ADMIRAL TURNER'S QUESTION RE THE CHAPTER OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE'S REPORT WHICH CONCERNS THE 'ORGANIZATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A002500100003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 55
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 16, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Executive Assistant to
DCI-Designate
Special Assistant to the DCI
16 February 1977
Admiral Turner's Question re the Chapter of the
Church Committee's Report Which Concerns the
"Organization of the Intelligence Community
as a Whole"
1. Attached are excerpts from the Church Committee Report which
discuss the organization of the Intelligence Community: Chapter "E:
The Director of Central Intelligence" and Chapter "G: Reorganization
of the Intelligence Community." What follows is a brief summary of
these two chapters and their recommendations, as well as some comments
on what we understand to be the current views of the SSCI (Inouye
Committee) on the same subjects.
2. Chapter E considers the DCI in his three roles as coordinator
of the Intelligence Community, producer of National Intelligence, and
head of the CIA.
a. DCI as coordinator: the Commtttee comments that the
DCI is not in a position to command the different departments
and agencies concerned with intelligence to respond to the
needs of policymakers because he lacks authority to allocate
intelligence resources. The Committee supports the CFI concept
but wonders if the CFI can be effective--for example, in enabling
the DCI to review tactical military intelligence operations--
without modification of the peacetime authority of the Secretary
of Defense.
b. DCI as producer of National Intelligence: the Committee
comments that the DCI faces obstacles in ensuring objectivity
in his national intelligence judgments because o "pressures -
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from the White House and the Defense Department," and that
the DCI's ability to resist such pressures was reduced with
the dissolution of the Board of National Estimates. The
Committee also emphasizes the importance of ensuring both
the DCI's proximity and access to the Presider,L and his
responsibility for Intelligence Community acOvities, The
Committee notes that the appropriate Congressional com-
mittees should be provided with the full range of Intelligence
produced by the Comounity, and that procedures should he
developed so that the DCI's role as an adviser to the
President is not compromised.
c. DCI as head of CIA: the Committee notes that the
DCI might find himself in a "conflict of interest" situation
when ruling on the activities of the Community because of
his direct management responsibility for CIA and, furthermore,
that the DCI's "span of control" may be too great for him to
exercise, in addition, detailed supervision of the clandestine
activities of the CIA.
3. Chapter E also includes several recommendations; namely,
that by statute the PCI be given exclusive responsibility for
producing National Intelligence, and that he establish a board
?including senior outside aduisers who would review the intelligence
product, thereby helping insulate the LCI from pressures to modify
his judgments; that the DCI by statute be authorized to establish
national intelligence requirements, prepare the intelligence budget,
and provide guidance for all national intelligence program operations,
and that to do so, the DCI should have authority to review all intel-
ligence resource allocations, including those for tactical military
intelligence; that statutory authority for the DCI's two deputies be
established, and that only one of the three be an active or retired
career military officer; that the oversight committee consider (1) that
funds for the national intelligence budget be appropriated to the DCI
rather than the different agencies and departments, and (2) that the
DCI be separated from direct responsibility over the CIA.
4. Chapter G--"The Reorganization of the Intelligence Community"--
expands on the question of separating the DCI from direct management of
CIA. Noting that such a separation would remove the DCI from any conflict
of interest in exercising his authority over the entire Intelligence
Community, the Committee also suggests that major structural changes in
CIA be considered: namely, by separating national intelligence production
and analysis from "the clandestine service." The Committee lists the
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advantages and potential disadvantages of this latter proposition, and
concludes with a recommendation that the appropriate Congressional
oversight committees study both questions.
5. We understand that the SSCT (Inouye Committee) continues the
concern of the Church Committee regarding the DCI's roles as coordinator
of the Community, producer of National Intelligence, and head of CIA_
Some impressions gathered by the Intelligence Community Staff and the
Office of Legislative Counsel regarding the thinking in the Inouye
Committee include:
a. DCI as coordinator, or Community Resource Manager:
Although the Church Committee strongly endorsed this
concept, it noted that shaping a committee process which
respected the direct executive powers of both the Secretary
of Defense and the DCI presented a problem. The Inouye
Committee generally favors the CFI and the consolidated NFIP
budget process which resulted from E.O. 11905. While the
Church Committee recommended founding this process in legisla-
tion, the Inouye Committee wishes further testing of the
existing- process before taking a position on the question of
legislation.
In addition, the Inouye Committee is interested in
the DCI's power to establish Community collection requirements--
already substantial in the imagery and SIGINT fields. Along
with the House Appropriations Committee, the Inouye Committee
would like to further investigate the question of DCI oversight
of tactical military intelligence operations in order to eliminate
wasteful duplication.
The Inouye.Committee's Charters.and_Guidelines Sub-
committee (Senator Hathaway) is drafting an "overall charter"
for the Community and it is possible that proposed legislation
could be ready by late spring. Also, the Carter Administration
intends to review Community organization through a Policy Review
Memorandum (PRM/NSC #11). which will examine the powers of the
DCI to manage Community resources either through committee
negotiation (as in the CFI's successor organization, the Policy
Review Committee/Intelligence) or through direct executive
authority, such as the DCI now has over the CIA.
b. DCI as producer of National Intelligence:
Given the fact that there is general agreement that the
DCI should be the principal foreign intelligence adviser to the
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President and the NSC, there continues to be controversy
both about the quality and objectivity of national intel-
ligence produced under present arrangements and about various
measures that could be taken to improve the situation, As
noted above, the church Committee criticized the disselution
of the Board of National Estimates because it believed the
Board helped insulate the DCI from policy pressures, The
Inouye Comittec has not yet taken a position on this 'subject.
We understand that Senator Stevenson's Sabcommittec on
Intelligence Collection, Production, and Quality is preparing
a study for the Committee's consideration on this issue and
that it is to be ready at the end of February. This staff
preparing the study is pursuing an in-depth investigation of
intelligence production in several areas, including Soviet
forces for intercontinental conflict--the NIE 11-3/8 series,
In this connection, it should be noted that the Inouye Com-
mittee as a whole was briefed fully on the controversy
surroundihg the recent "B-Team" experiment and the false
press charges that outside "hard-liners" had succeeded in
forcing changes in the judgments of this particular NIE.
Because of their positive reactions to these briefings, we
believe the Committee members are not now overly concerned
about estimative objectivity, but undoubtedly will develop
specific recommendations designed to further reinforce the
independence of the estimating process and its end product.
The Inouye Committee also is aware, from meetings with
former DCI George Bush, that the DCI was considering the
formation of a body of outside consultants to be called the
Director's Estimates Advisory Panel. This Panel would be
composed of experts in various disciplines from the academic,
business, and "think-tank" worlds who would be called upon to
provide non-Intelligence Community views of selected Estimates,
Whether or not to proceed with the formation of such a Panel
remains a decision for the new DCI.
c. DCI as head of CIA:
Concerning the Church Committee's recommendation that
serious consideration be given to separating the DCI from direct
responsibility for managing CIA, the Inouye Committee's Sub-
committee on Charters and Guidelines continues to look into the
question. Although we do not know what the general view of the
Committee currently is, it is probable Committee members must
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advantages and potential disadvantages of this latter proposition, and
concludes with a recommendation that the appropriate Congressional
oversight committees study both questions.
5. We understand that the SSCI (Inouye Committee) continues the
concern of the Church Committee regarding the DCI's roles as coordinator
of the Community, producer of National Intelligence, and head of CIA.
Some impressions gathered by the Intelligence Community Staff and the
Office of Legislative Counsel regarding the thinking in the Inouye
Committee include:
a. DCI as coordinator, or Community Resource Manager:
Although the Church Committee strongly endorsed this
concept, it noted that shaping a committee process which
respected the direct executive powers of bothithe Secretary
of Defense and the DCI presented a problem. The Inouye
Committee generally favors the CFI and the consolidated NFIP
budget process which resulted from E.O. 11905. While the
Church Committee recommended founding this process in legisla-
tion, the Inouye Committee wishes further testing of the
existing.process before taking a position on the question of
legislation.
In addition, the Inouye Committee is interested in
the DCI's power to establish Community collection requirements--
already substantial in the imagery and SIGINT fields. Along
with the House Appropriations Committee, the Inouye Committee
would like to further investigate the question of DCI oversight
of tactical military intelligence operations in order to eliminate
wasteful duplication.
The Inouye.Committee's Charters and Guidelines Sub-
committee (Senator Hathaway) is drafting an "overall charter?
for the Community and it is possible that proposed legislation
could be ready by late spring. Also, the Carter Administration
intends to review Community organization through a Policy Review
Memorandum (PRM/NSC #11) which will examine the powers of the
DCI to manage Community resources either through committee
negotiation (as in the CFI's successor organization, the Policy
Review Committee/Intelligence) or through direct executive
authority, such as the DCI now has over the CIA.
b. DCI as producer of National Intelligence:
Given the fact that there is general agreement that the
DCI should be the principal foreign intelligence adviser to the
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first answer a more basic question: In his role as Community
leader, how much of the DCI's authority should be directly
executive and how much should be expressed through negotiation
with other agencies and departments (primarily Defense) which
retain executive control of particular national intelligence
elements and programs?
Attachment:
As stated
Distribution:
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T;In Dlitscron ci?e, C..es.z, in.a..nr-rewnkef% ' ? ' . .
The. 1 0.17 National Security Act gave the DCI resPonsibility or
"coordinating the intelligence :let ivities of the several Government a-
partments and. aaeeneies in the interest'of national security."
tion, the DCI as the President's principal foreign intelligence a dViSar;
NN'fii given res?ponsibility for coordinating and prodticing national,' intel-
genc,e for senior policymakers, :However, the, Committee foimd that ;
these ,DCI _responsibilities have often conflicted \\.?th, the parteculat'
interests and prerogatives of the other intelligence community de- .
partMentS and agencies. They have not given up control over their ow..'1, ?
intelligence operations, and in particular the Department of Defense
and the Military services, which allocate $O perce,at of the direct costs
for national intelligence, have. insisted that they must exercise direct
control. over peacetime in activities to prepare, for war. Thus,
while the DCI was given responsibility under the 1017 act for intelli-
gence community activities, 110 WIN not, anthoriSed to centrally coordi-
nate or manage tile overall operations of the community,
1. roordinotoe of tile o iciligewye, ohRomunity
The Commit( en has fm Ind that the. Det in his coordinator role has
been unable io ensure. that. waste, and in:necessary duplication arc,
avoided. Bemuse the DCT only provides guidance for intelligence
collection and prmluction, and does not establish requirements, he is not
in. a posi Linn to command the int ell igenee community to respond_ to the.
intelligence needs of national policymakers. Where the DCI has been
able to define priorities, he has lacked authority to allocate intelligence,
resources---eit her among different systems of intelligence collection or
among. intelligence collection, 'analysis and. finished intelligence
prod a eti on.
- The' Commit tee supports President Ford's objectives of enhancing
I he. stature. of the DCI and establishing a mechanism such as the Com-
mittee-on Foreign Intelligence (CFI) with the DCI as chairman to
control the allocation of national int ellig,enc,e programs resources. The.
Committee questions, however, Whether the. OFT ean be effective. with-
out some ?appropriate modification of the?peac.e.time authority of the
Soc.retary of De'rense. In order to strike .an appropriate balfince be
:-
1 ween thur requirenients of national and tactical intelligence, the intelli-
gence 011ected by national means should be readily available to the
military eommanders and vice versa, and the Secretary of Defense
and the. military services should retain direct control over the opera-
tions of fact hal enilitary intelligence. Nonetheless, the DC,1 needs
the right, to re.,?iew tee( ical military intelligence,. operations in
order toaniike huu idget choices bet ween tactical and national int elligenee
act iv it ies. ,I1toreover, to carry out his cemalinating the DOT needs ?
to retain control over maim' technical intelligence collection systems
which service both tact ival and nat ional intelligence requirements. .
2. l' mill/ cpp of Not oval 'it( cif i gemee ?
Iii the. :ill% of providing finished intelligence, the Committee dis-
covered that, the, DC1., in his role as intelligence adviser, has faced
. .
? , a - Lar y eonce,rnet with pressures irom hoth the 11rI1ito
House
and the Defense, Department, on the DCI to alter his intelligence
judgments. One example of such pressure investigated by the Coin-
mittke occurred in the fall of I 0(>1); \dun). the DCI modified his judg-
ment on the capability of the Soviet, 8S-D system when it. conflicted
with the public position of Secretary of Defense Laird. A f ter a meeting ?
with staff of the Office of theSecretary of Defense, Director I felms
deleted a paragraph from the draft of f he National Intelligence Es-
timate CAI SM/let :Strategic. fOrreS Whiell St:1(Ni that. within Ilw next five
years it Was. "highly unlikely" that. the Soviets would attempt to
'achieve "a first strike capability, i.e., a capability to launch a surprise
attack against the, United States with assurance. that I he U.S.S.R.
would not itself receive damage it. would regard :is 111110(011101)1 C."
The Committee, believes that over the. past five years the, DCI's
ability to produce objective national in and resist, out
pressure has bee7n reduced with the dissolution of the. independent
Board of National Estimates and the sebsequent delegation of its
staff to the departments with responsihility for drafting the DCrs
national intelligence judgments.
In the end, the DCI.mnst, depend on his posit ion as the President's
principal intelligence adviser or on his personal relationship with the
Pi?esidenti to carry out his various responsibilities and to withstand
pressures to compeomise his intelligence judgments. Consequent ly, I he
Committee has been ooncerned I lint the DCI's proximity and access
to the President. has diminished over flu, years. Since 1 00. at least,
until the confirmation of Mr. Bash. the MI has ra rely seen .1 ho
President except at NSC meet lags. The influence a I 41 (amid have
from a close relationship with the President has generally liven
lacking. ? .?
? 117hile President' Ford's Execnti uc Order is a step in the right
direction, the Committee believes I hat t he DC.I's responsibility over
intelligence community activities should be. enhanced :ind spelled out
elearly and in clot-nil in statute. The Executive should not continue
defining these responsibilities alone as it has done since 1017 through
F,xecutive Orders and National Security Council -Intelligence Diree-
t,ives (NSCIDs). ' . ? "
-The CommitteeIelieve.s that, the Congress, in co fling mit its re-
Tonsibilities in the area of national security policy, should have access
to the:fail range of intelligence produced by t he 1 Jailed States intelli-
gence, community. The Committee furthelebelieves that it. should lie
possible to work Out a means of ensuring that the DCPs national
intelligence judgments are, available to the a pproPriat e. Congi?essional
-aommi.t.tees on a regular basis without vompromising the DC role.
as personal adviser to the, President.
