COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS FOLLOWING LECTURE BY HONORABLE ALLEN W. DULLES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01009A001502620011-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 21, 2013
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: May 4, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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COMMENTS AND QUEST/ORS
FOLLOWING LECTURE
By
Honorable Allen W. Dulles
"This is an official document of The
National War College. Quolatien from
AbstractIon from, or R cf all
or any part of to::drnt i3 i:DT
AUTHORIZED wneui spacilic pvnicsion
of the Commandant cf The NatiNial 1,7ar
College,
The National War College
Washington, D. C.
4 May 1960
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(4 may 1960)
5.41..me -I:LW 4.
OliVIENTS QUESTIONS
POIDOWING tEcTuRE TR'
Honorable Allen W. Dulles
QUESTION: . ? ? ? ? ? 0 ?
(inaudible,
loatisfaction vithialraphdhev's empha
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on disarmament.
X believe some of those vilo went to Moscow got a few echoes of the
fear of the Soviet military of what Will happen to them in the future
if this takes place. Do you have any evidence of any real appre4.*
hension in the Soviet military over Khrushchev I a cUrrent emphasis?
ANSWER: You probably all heard. the question. The question
in whether the Soviet disarmament and. r e duction of forces has esuied.
any dissatisfaction.
We have. uite a lot of evidence on that. You can't reduce
? over as short a time as he has indicated. by over a million men with
out affecting a great nany people. We have some reason to believe
that there was a good deal of dissension initially when this was
? considered in the Presidium and that there wee not unaniraity on it.
Later, when it was promulgated as a policy a, and in the Intelligence
? County we are rather inclined to feel that it will be carried. out
quite largely as exposed there has been a great deal of dissatis-
faction.
It could happen in any country. If a lot of you were told,
that pretty soon you would be goizig .into the factories and be on the
assembly lines, 'I don't think you would be very happy. And that is
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about what has happened. in the Soviet Union.
QUESTION: Will you comment, please; on those weaknesses
which would seem to lend themselves most easily and effectively to
exploitation by the United States? And, in this connection, perhaps
comment on the nationalist aspirations in the satellite states and
within the Soviet republics, for one, and, the other, the religious
role there, the extent to which the religious groups outside the
migat exploit the religious hopes of those that still do
have them within the Communist Bloc?
ANSWER: That is quite an order.
With regard to the situation in the satellites; a good many
things are being done to try to exploit that situation. It is a
tricky one to handle. Take, particularly, the Polish situation.
As I indicated, that is now again coming up towards a boil.
./t is not the policy, and / am convinced should not be the
policy, to try to encourage these people or push these people in the
satellites to a point of revolt, which would just lead to a second
might lead to a second Hungary. One assumes a good deal of responsi.
bility in doing a thing of that kind, unlees one is in a position to
act. And in that area it would. be very difficult to act, because
probably only military action would be effective, and then in effect
you would have World War /II.
So that the situation in the satellites has to be handled
with a good deal of care wade good deal of discretion. What is being
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done tp to keep the hope of eventual liberation alive, to keep their
faith strong and their ideals as a part of a free Europe, but not to
,push, either by propaganda or any other action, to the point of
encouraging outright revolt.
Now, as to the whole gamut of exploiting these weaknesses,
that would really be another Speech. At the end / suggested one or
two points. I feel we ought to develop the great advantage we have
and the 1431a-speaking world has in having .a language which every.
body in the wad wants to learn. If we could teach thet more, get
more books out, get books out into Africa, get teachers out into
Africa, as -well as into Seutheast ASIA, We Could makelInglia, plus
'to some extent French, the great language of all Black Africa. If
we could do that, we would have Von-the first leg of the victory to
the holding of those countries, 'which are probably going into a-
meaare of dhaop over the next few years in any event, but it still
would give us a great advantage.
Pram the point of view of effective aid, we have in the
great financial structure of the Free World a great advantage that
we can exploit over that of the Soviet Union.
I th4nk in the military field, as I indicated, in the field
of via limited action in distant areas, we have advantages that Can
be developed and exploited.
I could go on, and, as I say, that is really another speech.
Maybe, if I am back here for my tenth anniversary speech, I can give
you, a talk on how we -Should exploit the weaknesses Of the Soviet Union.
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QUESTION: You spoke of the differences over doctrimal
.
matters between the Chinese and the Russian Communists. Are there
any signs of competition as between pro?Bussian and?pro4hinese
elements in the Communiat Parties abroad that is, in Africa,
Asia, and other countries outside the bloc -. that are serious? .
