THE DANGEROUS GAME OF BAITING THE CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01009A000100050066-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 29, 2013
• Sequence Number: 66
• Publication Date: February 17, 1964
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Tongrosional Record
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 88th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION
The Dangerous Game of Baiting the CIA
SPEECH
OF
HON. THOMAS J. DODD
OF CONNECTICUT
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
Monday, February 17, 1964
Mr. DODD. Madam President, I have
been disturbed, as I am sure many of my
colleagues have been, by the virtual epi-
demic of attacks on the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in recent months.
Some of these attacks have clearly
been the product of irresponsible and
speculative news reporting by men who
are more concerned with the headline
value of something that smacks of sen-
sation or scandal than they are with the
security of the country.
But there have also been attacks, or
sharp criticisms, by commentators of
national reputation who are generally
careful about their facts but who have
apparently been impressed by some of
the rumors and stories and inaccuracies
which seem to have become credible be-
cause they have been repeated so often.
There have also been attacks on the
CIA by distinguished Members of Con-
gress which seem to me exaggerated and
without foundation. These men are
friends of mine, whom I respect and who
are greatly respected by the country.
Their views are very influential and be-
cause of this I feel an obligation to make
reply to some criticisms which I feel are
unwarranted.
Baiting the CIA almost seems to have
achieved the stature of a popular na-
tional pastime.
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It is a highly dangerous pastime be-
cause the CIA is one of the essential ele-
ments of our security.
There is also something unbecoming
about the pastime, because the CIA can-
not defend itself. Attacking the CIA,
indeed, is something like beating a man
who has his arms tied behind his back.
For reasons of national security, the
Agency cannot confirm or deny pub-
lished reports, true or false, favorable or
unfavorable. It cannot alibi. It can-
not explain. It cannot answer even the
most outrageously inaccurate charges.
It was to this situation that President
Kennedy addressed himself when he
spoke to the CIA personnel at their head-
quarters in Langley, Va., on November
28, 1961.
Your successes are unheralded?
Said President Kennedy?
Your failures are trumpeted. * ? * But I
am sure you realize how important is your
work, how essential it is?and, in the long
sweep of history, how significant your efforts
will be judged. So I do want to express my
appreciation to you now, and I am confident
that in the future you will continue to merit
the appreciation of our country, as you have
in the past.
The charges that have been made
against the CIA in recent months are al-
most as numerous as they are sensa-
tional.
We have been told that the CIA has
been running wild, that it has been func-
tioning without control or supervision
either by Congress or the administration,
that it has been making foreign policy.
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The CIA has been criticized for the U-2
Overflight.
It has been blamed for the Bay of
Pigs disaster.
And it has even been criticized for the
anti-Mossadegh coup in Iran and for the
overthrow of the pro-Communist Arbenz
government in Guatemala.
Whether the critics realize it or not,
these charges also constitute an attack
on the wisdom and integrity of both
President Eisenhower and President
Kennedy. It is tantamount to accusing
them of passively allowing an executive
agency to function without control or
supervision, and to make foreign policy?
in other words, to usurp the President's
own authority. This is patently ridicu-
lous. Neither President would ever have
permitted such a thing.
I propose to say a few words about
some of these charges.
I feel that I am in a position to do so,
because in the course of my travels
around Europe, Asia, and Africa, I have
come to know many of the CIA's field
representatives, and, from long conver-
sations with them, I have some appreci-
ation, I believe, of the work they do. In
addition, I know something of the head-
quarters operation because senior offi-
cers of the Agency have on a number of
occasions appeared before the Senate
Subcommittee on Internal Security and
have given testimony of vital signifi-
cance.
If the overall quality of an agency may
be judged from the quality of the men
who compose it, then the CIA would have
to be given a triple A rating. I have
never encountered in any Government
agency a body of men whose ability and
dedication impressed me more.
Perhaps the most popular charge di-
rected against the CIA is that it operates
Completely without congressional over-
sight or supervision. It is this charge
that has given rise to the clamor for a
congressional watchdog committee.
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This charge is totally and demon-
strably untrue. Indeed, the CIA is prob-
ably one of the most supervised agencies
in the Government.
