding its nature,.
Suggested Topics for Consigle:tlon.,
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The following qncotioris E4re. posed, not es. a gaf,de for 1.h.e formal
lecture, ht to stimulate individual study and analysis and cor pos-
sl.ble 11EG ID, ditiellgan;L:. greAlpSt
0,, How hs???t,,, the Cozna-mulist's mamaged disguise the real na-
ture ci their system aud philosophy?
b,? How ha.ite these mrths arisen?
c.,? Why are the unconm)MA f;eople of Asia and Africa so Sqls-
cely1ato theoe myths?
d? Wh?:?tls -the dIfference between .Socia,lism and Communism?
Eow Soviet pc,rActife correspond to Cerninmale theory?
't!o
The tttie of the leetLre for this morniag is "THE NATURE OF
COMMIJNSMIc
5? References,
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FOURTH DAY
T.IIITASDAY, 14 JULY
* * *
PART 111. TEM SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT
Topic #10
THE RANGE OF CONFLICT
Introductions
a, All devices are employed by the Communists to advance
their overall goat.. Their master technique is to combine militar.y with
nonmilitary mewl of struggle. They seek first to achieve a (Tali-
tative and el.aaritit-Itive waperiority of armaments relative to the Free
World; secondly, to mtud.mize the effectiveness of Communist mili-
tary organization and coordination; thirdly, to integrate their mili-
tary potential into the conduct of their permanent revolution against
the 'West.
b. The Communists seek to achieve armaments superiority
by their own accomplishments in the technological race, and by try-
ing to reduce the armament of the Free World by disarmament propa-
ganda. and diplomacy. For the latter purpose they threaten the allies
of the United States, especially those in whose territory the US has
military bases and use nuclear blackmail to reinforce political pres-
sure.
c? The Soviet combined arms doctrine extends to the whole
spectrum of military conflict. The Communists use proxies to avoid
direct responsibility for the Initiation of hostilities and maintain a
balanced military system repable of waging all types of warfare,
from nuclear war to guerilla activities and individual terror. The
spectrum includes all the methods of psycho-political and economic
warfare.
d. The weakening of the Free World from within and the neu-
tralization of strong elements of resistance are an integral part or
Communist strategy.
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e4 The Communists are, ea:kilned by their Eir..ettrine to withhold
attack until a truly favorable opportunity arises, ..)kee. whAch the
risks of the effort are minimal and the CIMItleCO of vielsory optimal.
Once the opportme moment ha s come, the Communists will strike
or try to ache world domination by forcing the Free World to sur-
render.
20 Scope and Purpose of the Topic.
To develop en. understanding of the nature of the Communist
tee1'inr3r challenge presented by an integrated system of military,
para.military and military-political techniques.
3. Suggeelteci Topics for Consideration.
The following questions are posed, not as a guide fer the formal
lecture, but to stineu3ate individual study and analysis aad for possible ?
use in discussion
a. How do CcannurilEets mesh violent and. non-Violent methods
of conflict in a given operattone-efor example, tb.c penetration a the
Middle Eact?
IP, How do Communists expiollt gaps or weaknesses in the
Free Worlds weapons spectrum?
Are Communists likely to stress increauflae)y violent rne,thods
of conflict as their military capabilities grow?
d0 s therett relationship between the USSItts nuclear disarma-
ment proposals and the actual composition and organization of its
military faeces?
e. By what techniques do Communists press for the disarma-
ment of the Free World?
f0 Under what circumstances is it likely that the USSR vrocl.fl
resort to all-out war? Would the same estimate hold true for Com-
munist China?
4, Lecture..
The title of the lecture for this morning is "THE RANGE OF
CONFLICT."
G. References.
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FOURTH DAY
THURSDAY, 14 Z.:to, ?
