STATUS OF CIVILIAN SPACE POLICY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00772A000400010037-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 25, 2004
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: August 4, 1978
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:
Deputy to e for Resource Management
SUBJECT: Status of Civilian Space Policy Review
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1. Action Requested: None. For your information only.
2. Background:
a. The President asked Dr. Frank Press, the President's
Science Advisor, to convene the NSC Space Policy Review Committee
(SPRC), established recently under NSC/PD-37, to prepare by 1
September an interagency space policy option paper (see Attachment
1). A meeting of the SPRC to discuss the President's instructions
and resolve the issues that would set the dimensions of the review
was held on 21 June (see Attachment 2). Since I was out of town,
attended as your representative along with Hans Mark.
b. The policy options have been addressed by seven inter-
agency task forces (see Attachment 3). We are represented on three
of these task forces. The schedule (Attachment 4) called for draft
Task Force reports by 20 July and a draft Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP) space policy options paper by 31 July.
The draft task force reports have been submitted but the OSTP draft
paper is about one week late and is expected by about 4 August.
3. Discussion: Short summaries of the draft Task Force reports are
attached Annex A). Pertinent comments on items of special interest to
you follow below.
a. On Task Force I, the space shuttle, I am your representa-
tive and Dr. Hans Mark is the Defense representative. The President,
as you know, expressed concern in the 0MB Spring Budget Reviews
about the adequacy of the scope and timing of the shuttle transition
planning. Action to respond directly on this issue was given to
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Secretary of Defense Brown and in turn to Hans Mark. Because of
this ongoing action, the Task Force has thus far attempted to avoid
detailed consideration of this issue and has instead focused on
other issues such as operations management, survivability, and
provision for additional capability. However, the President also
requested that the SPRC review this issue and there has been pressure
from Frank Press to include it to a greater extent than in the
first draft Task Force report.
b. Task Force III, remote sensing, addressed the concept of
an integrated National earth observation space program to sense the
atmosphere, land, and ocean on an operational basis. As conceived
by the Task Force, the program ultimately would meet both the
.defense and civil sector needs. While the program would exclude
space intelligence assets, it is envisioned that data output from
satellite reconnaissance selectively would be made available to the
proposed National Earth Observation Space Program consistent with
the limitations of national security restrictions as defined by the
DCI. With declassification of the "fact of", increased use of
intelligence imagery in the civil sector can be anticipated.
Questions concerning sector overlap relative to the foreign release
of data, the resolution limits (if any), and intelligence needs for
Landsat multispectral imagery also need to be addressed before
accepting the Task Force's recommendation to approve in principle
the concept of an integrated National Earth Observation Space
:Program.
c. Task Force VI, Intersector Overlap, has been cut back in
scope from Frank Press's original issue formulation. The conclusions
thus far give qualified support to the status quo and no recommen-
dations for change are made. Press may change this Task Force
report to include options for increased intersector technology and
data sharing. Task Force VI is also addressing the "fact of" issue
which you have discussed with Dr. Brzezinski and Secretary of State
Vance and which you and I subsequently discussed. The Task Force
Report on this subject assumes ,a decision to declassify the "fact
of" and focuses on planning for implementation. As you know, this
step is widely opposed throughout the Intelligence Community because
of risks relative to intelligence security and to U.S. foreign and
domestic policy. We are planning to continue to evaluate both
risks and benefits in connection with the further refinement of the
implementation plan.
d. Following interagency staff level comment, a redraft of
the OSTP draft paper will be circulated in late August and an SPRC
meeting to seek further consensus will be scheduled for about
1 September.
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We have established an Intelligence Community working group to
aid coordination on the issues (Attachment 5). I will keep
you fully informed on significant developments in this area.
Attachments
1 - 13 June memo fm Dr. Press
RE: Civilian Space Policy
2 - 27 June memo fm Ms. Dodson
RE: Policy Review Committee
Meeting on Space
3 - List of Space Policy Task
Forces (6/27/78)
4 - Schedule for Space Policy
5 - List of IC Working Group Members
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TASK FORCE I
STRATEGY TO UTILIZE THE SHUTTLE CAPABILITY
CHAIRMAN: NASA - John Yardley
MEMBERS: NASA, Defense, DCI, Commerce, Interior, State
DCI REP.: I (D/DCI/RM), Alternate -
(IC Staff)
ISSUE STATEMENT:
What should be the U.S. strategy to effectively utilize the Shuttle by
all space sectors, including the better flow of technology between
sectors?
