ADDRESS BY ALLEN W. DULLES DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AT THE NATIONALWAR COLLEGE DEFENSE STRATEGY SEMINAR JULY 20, 1960 EXPLOITING THE VULNERABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01009A001502660002-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 1, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 20, 1960
• Content Type: MISC

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? j1-7.-*
? ADDRESS
BY
ALLEN W. DULLES
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AT
THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE DEFENSE STRATEGY SEMINAR
JULY 20, 1960
A OCI-1042 -61
EXPLOITING THE VULNERABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD
Any report dealing solely with the Soviet bloc weaknesses
is one-sided and therefore =mit be taken with,reserve.
True picture of any country's strength is a net balance
between assets and liabilities; its relative world position is its power
in contrast to that of its chief rivals or potential antagonists.
Today I speak of Soviet vulnerabilities and methods of exploiting
them. But, at no point in any such presentation should we forget that
the Soviet is a very powerful nation, second greatest military and
industria
power in the :world, s
iving over the ?next decades to reach
the first place, and possibly now first in certain areas
capability.
e r T
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'? 1111
.
The Soviet Union and. its communist allies like any
alliance has weaknesses which can be exploited.
ome of them
are inherent and cannot be corrected. Some of them maybe short-
term d* ficulties which are likely to be overcome. Others are
important chiefly because they relate directly to the contest between
the Communist world and alliances of Free Sta
shall deal chiefly with weaknesses of the Soviet Union but
in the context of its p sition..as the Bloc leader.
ernprr
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L.
?
In this review I shall cover these features of national power:
(a) geography; (b) the political and social system of the Soviet Union;
(c) the international concerns of the Soviet Union; (d) the industrial,
agricultural, and general economic situation in the Soviet Union;
(e) its military situation. Finally, I shall mention a few exploitable
weaknesses that fall in no particular category.
(a) Geography.
When it comes to defense, or for offense against some
neighboring European or Asiatic targets, the Soviet Union is in a
position of great strength. (Napoleon-Kaiser-Hitler learned this).
Furthermore its great land mass permits wide dispersion of vulnerable
assets and a large measure of secrecy and security for those assets and
for its striking force -- aircraft and missiles. (Evidence of ability to
penetrate this security by U-2 ? hit Soviet at most sensitive point).
Mnf:T
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On the other hand, in dealing with targets more distant
from the USSR, such as the United States, Africa, and Latin
America, the Soviet is at a certain disadvantage, though modern
technology, missiles and air transport somewhat mitigate this.
4.
The Soviet has no dependable military bases outside the
Bloc. It does not even have thoroughly dependable centers of political
strength, in which it can find a secure base for extending its influence
in the neighborhood. (Trying to get them in Cuba -- Guinea ? Indonesia).
Our alliances and treaty relationships give us such bases of
action nearer to the USSR. (Reason Soviet wants to get us out of our
bases).
Also, for the time being at least, the great superiority in
commercial shipping and numbers of commercial aircraft of the United
States and its friends gives us advantages in overseas trade; but Soviet
air transport development is cutting down this davantage somewhat.
SECRFT
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IP 5.
(b). Social and Political
(I) Their internal political system.
Past history has taught us that dictatorships do
not last indefinitely. Eventually they almost always
degenerate, sometimes falling to a revolt of the people
against them. Or they mellow and reform, and lose
some of their initial aggressiveness.
It is true that modern weapons make the French
Revolution type of popular upheaval outmoded. Dictatorships
have endured for a long time if supported by the army, or
an effective police system, although even these will not
suffice nowadays if discontent is severe and disaffection
widespread.
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?
turic
The Soviet dictatorship its entering upon an
evolutionary stage. This may give it a new kind of
strength over the long run, but it might also lead in
time to a loss of dynamic aggressiveness.
Today the Soviet system is becoming somewhat
more responsive to popular pressures. The Soviet people
today have high expectation of better things to come.
Even Khrushchev cannot totally disregard popular
feelings or the pressure for evolution brought by education
and increasing foreign contacts. The new generation of
Russians may well differ greatly from the Old Bolsheviks.
