TRIP ON 18 AND 19 AUGUST 1978

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00772A000400010038-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 25, 2004
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: August 4, 1978
• Content Type: MF

ilic Director of Central In telli ecncc
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Washin bn,l).C 20505
177
DCI/IC-78-0051
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Security Agency
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director, Intelligence and Research, State
Under Secretary of the Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Army
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Air Force
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management
Deputy to the DCI for Collection Tasking
Deputy to the DCI for National Foreign Assessment
SUBJECT: Trip
on 18 and 19 August 1978
1. I am pleased that you all are coming to our brief retreat on
the 18th and 19th. I look forward to the opportunity to share ideas
on how we can mutually do our jobs better. It is my plan that our
conversations be relaxed and informal. This will not be a decision-
making event.
2. I would like to table the following topics for discussion.
They are matters that are much on my mind with respect to where we are
going in the longer run. I would be happy for your suggestions, either
in advance or on the spot, for additional topics.
a. What our activities should be producing for the country
in terms of "outputs."
b. How the outputs of intelligence are likely to change over
the next decade,
c. How we can better integrate the collection operations of
the Community.
d. How we can better integrate the production activities of
the Community.
e. How we can best ensure under our new organization that
there is a good connection between the collectors and the producers.
`178,
25X1
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SUBJECT: Trip
on 18 and 19 August 1978
3. I am attaching some papers with respect to output functions.
The first is a list of outputs to which I have assigned my own priorities.
I recognize we each view the Intelligence Community's product from a
different perspective, therefore; for openers, it may be interesting for
you to indicate the order of priority you would favor and whether these
are the correct measures of output. Also attached are short point papers
on each of the ten proposed outputs. They are very basic and are intended
only to stimulate the conversation on how we all look on the value of our
different outputs.
4. Look forward to seeing you on the 18th.
/s/ Stansfield Turner
STANSFIELD TURNER
Attachments:
as stated
Distribution:
1 - Each Adsee., Watts
1 - DCI, w/atts
1 - ER, w/atts
1 - D/DCI/RM Chrono, Watts
1 - RM Registry, w/atts
DCI/STurner&D/DCI/RM
(3 August 1978)
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KEY ISSUES
FOR DISCUSSION AT RETREAT
18 - 19 AUGUST 1978
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Output functions of National Foreign Intelligence Program in
order of priority.
1. Provision of Indications and Warning of Military Attack
2. Support in Managing Military or Political Crisis Situations
3. Support to National Policy Making with Political Data
4. Support to Military and Political Planning with Data on Strategic
Military Forces
5. Treaty Monitoring
6. Support to National Policy Making with Economic Data
7. Support to Military and Political Planning with Data on Tactical
Military Forces
8. Support to Military Commanders in Operational Matters
9. Support to National Planning with Non-Military Technical and
Scientific Data
10. Provision of Counterintelligence Support
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1. Key issues under, "Provision of Indications and Warning of
Military Attack":
a. Our capability to provide warning of strategic attack on
the United States is very much a joint product of DOD's Intelligence
Related Activities and the NFIP. Our greatest weaknesses at this
point lie in the ability to predict rapidly the intended impact of
ICBM launches that are detected and to correlate sizeable numbers of
such indicators in a brief span of time. How much additional effort
may be warranted here is a function of the probability that we would
launch on warning and/or take instant defensive measures for protection
of leadership and population.
b. Warning of theatre level attack against U.S. forces can
be divided into four principal cases:
European theatre: NIE 4-1-78 provides a reasonably optimistic
forecast of our ability to warn that the Warsaw Pact is moving
into a posture from which attack is more probable. Clearly
one should never be complacent about such warning. We should
discuss whether you have mild, substantial or severe concern
about warning in Europe. We can also look at what steps
might increase our confidence in being able to provide adequate
warning and at what cost.
-- Korean theatre: Our warning capability here is less certain
than in Europe and, perhaps, more critical to the tactical
situation. Our planned redeployment of U.S. ground forces
may make warning a more critical factor; though U.S. Air Force
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forces will still remain. We appear to be at a costly point on the
curve of improving capability.
-- U.S. Naval Forces worldwide: Naval forces are distinct
targets easily separable from territorial issues. They could
be selected out for separate attack. Warning here is primarily
dependent on IRA and tactical DOD assets.
-- Smaller permanent or special deployments of U.S. forces: Such
forces are always subject to possible isolated attack. Warning
again is largely a responsibility of IRA and tactical capabilities.