'Finally, the Committee has found (quieten lint the unetion of the.
DCI in his roles as intelligence (annum:illy lender and principal in-
lelligneo adviser to the President is ineonsistent With his responsibil?
uiy to manage one of the intelligence eonniumity ageneies ---the
Potential problems exist in '11 windier of' areas. Because I he DCI as
head of the CIA is rrspOnsihle for human claticlest collertion r-
griefillgigAki004/03/15 CIA-RDVib ritiliolieWitMARY1065cisat
mhstacies in onmn.in, tio his national inteliw =men( ion overseas, the developinc
tive and independent, of 'department and agen lases. le ?ommi e
?
434 435
and interception of technical collection se%Iggv, VileFPfsiNRF2 19L-4
the DCI as community leader is in "a conflict of interest" situation
?vhen ruling.on the activities of the overall intelligence commvinitty.
The Committee is also concerned that the DCI's new span of con-
trol?both the entire. intelligence community and the entire CIA
may be too great for him to exercise effective detailed supervision
of clandestine activities.
Recommendations
16. By statute, the DCI should be established as the President's
principal foreign intelligence adviser, with exclusive responsibility
for producing national intelligence for the President and the Con-
gress. For this purpose, the DCI should be empowered: to establish
staff directly responsible to him to help prepare his national intelli-
gence judgments and to coordinate the views of the other members of
the intelligence community. The, Committee recommends that the Di-
rector establish a board to include- senior outside advisers to review
intelligence products as necessary, thus helping to insulate the DC/
from pressures to alter or modify his national intelligence judgments.
To advise and assist; he 1)0I in producing national intelligence, the
DCI? would also be empowered to draw on other elements of the
intelligence community.
IT. liy s(.lil ut the should be given responsibility and authority
for establishing national intelligence requirements, preparing the na-
tional intelligence budget; and providing guidance for "United
States national intelligence program operations. In this capacity he
should be designated as chairman of the appropriate NSC committee,
such as the CFI, and should have the following powers and respon-
sibilit ies
a. The DC I should establish national intelligence requirements for
the entire intellig-once community. Tie should be empowered to draw
on intelligence community representatives and others whom he may
designate to assist, him ? in establishling national intelligence require-
ments and determining the success of the various agencies in fulfilling
them. The DCI should provide, general guidance to the various intel-
ligence agency directors for the management of intelligence operations.
b. The 1)01. should have responsibility for preparing the national
intelligence program budget for presentation to the President and the
Congress? The definition of what. is to be included within that national
intelligence. program should be established .by Congress in consultation
with the Executive. In this capacity, the Director of Central Intelli-
gence should he in vol \.ed early in the. budget cycle in preparing the
budgets of the respective intelligence community agencies. 'Flm Direc-
tor should have speci fie responsibility 'for choosing among the pro-
grams of the different collect ion and production agencies and depart-
ments and to insure :Against, waste andsunnecessary duplication. The
DOT should also have responsibili(y. for issuing fiscal guidance for the
allocat ion of all nal ional intelligence resources. The authority of the
" [The 1)111 shall : Ensure the development mid sulunission of a' budget. for lice
National Foreign Intelligence Program to the CPI. (Executive Order 11005.
See.
/03/15 ; CIA-RDMOIMAOrTIMPAPPaRnielin the intellicrenee budget should
defined by statute."'
' c. In order to carry 'out' his national intelligence responsibilities
the DCI should have the authority to review all foreign and military
intelligence activities And. intel igence. resource allocatias, including
tactical military intelligence. winch is the responsibility of the armed
forces."
d. The DCI should be authorized to establish, an intelligence eom-
:flunky staff to support him in carrying out his managerial respon-
sibilities. This staff should be.
drawn from the best, -available talent
within and outside the intelligence community. ?
e. In addition to. these provisions concerning DCI control overna-
.
tional intelligence operations in peavetime, the., statute should require
establishment of a prOCCd111V.td) I isure 1hat iii t IMO of war the relevant
national intelligence operations come under the control of the Sec-
retary of Defense..
.18. By statute, the position of Deputy Director of Central Intelli-
gence fee the' intelligence community should be established as recom..
mended 'el Executive Order 119M, This Deputy Director should
be subject to Senate confirma/ ion and would assuittu I he. 1)01 ls
/.grenee, connnunity functions in the I ill's ;:bsonee. ( rrent.provisions
regarding the status of the TX I and his single &luny should, he ex-
tended to eover the DCI aed both del att its. ( liyilinn emit rol of the int-.
tion's intelligence is import ;,ni.; only OHO (II the three could be a career
in!litary officer, active or retired.
19. The Conimittee recommends ))6,,. intelligence oversight coin-
iniftee(s) of Congress consider 1:?-eLir,e the Congress should appro-
priatci. the funds for the national in:elligenee budget. to the ,DCI,
rather than to the directors of the various intellig,enee agencies and
departments.
20. By statute, the Director of Central Intelligence should serve, at
the pleasure of the President but llor no more than ten years.
21. The Committee also recommends consideration of separating the
DCI from direct responsibility over the CIA.' 2
INTF11I1 NC:10 N
cF AGFCY
. \ 1 4 J., A A A
L The Charter for-intetlirino&Actirities Espio , ounterin-
telligence ,and COVe2'
The Committee. finds thatj,elle-ClA s prosente-eieTter, embodied
in the NationalS_iyiewiterlgEt of (, 11, ci A Act-iii'INQ mid the
1974 ITughes-afrin amendments to the Folvign Assistance Act., is-in
ulequato in a number of respects. ?
" "Reprogramming" menus shifting money previously /IpprOVed (or ono puTpof;(%
another use; for instane.e, from via nrjestine vollt`Cli011 10 ITC111111%1I Col-
or ?overt. action.
" rut contrast. tc President. Nixon's 397i ;e:(-1,- i I )irector Helms \Odell
IheIICI lo plan nod review "... cli intelligc2cc act ira ieN including lac! ical
1elligence and the J1:floe:Won ttr 10;xec'll-
jvo ()Myr ii 190', stalus . flu^ ;WI nor the OKI shall have
responsibiWy ccr tactical int ell igent.e."
? "See Clieussion ;an pp. 449-4r)o.
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ex tidy? should c.ontinuo to have the initiatove m :ornall.atme? eover
actio. it also strongly believes that the appropriate oversig,1-2 bodies
of Coiereess should fully informed prior to the initia. tion or \
actions.
. Congres.ional power over the purse can serve as the most, efiee/t ve
eongression 1 oversight tool if there is the courage and the-will to, xer-
else it. In add4ion to the regular budget for covert action, the e aency
draws on a Coi in (Tile)/ Reserve Fund for unanticipated proj .s. Any
withdrawals fm this fund require approval from the 1Office of
Management am Budget and notification, within 48 hots, to the
appropriate congrkss'onal committees. The Cortimittee ).elieves that
. ,
the Contingency niatl can also provide one of the n3cchanisms by
which Congress can 2" ectively control covert action.
llero inmcndati ?vs
35. The, legislation es
tell igence Agency should
ernment agency authorized
covert, actions should be t
security. Covert actions shot
United states foreign policy gc
dinar y circumstances when no a
governing covert action should
"vhich will ensure careful and, t,
general policies governing covert a
projects; such procedures should req
ability of highest level policymakeyg.
36. The, ;Committee has already re mmended, following its in-
vestigation of alleged assassination.attei As directed at foreign lead-
ers, a statute to forbid such ,activities. le Committee reaffirms its
? support for such a statute . lid further re ommends prohibiting the .
following covert activities y statute;
? All political ftSSa, mations." .
?Efforts to subvert democratic governn
? Support for pplice or other internal semi
engage in the' systematic violation of hum
37. By statute,/he appropriate NSC committe (e.g., the Opera-
tions Advisory Group) should review every covert ction proposal."
The Com/my:tie recommends that the Operations . dvisory Group
review incluc ti: . .
?A ea' Tful and systematic analysis of the politica, 'remises
mylerlying the recommended ,actions, as well asith nature,
extent, purpose, risks, likelihood of success, and e sts of
the operation. Reasons explaining why the objectiv can-
15 CIA-RD
rthlishing the charter f
,ecify that the CIA i'
o conduct covert a
deal with gray
ld be consistent, with publicly-defined
'us, and shonja be reserved for extraor-
her mean vill suffice. The legislation
.equire,executive branch procedures
oroiy.,?h consideration of both the
ition and particular covert action .
re the participation and account-
the Central Li-
the only U.S. Gov-
ons. .The purpose of
threats to American
nts.
ity forces which
n rights.
C'onanitlee? endorses L'xecutIve Order 1100$, of February 5, 1976,
N'llieh states: "No empl,lyee of the United States Goverment, shall enga c in, or
.onspire in 'gogo in, )oliticat. assassination."
l'INecnt ive Order 11:105, 2/18/7(i, .estnillislioil the Operations Ad1 isory
o

440
P80. 16252.4Q02.5,001090L0.34 means should also be considered. ?
ch covert. action project should be formally considered
at a, t-leeting of the OAG, and if approved, orwarded to the,.
P.resi nt for final decision. The views and positions of t
`oarticip.. 'Its would be .fully recorded. For the limps of
? -OAG, pre dential, and congressional consideratiofis
r -.1g
6o-called no sensitive projects should be aggitted ac-
. cording to the traordinary circumstances o contingency
. against which th
)roject Is directed...
t 38. By statute the intel men oversight committee(s) of Congress
should require that the folio 1 budget;
ifnission for (overt action
programs be specified and ;detailed as .0 thin activity recommended,
Unforeseen -covert action proleqs iould by funded from the
Contingency Reserve Fund which he replenished only Il fter the
concurrence of the oversight, am any Qmer appropriate vongressional
committees. The congressio once oversight committees
should he notified prior any withdra% ell from the Contingency .
Reserve Fund.
30. By statute, any7weet, use by the 11.S. t."3 ', eminent of American
citizens as corobaf.:a its should he preceded by the lot i float ion required
for all covent, act ns. The st,a(tute should provide lot wit hin 60 days
-
of such notifietatobn such use shall be, terminated un ss ;the Congress
has specifically authorized such use. The Congress shoi 1(1 he empow-
ered to tepliinate such Use at any ti n
40. I,3/3(Statitte, the executive braneli should be prevent ec rom ,eon-
ducting any covert military assistanee program (includin; the hi-
diia&ta or direct provision of n'tilitn'y tnatoTiai, military or 1(e...ieics
tivice and training, and funds for mercenaries) without tile ('NpNt
prior consent of the intelligence oversight committee (s) of 1
REORGANIzATION OF TUE INTELLICENCE COMAFUNF
1. The Position of the DCI
The Committee recommendations regarding the Director of Central
Intelligence (pages 43-45)-would, if iiipl
o mm emented, increase his author-
ity over the entorentelligence coainity. Given such increased au-
thority,.the Committee believes that both Inc executive branch and .the
intelligence oversight committee(s) of Coogress should give careful
consideration to removing the DCI from direct management responsi?
bility for the Central Intelligence Agelicy. This would free the DCI'
to concentrate on his responsibilities with regard to the entire intelli-
gence community and wonlcl remove hint from any conflict. of interest
an performing that task. It might also no-lease. the accountability of
the Central Intelligence Agency by establishing a. new and separate
senior position?al Director of the .Central Intelligence Agency?
responsible for only the CIA. ?
2, T 4e Strveturcs of the CIA
The. Committee boliavcs that -several important problems uncovered
in the course o?f titis inquiry f;tig,gest that sori50110115o
s cn'iderai ion also
be g - given to iitate: ,struetatral change in Hie CIA?in particular,'sepa-
;
(iron') 'did directed it I,: "consider and develop a policy reconuncudatin, includ-?
? ?
[6.g covert operathins] in support of n:ItioripA-'1/11041131:iIF1517RdifieM3es2004/03115 : LIA-R woblIk?talv current provisions; of the 1Vnr Power
I ,
ing any dissents, for the' l'resitient prior to his decision on each silecift1 .
DP?c0,,I? 11,00/11AlillIct.401 ? umented, (Appenti-Lx (7, Hearings, Vol, 7, 99G )
450
l'atin, national intelligence production
1 iiillbs-,04/03/15:
tine service and other ?collection functions. _Alit-
Agm Le
could be placed directly vinder the DCI, while clandestine coUiection
foreign intelligence from human and technical sources ann coveri.
operations would remain in the CIA._
The advantages of such a step are several ? .
?The DCI would be removed from the conflict of interest
situation of managing the intelligence, community as a
whole while also directing a collection agency.
?The concern that the DCI's national intelligence judg-
ment. are compromised by the impulse to justify certain
covert action operations or by the close association of the
analysts with the, clandestine service would be remedied.
?The problem, seen by some, in the intelligence community,
of bias on the part, of CIA analysts toward the collection
resources of the CIA would be lessened.
?It. would facilitate, providing the, intelligence production
unit with greater priority and increased resources neces?
sary for improving the quality of its finished intelligence.
?"Fighter policy control of the Clandestine Service by the
National Security Council and the Department of State
would be possible.
?The Director would he, abIc to focus increased attention
on monitoring- Clandestine Services.
?Internal reorgunizat ion of the Directorate for Intelligence
and the rc.,mainder of the CIA could be facilitated.
There are potential drawbacks as well:
?The Director of Central Intelligence might lose, the influ-
ence that is part, of having command responsibility for the
clandestine -serviees.
?The increasing, though still not extensive, contact between
national intelligence analysts and the Clandestine Service
for the purpose, of improving the espionage effort might be
inhibited.
?The ,DCI would have managerial responsibility over the
former CIA analysts which might, place him in a conflict-
. of-interest situation in regard to the production of intelli-
gence.
?The increased, number of independent agencies would in-
crease the DCI's coordination problems.
?If the clandestine services did not report to the, DCI, there
would be the problem of establishing an alternative chain
of command to the President.
?The Clandestine Service might be downgraded and fail to
secure adequate support. ?