Possible options and questions that need to be examined include whether
to gradually reduce reliance on expendable launch vehicles as currently
planned or increase earlier reliance on Shuttle capability with the
first successful test, so as to reduce the redundancy requirement.
Likewise, the space-related capabilities required to effectively utilize
the Shuttle for specific national needs (currently projected) will have
to be examined; e.g., increased orbital staytime, increased maneuvera-
bility, or other new space capabilities. The issues on utilizing the
Shuttle and on technology overlap between civil, military, and national
intelligence programs (Task Force VI) have many similiarities. The task
forces responsible for developing options on these two issues will work
closely, and consideration on whether to combine these efforts will be
made after each is developed independently.
CURRENT SUBISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES:
Issue: When and how should the operational responsibilities of the DOD
and NASA change vis-a-vis the two sectors as use of the STS approaches
and is initiated? Should the current plan for joint use of the JSC
Mission Control Center (MCC) as delineated in the NASA/DOD Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) on Management and Operation of the STS continue or
do the respective sector responsibilities require separate operational
entities?
Options :
A. Continue current plan until adequate learning and maturity is
achieved and then establish a separate DOD MCC, if required, based on
accumulated experience.
B. Decide now that the risks to security will outweigh the benefits of
experience thereby establishing a separate DOD MCC as soon as possible
to meet critical DOD STS missions.
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Issue: At what level and pace of activity should provisions for surviv-
ability be implemented for the Space Transportation System and its
supporting resources?
Options :
A. Limit STS survivability provisions to existing maneuverability and
to encryption of command and data links to, from and between space
segments.
B. Provide for limited engineering changes and special operational
procedures to improve survivability of flight systems--for example,
addition of warning sensors, development of extended evasive maneuvering
capability, greater protection of avionics equipment, and autonomous
operation. Develop contingency plans for dedicated military use of the
STS.
C. In addition to provisions of Option B, provide for eventual selected
major modifications to flight systems--for example, total vehicle hardening,
a new concept thermal protection system, or greatly increased AV capa-
bility. Develop alternate operational capabilities for critical resources--
for example, propellant manufacturing or external tank transport.
Issue: How, when, and in what areas is it in the best interests of the
government to build on the presently defined capabilities of the STS
through system augmentation and/or developments?
Options:
A. Recognized deficiences or imbalances in capability which occur
during the development cycle should be studied, identified, evaluated by
the collective system "users" and introduced into existing development
decision-making systems.
B. In addition to overcoming recognized deficiences or imbalances
(Option A), studies should be directed to new system elements to enhance
the range of capabilities available to the users of space.
C. Recognizing the 7- to 10-year development cycle for large space
systems, we should, in addition to those activities covered in Options A
and B, now undertake a major study of the follow-on systems which will
serve the nation's space capability needs in and beyond the 1990's.
Issue to be added*: Should early reliance on the Shuttle capability be
increased with the first successful test, so as to reduce the redundancy
requirement for expendable launch vehicles?
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
*Transition plans are described in the text and are justified as reasonable and
necessary to maintain a high confidence of assured launch capability. Higher
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TASK FORCE III
GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE ROLE IN REMOTE SENSING
CHAIRMAN: NASA - Anthony Calio
MEMBERS: NASA, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, State, AID, Defense,
DCI REP.: (Collection Tasking Staff), Alternate -
I(IC a /COMIREX)
ISSUE STATEMENT*:
What are the organizational questions that need to be addressed to
further exploit civil remote sensing capabilities?
Possible options and questions that need to be addressed include:
whether to continue present arrangement with NASA sustaining lead agency
responsibility for civil remote sensing R&D with the user agencies
responsible for data processing and distribution; whether to establish a
Federal Survey Administration, for example, that would operate aggregate
remote sensing requirements across the board; or whether and how to
encourage user agencies to operate and determine what technologies and
systems should be advanced to meet their individual requirements. Of
course, the budget and possible financing arrangements of these various
approaches must be addressed.