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2. Key issues under, "Support in Managing Military or Political
Crisis Situations":
a. This Administration has not had a severe and time-urgent
crisis to manage. We have had considerable concern with a number of
military crises in which we were not directly involved: Lebanon, Ogaden,
Shaba I, Shaba II, Afghanistan, Egypt-Libya, Chad, Cambodia, and Western
Sahara; and with a number of political crisis internal to some third
countries: Pakistan, Bolivia, Mauritania, Kalahari and South Yemen.
There are two aspects to intelligence performance in such crisis:
- Advance warnin : We provided advance warning in very few of
these cases. In some situations it is most unlikely that we
could ever expect to provide warning; in others, better analytic
and collection efforts might do the trick. Are we doing an
inadequate job if we do not provide advance warning?
-- Information during a crisis: We attempt to provide data on
events as they occur and predictions of what may ensue. In score
of the crises noted above, our performance in providing an
account of events was reasonably canplete; e.g., Lebanon,
Ogaden, Kalahari, Egypt-Libya-in others much less so.
Success in these situations is dependent on bringing a variety
of intelligence collection assets to bear, on good interpreta-
tional work, on prior development of collection and analytic
capabilities in various areas, and on happenstance. Are there
geographic areas of probable crisis incidence on which we should
concentrate more effort?
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3. Key issues under, "Support to National Policy Making with
Political Data":
a. Some important consumers have complained that our
reporting on political matters lacks depth and perspective and does
not penetrate sufficiently into the intentions and plans of other
nations. If we accept this criticism, in your view, where are our
greatest shortcomings?
-- In reporting on current developments to support day-by-day
decision making?
-- In analysis of longer-term trends that is designed to support
broad policy making?
-- In local or in regional analyses?
In particular geographic areas?
b. Further, does your estimate of the value of the reporting
from those few high-level penetrations which we have, make you believe
that we should increase emphasis on these difficult and risky operations?
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4. Key Issues under, "Support to Military and Political Planninq
with Data on Strategic Military Forces":
a. This is an area in which we pride ourselves on the technical
ingenuity of our collection effort and the scientific skill of our
interpretative work. There is always a thirst for more specificity and
breadth of coverage and the qualitative arms race shows no sign of
abatement. Yet this one output area, plus that for conventional
forces, could virtually consume our total budget. The key issues are:
Do we need to maintain this same level of effort? Should we increase it
across the board, or can we increase it selectively; and, if so, how?
For a discussion of force planning, which I propose to address here, rather
than as part of treaty monitoring, I have the following questions:
-- to we give the consumers enough for them to understand
adequately Soviet strategic doctrine and intentions?
-- to policy makers have sufficient data with which to plan our
strategic forces?
b. If we agree that we can improve our intelligence, what can we
do in the following areas:
-- Soviet civil defense
-- Better interpretation of the Backfire's capabilities
-- Detection of indicators of an ABII development/deployment
-- Evaluation of the long term prospect for anti-cruise missile
defense
-- Others
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5. Key Issues under, "Treaty Monitoring":
a. Much of the data for treaty monitoring is subsumed under
our efforts to support both strategic and conventional military policy.
Many of the issues discussed under those output functions are applicable
here. I suspect, however, that there are monitoring requirements
which exceed military planning requirements, e.g.:
- For a CTB there are two fundamental approaches to monitoring:
1) A recognition that limitations on the state-of-the-art are
severe and that the marginal capabilities for seismic and
radioactive monitoring of a CTB do not warrant large
investments beyond our capabilities for a LTBT;
2) A conviction that we must do as much as possible to increase
the cost, complexity and uncertainty of cheating by the Soviets.
What are the implications of each?
- For an ASAT treaty we must consider whether our prioity of
effort should be on monitoring a treaty so as to prevent the development
and deployment of a capability against our satellites or on detecting
and defending against attack if it occurs.
-- For SALT we are liable to agree on some conditions for which
there is rather limited capability to detect cheating. Could
the cheating indeed pose a threat of a first strike? -- of
political blackmail? Which areas of potential cheating would
be most troublesome?
-- More warheads?
- More throw weight?
-- Cruise missiles?
- ICBM reload capability?
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6. Key issues under, "Support to National Policy Making with Economic
a. Some of our present major efforts in the economic arena
concern forecasts of energy supply and demand, prospective growth
rates in the major industrial nations, insights into trade negotiations,
and grain forecasting for the Soviet Union. Are our efforts adequate?
In what other areas can we produce better economic data today?