Nonetheless, on balance, the. Committee believes such a separation
of -cutlet ions and consequent. possible realignments in authority within
t he int elligence community wait serious consideration. ?
oronendations
CIA-RittR611#19PIAMPOWIRWQ3
hal committee(s) of Congress in the
. course of developing a new charter for the, intelligence community
t-, - ? k rs
should give consideration to separating the. functions of the, DCI and
the Director of the CIA and to dividing the, intelligence analysis and
Production functions from the clandestine collection and covert action
'functions of the present CIA. .
. RELATIONS WMI UNITED STATES INsTauvoics ANDI)RIVATE
Crriznisis
mediate postwar period, as the communists pressed to
to control international organizations and movements,
ations, and cultural institutions, the. Unit i
ed States
lying American pri?'ate institutions and ndivi5.1 rals
over minds, institutions, and ideals. ,111 the
sidized, and oven helped develop"plikrate" or
In the
influence an
mass COMMIL1
responded by in
in the secret stru.
process, the CIA sio-
non-government oral
communists around
organizations, but also tl
student, labor, cultural, a in
These covert relationships
Committee's attention because
attach to the independence of flies(
The Committee found that. in t
these covert actions has been extenst
? zations nat., were designed t eon .witn
ly foreign
tilted States
merit and this
that Americans
'orid. Tile CIA supported not, a
international act ies of 1
)hilant hropie organizatio
aVe. Itt t';tck'd
tic' importance
Hist it ntions.
S . past the s.c,t lo and diversity of
s For op 4.ational purposes, the
CIA has: ?
?Funded a special program of a in r American business
association;
?Collaborated with an American t ado lion federation :
?Helped to establish a researcl center a a major United
States university;
?Supported an internationa exchange pg nin sponsored
by a group of United Sti es universities;
--Made widespread use p philanthropic organ ations to
fund such covert actio l'programs.
The Committee's eonce about these relationships is hei,.; itened by
the Agency's tendency to move from support, to use -f both
institutions and' indiv,ithials. For example, the initial purpose. f the
Agency's funding o the National Student. Association was to p smit
United States slit( nts to represent their own ideas, in their own
in the internati forums >f -the day. Nevertheless, the Commith ?
'has found ins rices in which the CIA moved from general support. to
the "operatip use" of individual sI udents."2 Contrary to the. public's
understan ing over 250 United Stat es sI mn
ie's we.re sponsored by the,
CIA to tend youth festivals in Moscow, Vienna and ITelsinki and
erational asci, areording to CTA dirvolivos, means porrorming orvici.s in
stipArt: oC this CIA Oporations I lirvult)ralp, and 111:1 d rvernilinntil.
upilzation, Or training of any individual such parposvs ;is providing covvr and
eneettng intelligence,
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
In the attached hearing at page 12
are the eight questions by Senator Thurmond
and answers by Mr. Bush which might be of
interest to Admiral Turner.
P-fe 101 USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
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That is a very general answer, sir..
The -CHAIRMAN. It has been my observatiton in the case of other
nominees who undertook this job that, as a minimum,, it takes: 12
months of intensive application to get On top of the job; so to speak, to
get the feel of it, the many angles and -ramifications. These are world-
wide as you know, and certainly domestic, too. -
Are you. williner6 to put whatever intensive application is necessary
into that, in order to get 'on top of it ? Have you thought that outt ?
Mr. Bum". I have thought it out. .1 am committed to it. I hope that
my record 'reveals I am not opposed to hard work. Indeed I have done
it since I can remember and I certainly will make that commitment?
' I have no other plans. My plan is to get in there. There is an awful lot
, of learning to be done. I have been back here a Week and .have .not had
'access to much of the classified information even now, and probably
that is better until the Senate disposes of this matter one way or an-
other, but I promise you, sir, that I will set an example out. there in
terms of hours, in terms of hard work, that I think this committee will
be proud of. I have done it before and I am prepared to do it again. -
The CHAIRMAN. I ask every nominee this question; in simple terms
now, boiled &writ why do you agree for your name to be submitted and
to undertake this job?
Mr. Bum. I have a?I hope you understand this one. I have a- sense
of obligation to this country. I am one who is old fashioned, in the
sense that I think duty and obligation to serve still should be incul-
cated into every son and every daughter of every father, and if feel
'strongly about it. My foreign affairs experience has taught me the
absolute - essentiality of this work and it is for?this reason that I
undertake this job?it is no more complicated than that. I did not, seek
.thiS job., I was riding my bicycle in Peking, coming home from church.
? A mesSenger came up and said: "Say, there is news for you back at the
office." I went back there, held up this telegram, and it -was out of a
cold clear blue China sky that this thing descended on ine. And I
thought about it, not long, thought about it and decided as I think
maybe your opening comments confirmed, there is nothing in this
politically for me. It, is my obligation' to my Country and I just hope
I can convince those who canna accept that because maybe they do
not know that to me that is what motivated me. I think my reply
to the President of the United States when I sent it back reflected that.
The CHAIRMAN. You did not volunteer.. They volunteered you.
Mr. BUSH. Yes, sir...
. The CHAIRMAN. All right.
renator Thurmond?
Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, I have a few questions that can.
be answered for the record in order to save time. I am very pleased with
the statement Mr. Bush has made here and I suggest that he answer
these questions for the record.
Mr. Bum. Thank you, sir..
RESPONSES TIT GEoRsE RUM TO WRITTEN QTJESTIONS OF SENATOR, STROM THURMOND
Question. Mr. Ambassador, what is your concept 'of your- job as. Director of
Central Intelligence? -
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13
Answer. To provide intelligence to the President and the NSC and to co-
ordinate intelligence from the entire intelligence community in addition to pro-
viding overall management of the intelligence community. -
Question. In Providing the natiAal intelligence estirrkate to the President, do
you feel strong_ differences of opinion should be noted in the final product?
Answer. Yes.
Question. How would you define the charter of the Central Intelligence
Agency?
Answer. The CIA was chartered for the purpose o ordinating intelligence
activities of several departments and agencies in the interns or na
its major responsibilitiea include correlation, evaluation and dissemination of
intelligence relating to the national security to. the President, the Natienal, Se-
curity Council and other government departments and agencies as appropriate.
To fulfill these responsibilities the CIA must administer an active program of
collection and the DCI must participate in the overall coordination of Intelli-
gence Community collection. It is clearly understood that CIA will have no
police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers or internal s.
Queation..- Whiit -is-your opinion of tl the National Security Counm
Intelguce Committ 9 -
Answer. The National Security Council Intelligence Committee should serve
as the major communicatinn link between the primary consumers and the pro-
ducers or intelligence. The NSCIC shopici provide guidance to the intelligence
Community on consu . in audition, I oeneVe that the NSCIO
can perform a vuable function by evaluatine the intellieence prod it. It Is this
. kind of cycle?consumer guidance, co r eewja?tgat will ea( to a better
and more useful Intelligence product.
Question. How do you envision your interface with the aPerefilla' of Defense?
Answer. Inasmuch as the Secretary of Defense has overall responsibility for
DIA and NSA, as well as the intelligence functions of the various Services, there
must be close_reinflonsb,ip. Prime interaction will come tDreugh Ineptines at
tritr..6(.1. I view the Segetary of Defense both as the manner of signibicant
. lirterfretce resour ,es and as a major consumer in his NSU po icy making role;
I view the as one who presents objective intelligence to the NSC and to the
President.
Question. Can you conceive of any r?equirement for, the CIA to engage in any
domestic surveillance?
Answer. believe that any such activity required should be conducted by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation or other appropriate law enforcement
bodies. ? ?
, Question. Mr. Ambassador, as one who would report directly to the Pros!-
dent, would you be inclined to acce t instructions from s me agent f th P ?es-
tient StITM. a-5 11rd soiituirior or ossioty or a .e.
Answer. As DCI, I am res onsible to tile nd will take his instruc-
tions in what er mann e i iii.iinnT to communicate them to me. Cer-
tainly, on most rou me, ay- 0-day matters, instructions will come through an
agent of the PreMrer. However, the President has promised -me direct acces4.
famill not abuse this access, but I certainly will use it If ever have questions
about the propriety of any instruction and to see that the views of the intelli-
gence community are properly presented to the President himself.
Question. 'What do you envision as the chief problems of your position in view
of the recent wide exposure of the CIA's respormuraties find activities?
Answer. While- the current Congressional hearings have been a necessary and
helpful evaluation in improving the management and oversight of the intelligence
community, they have inevitably raised questions abroad about theinterltv and
relialaLz of the Unitde States and, in addition, there are morale pr eras within
nrilif-ETItgence community. I think it is imperative that the country backs
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.the legitimate activities of the CIA. Management and control of the Agency itself
could present major problems at the outset. I will take seriously the Director's
responsibility "for protecting Intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure" and likewise working out a proper relationship with Congress 's
important. All of the problems are important?none appear to be insoluble. -
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Syming,rton ?
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman..
Mr. Auibassador. It is an impressive Statement you have made. Based
.on the remarks made already, it would appear as if you were already
confirmed. But I would ask. a couple of questions, and make kfew.
comments.
First, I believe a strong economy and a sound dollar is just as im7
portant to true national security as anything else. Without, an economy
that is viable, this country could not preserve its system. You would
agree, would you not? ?
Mr. Bum. Yes, sir.
Senator SymixoTox. I thought so, based on your record and yOur ex-
tensive experience. I do not know of any man your age who has had
more. Now, much of the criticism of the CIA, it is clear to me, is the
fault of Congress, not just the CIA. This committee's Subcommittee on
Central Intelligence has never really looked into the CIA, which it
should, if it wants to assume the obligation. .? ? -
As perhaps the greatest industrialist I knew once said: "If a man
thinks he is being watched, it is about as good as watching him." The
Central Intelligence Agency has known for many years that., in effect,
it was not really being watched. -
I hope you will do in this job what was clone by law with respect. to
the. Atomic Energy Act,. It was difficult to get .any real interest in this
committee, for a long time, in the. development of nuclear weapons,
and difficult in the Foreign Relations Committee to get any real knowl-
edge of the great and growing impact of nuclear weapons. It was like
trying to pull teeth.
So I went on the Joint Atomic Energy Committee because under the
law it is the obligation of the, Atomic Energy Committee to keep the
congressional committee fully informed of all developments. There
I found out more about atomic weapons in a few weeks than in time
previous 20 years, even though I served more than 20 years on this
committee. The Backfire bomber and even More the Cruise missile- are
probably the, two most important new items .under discussion from
the standpoint of the future of your children .and my grandchildren
and an independent civilian analysis of these from the CIA could -
not be. more important.
I would hope you would agree that even if net questioned, that you
would come before this committee and volunteer anything that you
thought was wrong in. the way of foreign situations or developments,
your own thinking abut what would be best: for the country. Would
you do that?
, . . .
Mr. Busn. Senator Symington, I hope that I?I know that my ex-
perience in Congress has taught me great respect for it, and I am con-
fident that I could cooperate fully with the proper oversight com-
mittees in that regard. And I would.
-Senator SYMINGTON. That is not a direct answer, but I would.
hope?
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NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947,
as amended 1 Ahtic figto
2.-3 41.5 3tio
[61 Stat, 495, P.L. 80-253, July 26, 1947, 50 U.S.
63 Stat. 578, P.L. 81-216, August 10, 1949;
65 Stat. 373, P.L. 82-165, October 10, 1951;
67 Stat. 19, P.L. 83-15, April 4, 1953;
68 Stat. 1226, P.L. 83-779, September 3, 1954;
70A Stat. 679, P.L. 84-1028, August 10, 1956]
50 U.S.C.A. 402 [?101 of Nat. Sec. Act]. National Security Council.
(a) Establishment; presiding officer; functions; composition.
There is established a council to be known as the National
Security Council (herinafter in this section referred to as the
"Council") .2
The President of the United States shall preside over meetings
of the Council: Provided, That in his absence he may designate a
member of the Council to preside in his place.3
The function of the Council shall be to advise the President
with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military
policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military
services and the other departments and agencies of the Govern-
ment to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national
security.
The Council shall be composed of?
( 1) the President;
( 2) the Vice President;4
(3) the Secretary of State;
(4) the Secretary of Defense;
(5) .;5
(6) . . .;? and
1
'December 1976
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(7) The Secretaries and Under Secretaries of other executive
departments and of the military departments,/ . . ,8 when ap-
pointed by the President by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, to serve at his pleasure.
Additional functions
(b) In addition to performing such other functions as the Presi-
dent may direct,9 for the purpose of more effectively coordinating
the policies and functions of the departments and agencies of the
Government relating to the national security, it shall, sul2ket to the
direction of the President, be the duty of the Counciliu ? par
(1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks
of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military
power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making
recommendations to the President in connection therewith; and
(2) to consider policies on matters of common interest to the
departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the
national security, and to make recommendations to the President
in connection therewith.
Executive secretary; appointment and compensation:
staff employees
(c) The Council shall have a staff to be headed by a civilian
executive secretary who shall be appointed by the President." The
executive secretary, subject to the direction of the Council, is au-
thorized, subject to the civil-service laws and the Classification Act
of 1949, to appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as
may be necessary to perform such duties as may be prescribed by
the Council in connection with the performance of its functions.
Recommendations and reports
(d) The Council shall, from time to time, make such recom-
mendations, and such other reports to the President as it deems
appropriate or as the President may require.
50 U.S.C.A. 403 [?IO2 of Nat. Sec. Act]. Central Intelligence
Agency?Establishment; Director; appointment.
( a) There is established under the National Security Council a
Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central Intelligence
2
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Name
ftwo,
who shall be the head thereotOand with a Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence 13 who shall act for, and exercise the powers
of, the Director during his absence or disability.I4 The Director 15
111 and the Deputy Director 1? shall be appointed by the President, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the
commissioned officers of the armed services, whether in an active
or retired status, or from among individuals in civilian life: Pro-
vided, however, That at no time shall the two positions of the
Director and Deputy Director be occupied simultaneously by com-
missioned officers of the armed services, whether in an active or
? retired status.I7
Commissioned officer as Director or Deputy Director; powers and
limitations, effect on commissioned status
. (b) (1) If a commissioned officer of the armed services is ap-
pointed as Director, or Deputy Director, then?
