CONTACTS WITH THE PRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A002400150014-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 182
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: August 16, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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STAT
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PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Phone: [phone]
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Mr. Richard C. Bjorklund
Executive Editor
Lerner Newspapers
7519 North Ashland
Chicago, Illinois 60626*
Dear Mr. Bjorklund,
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
August 16, 1977
Admiral Turner has asked me to thank you for your letter of
August 2nd. He will be in the Chicago area in mid-November, but
the schedule is still somewhat uncertain. In any event, we will
be happy to cooperate if at all possible. I will give you a call
when our trip plans become firm to see if we can work out a
mutually agreeable date and time.
In the meantime, I am enclosing a biography of Admiral Turner
and some additional information on the CIA which I hope you will
find useful. Please let me know if we can assist in any other way.
Sincerely,
Assistant to the Director
(Public Affairs)
Enclosures
Biography of Admiral Turner
Central Intelligence Agency Information Kit
A/DCl/PAO:HEHetu/mee
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UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL I J SECRET
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TO:
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Routing Slip
ACTION
INFO
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L 'Mee 69tititibil
7519 North Ashland ChicagolL60626 312 761-7200
August 2, 1977
Admiral Stanfield Turner
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20506
Dear Admiral Turner:
?MOO
00240015
Our publisher, Louis Lerner, met with You today and passed on to us
the word that YOU are a Highland Parker and that You will be in Chi-
cago later this Year.
We are eager to have a hometown interview with You, one that would
cover Your residency in Highland Park, Your military career and the .
challenges of your present position.
Please have Your staff contact us about the dates of Your upcoming
visit to the Chicago area and we will arrange our schedule to the
time You have available.
Sincerely,
.0zilettJ
Richard C. Biorklund
Executive Editor
RCB:ek
cc: Lou Lerner
LINCOLNIBELMONT BOOSTER
LINCOLN PARK;
LAKEVIEW BOOSTER
NORTHCENTER,
IRVING PARK BOOSTER
THE BOOSTER-MAIL EDITION
SKYLINE
THE SUNDAY BOOSTER
viael
UPTOWN NEWS
RAVENSWOOCKLINCOLNITE
RAVENSWOOD NEWS
ALBANY PARK NEWS
NORTH TOWN NEWS
ROGERS.PARKI
EDGEVVATER NEWS
THE SUNDAY STAR
? ,
HIGHLAND PARKIHIGHWOODI HA.RLEM/IRVING TIMES
FT, SHERIDAN LIFE ? ? , HARLEM/FOSTER TIMES
DEERFIELD/LINCOLNSHIRE LIFE SCHILLER PARK TIMES
NORTHBROOK/ JEFFERSONMAYFAIR TIMES
NORT4FIELD LIFE PORTAGE PARK TIMES
WHEELING! LOGAN SQUARE TIMES
BUFFALO GROVE LIFE NORTHLAKE TIMES
GLENVIEW LIFE FRANKLIN PARK TIMES
LAKE FOREST!
LAKE COUNTY LIFE
PROVISO TIMES
RIVER GROVE TIMES
ELM WOOD PARK TIMES
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NORTHWEST SUNDAY TIMES
THE SKOKIE LIFE
LINCOLNWOOD LIFE
MORTON GROVE LIFE
THE NILES LIFE
DES PLAINES'EAST MAIN LIFE
THE SUNDAY LIFE
VOICE OF ELK GROVE VILLAGE
VOICE OF BENSENVILLE.
WOOD DALE
VOICE OF ADDISON
VOICE OF iTASCAIROSELLE.
BLOOMINGDALEMEDINAH
VOICE OF SCHAUMBURG
VOICE OF HOFFMAN ESTATES
VOICE OF HANOVER PARK
VOICE OF STREAM,NOOD
BARTLETT
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
[phone]
Herbert E. Hetu
Assistant for Public Affairs
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STAT
es..???????6m.osoe
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Be attached'invitation. -- you have this to give to
DCI. Mr. Fulker called me on 10 August to see if we
knew whether DCI could do this; I said DCI was out of the
city until 19 August. Fulker explained that they need to
get letters out early to ensure a large crowd; he asked if
there were any way to get an earlier decision. I said the
only thing I could do for him is to ask Mr. Hetu to call
him next week but that I was not sure Mr. Hetu would even
be able to give him an answer. I have passed this mes-
sage on to Mr. Hetu's office; suggest you call him to see
what action he takes.