- The economic vulnerability of Rhodesia? South Africa?
- The investment actions of Saudi Arabia?
- The viability of Iran's combined military and industrialization
program?
- The economic impact on the EEC of Greek and Portuguese accession?
- German and Japanese economic intentions and performance versus
professions?
b. Looking toward the future, which directions are most
likely to need accent? There has been very little change in the quantity
of intelligence effort in economic matters in the past two decades.
Should there be more in the future?
- Do we need to be able to model the economies of 50 countries
as we now do ten-to-twelve?
-- Are particular areas of growing import?: e.g., non-fuel mineral
resources, food; population?
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7 Key Issues under, "Support to Military and Political Planning
with Data on Tactical Military Forces":
a. There are two distinct concerns here: conventional forces
that may oppose our own forces; forces that may oppose each other. We have
addressed already crisis management of situations involving our conventional
forces support to consumers for force planning is an additional area
that does consume considerable effort and could consume much more.
The key issue is what force planning decision might the U.S. make todav
or tomorrow if policy makers knew more about the forces of potential
opponents?
-- Are there data missing or insufficiently explicit that would
be likely to lead to quantitive changes in our force levels?
If so, in which areas?
-- Are there data missing or insufficiently explicit that would
lead the U.S. to structure the mix or the characteristics of
individual forces differently? If so, are these most likely
to be in:
-- Tactical aircraft and weapons characteristics?
- Electronic warfare equipment and techniques?
- 'Anti-submarine warfare?
-- Chemical/Biological warfare capabilities/intentions?
- Cruise missile characteristics and doctrine?
-- Soviet tactical planning in the European theatre?
-- North Korean tactical planning?
b. With respect to analyzing non-U.S. forces that might oppose
each other, we pay particular attention to the Middle East, but rather little
elsewhere. Where else would detailed balance assessments be useful?
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8. Key Issues under, "Support to Military Commanders in Operational
a. A number of our national intelligence capabilities have
potential for support commanders engaged in military operations. Real-
time photo and ELINT satellites stand out in this category. The costs
of transmission systems are substantial. Transmitting intelligence frcm
a satellite is not all that is required, however. New intelligence data
must be processed, often involving computerized sorting and sifting
techniques; and it must be interpreted, at times involving computerized
comparisons with stored data bases. Every military commander understand-
ingly wants direct access to, and even control of, his intelligence data
collection. He wants, and needs, to ensure that interpretation is
tailored to his requirements. In fast moving situations this is best
achieved on his own territory.
b. Yet because the requirements for processing, collation and
interpretation are so substantial, they are not likely to be performed
in a commander's immediate command post. I have to decide if it is worth
the expense to transmit the data and duplicate the processing and inter-
pretation centers simply to shorten the ultimate transmission distance
and to subordinate the interpretations process to the military commander.
Beyond this, is it worth a major expense to transmit the data only to
the CinC level? Do we know the levels to which photos must descent
in order to gain maximum usefulness, for instance?
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c. A separate issue is how much effort should be made to
advance real-time availability of ELIl r data and to develop geolocation
capability with that data, regardless of whether it is transmitted to
CONUS or to the field. Clearly it is desirable, but at what expense?
Should we aim for:
- Command posts?
- Airfield activity?
-- Armored force movements?
-- Submarine transmissions?
- Major surface ship movements?
-- In-flight aircraft movement?
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9. Key Issues under, "Support to National Planning with Non-Military
Technical and Scientific Data":
a. There is a modest amount and wide variety of intelligence
produced in this area today. A good hit relates to issues of technology
transfer, and this has military implications. Other relates to ccinmerci.al
technology and has implications for economic competition. A major
issue to be decided is how far should we go toward utilizing our intelligence
capabilities to keep American industry abreast of technological develgxnents
and demands in the markets in which they compete.
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10. Key Issues under, "Provision of Counterintelligence Support":
a. Counterintelligence has both human and technical dimensions-
Should we have a more sharply defined national program to counter
penetration of the U.S. by technical intelligence systems?
b. On the human side, do we need to expand our counter
efforts in the U.S. in light of increasing numbers of Warsaw Pact,
PRC and other foreign intellignece operatives believed to be here?
Also should we increase our counterintelligence efforts overseas in light
-- Recent activities between ourselves and the Soviets which
will likely lead to greater efforts against our HUMIAFT programs.
- The increasing emphasis on collecting intelligence in friendly
or semi-friendly foreign countries where the embarrassment of
disclosure is greater than in non-friendly areas?
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