( A ) in the performance of his duties as Director, or Deputy
Director, he shall be subject to no supervision, control, restriction,
or prohibition (military or otherwise) other than would be operative
with respect to him if he were a civilian in no way connected with
the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the
111 Department of the Air Force, or the armed services or Any corn- -
ponent thereof; and
( B ) he shall not possess or exercise any supervision, control,
111 powers, or functions ( other than such as he possesses, or is autho-
rized or directed to exercise, as Director, or Deputy Director) with
respect to the armed services or any component thereof, the De-
partment Of the Army, the Department of the Navy, or the Depart-
ment of the Air Force, or any branch, bureau, unit, or division
thereof, or with respect to any of the personnel (military or civilian)
of any of the foregoing.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subsection, the
appointment to the office of Director, or Deputy Director, of a corn-
' missioned officer of the armed services, and his acceptance of and
service in such office, shall in no way affect any status, office, rank,
or grade he may occupy or hold in the armed services, or any
emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or
arising out of any such status, office, rank, or grade. Any such
December 1976
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commissioned officer shall, while serving in the office of Director,
or Deputy Director, continue to hold rank and grade not lower
than that in winch serving at the time of his appointment and to
receive the military pay and allowances ( active or retired, as the
case may be, including personal money allowance) payable to a
commissioned officer of his grade and length of service for which
the appropriate department shall be reimbursed from any funds
available to defray the expenses of the Central Intelligence Agency.
He also shall be paid by the Central Intelligence Agency from such
funds an annual compensation at a rate equal to the amount by
which the compensation established for such position exceeds the
amount of his annual military pay and allowances."
(3) The rank or grade of any such commissioned officer shall,
during the period in which such commissioned officer occupies the
office of Director of Central Intelligence, or Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence, be in addition to the numbers and percentages
otherwise authorized and appropriated for the armed service of
which be is a member."
Termination of employment of officers and employees;
effect on right of subsequent employment
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 652 [now ? 7501] 20
of Title 5, or the provisions of any other law, 21 the Director Of
Central Intelligence may, in his discretion, terminate the employ-
ment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he shall
deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of
the United States,22 but such termination shall not affect the right
of such officer or employee to seek or accept employment in any
other department or agency of the Government if declared eligible
for such employment by the United States Civil Service Commission.
Powers and duties
(d) For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities
of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest
of national security, it shall be the duty of the *Arai= under the
direction of the National Security Council-23
(1-) to advise the National Security Council in matters concern-
ing such intelligence activities of the Government departments and
agencies as relate to national security;
4
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(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council
for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the depart-
ments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national
security;
(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national
security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such
intelligence within the Government using where appropriate exist-
ing agencies and facilities; Provided, That the Agency shall have
no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers,21 or internal-security
functions: Provided, further, That the departments and other agen-
cies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate,
and disseminate departmental intelligence: And provided further,
That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for
protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure;
(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agen-
cies, such additional services of common concern as the National
Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished
centrally;
(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelli-
gence affecting the national security as the National Security
Council may from time to time direct.
Inspection of intelligence of other departments
(e) To the extent recommended by the National Security Coun-
cil and approved by the President, such intelligence of the depart-
ments and agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter pro-
vided, relating to the national security shall be open to the inspec-
tion of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence
as relates to the national security and is possessed by such depart-
ments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter
provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intel-
ligence for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination: Provided,
however, That upon the written request of the Director of Central
Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such
information for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination as may
be essential to the national security.
5
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Termination of National Intelligence Authority; transfer of
personnel, property, records, and unexpended funds
( f ) Effective when the Director first appointed under subsection
(a) of this section has taken office?
( 1 ) the National Intelligence Authority (11 Fed. Reg. 1337, 1339,
February 5, 1946)25 shall cease to exist;" and
(2) the personnel, property, and records of the Central Intelli-
gence Group are transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency,
and such Group shall cease to exist.27 Any unexpended balances of
appropriations, allocations, or other funds available or authorized
to be made available for such Group shall be available and shall
be authorized to be made available in like manner for expenditure
by the Agency.
50 U.S.C.A. 405[f 303 of Nat. Sec. Act]. Advisory Committees; ap-
pointment; compensation of part-time personnel; applicability
of other laws.
( a) The ... ,28 Director of Central Intelligence, and the National
Security Council," acting through its Executive Secretary, are au-
thorized to appoint such advisory committees and to employ, con-
sistent with other provisions of this Act, such part-time advisory
personnel as they may deem necessary in carrying out their respec-
tive functions and the functions of agencies under their control.
Persons holding other offices or positions under the United States
for which they receive compensation, while serving as members
of such committees, shall receive no additional compensation for
such service. Other members of such committees and other part-
time advisory personnel so employed may serve without compensa-
tion or may receive compensation at a rate not to exceed $50 30 for
each day of service, as determined by the appointing authority.
(b) Service of an individual as a member of any such advisory
committee, or in any other part-time capacity for a department or
agency hereunder, shall not be considered as service bringing such
individual within the provisions of sections 281 [now 203], 283
[now 205], or 284 [now 207] of Title 18," unless the act of such
individual, which by such sections is made unlawful when performed
by an individual referred to in such section, is with respect to any
particular matter which directly involves a department or agency
6
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which such person is advising or in which such department or
agency is directly interested.
? 310 [of Nat. See. Act]."?Effective Date.
( a) The first sentence of section 202( a) and sections 1, 2, 307,
309, and 310 shall take effect immediately upon the enactment of
this Act.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (a), the provisions of this
Act shall take effect on whichever of the following days is the
earlier: The day after the day upon which the Secretary of Defense
first appointed takes office, or the sixtieth day after the date of
the enactment of this Act."
1 Legislative history materials include:
Sen. Rep. No. 80-239 (Committee on Armed Services), June 5, 1947;
H.R. Rep. No. 80-961 (Committee on Armed Services), July 16, 1947;
li.R. Rep. No. 80-1051 (Conference Report), July 24, 1947.
2 The National Security Council, together with its "functions, records,
property, personnel, and unexpended balances of appropriations, alloca-
tions, and other funds (available or to be made available)," was trans-
ferred to the Executive Office of the President by Reorganization Plan
No. 4 of 1949 (63 Stat. 1067, 5 U.S.C.A., App., p. 222).
3 Historically, the Director of Central Intellig,nce has attended Council
meetings and serves as the Council's intelligence advisor. Subsection
3(d)(1) of Executive Order 11905 (41 F.R. 7703, February 19, 1976) pro-
vides that the Director "shall be responsible directly to the National
Security Council and the President" and is to act "as the President's pri-
mary advisor on foreign intelligence."
4 The Council, as composed by the Act of 1947, did not include the
Vice President. The Vice President was designated a member by the
National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (P.L. 81-216).
5 The omitted words are "the Director of Mutual Security," a position
which did not exist when the Act was enacted in 1947. The position was
established, and its incumbent made a member of the Council, under the
7
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provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (P.L. 82-165). The office
of the Director for Mutual Security was abolished and the functions of the
Director as a member of the Council transferred to the Director of the
Foreign Operations Administration by Reorganization Plan No. 7 of the
1953 (67 Stat. 639). The office of the Director of the Foreign Operations
Administration and the membership of the Director on the National
Security Council were abolished by Executive Order 10610 (3 CFR, 1954-
1958 Comp., p. 250).
The omitted words are "the Chairman of the National Security Re-
sources Board;" the Chairman was a member of the Council under the
provisions of the 1947 Act. The functions of the Chairman as a member
of the Council were transferred to the Director of the Office of Defense
Mobilization by Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1953 (67 Stat. 634,
5 U.S.C.A., App., p. 295). The Office of Defense Mobilization was con-
solidated into the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization by Re-
organization Plan No. 1 of 1958 (72 Stat. 1799, 5 U.S.C.A., App., p. 336),
and redesignated the "Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization" by P.L.
85-763 (72 Stat. 861, August 26, 1958), as the "Office of Emergency
Planning" by P.L. 87-296 (75 Stat. 630, September 22, 1961), and as the
"Office of Emergency Preparedness" by P.L. 90-608 (82 Stat. 1190,
October 21, 1968). The Office of Emergency Preparedness, and the office
of Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, as well as the func-'
tions of the Director "with respect to being a member of the National
Security Council," were abolished by Reorganization Plan No. 1 of the
1973 (5 U.S.C.A., App., p. 73).
7 The Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force also were members,
under the 1947 Act. Their memberships were abolished by the National
Security Act Amendments of 1949 (P.L. 81-216).
8 The omitted words are "the Chairman of the Munitions Board and the
Chairman of the Research and Development Board." Under the 1947 Act,
the President was authorized to designate those Chairmen, and certain
other officials, as members of the Council, "but no such additional member
shall be designated until the advice and consent of the Senate has been
given to his appointment to the office the holding of which authorizes his
designation as a member of the Council." Both of these offices were
abolished and the functions of both Boards transferred to the Secretary
December 1976
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8
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of Defense, by Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953 (67 Stat. 638, 5
U.S.C.A., App., p. 304). The 1947 Act also authorized the designation of
"the Secretaries of the executive departments," subject to the same Senate
confirmation requirements. That provision was amended to the current
language by the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (P.L. 81-216).
!IL
P*.
9 Functions assigned to the Council by Executive Order include:
a. Certain functions with respect to the National Security Medal
(E.O. 10431 (1953), Guide, p. 61);
b. Certain monitoring and other functions with respect to the
executive branch program of security standards for government em-
ployment and for access to classified information (E.O. 10450 (1953),
Guide, p. 161);
c. Certain functions with respect to maintaining channels of com-
munication with former Presidents (E.O. 11456 (1969), Guide, p. 175);
d. Certain supervisory and other functions with respect to the
classification and protection of national security information (E.O.
11652 (1972)); and
e. Certain authorizing, supervisory and other functions with re-
spect to United States foreign intelligence activities (E.O. 11905
(1976)).
n addition to the duties and functions of the Council prescribed by
subsections 402(a) and (b), see also subsections 402(d) and 403(d) and
(e). Executive Order 11905 assigns additional functions to the National
Security Council, principally to "provide guidance and direction to the
development and formulation of national intelligence activities" and to
"conduct a semi-annual review of intelligence policies and of ongoing
special activities in support of national Foreign policy objectives" (sub-
section 3(a)).
11 In the 1947 Act the following language was included at the end of
the sentence: "and who shall receive compensation at the rate of $10,000
a year." That language is omitted from section 402 of Title 50 of the
Code "since the position referred to is now in the classified civil service
and subject to the applicable compensation schedules." (See Codification
Note following subsection 402(d) of Title 50.) Under P.L. 90-222 (81 Stat.
December 1976
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1
726, 3 U.S.C.A. 105) the President is authorized to fix the compensation
of the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council at a rate "of
compensation not to exceed that of level II of the Federal Executive Salary
Schedule." For the rate set for level II see Federal Executive Salary Act
of 1964 at page 173 of the Guide.
Ohe Director is also the "President's primary advisor on foreign intel-
ligence" (subsection 3(d) of Executive Order 11905), with interagency
authorities and responsibilities prescribed primarily by subsections 102(d)
and (e) of the National Security Act and by Executive Order 11905.
" The Act of 1947 did not include the position of Deputy Director and
for several years there was no "provision of law establishing a Deputy
Director with statutory authority to act for the Director or to perform
such functions as the Director may assign to him" (H.R. Rep. No. 83-219,
March 30, 1953). The existence of the position was given statutory recog-
nition by the enactment of the Executive Pay Act of 1949 (63 Stat. 880,
P.L. 81-359, October 15, 1949), which prescribed compensation for the
position. The position of Deputy Director was created by an amendment
of 1953 to subsection 102(a) (67 Stat. 19, P.L. 82-15, April 4, 1953),
thereby enhancing the authority and standing of the position and its
incumbent. The statute also served to put to rest any contention that the
statutory acknowledgement of the position in the Executive Pay Act of
1949 converted the position to an appointive office to which a commis-
sioned officer could not be appointed in view of the statutory prohibitions
against the appointment of such officers to appointive offices (now 10
U.S.C.A. 973). The 1953 amendment also amended subsection 102(b) to
render that subsection applicable to the Deputy Director, as well as to the
Director.
14 In addition to the authority to "act for, and exercise the powers of
the Director during his absence or disability," it is considered "inherent
in the statutory position of the Deputy Director that the holder will assist
the Director in the performance of his duties, including those vested by
law in the Director" (41 Comp. Gen. 429 (1962), Guide, p. 209). The
President has directed that the Director "shall, to the extent consistent with
his statutory responsibilities, delegate the day-to-day operation of the
Central Intelligence Agency to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence"
(Executive Order 11905, subsection 3(d)(3)).
10
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fl
r,
15 The following men have been appointed Director under the authority
of the Act, and served in that capacity for the periods indicated:
Rear Admiral Roscoe Henry Hillenkoeter, USN
September 26, 1947-October 7, 1950 '
Lieutenant General (later General) Walter Bedell Smith, USA
October 7, 1950-February 9, 1953
Allen Welsh Dulles
February 26, 1953-November 19, 1961
John Alex McCone
November 19, 1961-April 28, 1965
Vice Admiral William Francis Raborn, Jr., USN (Retired)
April 28, 1965-June 30, 1966
Richard Helms
June 30, 1966-February 2, 1973
James R. Schlesinger
February 2, 1973-July 2, 1973
William E. Colby
September 4, 1973-January 30, 1976
George Bush
January 30, 1976-
Admiral Hillenkoetter took office on September 26, 1947, under a recess
appointment. He was nominated by the President on November 24 and
confirmed by the Senate on December 8, 1947. Admiral Hillenkoetter also
had been appointed Director of Central Intelligence, and had served in
that capacity from May 1, 1947, to September 26, 1947, under the au-
thority of the President's Directive of January 22, 1946 (footnote 24),
which established that Office, as well as the National Intelligence Au-
thority and the Central Intelligence Group. Mr. Dulles also served as
Acting Director from February 9 to February 26, 1953.
16 The following men have been appointed Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence under the authority of section 102(a) of the Act, as amended,
and served in that capacity for the periods indicated:
Lieutenant General (later General) Charles Pearre CabeII, USAF
April 23, 1953-January 31, 1962
Lieutenant General Marshall Sylvester Carter, USA
April 3, 1962-April 28, 1965
Richard Helms
April 28, 1965-June 30, 1966
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Vice Admiral Rufus Lackland Taylor, USN
October 13, 1966-January 31, 1969
Lieutenant General Robert Everton Cushman, Jr., USMC
May 7, 1969-December 31, 1971
General Vernon A. Walters
May 2, 1972-July 2, 1976
E. Henry Knoche
July 2, 1976-
Also appointed and serving as Deputy Director under the Act during the
period when that office was not a position established by statute (Sep-
tember 18, 1947, to April 4, 1953) were:
Brigadier General Edwin Kennedy Wright, USA
September 26, 1947-March 9, 1949
William Harding Jackson
October 7, 1950-August 3, 1951
Allen Welsh Dulles
August 23, 1951-February 26, 1953.