* * *
Topic #11
THE PSYCHO-POLIT/CAL CONFLICT
1.0 Int?? ed motion.
ao On the pa::-.Y000--,political batiefield, the West has failed to
match Soviet prowZ-,90.tiespite the Wet ?s overall superiority In
ma.terial power,, This paradox underscores the need of a thorough
examination of the base of US psycho-political strategy-.
bo Propaganda, no matter how cleverly conceived., is not by
itself sufficient to determine the trend of international political
attitutleso 'Maria is a wtdesp.ttead belief that propaganda constitutes
age instrument for influ.encing the thinking oi peoples accord-
ing to a desired pattern, irrespective of basic roi,71;.:ary, political
or economic factors. Actually, propaganda cannot be a substitute
for power or, indeed, for policy.
co Whereas the United States attempts to persuade, the Soviets
oeelt cooeition. We conduct irlormation programs; they wage
psychological warfare. We try to accompliah our political objec-
tive of influencing foreign peoples through formal arrangements
made at the goat rnment-ic-government level; they press their con-
ditioning ca.mpolgo, through numerous non-governmental channels,.
d, tn waging psychological warfare the Soviets will continue
to hold certain advantages which are inherent in the nature of
"closed" 000ieties pitted against the "open" societies of the free
nations.
0. Paycho-pcia-'ical. strategy, to be successful, must in the
last analysis be based upon an adegoate comprehension of the ideo-
logical forces and cultural factors ccerative in the contemporary
international environment. During the last decade, the swelling
ideological currents in the underdeveloped ?areas?nationalism, anti-
colonialism, neutralism, antimilitarism, anti-imperialism and
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nnticaptii,IIern--have been rtinnt,g aguinst the West, B cleTcrly
e-zploiting these forces, the Soviets have been able to ii fnds,
tr23-,le for the West and reap home strategic profits at
low r oat.
Scvne and Parpc:F.3,9 (...4 the Topi.c.,,,
To assess the relative strengtha.; and weaknesocs of the Free and
Communist Worlds in the 17.;syelto-politica1 con.f11,,,:to
Fil.genet.lte,,a Topics for Cons:1.721.,I.,.t.loy.x.
The following questions are poried? not as a guide.. for the formal
1ecire ht to s.j.mu.:Uxte individual study and aysis and for possible
. aue iii disctsr:don groupz.n.
ar, What are the inherent advuntages held by Commmists in
the p yobo-st,-;litical conflict?
b. What are the moral, and imtitutioctal restraints which inhibit
lorcefui Western poycho-pohltical strategy, and Lo-ctr can theso be
overcome or modified?
c. What is the 7..nle of the Soviet disarmamentcanip..:',Iggi iTfie
Convinur);..".3t psycho-political strategy?
d, Ilow do the Iron and Bamboo Curtains shield the Communist
Lbloc against outside 1,7,51,alerices and assist it leaders in their attempt
to proser-ve unity of nliad at home?
e., What is t.i! role ol nuclear bla,clunail in the Soviet cam-
paign to undermine psychological deferxses of the West?
4? Lecture,
The C.1":; of the lecthre fcr tt1-1,7 afternoon is "THE PSYCHO-
POLITICAL CONFLICT."
5. Ref.erences..
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FRTINV.I; k5 :51CFLY
* * *
Topic #12
TEE ECONOMIC CONFLICT
10, Introduction.
?
a.. Althoolgh the West bx,.e irlotorically assumed that only one
international eeonomy exis'4..-;; the Soviets are convLiced that they
000e brndg a "parallel world market" which will g,rndually ot,ver-
take and sorpn.ss the Free World market system0
b. The Soviet GNP is probably -about 40 per cent of that a the
US but the Soviet arnuoi growth rate seems to be greater tilan ou
Moi: cover, the tobsooent n:ure of the SovIct system makes
he for for the USSR to depress consumption and allocate a L4Aoo--1-.Oizx
portion oZ total expenditures to programs whinh promote national
strategie power (mUttaxy production? k & D, investment, foreign
assistanee and higher education).
e. Eastern 14 plays a more signiiice.nt economic 2.'o1c. than
is generally realizod YbiIi the Woot.. The program of industloializa-
tion which hs beon care d out In Eastern Europe during the past
decade has aided the economic development a Cb.f.na and enhanced
the Moots CaPat:!ity or co.r.oyin.g out its foreign ectscunic offensive.
d. The Soviet offensive is waged against the West, kg.)th di-
rectl-y (through dun-.gping, gold exports and other disruptive tactics),
an indirectly in the underdeveloped areas (throagh low-interest
loans, barter deals, exchange manipulation. and ether .dcvilees of
economic penetration). The dangers posed by the bloc in the area
of trade consist, not so much in its actual volume, hut rather in the
f:texibility mad eficiency wieo which the Soviets can ey.npioy the re-,
sources of a s',,:ate trading monopoly in dealing with irdivjdiral free
countries and business firms.
e. In any assessment of the long-term economic conflict, we
should not lose sight of the great economic power of our Free World
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indust'ial. allies (United Kingdom, th.e, countries of Westen). Europe.,
Japan and Canada), as well as the yoUnger industrialng nations
(Mexico, Argentina, ail end others).