Barbara
12 Aug 77
Date
FO., to' LI ESDITILVSIOUS
5
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AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
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National Capital Area Chapter
Exetrutivo Bogiatry
Suite 227, National Press Building, Washington, D.C. 20045 202/447-3247
OFFICERS 1977-78
President
Edmund N. Fulker
Vice Presidents
Nanette Blandin
Eileen Siedman
Treasurer
Wayne Leshe
Secretary
John Warren
COUNCIL
Dana Baggett
Enld Beaumont
Paul R. Brockman
Herrington J. Bryce
Merrill Collett
Sally A. Ehrle
Michael J. Halperin
William J. Long
Alan H. Magazine
Bradley H. Patterson
Phyllis Wiesenfeider
Dona Wolf
PAST PRESIDENTS
Morris W. H. Collins, Jr.
Donald C. Kull
NATIONAL COUNCIL MEMBERS
Anita Alpern
A. Lee Fritschier
Dwight A. Ink
Glide Harris Jacobs
Fred A. Kahn
Ann C. Macaluso
Philip J. Rutledge
Graham W. Watt
COMMITTEES
Student Activities
Michael J. Halperin
Membership
John P. Giacomini
Publications
Harold Henderson
Semi-Retired Professionals
Ward Stewart
Training & Development
Rossiyn Kieeman
Woinen in P.A.
Raiford Gaffney
Young Professionals
Barry Brown
Tom Lambrix
Elaine Walker
Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Admiral Turner:
q
August 8, 1977
The National Capital Area Chapter of ASPA would be delighted
if you would accept our invitation to speak at the Chapter's
September luncheon meeting. We are interested in hearing your
views on the management of the U.S. intelligence community.
Previous speakers have included Alan Campbell, Chairman of
the United States Civil Service Commission and a member of
ASPA; William Coleman, then Secretary of Transportation;
Elmer Staats, Comptroller General of the United States, also
an ASPA member and Past President; and William Proxmire,
Senator from Wisconsin.
To accommodate your busy schedule, we are suggesting three
alternative dates for your consideration: Wednesday,
September 7; Thursday, September st; or Wednesday, September
_
21. Our preference is September 21.
The meeting will be held at Hogates Restaurant, 9th Street
and Maine Avenue, S.W.
Luncheon will be served promptly at 12 noon, preceded by
cocktails at 11:30 a.m. The meeting will begin at approxi-
mately 12:30, to allow sufficient time for your remarks and
_
for a question and answer period. We like to adjourn between
1:30 ani r:45 -p.m.
We are enclosing some ASPA materials for your information:
the latest issue of Public Administration Review; a copy of
the October 1976 monthly newsletter "News and Views," in
which President Carter and then President Ford, as candidates,
addressed the public administration community on "The
Management of the American Governmental System;" an ASPA
brochure which outlines ASPA's programs and activities; and
an organization chart.
Rig3984i0F4filtlet@fifiCak261345/0211/2rEP't cistiNt6rillgtneakOtW2lltiti1t541044-8
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Turner - page 2
The National Capital Area Chapter has 2200 members, many of
-
whom are top-level career public servants who are key to
implementing all new policies and programs.
Through our programs we try to provide a forum on timely new
policies and programs. Through our newsletter your remarks
will reach hundreds of additional officials in all government
agencies.
We hope you will be able to speak to us in September. Given
the time needed for publicity, we would appreciate hearing
from you as soon as possible. I will call your office on
August 10 for a reply.
Should you need any further information, call me on 447-3247,
or at home on 971-6354.
Thank you for your consideration of our invitition.
Enclosures
Sincerely,
Edmund N. N. Fulker
President
!,--rfb 4104
t,
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news
views
PUBLISHED BY THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Volume 26, No. 10
OCTOBER 1976
In September, P.A. News and Views invited Presidential Candidates Carter, Ford, Maddox, and McCarthy
to submit brief statements on the topic, "The Management of the American Governmental System."