ANSWER; One has seen evidences of that to some extent in
the satellites, as I briefly indicated. That is, Ulbricht in East
Germany would probably prefer to see a Mao policy rather than a
Ehruthchev policy. Novotny in Czechoslovakia / can't remember
the name of the great statesmen who lead Bulgaria and Albania today .-
I probably should remember them both 7- Brneha, I think, is ntil; in
Albania -- there has been a change, I think, in Bulgaria recently am.
but those two men would probably prefer allho policy.
Now, when it comes to otheriarts of the earth outside the
Bloc, there was at one time somewhat of a tendency beiWeen Moscow
and Peiping to divide the world to some extent. Areas like Southeast
Asia were to be exploited more by than by Mosebi. I begin to
see a slight Change in that. I don't think that Moscow likes to leave
that now too much to the Chinese. They don't like very much what the
Chinese Communists did in Indonesia, for example very much muddied
up Khruahdhev's visit there because of the anti?Communiot attitude
of the government just at that time because of their struggle with
Peiping.
There are certain evidences of what you suggest in various
parts of the world. On the other hand, there are certain areas where
we see them working together. They are working together to some
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extent in Yemen. They are working together to some extent in Latin
America. So it is hard. to generalize.
(WE-S=0N: One of the great debates here this year has been
Whether tine in on our side or not. We have had. varying answers. 'Y
wonder if you could give us your own personal opinion as to Whether
time 36 on our side or not.
ANSWER; 1 think the answer 0 'a very abort one and a very
accurate one. Time is on the gide of the people who use it.
I think there is quite a. lot of time. That in, I don't
think that anything is going to happen tombrrow that is going to
Vitally Change the situation. I always believe in profiteering. We
have a little time; but unless we do our planning effectively, unless
we are ready to seize opportunities as they present themselves and
the other fellow does oeize those oPportunities then time is against
US.
Take these Underdeveloped areas of the world. Take Central
Africa; for example; They have an advantage in that they are able to
pinpoint and specialize. Because of our particular situation in the
world we. have to spread our butter fairly thin; although we put it
on pretty thick in India; I guess we are today; aren't we?, a lot of
butter.
But the whole world is looking to the United States and we
are not in a position to do as they have done; as to pinpoint their
efforts. '
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Take Africa. They have just taken the country of Guinea
and they have moved in there. It is a email country. They have
moved their experts in there, both the Russian and. Chinese in that
' case as well as the Czech? and others. They are going to try to
-make Guinea a showplace of what the Soviets can do.
We have twenty countries in Africa where we have to do
something, or we feel that it is necessary to do something. /f you
Study, as you have done, and analyze their foreign aid, it has teen
,
pinpointing in a dozen countries, whereas we have over fifty where
we have to be doing samething. Sp in that way they have a certain
advantage over us. The whole world is expecting the Soviets to do -
something for them, as they have that advantage over us, even though
our resources are far greater and the total amount of our effort in
the foreign aid field is far greater.
QUESTION: Mr. Dulles, you mentioned briefly the education ?
and the problems they have with that. WoUld you develop this a little
further for us? Raw are they handling their students? Is there a
problem in that area?
ANSWER: With regard te the Soviet Union itself - the in-
ternal situation - they are, I believe, having a. growing problem. The
information we get from American students who have been to Russia and
others who have been studying the Russian educational system indicates
that they are becoming more and more inquisitive, they are becoming
more and more open in student meetings in questioning things that
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are being done by the government, questioning international Dandies.
Under the present regime this is being tolerated as long as it keeps
within bounds. I dont t know of the open arrest of students who have
asked impertinent questionS (impertinent from the Soviet angle). '1
think that is a growing problem.
An 'I suggeSted in my remarks, they are putting a tremendous
emphasis on the scientific and technical side as being less dangerous
for them. The percentage of students in the sciences as compared _to
the liberal arts 10 tremendously higher in the Soviet Union than it
is here.
There is one other facet to that that I neglected to mention
here in my talk and I am glad you gave me an opportunity to bring it ?
up, namely, the growing dissatisfaction about the educational handling
of foreign students who go to the Soviet Union.
With a great deal of _fanfare recently they had. advertised
that they were organising a great separate academy in Mbscow for
foreign students. Well, the reason for that vai not because they
wanted to do that; it was because the foreign students and the Soviet
Students are not getting on veil together and they want to segregate'
them. There has been great dissatisfaction by foreign students.
The language problem is one of the reasons VA* it, but the reasons .
are much deeper than that. For example, the students that vent to.