How should the U.S. proceed with remote sensing capabilities developed
under LANDSAT and other remote sensing activities?
Possible approaches would include: to continue experimentation in a
limited R&D environment with a commitment to continuity of data services
at least through 1985; or to declare the undertaking of a full-scale
operational demonstration program for a period of 10 years with a decision
on operational status by 1985. Specifically, the various modes of
transition of LANDSAT from R&D to operational status need to be examined.
Likewise, how to respond to initiatives of the U.S. private sector for
involvement in remote sensing needs to be evaluated and various alterna-
tives considered.
CURRENT SUBISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES:
The Task Force recast the original issue statements as follows:
-Issue: What should be the U.S. position on space remote sensing?
*Memo, Frank Press to Multiple Addressees, Civilian Space Policy, 13 June 1978
(Attachment 1).
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Otpions:
A. Maintain present funding levels and objectives for current opera-
tional environmental satellite systems and for on-going remote sensing
research and development programs.
B. Add-on: NOSS. To the present operational and R&D programs, add
the National Oceanic Satellite System (NOSS) as an operational demon-
stration.
C. Add-on: Landsat (operational capability). To the present opera-
tional systems and R&D programs add land observation operational capa-
bility based on a Landsat D or -D' technical capability.
D. Add-on: Both NOSS and an operational Landsat. To the present
operational systems and R&D programs add both the National Oceanic
Satellite System and an operational Landsat system.
NOTE: Analysis of issues such as the operating agency, the role of the
private sector, and international arrangements was deferred for further
study.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
The Task Force believes that the opportunity is now at hand to integrate
sensors, platforms, orbits, and data streams in a way that permits great
gains in efficiency and economy of remote sensing from space. It is
recommended that the President approve in principle the nation moving to
an integrated national system for observing the atmosphere, land and
oceans from space and direct that the conceptual design, detailed steps
and phasing, management approach and operating entity be developed by
August 1979 for review by the Space PRC and forwarding to the President
in time for decisions on the FY 1981 budget.
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TASK FORCE VI
EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY OVERLAP BETWEEN
CIVIL, MILITARY, AND NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SPACE PROGRAM
CHAIRMAN: Defense - Adm. Dan Murphy
MEMBERS: Defense, NASA, State, DCI, Commerce, ACDA
DCI REP.:
(IC Staff)
ISSUE STATEMENT*:
What steps should be taken to improve data and technology sharing between
the civil, military, and national intelligence space programs?
This issue was originally framed to address a much broader question,
"Should the U.S. continue to maintain the separation between civil,
military, and intelligence programs?" At the 21 June SPRC meeting, we
pointed out and there was general agreement that institutionally, the
separation between civil, military, and national intelligence programs
had been thoroughly examined in PRM-11, in E.O. 12036, in PRM-23, and
the ensuing PD-37. It was agreed, therefore, that this issue would be
recast along the lines identifying areas where data, equipment, and
technology sharing should take place. This would avoid undue duplication
and overlap--assuring that if one agency can or is doing a function
better than another, both would not carry out the function.
On 7 July, Dr. Brzezinski requested that Task Force VI analyze the
implications of maintaining the classified status of the "fact of"
reconnaissance from space.
The thrust of the effort should be to focus on the following issue: Is
a change in current policy beyond NSC/PD-37 concerning utilization of
information derived from remote sensing systems in the ultimate national
interest? If so, to what extent and in what manner should such a change
be made, beginning with the acknowledgement of the "fact of" reconnais-
sance? Determine whether the benefits to be derived in defense of our
foreign and defense policies sufficiently outweigh the potential risks.
Assure that a change will not constitute an ultimate threat to national
security. The analysis should address the needs for a careful implemen-
tation plan to assure that potentially negative impacts of such action
are solved. Some specific issues include: consultation with Congress,
Allies, and the Soviets; international legal considerations; and security
plan to assure that public government exposure does not result in a
breakdown of existing security systems.