17 The proviso was added to the subsection by the 1953 amendment
which created the position of Deputy Director (P.L. 83-15).
18 See Footnotes 2 and 3 to the Federal Executive Pay Act of 1964
(Guide, p. 173) as to the rates of "compensation established for" the
positrons of Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
1" Paragraph 3 was added to the subsection by the 1953 amendment
which created the position of Deputy Director (P.L. 83-15). Existing law
(now 10 U.S.C.A. 3202, 5231, 8202) imposed restrictions on the total num-
ber of general and flag officers allowed for active duty.
20 Section 7501 authorizes the removal or suspension of any individual
in the competitive service "only for such causes as will promote the
efficiency of the service," and prescribes procedures for such actions.
Since CIA employers are excluded from the competitive service by the
CIA Act of 1949, the enactment of that statute, in 1949, subsequent to the
enactment of the National Security Act, in effect obsolesced the reference
to section 7501.
12
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21 A 1942 decision of the Comptroller General interpreted the term
"notwithstanding the provisions of any other law" as used in another
national defense statute (the Lend-Lease statute of 1941). It was held
that Congress "intended that only those laws should be suspended,
waived, or disregarded whose provisions otherwise might prohibit or un-
duly interfere with the carrying out of the purpose intended to be ac-
complished by" the Lend-Lease act (22 Comp. Gen. 400). But see Philippi
v. Central Intelligence Agency (U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, No. 76-1004, November 16, 1976), a case brought under the
Freedom of Information Act, in which a dissenting judge was of the opinion
that section 6 of the CIA Act exempting this Agency from the provisions
of any other law requiring disclosure means "the entire law."
A somewhat different problem was involved in a decision of a Federal
District court in 1947. Certain war powers statutes conferred authority
to control commodities, and established both civil liabilities and criminal
penalties. A subsequent statute, the Sugar Control Act of 1947, provided
for the control of sugar and provided also that there would be no civil
liability or criminal penalty for violations of that Act. The Act also pre-
scribed that the earlier war powers statutes were to continue in effect
"notwithstanding any other provision of law." The court held that the
suspension of sugar allocations, pursuant to the earlier war powers
statutes, was neither a civil liability nor a criminal penalty and was re-
tained by the 1947 Sugar Control Act.
22 A similar, but not identical, authority to terminate the employment
of National Security Agency personnel is provided by subsection 833(a)
of Title 50:
(a) Notwithstanding section 863 [now 3315(b), 7701, 7512(a)(b)]
of Title 5, section 22-1 [now 3571, 5594, 7312, 7501(c), 7512(c),
7532] of Title 5, or any other provision of law, the Secretary [of
Defense] may terminate the employment of any officer or employee
of the Agency whenever he considers that action to be in the interest
of the United States, and he determines that the procedures pre-
scribed in other provisions of law that authorize the termination of
the employment of that officer or employee cannot be invoked con-
sistently with the national security. Such a determination is final.
In addition, subsection 833(c), authorizes the delegation of the authority
vested in the Secretary by subsection 833(a), but only to "the Deputy
Secretaries of Defense and the Director of the National Security Agency."
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23 This section is implemented from time to time by the issuance of
National Security Council Intelligence Directives. Other authorities and
responsibilities are conferred on the Agency and the Director of Central
Intelligence by other statutes and executive orders (Footnote 9), primarily
by Executive Order 11905. See also 42 U.S.C.A. 2162, at page 165 of
the Guide, authorizing certain joint action by the Director and the Ad-
ministrator of the Energy Research and Development Administration with
respect to Restricted Data, in implementation of subsection 403(d).
24 See also section 508 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, as amended, prohibiting the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration from using the services, equipment, personnel and facilities
of the Agency (Guide, p. 185). In addition, section 5 of Executive Order
11905 imposes certain restrictions on the activities of the Agency and
other intelligence agencies.
25 The Federal Register citation is to the President's Directive of January
22, 1946 (3 CFR, 1943-1948 Comp., p. 1080), establishing the National
Intelligence Authority and the Central Intelligence Group. That Directive
has striking similarities to subsections 403(d) and (e):
PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE OF
JANUARY 22, 1946
Coordination of Federal Foreign Intelligence Activities
The White House,
Washington, January 22, 1946.
To the Secretary of State, The Secretary of War, and The Secretary
of the Navy.
1. It is my desire, and I hereby direct, that all Federal foreign intelli-
gence activities be planned, developed and coordinated so as to assure
the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to
the national security. I hereby designate you, together with another person
to be named by me as my personal representative, as the National Intel-
ligence Authority to accomplish this purpose.
2. Within the limits of available appropriations, you shall each from
time to time assign persons and facilities from your respective Depart-
ments, which persons shall collectively form a Central Intelligence Group
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and shall, under the direction of a Director of Central Inteligence, assist
the National Intelligence Authority. The Director of Central Intelligence
shall be designated by me, shall be responsible to the National Intelli-
gence Authority, and shall sit as a non-voting member thereof.
3. Subject to the existing law, and to the direction and control of the
National Intelligence Authority, the Director of Central Intelligence shall:
a. Accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating
to the national security, and the appropriate dissemination within the
Government of the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence. In
so doing, full use shall be made of the staff and facilities of the intelli-
gence agencies of your Departments.
b. Plan for the coordination of such of the activities of the intelligence
agencies of your Departments as relate to the national security and recom-
mend to the National Intelligence Authority the establishment of such
overall policies and objectives as will assure the most effective accomplish-
ment of the national intelligence mission.
c. Perform, for the benefit of said intelligence agencies, such services
of common concern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can
be more efficiently accomplished centrally.
d. Perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence
affecting the national security as the President and the National Intelli-
gence Authority may from time to time direct.
4. No police, law enforcement or internal security functions shall be
exercised under this directive.
5. Such intelligence received by the intelligence agencies of your
Departments as may be designated by the National Intelligence Authority
shall be freely available to the Director of Central Intelligence for cor-
relation, evaluation or dissemination. To the extent approved by the
National Intelligence Authority, the operations of said intelligence agen-
cies shall be open to inspection by the Director of Central Intelligence in
connection with planning functions.
6. The existing intelligence agencies of your Departments shall con-
tinue to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental intel-
ligence.
7. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be advised by an Intelli-
gence Advisory Board consisting of the heads (or their representatives)
of the principal military and civilian intelligence agencies of the Govern-
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ment having functions related to national security, as determined by the
National Intelligence Authority.
8. Within the scope of existing law and Presidential directives, other
departments and agencies of the executive branch of the Federal Govern-
ment shall furnish such intelligence information relating to the national
security as is in their possession, and as the Director of Central Intelligence
may from time to time request pursuant to regulations of the National
Intelligence Authority.
9. Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize the making of
investigations inside the continental limits of the United States and its
possessions, except as provided by law and Presidential directives.
10. In the conduct of their activities the National Intelligence Authority
and the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for fully
protecting intelligence sources and methods.
Sincerely yours,
HARRY S. TRUMAN
26 The first Director appointed under subsection 402(a) took office as
of September 26, 1947, and the National Intelligence Authority therefore
ceased to exist as of that date.
27 The first Director appointed under subsection 402(a) took office as
of September 26, 1947. As prescribed by subsection 403(f), the CIG
therefore ceased to exist, and its personnel, property and records trans-
ferred to CIA, as of that date. The Office of Strategic Services, a military
unit during World War II generally considered a forebear of CIA, was
not in fact a legal predecessor to CIA. OSS was created by a Military
Order of June 13, 1942 (3 CFR, 1938-1943, Comp. p. 1308):
MILITARY ORDER OF JUNE 13, 1942
Office of Strategic Services
By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United
States and as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, it is ordered as follows:
1. The office of Coordinator of Information established by Order of
July 11, 1941, exclusive of the foreign information activities transferred
16
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Nisie
Ito the Office of War Information by Executive Order of June 13, 1942,
shall hereafter be known as the Office of Strategic Services, and is hereby
transferred to the jurisdiction of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2. The Office of Strategic Services shall perform the following duties:
a. Collect and analyze such strategic information as may be required
by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.
b. Plan and operate such special services as may be directed by the
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.
1
3. At the head of the Office of Strategic Services shall be a Director
of Strategic Services who shall be appointed by the President and who
shall perform his duties under the direction and supervision of the United
States Joint Chiefs of Staff.
4. William J. Donovan is hereby appointed as Director of Strategic
Services.
5. The Order of July 11, 1941 is hereby revoked.
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
Commander-in-Chief
THE. WHITE HOUSE,
June 13, 1942.
OSS was terminated as of October 1, 1945, by Executive Order 9621
(3 CFR, 1943-1948 Comp., p. 431), and its functions, personnel, property,
records and funds transferred to the State and War (now Army) Depart-
ments. The Order permitted the termination or discontinuance of trans-
ferred functions and directed that all affairs relating to discontinued ac-
tivities be wound up. By memoranda of 26 and 27 September 1945,
Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy and Secretary of War Robert
B. Peterson created the Strategic Services Unit, with Brigadier General
John Magruder as its head, to "exercise, administer and operate (with
power of delegation and successive redelegation where appropriate) the
functions, personnel, records and property which have been or will be
transferred to the War Department and the Secretary of War under"
Executive Order 9621.
28 The omitted words are "Director of the Office of Emergency Prepared-
ness." That Office was abolished by Reorganization Plan Na. 1 of 1973
(5 U.S.C.A. App.,) p. 73).
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2" The subsection, as enacted in 1947, did not apply to the National 1
Security Council. The Council was included in the subsection by the
National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (P.L. 81-216).
As enacted in 1947, the subsection conferred authority also on the
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the National Security Resources
Board. The subsection was repealed in 1956, as to the Secretary of
Defense, by P.L. 80-1028 (70A Stat. 641), but that statute conferred
similar authority on the Secretary (10 U.S.C.A. 173). See Footnote 6 as to
the abolition of the National Security Resources Board.
" The 1947 Act authorized compensation "not to exceed $35." The
amount was increased to $50 by the National Security Act Amendments
of 1949 (P.L. 81-216).
' Section 203 prohibits bribes and similar activities and sections 205
and 207 prohibit activities by government employees and former em-
ployees which are inconsistent with their duties as government employees.
By regulation, the Civil Service Commission requires employees of the
government, including officers and employees "retained, designated, ap-
pointed or employed to perform with or without compensation, but not to
exceed 130 days during any period of 365 consecutive days, temporary
duties either on a full time or intermittent basis," to submit statements of
employment and financial interests. But such employees are exempt from
the reporting requirement if they are specialists "appointed for inter-
mittent confidential intelligence consultation of brief duration" (5 CFR
735.412).
32 With the exception of section 310, the provisions of the National
Security Act set out in the Guide are the provisions as codified in Title 50
of the United States Code, specifically sections 402, 403, and 405 of
Title 50. Section 310 of the Act is not codified and therefore is quoted
from the Act.
33 Sections 402, 403 and 405 of Title 50 of the Code became effective
under subsection (b) of section 310, as did those provisions of the Act
which established the National Military Establishment (redesignated the
"Department of Defense" by the National Security Act Amendments of
1949), the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of the
18
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t
I
Pool
Oat
Air Force and redesignated the War Department as the "Department of
the Army." The National Security Act was enacted July 26, 1947, and
James V. Forrestal took office as the first Secretary of Defense on
September 17, 1947. The effective date of those provisions therefore
was September 18, 1947, and the Central Intelligence Agency was
established as of that date.
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OEM.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949,
as amended
(63 Stat. 208, P.L. 81-110, June 20, 1949;1
64 Stat. 450, P.L. 81-697, August 16, 1950;
65 Stat. 89, P.L. 82-53, June 26, 1951;
68 Stat. 1105, P.L. 83-763, September 1, 1954;
72 Stat. 327, Pl. 85-507, July 7, 1958;
74 Stat. 792, P.L. 86-707, September 6, 1960;
78 Stat. 484, P.L. 88-448, August 19, 1964)
AN ACT
To provide for the administration of the Central Intelligence Agency,
established pursuant to section 102, National Security Act of 1947, and for
other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,
DEFINITIONS
SECTION 1. When used in sections 403b-403j of this title,2 the
term-
(a) "Agency" means the Central Intelligence Agency;
(b) "Director" means the Director of Central Intelligence;
(c) "Government agency" means any executive department, com-
mission, council, independent establishment, corporation wholly
or partly owned by the United States which is an instrumentality of
the United States, board, bureau, division, service, office, officer,
authority, administration, or other establishment, in the executive
branch of the Government.?
SEAL OF OFFICE
SEC. 2. The Director of Central Intelligence shall cause a
seal of office to be made for the Central Intelligence Agency, of
such design as the President shall approve,4 and judicial notice
shall be taken thereof.
PROCUREMENT AUTHORITIES
SEC. 3. (a) In the performance of its functions the Central
Intelligence Agency is authorized to exercise the authorities con-
tained in sections [2(c)(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (10), (12),
(15), (17),5 and sections 3, 4, 5, 6, and 10 ? of the Armed Services
September 1970
31
50
U4. S0.3Ca. .
50
U.S.C.A.
403b.
+.1
50
U.S.0 A.
403c.
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4.or
Approved FcribRelease 2004/03/15 : CIA-RDP80M001Noe65A002500100003-4
Procurement Act of 1947 (Public Law 413, Eightieth Congress,
second session)
( b) In the exercise of the authorities granted in subsection ( a)
of this section, the term "Agency head" shall mean the Director,
the Deputy Director, or the Executive of the Agency.8
(c) The determinations and decisions provided in subsection
(a) of this section to be made by the Agency head' may be made
with. respect to individual purchases and contracts or with respect
to classes of purchases or contracts, and shall be final. Except as
provided in subsection ( d) of this section, the Agency head is
authorized to delegate his powers provided in this section, in-
cluding the making of such determinations and decisions, in his
discretion and subject to his direction, to any other officer or
officers or officials of the Agency.'