In both the House and Senate there are
special subcommittees of the Anted
Services Committee and of the Appro-
priations Committee that oversee the
activities of CIA.
In the House these subcommittees are
headed by Representatives CARL VINSON
and CLARENCE CANNON; in the Senate
they are headed by Senator RUSSELL and
SENATOR HAYDEN. These men are among
the most knowledgeable and conscien-
tious legislators our Nation has prod
duced; and I, for one, am willing to abide
by their judgment on matters which, for
reasons of security, cannot be revealed to
all Members of Congress.
The Director of the CIA and the chair-
man of the House and Senate subcom-
mittees have frequent meetings during
the course of the year. The subcom-
mittees are advised and fully informed
of special or unusual activities. They
are also informed upon the receipt of
significant intelligence.
In 1963, the Director of Central Intel-
ligence or his deputy, Gen. Marshall S.
Carter, appeared before congressional
committees on some 30 occasions. In
addition to briefings of the CIA subcom-
mittees in the House and Senate, these
appearances included briefings on sub-
jects of special interest to the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy, the Foreign
Affairs and Foreign Relations Commit-
tees, the Senate Preparedness Subcom-
mittee, and other committees.
I recall the clamor that immediately
arose when our 13-2 plane was shot down
over Soviet territory in May of 1960.
Many people jumped to the conclusion
that the CIA had been operating on its
own, without the authorization of Presi-
dent or Congress. The 13-2 flights were
charged with endangering the security of
the Nation, when, in fact, they had de-
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fended us against the possibility of a sur-
prise missile attack.
President Eisenhower put an end to
the speculation about the lack of Execu-
tive authorization by informing the
press that he had personally approved
the U-2 program. Unfortunately, it did
not receive quite as much attention when
Representative CANNON on May 10 rose to
inform the House that the House sub-
committee was fully apprised of the proj-
ect, had approved it, and had recom-
mended the funds for it.
Let me quote his words on that occa-
sion, because I think they constitute an
adequate response to all those who, in
ignorance of the facts, still charge that
the CIA operates without congressional
supervision.
This is what Representative CANNON
said:
The plane was on an espionage mission
authorized and supported by money pro-
vided under an appropriation recommended
by the House Committee on Appropriations
and passed by the Congress.
Although the Members of the House have
not generally been informed on the subject,
the mission was one of a series and part of
an established program with which the sub-
committee in charge of the appropriation
was familiar, and of which it had been fully
apprised during this and previous sessions.
The appropriation and the activity had
been approved and recommended by the Bu-
reau of the Budget and, like all military
expenditures and operations, was under the
aegis of the Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces of the United States, for whom
all members of the subcommittee have the
highest regard and in whose military capac-
ity they have the utmost confidence.
It seems to me that what some Mem-
bers of Congress have been complaining
about in advocating a joint congressional
watchdog committee is that they have
been unaware of certain activities con-
ducted by the CIA. But the informa-
tion gathered by CIA and the activities
conducted by it must, of necessity, be
confined to a careful selected and re-
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stricted committee. If this information
were made available to all Members of
Congress, the security essential for na-
tional defense would cease to exist.
The Members of Congress are all trust-
worthy; but a secret ceases to be a secret
when it is shared by more than 500
people.
Even if a joint congressional watchdog
committee were established, it would
have to observe the same rules of secrecy
that today govern the activities of the
House and Senate subcommittee; and
those Members of Congress who today
complain that they do not know what
the CIA is doing, would still find that
they know precious little about it.
Which, I may say, is the way things
ought to be.
Whether or not a joint committee of
Congress could more effectively supervise
the activities of the CIA than the House
and Senate subcommittee now in exist-
ence is a purely mechanical question
which I frankly consider to be of a third-
rate importance. This proposal appears
to be based on the false assumption that
the CIA has engaged in unauthorized ac-
tivities. It also casts doubt upon the
competence and dedication of the distin-
guished Members of the House and Sen-
ate who now serve on the two subcom-
mittees.
