STATEMENT THEODORE C. SORENSEN DIRECTOR-DESIGNATE OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BEFORE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE UNITED STATES SENATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A002600080011-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: January 17, 1977
• Content Type: STATEMENT

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STATEMENT
THEODORE C. SORENSEN
DIRECTOR-DESIGNATE OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
BEFORE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
17 JANUARY 1977
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Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:
I am grateful for this opportunity to share with you my views
on President-Elect Carter's decision to nominate me for the post
of Director of Central Intelligence.
I did not lightly accept this assignment, and some of my friends
have suggested that anyone agreeing to take the job lacks either the
sanity or the common sense necessary to fulfill it. I recognize that
the successes of the Intelligence Community, including the CIA, remain
largely unknown while its errors are roundly assailed; that it is often
accused, both at home and abroad, of deeds that it never committed or
that it undertook at the insistence of higher authority; and that the
Agency and its employees are often unable to defend themselves publicly
against these attacks.
But I accepted this assignment because I regard the intelligence
process as second to none in its importance to our national security.
This country cannot properly evaluate either the threat of war or
the prospects for peace, either the strategic weapons systems it
needs or the strategic arms limitations it can accept and monitor,
without reliable foreign intelligence. In world affairs, knowledge
is power; and this country can be secure only if it knows what is
going on in other countries, most of which have societies far less
open than our own. To strengthen our intelligence agencies, to
maintain and improve their effectiveness in this new era of public
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accountability, to provide to President Carter and his policy-
makers the objective intelligence estimates needed to build the
more peaceful world for which he has called, all this represents
a challenge which I could not refuse.
I was raised in Nebraska as the son of second-generation
Americans who taught their children to love this country and to
participate in a never-ending effort to protect and improve it.
After graduation from the University of Nebraska College of Law
in 1951, I spent nearly 13 years here in Federal Government, a
period of service that was capped by 3 years as Special Counsel
to President Kennedy.
I do not want to exaggerate my foreign policy experience in
that job. After the Bay of Pigs fiasco of 1961, about which I
knew nothing whatsoever in advance, the President asked me to
attend National Security Council meetings as an observer; and
in that capacity I received each day the reports and estimates of
the Central Intelligence Agency. The President also requested
my participation in various crisis management sessions, including
most notably the Executive Committee of the National Security Council
during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. (At no time, let me add,
did I know of any plots to assassinate foreign leaders or subvert
foreign governments, nor was I privy to any discussions or decisions
concerning CIA covert activities.)
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Three months after President Kennedy's death, I left the
White House, first to write a book and then to engage in the
practice of law in the New York firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton and Garrison. The bulk of my practice has been in the
international arena, involving negotiations with the leaders of
dozens of countries around the world, particularly in Latin
America, Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe. On brief
occasions I represented the Governments of Iran, Zaire, Sierra Leone
and Newfoundland in commercial disputes or negotiations. In no
country did I have any connection with or first-hand knowledge
of any activities of either their intelligence agencies or our
own, nor do I have now any obligations or prejudices regarding any
foreign country which would interfere with my new duties.
During this period I wrote extensively on international
questions for Foreign Affairs, the Saturday Review, the New York Times
and others; and I was also invited to deliver lectures in several
countries, including New Zealand, Israel, West Germany, England,
Ireland, all four Scandinavian countries and the Soviet Union.
I do not believe that anyone who heard the lecture I delivered
to Moscow's Institute of the United States could doubt for one
moment my rejection of communism and all that it represents.
Believe me, Mr. Chairman, my observations of all kinds of systems
and my travels in all kinds of countries has served continually
to increase the depth of my devotion to our own nation and to its
system of government. I might add that the Ford White House invited
me down last year to consult with me on changes that should be made
in the conduct of foreign intelligence by our government.
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With that brief sketch of my background, allow me now to
outline what kind of Director of Central Intelligence I believe
is needed at this particular time, the kind I would, if confirmed,
strive with your help to become.
