DIRECTOR'S PUBLIC SPEECHES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A002500040036-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: December 5, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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Executive Registry
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, NFAC
STATINTL Robert R. Bowie
SUBJECT . Director's Public Speeches
During the past several months, Admiral Turner has
spoken to government, business, and university audiences.
In his remarks he has tried to increase public understanding
of:
. the continuing need for good intelligence;
the difficult ethical and moral choices
faced by intelligence agencies in their
daily operations;
the nature and probable effect of the
reorganization;
the checks and balances of the oversight
process;
the continuing and indispensable contri-
bution of human intelligence;
the high quality of the intelligence
professional, and
the evolving American model of intelligence.
The two texts I have attached are transcripts of the
Admiral's most recent speeches. They reflect the views he
has expressed in most of his talks and I thought they would
be of interest to you and your associates.
Attachments:
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Secrecy and Morality in Intelligence
When I came back to Washington from my overseas assignment
nine months ago, I found myself confronted with what appeared
to be a beleaguered CIA. Beleaguered by several years of
criticism, investigation, and adverse publicity. Yet, as I
grew to know the organization and the people I-realized how
very fortunate I was to come to it at this particular time
in our nation's history. I felt it was a?moment of opportunity.
Opportunity first, because I doubt that anywhere else in
the business world or in government will you find more dedicated,
more capable public servants than in the Central Intelligence
Agency and the other associated intelligence organizations in
our country. They have an admirable record and, with this, I
am confident that we have the foundation on which to rebuild
public confidence which is much deserved.
The second way it is a moment of opportunity is because
today, out of the crucible of this period of investigation and
inquiry we are forging a new model of intelligence - an American
model of intelligence. The old, traditional model of intelligence
remarkably unchanged over centuries of history, is one where
intelligence organizations maintained maximum secrecy and operated
with a minimum of supervisory control. Nearly all foreign
intelligence organizations continue to follow this pattern.
The new model we are forging is singularly tailored o the
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outlook, the attitudes, and the standards of our country.
On the one hand, it is open, more open just like our society.
On the other hand, there is more supervision, more control, much
like the checks and balances that characterize our entire
governmental process. Let me explain a few of the cardinal
features of this new American model of intelligence.
First - Openness. Today we are attempting to share more with
you, the public of the United States, than ever before. We
are sharing first something about the process of intelligence,
how we go about doing our work. Now, clearly we cannot share
everything. Very often the reason information or how it was
obtained is useful is because it is unsuspected by our potential
adversaries. Publicity would vitiate its usefulness. But at
the same time there is much about intelligence work that need
not be kept secret and which I think both the Intelligence
Community and the public would benefit by discussing openly.
For example, contrary to popular belief, a very large
percentage of our effort is not involved in clandestine spying.
Most of our effort is concentrated on what would be termed
on any university campus, or in many major corporations, simply
as research. We have thousands of people whose task is to take
bits of information that have been collected - sometimes openly,
sometimes clandestinely - and, much like working on a jigsaw
puzzle, piece them together to make them into a picture.
With this picture they can then provide an evaluation or an
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estimate that will help our nation's decisionmakers better
understand world events, anticipate problems, and make better
decisions on behalf of you and me. This is a very ordinary
but a very challenging task intellectually. It is no way spooky.
Today, in carrying out our new policy of greater openness
we want to share more of the results of this kind of analysis.
Each time we complete a major intelligence study today, we look
it over carefully to see if it can be declassified. Whatever
its classification - Secret, Top Secret, or burn before reading
we go through it and. excise those portions which must reamin
classified. These are clues which in the hands of our enemies
could jeopardize the way we acquired the information, or could
endanger the life of someone who has helped us. . Once these
clues are removed, if there. is enough substance left to be of
interest and of value to the American public, we publish the
study and make it available, usually through the Government
Printing Office.
You may have heard that in March the CIA issued a report-on
the world energy prospects for the next 10 years or so. In May,
a study was issued on the world steel outlook - available capacity,
prospects for the future. In July, on behalf of the Joint
Economic Committee of Congress, we issued one on the future
prospects of the Soviet economy - a rather startling change from
what had been predicted in the past. Also in July, we issued
a study on International Terrorism which has subsequently been
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made available through the Department of Commerce to businesses
operating overseas.