We have every interest in exploiting these
evolutionary trends.
errarr
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VI
7.
(2) The form of government of the Soviet is an inherent
weakness.
The locus of power is of course in the Presidiumc,.2--
,
Q_
El
With the personnel changes f.rrnally approved by
the Supreme Soviet in early May, the presidium became the
meeting ground of the three ey power-wielding bodies, the
Party Secretariat, the abinet of the Russian Soviet Republic,
and the Soviet go rnment itself. It is noteworthy that Khrushchev
alone is the y presidium member to sit on all three bodies,
and that Central Committee is packed with Khrushchev
sup. .rtere
Ae-r---(4A9
But packed organizations sometimes change in
attitude. If Khrushchev should have a serious defeat in
his foreign policy, in industry, or in agriculture, there
might be trouble.
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In the Soviet
.41, II. MI we
as in China, there is no clearly
defined or inStitutionalized way of dealing with basic
?disagreement between the dictator
as ates.
arxd any disagr
o 1957 when K. in xriino
appealed t
? This is a major weakness-.
Will Khrushchev r3 successor be determined, as
were the successors to both Lenin and Stalin, by a, period
? of so-called collective leadership and the emergence of
. the dictator? Will the Army come to play a role?
These are two question marks. Tradition is too
short for a procedure to have been settled.
Rrent
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9.
? ,
However, the Communist Party and its organs have
--?""
strict discipline. Its relative restricted numbers -- some
eight million out of over 140 million potential voters on a
basis comparable to U.S.A., help to make it well-knit.
The Party leaders realize importance of cohesive action
to protect their control.
One cannot reasonably predict that the Party will
fall to pieces, organizationally or otherwise, if Khrushchev
disappears. On the contrary, the discipline of the eight
million party members will constitute the main guarantee
of regime stability in the event of a new succession crisis.
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WIP
These institutional weaknesses are not readily
open to direct exploitation. However as contact with the
outside world increases, internal pressures in Soviet Union
will also increase. Kis summit decision, refusal to receive
President Eisenhower, actions toward Cuba and the Congo,
are all evidence K. desired to slow up the trend of co-
existence. It had become too dangerous.
(3) Soviet educational programs also present K. with
a dilemma. To compete with the U.S.A. and the Free World,
they have stressed the development of their technology,
industry and the sciences. This has led to a broad
educational program throughout the Soviet Union.
gf7n.r,,:77
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1110 11.
While the emphasis has been on science and
technology rather than on the liberal arts, and hence less
dangerous from the ideological viewpoint, nevertheless
education makes men and women think; it makes them seek
for more, even in broader fields than their particular areas
of specialization. It makes them more interested in develop-
ments in the outside world.
Over the years the Soviet has taught their people so
much nonsense about the outside world in general, and the
gradual
U.S.A. in particular, that the/coming of the truth to them
Is something of a shock, and Khrushchev realizes this.
erP/Ir7
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12.
The sly perception with which the Russian people
note all this is illustrated by the following joke that is being
passed from mouth to mouth in Russia today:
"School teacher: Sascha, tell us about America.
"Sascha: America is a land of poverty, corruption
and degeneracy.
"School teacher: Good; now, tell us about Russia.
"Sascha: Russia is trying to catch up with America."
Many years ago during the war when Wendell Wilkie
visited Russia, he suggested that Stalin by educating his.
people, might be educating himself out of a job. Stalin
laughed. Khxushch.ev is pondering.
RFINFT
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? 13.
(4) With the disappearance of the old revolutionary
dialecticians of Communist theory, some of the vim and
vigor may be lost to the Communist movement. Ideological
revolutions such as Communism tend to lose their vigorous
drive after they reach their initial objectives, and adherents
become more interested in their vested interests and in
keeping an acquired position political, social, military,
or material, rather than engaging in adventures.
RFP.IIPT
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flp 14.
While Khrushchev makes a vast number of speeches,
and his regime claims credit for a high degree of doctrinal
creativeness, he is not personally distinguished as a
dialectician. He is eminently a practical man. His most
remarkable innovations have been in the organization of
industry and agriculture.