First, the next Director should be an individual well known
to and completely trusted by the new President. Only in this way
can the Director have the direct and continuous access to the
President that is essential to his role as the President's principal
foreign intelligence adviser. Only in this way can he report to
the President the hard, unvarnished facts produced by an independent
intelligence process, and report them whether or not the President
wants to hear these facts. Only in this way can the members of
the Intelligence Community feel certain that their final product
is getting through to their principal customer and only in this
way can the Director refuse to take orders from the White House or
elsewhere that he regards as unlawful or improper, whether they
involve the undertaking of wrongful covert operations, the altering
of intelligence conclusions, the yielding of necessary functions,
or the concealment either from or by the Director of information
that should not be so concealed. President-Elect Carter has
generously expressed that kind of faith in me; he has promised
me that kind of access; he has promised to accept whatever unpleasant
facts I bring him; and I have in turn promised to know all there is
to know about the activities of my subordinates and to make certain
he knows as well.
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Second, the next Director should be an individual who can
continue the restoration of public trust and support that the
Central Intelligence Agency needs to succeed. If the American
people lack confidence that the Agency serves their interests
and obeys their laws, if they ever again believe that it is
merely the personal instrument of the President, unaccountable
to the Congress, then that Agency will be unable to obtain either
the talent, or the funding, or the period of relative calm needed
to carry out its work. In order to reach this goal of public
trust at a time of general distrust, there may be some merit in
adopting the Murphy Commission's recommendation that the Director
be an "outsider" who is free from personal and departmental ties
to the Agency. Nor is it inappropriate that the Director be a
lawyer, sensitive to the rights of Americans at home and abroad.
It is President-Elect Carter's hope that many of today's critics
of the CIA will feel over time somewhat assured that the Agency
under my leadership will not return to improper domestic activities,
political assassination plots, unlawful mail openings and other
abuses of the past; and that covert operations, while not being
abolished, will go forward only in extraordinary circumstances,
and only after having been reviewed by senior Cabinet officials,
including the Attorney General, and authorized in writing by the
President upon his determination that the operation is justified
by important national security interests. Further, scrupulous
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attention must and will be paid to the requirement, imposed by
law, that the appropriate Congressional committees be informed
about such operations in a timely manner. It is also essential
to reexamine such operations periodically to make certain that
they are still productive, still justifiable, and still within
the bounds of American law. It would be my hope through such an
approach to help repair some of the damage that has been done to
the good name of both the USA and the CIA.
Third, the next Director of Central Intelligence must have
the degree of intellect and independence required to protect the-
integrity of the intelligence process. Whatever you may think
of any particular Director's views on policy, his job is not to
make policy but to oversee the collection, processing, analysis
and delivery of foreign intelligence. If he permits outside
pressures and politics to influence the results of that process,
if conclusions are altered to fit the policies of the President
or the wishes of the Secretary of State or the programs of the
Secretary of Defense or the preconceptions of the Congress or
even the previous findings of the CIA or the prejudices of its
Director, then the results are no longer intelligence but propaganda.
Intelligence analysts, of course, cannot be so shut off from the
real world that they lose touch with the raw data; they must
utilize human intelligence sources where technology cannot discern
a government's intentions; and they must draw upon military,
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diplomatic, scholarly and other experts both inside and outside
of government. But the final product, containing dissents from
those who disagree, should be neither a watered-down compromise
nor a reflection of institutional bias, but the most objective,
accurate, reliable intelligence estimate possible, delivered in
time and in a form that will make it both relevant and readable
to the President and National Security Council. I would hope
that my experience as a lawyer, writer and White House counsel
would stand me in good stead in striving to maintain that kind
of standard; for intelligence reports which are unread or unreliable
or irrelevant are simply a waste of precious money, manpower and
brilliant technology. Director Bush has faithfully prevented any
hint of partisan political bias in the intelligence analyses and
estimates issued during his tenure; and I can assure this Committee
that I intend to adhere to that standard and, also like George Bush,
renounce all political activity and electoral ambitions while
serving in this sensitive post.
Fourth and finally, the next Director of the CIA must be able
to lead that Agency into this new era of accountability without
subjecting it to further demoralizing disruptions. If confirmed,
I will be the fifth Director in little more than fcur years. The
Agency has been through a series of investigations, reorganizations,
reductions in force and reshuffling of top personnel. The creativity
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of the analytical mind--and I have found the intellectual
quality at Langley to be of the very highest--now needs a
period of relative stability. For that reason, I have assured
President-Elect Carter of my intention to serve a full four
years if confirmed; I have recommended to him that Deputy
Director Hank Knoche, Admiral Dan Murphy and the other top
professionals with whom I am much impressed be continued in
their present positions; and I have further recommended that no
drastic reorganizations be undertaken at this time.
This is not to say that the effort to improve the intelligence
process and adapt it to today's world is not a continuing one.