Now, not to exaggerate, the Intelligence Community has,
of course, not been thrown open with all secrets revealed.
Anyone with a cursory understanding of the international system
appreciates that that would be very much to our disadvantage.
Sources would evaporate, the advantage of knowing more about
your adversary than he thinks you know would be lost, and a
foreigner's loyalty to us would assuredly be rewarded with
prison or death.
But there are real advantages to opening up within the
limits of necessary secrecy. Interestingly, I believe it is
going to make it easier to protect important secrets.
Winston Churchill once said, if everything is classified secret,
nothing is secret. Today too much information is classified.
There are also too many people running around who feel they
can take it unto themselves to decide what should be classified
and what should be released. They have released information
which has done irreparable damage to our country. in terms of
damaged national relationships; in terms of expensive, technical
intelligence systems compromised; in terms of lives dedicated to
America and what we stand for, lost. By our releasing as much
information as we can, we can help improve the quality of national
debate on important issues. And, in making that contribution
we also derive a benefit. Greater public exposure of the
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intelligence product, generates discussion and feedback to us
of attitudes toward what we are doing and good constructive
criticism of how-we are doing it. This is important not only
because it decreases the likelihood of misunderstandings - and
much of the criticism of the past derived from.misunderstandins -
but-also, everyone of us in authority clearly recognizes that
the intelligence mechanism of the United States must be operated.
in ways that are compatible with the ethical and moral standard's
of our country. The problem with that, however, is that it is
not always easy to know with certainty what those standards are..
What the country would condone in intelligence operations or
other governmental activities 20 years ago, it may conder^z today.
How will the nation look 5, 10, or 20 years from now at what
we are doing today?
Unfortunately, we cannot launch a trial balloon. We can't
take some proposed activity and test it out on 210 million or so
Americans and expect it to remain secret. Often we either do
something secretly.. or we just don't do it at all. That places
a particular burden on all of us in the Intelligence Community.
A burden to make difficult judgments as to what things we should
and what things we should not do. The American model that I'm
speaking of establishes controls to help us make these judgments.
Let me discuss three of those controls.
The first type of control is self-control, or self-regulation.
For instance, today, and for some months, we have been attempting
to write a specific code of operational ethics for the Intel ligenc_
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Community. It hasn't 'been easy to write something that is
specific enough to give genuine guidance, yet not so specific
as to be totally inhibiting and prevent effectiveness. But to
process of attempting to write such a code has been salutary
for us. It has forced us to think more about ethical issues.
It has forced us to grapple with the subtlties of these issues.
Just as in business, just as in other agencies-of government,
ethical issues are seldom all black or all white. But in
examining the many shades of gray, we must ask ourselves exactly
what are the boundaries of our societal standards? To what
lengths should we go to obtain information which would be
useful for the decisionmakers of our country? The answers are
never clear cut. It would be easy for us to simply interpret
standards arbitrarily and, stay right in the middle-of-the-road.
Never 'doaziything that would embarrass the United States of
America were it disclosed. Never treat people of another
country differently than we would treat Americans. Be as open
and fair in our dealings with other countries as we believe
all peoples should be treated.
Unquestionably ' this is how. we would hope we
could act. However, in many situations they represent an
unrealistic ideal. We must always remember, that we are an
unusually blessed people, living in an unusually open society.
In an open society like ours an outsider can come in and without
great effort, using only open sources,a.ttain a good`-grasp of what's
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going on, what our basic purposes are, the directions we are going,
and what we are thinking. He comes; he reads; he looks;
he talks to people; he walks down the street; and he can
easily make.an accurate appraisal of what the United States is about.
Unfortunately, as we all know, there are closed societies in
the world today. Closed societies where you can't go and walk down
the street and talk to the people. And, reading the newspapers
is'not very informative because they only say what the government
puts in-.-them. Yet, we have a genuine need to know what'is going
on in those societies. I don't think you would want your government
to negotiate a new strategic arms limitation agreement with the
Soviet Union if I could not assure you that we had some
chance of feeling the pulse of the Soviet Union's political,
economic, and military motives; if I didn'.t think there was a
good chance of knowing whether or not they were abiding by the
terms of such an agreement.
