QUANTICO ADDRESS 20 JUNE 1958

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01009A001502520007-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2013
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: June 20, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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QUANTICO ADDRESS
20 June 1958
(1) Tough role of Intelligence. With a world bursting at seams --
(2)
from Lebanon - Indonesia. And trying at same time solve
both terrestrial and outer space. (Trust can leave much of
latter to scientists but we must still monitor USSR activities).
High recognition of Intelligence -- Have chance to sell our
wares to President, NSC, etc. Never before such interdst.
V1/41?
(3) ceg,
Intelligence mechanism From Mata Hari to machine age
C Radar -- Electronic Intelligence Intercepts.
SI\ Electronic computers can't prepare a national estimate or
gauge our dangers.
Sifting and appraisal process.
(4) I. A. C. - - Watch Committee -- Indications Center. Increasing
need of rapid communication Intelligence Info. (Cooperation
Military HQS abroad needed)
(5) Intelligence team includes -- State - Military Services & JCS;
C.I.A. with assist from AEC and FBI.
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? ?
2.
(6) Vital role of Mil. Services -- Service attaches and Int. officers
in military commands abroad make great contribution.
Mil. attaches - (not merely for battle order or disorder
and training) -- Opportunity to learn about foreign countries
and personalities.
(c4.146,-Tp...4 )
Burden of empire- whether like it or not -- Need corps of
pro-consuls (not to exercise authority of the old -- but to help
guide inefficient, incompetent new gov'ts.)
Mil. men will take over larger role in these new countries. ,
They often represent element of stability in troubled areas.
Mil. attaches and chiefs of MAAG missions -- Now working
with military men of other countries who will be future leaders.
Must help build up leaders of free world --(lost two - Magsaysay
and Castillo Armas).
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3.
(7) Intelligence appraisal. Past year a difficult one.
A. In the political field:--
Soviet regained much of ground lost in Hungary,
consolidated position in most of satellites and East
Germany by ruthless methods (smacking of Stalinism).
Slowly trying bring Poland back into Communist fold.
(But this remains a tinderbox as Poles may resist total
loss of liberties they gained).
In Europe: NATO allies divided by issues such as Cyprus,
Algeria. /4-- &tat OA, titin-r 2 Gustreififro fut.c4p.)-401,4%)
Cattnt taw-.
Also public opinion problem re missile bases.
In Middle East -- Communists are backing nationalism
?and Nasrism which has wide popular support even in
countries, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia where govts pro-West.
Lebanon -- undoubtedly backing Syria in its covert support
of the rebels in the fighting which partly a civil war and
partly covert external aggression.
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In the uncommitted areas of Asia and Africa the Soviet
trade and subversive offensive is taking advantage of the
weak and inefficient governments which with inadequate
preparation, experience and skill are trying to make the
democratic processes work.
In Indonesia -- the Comrnunists are partly taking
advantage of a civil war to strengthen their grasp on
the Island of Java. But in some of these areas (and
this is beginning in Indonesia) there is some realization
that Communists more effective in wrecking an economy
than in making it work.
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4.
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5.
(B) In the economic field, at home,
Soviet reorganizing and decentralizing its control of industry
and maintaining a high rate of national growth -- rate
01A4
almost double that of ours but on a lower base. But still
their gross national product is less than one-half of our own.
(0 In the agricultural field; still suffering from the effects
of collectivization and has low rate of efficiency in comparison
with us. ALL..44) AM-R-AX-0.-444 AMA:PA& kyr-LA-AAA-LA.4 LA-0.17,
Q_cAlpti-cats-m 1?,,
(D) In the military field -- estimate that with a GNP only about
40% of ours they are nevertheless putting out an effort
roughly equivalent in value to our own in terms of investment,
manpower, materiel and research. (EXPLAIN)
Emphasis on heavy industry and military hardware means
that although they have been able to increase somewhat
their standard of living, their per capita consumpt ion is only
about one-fifth of our own; -- how long will the Russian
? people tolerate this situation? Effect of education and
greater knowledge of outside world - Can they return to
Stalinism - Y.S. situation.
- 5
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6.
E. Basic aim in military field is to create a deterrent as
effective as the one we have possessed; to develop a
military capacity which would inhibit the U.S. from
using its military power.
Soviet leaders probably believe that after long period
of inferiority is goal in sight:
(a) They possess adequate nuclear weapons capability
but substantially less than our own.
Between now and mid-1960 they expect to have an
initial ICBM capability -- a moderate number of
heavy bombers supplemented by titte large number,
about 1,000, medium type bombers of the B-47 type;
useability (on a one-way mission) against the USA.
Big question: will they try for super-sonic bomber.
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7.
(b) Between 1960 and 1963 they will be shifting over
to a greater emphasis on missiles. Indications
are that they have drastically reduced (probably
temporarily ceased) production of heavy bombers
(BEAR and BISON-type).
(c) In the submarine field with an existing fleet in
the neighborhood of 500 submarines, one-half of
which are modern, they have ceased production
of this type and appear to be starting a new series,
presumably some of which will be nuclear-powered
and probably with built-in missile capability.
(d) Retaining formidable capability in conventional
arms; modernization and streamlining their ground
C-aw rt.m,to
forcesSome force reductions being carried as
they prepare for nuclear warfare.
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?
( 8) Eeiimatel
(1) That Soy does not desire to initiate gen. war vs US in
near. future, say for next five years, or to be drawn
into one if they can avoid it.
L120144je I do.
(2) That Soy would not risk even limited war involving Soviet
(3)
forces directly for fear it would not stay limited.
But might through indirect means foster limited wars,
4-- Azikiv...,
particularly in ME or Asia, begun by others, if it suited
efik1/4
their interests.
8.
That Soy will advance its policies which remain unchanged
by political and economic penetrations, subversion_ and
the like.
teas).
This is on assumption that we maintain our military
deterrent power; that no spectacular technical break
through in military field; and finally that there is no
serious miscalculation by Soviet of our intentions to honor
our commitments or of our ability to do so.
4..14)44-4-1.4-- 'VL
Ifthis estimate correct, we must look forward toi\a
prolonged and intensive period of cold war.
ZLUA.TAJJ1.46-Gt.c..t.
Ct,-ftf fah 4 - !Van 414-61
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9.
(9) What weapons will the Soviet use:
A. Communist Party organizations on a world-wide basis
in the hard-core of the Communist apparatus. The popular
front technique; -- refer to Mikoyan at the 20th Party Congress
re Czechoslovakia.
B. Other front organizations: World Federation of Trade Unions
and control of major labor unions, viz., France, Italy,
Indonesia, Japan, women's organizations, student and youth
fronts, and the like.
C. A judicious supply of military equipment to weak governments
in Asia and Africa, particularly where prospects of upsetting
larecraotm;P
governments are good. .U-sa..r of leaders of weak
countries. Use and abuse of the electoral process of the
democratic machinery of government in those areas where
democracy is young and vulnerable.
(10) To combat these techniques we must:
Develop adequate intelligence regarding their techniques
ctilk.