20 Sec.pe arid PIA:IPC*34"3 of the TopCi.e.
To understand the re:alities of a divided ecouon-jc world, the.
problem ol comparing growth rates, and the various factors which
be upon economic strategic pow ae in a period of prolonged inter-
national conflict:
3,, S",tggested Topics for Consideration.
The follow;.ag questior.s are posed, not as a ge...'ide fc,r the formal
lecture, but fts :7:emulateid study and analysis and for possible
use in di,scPanion groups:
a. What are the assets and liabilities of the Soviet c-)conornic
system? Arc elp. Con-ere:mists more conscious of "growth" as a
strategic ob-.),ceetive than we are? Are they able to put their produc-
tive resources to fuller use than we dc?
110 P.ere the Communist bloc countries moving toward eeonomic
!.ntsgration and cooperedoa more vigorottsly than .2rie couzt:ties
the Free World?
c. Does Chlna,, en balance, represent a net gain or a not drain
to the Communist vr.T.y.id?
d, What dIffictiltis s-%7r-o :likely to conf.ront the Soviet economic
planners during the years attemd?
e. What advautages do the Soviets enjoy ht approaching the
underdeveloped countries with aid-trade offers?
f. What is the relation hetw.l.en military aosistance and eco-
nomS..c. aid in our efforts to strengthen the defeesee of the underde-
veloped countries?
g. Is There any danger that we. may begin to view other allied
cotmtries as posing a greater threat in the realm of economic corn-
pettier. Veze,. the Sino-Soviet bloc? What can be done to head off
sueh a danger?
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4. Lecture.
The title of the 1&ture for this morning is "THE ECONOMIC
CONFLICT."
5. References.
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FIFTH DAY
ratan?: 15 eTTJLY
* * *
Topic #13
TEE
rf HNOTOG'CPL COWLICT
1. Intretleetion.?
The Soviet Union during the postwar period hes made rapid
techuoloatical progreee and radically increased its power-base rela-
tive to that of the thehed Sta.tes3 rrteis surge has been reflected most
vividly by the rapid Se via attainment of a strong nuclear posture,
its highly sophis.ecated conventional weapons, initial missile sys-
tems and achievements In the field of space teethology.
bo There are eeveral fundamental reasons for Soviet advance-
men% First, there is a continuous, sense of awareness and decision,
both by planners and those who carry out plans, as to the direction
antfi relative priority of projects? Second, wife: these objectives in
mind, the Soviet decisionemaking structure itselt to more respon-
sive and immediate in its reactions.. Third, o-ace decsione and
priorities are -established, effolets are, devoted to a particular pro-
ject in proportion to its prierily.
eo Soviet leadtime for complex weapon systems development
and other tec.hnical projects tends to be significantly shorter than
our own. Moreover, the Soviets allocate funds according to stra-
tegic priorities, end do not determine priorities or strategies ac-
cording to available frinds,
la terms of comparative capabilities, the United States ad
the Free World undoubtedly possess the necessary physical and intel-
lectual reeources to meet the challenge of the Communist Ittoia Bet
mere possession of the tools is not enough. The technological ad-
vantage will go to that side which is most perceptive, dynamic and
adept in exploiting thnre.,,
eo Technology is unique in the arena of strategic conflict in
that the development of a technological arm of stvat,Pgy is relatively
within our own control. The interrelationships or. the politieo-
diplomatic, military, economic or geographic aspects of an overall
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strategy are complex and dependent on many factexs? But techno-
logical aspects of US otrateu enjoy the luxury iceL! onmparatively
little interference from external pressure.
f? There are clear indivetions that the Soviets are in deadly
earnest aboui: outstripping ue in this key field of endeavor. This is
not merely a race for marginal advantages, but rather a ruthless cord-
pciition for the wherewithal and know-how to win the protracted con-
flict,
23 Scope and Fa 'pose e the Topic..
To develop an understanding of the technological couflict, wish
parUcualx? emphasis on the implications of the rapid Soviet techno-
logical adsznecs on the security of the Free World,
3., S!.azgested Topiee for Consideration.