The problem is not limited, to the military. Today we are
in a economically interdependent world. What happens to the
economies of the Soviet Union or the United States has ripple
effects around the world. Yet, even here, closed societies of
the communist bloc are not very informative. The pocketbooks of
each one of us here is-exposed to dangers of the -
economically unsound actions of other countries. We must have
some intelligence capability for anticipating those events, for
getting a.feel for the way foreign economies are moving. But
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this too is not easy. Nor is it clear cut how much of that
information is of real value. Nor are the lengths to which we
should go in acquiring that information well-defined. So, we
must look to controls beyond the self-control which I have described.
The second type of control over the Intelligence Community is
in the form of laws and formal regulations. Congress has passed
a number of laws that affect intelligence operations, like, for
example, the law on wiretapping. This spring the Administration
went to the Congress with a revision to this wiretapping law
in an effort to better protect the right to privacy of American
citizens and at the same time enable the government to obtain
information that may be crucial to it.
The President himself may issue very specific regulations.
For example, there is a written regulation today prohibiting the
Intelligence Community from counselling, planning, or carrying out
an assassination.
In the next session of Congress, our recent work with
Congressional leaders will culminate in a
series of charters being
issued for intelligence agencies. All of the intelligence operations
in the CIA, the Defense Department, and elsewhere in the government,
will have a specific charter which will govern their operations.
The third form of control under the American model of
intelligence is called Oversight. Earlier I mentioned the
impossibility of attempting full public oversight by ,launching
trial balloons for every secret operation. While!we- really would
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like to have full public oversight, it simply is not practical.
The substitute that has been evolving is a surrogate process
of public oversight.
One of the surrogates for the American people is the
President of the United States. Another is the Vice President.
.Both these elected officials take a very keen interest in
the intelligence process and operations: I see them both
a
regularly and they are fully aware of intelligence activities.
Another surrogate is a committee called the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence which has been in existence for
just over a year-and-a-half. This committee is in many
respects a sounding board for us. We go to them with our
problems and they feedback to us with what they feel the
American people want. It is also a check on us. They
hear things, they read things, they callus up, and ask us
to come over and tell them what is happening and why it is_
happening. Through the budget process, I keep them informed
of the full range of our activities. It is a very valuable
line of communication between the intelligence agencies and
the people of the United States.
I am very pleased that in August the House of
Representatives elected to establish a corresponding committee.
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I look forward to having the same point of contact, the same
sounding board in the lower chamber, as we now have in the Seat-e.
The Intelligence Oversight Board is still another oversight
surrogate. This board is comprised of three distinguished citizens:
former governor Scranton, former Senator Gore, and Tom Farmer of
Washington, D. C., appointed by the President for the sole task
of overseeing the legality and propriety of-what the Intelligence
Community is doing. You, any of my employees, anyone who wants,
may write to the Intelligence Oversight Poard, and say that_llow
Turner is doing something wrong. If they think there's any
illegality in intelligence operations or that something is being
done improperly, they can go directly to this-'Board. The Board then
makes its own investigation; they may call me. in and ask me what
is going on; but they do it independently and report only to
the President of the United States. He then decides if some
action should be taken.
Another form of control is over what is called covert action.
Covert action is not gathering or analyzing intelligence, it is
taking actions intended to influence opinions or events in other
countries without those actions being attributed to the United States.
The CIA has been charged by the President over many years as the
only agency in the government that will conduct covert action
and continues to be required to retain that capability. It is
outside the normal ambit of intelligence activities and, as you
can imagine involves a high element of risk. This is where the
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CIA has received the most adverse publicity. In the past, in
Viet Nam for example, there was a good deal of covert activity
being carried out. Today, covert activity is first, on a very,
very, low scale; and second, before any covert effort is undertaken,
it must be cleared by the National Security Council, the
President must then indicate his approval by signature, and I
must then notify eight committees of Congress.
There are some who say that all of this oversight may be
overkill. Let me be candid with you. There are risks in this
process. There is the risk of timidity. The more oversight
over an intelligence operation the less willing individuals
are to take the risks that operation may entail. Maybe too few
risks will be taken for the long term good of our country.
When you sit around a conference table with other members of a
committee, it is easy to say, no, that's too risky, let's not do it.
