SECURITY WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01009A000300420029-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2013
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: September 29, 1963
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/10 : CIA-RDP80M01009A000300420029-0
THE OBSERVER, SEPTEMBER 29, 1963
ANTHONISAMPSON
Security
without
responsibility
He that has a 'secret should not only hide it but hide
? that he has it to hide.?CARLYLE.
TIP-TOEING through the pages of the Denning Report is the
most mysterious character of all, the man known as the "Director-
General of the Security Service."
More simply, he is the head of MI 5. the chief spy-catcher.
Journalists are forbidden to mention his name and we must, there-
fore, call him M. Normally it is considered rather bad form even
to mention his existence: but now it is difficult to avoid that.
For M is one of the central figures in Denning's drama. He
Is popping up everywhere, even writing a memorandum (in the best
urbane style of James Bond) about the Ward "pike."
It was M who?suggested to Sir Norman Brook that Profumo
might be warned about seeing Stephen Ward. and that Ivanov
might possibly be persuaded to join our side. It was M to whom
Profumo admitted his connection with Christine, on January
28. 1963, and who (to his credit) refused to issue a " D " notice to
suppress publication of the scandal on security grounds. It was M
who decided the next day that it was not his business to find out
whether Christine had been Profumo's mistress, and that "no
Approach should be made to anyone in the Ward RaThre."
Was M to blame? Lord Dilhorne and Macmillan blamed
him for not having passed on the information about the Profumo-
Christine affair. But Lord Denning, having studied the Directive
of 1952 (which itriely limits the scope of MI 5) exculpated him.
,But what is clear from the Denning Report is that M is not
only very important; but even more mysterious than people thought.
For no one seeds to know whom he is repsonsible to.
?
Maxwell Fyfe, in his 1952 directive,' explained that be was
responsible to the Hoar Secretary. But Lord Dilhorne, when he
gave his report to Macmillan, didn't seem to know about the 1952
directive: nor, apparently, did Harold Wilson. who made no men-
tion of the Home Secretary in his attack: and Macmillan kept very
quiet about it. Even Henry Brooke himself. as Home Secretary,
had to-send for M in March, 1963, to find out the facts; and when
M told him the story about Christine being asked about the bomb.
he didn't realise that he was the first Minister to be told about it.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/10 : CIA-R DP80M01009A000300420029-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/10 : CIA-RDP80M01009A000300420029-0
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The position would seem to be quite absurd. Here is a crucial
Civil Servant, in charge of our security, and no one knows who is
his boss. He pops up one moment talking to Sir Norman Brook,
one moment to Profumo, one moment to Henry Brooke, and eventu-
ally to the Prime Minister. Parliament will be cross (though not
wholly surprised) to discover that this elusive man is quite out of
Its control.
But, looked at a little further, it may not be quite so silly. For
the fact must be faced that MI 5. in its day-to-day workings. is
responsible to no one. Whatever the technical arrangement. MI 5
Is free to roam almost anywhere. MI 5. more than any other depart-
ment, must have no political allegiance, and must trust no one.
" Having got the right man:' Sir Findlater Stewart wrote in 1945,
" there is no alternative to giving him the widest discretion. . ."
When an M.P. asks a question about security, it doesn't make
much difference whether the Home Secretary or the Prime Minister
fobs him off : a serious matter (such as Philby) will be settled in
private between the Prime Minister and the Leader of the
Opposition.
But if M is so important, and invulnerable to Parliament. must
be remain a secret? .Doesn't the public have a right to know who is,
almost single7handedly, guarding them?
The Government's answer is that a service dealing with secrets
Is much, easier to operate if it is itself secret. M. they argue, can
operate much more efficiently away from the public gaze.
?
The Americans, of course, provide a spectacular contrast.
There, the FBI?the rough equivalent of MI 5?is run with a blaze
of publicity and its head. I. Edgar Hoover. shows some signs of
being fame-hungry. And its spy organisation. the CIA. the equiva-
lent of MI 6 (our spies) is run from a big well-known building in
Washington by John McCone. Of course, inside the large public
outfit there is a smaller secret one, and the apparent key figures
may not be the real ones. But still, the public and Congress know
whom to blame, and to cross-examine; if a major blunder occurs. .
_The Russians, on the other hand, are more secret than we
are; and their secret services are apt to be secret from one another.
Between these two extremes. Whitehall likes to think it keeps the
right balance: MI 5 is secret, without being secret from everyone;
and responsible. without being responsible to anyone very
particular.
But now that M has emerged, through the Denning Report, in
such an important light, it is essential that his responsibility should
be clearly.defined. The trouble with Whitehall is always that they
do not knoll: where secrets should end.
Either.- one Minister?preferably not the Home Secretary?
must be la:charge of security, both MIS and MI 6. with no actual
Ministryof his own but with large powers of inquiry. Or the present
boss. whOIS if. must be revealed to the public. They should be
allowed to know Who M is?who appointed him, when. and Where
he came from.
? We do Dot think he should be fired, but we would like to know
who could fire him. And having found that, we would promise
to leave him alone, to be as secret as he liked until the next scandal.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/10 : CIA-RDP80M01009A000300420029-0