(d) The power of the Agency head to make the determinations or
decisions specified in [paragraphs (12) and (15) of section 2 (c) and
section 5 (a) of the Armed Services Procurement Act of 19471" shall
not be delegable. Each determination or decision required by [para-
graphs (12) and (15) of section 2 (c), by section 4 or by .section 5 (a)
of the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947]," shall be based
upon written findings made by the official making such determina-
tions, which findings shall be final and shall be available within
the Agency for a period of at least six years following the date of
the determination.
TRAVEL, ALLOWANCES, AND RELATED EXPENSES
SEC. 4.12 Under such regulations as the Director may prescribe,
50
U.S.C.A. the Agency, with respect to its officers and employees assigned to
403e.
duty stations 13 outside the several states of the United States of
America, excluding Alaska and Hawaii, but including the District of
Columbia,14
shall?
(1) (A) pay the travel " expenses of officers and employees of
the Agency, including expenses incurred while traveling pursuant
to authorized " home leave;
(B) pay the travel expenses of members of the family of an officer
or employee of the Agency when proceeding to or returning from
his post of duty; accompanying him on authorized home leave; or
otherwise traveling in accordance with authority granted pursuant
to the terms of sections 403a-403j 17 of this title or any other Act.;
(C) pay the cost of transporting the furniture and household and
personal effects of an officer or employee of the Agency to his suc-
cessive posts of -duty and, on the termination of his services, to his
32
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-
Approved For:&Meese 2004/03/15 : CIA-RDP80M0016V1002500100003-4
,
III= CM
?????
.C71
residence at time of appointment or to a point not more distant, or,
upon retirement, to the place where he will reside;
(D) pay the cost of packing and unpacking, transporting to and
from a place of storage, and storing the furniture and household
and personal .effects 18 of an officer or employee of the Agency,
when he is absent from his post of assignment under orders, or
when he is assigned to a post to which he cannot take or at which
he is unable to use such furniture and household and personal
effects, or when it is in the public interest or more economical to
authorize storage; but in no instance shall the weight or volume of
the. effects stored together with the weight or volume of the effects
transported exceed the maximum limitations fixed by regulations,19
when not otherwise fixed by law;2?
(E) pay the cost of packing and unpacking, transporting to and
from a place of storage, and storing the furniture and household
and personal effects of an officer or employee of the Agency in
connection with assignment or transfer to a new post, from the date
of his departure from his last post or from the date of his departure
from his place of residence in the case of a new officer or employee
and for not to exceed three months after arrival at the new post,
or until the establishment of residence quarters, whichever shall be
shorter; and in connection with separation of an officer or employee
of the Agency, the cost of packing and unpacking, transporting to
and from a place of storage, and storing for a period not to exceed
three months, his furniture and household and personal effects; but
in no instance shall the weight or volume of the effects stored to-
gether with the weight or volume of the effects transported ex-
ceed the maximum limitations fixed by regulations,2i when not
otherwise fixed by law;22
(F) pay the travel expenses and transportation costs incident to
the removal of the members of the family of an officer or employee
of the Agency and his furniture and household and personal effects,
including automobiles, from a post at which, because of the pre-v-
alence of disturbed conditions, there is imminent danger to life and
property, and the return of such persons, furniture, and effects to
such post upon the cessation of such conditions; or to such other
post as may in the meantime have become the post to which such
officer or employee has been assigned. .
(2) Charge expenses in connection with travel of personnel, their
dependents, and transportation of their household goods and per-
sonal effects, involving a change of permanent station, to the ap-
33
September 1970
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,
111111=111111=111C=11
'???'
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propriation for the fiscal year current when any part of either the
travel or transportation pertaining to the transfer begins pursuant
to previously issued travel and transfer orders, notwithstanding the
fact that such travel or transportation may not all be effected during
such fiscal year, or the travel and transfer orders may have been
issued during the prior fiscal year.
(3) (A) Order to any of the several States of the United States of
America (including the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States)
on leave of absence each officer or employee of the Agency who
was a resident of the United States ( as described above) at time of
employment, upon completion of two years' continuous service
abroad, or as soon as possible thereafter.23
(B) While in the United States (as described in paragraph (3)
(A) of this section) on leave, the service of any officer or employee
shall be available for work or duties in the Agency or elsewhere as
the Director may prescribe; and the time of such work or duty
shall not be counted as leave.24
(C) Where an officer or employee on leave returns to the United
States (as described in paragraph (3) (A) of this section), leave of
absence granted shall be exclusive of the time actually and neces-
sarily occupied in going to and from the United States (as so ?
described) and such time as may be necessarily occupied in awaiting
transportation.25
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, transport :
for or on behalf of an officer or employee of the Agency, a privately
owned motor vehicle in any case in which it shall be determined
that water, rail, or air transportation of the motor vehicle is neces-
sary or expedient for all or any part of the distance between points
of origin and destination, and pay the costs of such transportation.
Not more than one motor vehicle of any officer or employee of the
Agency may be transported under authority of this paragraph during
any four-year period, except that, as a replacement for such motor
vehicle, one additional motor vehicle of any such officer or em-
ployee may be so transported during such period upon approval,
in advance, by the Director and upon a determination, in advance,
by the ,Director that such replacement is necessary for reasons
beyond the control of the officer or employee and is in the interest
of the Government. After the expiration of a period of four years
following the date of transportation under authority of this para-
graph of a privately owned motor vehicle of any officer or employee
September 1970
34
11?1?Ns
??".
yr,
* A
? "7:r? sN?k-
9??!""H.4.,T,
t.,,c?-.7",??^'''''"''
"?,.. ? ?
Approved For Release 2004/03/15 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002500100003-4
Approved Foelease 2004/03/15 : CIA-RDP80M001*gA002500100003-4
?
who has remained in continuous service outside the several States
of the United States of America, excluding Alaska and FIawaii, but
including the District of Columbia, during such period, the trans-
portation of a replacement for such motor vehicle for such officer
or employee may be authorized by the Director in accordance with
this paragraph.2?
(5) (A) In the event of illness or injury requiring the hospitaliza-
tion of an officer or full time employee of the Agency, not the result
of vicious habits, intemperance, or misconduct on his part, incurred
while on assignment abroad, in a locality where there does not exist
a suitable hospital or clinic, pay the travel expenses of such officer
or employee by whatever means he shall deem appropriate and
without regard to the Standardized Government Travel Regulations
and section 73b [now section 5731 (a)] of Title 5,27 to the nearest
locality where a suitable hospital or clinic exists and on his recovery
pay for the travel expenses of his return to his post of duty. If the
officer or employee is too ill to travel unattended, the Director may
also pay the travel expenses of an attendant;
(B) Establish a first-aid station and provide for the services of a
nurse at a post at which, in his opinion, sufficient personnel is em-
ployed to warrant such a station: Provided, That, in his opinion, it
is not feasible to utilize an existing facility;
(C) In the event of illness or injury requiring hospitalization of
an officer or full time employee of the Agency, not the result of
vicious habits, intemperance, or misconduct on his pail, incurred
in the line of duty while, such person is assigned abroad, pay for
the cost of the treatment of such illness or injury at a suitable
hospital or clinic;
(D) Provide for the periodic physical examination of officers and
employees of the Agency and for the cost of administering inocula-
tions or vaccinations to such officers or employees.
(6) Pay the costs of preparing and transporting the remains of an
officer or employee of the Agency or a member of his family who
may die while in travel status or abroad, to his home or official
station, or to such other place as the Director may determine to be
the appropriate place of interment, provided that in no case shall
the expense payable be greater than the amount which would have
been payable had the destination been the home or official station.
( 7) Pay the costs of travel of new appointees and their depend-
ents, and the transportation of their household goods and personal
effects, from places of actual residence in foreign countries at time
September 1970
35
*r, k
7r? _
4
?
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1111M1011411111?1111=111110
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of appointment to places of employment and return to their actual
residences at the time of appointment or a point not more distant:
Provided, That such appointees agree in writing to remain with the
United States Government for a period of not less than twelve
months from the time of appointment.,
Violation of such agreement for personal convenience of an em-
ployee or because of separation for misconduct will bar such return
payments and, if determined by the Director or his designee to be
in the best interests of the United States, any money expended by
the United States on account of such travel and transportation shall
be considered as a debt due by the individual concerned to the
United States.28
'?!
GENERAL AUTHORITIES
SEC. 5. In the performance of its functions, the Central Intelli-
gence Agency is authorized to 29?
(a) Transfer to and receive from other Government agencies such u.s5.g.A0,
sums as may be approved by the Bureau of the Budget," for the 403f.
performance of any of the functions or activities authorized under
sections 403 and 405 of this title,34 and any other Government
agency is authorized to transfer to or receive from the Agency such
sums without regard to any provisions of law limiting or prohibiting
transfers between appropriations. Sums transferred to the Agency in
accordance with this paragraph may be expended for the purposes
and under the authority of sections 403a-403j of this title 82 without
regard to limitations of appropriations from which transferred;
(b) Exchange funds without regard to section 543 of Title 31;33
(c) Reimburse other Government agencies for services of per-
sonnel assigned to the Agency, and such other Government agencies
are authorized, without regard to provisions of law to the
contrary, so to assign or detail any officer or employee for duty
with the Agency;
(d) Authorize couriers and guards designated by the Director to
carry firearms when engaged in transportation of confidential docu-
ments and materials affecting the national defense and security;
(e) Make alterations, improvements, and repairs on premises
rented by the Agency, and pay rent therefor without regard to
limitations on expenditures contained in the Act of June 30, 1932,
as amended:34 Provided, That in each case the Director shall certify
that exception from such limitations is necessary to the successful
36
pillIONNINIONINIMINIMPOIN11.11
114
.41,-aalbohh.
Arl!t
September 1970
t 4
4111.011111111MOMINIMMIONIMMINNI
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1
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I performance of the Agency's functions or to the security of its
activities.36
50 SEC. 6. In the interests of the security of the foreign intelli-
I.S.C.A.
403g. gence activities of the United States and in order further to
implement the proviso of section 403(d)(3) of this title" that the
Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting
I Agency shall be exempted from the provisions of section 654 of
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, the
Title 5,37 and the provisions of any other law which require the
publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names;
I official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the
Agency: Provided, That in furtherance of this section, the Director
of the Bureau of the Budget shall make no reports to the Congress
Iin connection with the Agency under section 947(b) of Title 5.38
50 SEC. 7. Whenever the Director, the Attorney General, and
U.S.C.A.
403h. the Commissioner of Immigration shall determine that the entry
I is in the interest of national security or essential to the furtherance
of a particular alien into the United States for permanent residence
of the national intelligence mission, such alien and his immediate
I family shall be given entry into the United States for permanent
residence without regard to their inadmissibility under the immi-
gration or any other laws and regulations," or to the failure to
comply with such laws and regulations pertaining to admissibility:
I Provided, That the number of aliens and members of their imme-
diate families entering the United States under the authority of this
section shall in no case exceed one hundred persons in any one
ifiscal year."
I50
U.S C.A.
403j.
APPROPRIATIONS
SEC. 8. ( a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, sums
made available to the Agency by appropriation or otherwise may be
expended for purposes necessary to carry out its functions,41
including?
(1) personal services, including personal services without regard
to limitations on types of persons to be employed, and rent at the
seat of government and elsewhere; health-service programs as au-
thorized by section 150 [now section 7901] of Title 5;42 rental of
news-reporting. services; purchase or rental and operation of photo-
graphic, reproduction, cryptographic, duplication and printing ma-
chines, equipment and devices, and radio-receiving and radio-send-
September 1970
37
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Approved FcipRelease 2004/03/15 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002500100003-4
ing equipment and devices, including telegraph and teletype
equipment; purchase, maintenance, operation, repair, and hire of
passenger motor vehicles, and aircraft, and vessels of all kinds;
subject to policies established by the Director, transportation of
officers and employees of the Agency in Government-owned auto-
motive equipment between their domiciles and places of employ-
ment, where such personnel arc engaged in work which makes such
transportation necessary, and transportation in such equipment, to
and from school, of children of Agency personnel who have quarters
for themselves and their families at isolated stations outside the
continental United States where adequate public or private trans-
portation is not available; printing and binding; purchase, mainte-
nance, and cleaning of firearms, including purchase, storage, and
maintenance of ammunition; subject to policies established by the
Director, expenses of travel in connection with, and expenses inci-
dent to attendance at meetings of professional, technical, scientific,
and other similar organizations when such attendance would be
a benefit in the conduct of the work of the Agency; association and
library dues; payment of premiums or costs of surety bonds for
officers or employees without regard to the provisions of section 14
of Title 6;43 .payment of claims _pursuant to Title _23; acquisition of
necessary land and the clearing of such land; construction of build-
ings and facilities without regard to sections 259 and 267 of Title
40;44 repair, rental, operation, and maintenance of buildings, utili-
ties, 'facilities, and appurtenances; and
(2) supplies, equipment, and personnel and contractual services
otherwise authorized by law and regulations, when approved by the
Director."
(b) The sums made available to the Agency may be expended
without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to
the expenditure of Government funds;4? and for objects of a con-
fidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, such expenditures to
be accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director 47 and
every such certificate shall be deemed 4 sufficient voucher for the
amount therein certified."
SEPARABILITY OF PROVISIONS
SEC. 9." If any provision of this Act, or the application of
such provision to any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the
38
September 1970
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Approve4,For Release 2004/03/15 : CIA-RDP8010106165A002500100003-4
remainder of this Act or the application of such provision to persons
or circumstances other than those as to which it is held invalid, shall
not be affected thereby.
SHORT TITLE
SEC. 10. This Act may be cited as the "Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949."
Approved June 20, 1949.
39
September 1970
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Approved For Release 2004/03/15 : CIA-RDP80M00165A02500100003-4
Central Intelligence Agency Act Footnotes
Legislative history materials include:
H.R. Rep. No. 160, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., February 24, 1949; and
Sen. Rep. No. 106, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., March 10, 1949.
' These sections of Title 50 arc the Central Intelligence Agency Act.
The 1949 Act also included a section 1(d): " 'Continental United States'
means the States and the District of Columbia." It was repealed by section
511(a) of the Overseas Differentials and Allowances Act (74 Stat. 792,
P.L. 80-707, September 6, 1960). This repeal of the definition of "Con-
tinental United States" was accompanied by an amendment to the section
which now is section 4 concerning the geographical application of that section.
See Footnote 14. For a statement of the general background and purpose of
the Overseas Differentials and Allowances Act see Footnote 13.