Candidates Carter and Ford submitted statements prepared specifically for P.A. News and Views. Candidate
McCarthy submitted a press release and an excerpt from a previous speech dealing with the subject, and
Candidate Maddox thanked P.A. News and Views for the opportunity, but said he did not have the time
nor the staff to reply.
The following are the statements of three presidential candidates on:
THE MANAGEMENT OF
THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM
7
Jimmy Carter
On the campaign trail, a lot of
promises are made by candidates for
public office to improve economy and
efficiency in government if they are
elected. This pledge has a natural
appeal to the financially overburdened
taxpayer. But when winning candi-
dates take office, they too often find
that it's easier to talk about economy
and efficiency in government than to
accomplish it. I would like to share
with you some of my ideas on how to
carry out improved management of
the federal government.
The basic difficulty facing the fed-
eral government today cuts across all
other campaign issues. National prob-
lems and the government programs
and agencies intended to deal with
them have become incredibly com-
plex. To begin with, the federal gov-
ernment is ill-equipped to deal with a
See CARTER, page 3
President Gerald Ford
I commend the members of the
American Society for Public Adminis-
tration for your excellent work in
helping to improve public manage-
ment. I especially note with satisfac-
tion your educational programs and
efforts to exchange useful manage-
ment information and experience with
federal, state, and local governments.
The term "management" was not in
use at the time of the framing of the
Constitution, yet it is clear that man-
agement is what the drafters had in
mind when they vested the President
with the general executive powers and
charged him to "take care that the
laws be faithfully executed" (Art. II,
Sec. 3). This "take care" clause con-
veys particularly well the fundamental
responsibility of the President with
respect to the management functions
of planning, organizing, actuating, co-
See FORD, page 3
Eugene McCarthy
WASHINGTON, D.C., September 23,
1976 ? Independent presidential
candidate Eugene McCarthy today
characterized the Carter energy pro-
gram as misconceived and inadequate.
Said McCarthy, "There should be no
separate department of energy since
energy supplies, needs and use must be
a part of general resources policy,
which neither Ford nor Carter have."
McCarthy continued, "The need is for
a Department of Resources which
would include, along with energy, agri-
cultural production (not marketing),
forestry, mines and minerals."
The Resources Department would
be according to a projected reorganiza-
tion plan being prepared by the inde-
pendent McCarthy. He would propose
to reorganize the Executive Branch of
the government into five basic depart-
ments. The other four would be:
See McCARTHY, page 3
* * * * * * * * ?A. fr?. .
404 * * * * * * *
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Were You There?
(Being an inquiry into the birth of ASPA and attendant matters)
One of the advantages of ASPA's new membership
information system is the ability to determine, with the
push of a computer button, the date that various Society
members came into the organization.
ASPA must be doing something right these days, because
so many people seem to want to associate themselves with
our founding days. In fact, ASPA staffers often hear from
members who claim that they participated in the Society's
organizational meeting and are charter members. However,
to quote one former ASPA president, if every person who
claims to have been in on the founding meeting had
actually been there, there wouldn't have been a room big
enough in the hotel to hold them all!
Anyhow, at the request of Charter Member Albert R.
Rathert of Walnut Creek, California, we asked the com-
puter to come up with all current members who have
starting membership dates of 1939 or 1940. The machine
came up with 47 names of such original members, which
are listed later in this article.
Historical Background
As a bit of historical background, the "founding session"
of ASPA was described by Donald C. Stone, a former ASPA
president and Society historian, in his article "Birth of
ASPA ? A Collective Effort in Institution Building"
published in the January/February 1975 issue of the Public
Administration Review.
According to the article, 700 invitations were sent out
for an organizing conference which was held December 27
and 28, 1939, at the Wardman Park Hotel in Washington,
D.C., in conjunction with the annual meeting of the
American Political Science Association. It is interesting to
note that the 1976 ASPA National Conference, attended by
more than 2,500 persons, was held in the same hotel, now
known as the Sheraton Park Hotel.