We need to place our emphasis on improving the quality and
timeliness of the analytical product in order to match the
increasing flow of technical. collections. We must keep abreast
of the constantly increasing need for new intelligence on economics
and energy, Third World developments, international terrorism,
nuclear proliferation and a new generation of world leaders.
We must maintain, as earlier indicated, vigilant safeguards
against abuse to make certain that we do not oppose our adversaries
by adopting their methods or philosophy.
Above all, the Intelligence Community must in this next four
year period as in no previous four year period achieve the goal of
true democratic accountability by working closely with the Congress
and this Committee. I pledge, if confirmed, to keep this Committee
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and the other appropriate committees of Congress fully informed
on a timely basis with respect to intelligence activities of every kind, not
merely covert operations. I promise you complete truthfulness
in all appearances before you, without playing games if information
is restricted and without waiting for you to ask precisely the
right question. I also look forward to working closely with
you in developing a stronger and more suitable statutory charter
for all U.S. foreign intelligence activities.
Leadership of the Intelligence Community in all these areas
does not, in my opinion, require that the Director be an experienced
manager. Under Executive Order 11905, the day-to-day management
of the CIA is delegated to the Deputy Director. The Director
should be, in effect, the Chairman of the Board, not the Chief
Operating Officer. He should set priorities, demand performance,
insure compliance, draw upon and coordinate the machinery of the
Intelligence Community and represent it with the President, the
National Security Council and Cabinet, the Congress and the general
public. Although I have much to learn and will count on this
Committee helping me to learn it, I sincerely believe that my
previous government and legal experience will enable me to fulfill
these responsibilities.
Before concluding, Mr. Chairman, I owe this Committee an answer
to two questions which have been raised concerning my fitness for
this particular post.
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First, questions have been raised about affidavits that
I submitted in the New York Times and Daniel Ellsburg cases
involving the publication of the so-called Pentagon Papers.
In those affidavits I stated my belief at that time that the
Executive Branch frequently and routinely overclassified documents,
and kept them classified long after there was any arguable
national security interest or legitimate secret to protect. I
further noted that it was common practice in Washington for
Government officials to take such documents home for review,
and that it was not uncommon for such officials to leak classified
information selectively to the press. On more than one occasion
I was directed by President Kennedy to do so myself. So far as
the Pentagon Papers themselves were concerned, I further noted
that information of incomparably greater importance to the national
defense had been leaked to the press, and that no criminal prosecutions
had ensued. I also recognized in these affidavits, let me emphasize,
a true need for secrecy in the conduct of government in certain
circumstances, including those relating to military personnel,
confidential foreign government communications, and candid reports
and advice to the President on governmental and military affairs.
Having last week reviewed these affidavits for the first time
in several years, I find considerable fault with their wording,
although I believe they were factually accurate; and I make no
apology for standing by the general principle of greater Executive
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Branch disclosure to the Congress and public. But as Director
of Central Intelligence, I can assure you that my views and
practices would be consistent with the perspectives of that
office, with my oath as Director, and with my statutory obligation
to insure the effectiveness of our intelligence activity by
protecting all sources and methods. I might add, however, that
a sensitivity to the dangers of over-classification, and a
demonstrated regard for the rights of the public and Congress
to be informed, are not in my judgment disqualifications for
that office.
I also stated in my affidavits that various classified
papers were among the documents that I removed from the White
House at the conclusion of my service in February 1964, and I
explained that I had simply followed a long-standing practice
among White House officials in this regard. That practice was
based not only on custom but also on the legislative histories
of the Presidential Libraries Act of 1955 and the Federal Property
and Administrative Services Act of 1949. As explained to me by
GSA at that time, there was unquestioned acceptance of the
proposition that White House papers belonged to its occupants
when their terms of service ended.
The essential facts respecting the removal of my own papers
from the White House, and my subsequent use of those papers, were
as follows: Following President Kennedy's death, the GSA arranged
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for my files to be removed to its National Archives depository
in the Boston area, and for me to select therefrom those papers,
including classified papers, that were necessary for the preparation
of my book. These selected papers were kept safely in my home,
not circulated to others, returned upon completion of my book
to GSA, and ultimately donated with all the rest of my White House
files to the Kennedy Library. To the best of my recollection, no
communications intelligence or documents of a similar classification.
were included in these papers. No information that I considered
classified was reproduced in my manuscript, although I drew on
such information for backgrcund and context. I took the additional
precaution of submitting my manuscript for review and clearance to
individuals who were. then serving or had previously served in high
national security positions in government. To the best of my
knowledge, no one has ever suggested that my book revealed any
national secrets or disclosed any classified information.