The following ellteeetions are por.3,..ed, not asi a. guide for the formal
lecture, but to EV:ratila.t,t)F.rI.diai sticky =ad analysis and for possible
use in discussion groups
a. Where does the United States stand, technologically speak-
ing, in the internatienal power struggle?
Is the notion of a techmlogical stalernatc an illusion? Is
a decisive tect..tological bre.aldhrough on either zit-Th poss;ble or
probable?
co VOW; are the reletivo stre-4ths and weaknesses of the
Soviets and ,trarselves with regard to advaticed planning methods and
leadtimes in the selection and production of weapons?
d? What will be the relationship between outer space develop-
ments and Free World security in the next decade?
e. How can the will to devote a higher proportion of the national
wealth and energy to critical defense research and production be
stilled in the American people?
4? 1..,ecture3
The title of the lect.nre for this afternoon is "THE TECHNO-
LOGICAL CONFLYCT, "
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50 References,
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SIXTH DAY
SATURDAYS
RESERVED FOP, DISCITEir:c.;:::.ON AND CONSULTATION
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SEVENTH DAY
MONDAY* 18 JULY
* * * *
Topic #14
THE MILITARY CONFLICT: "GENERAL WAR"
I. Introduction.
a. Nuclear weapons exist in many forms, and their yield and
variety are suited to various modes of application. Since we are still
in the "model T" stage of nuclear weapons development effective
types can be evolved only by continued research, experimentation and
development.
b. It is necessary to understand the impact of nuclear weapons
and powerful new delivery systems on the developing forms of mili-
tary operations and forms of combat in general, and upon Soviet
military doctrine in particular. The trend appears to be toward the
development of ever -greater firepower of nuclear weapons.
c. So far the Soviets have rejected exclusive reliance on an
ultimate weapon or on a particular weapons system, realizing that
it is necessary to possess a capacity to deal with a variety of stra-
tegic and tactical objectives. Apparently they are shifting to a con-
cept of nuclear surprise attack and of nuclear blackmail based upon
technological superiority. While in the past the combined operation
by balanced forces, tailored to the strategic role or tactical mission
and not to a specific weapons concept or system, has been the Soviet
answer to warfare, it is gradually changing.
d. Like ourselves the Soviets are confronted by the problem
of how to fight an all-out nuclear war without committing suicide.
Winning the technological race and winning the political battle are
the two cornerstones of a nuclear survival strategy.
2. Scope and Purpose of the Topic.
To assess the problems of general war and the impact of new
weapons systems upon military strategy,
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3, Suggested Topics for Consideration.
The following questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal
lecture, but to stimulate individual study and analysis and for possible
use in discussion groups:
a. What has been the impact of nuclear weapons technology on
traditional Soviet military doctrine?
b. Are their dangers in the so-called "missile gap"?
c. Is the "balance of terror" a stable one?
d. What are the objectives of the Soviet campaign for a nuclear
test ban? How would such a ban affect the capabilities of both sides?
e. How can a more constructive US public opinion be developed
regarding the relation of nuclear weapons to national security?
4. Lecture.
The title of the lecture for this morning is "GENERAL WAR,"
5, References,
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SEVENTH DAY
MONDAY, 28 JULY
* * * *
Topic #15
THE MILITARY CONFLICT: LIMITED AND GUERRILLA WAR
1. Introduction.
a, The definition of limited war is an elusive one. Wars may
be limited in terms of their intensity, geographic sweep and the ob-
jectives pursued by the combatants.
b. The USSR's growing nuclear capability is likely to open to the
Communist leadership an increasingly wide range of political and
military option. The Soviets may well come to conclude that limited
and guerrilla wars, especially those initiated by satellites under am-
biguous circumstances, may be "safe wars"?wars that will not
trigger all-out nuclear conflict. The various instruments of indirect
aggression, such as "volunteers" and proxies, which have proven
so successful in the past, may be used more frequently.
c. The Communist bloc's capability for limited war?with or
witbout resort to tactical nuclear weapons--may not have to be exer-
cised in actual combat. The implied threat of its use may be suffi-
cient to gain such limited objectives as Berlin.
d. Strategic nuclear capabilities are of overriding Importance
in deterring a direct nuclear attack against the United States. But
they may not deter challenges overseas that fall below the "threshold"
of an obvious issue of US survival. The Soviets may seek to raise
this "threshold" through an incessant campaign of nuclear blackmail.
e. A major danger inherent in limited war?especially one
fought with tactical nuclear weapons?is its possible "spiralling"
into general thermonuclear conflict. The contestants* willingness
and ability to keep a given conflict limited will depend on their re-
spective objectives and their tacit acceptance of certain "ground
rules" concerning firepower and geographic limitations.