Approximately 250 persons participated in this first
ASPA conference. To quote Dean Stone's article:
"An overflow turnout gathered at the opening luncheon,
chaired by Louis Brownlow. Professor Leonard D. White of
the University of Chicago described the British Institute of
Public Administration with special reference to its appli-
cability to the American scene. Luther Gulick, the major
theoretician for the new society, outlined the case for it.
Dean Mosher [Dean William E. Mosher of the Maxwell
School at Syracuse University] then reported on the steps
already taken and 'indicated the desirability and advantages
to those broadly interested in public administration of a
permanent society.' He made sure that everyone had a copy
of the proposed constitution and set the stage for formal
action in the evening."
That evening, after an afternoon of panel sessions and a
meeting of the Organization Committee where the member-
ship dues were set at $5 for full members, the constitution
was adopted, a slate of officers elected, including Dean
Mosher as the first president, and the new organization was
born.
According to Dean Stone's article, about 150 persons
applied for membership during the two-day conference.
Because ASPA membership records were kept by hand
until recently, and it is possible that during the computer
conversion some founding dates were dropped, the follow-
ing list contains only the names of those for whom we have
1939 or 1940 joining dates and continuous membership
since that time. Now here's your chance for ASPA
immortality (although we'll probably be bringing rainclouds
down on our own heads). If your name is not on the list
and you can demonstrate you are a founding member with
continuous membership since 1939 or 1940, please let us
know so that we can make our records more complete.
Current ASPA Founding Members
Lyndon Abbott, G. Lyle Belsley, George C. Benson,
Horatio Bond, John J. Corson, Edwin J. Crockin, J. Lyle
Cunningham, Manlio F. DeAngelis, Marshall Dimock, G.
Homer Durham, Rowland Egger, William 0. Farber, James
Fesler, Bernard L. Gladieux, Luther Gulick, Rolf N.
Haugen.
Daniel Kurshan, John D. Larkin, George W. Lawson,
Kendall I. Lingle, Elwin A. Mauck, William F. McCandless,
Clifton McCleskey, Frederick C. Mosher, Lionel V. Murphy,
Holtan P. Odegard, Emery E. Olson, Enar B. Olson, William
W. Parsons, Don K. Price, C.H. Pritchett, Albert R. Rathert,
Robert H. Rawson.
Emmette S. Redford, Leonard Reichle, Henry Reining,
Jr., Harold Seidman, Irving E. Sheffel, Lloyd M. Short,
Elmer B. Staats, 0. Glenn Stahl, Donald C. Stone, Harold
A. Stone, Stephen Sweeney, Carl W. Tiller, Paul P. Van
Riper, and Robert A. Walker.
Volume 26, No. 10 ASPA News & Views OCTOBER 1976
Published monthly. ?1976 by the American Society for Public Administration, 1225 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036. 1976 subscription: $12.00. Second class postage paid at Washington, D.C. and at additional
mailing offices.
Editor: Keith F. Mulrooney
Director of Communications: Barbara Byers Judd
P.A. News & Views Advisory Group: Raymond Bancroft, Leigh Grosenick, Edward Pazicky, and Wanda C. Woolcot.
PA NEWS & VIEWS, OCTOBER 1976
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CARTER, from page 1
growing number of problems that
transcend departmental jurisdictions.
For example, foreign and domestic
issues are becoming more interrelated;
domestic prosperity and international
relations are affected by our foreign
agricultural policy, by raw materials
and oil policies, and by our export
policies, among others. We must de-
velop a policy-making and manage-
ment machinery that transcends
narrow perspectives and deals with
complex problems on a comprehen-
sive, systematic basis.
In addition, the proliferation of
programs and agencies, particularly in
the past ten years, has inevitably
created duplications, waste, and in-
efficiencies. There are over 83 federal
housing programs, 302 federal health
programs, and over 1,200 assorted
commissions, councils, boards, com-
mittees, and the like. We must under-
take a thorough revision and reorgani-
zation of the federal bureaucracy, its
budgeting system, and the procedures
for analyzing the effectiveness of its
services.
The first step is to reshape the way
we make federal spending decisions.
The federal government should be
committed to requiring zero-base bud-
geting by all federal agencies. Each
program, other than income support
programs such as social security,
should be required to justify both its
continued existence and its level of
funding. We need to continue and
expand programs that work and to
discontinue those that do not. Without
such a comprehensive review, it will be
difficult to assess priorities and im-
possible to redirect expenditures away
from areas showing relatively less
success.