The second matter upon which I owe this Committee a full.
answer concerns my draft status. The facts are that'I registered
for the draft upon becoming 18 years of age in 1946, and shortly
thereafter expressed the philosophy of non-violence with which
I had been reared by two deeply idealistic parents by requesting,
not -an avoidance of military duty, not an avoidance of hazardous
duty, but military service in a non-combatant capacity--preferring,
by way of illustration, to serve on the battlefield as a medical
corpsman saving lives instead of taking lives. My action was largely
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symbolic, inasmuch as our country was not then at war or expected
to go to war; nor did I ever see military service, having been
ineligible during the Korean War first for physical and then
for family reasons. As previously noted, however, I did serve
in the U.S. Government as a civilian from 1951-1964, including
participation on the National Security Council's Executive
Committee during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962; and at no
time did I or, to the best of my knowledge, any of my colleagues
ever feel that my personal preference for non-violence inhibited
in any way my advice to the President on his choice of military
or other options.
As Director of Central Intelligence, my principal role would
be to provide intelligence to the policymakers who are considering
the military and diplomatic alternatives available to the United
States. I would never have accepted this nomination were I not
determined to strengthen our country in every way appropriate to
my position and to implement all lawful. orders and policies of
the President, whatever that may involve, without permitting my
private religious and philosophical beliefs to intrude into public
policy. I doubt that this qualifies me today for the label of
conscientious objector; but I earnestly hope that I will be a
conscientious Director of Central Intelligence.
Thank you for this opportunity to set the record straight.
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STATEMENT
THEODORE C. SORENSEN
DIRECTOR-DESIGNATE OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
BEFORE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
17 JANUARY 1977
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Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:
I am grateful for this opportunity to share with you my views
on President-elect Carter's decision to nominate me for the post
of Director of Central Intelligence, and to answer the scurrilous
and unfounded personal attacks which have been anonymously
circulated against me.
I did not seek or lightly accept this assignment, and some of
my friends have suggested that anyone agreeing to take the job lacks
either the sanity or the judgment necessary to fulfill it. I
recognize that the successes of the Intelligence Community are
largely unspoken while its errors are roundly assailed; that it is
often accused of deeds that it never committed or that it undertook
at the request of hi
er authority; and that the Agency and its employees
are rarely able to defend themselves publicly against these attacks.
In recent days, I have had the same experience.
But I do not intend to be intimidated by those who wish to strike
at me, or through me at Governor Carter, by personal attacks on my
integrity and probity, grossly distorting the facts and maliciously
twisting my words. I prize both my country and my honor too greatly
to desert this post under that kind of cloud; and I am here to appeal
to the sense'of fairness of the Members of this Committee.
I recognize that some of you have legitimate questions concerning
my qualifications. But before dealing with those questions, I must as
a matter of personal privilege respond to the personal attacks upon my
character which my nomination has suddenly stirred.
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1. First, it has been said that I leaked or otherwise conveyed
classified information for political or personal purposes. That
charge is totally false. In the White House, I drew upon classified
materials in backgrounding the press only when I was specifically
directed to do so by the President, who clearly had such authority;
and I took documents home for review only in those rare instances
when I would otherwise have spent 24 hours a day in that office.
I have never compromised the national security of this country,
or approved of anyone else doing so. My affidavits in the lawsuits
brought against the New York Times and Daniel Ellsberg regarding
publication of the Pentagon Papers accurately described the practices
then prevalent in Washington -- not as they should have been but as
they were. Almost identical affidavits were submitted by a former
Assistant Secretary of State, a former State Department Legal Adviser
and a former Ambassador. During my White House service I received
the highest security clearances from the CIA; and I received them
again in the last few weeks. I have something of a reputation for
guarding secrets, whether they be those of my government, my clients,
or my friends. No one has ever charged me with conveying classified
information to others or mislaying classified materials.
