ALLEN W. DULLES QUANTICO ADDRESS 20 JUNE 1958

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01009A001502520006-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2013
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: June 20, 1958
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502520006-9
NOT; U
QUANTICO ADDRESS
20 June 1958
(1) " Tough role of Intelligence. With a ;world bursting at seams from Lebanon Indonesia.: And trying at same time solve both
terrestrial and outer space. (Trust can leave much of latter
to scientists but we must still monitor USSR activities)
(2) High recognition of Intelligence
Have chance to sell our wares
to President, HSC, etc. Never before such interest.
(3) Intelligence mechanism From Mata Hari to machine age
Radar Electronic Intelligence Intercepts.
Electronic computers can't prepare a national. estimate or gauge
our dangers.
Sifting and.appraisal process..
(4) I. A.`C,
Watch Committee -- Indications Center. Increaoing-
need.of rapid communication Intelligence info. (Cooperation
Military NOS abroad needed).
(5) Intelligence team -.. includes STATE, Military Services & JCS;
C.I.. A. with assist -from AEC and "BI.
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(6) Vital role of Mil. :Services -- Service attaches and W. officers
in military commands abroad make great contribution.
'Mil. attaches -? (not merely for battle order or disorder
and training) --- Opportunity to learn about .foreign countries
- and personalities.
Burden of empire -- whether like it or not --.Need corps of
pro-consuls (not to exercise authority the old -- but to
help guide inefficient, incompetent new govrts).
Mit, men will take over larger role in these new countries.
They often represent element of stability in troubled areas.
Mil. attaches and chiefs of MAAG missions now working with
military men of other co
who will be future leaders.
Must help build up leaders of free world --(lost two - Magsaysay
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(7) Intelligence appraisal. Past year a difficult one.
A. In the political field:--
Soviet regained much of ground lost in Hungary.
consolidated position in most of satellites and East
Germany by ruthless methods (smacking of Stalinism).
Slowly trying bring Poland back into Communist fold.
(But this remains a tinderbox as Poles may resist total
loss of liberties they gained).
In Europe: NATO allies divided by issues such as Cyprus,
Algeria.
Also public opinion problem re missile bases.
In Middle East -- Communists are backing nationalism
and Nasrism which has wide popular support even in
countries, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia where govts pro-West.
Lebanon -- undoubtedly backing Syria in its covert support
of the rebels in the fighting which partly a civil war and
partly covert external aggression.
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in the uncommitted
eas of Asia and Af r i
trade and subversive c fensiv
the $m,
and inefficient governments which with inadequa
preparation, experience and smell are tr1
democratic processes work.
ke the
advantage :of an civil war to strengthen their grasp on
some of., the a
aessia) there is some ;realiizatia
hat Communists more effective wrecking an economy
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(BY In the economic field, at homes
Soviet reorganizing and decentralizing Its control. of industry
and maintaining a high rate of national
rate
.almost double that of ours but on a' lower base. But still
their gross national product is less than one-half of our, own.
in the agric turai field; still suffering from the effects
of collectivization and has low rate of efficiency in comparison
.with us.
In the-military fief
hat with a GNP only about
'40% of ours they are nevertheless. putting out an effort
roughly equivalent in value to Our own in terms of investment,
manpower* materiel and research, (EXPLAIN)
Emphasis on heavy industry and military hardware means
that although they have been able to increase somewhat
their standard of living, their per' capita consumpt ion is only
a. about one -fifth of our own, how long will the Russian
people tolerate this situation2 Effect of education and
greater knowledge of outside world Can they return to
Stalinism - Y. S, situation,
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Basic aim-in military field is to create. a deterrent as
effective. as the one we .have , p sessed, to develop a
military. capacity which -would inhibit the U.S. from
sing its military power
Soviet leaders probably believe that after long period
of Inferiority this goal sight:
(a) .. They possess "equate nuclear weapons capabilit
but subs .nt ially less than our .own..
een now and .mitt-1940 they expect, to `ave an,
I ICB rapabii ty a noderate nun ber of
ea~ bombers supplemented: by the l ige number,
..!
about .1, O0O .medium type bombers- of the 3-47 type;
useability (on a one-way, mission) agains the USA.
Big question: will they try.for -super-some bomber.
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(b)
Between 1960 and 1963 they will be shifting over
to a greater emphasis on missiles. Indications
are that they have drastically reduced (probably
temporarily ceased) production of heavy bombers
(BEAR and BISON-type).
(c) In the submarine field with an existing fleet in
the neighborhood of 500 submarines, one-half of
which are modern, they have ceased production
of this type and appear to be starting a new series,
presumably some of which will be nuclear-powered
and probably with built-in missile capability.
(d) Retaining formidable capability in conventional
arms; modernization and streamlining their ground
forces. Some force reductions being carried as
they prepare for nuclear warfare.
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8.
(8) Estimate:
(1) That Sov does not desire to initiate gen. war vs US In
near future, say for neat five years, or to be drawn
into one if they can avoid it.
(2) That Sov would not risk even limited war involving Soviet
forces directly for fear it would not stay limited.
But might through indirect means foster limited wars,
particularly in ME or Asia, begun by others, if it suited
their interests.
(3) That Sov will advance its policies which remain unchanged
by political and economic penetrations, subversion and
the like.
This is an assumption that we maintain our military
deterrent power; that no spectacular technical break
through in military field; and finally that there is no
serious miscalculation by Soviet of our intentions to honor
our commitments or of our ability to do so.
If this estimate correct, we must look forward to a
prolonged and intensive period of cold war.
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9.
(9) What weapons will the Soviet use:
A. Communist Party organizations on a world-wide basis
in the hard-core of the Communist apparatus. The popular
front technique; -- refer to Mikoyan at the 20th Party Congress
re Czechoslovakia.
B. Other front organizations: World Federation of Trade Unions
and control of major labor unions. via. , France, Italy,
Indonesia, Japan, women's organizations, student and youth
fronts, and the like.
C. A judicious supply of military equipment to weak governments
in Asia and Africa, particularly where prospects of upsetting
governments are good. Subordination of leaders of weak
countries. Use and abuse of the electoral process of the
democratic machinery of government in those areas where
democracy is young and vulnerable.
(10) To combat these techniques we must: !
A. Develop adequate intelligence regarding. their techniques
and targets in key personnel ofitNeirriubversive apparatus.
Develop and indoctrinate real leaders erever they can
be found and begin building for the future bra choosing the
younger men who are likely'to become leadena in next decade.
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authorities and high-level decisions, some progress'
has been made in these fields; however, much tnvr'e' remains to be done
and it will require a coordinated effort on the part of the Departments
of State, Defense, C. I. A* .j. V. S. . A. and other agencies to develop
mechanisms adequate to meet the danger we face. As. a result of
experience gained, we are working on a program for consideration with
many of you to see that the great potential assets we have are properly
organized; properly located logistically;, and properly manned,
to meet the type of subversive warfare with which we are faced.
10.
Equipping ourselves to be ready to supply our friends and
allies with the proper type of equipment in the military field;
in the field of communications, as well as helping them to
find and neutralize elements. working for the Communists,
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