The heart of zero-base budgeting is
decision packages, which are prepared
by managers at each level of govern-
ment, from the top to the bottom.
These packages cover every existing or
proposed function of activity of each
agency. The packages include analysis
of the cost, purpose, alternative
courses of action, measures of per-
formance, consequences of not per-
forming the activity, and benefits.
See CARTER, page 4
FORD, from page 1
ordinating, and controlling, which are
the necessary consequences of faithful
and efficient execution of the nation's
laws governing Executive Branch
activities.
Over the course of almost 200
years, the role of the federal govern-
ment has expanded and grown more
complex. Each year new laws are
passed by Congress which make the
jobs of both the Congress and Presi-
dent more demanding. This is a direct
reflection of what has happened in the
country ? the United States is a far
larger, more complicated nation than
that perceived by the founding fathers,
and it demands a far more sophisti-
cated federal government to admin-
ister national affairs.
Each President must cope with this
complexity within the continuing
constitutional framework of checks
and balances. As President, I have
pursued a broad range of initiatives in
a constant effort to improve the
quality of management in the federal
government. My commitment to im-
proved management of the govern-
mental system is fully demonstrated in
my legislative and budget programs. A
few examples illustrate that commit-
ment:
? I have proposed reform of the
regulatory process to make regulatory
agencies more effective and efficient in
order to better serve the needs of the
American people.
? I have placed increased emphasis
on improving management in connec-
tion with the annual budget process.
The yearly instructions to the agencies
on developing their budget recom-
mendations now require the agencies
to do a better job in identifying
program objectives, reducing paper-
work, and assessing effects of infla-
tion.
? I placed before the Congress in
January legislative proposals to con-
solidate 58 categorical programs into
four block grants. Together these 58
programs account for over $18 billion
in federal spending for health, educa-
tion, social services, and child nutri-
tion. The defects in these programs
and the obvious need for reform have
been well documented.
PA NEWS & VIEWS, OCTOBER 1976
McCARTHY,from page 1
?Commerce, which would include ag-
ricultural marketing, transportation,
banking, regulatory agencies, postal
services, housing, and labor.
?Justice, largely as now operating,
with additional responsibility in the
handling of tax cases.
?Foreign Affairs, which would include
both State Department and military
operations.
?Finance Department.
Finally, Eugene McCarthy would
limit the number of independent
executive offices which are self-con-
tained and can be operated outside
normal channels to those principally
concerned with state, local, and fed-
eral government relationships.
The following are excerpts from an
address given by Senator McCarthy to
the 4th Annual AFL-CIO National
Conference on Community Services in
Chicago, Illinois, on June 1, 1959:
"We are guided by the fundamental
rule of social philosophy, the principle
of subsidiarity: that government
should leave to individuals and private
groups those functions which they can
efficiently perform for themselves. But
at the same time we must realize the
right, the duty, of government to
intervene when basic human welfare is
at stake."
? I have directed a comprehensive
review of energy organization to assure
the most effective long-term structure
for managing energy and energy-
related functions. The Energy Re-
organization Act of 1974 established
the Energy Research and Development
Administration and the Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission, and the Federal
Energy Administration Act established
the Federal Energy Administration to
deal with the oil embargo and the
energy crisis. It is generally recognized,
however, that these actions were
interim measures and that a more
comprehensive plan would be neces-
sary to deal with the entire range of
federal energy problems.
? I have placed increased emphasis
on intergovernmental relations
See FORD, page 4
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CARTER, from page 3
These packages are then ranked in
order of importance against other
current and new activities, as a basis
for determining what functions and
activities are to be recommended for
funding in the new budget.
Besides placing priority on spending
programs and revealing more informa-
tion about actual governmental opera-
tions, zero-base budgeting achieves one
more important action: it forces
planning into levels of government
where planning may never have
existed. It forces all levels of govern-
ment to find better ways of accom-
plishing their missions.