KhruslItchev's philosophy is simple: history will
take care of the United States. As capitalism took care of
feudalism 80 communism will take care of capitalism, and
our grandchildren will all live in a communist society. He
proposes to help along this process peacefully he proclaims.
RI:r!RPT
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1110 15.
(c) Now to turn from the domestic to the Soviet international
problems.
(1) The Warsaw Pact countries.
Communist control in these countries is an asset
in that it moves the frontiers of the Soviet Union into the
heart of Europe, thus protecting the Soviet homeland. The
Kremlin knows, however, that these satellite allies are for
the most part unreliable.
Their have had the setback of Hungary and another
situation of this kind would be serious for the USSR. Poland
today is still a powder keg.
They haven't yet won over the people in the Satellites
though they have made most progress in Bulgaria and
Czechoslovakia.
SHAFT
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16.
They are not likely to really win them over to full
and wholehearted cooperation at any time in the near future.
As I have said, many of the Satellite leaders are
tough Stalinists; they fear the co-existence policy. They
believe contact with the West will make people even more
restless. This is clearly shown by the refugee flood from
Eastern Germany to the West which reached 20,000 in May
and 18,000 in June. It points up their weakness in this area.
We can help to keep alive the hope and goal of
freedom in this Eastern European area ? and we are doing
so (RFE). We can continue to help Berlin and West Germany
to be "show cases" of freedom and free enterprise.
RFPRri
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?
17.
(2) Communist China.
China still follows the hard Communist line --
still in the days of Stalinism.
USSR faced with the choice of helping a Stalinist
China become strong, and this they fear, or of dragging
their feet as regards military, nuclear and industrial aid,
and thus incurring the displeasure of the Chinese Communists.
Mao is irritated at this, and at his exclusion from
Summit Meetings and had been muddying the Soviet copybook
of co-existence by his aggressions in Tibet and on the Indian
frontier.
MUT
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? 18.
? MI ar.unL
And Mao by his program of creating communes
has irritated the Soviet leaders who propose to sell both
domestically and abroad a much more restrained pattern
of the ideal Communist state.
Mao has set himself up as a fountainhead of real
Communist ideology. Khrushchev doesn't like this. In the
last month or two he doctrinal controversy between Moscow
and Peiping, evidenced by Chinese writings and Soviet
speeches reached an unprecedented height. There is some
basic trouble here, but it would be premature to predict a
break. Chicorn aggressive and antagonistic attitude toward the t.
U.S. makes it difficult today to exploit this weakness but it
can be advertised, and we must work for opportunities to
widen the breach.
erNKT
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f.
? 19.
(3) Yugoslavia.
One of the most irritating experiences for the Soviet
rulers is the demonstration that a country under Communist
leadership can follow an independent of Moscow line and still
survive. Yugoslavia is creating a dangerous heresy. It is
more dangerous to Moscow than is a state that has always been
an outright enemy of the USSR. Our policy toward Yugoslavia,
in my opinion, has helped to free Y. S. from dependence on the
Kremlin.
(4) General balance of Soviet progress.
Soviet policy over the last ten years has won few new
allies or Satellites (only change North Vietnam - vs East Austria).
This is in contrast to the previous decade. It represents a
slowing down, and any slow down is dangerous for a
revolutionary state.
erriorT
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? II
?
itorially the Soviet Bloc is no stronger than
20.
was thwarted; the Berlin Blockade was ended. The Communist
threat in ItaiyandFrance, though still serious
drama c than it
twelve years ago.
Obv Pusl still many weak
threat of :terrttora1 takeover.
In he foreign policy aea, Ithrushchevis visits to
India and Southeast As a and Austria were not really
successful.
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SECFIET
Today a new aggressiveness -- evidenced in
Africa (Congo and Guinea), in the Caribbean (Cuba), and
in SEA -- particularly Indonesia and a threat to Laos. In
many of these areas a clear evidence of Soviet-Chicom
coordination.
Some of these new held initiatives are far from
their home base. This fact is a weakness we should be
able to exploit with our greater ability to meet the problem
of logistics. (In Congo they threaten -- we act). Both Congo
and Cuba show signs of backfiring.