It is much more difficult to stand alone in a group and say yes,
for the long term needs of the country, we require that information,
we should take that risk.
The second risk is that there may be a security leak.
As you proliferate the number of people with access to information
about intelligence operations in order to conduct the oversight
process, you run the risk of somebody saying something that
he should not.
In conclusion, you should know that I feel very confident
that today we are beginning to find the balance between the risks
of too much oversight on the one hand and necessary control on
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the other. There is every good prospect that a relatively
stable balance can be established over these next 2 or 3 years
as we shake down this process and as we mature into this new
American model of intelligence. I believe we will develop
ways of maintaining that necessary level of secrecy while at
the same time conducting intelligence operations only in
ways that will strengthen our open and free society.
Thank you very much. I would be happy to entertain
your questions.
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An American Model of Intelligence
I appreciate your asking me to be with you to
talk about what we are doing in the world of intelligence
to serve you and to serve the country. President
Carter directed a major effort to reshape the intel-
ligence structure of this country back in February.
After six months of scrunity, close study, and consideration
of many alternatives, in August, the President issued
several directives to change the way the Intelligence
Community is organized. As a result of this, we are
starting to evolve today toward a new model of
intelligence e an American model.
This American model contrasts with the old,
traditional model where-intelligence organizations operated
under a cloak of. maximum secrecy and with a minimun of
.supervision. We hope today to develop a model which
will conform to American standards of ethics and propriety
and at the same time continue to provide senior decision
.makers in government with the facts on which they can
base sound decisions. On the one hand it will be more
open as our society is more open; on the other hand
it will be more controlled, with checks and balances much
like those which characterize the rest of our governmental
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process. I thought'itmight be of interest to you
today if I discussed some of the actions we're taking
to move toward this new model.
The President's directive of last August
had two fundamental objectives. The first was to
strengthen control over our entire intelligence
apparatus thereby encouraging greater effectiveness.
The second objective was to assure control. through
stringent oversight, thereby increasing accountability,
Now let me point out that I am the Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency, but this is only
one of many intelligence agencies of the government.
Intelligence activities also reside in the Department
of Defense, in the Department of State, Treasury, the
FBI, and even the new Department of Energy. But I am
also the Director of Central Intelligence. In that
capacity my task is to coordinate, to bring together
into one effective, harmonious operation, the activities
of all of those intelligence organizations. The
President's reorganization strengthens my hand in that
regard in two very specific ways. As the Director
of Central Intelligence it gave me full authority over
the budgets of all of the intelligence activities I've
enumerated; and secondly, it gave me full authority to
direct their tasking, that is, the day to day operations
of these organizations. This should enable me to better
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control the total effort of collecting, analyzing,
.and producing intelligence. This is really what
was intended, in my opinion, in the National Security
Act of 1947 which first established the Central Intel-
ligence Agency.
Now some of the media have portrayed this
as the potential creation of a intelligence czar. That
interpretation could only come from a misunderstanding
of the intelligence process itself. Let'me explain.
Intelligence activities can be divided into two basic
and separate functions. The first is collecting
information. This is the costliest and the riskiest
of our operations. It involves, among other things,
reading foreign newspapers, intercepting broadcasts,
trying to break codes, and recruiting individual in
other countries to spy for us. Here you want good
control. You want to be sure there is a minimum of
overlap because each of these activities are time
consuming and very costly; and you want to be sure
there is a minimum possibility of a gap in what
your collecting because that could be responsible
for another Pearl Harbor. Only centralized control
can ensure the intelligence collection effort is
well coordinated. The second major activity of intelligence
organization is analysis. It is exactly the same as
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what would be called research on a college campus. It
is the analyzing, the estimating, the pulling together
all the little pieces of information that are obtained
by the collectors and trying to put them together to
produce a coherent picture of what another country
is doing, or thinking, or planning. Hopefully this
picture, or analysis, provides the decision-makers,
the policy-makers of our country, a better basis
upon which to make those decisions.
Now let me make it clear, that under this
new reorganization I do not control all the people
who do these analyses. I do control those in the
CIA; however, there is a strong analytic capability
in the Department of Defense and another in the
Department of State. The Department of State specializes
in political analysis with second suit in economics.