Moscow from EgYpt are very largely being withdrawn. The Egyptian
government has asked, the United States, Britain and other countries
(yet, even Britain and Germany) whether they could not take these
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students. There were twe reasons for that. One, they were being
taught too much ideological Communism; and, second, the students them.
selves were dissatiefied:with the education they were getting; and
their relationship with the Russian students was net good. Further,,
there was a good deal of difficulty with regard to .the Chinese
students in the Soviet Union. They tell me that the Chinese work
too damn hard and the Russians don't like it. / think there is some
truth in that.
So that there is a sort of datible.edged educatiOnal problem.
QUESTION: Sometime ago we saw -some? discussion in. Papers
on the difference between capabilities and intentions. They were
pretty well muddied with politics and it Was very hard for us to
evaluate what exactly was happening. / believe this is related to
your subject. Can you help um understand a little bit more about
What is going on within our Government? Will you discuss it a bit
for us, sir?
ANSWER: / would be wry glad to.
The issue arose very largely over the latest estimate of
the Intelligence Community with regard to the Soviet missile program;
and. the statement was made by a Defense Department spokesman, I be.
hove, to the general effect that in this year's estimate we had
shifted our basis from capabilities to intentions. That was actually
a little forres_fihortening of what actually had taken place.
In our estimating in most fields one has to deal with the
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capabilities and. the intentions of a potential antagonist. Where one
is dealing with the political field the issue is somewhat different
than it is When you are dealing with any particular family of missiles
that they may be developing;
. One of the most interesting issues of capabilitiee and in-
tentions was in connection with an estimate made just before I was '
down bete at the time of the attack over the Yalu River in September,
October, and November of 1950. At that time the intelligence Com-
munity was quite accurate with regard to the capabilities of the
Chinese Communists. We had their battle order the other side of
the tau River quite accurately. The problem was: What were their
intentions? On their intentions we were a little fuzzy, I an frank
to admit. That is an illustration of the point that you raised:
But, getting into the particular issue with regard to
missiles, we had this situation. Going back to 1957 (or late 1957
into 1958), we had been able to detect and analyze a sufficient
number, although small in nUnber? of testa of the Soviet long-range
missile, te be able in our estimate to indicate that they had the
capability of producing .a missile with certain eualificationsor
with certain attributes, rather, and that they had the industrial
capability to produce certain numbers of these missiles..
At that point we did net feel, however, we could make out
a very definite program -- that is; What was their intention with
regard to this particular weapon.
? Now, when it came to this year, we thought we had. been
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able to analyse a much larger testing program, to have farther infor-'
Motion with regard to their manufacturing capabilities and intentions
in order to gay that we believe their prograt will be so.4uldmso and
co-math-so, not merely a capability. But we said that. we believe
they intend to produce so many missiles over et certain period. There
were certain divergent views in the Community but we were fairly well
together within the first year or so of .this program.
That idea got a little fuzzed up. I think it wail clarified
somewhat at the end, but it Wasn't entirely.clear.
We had a.very camparableprOblem with regard. to the heavy
bomber. There at first we had the estimate baped on capability._ We
Saw the BISON; they produced a good. many Of them at one of their liky
Day fegtivals. I have forgotten how long ago it was .4.-about five
years ago - more / gaess ?4 43, '54, along about then. We had a
.pretty good idea as to their production line and we started out with
an estimate based on capabilities, and then we staid We believe their.
program is going to be as follows, and we bad:4 very good data on
that program what they were actually producing and flying off.fram
their test fields.
Then right in the middle their intentions dhanged and their
capabilities remained. Their intentions. about the production of the
BISON changed and we began to see they were cutting down the actual
nUmber Of bombers being produced; so we changed our estimate.
We have changed our intentions. We have changed Out in-
tentions about the Boa57 and the B..701 and so forth, and. so on. They
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changed their intentions.
You have to be very alert to this. When you just see -a
program emerging, you start out and say-we know they are capable of
producing this kind of a weapon, and then aS you getfurther along
you say .not only are they capable Of producing it but we believe
It it) their intention to have a program of about these dimensions.
QUESTION:- Mr. Dulles, we hear &good deal about Soviet ?
concern with the possible emergence of Communist China as a member
of the nuclear club. And., of course, it is a matter of concern to
ourselves also. What can you tell us about the progress that Commu-
nist China has achieved thus far in the direction of attaining .a
nuclear weapons capability?
ANSWER: We have very little hard evidence on that. We
know that they have capable nuclear scientists. We believe that
over the next four or five years they could be perfectly capable
of producing on their own steam a nuclear weapon, if they desire 'to
put that amount of money and effort into it at this particular time.
/t requires a lot of money; it requires a lot of power which they
might want to use for other purposes.
