ADDRESS AT ARMY WAR COLLEGE NATIONAL STRATEGY SEMINAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01009A001402460003-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 21, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 6, 1956
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21: CIA-RDP80M011 009A001402460003-0
\ r
ADDRESS AT ARMY WAR COLLEGE
NATIONAL STRATEGY SEMINAR
6 June 1956
Proposed scope of my address:
A brief survey of the state of the world in 1956, highlighting
major problem areas and the relative positions of the two power blocs
with respect to these areas; an analysis of the significance of the
neutral nations and the relatively undeveloped areas to the power of
balance; an estimate of Soviet capabilities and limitations for the
next 10 - 15 years.
(Disclaim idea of dealing with Soviet capabilities and limitations
over next 10 - 15 year period.) 'el
I. With Stalin's death, March 1953, Soviet tactics have taken a
new turn and blueprint of their policies now appearing. Propose discuss
briefly the reason for the change, the nature of the new policy, and the
power position as we see it for the immediate future.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001402460003-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001402460003-0
2.
'u c S3
II. When Stalin died, world situation tense, Korean war still on,
Indo-China war developing, ChiCom's belligerent in off-shore island
situation, etc. , etc. , here expand. Looking back few years before .
Stalin's death, Soviet policy had not had for them satisfactory results
in their international relations with the sole exception of the ChiCom
situation.
Examples:
(a) Failed in attempted Greek take-over;
(b) Failed in Berlin Blockar,
(c) Alienated Yugoslavs and drove Communist-ruled country out of Bloc;
(d) Attempt to infiltrate Iran failed;
(e) Marshall Plan successfully carried out despite Stalin's attempts
to block it;
(f) And worst of all for Moscow, Soviet policy had let to USA
rearmament, NATO build-up, and cleared way for German
rearmament.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001402460003-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01402460003-0
Neither balance sheet nor trend pleasing to Kremlin. An
adventurous policy had seemingly led Soviet Bloc to verge of war at
a time when not ready.IHer-e--interpolate why;Mos.cow-does =not -want-
Also when Stalin died, internal situation USSR presented
III.
grave problems for Stalin's successors though at that tome we did not
fully realize extent of their problems. Now they beginning to tell us.
Refer de-Stalinization program, Khrushchev speech, etc.
While revolutionary moves unlikely in Moscow-type dictatorship as
long as army remains loyal, hard to ,obtain cooperation of a sullen,
thwarted and unhappy people.
3,
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01402460003-0
?n o~ ~~~:i'C~~~c~~~
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21 : CIA-RDP80MO1009A0l01402460003-0
IV. Believing that Stalin policies had reached point of diminishing
+'Vuwu.'t C+i~
return externally and internally, Soviet/hati{been effecting important
tactical changes in its foreign policy, internal policy, economic policy,
and military policy.
(a) Foreign policy
(1) Pressured China to end Korean war (Armistice 27 July 1953).
(2) Malenkov started peace offensive - "No questions unsolvable
by peaceful means on basis of mutual agreement. "
(3) Reversed policy towards Yugoslavia beginning April 1953
by exchanging diplomatic reps, concluding barter agreement
in 1954, and concluding with K, B and Mik visit Belgrade May 155.
(4) Set up East Germany with pseudo independence and
established diplomatic relations with West Germany.
(5) Renounced post-war claims against Turkey.
_ -_ i~l f
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01402460003-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001402460003-0
(6) Joined UNESCO and agreed to admission of 16 of 18
new UN applicants.
(7) Reversed policy towards Austria and signed the Austrian
Treaty.
(8) Returned Porkkala Naval Base to Finland, and held
out further concessions.
(9) Opened negotiations for a peace treaty and restoration of
diplomatic relations with Japan. (Then stalled - Adenauer
formula)
(10) Activated new Middle East policy and espoused Arab cause.
(Looking for our vulnerable spots)
(11) Summit Conference
(12) Started series of good-will trips -- China, India, Burma,
Afghanistan and England
(13) Encouraged visitors to Soviet Union and sought reciprocity.
(Twining) (Discuss problems here)
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001402460003-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01402460003-0
6.
(14) Probably responsible for Hungarian gesture in starting
to take down the frontier barbed wire -- symbol if not
the substance of the Iron Curtain. ( is move real? )
(b) Internal policy (Civil Rights, etc.)
(1) Beria and several other MGB leaders liquidated.