2. Second, it has been said that I improperly took classified documents
with me from the White House when I left government service, improperly
used them in writing my book on President Kennedy, and improperly
obtained a tax deduction for donating them to the John F. Kennedy
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Library. Those charges are totally false. Upon the announcement
in early 1964 that I was leaving the White House, I was visited
by the Assistant Archivist of the United States, an official in
the General Services Administration. He informed me that the papers
in my files that I had created and accumulated during the period
of my service in the White House were regarded by both law and
historical precedent as my personal property; and further, that
I was entitled to make any use of those papers that I deemed appro-
priate, whether selling them as some former White House aides had
done, writing books based on them as other former aides had done,
or donating them to an appropriate educational institution -- with
a tax deduction on the value of the gift -- as still others had done.
Upon my signing on February 14, 1964, a Letter of Intent to
donate my papers to the Kennedy Library, the Archivist's Office
sorted and packed my files, presumably leaving behind anything that
was not mine, transferred them to a GSA depository in the Boston area.
The GSA then sent to my home certain of those papers which I had
selected as necessary background materials for my book. It collected
them from me upon completion of my manuscript, and the entire lot of
my papers was then transmitted to the John F. Kennedy Library, to
which I donated them.
Naturally there were classified papers among them (although no
communications intelligence reports), just as there were classified
documents among the papers taken upon their departure from the White
House by the principal aides of every President at least since Woodrow
Wilson, including Col. House, Samuel Rosenman, Harry Hopkins, Sherman Adams,
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McGeorge Bundy and many, many others. Like most of those named,
I reviewed my papers, including classified papers, in preparing
a book on my experiences, just as Gerald Ford at his confirmation
hearing acknowledged drawing upon Top Secret documents in his
possession when writing his book on the Warren Commission. In
the decade since my book was published, no one has suggested that
security was in any way breached by anything in my book, and it
was in fact submitted for clearance in advance to the National
Security Adviser to the President, to his former deputy, and to
the former Deputy Secretary of Defense. My handling of classified
information was at all times in accordance with the then-existing
laws, regulations and practices.
Upon donating my papers to the Kennedy Library (instead of
selling them individually for a far larger amount), I received the
tax deduction to which I was entitled by law, just as many former
government officials did over the years including, in addition
to some or all of those already mentioned, former Ambassador Galbraith,
former White House aide Arthur Schlesinger, and former Governor and
Ambassador Adlai Stevenson.
No doubt arguments can be made against the practice begun by
George Washington of White House occupants taking their papers with
them -- John Eisenhower has recently stated, for example, that his
father inherited from Truman and left to Kennedy no papers other
than the instructions on nuclear attack procedures but at the time
I took my papers in 1964, that was clearly the accepted view of the law.
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No doubt arguments can also be made against permitting tax
deductions on the donation of papers by former government officials --
and such arguments were made when the law was changed in 1969 --
but that was nevertheless the law prior to that time.
All of the above actions were taken with the full knowledge
and approval of the government, and were publicly described in
the well-publicized affidavits which I filed in the New York Times
case and subsequently in the Ellsberg case. Those two cases involved
important First Amendment issues, including the public's right to
know the tragic history of the Vietnam War. Whatever improvements
might have been made in the wording of my affidavits, I make no
apology for having responded to the requests of counsel in both
cases to attest to the inconsistencies and anomalies of government
classification practices.
3. Third, it has been said that I avoided military service as a
pacifist during World War II and the Korean War. This charge is
totally false. I have never sought to avoid military service, hazardous
or otherwise, in wartime or any other time. I have never advocated
for the United States a policy of pacifism, non-resistance to attack
or unilateral disarmament. The facts are that I registered for the
draft upon becoming 18 years of age in 1946, a year after World War II
ended, and shortly thereafter expressed the philosophy of non-violence
with which I had been reared by two deeply idealistic parents by
requesting, not an avoidance of military duty or hazardous duty,
but military service in a non-combatant capacity (classification IAO) --
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preferring, by way of illustration, to serve cn the battlefield
as a medical corpsman saving lives instead of taking lives. This
status was granted. My action was largely symbolic, inasmuch as
our country was not then at war or expected to go to war. I have
never, in my service on the Executive Committee of the National
Security Council during the Cuban Missile Crisis or at any other
time, permitted my preference for personal non-violence to inhibit
in any way my advice to the President on the military and other
options available as a matter of national policy. I would not have
accepted Governor Carter's designation to be Director of Central
Intelligence were I not prepared to carry out every lawful order
of the President conceivably connected with this post.