We do not believe that the Soviets have so far given the
Chinese nuclear weapons. We believe that they have them in the Far
East available to the Russiana and they might give them, but there
is no indication that they have given any so far. Now, at any time,
if it was in the interest of the Soviets politically to do SD, they
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could turn over, of course, a nuclear bomb to the Chinese for the
Chinese to detonate =drake a great hoop-la about it. We would
believe, though, that if over the next few months or even the next year
or so there was a detonation of a nuclear bomb in Communist China it
would be a.bomb that had been loaned to then by the Russians rather,
than one which had, been the result of native production, although;.
as / say, Overa period of time they could produce 4 tomb, in our
opinion, if they wanted to.
QUESTION: Mr. Dulles, recently we have been hearing a
great deal about eommunist guerrilla activities in Lees and Vietnam.
Would you care to give usan appraisal of their capabilities to
defend the area and. how they 2
(inaudible)
ANSWER: Starting with Laos, Laos has a common border with
Communist China and a very long border, of course, with North Vietnam.
Both of those countries have the potential nearby -- either a few
guerrillas, volunteers, or otherwise to do a lot of harm and make'
a lot of mischief in Laos. We do not believe that at the present-- ,
time they want to move in a way which would openly dhow their hand
as intervening and that they will restrict themselves T.? both the
northern Vietnamese - Communist Vietnamese ? and the Communist Chinese
to infiltration and other moves not clearly identifiable.
One of the reasons for trying to bring the U. N. into that
picture WI to have the presence of the U. N. there, to be able to
advertise quickly any moves that were made. Laos is a very exposed
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country. They have had an election recently. They probably overdid
a little bit in the elections. The present government that will be.
formed following the elections will be a pro-Western government in
all respects, / believe. It would have been even if there hadn't
been a little packing of the ballot boxes here and there; the pro-
Westerners would have won it. They didn't need to do some of the
thine they did, I am afraid. / am very much against allthe'vice
that they did with it.
You have to keep an eye on that situation. It is not one
that you can say: Well, that is all very nice; that is aIlin order;
We can put that in the box and forget it. /t is a permanently.
fragile situation. With a long exposed frontier in a country Where
the population on both Sides look so much alike that you can't tell
When they come over the frontier whether they belong in the country
or Whether they have come there a very small population in a very
large area., So Laos is going to be perpetually a potentially weak
and dangerous spot.
As to Vietnam, the activity of the pro4ammunists is _spear-
headed very largely from northern Vietnam through the infiltration
of the volunteers through Laos and around through Cambodia into
southern Vietnam, directly and by sea and by other ways; They have
built up in very difficult fighting areas- swampy areas in southern
Vietnam amarea of resistance based upon the inzurgenta that ha;re re-
mained there in some 'nuMbers ever since Diem pacified the country.
Attention had been alerted to this sometime back. Steps
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are being taken .64. I think very effective steps are being taken to:
control that situation. But it is still a bit tricky situation in
southern Vietnam.
QUESTION: The Soviet people, sir, have the capability of ,
. (inaudible)
This could be good for us or bad for us, correct or incorrect. The
main point is
(inaudible)
or tura it around as they see fit. Since we have relative difficulty
in getting to the Soviet population boo] and various programs, do you
think this is more of a weakness than a strength? If so, An what way
would be the more exploitable than it is at the present time?
ANSWER: You are quite right; it is not easy to get the
voice of the Free World, Voice of America, and other mentalities into
Russia. There has been same cessation of Jamming of the Voice of
America. / understand that they have threatened recently that if
the Voice of America doesn't behave they won't stop the jamming; they
will probably start the jamming again. But so far they are not jam-
ming the Voice of Americavto any great degree anyway, in the Soviet.
Union, and that is quite an advantage.
I don't know that I agree with the first premise that you
suggested. Others who have been to the Soviet Union some of you
who are sitting here would know maybe better than I, although / see
a great many reports -- I haven't been given a visa yet to go. I
applied for one in 1936 and I haven't had an answer yet. I haven't
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asked for one in recent years, however. I imagine they might give
me one if / asked for it, but I haven't asked for it.
/ think there is a very basic fundamental friendship be.
tween the Russian people and the American people. I don't think
that the propaganda and the vituperative, vile stuff they have
.poured out at times have basically changed that. They are not do=
ins that so much nov. I may be wrong but that seems to be the
testimony of American travelers, and I have talked to hundreds of
them, who have been around Russia and have :talked with the Russian'
people. / have seen practically no evidence of hostility, of
? unfriendliness in those contacts. So I have great hope that there
to this residue and a very great residue of basic good will between
the two peoples., Am I right on that?
AMITASSADOR LACY: I think so.
MR. DULLES: Ambassador Lacy woad know that better than
anybody.