Second, we must commit ourselves
to a greater reliance upon long-term
planning budgets. I propose that we
adopt a three-year rolling budget tech-
nique to facilitate careful, long-term
planning and budgeting. Too many of
our spending decisions are focused just
beyond our noses on next year's ap-
propriations. "Uncontrollable" spend-
ing is only uncontrollable in the short
run; spending can be controlled if the
planning system builds in more lead
time. The three-year rolling budget
technique will also permit businessmen
and public officials at the state and
local levels to do a much better job in
laying out their own plans, relying less
on the need for more elaborate pro-
posals of comprehensive planning.
Third, reforming the budget and
planning process will not be enough
unless we are also committed to in-
suring that programs are carried out
with efficiency. Improving govern-
ment's performance will require action
on at least two other levels. We must
undertake the basic structural reforms
necessary to streamline federal opera-
tions and to make the government
efficient once again. And we need
increased program evaluation. Many
programs fail to define with any
specificity what they intend to accom-
plish. In Georgia, we applied rigorous
performance standards and per-
formance auditing. Such standards,
which are working in state capitols
around the nation and in successful
businesses, should be adapted for use
in federal departments and agencies.
Fourth, we must take steps to help
insure that we have an open and
honest government as well as an effi-
cient and effective government. An
all-inclusive "Sunshine Law," similar
to those passed in several states,
should be implemented in Washington.
With narrowly defined exceptions,
meetings of federal boards, commis-
sions, and regulatory agencies should
be opened to the public. Broad public
access, consonant with the right of
personal privacy, should be provided
to government files.
The activities of lobbyists must be
much more thoroughly revealed and
controlled, both with respect to Con-
gress and the Executive departments
and agencies. Quarterly reports of ex-
penditures by all lobbyists who spend
more than $250 in lobbying in any
three-month period should be re-
quired. The sweetheart arrangement
between regulatory agencies and the
regulated industries must be broken
up, and the revolving door between
them should be closed. Federal legisla-
tion should restrict the employment of
any member of a regulatory agency by
the industry being regulated for a set
period of time.
Thus our first priority must be to
improve both the process and struc-
ture of government. We seek a govern-
ment that is efficient and effective,
open and honest, and compassionate
in achieving justice and meeting our
critical national needs. Reorganization
is not a dry exercise of moving around
boxes in an organizational chart. It is a
creative venture toward the better
direction of the energies and resources
of our government.
The reform I am seeking is not a
retreat; it is a marshalling of our
resources to meet the challenges of the
last quarter of this century. The prob-
lem is not that program goals are
unworthy; it is not that our public
servants are unfit. What is at fault is
that the structure and process of our
government have not kept up with the
times and a changing society.
In our fast moving world, the rela-
tionships among societal factors are
indeed difficult to understand. In-
creases in world population, food
shortages, environmental deteriora-
See CARTER, page 5
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FORD, from page 3
through improved policy guidance and
strengthening the Federal Regional
Councils. I look to the Federal Coun-
cils as a major force in our efforts to
make government more efficient and
responsive to the needs of the Ameri-
can people.
? I have proposed reform of the
so-called Impact Aid Program. This
initiative would ensure that school
districts that are adversely affected by
federal activities would receive off-
setting support. At the same time, my
proposal would not provide support
where there are ancillary economic
benefits provided through a federal
presence or where there is no true
burden resulting from federal activi-
ties.
? I have directed the establishment
of a management orientation program
for non-career executives who are new
to the Executive Branch. The program
has been established and is currently
operational. This is a White House/
OMB/Civil Service Commission enter-
prise which, through seminars and
special reading materials, ensures that
non-career executives, as they take
office, are very well informed about
how the Executive Branch and its
central staff institutions work at the
top level.
These are but a few of many, many
examples where specific action has
been proposed or taken to improve the
governmental system. Perhaps the
most important part of the total effort
is our continuing work with the de-
partments and agencies to "build in"
effective management principles and
practices in their major programs.
Using the budget process, the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) cir-
culars, and a variety of other tech-
niques, we seek better program plan-
ning, clearer definition of program
objectives, detailed, well-designed
implementation plans and procedures,
effective evaluation of programs,
tighter financial controls, and im-
proved management systems to sup-
port decision making.