SECRET
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21.
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? SILTRET
(d) The Military Sector.
I have suggested at the outset that the Soviet geographic
position, strong though it be for resisting attack, for aggression
against peripheral states, and as a base for long-range missile attack,
still has inherent in it a measure of weakness as regards launching
limited attack against distant targets overseas. "Volunteers" were
easily useable in Korea, Northern Vietnam and even if they chose, in
Greece, Iran and Turkey. In the Congo, Cuba and Indonesia they must
aid
rely largely on economic itiiiRst6tis and subversive action.
Despite the debate about our readiness for so-called
"limited wars" it is unlikely that today the Soviet could do what we
did in countries as distant as Lebanon, Korea, or Taiwan.
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22.
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IP .23.
Hence, in many parts of the world, the Soviet has
they do not desire, o
politic
believe
1 subversion and econoznic
penetration on the other, as instruments forchanging controls
in foreign countries in their favor,
1 believe that for the irne being they 1
latter and tha
it s in this arena that we mus
vulnerabil hes and meet their challenges,.
cheose the-
seek out their
Me anigh
e, however,we must o
overlook the f
that we are now entering the nude .znissile age. Here
distance is no longer an obstacle. The Soviet will soon have
the potential to attack any part of the world from their interior
bases.
ernrwry
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24.
But this means all out nuclear war. Today and
tomorrow it is a weapon which can be used as a threat,
as we have recently seen in the Cuban situation -- and
four years ago during Suez. To carry out the threat
changes the face of the world. It is not likely to be
invoked to achieve limited objectives in any of the areas
where the Communist world is today threatening us, and
the more the missile threat is brandished, the less
effective it becomes.
RPPRP7
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? 25.
, .
(e) Soviet Economy
We see no immediately critical problems for
the Soviet in the economic or industrial fields.
But like all of us they have certain problems.
At the moment due to the war losses and the great inefficien-
,
cy of their use of agricultural manpower, there are problems
in providing sufficient labor to industry but corrective
action has allowed the manpower plans to be overfulfilled
in the last two years) ct-144t%4-e., 1,,s6
Today they have on their farms about six times
as many workers as we do. Despite this far smaller agricul-
tural labor force, the United States produces about one-third
more food than does the Soviet Union.
SECRET
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_ auvilLu
? 26.
The manpower problems help to explain the cutback
in their military forces and fft the fact,that many students
reaching the age of 15 are now being sent to the assembly
lines and will continue their education on a part-time basis
in the evening.
The availability of essential raw materials will
probably not impede the successful execution of the Soviet
Seven-Year Plan, 1959 - 1965. In fact, Khrushchev recently
announced that industrial production of some basic commodi-
ties was going so well that there could be some cutback on
overfulfillment in order to bolster agricultural investment.
There are, however, some raw materials problems.
To support the planned expansion of the steel and
aluminum industries for example, the USSR must exploit leaner
and more costly ores. In the case of the steel industry, it
must process very expensive coal for the necessary metallur-
gical coke.
SFITFT
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? 27.
..WittlegraMPL% tn the case of natural rubber, bauxite,
industrial diamonds, and possibly copper the USSR is likely
to be dependent on non-Bloc sources for the supply of as
,essential industrial raw materialsitl,
mrryl.P..AfmA eta
In this connection it is well to note that today
they are using their raw materials sparingly insofar as
consumer production and consumer goods are concerned and
diverting them very largely, to the national power segment
of their economy.
For example, they need a relatively modest amount
of gasoline for the small number of automobiles they pro-
duce, and are even able to make substantial quantities
available for export where political considerations dictate;
viz., Cuba.
SECRET
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?? stun!
The task of -extracting riches from the-frozen Tundra of
the Far North is not appealing.
While the'Soviets
now paying
erious at
ntion to. housing
. their much-publicized civilian c
nstructio
plans will
completed Until well after
1965., Even then the
vailable living?:
space on a per capita bald
that now
being
small frac
njoyed in the U.
that matter, Vj
rn Europe. Furthermore, the quality of con ruction is
inadequate by our-standard and even in the ne eet apartmenthouse
the chances are
e plumbing will not work.