As for the oft-repeated charge that
even the President does not know what
the CIA is doing, let me quote a few para-
graphs from the National Security Act
of 1947, under which the Central Intelli-
gence Agency was established:
There is hereby established under the Na-
tional Security Council a Central Intelligence
Agency with a Director of Central Intelli-
gence, who shall be the head thereof.
The National Security Act further pro-
vides in section 102(d) :
For the purpose of coordinating the in-
telligence activities of the several Govern-
ment departments and agencies in the in-
terest of national security, it shall be the
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duty of the Agency, under? the direction of
the National Security Council?
(1) to advise the National Security Coun-
cil in matters concerning such intelligence
activities of the Government departments
and agencies as relate to national security;
(2) to make recommendations to the Na-
tional Security Council for the coordination
of such intelligence activities of the depart-
ments and agencies of the Government as
relate to the national security;
(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence
relating to the national security * *;
(4) to perform, for the benefit of the exist-
ing intelligence agencies, such additional
services of common concern as the National
Security Council determines can be more
efficiently accomplished centrally;
(5) to perform such other functions and
duties related to intelligence affecting the
national security as the National Security
Council may from time to time direct.
The text of any piece of legislation
makes dry reading, but I have gone to
the trouble of reading these paragraphs
of the National Security Act for the rec-
ord because they repeatedly make it clear
that the CIA functions under the direc-
tion of the National Security Council,
and as an arm of the National Security
Council.
They also make it abundantly clear
that the CIA was to have duties broader
than the simple gathering of intelligence
data, operating under the direction of
the National Security Council.
The wording of the National Security
?Act was a reflection of the growing rec-
ognition that we cannot compete with
communism if we confine ourselves to
orthodox diplomacy and orthodox intel-
ligence collection.
Over and over and over again, it has
been demonstrated that a handful of
trained Communists can seize control of
a trade union or a student federation,
or for that matter, of a country. The
fact that the overwhelming majority of
the people are non-Communists or anti-
Communists has, in most such situations,
not seriously impeded them because the
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opposition generally lacks organization,
lacks know-how, lacks discipline, lacks
funds.
In every country that has been taken
over by the Communists or that has
been menaced by Communist takeover,
there have always been men of under-
standing and of courage who are pre-
pared to risk their lives for freedom.
There have been situations, and there
will, I am certain, be situations in the
future, in which some sound advice plus
some limited assistance in the form of
funds, or even arms, may make the
difference between victory or defeat for
the forces of freedom.
If we are not prepared to give this as-
sistance to those who share our beliefs,
then we might as well run up the flag
of surrender today: because it can be
predicted as a certainty that the Com-
munists will move without serious op-
position from one triumph to another.
I do not propose to draw up a score-
card of CIA victories and CIA defeats.
I do not know for certain whether they
played any role in the uprising that over-
threw the pro-Communist government
of President Arbenz in Guatemala.
Nor do I know whether the Agency was
In any way connected with the over-
throw of the lunatic Mossadegh regime
in Iran in 1953. But I would like to
discuss these two events because I con-
sider them to be outstanding examples of
the kind of perilous situation I have just
described.
In the case of Guatemala, the Arbenz
government, which had been elected on
a nationalist and reform program, was
moving, in a manner later to be emulated
by Castro, toward the complete com-
munization of the country. As the gov-
ernment introduced more radical meas-
ures, it lost its hold over the people and
over the armed forces. But the regime
would not have toppled had it not been
for the courageous action of a hand-
ful of patriots under Col. Castillo Armas,
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who invaded Guatemala from Honduras
in 1954.
When this small band of determined
patriots established themselves on Gua-
temalan soil, the Arbenz regime collapsed
like a house of cards. Hardly a shot was
fired in its defense, so completely with-
out support was it among the people
and among the Guatemalan armed
forces.
A similar situation existed in Iran
under Mossadegh in 1953. Mossadegh
had come to power as a Nationalist.
But his nationalism was of the lunatic
variety that was prepared to give carte
blanche to the Communists in return for
their support. Had he remained in
power another year, it is probable that
today Iran would be on the other side
of the Iron Curtain.
In August 1953, mass demonstrations
against the Mossadegh regime erupted
in Teheran. Within 48 hours, the re-
gime had been swept out of power, the
Communist Tudeh Party had been
crushed, and wildly cheering throngs
hailed the return of the young Shah to
his throne.