*Based on: (1) Summary of Conclusions of 21 June 1978 SPRC Meeting,
(2) 7 July OSTP Memo, A. Morrisey to
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CURRENT SUBISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES:
None.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
Conclusions on Technology Overlap Issue: It is clear there is interaction
among the sectors. In addition to formal management structures for
coordination and review, there are other powerful forces that act to
minimize duplication and foster intersector transfers of products and
capabilities. Indeed, many of the technological security issues center
on controlling this interface in response to industry pressures. A
major forcing function is the chronic shortage of resources.
The government review process--OMB, Congress, and the GAO--perform some
cross-cut association of programs, technologies, and resources. In
fact, much intersector coordination has been caused by these agencies,
including the use of intelligence imagery for civil mapping coordinated
weather satellite development and procurement, and consolidation of
radionavigation systems. Nonetheless, none of these review elements
have performed an efficient or effective cross-cut on a continuing
basis.
Despite the success in intersector coordination and cooperation over the
years, one single characteristic stands out. While Federal civil
programs are scrutinized in detail for military or intelligence inter-
actions, the reverse has not been true. Improved two-way flow in this
area is largely a matter of policy direction from above, supported by
security guidelines that allow access to information without increasing
risks of compromise. Such guidelines can focus on the interaction among
top program managers within the sectors, without exacerbating the existing
problems of "cleared" versus "not cleared" personnel.
Another opportunity lies in the direction of overt joint program and
project activities among the sectors, particularly in the area of civil
support to military activities.
Because of time constraints, it was not possible to review specific
technologies nor examine program details. Nor was it possible to prepare
budget data in a way that showed the space program in an internally
consistent accounting system (departments allocate launch costs differ-
ently). These steps are candidates for follow-on work.
Conclusions on the "Fact of" Issue: This very compressed review suggests
the following:
1. Under appropriate circumstances and with stringent advance
preparation, the "fact of" can be declassified with real
but not unacceptable risks to intelligence security and to
U.S. foreign and domestic policy.
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2. The benefits of declassifying the "fact of" alone are
limited: there is an obvious, commonsense value to the
forthright admission of what is widely known; there are
some short-lived public information values; and there
may be some improvement in the credibility in the eyes
of the U.S. public of SALT verification.
3. If a decision is reached to go beyond declassification of
the "fact of" and to additionally include a selective and
phased public release of substantive imagery, both risks
and benefits increase; it is believed that the risks, while
far from negligible, could be adequately controlled and that
the potential longer term benefits of a policy revision
warrant a careful assessment of this possibility before accep-
tance or rejection.
4. It is imperative that full and detailed execution and con-
tingency plans be develo ed and assessed well in advance of
overt policy change or official public statement on this
matter.
Recommendations on the "Fact Of" Issue: Given that the initial assess-
ments outlined above appear reasonable, it is clear that further work on
analyzing the concept of a space intelligence security policy change is
in order. This effort should fall into four phases:
1. An intensive analysis of the points and possibilities noted
in this paper by a few key individuals selected from the
Departments of Defense and State, the intelligence community,
and the Executive Office of the President under the direction
of a senior NSC member. This could be accomplished within
4 to 6 weeks; with an additional 2-week period for official
agency comment.
2. Presidential review and decision on desirability of change
and appropriate scope thereof in 3 weeks.
3. Detailed development and setting in place of the implementation
elements--consultation strategies, security planning, contin-
gency plans--by the responsible agencies over a period of at
least 12 to 16 weeks.
4. Execution after final Presidential review and approval.
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Schedule for Space Policy
June 21
June 23
July 20
August 4 --
August 14 --
August 28 --
September 1 --
SUBJECT
Review President's instructions, determine any addi-
tional issues to be raised, and make task force
assignments.
Agencies to submit names of task force chairmen and
cochairmen to OSTP.
Task force drafts of space policy options due to OSTP
indicating the interrelationship of policy issues.
Agency comments due to OSTP.
OSTP will circulate space policy options paper in
preparation for Space Policy Review Committee meeting.
Consider space policy options paper at a Space Policy
Review Committee meeting and seek further consensus.
Submit space options paper to President.
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