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f. Guerrilla warfare is gaining importance both as a "safe"
means of waging conflict under the nuclear umbrella and as a po-
tential instrument for winning the "broken back" phase-of a nuclear
conflict. With few exceptions--notably the british anti-guerrilla
campaign in Malaya--the West has proven itself inept against this
unconventional and surreptitious form of attack.
2. Scope and Purpose of the Topic.
To develop an understanding of the nature of limited and guerrilla
war and their role in the spectrum of conflict.
a. Suggested Topics for Consideration.
The following questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal
lecture, but to stimulate individual study and analysis and for pos-
sible use in discussion groups:
a. Is it feasible or desirable for the West to maintain a "dual
capability"--i.e? a capability to fight limited wars either with
nuclear or conventional means?
b. Do announced Soviet forces reductions signify that the Soviets
have abandoned the idea of limited war?
o. How do limited war and guerrilla warfare conform to tra-
ditIonal Communist conflict doctrine?
da In the light of the unfolding strategic equation, is limited
war in Western Europe possible?
e. Are the requirements of a general and a local deterrent
power compatible or mutually antagonistic?
f. How can the democratic nations increase their capabilities
to wage both guerrilla and anti-guerrilla warfare?
4. Lecture.
The title of the lecture for this afternoon is "LIMITED AND
GUERRILLA WAR."
5. References.
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EIGHTH. DAY
TUESDAY, 19 JULY
* * * *
Topic #16
THE DIPLOMATIC CONFLICT
1, Introduction.
a. The Communists have recognized more perceptively than
the nations of the Free World the-interrelationship between diplo-
macy, military power and psycho-political strategy. Diplomacy
can maximize and consummate gains in the relative power position.
It can enhance the psycho-political impact of these gains. But
diplomacy cannot be substantially stronger than the power on which
it is based.
b. A totalitarian regime possesses inherent advantages in the
diplomatic struggle--highly centralized direction, greater secrecy
and fewer intelligence requirements, A democracy cannot hope to
overcome these advantages completely but can, within the frame-
work of its institutions, take certain steps to modify its handicaps.
c. One of the Communist& inherent advantages is their ability
to enter into specific negotiations with the West with maximum de-
mands. By contrast, the bargaining position of democratic coali-
tion, because they must achieve a consensus both within their own
constituencies and among themselves, is invariably a minimum one.
Any compromise, therefore, represents a net gain for the opponent.
This is one of the main techniques used in the Communist diplomatic
offensive today.
d, Diplomacy, conducted as it is today on the floodlighted in-
ternational stage, is a key theater of the psycho-political conflict.
The Communists are past masters at meshing diplomatic thrusts
with their over-all psycho-political operations. This is the signifi-
cance of the current Soviet disarmament campaign,
Z. Scope and Purpose of the Topic.
To assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Free
and Communist Worlds in the diplomatic conflict.
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3, Suggested Topics for Consideration.
The following questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal
lecture, but to stimulate individual study and analysis and for pos-
sible use in discussion groups:
a. How is Lenin's maxim of "two steps forward, one step back-
ward" applied to the Communist diplomatic offensive?
b. How do the Communists "manufacture" bargaining positions
through such devices as the "crisis strategy" and the open or implied
threat? Are similar devices available to the Free World?
c, What is the role of "sammitry" in the diplomatic conflict?
d. What is the impact of public opinion and debate upon the
conduct of diplomatic negotiations?
4. Lecture.
The title of the lecture for this morning is "THE DIPLOMATIC
CONFLICT."