If the CIA did have a role to play in
Guatemala and Iran, then it played its
role successfully. It inflicted two great
defeats on the Communists and thereby
saved two vital countries from slipping
into the Communist orbit. Is this some-
thing we should apologize for? No, on
the contrary, it is something of which
every American should be proud.
There are some people who would have
us place an absolute prohibition on any
form of assistance to the forces of free-
dom in other countries in the name of
"nonintervention."
Some of these are of the absolute paci-
fist variety, who would rather let the
Communists take over the world than
fight against them.
Others are muddleheaded moralists,
who might be willing to fight if their
own country were threatened by a Com-
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muriist takeover, who are prepared to
admit that the Communists engage in
massive subversive activities of every
kind, but who, for some strange reason,
consider it wrong for the United States
to do anything about it.
At least a few of the critics of the
CIA's operations are unquestionably fel-
low travelers and Communists.
What is most damaging and most per-
plexing, however, is the criticism that
comes from Members of Congress who
are staunch anti-Communists, who do
not believe that the United States
should stand by, indifferent and supine,
while the Communists proceed to take
over in other countries, but who, never-
theless, argue that the CIA should not
have an operational function. They say
that if the United States is to conduct
operations designed to meet the Soviet
subversive threat, this should be done by
a separate agency.
Once the need for clandestine opera-
tions is conceded, I frankly do not see the
importance of the argument that they
should be conducted by a separate
agency. In either case, the United States
would still be involved in the business
of covert operations which so disturbs
the ultramoralist critics of the CIA.
From a strictly practical standpoint,
moreover, I believe that grave harm
would be done by separating the conduct
of clandestine operations from the care-
ful processing of intelligence which must
govern such operations.
It may disturb some people, but I think
it can be stated as a certainty that many
countries that remain free today would
not be free if it had not been for the
CIA.
The U-2 flights which the CIA con-
ducted with such outstanding success for
some 4 years before the shooting down
of Gary Powers also disturbed some of
our ultramoralists. But I think that
the vast majority of the American peo-
ple take great pride in the knowledge
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that we had been able to penetrate So-
viet secrecy.
The CIA has been attacked from
many different directions for the role it
played in the Bay of Pigs invasion. I
am not saying that the CIA is blameless
or that it has made no errors. But
I do oppose what appears to be a mount-
ing tendency to shift all the blame for
the Bay of Pigs disaster onto the much
abused head of the CIA, because the
record made it clear that many people
shared the. blame.
Essentially, it failed because we had
not made the decision that it must not
be permitted to fail.
This is the position I took in speaking
on the floor of the Senate on April 24,
1961, hard on the heels of the disaster;
and since that time and up to this min-
ute, no information has been adduced
which would lead me to revise this posi-
tion.
The propaganda campaign against the
CIA reached a crescendo during the re-
cent Vietnamese crisis. Last October
4, an article written by a correspondent
for an American newspaper chain
charged that the CIA had been subvert-
ing State Department policy in Vietnam,
and that John Richardson, the CIA
man in Saigon, had openly refused to
carry out instructions from Ambassador
Lodge.
The correspondent who wrote this arti-
cle was guilty of openly identifying a
CIA representative abroad, thus re-
ducing, if not destroying, his potential
usefulness forever. Visiting Congress-
men and members of the press may
sometimes know the identity of the CIA
representative, but it has been taken for
granted that they do not reveal his iden-
tity to the public.
To the best of my knowledge, this was
the first instance in which an American
correspondent has been guilty of this
flagrant breach of the ethics of security.
Moreover, these sweeping charges
against an important agency of the Gov-
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ernrnent, and against a man's integrity,
were obviously based on a one-sided pres-
entation from some official source. Mr.
Richardson and the CIA could not de-
fend themselves. I have always taken it
for granted that American newspaper-
men in any controversial situation en-
deavor to obtain the facts from both
sides, and all the more so when such
sweeping accusations are involved. Not
only have I taken it for granted, but it
is also true what the vast majority of
our newspapermen do. But the cor-
respondent in question apparently con-
sidered this unnecessary.