'The Director has caused a seal of office to be made for the Central
Intelligence Agency and President Truman approved it by his issuance of
Executive Order 10111 (3 C.F.R., 1949-1953 Comp., p. 302, February 17,
1950):
Executive Order 10111
ESTABLISHING A SEAL FOR THE
.CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WHEREAS section 2 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949, approved June 20, 1949 (Public Law 110-81st Congress), pro-
vides, in part, that the Director of Central Intelligence shall cause a
seal of office to be made for the Central Intelligence Agency of such
design as the President shall approve; and
WHEREAS the Director of Central Intelligence has caused to be
made and has recommended that I approve a seal of office for the
Central Intelligence Agency the design of which accompanies and is
hereby made a part of this order, and which is described in heraldic
terms as follows:
SIIIELD: Argent, a compass rose of sixteen points gules. -
CREST: On a wreath argent and gulcs an American bald eagle's
head erased proper.
Below the shield on a gold color scroll the inscription "United States
of America" in red letters, and encircling the shield and crest at the
top the inscription "Central Intelligence Agency" in white letters.
All on a circular blue background with a narrow gold edge;
AND WHEREAS it appears that such seal is of suitable design and
is appropriate for establishment as the official seal of the Central
Intelligence Agency;
40
September 1970
1
1
1
1
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MIK
Nee
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(Footnote 4?Continued)
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of and pursuant to the authority
vested in me by the said section 2 of the Central Intelligence Agency
Act of 1949, I hereby approve such seal as the official seal of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
IIarry S. Truman
The White house,
February 17, 1950.
A facsimile of the seal appears below the President's signature on the
Executive Order, and is reproduced on the binder and the TITLE PAGE of
this manual.
' These subsections of the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 (62
Stat. 21, P.L. 80-413, Februmy 19, 1948, 10 U.S.C.A. 2301 et seq.), thus are
authority for the Agency to negotiate purchases and contracts for supplies
and services, without advertising, if?
(1) determined to be necessary in the public interest during the
period of a national emergency declared by the President or by
the Congress;
(2) the public exigency will not admit of the delay incident to
advertising;
(3) the aggregate amount involved does not exceed $1,000;
(4) for personal or professional services;
(5) for any service to be rendered by any university, college, or
other educational institution;
(6) the supplies or services are to be procured and used outside
the limits of the United States and its possessions;
(10) for supplies or services for which it is impracticable to secure
competition;
(12) for supplies or services as to which the agency head determines
that the character, ingredients, or components thereof arc such
that the purchase or contract should not be publicly disclosed;
(15) for supplies or services as to which the agency head deter-
mines that the bid prices after advertising therefor are not
reasonable or have not been 'independently arrived at in open
competition; Provided, That no negotiated purchase or contract
may be entered into under this paragraph after the rejection of
all bids received unless (A) notification of the intention to
negotiate and reasonable opportunity to negotiate shall have
been given by the agency head to each responsible bidder,
(B) the negotiated price is lower than the lowest rejected bid
price ,of a responsible bidder, as determined by the agency
head, and (C) such negotiated price is the lowest negotiated
price offered by any responsible supplier;
(17) otherwise authorized by law.
41
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(Footnote 5?Continued)
The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (63 Stat.
377, P.L. 81-152, June 30, 1949, 40 U.S.C.A. 471 et seq.) in essence re-
enacted the Armed Services Procurement Act to apply to the government
generally. It also provides that nothing therein "shall impair or affect any
authority of . . . the Central Intelligence Agency" (40 U.S.C.A. 474(17);
see also page 112 of PART VI). Thus, procurement authority available ? to
CIA includes the listed sections of the Armed Services Procurement Act, as
well as the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act. Further, any
amendments to the latter would be applicable with respect to CIA procure-
ment. Since section 3(a) of the CIA Act adopts the listed provisions of the
Armed Services Procurement Act in existence at the time of the enactment. of
.the CIA Act, any subsequent amendment of any of those provisions would not
be applicable automatically to CIA.
A 1905 amendment to the Federal Property and Administrative Services.
Act concerns automatic data processing equipment. See excerpts from that
amendment and accompanying narrative at page 111 of PART VI, as to its
application to national security and to CIA interests.
? These sections of the Armed Services Procurement Act (the Act is cited at
Footnote 5) prescribe rules with respect to advertising for bids, types of con-
tracts which may be negotiated, advance payments, liquidated damages and
procurement for other agencies and joint procurement. Authorities similar to
all of these, except procurement for other agencies and joint procurement, also
are provided for the government generally by the Federal Property and Admin-
istrative Services Act (Footnote 5).
' The bracketed language is from section 3 as enacted in the CIA Act
of 1949, rather than from section 3 as it has been codified at 50 U.S.C.A.
403c. As indicated in the PREFACE, section 3 is one of only two instances in
the Guide in which a statute is set out in the language of the original act, rather
than the language by which the act now is codified in the United States Code.
This is necessary because of the following factor. As indicated in Foot-
note 5, only the listed Armed Services Procurement Act sections in force
at the time of the enactment of the CIA Act, and not any subsequent amend-
ments to those sections, are authorities available to CIA. Since some of
the sections listed in 50 U.S.C.A. 403c, are amended sections of the Armed
Services Procurement Act of 1947, a listing of those sections would be
a listing of some procurement authorities which had not been made ap-
plicable to CIA.
At the time of the enactment of the CIA Act, the Executive was the
principal staff officer of the Agency charged with overall coordination of
Agency activities. By a reorganization of December 1, 1950, the Deputy
Director for Administration was designated the Executive, for the purpose
of exercising those Agency powers specifically delegated by law to the
Executive. The office of the Deputy Director (Administration) was re-
placed by the office of the Deputy Director (Support), and the functions
of the former transferred, effective?February 3, 1955. The title was changed
to Deputy Director for Support in August 1963.
42
February 1971
1
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1/1 ) pproved For Release 2004/03/15 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002500100003-4
1,
? Sections 3(c) and (d) are nearly identical with corresponding provisions
of the Armed Services Procurement Act and the Federal Property and Ad-
ministrative Services Act (Footnote 5).
"Paragraphs (12) and (15) of section 2(c) of the Armed Services Pro-
curement Act of 1947 are set out at items (12) and (15) in Footnote 5.
Section 5( a) of that Act authorizes agency heads to make advance pay-
ments under negotiated contracts under certain circumstances and provided
the agency head "determines that provision for such advance payments is
in the public interest or in the interest of the national defense and is
necessary and appropriate in order to procure required supplies or services
under the contract."
The language keyed to this Footnote is in brackets 'for the reason set
forth at Footnote 7.
" Footnote 10 is applicable also with respect to all the language keyed to
this Footnote, except the reference to "section 4" of the Armed Services Pro-
curement Act. The determinations and decisions required by section 4 of that
Act are: (n) that contracts negotiated pursuant to section 2(c) are to con-
tain a suitable warranty by the contractor "as determined by the agency head"
that no person or selling agency was employed or retained by the contractor to
solicit or secure the contract for a commission, percentage, brokerage, or
contingent. fee, except "bona fide employees or bona fide established com-
mercial or selling agencies maintained by the contractor for the purpose of
securing business"; and (b) that in the case of a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract,
a fee in excess of 10 per centum may not be allowed except upon certain
determinations by the agency head. Also, the per centum is to be based on
the "estimated cost of the contract" as determined by the agency head at
the time of entering into such contract. Additionally, neither a chst, nor a
cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract, nor an incentive type contract may be used
"unless the agency head determines that such method of contracting is
likely to be less costly than other methods or that it is impractical to secure
supplies or services of the kind or quality required without the use of" a
contro ct of one of those types.
Section 4, as enacted in 1949, provided:
EDUCATION AND TRAINING
SEC% 4. ) Any officer or employee of the Agency may be as-
signed or detailed for special instruction, research, or training, at
or with domestic or foreign public or private institutions; trade,
labor, agricultural, or scientific associations; courses or training pro-
grams under the National Military Establishment; or commercial firms.
(b) The Agency shall, under such regulations as the Director may
prescribe, pay the tuition and other expenses of officers and employees
of the Agency assigned or detailed in accordance with provisions of
subsection ( a) of this section, in addition to the pay and allowances
to which such officers and employees may be otherwise entitled.
September 1970
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1
(Footnote 12?Continued)
Section 4 was repealed, and sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11 and 12 were redesignated
as sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10, respectively, by section 21 of the Govern-
ment Employees Training Act (72 Stat. 327, P.L. 85-507, July 7, 1958).
As to the original section 9, see Footnote 49. (See, at page 169 of PART VII,
Executive Order 10805 exempting CIA from certain provisions of the Gov-
ernment Employees Training Act.)
" As enacted in the 1949 Act, this provision read "permanent-duty sta-
tions." The word "permanent" was deleted by section 323(a) of the Overseas
Differentials and Allowances Act (Footnote 3).
The current section 4 of the CIA Act was patterned on the travel and benefits
provisions of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 999, P.L. 79-724, Au-
gust 13, 1946, 22 U.S.C.A. 801 et seq.). With later amendments to the Foreign
Service Act, section 4 had become somewhat out of date. Additionally, pro-
visions for overseas travel and allowances for government generally were
not adequate for the increasing numbers of personnel from various govern-
ment agencies going abroad. Therefore, in early 1955, the IIouse Post Office
and Civil Service Committee instituted a complete revamping of the law
in this area for government generally. Recognizing the wisdom of having
uniform travel and allowances for government employees assigned abroad,
the Committee entertained a request both from the Department of State
for the Foreign Service and from CIA to consider a uniform overseas travel
and allowances act for government generally, including the Foreign Service and
CIA. The resulting Overseas Differentials and Allowances Act in 1960, amend-
ing the Foreign Service Act and sections 1 and 4 of the CIA Act, as amended,
and other laws, thus originated in the house Post Office and Civil Service,
Committee, rather than in the House Foreign Affairs and Armed Services
Committees.
" As enacted in the 1949 Act, this provision read "outside the continental
United States, its territories, and possessions." The current language was
enacted by section 323(a) of the Overseas Differentials and Allowances
Act (Footnote 3). This amendment was accompanied by the. repeal of
section 1( d), which defined "Continental United States." See Footnote 3.
" Attachment A of Bureau of the Budget Circular No. A-56 prescribes
regulations governing travel and transportation expenses of government em-
ployees generally. By its terms it does not apply to "officers and employees
transferred in accordance with the provisions of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949, as amended." Since section 4 of the CIA Act provides
authority to pay travel and transportation expenses of CIA personnel assigned
to duty stations outside the 48 states and the District of Columbia, travel and
transportation expenses for such persons may be paid under the authority of
section 4, and Circular A-56 need not be utilized.
" As enacted in the 1949 Act, this provision read "orders issued by the
Director in accordance with the provisions of section 5 ( a) ( 3 ) with regard
to the granting of" home leave. The quoted language was deleted by section
511(c) of the Overseas Differentials and Allowances Act (Footnote 3).
44
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1
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Approved fger Release 2004/03/15 : CIA-RDP8011/10(65A002500100003-4
" These sections of Title 50 are the Central Intelligence Agency Act.
"The term "furniture and household and personal effects," as used in
paragraphs (1)(D) and (E) (but not in (1)(C) or (F)) is defined by
section 301(d) of the Overseas Differentials and Allowances Act (Footnote
3) to mean "such personal property of an employee and the dependents of
such employee as . ? . the Director of Central Intelligence . . . shall by
regulation authorize to be transported or stored under the amendments made
by" that Act to paragraph (1)(D) and (E) "(including in emergencies,
motor vehicles authorized to be shipped at Government expense)."
" Section 301(d) of the Overseas Differentials and Allowances Act
(Footnote 3) provides that motor vehicles authorized, in emergencies, to
be shipped at Government expense are "excluded from the weight and volume
limitations prescribed by" paragraphs (1)(D) and (E) of section 4.
"Paragraph (1)(D), as enacted in the 1949 Act, read: "pay the cost
of storing the furniture and household and personal effects of an officer or
employee of the Agency who is absent under orders from his usual post of
duty, or who is assigned to a post to which, because of emergency conditions,
he cannot take or at which he is unable to use, his furniture and household
and personal effects." It was amended to the current language by section
301(b) of the Overseas Differentials and Allowances Act (Footnote 3).
" See Footnote 19.
"Paragraph (1)(E), as enacted in the 1949 Act, read: "pay tho cost of
storing the furniture and household and personal effects of an officer or
employee of the Agency on first arrival at a post for a period not in excess
of three months after such first arrival at such post or until the establishment
of residence quarters, whichever shall be shorter," It was amended to the
current language by section 301(b) of the Overseas Differentials and Al-
lowances Act (Footnote 3).
"Paragraphs (3)(A), as enacted in the 1949 Act, read: "Order to the
United States or its Territories and possessions on leave provided for in
5 U.S.C. 30, 30a, 30b, or as such sections may hereafter be amended, every
officer and employee of the agency who was a resident of the United States
or its Territories and possessions at time of employment, upon completion
of two years' continuous service abroad, or as soon as possible thereafter:
Provided, That such officer or employee has accrued to his credit at the
time of such order, annual leave sufficient to carry him in a pay status while
in the United States for at least a thirty-clay period." It was amended to
the current language by section 511(c) of the Overseas Differentials and
Allowances Act (Footnote 3).
Paragraph (3)(B), as enacted in the 1949 Act, read: "While in the
continental United States on leave, the service of any officer or employee
shall not lie available for work or duties except in the agency or for training
45
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(Footnote 24?Continued)
or for reorientation for work; and the time of such work or duty shall not
be counted as leave." It was amended to the current language by section
511(e) of the Overseas Differentials and Allowances Act (Footnote 3).
" By an amendment enacted in section 511(c) of the Overseas Differentials
and Allowances Act (Footnote 3), the words "(as described in paragraph
(3)(A) of this section)" and "(as so described)" replace, in each instance,
-
the words "or its Territories and possessions" as enacted in paragraph (3)(C)
of the 1949 Act.
"In the 1949 Act the word "automobile" appeared in two places in para-
graph (C)(4). That word was replaced by the words "motor vehicle", the
I
final two sentences of the paragraph were added, and minor editorial changes
were made by an amendment enacted in section 323(b) of the Overseas
Differentials and Allowances Act (Footnote 3).
' Section 5731(a) limits transportation expenditure to the rate of the I
lowest first class rate by the transportation facility used unless lowest first
class accommodations are not available, or approval for use of a compartment
or other accommodation "is required for security purposes."