The Department of Defense specializes in military analysis
with a second-suit in political. The CIA covers the
waterfront. So we have assurance that-divergent views
will come forward if they exist. We encourage that.
It is in the interest of each of us in the Intelligence
analysis business to be sure that the decision-makers
don't .get just one point of view when several are justified.
Our quest is to see to it that there is competitive,
overlapping analyses. But, should I try to be a-
czar; should I try to short-change the descenting or
minority views, there is a Cabinet officer in the
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Department of Defense, and another in the Department
of State who manage those intelligence analytic operations
If I were to try to run roughshod over their views
of events, I am sure those Cabinet officers would
not fail to take advantage of the access they have
to the President to ensure their views are brought
forward. So we are not trying to set up a centralized
control over the important interpretive process
'but over the collecting process. And,.I sincerely
believe that this new organizational arrangement is
.going to assure better performance in both collecting
and interpreting intelligence for this country.
The President, the Vice President, and
many other of our top officials have spent much time
working out this new reorganization. I believe
this evidences the keen awareness throughout the top
echelons of our government that good intelligence
is perhaps more important to our country today
than in any time since the creation of the Central
Intelligence Agency thirty years ago.
Thirty years ago we enjoyed absolute military
superiority. Since-that time the failure of the Soviets
to make their system grow adequately in areas other than
the military has led them to accent that particu1 r
competition. They have, I believe, achieved a
position of reasonable parity in most areas of the
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military. That parity places greater value on
our intelligence product as an important adjunct
of our military. When you know your enemies potential
and something of his intentions, you can use your
forces to much greater advantage. He doesn't normally
reveal that information outright., but if we can
pick up pieces of information here and there, over
time you can bring those pieces together to tell you
important things about your enemy. This gives your
military commanders greater leverage in the use of their
forces and the upper hand in any confrontation of
their otherwise equal forces.
Let's look past the military scene. Thirty
years ago we were also a dominant and independent economic
power. Today we are dependent on other countries in an
economically interdependent world. This growing
interdependence and the impact on our and other national
economies on each other is more and more apparent. Here
too, I believe, we desperately need good intelligence
to make sure that we don't lose our shirt in the
international economic arena.
Politically, thirty years ago we were the
dominant influence in the world.. Today even some of
the most underdeveloped, emerging nations insist-on
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a totally independent course of action. They go their
own way and refuse to be directed to by the Soviets
or ourselves. Here again, we must be smart. We must
understand other nation's attitudes, cultural imperatives
and outlooks so that we will not be outmaneuvered in
the process.
At the same time that we are trying to produce
better intelligence in all three of these fields, we
must be careful not to,undermine the principles on
which our country was founded. or the standards by which
we live in the process of so doing. Thus, the second
leg. of the President'g'new policy is better oversight.
The cornerstone of-all oversight is the keen and regular
participation of both the President-and the-Vice President
in the intelligence process. I can assure you they are
both very much active participants.
Beyond that there are two intelligence
oversight committees in the Congress. The Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence was formed a year
and a half ago and has been working closely with the Intelligence
Community. We have a relationship here of closeness
but yet aloofness. Closeness in that I feel very free
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in going to them for help and advice particularly
when I'm involved with other committees of the Congress
and there may be boundaries that are being encroached
upon. But aloofness in that I very definitely report
to them. When they call and want to know what we are
doing and how we're doing it and why, I am answerable
to them. It is a good oversight procedure and it is
working well.
The House of Representatives, last August, set up
a corresponding committee. We are sure that that
relationship will develop as has the one with the Senate.
Beyond this the Intellligence Oversight Board
oversees our activities. Three distinguished Americans,
former Senator Gore, former Governor Scranton, and
Mr. Thomas Farmer, a lawyer from Washington, are. appointed
by the President, with their only task to oversee the
legality and the propriety of our intelligence operations.
They report only to the President. Anyone may go to
them, bypassing me, and say look, that fellow Turner,
or somebody else in the Intelligence Community is doing
something he shouldn't be doing. The Board will look
into it and let the President know whether they think
corrective action is necessary,
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Now let me be perfectly honest with you.
There are risks to this or any oversight process. The
first risk is that timidity may reduce the intelligence
effort. It is easy when acting as overseer not to
take a risk, not take a chance. But in so doing, we
could fail to do things that could be very important
to the long term benefit of our.country. It might
place the avoidance of current risk over the gaining
of long term benefits.