In the third place, the charges against
Mr. Richardson were a tissue of false-
hoods. President Kennedy, when he was
asked about the charges against the CIA
and Mr. Richardson at his press confer-
ence of October 12 said:
I must say I think the reports are wholly
untrue. The fact of the matter is that Mr.
[CIA Director John] McCone sits in the Na-
tional Security Council. I imagine I see him
at least three or four times a week, ordi-
narily. We have worked very closely together
in the National Security Council in the last
2 months attempting to meet the problems
we face in South Vietnam. I can find noth-
ing, and I have looked through the record
very carefully over the last 9 months, and
I could go back further, to indicate that the
CIA had done anything but support policy.
It does not create policy; it attempts to exe-
cute it in those areas where it has compe-
tence and responsibility. I know that the
transfer of Mr. John Richardson [CIA official
In Saigon] who is a very dedicated public
servant has led to surmises, but I can just
assure you flatly that the CIA has not car-
ried out independent activities but has op-
erated under close control of the Director of
Central Intelligence, operating with the co-
operation of the National Security Council
and under my instructions.
So I think while the CIA may have made
mistakes, as we all do on different occasions,
and has had many successes which may go
unheralded, in my opinion in this case it is
unfair to charge them as they have been
charged. I think they have done a good job.
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President Kennedy's characterization
of Mr. Richardson, I can wholeheartedly
endorse from my personal knowledge of
Mr. Richardson. In most countries I
have visited, the briefings by CIA repre-
sentatives have been limited to an hour
or two. But in May 1961, when I was in
the Far East, Richardson briefed me for
some 7 or 8 hours, all told. Certainly, it
was the most detailed, most balanced,
most knowledgeable briefing I have ever
been given. But I was even more im-
pressed by Mr. Richardson as a man than
by his exceptional competence as an in-
telligence officer. Indeed, of all the hun-
dreds of people in the American service
whom I have met in the course of my
travels through Europe, Africa, and Asia,
I can recall no one for whom I formed a
higher esteem than John Richardson.
There is a final word I wish to say in
this connection. It is clear that the ar-
ticle in question originated in some offi-
cial source. It had to. The official who
was guilty of giving out this story to the
press was himself guilty of violating the
rules of security as well as the ethics that
should govern relations between govern-
ment departments. This officer, in my
opinion, should be identified and dis-
missed.
The time has come when Members of
Congress and members of the press must
take stock of the growing campaign
against CIA and of the part they them-
selves may have played in forwarding this
campaign.
I am not suggesting that the CIA
should be immune to criticism because of
the sensitive nature of its operations. No
government agency should be immune
from criticism.
I do believe, however, that there has
been far too much sensationalism, far
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too many inaccuracies, and far too little
concern for the national security in some
of the criticism that has heretofore been
made of the CIA.
I believe that, before we indulge in
criticism of the CIA, we should take into
account the fact that it cannot defend
itself. We should also take into account
the fact that every critical statement,
whether accurate or inaccurate, will be
picked up by the special bureau of the
Soviet secret police whose task it is to
discredit the CIA, and will be put to work
through all the information and propa-
ganda channels open to the Kremlin and
through all its agents in the world's news
media.
Because these things are so, we all
share a special responsibility, if we feel
constrained to criticize the CIA, to check
our facts painstakingly, to weigh our
words carefully, and to speak with re-
straint. If we have questions or com-
plaints, I believe that, before taking them
to the mass circulation press, we should
discuss them with the Director of the
CIA, or his deputy, or with the chairmen
of the four House and Senate commit-
tees charged with the supervision of the
CIA's activities. And if, after checking
in this manner, there is any one of us
who still considers it necessary to speak
out against certain policies of the CIA,
the proper place to do it would be on the
floor of Congress rather than on tele-
vision, or through the mass circulation
periodicals. This would provide an op-
portunity for rebuttal and debate, and
the press accounts, hopefully, would re-
flect all sides of the discussion.
For whatever its errors and shortcom-
ings may be, I believe, with President
Kennedy, that the CIA will in the future
continue to merit the appreciation of our
country, as it has in the past.
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