4. Fourth, it has been said that my legal representation of
multinational corporations and foreign governments poses a conflict
of interest in undertaking this assignment. This charge is patently
absurd. Over the years, the highest national security officials
in our country have frequently represented such clients before
taking office -- including Messrs. Dulles, Acheson, Rogers, McCloy,
Stevenson and a host of others -- but no one challenged their right
to serve or later claimed that their actions were prejudiced by those
earlier ties. My only representations of foreign governments were
the brief occasions on which I represented the Governments of Iran,
Zaire, Sierra Leone and Newfoundland in commercial disputes or
negotiations. In no country did I have any connection with or first-
hand knowledge of any activities of either their intelligence agencies
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or our own; nor do I have now any obligations or prejudices regarding
any foreign country which would interfere with any official duties.
5. The fifth and final charge is the suggestion that I must have
been somehow involved in Kennedy White House plots to assassinate
foreign leaders. That charge is totally false. I have previously
testified under oath, and I do so again today, that I knew nothing
of such plots; and no one who did has ever stated or ever could state,
nor did your predecessor committee find or suggest, that I was
informed or involved in any way. The record is equally clear that
I had no advance knowledge or involvement of any kind in the Bay of
Pigs or in any CIA covert operations.
Mr. Chairman, far more than any job or title, I value my good
name. I resent this reckless scattering of baseless personal accusations
in order to suppress a different point of view. I respectfully ask
this Committee, whatever the fate of my nomination, to consider
the evidence submitted today and previously submitted to your staff,
and to make it clear that these personal charges are wholly false
and without foundation and not the basis for the Committee's view
of my nomination.
With these personal charges out of the way, we can turn now to
the question of my qualifications -- to legitimate questions raised
by those with whom I respectfully disagree but who are entitled to raise
what they regard as valid questions. There are basically two such
questions:
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First is the question of my experience in intelligence. I was
an observer at National Security Council meetings and a reader of
intelligence reports in the White House, and worked closely with
the CIA and other national security officials during the Cuban
Missile Crisis. I have since leaving the White House written and
lectured widely on international affairs, and engaged in negotiations
with dozens if not hundreds of top foreign officials. I was requested
by the Ford White House a year ago to provide advice and consultation
on its reorganization of the intelligence effort. My qualifications
for this post have been endorsed by John McCone, Clark Clifford,
Averell Harriman, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, General James Gavin, and
others who know of my work. Most importantly, I was chosen by the
President-elect as someone sufficiently in his personal trust and
confidence to bring him the hard unvarnished facts, and to reject
any improper orders whatever their source; as someone who possessed
the integrity necessary to continue the task of restoring public
trust and confidence in the CIA, and earning that trust and confidence
by keeping the Agency accountable and free of abuse; and as someone
with the degree of intellect and independence required to protect
the integrity of the intelligence process from outside pressures and
politics.
But I recognize that there are those, inside and outside of
the intelligence establishment, who disagree with the Murphy Commission
recommendation that an outsider always be named to this post; who
refuse to recognize the totally non-partisan leadership provided
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by George Bush despite earlier concerns about his partisan
background; or who see no value for this post in a lawyer's
sensitivities to civil liberties and lawful conduct. These people
believe that only someone from inside the military or intelligence
establishment has the experience necessary for this job. I disagree.
Second is the question of my views. Although as previously
indicated I am not a pacifist, I do favor a foreign policy that
prefers where possible the risks of peace to the risks of war.
Although as previously indicated I fully recognize the need for
legitimate government secrecy, which is in fact weakened by over-
classification, I do believe in the right of the Congress and
public to receive far more information than they presently do
from all government agencies, including the CIA. I believe in
the application of moral and legal standards to national security
decisions, including the limitation of covert operations to
extraordinary circumstances involving the vital national interests
of our country, with timely review by the appropriate Congressional
Committees and written authorization by the President and his senior
Cabinet officials.
There are those who disagree with these views and regard them
as incompatible with the duties of a Director of Central Intelligence.
Paying little heed to the fact that the Director's real responsibility
is to provide leadership to the Intelligence Community and objective
intelligence not policy to the President and his policymakers, these
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critics prefer to view this post as part of the national security
decision-making apparatus and prefer in that post someone with
policy commitments more like their own.
Obviously I disagree with that view as well.
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From the founding of the Republic, as a matter of principle
and uniform practice, White House papers have been treated as the
personal property of the President and his aides, and have been
removed from the White House upon their departure from office. The
practice began when George Washington removed all of his papers,
and was followed continuously thereafter. [National Study Commission
on Records and Documents of Federal Officials, (Honorable Herbert
Brownell, Chairman), Public Hearings Background Memorandum, page 60,
et. seq.]