(2) Broad amnesties accorded -- labor camps reformed and
many prisoners released.
(3) Criminal code modified and thorough revision undertaken.
Laws establishing exceptional methods for investigation
and trial in secret apparently abolished. (But used on Beria)
`Vl cr5 T'w QUI is i_ tE~S itQ a. '4s W
(4) Scientists, writers, etc. , given new freedoms and
science largely purged of Marxism. (Lysenko).
Khrushchev calls upon scientists t;o exercise critical
approach and !'learn the best from the West.
(5) Educational opportunities broadened. (Refer general
effect of education on Sov system.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21 CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01402460003-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01402460003-0
(c) Economic policy (Domestic)
(1) Consumer goods prices cut.
(2) Working hours reduced.
(3) New incentives for individual-farmers (though
collectivization continues).
(4) But did not change paramount stress on heavy industry
and capital investment.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01402460003-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21: CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01402460003-0
I;!
(d) Foreign economic policy.
(1) Trade and barter agreements negotiated with large number
of countries.
(2) Acquiring food stuffs - - butter from Holland, meat from
Australia, Argentina. Wheat from Canada cheaper than
rail - shipping from Ukraine to Siberia saves two major
trains a day.
(3) 75 million dollar barter agreement with Argentina
and many other countries.
(4) $100, 000, 000 to Afghanistan.
(5) $20, 000, 000 goods exchange agreement with Yugoslavia.
+ $50, 000, 000 long-term low interest loan and other
capital assistance. V t4.:%
Y? )
l1 `
(6) Agreement to provide 1, 000, 000 ton steel ingot plant to India.
(7) $200, 000, 000? of arms to Egypt plus a nuclear physics
laboratory.
(continued)
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001402460003-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21: CIA-RDP80M01009A001402460003-0
(8) Offer of arms to several other Middle East countries, etc.
(9) Massive economic and military assistance to China.
(e) Military Policy
(1) Zhukov appointed Defense Minister and Alternate Member
of Politburo.
(2) Revising military establishment for nuclear warfare.
(3) Disarmament - Last month announced reduction of
1. 2 million, allegedly in addition to 640, 000 announced
last August. Motivation: Desire bolster Soviet position
on disarmament. Reflects belief early war unlikely and
reassessment to meet conditions of modern nuclear
warfare. Will they carry out promised reductions?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21 CIA-RDP80M01009A001402460003-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01402460003-0
(4) Military preparations stress air power and long-range
bombers -- nuclear weapons -- guided missiles.
(Exhibited new jet airliner, TU 104, in connection
with London visit Soviet leaders.)
(5) Navy renovated and submarine fleet increased to about
400, half are long-range type, and adds up to more submarines
than in all other navies of world.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01402460003-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21: CIA-RDP80M01009A001402460003-0
V. Why have they changed their techniques?
(1) Old policy not productive -- as already stated.
(2) Gain. time. As world passes into era of nuclear "enoughness, H
guided missiles, inter-continental bomber -- Wish for
immediate future to avoid war at all costs because still
behind in nuclear power and effective means of delivery
over USA. They hope to modify this in three to four years.
I don't predict that Sov will inevitably or even probably
risk global war when the peri.od of enoughne s s or stalemate
reached.
Believe their protestations that they realize folly of
global nuclear war.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001402460003-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21: CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01402460003-0
Also believe they will take new look at their overall
policies when they feel that they have reached certain goals
in nuclear, missile and air power fields. (This one reason
why do not wish predict their long range policies -- also
because certain evolutionary changes taking place in their
Soviet ultimate effect of which not now predictable).
(3) Internal pressures probably induced some of these changes.
Industrialization, education, and greater maturity forced
leaders to abandon hard Stalinist line, give more liberty, etc.
(4) Considered new policies best calculated.to weaken our Alliances,
threaten our position in Middle East plus SEA -- and endanger
overseas bases.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01402460003-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01402460003-0
(5) Also believe they can gain the uncommitted neutrals and
enlarge the number of neutrals by creating impression
Soviet wants co-existence not war; that it is. the champion of
freedom for all colonial areas (except their own Satellites).
(6) Have confidence in their subversive policies; i. e. , popular
front, subvert parliaments; etc.