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(F)
29.
INDUSTRY
industry problemsremain but they arecentered around
the need to increase efficiency and productivity rather than output
alone. Khrushchev is still tinkering with his economic reorganization
which we
Into effect in 1957 substituting a form of
for vertical ministerial control industry
Mos co
oca
control
enter in
The lack of competition has resulted in lags in the
Introduction, of new technology, in the continued use of high cost
production facilities in many Industries.
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SECRET
30.
Khrushchev is aware of the need for reform. In 1960
it was decreed that plant managers in the Soviet Union will
no longer receive substantial bonuses merely for the comple-
tion of the physical output called for in the various annual
plans. Now these managers must show substantial improvement
in the cost of production if they are to be rewarded by incen-
tive bonuses. In addition, a bonus system was set up in the
engineering industry to encourage new ideas and their appli-
cation in practice. Last year economic councils were set up
NeftebAkhe Soviet Republics to provide better coordina-
tion of industrial production. The national planning appara-
tus also underwent change to separate the short term and long
term economic planning responsibilities.
We can expect to read a good deal about new experiments
in organization and management over the next few years as the
Kremlin leaders grope for solutions to these problems.
SECRET
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31.
The Sp
t Central Committee Plenum which adjourned/
I
last Fridays has been cons dering problems of intl. try and
transportation.? Accerdimg to. Soviet pr eports1 it found
that serious difficulties still existed, including failure to make
use of new gains in scien
and technology, to cut production
costs and to improve the quality of the goods produced. T alas
summaryof the final resolution failed to indicate wit tmeasurea
had been determined to o ercom
ciencies.
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SE C ELI
32.
AGRICULTURE
Agriculture, as I have indicated, has been a perennial
problem in the Soviet Union. The resistance of the peasants
to collectivization and their resultant cruel measures of de-
portation and liquidation by Stalin are well known. While the
Soviet concentrated on the development of industry in the
years following WW II, agriculture was neglected. The
table result was that in the early 1950's agricultural pro-
duction was still on the pre-war level although population
had increased substantially.
Khrushchev tried to meet this challenge by expansion of
crop acreage into the so-called new lands area of Siberia and
Kazakhstan. The growing of grain on the new lands is subject
to great uncertainty. In both 1959 and 1960 unfavorable
weather at harvest time resulted in failure to increase output.
SECRET
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SECRET.
33.
The other major agricultural program was the introduc-
tion of corn. But remember that 80% of the Soviet Union lies
north of the 50th parallel or Winnipeg, Manitoba. This means
that much of the corn does not mature and must be cut in the
green stage.
There is no counterpart in the Soviet Union to our own
highly productive corn belt. The uncertainty of agricultural
production even in the traditional growing areas of European
USSR showed up again in 1960. Winterkill and dust storms
caused severe damage to crops in the North Caucasus and the
Southern Ukraine. These problems together with difficulties
in the New Lands resulted in agricultural production showing
no improvement over 1959, and no progress toward meeting the
increases scheduled by the Soviet Seven-Year Plan (1959-65).
Khrushchev has once again taken a personal hand in solving
agriculture's troubles. Following the USSR Central Committee
meeting on agriculture last month Khrushchev went on a barn-
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storming tour of the USSR's farm areas, offering advice and
censure on a wholesale basis.
Since December, the USSR Minister of Agriculture has
been replaced, The Ministry, which had become an inflated
bureaucracy, has been greatly reduced to little more than
azloinformational and training bureauo Ow agencies have been
set up to smooth out agricultural supply and procurement and
Khrushchev has announced that he intends to increase agricul-
tural investment.
These measures will probably improve the situation some-
what--Khrushchev seems determined that they will--
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but factors of geography and climate will always make agri-
cultural production in the Soviet Union much more risky and
uncertain than either in the U.S. or Western Europe and the
Soviet regime as yet shows no inclination to divert funds in
sufficient amount
rom. the industrial program
to make really
substantial changes in the situation.
(G) MISCELLANEOUS WEAKNESSES.