The second risk is the risk of security
leaks. The more you proliferate the number of people
privy to secret. or sensitive intelligence operations,
the more danger there is of some inadvertent leak. I
am confident at this time that we are moving to establish
-a healthy balance between the degree of oversight which
will, ensure proper intelligence activity and the degree
of secrecy by which permit necessary intelligence
.operations to be protected. But it will be two or
three years before we shake this process out and
establish just how those relationships are going to
function best. During that time, we are going to
need the understanding and support of the Congress
and that of course means the support and understanding
of the American people.
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Accordingly, we are now reappraising the
traditional outlook toward secrecy, toward relationships
with the public. We are adopting a policy of more
openness, in.the hope that we can be more forthright
at the same time as we ensure preservation of that
secrecy which is absolutely fundamental. As a
first step we've tried to be more accessible to the
media. We have appeared on Good Morning America, 60 Minutes,
Time magazine. Also we are trying to respond more
candidly to inquiries from the media. We try to give
substantive, meaningful answers whenever we can, within
the limits of necessary secrecy.
But perhaps of'more interest to those of
you who are concerned with international affairs, we
are trying today to share more of the product of the
intelligence effort. More of the analyses, the estimates,
the studies that we do. It is our policy to carefully
examine every study we do, whether it is secret,
top secret, or destroy before reading to determine if
it can be reduced to unclassified form and still be
useful to the public. If it can be done, we feel we
have an obligation to print it and publish it. We
are doing that to the maximum extent we can. We hope
they will be of value and perhaps help improve the
general. quality and tenor of debate on major issues
effecting our country.
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You may have heard last March of our study
on the world energy outlook. We have recently done
another one on the world steel prospects - whether
there is over-capacity; what the expected demand may
be. We have published studies on the Chinese and
Soviet energy prospects. And, under the egis of
the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, last July
we published one on the outlook for the Soviet economy
itself. Let me describe that very briefly to give
you the flavor of what we think we can put out in
unclassified form.
Previously, the CIA has looked at the Soviet
economy and felt that generally it had the capability
to achieve three things:-
1) to sustain the level of military
growth that would permit them to
catch up with us generally;
to make improvements, if not
spectacular improvements, in the
quality of life inside the Soviet
Union.; and
3) to sustain enough investment to
carry on a generally growing economy.
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Our most recent study reexamines these premises and
comes to the conclusion that the outlook for the Soviet
economy is bleaker today than at any time since the
death of Stalin. This is based on our belief that the
Soviets have maintained their levels of productivity
over these many years primarily by infusing large quantities
of labor and capitol. We believe they are coming to
.a dead end, here. For example, in the 1960?s they had a
very big drop in their birth rate. In the 1980's the
rate of growth of their labor force will drop correspondingly
from about 1.5% to about 0.5%. They will not be able to
find the additional labor to keep up their productivity.
Also, a lot of the growth of their labor force today
is coming from the central Asian areas of the Soviet
Union where there is serious resistance to the idea of
migration to the big cities.
Secondly, their resources are becoming more
scarce. They must reach further into the Siberian wasteland
for minerals. This is more difficult and more costly.
Less petroleum can be brought in than before because
their emphasis in recent years has been on current
production at the expense of developing reserves and
new supplies.
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Now. if you look carefully at the Soviet's own'
five year development plan, you will see that they themselves
predict they will not be able to infuse the same amount
of capitol or labor as they have in the past. However, they
do conclude that somehow and nonetheless they will increase
productivity. We don't think that is in the cards. We see
no-sign of increasing efficiency, nor any sign of a willingness
to become less shackled to the economic doctrines which are
fundamental to their growth problem. Instead, we think
that between now and the early 1980's the Soviets are
going to be faced with some difficult pragmatic choices:
(1) There may be a debate over the size
or the amount of investment in their
armed forces. Clearly, this is one
avenue to find labor and capitol.
(2) Another may be over whether they will
continue to fulfill their promises
for the delivery of oil to their
Eastern European satellites. From
exports of 1.6 Mbbl ~to E. Europe,
they may have to reduce to something
like 800,000 bbl. That would mean an
increased oil bill for E. Europe of
$6-7B/yr in probable 1983 prices.