Congressional ratification of this practice was evidenced by
repeated appropriations of public funds to buy Presidential papers
from their heirs. For example, Congress appropriated funds to buy
Presidential papers of Presidents Washington, Jefferson, Madison,
Monroe, Jackson, Polk and Tyler. [Library of Congress, Congressional
Research Service, "Ownership of Presidential Papers" (1974), pages 3-4.]
The concept of private ownership of such papers also received judicial
endorsement when Mr. Justice Story of the Supreme Court, sitting as a
circuit judge, held that the papers of George Washington were private,
not public, and subject to copyright protection. [Folsom v. Marsh,
9 Fed. Cas. 342 (No. 4901) (C.C.D. Mass. 184)]
Further Congressional acquiescence in the concept that such papers
are private and not public is reflected in the Presidential Libraries
Act of 1955, which directed the Administrator of General Services to
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negotiate for and accept donations of Presidential historical
materials. As the Library of Congress Research Service found in
reviewing the legislative history of this Act: "In the hearings
which led to the enactment of the Presidential Libraries Act in 1955,
the Administrator of General Services testified that as a matter of
ordinary practice, the President has removed his papers from the
White House at the end of his term. This, he testified, was in keeping
with the tradition and the fact that the papers are the personal
property of the retiring Presidents. Accordingly, he indicated that
the proposed legislation was not mandatory in nature and would not
bind future Presidents. Rather, the decision to make the gift would
continue to rest with the former President and his heirs. Testimony
of Edward F. Measure, Administrator of General Services, in Hearing
at 14-15." [Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service,
op. cit., p
The private ownership concept and the practice of removing such
papers upon termination of White House tenure, continued, without
interruption, and was the universally accepted practice when President
Kennedy entered the White House and Mr. Sorensen began his White House
service. Indeed, as John Eisenhower recently stated, "The only material
left by President Eisenhower for President Kennedy was a satchel con-
taining a series of orders and instructions to be of assistance in the
event of nuclear attack or national crisis."
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This historical practice was summarized as follows in 1971
by Herman Kahn, the former Assistant Archivist of the United States
in charge of Presidential Libraries: "Probably the best proof that
the papers of the Presidents and their aides are not official records,
is that there are not now nor have there ever been in the White House
any files that pre-date those of the incumbency of the current President
and his aides. Nor are they any such papers in the National Archives.
Following their removal from the White House it has been the universal
practice for Presidential aides either to keep in their own office or
house the files created during their White House employment or to give
them to an appropriate library or other depository."
Under governing law at the time of Mr. Sorensen's gift, it was
totally lawful and appropriate that the donor take a tax deduction for
the transfer of such documents. Numerous government officials over
the years have taken such tax deductions, including Governor Adlai
Stevenson, Arthur Schlesinger and J. Kenneth Galbraith. In Mr. Sorensen's
case, his ownership. of the documents in question was confirmed by the
government archivist who originally requested the donation. The
Internal Revenue Service, after full audit, approved of the deduction,
and Mr. Sorensen's accountant settled with the Internal Revenue Service
the valuation of the papers.
It was only after the events in question here that Congress
changed the law to preclude such deductions. And it was not until
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1974, ten years after the events in question here, that Congress
made a limited change in past law and practice concerning ownership
and removal of such papers by adopting the Presidential Recordings
and Materials Preservation Act. However, that Act was limited solely
to records and tapes created by the Nixon Administration -- and not any
Administration prior or subsequent thereto.
To cite just a few of the precedents with respect to removal and
donation of papers: Judge Samuel Rosenman, who served as Special
Counsel to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, removed and donated his
papers to the Roosevelt and Truman libraries, as did Roosevelt aides
Harry Hopkins and Louis Howe. Clark Clifford, President Truman's Special
Counsel, took his papers, and donated them to the Truman Library.
Sherman Adams, Eisenhower's Special Counsel, removed his files and
donated them to the Dartmouth College Library. And Mr. Sorensen's
colleagues, McGeorge Bundy, Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, Douglas Dillon,
Kenneth Galbraith and Arthur Schlesinger took their files and donated
them to the Kennedy Library.
In almost every case, these papers included classified documents.