1. No convertible currency. This restricts their
trade dealings to barter type of operations. (But speed in
effecting barter deals with underdeveloped nations, as con-
trasted with our red-tape type deals, has created impact,
though at times some of the goods delivered in barter have
proved second rate.)
2. Limited use of Russian as a language of general
communication as contrasted to English; the great lingua
franca of the world. Here is an asset of ours to exploit.
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3. Shortage of adequately trained operatives for
many parts of world - (The tea timony of Kaznacheyev as contrasted
with the book, "Ugly American".) Many Soviet experts do not
know foreign languages.
4. Soviet rulers lack of trust in their people.
This slowly changing but still exists.
5. Paucity of production in the field of the arts with
the exception of music. Lack in literature and poetry, painting,
sculpture. Their ballet is great but it is still old.fashioned and
probably not as good as in the time of the old regime.
6. Existence of boredom and L adeq ate means 01
using their leisure.
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7. Russia is an atheistic country and history has shown
that no country whose people lack a deep moral and religious purpose
has ever survived long as great.
CONCLUSION
Russia is a country of great contradictions.; great technical
skills; massive scientific and military achievements combined with
great areas of backwardness; housing shortages and road shortages,
transportation problems except for air transport. With great cities
like Moscow and Leningrad and yet thousands of small villages
which show little change over the past decade; great in industry,
backward in agriculture; outstanding in music, sterile in the other
arts; Russia is great in many things and shriveled in many others.
It remains a state isolated from freedom.
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In approaching the problem of exploiting the vulnerabilities
of the aggressive Communist movement which boasts that it will
take us over in time, there are certain general considerations which
I feel are quite fundamental.
First: there is no trick solution. We cannot solve the matter
by creating some sort of Cold War Executive to master-mind a program.
We cannot solve it by massive propaganda.
Second: The Communist Bloc has largely closed and sealed
itself off from the normal methods for the exchange of thoughts and
ideas. There is both an Iron Curtain and a jamming barrier. There
are, of course, leakages into the Communist orbit which can be
exploited by radio, by exchanges and by the very fact of a considerable
flow of people back and forth.
carrinur
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Third: There is no subtle propaganda thesis which even
if it could be got over to the Soviet people would have much effect
upon them. They think they are doing reasonably well; better than
In the past. They have a pride in their country's accomplishments.
While there are the elements of unrest and uneasiness, of desire
for more contact with the outside world, these are slowly moving
forces. Evolution and not revolution should be our objective in
exploiting vulnerabilities. Educational advances may be a solvent
in this process as we come to deal with a new generation of Russians.
RI:PAPT
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Fourth: Communist vulnerabilities are most open to direct
and effective countermeasures where we meet them outside of the
Communist Bloc, in the uncommitted and rapidly changing areas
of the world ? in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Also we must
meet the threat, even in countries of the NATO Alliance. In Italy,
for example, a strong Communist Party, tied to Moscow, is still
endeavoring to underminetaly's freedom.
Fifth: I do not believe that the Soviet now intend to try to
achieve their objectives by direct military actions. As long as we
maintain our own military strength, they will rattle their atomic
to time
missiles from time/for blackmailing purposes but probably will not
use them. Hence our attack should be against their economic and
subversive thrust into the free and uncommitted world.
errinr-r
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This should include publicizing the activities of Communist
parties in the Free World, and their controlled, subversive front
organizations. We should meet their economic thrust both directly
or collaterally by quicker action on our own part; sending better
a
goods and giving better services; by/better understanding of the
needs and aspirations of the new nations of the world. And don't
let us try to make them little replicas of the United States,
governmentally or economically, as we cannot do it. But let us
try to get rid of Congressionally-imposed red tape on many features
of our overseas aid.
RrP.rrIr
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Where we are "cheek by jowl" with the Communist world,
let us help to build show cases of freedom, as in Berlin, in West
Germany, in Austria.
Finally, in the contest for survival which is joined between
the Free World arid the world of aggressive Communism, we must
be prepared to meet their elements of military strength with equal
or superior strength; we must maintain our economic and industrial
superiority and continue to exploit peacefully but effectively the
vulnerabilities of the Communist drive.
cirnnrT
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