Will they be able to afford to do
this when it becomes more and more
difficult for them to obtain hard currency?
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(3) And third, how will they obtain the
necessary foreign exchange to sustain
the rate of infusion of American and
Western technology which they are
currently depending upon to increase
$ improve their economic position?
The Soviet hard currency debt is
$16B and E. Europe's is $24B. Both
are rising rapidly.- an annual rate of
$54B/yr. since 1973.
Interestingly, when they face these and other
decisions, there is a high probability that they will
be in the midst of a major leadership change. It could be a
very difficult time for them. It may go very smoothly if they
made the right decisions-and are willing to sacrifice other
things; we just can't tell.
One of the important points that comes out of
all this is that we believe as they make these policy decisions,
it will not be remote from you and me, it will be important
to us both. What they do with their armed forces obviously
impacts on what we do with ours. What they do with their oil
inputs to the Eastern European countries and whether that area
remains politically stable is going to have major impact on the
events throughout the European scene. If there is too much
competition for energy because they don't produce what they need
will affect the world supply and price of petroleum. If they
enter the money markets in an attempt to borrow more from us and
others in the West what will be our response? What will be our policy
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Now let me say that when we produce a study
like this we are not so confident that we present it
as the future revealed. We are merely providing our
best reading of the clues we see. We expect others may
disagree with us. But this too is productive. A good
debate generates a good dialogue on important issues.
When we did the oil study last March, for instance, it was
criticized in the press. We then,wrote to the professors,
the oil companies, to think-tanks which had critized
our conclusions and we asked them to detail their
criticisms for us. Those who did we invited to come
into the Agency for a day of discussions with the
authors of the study. A very interesting and stimulating
dialogue resulted from which both sides benefited. We
hope that as more of our studies come off the press,
we will increase our dialogue with the public.
However, let me assure you, while we're on
this subject of openness that we cannot and we will not
open up everything. There clearly must be some secrets
which remain. Some of the information behind the Soviet
oil and economic studies clearly was derived from very
sensitive sources which would dry up if they were revealed.
Thus, it is important to remember'that while we move
ahead, increasing a public dialogue and trying to-build
public understanding and respect for what we are doing,
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we must also obtain the public's understanding that
a level of secrecy must be preserved.
In short, we're moving in two directions at
once today. On one hand we are opening up more. But,
in that process we expect to protect those secrets which
remain better classified. When too much is classified
it is not respected. The other direction we are moving
is to tighten. the barriers of security around what
must be kept secret.
And in so doing, we are trying to develop a
model of intelligence uniquely tailored to this country,
which balances an increased emphasis on openness with a
firmer resolves to preserve that which is truly secret.
The model emphasizes the-continued necessity of providing
good information to our policy-makers while at the same time
responding to effective control.
I am confident, that although this model is
still evolving, it will guarantee that. necessary intel-
ligence operations are carried out only in ways which
will in the long run strengthen our open and free society.
Thank you very much.
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 Approved For Release 2006/08/02 : CIA-RDP80MOO165AO02500040036-5
MEMORANDUM
FROM
SUBJECT . Director's Public Speeches
NFAC
Robert R. Bowie
Director, NFAC
Room 7E44, Headquarters Bldg.
Dr. Sayre Stevens
Deputy Director, NFAC
Room 7E44, Headquarters Bldg.
I I
Associate irector- Management
Room 7E62, Headquarters Bldg.
Richard Lehman
Associate Director - Substantive Support
Room 7E62, Headquarters Bldg.
John Kerry King
Director, Office of Regional & Political Analysis
Room 6G00, Headquarters Bldg.
Karl H. Weber
Director, Office of Scientific Intelligence
Room 6F20, Headquarters Bldg.
James P. Lynch
Director, Office of Geographic & Cartographic Research
Room 1206, Ames Bldg.
Harry C. Eisenbeiss
Director, Office of Central Reference
Room 2E60, Headquarters Bldg.
I
Chief, Current Reporting Group
Room 7G25, Headquarters Bldg.
Evans Hineman
Director, Office of Weapons Intelligence
Room 5F46, Headquarters Bldg.
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Page -2-
Maurice C. Ernst
Director, Office of Economic Research
Room 4F18, Headquarters Bldg.