QUEST/ON: lir. Dulles, we all know there are many programs
and actions that are taking place in this field of lessened tensions
between the U. S. and Russia, such a0 liftingtravel'restrietione,
cultural exchanges, and so on. On the other hand, there are some
programs taking place that cause one to wonder, such as helping the
Russian agricultural .segment of the economy by giving them hybrid
corn, all sorts of advice, experts traveling there, and. so on. I was
wondering whether you feel this type of program should go on,
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especially from the standpoint of haw do you assess the advantages
to be gained in our better relations between the two countries versus
the disadvantages by ameliorating some of RuSsia's difficulties in
the very ticklish agricultural problem they have and freeing some of
their resources to be used. perhaps in building up some more of their
power capabilities against us.
ANSWER: Well, there may be difference of views on this.
/ am inclined to think, taking the agricultural field, that most of
the information Which they get through these exchanges they could
get anyway, maybe not quite as accurately but they could get it by
other methods.
This is an open country. All our agricultural journals and
.all our publications are telling all about this. If is not something
that we could keep secret, even if we wanted to. I think, by having
these exchanges, we Maybe forcing Op, pushing on this eVolutionary
movement which I think is the only hope for peace in the world. /t
is a risk. Obviously, we take certain risks. Maybe we are helping
them to get strong faster than they would otherwise. But to deny
this to them would, I think, turn back what maybe the greatest hope
of the future, that is that there will be this evolution, this mellovw
ing, and so forth. I don't say you can trust them today. I wouldn't
trust Khrothchev very far. But I think he is being carried, as /
indicated, somewhat on a wave that he would find it very hard to
resist like trying to turn back the tides. He might try to do it;
don't think he would succeed in doing that.
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I think the Ce exchanges help along that movement which
hopefully might lead to some reforms and changes in the Soviet system
and in its aggressive policy.of trying to take over the world.
-Khrushchev made his position very clear when he said,
regarding his comment "we will bury you", that he didn't mean he
was going out with a pick and Shovel and put 1113 in a,grave. He Said,
as / indicated in my remarks, that the wave of the future was with
him and that Ccenunism was going to succeed capitalism just as capital..
ism succeeded feudalism. Well, we have to show him that he is Wrong.
It is not that capitalism is going to change but that it is Communism
that is going to change. That is the only hope, as I see it, we have
of maintaining the peace over the distant future.
QUESTION: Sir, would you discuss the potential dangers and
recent developments in Cuba?
ANSWER: It is never nice to dee a neighbor and a great
friend fall by the wayside and get led into evil paths. There is
always a question of how you are going to turn some One fraM their
evil paths. It is not always by our preaching to them. Sometimes
you have to let them see where their evil paths are taking them and; 1
after they are in the gutter, then maybe one can help them to rise.
It is 'a tragic situation in Cuba. I think there have been,
of course, mistakes nade in the past. They have had dictatorships.
They have had corrupt governments in Cuba. That happens. Nov, we
'see Cara taken over by a regime whose stock and trade is to attack
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the United States, try to turn the people of Cuba. away fret the United
States, try to misrepresent and malign everything we have done and
tried to do for Cuba over the Years is a tragic situation. I'don't
think it is a permanent situation.
The change in Cuba over the last six months, the recession
of the Castro wave -- I don't say that it has Stopped. Castro still
has the support of a great many people but he hap the support of fat
fewer people than he had six months ago.
. The great patience that the United States hat Shawn -- we
are big enough to be patient, we are big enough to let the Cubans
learn their own lessens without trying to teach them by intervention
or anything of that kind. I am hopeful of the resat. .I don't
expect anything from Castro. - /t leeks as though he were getting
little frightened now and maybe trying to make up to us just a little
bit. Put / think Castro is essentially hostile. I think he feels
that that it his real stock and trade. His adbitiona 6 beyond. Cuba.
He would like to take over the Dominican Republic and Haiti, aid he
would like to be the dictator of the Caribbean and eventually of
Letin America. He has very bread. ambitions. I don't think he has
the ability to carry them out. I think he will come a cropper.
I look optimistically toward the future, but a good deal
.
of crockery is going to be broken in the meantime, and it is a:tragic
thing to ped it happen. It is bard. to bo patient. It is hard. to
.reatrain one's self, but I think we are big enough to do it.,
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GENERAL CRABS: Mr. Dulles, we appreciate this most inter-
esting, informative, and invigorating presentation. I think one of
the reasons we have enjoyed it so much is because we sort of feel
that you know what you are talking about.
On behalf of the students and the faculty, thank you.
MR. DULLES: Ulm* you.
* * *
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