5. References.
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EIGHTH DAY
TUESDAY, 19 JULY
* * * *
PART IV. MEETING THE SOVIET CHALLENGE
Topic #17
SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES
1. Introduction.
a. Military considerations have always loomed large in all
phases of Soviet life. Since the Soviet economy is state-controlled,
it can be readily mobilized for any specific task its rulers might
dictate. The priority which the USSR gives to military power is
demonstrated by the proportion of the nation's economic effort de-
voted to it. The USSR, with a gross national product less than half
of ours spends roughly as much as we do for military purposes.
b. Efforts to maximize military power and potential have been
as marked since the Second World War as before. Despite recon-
struction demands, only a partial military demobilization was effected
after hostilities ended. Throughout the postwar period budgetary al-
lotments for military purposes have remained high to permit a broad
program of weapons development and general modernization and re-
equipment. Repeatedly the Kremlin has asserted that world condi-
tions and other factors indefinitely preclude any diversion of effort
from expanding as rapidly as possible the basic industrial and mili-
tary might of the country. The result has been the creation of what
is generally considered, both quantitatively and qualitatively, a
formidable military machine, and one that appears likely to continue
its forward progress.
c. In 1956 Klumshchev officially shaded the traditional corn.-
munist doctrine regarding the inevitability of conflict between com-
munists and capitalists. He declared that the ultimate collision be-
tween the two systems, as foreseen by Lenin, was no longer inevitable,
largely because of the growth of Soviet power. This adjustment of
communist theory to the realities of the thermonuclear age has been
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accompanied by a re-examination of long-standing concepts by Soviet
professional military writers, intent upon developing a strategy
that takes into account the new weapons. Since this military assess-
ment affects, in turn, total Soviet policy, it is clearly essential to
examine the concepts underlying contemporary Soviet military doc-
trine.
2. Scope and Purpose of the Topic.
To assess current Soviet military strategy, the qualitative and
quantitative strengths and weaknesses of the existing Soviet military
establishment and its future potential.
3, Suggested Topics for Consideration.
These questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal lecture,
but to stimulate individual study and analysis and for possible use in
discussion groups:
a, Soviet propagandists make mach of the fact that the US de-
fense allotment represents a higher percentage of the total national
budget than does the reported Soviet figure. What are the flaws in
their contention?
b, What is known of the quality of Soviet military equipment
as compared with that of the US?
c. What are the major assets and the major deficits of the
Soviet armed forces?
d. Have the Soviet rulers or military leaders indicated any
change in their thinking and practices as a result of nuclear weapons?
e, What is the effect on US national security policy of the
Soviet possession of an ICBM?
4, Lecture.
The title of the lecture for this morning is "SOVIET MILITARY
CAPABILITIES."
5. References.
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EIGHTH DAY
TUESDAY, 19 JULY
* * * *
Topic #18
US MILITARY CAPABILITIES
1. Introduction.
a, The military power of a nation has in the past been measured
largely in terms of the total potential of a nation to mobilize its re-
sources for war. Although this is still to some degree a measure
of military power, recent technological advances in weapons and
weapons systems have placed a far greater premium on instant readi-
ness as a true measure of military strength. In this age of thermo-
nuclear weapons and missiles the advantages accruing to the aggressor
assume new and sinister meaning. In view of the announced policy
of the United States to use its military strength only to resist aggres-
sion we stand to lose a quantity of our military resources to an enemy's
surprise blow.
b. WIthin the above framework, the principal requirement for
the United States is for strategic delivery forces capable of surviv-
ing a surprise attack and still dealing a crushing blow. This means
"ready" diversified delivery systems, both land-based and sea-based
with emphasis upon dispersal, mobility and invulnerability. Logically,
the capacity to retaliate massively embraces both the ability to inflict
great damage on the enemy and to minimize it at home. It is obvi-
ous that an extensive and well-planned civil defense program would
constitute a most meaningful and positive step toward indicating to
the USSR our readiness to meet the threat of surprise nuclear attack.
c, In addition to the above, the United States must be prepared
to meet limited aggression wherever and whenever it may occur,
This means adequate numbers of highly trained mobile forces armed
with the best weapons modern science and technology can provide.
This also means that adequate air and sea lift must be available at
all times.
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24 Scope and Purpose of the Topic.
To assess current US military strategy, the qualitative and
quantitative strengths and weaknesses of the existing US military
establishment and its future potential.
3, Suggested Topics for Consideration.
These questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal lecture,
but to stimulate individual study and analysis and for possible use in
discussion groups:
a. Is the present overall milittry strength of the United States
adequate vis-a-vis that of the Sino-Soviet bloc?
b. What is the impact of lead time problems upon the level of
our preparedness?
c. What is the meaning of the so-called missile gap2"
d. Are our manned bomber forces becoming obsolete in the
missile age?
e. Why is the United States, in terms of population and indus-
trial concentration, more vulnerable to nuclear attack than the
Soviet Union? How could this vulnerability be reduced?
f. Are present US and NATO forces adequate In number and
armament to contain limited probes by the Communists?
g. Does the US have adequate strategic reserve forces and the
capability to deploy them rapidly:
4. Lecture.
The title of the lecture for this afternoon is "US MILITARY
CAPABILITIES."
5. References.
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WEDNESDAY, 20 JULY
* * * *
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NINTH DAY
Topic #19
EXPLOITING THE VULNERABILITIES
OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD
1. Introduction.
a. -? The Communists are increasingly hard-put to reconcile
Marxist-Leninist dogma with the realities of the Communist system
and strategy.
b. The existence of a massive and in part secret police sys-
tem casts doubt upon the popularity of Communism in the Sino-Soviet
bloc. "People's Democracy" is government neither for nor by the
people. The inhabitants of the "workers' paradise" escape, satel-
lites rebel, and individuals concentrate on improving their own lot,
not the good of the state. Revolts in East Europe and Tibet, and
sporadic reports of unrest among Soviet Russia's own national
minorities, prove that Communism has not conquered the forces of
traditional nationalism.
c. The Sino-Soviet bloc directs its economic activities toward
increasing its power-base for world domination, not toward improving
the living standards of its people. Contradictions within the system
include the disparity of income levels in the "classless" society, the
rise of a technological managerial elite intent on maximizing its own
welfare, the shortage of labor and the relatively poor performance
of Soviet agriculture.
(4 Communism is based inherently on fear and violence.
Terrorism, the purge, liquidation and the slave labor camp are its
refinements of the instruments of organizational control. Fear, how-
ever, not only forces compliance, but spurs defection. The power
struggle is the only mechanism for leadership. Leadership succes-
sion is invariably accompanied by a simulated break with the un-
popular past and the persecution of those associated with past poli-
cies,
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e. The above is not to suggest that the Sino-Soviet bloc is ready
to collapse. But we should make a careful study of the weaknesses
and vulnerabilities of the Communist system as an aid In our own
policy-making process. We should avoid policies which help the
Communist leadership to get "off the hoiak" by relieving them of -
some of their difficulties. We should actively criticize the short-
comings and failures of the system in our propaganda, ridicule the
leadership and compound the internal problems confronting it. Above
all, we should endeavor to shift the psycho-political conflict onto the
Communist-dominated areas.
2. Scope and Purpose of the Topic.
To assess the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the Communist
system and to discuss ways of exploiting them.
3. Suggested Topics for Consideration.
The following questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal
lecture, but to stimulate individual study and analysis and for pos-
sible use in discussion groups.
a. Does criticism of the Soviet regime in our radio broadcasts
beamed to the USSR serve any useful purpose?
b. Is it possible to make any effective appeal to the non-Russian
nationalities inside the USSR?
c. Is there any danger that in criticizing the Soviet way of life
we may alienate the Soviet people? To what kinds of criticism are
they likely to prove sensitive? To what kinds most receptive?
d. What can the-United States and its allies do to exacerbate
the strains in the Sino-Soviet alliance? In this context, is it better
to maintain a US posture of strength around the periphery of the
Sino-Soviet bloc or to consider detente, disengagement and accommo-
dation?
e. How can our cultural exchange programs be geared more
effectively to pointing up the differences between our way of life and
the Soviet way, to our advantage?
f. In World War II, the Ukrainians and other Soviet people
welcomed the Germans as liberators. Are we doing enough to take
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advantage of a possible inner front of anti-Russian and anti-Communist
forces in the Soviet Union?
g, What should we do the next time trouble flares in Eastern
Europe?