For example, a brief review of the tables of contents attached to
gifts of papers deposited in the Kennedy Library reveals that donations
of papers by the following individuals included classified documents:
McGeorge Bundy, National Security Adviser to the President; Robert
McNamara, Secretary of Defense; Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury;
Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; and Presidential Aides Arthur Schlesinger,
J. Kenneth Galbraith, and Walter Heller.
-I-
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No statute, rule or precedent precluded a government official
from having reference to classified documents or information in
writing books or memoirs. Indeed, since officials carry such
information in their heads, they are always in a position to draw on
it. The current attacks being made on Mr. Sorensen in this regard
could as easily have been levelled against all of the other great
memoir writers of recent history.
A quite recent example is President Ford. On November 21, 1973,
in testimony before the House Judiciary Committee considering his
confirmation as Vice President, President Ford said that in his book,
Portrait of the Assassin, he drew upon highly classified papers of the
Warren Commission and revealed information from at least two "Top Secret"
documents. The Committee did not express concern as to the propriety
of Mr. Ford having had such "Top Secret" papers in his possession while
writing his book. (See transcript of the House Judiciary Committee
hearings of that date.)
The only laws in effect, at the time Mr. Sorensen wrote his book,
governing the use of classified information were the espionage statutes
which prohibited: a) the use of national defense information with the
intent of causing injury to the United States, or to confer an advantage
on a foreign government (18 U.S.C. 8793, 794); b) the release of
classified communications codes (18 U.S.C. 798); or c) the disclosure
of classified security information to foreign governments (50 U.S.C. 8783).
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It is not suggested by anyone that any of these provisions were
violated. Nor has it ever been suggested, in the decade since
Mr. Sorensen's book was published, that the book disclosed any
classified security information. In fact, the relevant portions
of the book were submitted in advance to McGeorge Bundy, National
Security Adviser to the President, who confirmed that there were
no inappropriate disclosures.
The only regulation governing the use and storage of classified
information received by White House aides was Executive Order 10501,
which provided that the custodian of classified information had
responsibility for providing for its secure storage and handling,
and for following procedures to insure that unauthorized persons not
gain access. Whatever documents Mr. Sorensen required for his book
were released to him by the custodian of his papers, the General
Services Administration, and no suggestion has ever been made that
he gave unauthorized persons access to them.
The General Services Administration acted in accordance with
established practice in permitting Mr. Sorensen to use his papers at
home. Indeed, government officials frequently work at home, and former
officials and generals, drawing on their papers, have often written their
memoirs at home or in their private offices.
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 =
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3637 (7-76)
17 January 77
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CONCLUDING STATEMENT OF THEODORE C. SORENSEN
But it is now clear that a substantial portion of the United
States Senate and the intelligence community is not yet ready to
accept as Director of Central Intelligence an outsider who believes
as I believe on these two legitimate questions. It is equally clear
that to continue fighting for this post, which would be my natural
inclination, would only handicap the new Administration if I am
rejected, or handicap my effectiveness as Director if I am confirmed.
It is, therefore, with deep regret that I am asking Governor
Carter to withdraw my designation as Director of Central Intelligence.
My regret stems not from my failure to get this post but from my
concern for the future of our country.
I return to private life with a clear conscience. When my
nomination was announced on Christmas Eve, my youngest son said to
me: "Now you will have to do some things you don't want to do"; and
I replied: "I never will." I have never compromised my conscience,
and I am unwilling to do so now in order to assure my nomination.
I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee,
for hearing me out and for the courtesies you have extended to me
over the past few weeks. I will be glad to answer any questions
you think necessary, and to answer those of the press immediately
after the conclusion of this hearing.
-11-
7 A?4. ,.e y~ yam. -i
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Portion of Sorensen Press Conference After Conclusion of Senate Hearings
Reporter's question was garbled...
Sorensen: "I would not want to characterize the intelligence community
as a whole. The people with whom I have been working at the Agency have
been extremely supportive of both my views and my qualifications."
Mr. Sorensen was asked if he withdrew his nomination "because of
the oppositions' elements within the intelligence community...."
o ense : "No, I didn't say that, I didn't say that... First of
all let me say that I.have not condemned, and will not condemn the
intelligence community as a whole. That's a grave mistake. -I met out
there some of the brightest and ablest and most dedicated people I have
ever met anywhere in government. I work extremely well with them. I
found them very much compatible with my views and attitudes on covert
operations, on the role of intelligence in American society, on the kind
of role America should play in world affairs..."
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