VI. How long will new policies continue?
They are committed for several years at least and will stt no
reason to change it as long as it proves successful. Hitler was in a
hurry. He had to accomplish everything in his lifetime. Soviet talk of
historical eras. At one time they counted on the failure of our economic
system, depressions, etc., to give them early victory. Probably have
abandoned any such hope and may have adopted long-term program.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01402460003-0
 fi)FL it
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21: CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01402460003-0
VII. Can they carry out their policy?
Undoubtedly could continue the economic, technical and military
aid phase of it for a considerable period without seriously affecting
internal economy. Very possibly impact of their aid programs will
h
have somewhat diminishing political and economic impact on recipient
countries just as has been the case with our own programs of far greater
magnitude.
VIII. Are Soviets likely win fresh adherents by their new policies?
More subtly dangerous than hard Stalin line.
Unwise to discount influence of Communist appeal in undeveloped
areas. They see Soviet as second great world power militarily and
industrially -- starting from nowhere some 30 years ago (expand).
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01402460003-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21: CIA-RDP80M01009A001402460003-0
Countries far distant -- Afghans, Laos, Iran, close to Communist
power threat. Some countries, Egypt, possibly naive as to ability
embrace Soviet and not get caught in embrace.
Issue now joined in various areas, especially in soft underbelly
of the Sino Soviet Bloc -- Middle East, South and Southeast Asia.
IX. What is the answer to the Soviet policies?
Obviously our policy cannot be purely defensive. Must exploit
Communist weaknesses and develop elements. of our own strength.
(Discussion of affirmative policies falls in area of Department of State --
Mr. Murphy -- but appropriate have an intelligence officer to analyze
the points of weakness of the potential enemy).
(1) Still behind us in industrial potential. Less than 2 /5ths of
our own and will take years before they can hope to close
the gap.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001402460003-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01402460003-0
7r'T rf
IU !,I R'
(2) Living standards here should make us, not Soviet Union, the
model for nations desiring to improve their own standards.
Viz: West Berlin -- East Berlin, West Germany -- East
Germany, Austria -- East and West, et cetera, et cetera.
Soviet agricultural system, if facts known, would not
appeal to agricultural countries Soviet trying to woo.
De-Stalinization program has been shock to Communist parties
outside of the Soviet Bloc and a revelation to the free countries.
Implications on Soviet will be lasting. Must change history
and admitted crimes and shortcomings of Stalinist regime
will stick forever to present leaders who participated.
Will tend create a people of cynics who will never know
what they can believe.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01402460003-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01402460003-0
16.
( Soviet leaders faced with a difficult dilemma -- committed to
expanding educational opportunities, training of scientists,
technicians, engineers, etc. , and opening country to outsiders,
technical, scientific and cultural delegations, tourists, etc.
Difficult do this without starting serious questioning.
(5) Khrushchev recently queried on subject of permitting establishment
of an opposition party in the USSR. Here is what he had to
say privately:
"We will never create an opposition party but must change
terms we use. We have called you lackeys of capitalism but
you have used some pretty energetic terms about us. Time
has come for both of us to revise our dictionary, to take an
historic attitude and, to get rid of obsolete ideas. It was
natural that we did some stupid things, but basically our
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01402460003-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01402460003-0
SECRET
attitude was right. We fought a civil war, beat everyone,
built for ourselves. Today we are second greatest world
power. We have technical personnel superior to that of
bourgeois countries. In ten years half the workers will be
graduating from secondary schools. We have made all of
this out of a Russia that was totally illiterate. And now you
want us to set up a second party! Establishing an opposition
party would be like putting a louse under our shirt."
6a
L Will atheistic Marxist-Leninist doctrine endure in face of resurgence
of religion?
Can Soviet give larger freedoms to their own people and deny them
to Poles, Hungarians, etc. ?
This raises whole question of maintaining their "colonial"
empire and Satellites.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01402460003-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21: CIA-RDP80M01009A001402460003-0
XII. Conclusions.
Not easy for Soviet to hide all of these problems and weaknesses
from those countries whom they are now trying to lure into their orbit
or at least detach from the free world and turn into neutrals that lean
on Moscow. (Obviously plenty of place in the world for those neutrals
-- Swiss, Swedes, et cetera, et cetera, who vigorously defend their own
free way of life but choose not to join in any alliances).
Anyone making a balance sheet of the spiritual and material assets
of the free world and the Communist Bloc will realize our real and
lasting advantage. We have the resources, the ingenuity and, I am sure,
the courage to meet the challenge of any policies Moscow and Peiping
can devise.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001402460003-0