4. Lecture,
The title of the lecture for this morning is "EXPLOITING THE
VULNERABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD,"
5. References.
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NINTH DAY
WEDNESDAY, 20 JULY
* * * *
Topic #20
FREE WORLD ALLIANCES
1. Introduction.
a. The United States, as the most powerful nation of the Free
World, plays the leading role in a number of regional organizations
of varying strength, composition and purpose. These include the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); the Organization of
American States (OAS); the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO); the security treaty of the United States with Australia and
New Zealand (ANZUS); and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).
b. The basic strength of the Free World alliance system de-
rives from its voluntary character. The nations which have joined -
with the United States in NATO and the other regional security organi-
zations have done so of their own free will. The Communist bloc is
bound together by the common interests of its power elites. In the
event of conflict, the Free World alliance may be expected to hold
together, while the Communist system will suffer strains which could
breach its bonds.
c. Conversely, the weakness of a flexible alliance system in
a cold war situation is the lack of cohesion in the efforts of individual
members to meet the wide range of conflict challenges. The Soviet
system is designed precisely for the exploitation of tensions and con-
flict arising in a revolutionary period.
d. The lack of centralized direction of the Free World alliance
system imposes handicaps which are not easily overcome. In the
first place there are wide differences among the various alliance
members on the nature of the threat of Communism. Lacking agree-
ment on this fundamental, there is even less agreement on the means
to deal with the threat.
e. The United States must take an active role in consolidating
and energizing the Free World resources. Coercion will not work
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and is not appropriate in a voluntary system. US-leadership must
convince our allies that it is in the combined self-interest of all
free peoples to pool resources in a common effort.
2. Scope and Purpose of the Topic.
To explore the strength and weaknesses of Free World alliances
and to seek ways and means to strengthen the Free World organiza-
tion.
3. Suggested Topics for Consideration.
The following questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal
lecture, but to stimulate individual study and analysis and for pos-
sible use in discussion groups:
a. How can NATO be organized more effectively to deal with
the nonmilitary threat of Communism?
b. Can the Council of NATO Ministers become a mechanism
for considering broad political and economic questions on which the
NATO countries must present a united front?
c. How can other regional security organizations be strengthened
to deal with the nonmilitary threat?
d. What should be the interrelationship of NATO and the other
regional associations?
e. What is the prospect of regional federation or confederation
In the varo us areas of the Free World and particularly within the
Atlantic Community?
4. Lecture.
The title of the lecture for this afternoon is "FREE WORLD
ALLIANCES."
5. References.
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NINTH DAY
WEDNESDAY, 20 JULY
* * * *
Topic #21
ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL STRATEGY
Introduction.
a. The United States needs to increase its annual rate of eco-
nomic growth and channel a greater share of its national resources
and efforts from consumer goods and services into those areas vital
to our survival as a nation. The US must meet the challenge of the
Soviet Union in military and space technology, promote fuller eco-
nomic cooperation among the nations of the Free World. A concerted
attack on mass poverty in the underdeveloped areas is indicated.
An economic-technological strategy is an integral part of an overall
strategy designed to protect US national interests and achieve US foreign
policy objectives.
b. The technological strategist must study the full sweep of
immediate and long-range problem facing the country, e.g., the
Soviet Union's increase in nuclear-missile capacity. He then must
survey the broad spectrum of technologies, both those immediately
at hand and those on the horizon. His next task is to decide what
technologies to apply to what problems. The technological strategist
must look-at every level of the current struggle. His planning must
be as long-term as the protracted conflict in which we are engaged.
2. Scope and Purpose of the Topic.
To seek ways and means of improving the position of the United
States and the Free World in the economic and technological conflict
with the Communist Empire.
3. Suggested Topics for Consideration.
The following questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal
lecture, but to stimulate individual study and analysis and for pos-
sible use in discussion groups:
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a. What is the relationship between technology and economic
growth?
b. Can the voluntary actions of private business and individuals
raise the-level of national effort and output sufficiently to meet the -
economic-technological challenge of the present age, or must the gov-
ernment operate as the catalyst for and organizer of such action?
c. Do US defense, mutual security and spece programs take
priority in our national effort over assistance to the underdeveloped
areas?
d. Can we devise a technological-economic strategy for the
underdeveloped areas which will utilize the skills and resources of
the Free World more efficiently so as to provide these areas with a
better opportunity for rapid development than is offered by the Soviet
Bloc?
e. What are or should be our national objectives in the devel-
opment of outer space technology?
f. Can the United States organize an effective economic-
technological strategy without endangering our private enterprise
economic system?
-g. Should the United States maintain her embargoes on the
Sino-Soviet bloc or are we more likely to hasten the "liberalization"
of the Communist system through trade?
4. Lecture.
The title of the lecture for this evening is "ECONOMIC AND
TECHNOLOGICAL STRATEGY."
5. References.
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