111
"Section 5 of the 1949 Act consisted of subsections (a) and (b). By the
1958 repeal of section 4 and consequent renumbering, section 5 became
section 4. See Footnote 12. Subsection (b) of the renumbered section 4,
which together with subsection designation "(a)", were repealed by section i
511( a) of the Overseas Differentials and Allowances Act (Footnote 3),i pro-
vided:
(b) In accordance with such regulations as the President may
prescribe and notwithstanding the provisions of section 1765 of the
Revised Statutes (5 U.S.C. 70), the Director is authorized to grant to
any officer or employee of the Agency allowances in accordance
with the provisions of section 901(1) and 901(2) of the Foreign
Service Act of 1946.
With the repeal of section 4(b), the executive order (Executive Order
10100 (3 C.F.R., 1949-1953 Comp., p. 295, January 28, 1950)) which imple-
mented the section no longer has legal effect.
Under an amendment to section 912 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, enacted by section 523(a) of the Overseas Differentials and Allow-
ances Act, "amounts received as allowances or otherwise" under section 4
of the CIA Act of 1949 "shall not be included in gross income and shall be
exempt from" income taxation. It would appear that any per diem allowances
in lieu of expenses paid Under section 4 are exempt from income taxation
by current Internal Revenue Regulations and Rulings and that the above
amendment to the Internal Revenue Code is not necessary to such exemption.
In view of the repeal of that portion of the renumbered section 4 which
authorized the payment of certain allowances, namely subsection (b) (see
above in this Footnote), it would appear that the only allowances exempted
by the amendment to the internal Revenue Code are per diem allowances.
111
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"See at Footnote 46 a summary of a case in which a United States District
Court dismissed a suit by a former Agency employee challenging the con-
stitutionality of section 5 and section 8(b) of the CIA. Act.
" Funds transferred under this authority and. pursuant to a specific infra-
government agreement thereby arc obligated for use in furtherance of the
specific project.
"These sections of Title 50 are sections 102 and 303 of the National
Security Act.
"These sections of Title 50 are the Central Intelligence Agency Act.
"Section 543 prohibits the exchange of funds by disbursing officers for
other than gold, silver or United States notes. Section 5(b) of the CIA Act
thus permits Agency disbursing officers to procure foreign funds by exchange
or purchase.
"The cited portion of the amended 1932 act (40 U.S.C.A. 278a) limits
expenditures for the rental of premises, or for altering, improving or re-
pairing rental premises, not to exceed 15 per centmn of the fair market value
of the premises or 25 .per centum of the amount of the rent for the first
year, respectively.
The 1949 Act was amended by P.L. 82-53 (65 Stat. 89, June 26, 1951)
to add a subsection (f) to what is now section 5, as follows:
(f )(I) Notwithstanding section 2 of the Act of July 31, 1894 (28
Stat. 205), as amended (5 U.S.C.A. 62), or any other law pro-
hibiting the employment of any retired commissioned or warrant
officer of the armed services, the Agency is hereby authorized to
employ and to pay the compensation of not more than fifteen
retired officers or warrant officers of the armed services while per-
forming service for the Agency, but while so serving such retired
officer or warrant officer will be entitled to receive only the com-
pensation of his position with the Agency, or his retired pay, which-
ever he may elect.
(2) Nothing in this section shall limit or affect the appointment
of and payment of compensation to retired officers or warrant offi-
cers not presently or hereafter prohibited by law.
Subsection (f) was repealed by section 402(a) of the Dual Compensation
Act (78 Stat. 484, P.L. 88-448, August 19, 1964).
This section of Title 50 is section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act
of 1947.
" Section 654 requira the Civil Service Commission to publish annually
a list of all persons "occupying administrative and supervisory positions" in
the government. The list was to include also the official title and compensa-
tion of each person listed. Section 654 has been repealed by P.L. 80-626 (74
Stat. 425, July 12, 1960).
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Section 947( b ) directed the Bureau of the Budget to determine quarterly
the number of full-time employees required by each depattment and agency
"for the proper and efficient performances of the authorized functions of"
the department or agency and provided that excess personnel were to be
released. Such determinations by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget
and the numbers of employees paid in violation of his orders were to be
reported to Congress quarterly by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.
Section 947( b ) has been repealed by section 301 of P.L. 81-784 (64 Stat.
832, September 12, 1950).
" The laws concerning admissibility are sections 211 et seq. of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act of 1952 (66 Stat. 163, P.L. 82-414, June 27,
1952), as amended, now codified at Title 8, Chapter 12, Subchapter II,
Part II of the United States Code. The regulations concerning admissibility
are those issued by the Attorney General and published at Title 8, Chapter 1,
Subchapter B of the Code of Federal Regulations.
" A United States Court of Appeals has cited this section as indicating that
Congress has recognized that "aliens within this country are sources of for-
eign intelligence" (Heine v. Raus, 399 F. 2d. 785, July 22, 1968). See
Footnote 21, PART I.
" Section 8 is the permanent law which authorizes expenditures by CIA.
Because the phrase "for purposes necessary to carry out its functions, includ-
ing," is an inclusive concept, that language authorizes expenditures for pur-
poses additional to those named in paragraphs ( 1) and (2) of subsection 8(a).
Among other purposes for which expenditures are authorized by section
8(a), that section is the authority for the employment and compensation of
personnel. See in this connection the excerpt from the Classification At of
1949 at page 114 of PART VI. A Comptroller General decision (31 Comp. Cen.
191, November 21, 1951, summarized at page 190 of PART VIII) has held that
retroactive salary "increases by the Central Intelligence Agency are not 'neces-
sary to carry out its functions' within the meaning of the said section 10 [now
section 81 and therefore, would be subject to legal objection." But see a later
decision upholding retroactive pay increases under circumstances which had
not existed at the time of the 1951 opinion (44 Comp. Gen. 89, August 20,
1964) at page 198 of PART VIII.
The language of section 8( a )( 1 ) was patterned, in part, on statutes making
appropriations for the Office of Strategic Services.
" Section 7901 provides in part:
(a) The head of each agency of the Government of the United
States may establish, within the limits of appropriations available, a
health service program to promote and maintain the physical and
mental fitness of employees under his jurisdiction.
" Section 14 of Title 6 authorizes the purchase, under certain circum-
stances and subject to certain requirements, of surety bonds covering civilian
officers and employees and military personnel "who are required by law or
administrative ruling to be bonded."
September 1970
48
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7
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4
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" Section 259 prohibited contracts and payments for public buildings sites in
excess of specific appropriations. Section 267 provided expenditure for public
buildings until after the General Services Administration had prepared and
the head of the agency which was to occupy the building had approved
sketch plans and cost estimates. Sections 259 and 267 were repealed, subject
to a savings clause applicable to certain projects specified by the repealing
legislation, by section 17 of P.L. 86-249 (73 Stat. 479, September 9, 1959).
Utilization of this authority enables the Agency to keep abreast of new
legislation concerning travel and other fringe benefits which are deemed ap-
propriate to apply to Agency employees.
" Richardson v. Sokol
This part of section 8(b), and section 5, were challenged in a law suit
brought in 1968 by a former Agency employee in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against the Commissioner
of the Bureau of Accounts, Treasury Department. The plaintiff sought a
declaratory judgment that sections 5 and 8( b) were repugnant to Article I,
Section 9, Clause 7, of the United States Constitution. Clause 7 provides
that "a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures
of all public Money shall be published from time to time." Plaintiff in effect
contended that the named sections of the CIA Act operate to prevent the
Commissioner from complying with Clause 7. The Court granted defendant's
motion to dismiss. The Court quoted a leading Supreme Court decision that
courts have no power per se to review -and annul acts of Congress on the
grounds that they are unconstitutional. That question, the Supreme Court
said, may be considered only when the justification for some direct injury
suffered or threatened, presenting a justiciable issue, is made to rest upon
such an act. Further, the Supreme Court held, the plaintiff must show not
only that the statute is invalid, but also that he has sustained, or is imme-
diately in danger of sustaining, some- direct injury as a result of the enforce-
ment of the statute, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way
in common with people generally. Iii,, the 1968 case involving the CIA Act,
the District Court held that the plaintiff asserted no special injury to himself
resulting from the defendant's alleged failure to publish the required report.
He did allege in oral argument ?"that Isis purported injury is based solely on
his contention that defendant's compliance with the Act prevents plaintiff
from gathering evidence in support of his proposition that there is a direct
correlation between international discord and the amounts expended by the
United States with reference to foreign affairs." The Court found such "injury
insufficient to establish plaintiff's standing to raise a justiciable controversy"
and dismissed the complaint. Richardson v. Sokol, 285 F. Supp. 866, May
8, 1968.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, affirmed,
but on different grounds. The Court noted that under the relevant statute,
district courts have original jurisdiction of civil actions only "wherein the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000." Nowhere did
the appellant allege that that amount was in controversy. Further, stated
49
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11111,
Noe'
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(Footnote 46?Continued)
the Court, we cannot reasonably say that the complaint otherwise indicates
"that the matter in controversy exceeds the value of $10,000 . . . We con-
clude that the requisite jurisdictional amount does not appear affirmatively
on the face of the complaint as it must in order for the district court to
have jurisdiction." Richardson v. Sokol, 409 F. 2d. 3, April 9, 1969. The
Supreme Court declined to accept an appeal. Richardson v. Sokol, 396 U.S.
949, November 24, 1969.
' In consequence of a directive by President Kennedy this authority to
certify the expenditure of funds, and all other authorities which the Director
is empowered to delegate, have been delegated to the Deputy Director.
President Kennedy wrote the Director on January 16, 1962:
As head of the Central Intelligence Agency, while you will con-
tinue to have over-all responsibility for the Agency, I shall expect
you to delegate to your principal deputy, as you may deem neces-
sary, so much of the direction of the detailed operation of the Agency
as may be required to permit you to carry out your primary task as
Director of Central Intelligence. . . .
In consequence of this directive and in accordance with legal opinions by the
Comptroller General of the United States (41 Comp. Gen. 429, January 2,
1962, set out at page 195 of PART VIII), the Department of Justice, and the
General Counsel of CIA, Director John A. McCone on April 2, 1962, delegated
to the Deputy Director
all authorities vested in me by law or by virtue of my position as Di-
rector of Central Intelligence and head of the Central Intelligence
Agency, including, but not limited to, the certification authority set
forth in section 8( b ) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949,
as amended, except for any authorities the delegation of which is
prohibited by law.
This delegation has been continued by succeeding Directors and is set forth
in an Agency regulation.
The Director's action of April 1962 delegated, in addition to the authorities
normal to the conduct of a government agency and the authority to certify
the expenditure of confidential funds under section 8, the administrative
authorities in sections 4, 5 and 8 of the CIA Act, the authority in section 7
1
of the Act concerning the entry of aliens, and the authority, in section 2
of the Foreign Espionage Agents Registration Act (70 Stat. 899, P.L. 84-893,
August 1, 1956, 50 U.S.C.A. 851, extracted at page 134 of PART VI), to exempt
from registration persons who have been instructed or assigned in the es-
pionage, counterespionage, or sabotage service or tactics of a foreign country or
political party. Additionally the Deputy Director is authorized to exercise the au-
thority in section 142(e) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (68 Stat. 919,
P.L. 83-703, August 30, 1954, 42 U.S.C.A. 2162(e), extracted at page 121 of
PART VI) to make joint determinations with the Atomic Energy Commission
for the removal from the Restricted Data category of information concerning
the atomic energy program of other nations. The authority of the Director
under section 102( c) of the National Security Act of 1947 to terminate em-
ployment of CIA personnel has been exercised only by the Director.
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"Funds to be accounted for solely on the basis of such certificates are
known as "unvouchered" or "confidential" funds. Statutory authority for the
use of such funds has a long history in this country. The secret journals of
the Continental Congress record numerous appropriations for military expend-
itures where the provisions for accounting were left to someone's absolute
discretion or were omitted entirely. The current law authorizing their use by
the President and the Secretary of State "for the purpose of intercourse or
1111 treaty with foreign nations" (31 U.S.C.A. 107) derives from a statute of
1793. For other examples in existing law of authority for the use of con-
fidential funds see 10 U.S.C.A. 7202 (Secretary of Navy), 42 U.S.C.A.
2017(b) (Atomic Energy Commission) and 28 U.S.C.A. 537 (Federal Bureau
of Investigation). See also the classified Historical Study of the Use of Con-
fidential Funds (1953) compiled by the Office of General Counsel, CIA.
Because these funds are "to be accounted for solely on the certificate of
the Director," any audit of expenditures of those funds by the Comptroller
111 General of the United States would be limited to determining that such cer-
tifications had been made. In practice the Comptroller General does not con-
duct such audits; certifications made pursuant to section 8(b) nevertheless
are retained as permanent Agency records.?
Section 66a of Title 31 of the Code, enacted in 1950, provides that the
"head of each executive agency shall establish and maintain systems of
accounting and internal control designed to provide . . . adequate financial
information needed for the agency's management purposes" and "effective
111 control over and accountability for all funds, property and other assets for
which the agency is responsible, including appropriate internal audit." In
compliance with section 66a, Agency components conduct comprehensive
audits of all such funds, property and other assets. .
" As enacted in 1949, the current section 9 was section 11. It was designated
as section 9 by P.L. 85-507 (Footnote 12). As enacted in 1949, section 9
provided:
Sic. 9. The Director is authorized to egiablish and fix the com-
pensation for not more than three positions in the professional and
scientific field, within the Agency, each such position being estab-
lished to effectuate those scientific intelligence functions relating to
national security, which require the services of specially qualified sci-
entific or professional personnel: Provided, That the rates of com-
pensation for positions established pursuant to the provisions of this
section shall not be less than $10,000 per annum nor more than
$15,000 per annum, and shall be subject to the approval of the Civil
Service Commission.
The smaller amount was increased from $10,000 to $13,100 by P.L. 81-697? (64
Stat. 450, August 16, 1950). Section 9, as. amended, was repealed in 1954
by section 601, of P.L. 83-763 (68 Stat. 1105, September 1, 1954), increases
in compensation rates for government employees having obviated the .need
to. compensate scientific personnel at rates higher than those applicable
to General Schedule employees. See page 116 of PART VI as to more recent
legislation concerning scientific pay rates.
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TRANSMITTAL SLIP
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