Noel E. Firth
Analysis
Director, Office of Image I
I Room 3N109,
Sidney N. Graybeal
Director, Office of Strategic Research
Room 3G00, Headquarters Bldg.
STAT
Chief, Publications & Presentations Group
Room 7G00, Headquarters Bldg.
Vincent J. Heyman
Chief, CIA Operations Center
Room 7F17, Headquarters Bldg.
Anthony A. Lapham, General Counsel
Office of General Counsel
Room 7DO1, Headquarters Bldg.
George L. Cary, Legislative Counsel
Office of Legislative Counsel
Room 7D49, Headquarters Bldg.
John Waller, Inspector General
Office of Inspector General
Room 6E08, Headquarters Bldg.
James H. Taylor, Comptroller
Office of the Comptroller
Room 4E42, Headquarters Bldg.
Omega J. C. Ware, Jr.
Director, Office of Equal Employment Opportunity
Room 5E47, Headquarters Bldg.
Herbert E. Hetu
Asst. to Director for Public. Affairs
Room 1F04, Headquarters Bldg.
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Page -3-
Benjamin C. Evans
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretariat
Room 7E13, Headquarters Bldg.
John F. Blake
Acting Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Room 7D6011, Headquarters Bldg.
Michael J. Malanick
Acting Deputy Director for Administration
Room 7D24, Headquarters Bldg.
Director, Office of Communications
Room 2A03,
D
Thomas B. Yale
Director, Office of Finance
Room 1212, Key Building
Clifford D. May
Director, Office of Data Processing
Room 2D00, Headquarters Bldg.
James H. McDonald
Director, Office of Logistics
Room 2C02,
Charles A. Bohrer
Director, Office of Medical Services
Room 1D4061, Headquarters Bldg.
Fred W. M. Janney
Director, Office of Personnel
Room 5E58, Headquarters Bldg.
Robert W. Gambino
Director, Office of Security
Room 4E60, Headquarters Bldg.
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Page -4-
Harry E. Fitzwater
Director, Office of Training
Room 1026, Chamber of Commerce Bldg.
DDS&T
Leslie C. Dirks
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Room 6E60, Headquarters Bldg.
Edward M. Ryan
Director, Office of SIGINT Operations
Room 7B44, Headquarters Bldg.
Philip K. Eckman
Director, Office of Research and Development
Room 606, Ames Bldg.
Donald L. Haas
Director, Office of Development & Engineering
Room '6B00, Headquarters Bldg.
John J. Hicks
Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center
Room 6N100,
David S. Brandwein
Director, Office of Technical Services
Room 203, South Building
Director, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
Room 1013, Key Building
William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
Room 7E26, Headquarters Bldg.
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Page -5-
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff
Room 2C43, Headquarters Bldg.
Chief, Evaluation and Program Design Staff
Room 2D32, Headquarters Bldg.
Eloise Page
Chief, Policy and Coordination Staff
Room 2D48, Headquarters Bldg.
William F. Donnelly
Chief, Information Services Staff
Room 1D4124, Headquarters Bldg.
Room GH56, Headquarters B g.
Chief, Career Management Staff
Room 3C43, Headquarters Bldg.
Room Headquarters BTdg-
Room 2B1415, Headquarters Bldg.
Chief, Africa Division
Room 3B21, Headquarters Bldg.
Chief, East Asia Division
5D00, Headquarters Bldg.
I
zie , European ivision
4B4405, Headquarters Bldg.
Room 3C17, Headquarters Bldg.
STAT
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Page -6-
Chief, Near East & South Asia Division
6D3107, Headquarters Bldg.
Chief, Soviet East European Division
Room 5B4803, Headquarters Bldg.
Tnier, Latin America Division
Room 3C2019, Headquarters Bldg.
Room 912, Key Building
DDO PANEL
Room 3B2606, Headquarters Bldg.
Room 2B44, Headquarters Bldg.
I I
eadquarters Bldg.
I oom eadquarters Bldg.
Room 3B2631, Headquarters Bldg.
I
Dorn a Headquarters Bldg.
Room 3C29, Headquarters Bldg.
Room 5C32, Headquarters Bldg.
STAT
STAT
STAT.
ST-AT-
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