The ongoing Presidential Manage-
ment Initiatives effort, for which I
have charged the Director of OMB to
See FORD, page 5
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Federal Employment Application Forms
Eliminate Questions on Organization Memberships
Applicants for positions with the federal government
will no longer be required to answer questions pertaining to
membership in organizations when they fill out Standard
Form 171 and other applications for federal employment,
the U.S. Civil Service Commission has announced.
The decision to discontinue using the questions followed
extensive consultation with the Justice Department, the
Commission noted. Although revised several times, the
questions have been held by the courts to be overbroad in
that routine use of the questions for all applicants
encroaches on rights of association which are protected by
the First Amendment.
Historically, questions regarding affiliation with organi-
zations were designed to elicit information regarding
membership in the Communist Party or other totalitarian
organizations. The Commission noted that the decision to
drop the so-called loyalty questions from federal employ-
ment applications does not lessen the Commission's respon-
sibility during the course of the required investigative
process to inquire into, and resolve, any question of loyalty
with respect to federal applicants and appointees.
The questions will be deleted from application forms
when they are revised, the Commission announced. In the
meantime, instructions have been sent to Commission
examining offices to inform all applicants in writing not to
answer those questions on existing forms.
CARTER, from page 4
tion, depletion of irreplaceable com-
modities, trade barriers and price
disruptions, arms buildups, arguments
over control of the seas, and many
other similar problems are each one
serious in itself, but each has a com-
plicating effect on the others.
As I stated at the outset, we must
develop a policy-making and manage-
ment machinery that transcends
narrow perspectives and deals with
complex problems on a comprehen-
sive, systematic basis. Whether the
issue is the cities, tax reform, energy,
or transportation, I am committed to
forging a federal government which
can successfully manage the modern
complexities of America's third cen-
tury.
FORD, from page 4
provide leadership, is an illustration of
this point. At my direction, nearly all
departments and agencies are currently
seeking ways to improve their decision-
making processes and organizational
structures, to obtain better evaluations
of their programs, to reduce the bur-
dens imposed by federal reporting and
regulations, to hold down overhead
costs, to increase the use of the private
sector in carrying out program func-
tions, and to improve personnel man-
agement. These steps may appear
unexciting to those who are constantly
looking for dramatic new policy
initiatives, but in the long run, the key
to effective government is to make the
programs we already have live up to
their promise, by conducting them in
an efficient and effective manner.
THE PRESIDENT'S CABINET: ISSUES AND QUESTIONS
BRADLEY H. PATTERSON, JR., a federal career executive with over 13 years' White House
service, has written a provocative paper . . . one that will remain a landmark in the field for years
to come.
Inside this remarkable work you will read:
o How should department heads be selected? What are the attributes a President looks for?
What is their relative importance?
o Cabinet officers are torn in many directions by for forces which demand attention and
deference. What are they?
o The Presidential staff and cabinet members tend to have markedly different perspectives.
What is the significance of this?
o Cabinet officers have to work together. What are the methods and which ones are most
effective?
o President and Cabinet together. How did earlier Presidents regard their Cabinet meetings?
What were the Eisenhower innovations? How did they work and in what four ways were
they effective? What are the three basic modes of a President using his Cabinet?
Send $4.00 (ASPA member price $3.50) to Publications Business Manager, American Society for Public
Administration, 1225 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 300, Washington, D.C. 20036.
o Please send copy(s) of THE PRESIDENT'S CABINET.
Name
Address
City
State Zip
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New HEW Guidelines Pending on Prohibiting
Discrimination Because of Physical Handicaps
The Office for Civil Rights of the U.S. Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare has proposed new regula-
tions, expected to become effective in early 1977, designed
to fulfill its responsibility under section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to insure that programs and
activities funded by HEW are free of unfair discrimination
on the basis of a handicap condition.
The section provides that "no otherwise qualified
handicapped individual in the United States ... shall, solely
by reason of his handicap, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance."
Section 504 is similar to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972. It differs, however, from both these civil rights
statutes in that it applies to discrimination based on
handicap. It differs from Title IX in that it applies to all
programs and activities receiving federal financial assist-
ance, and from Title VI in the extent to which it applies to
employment practices.
There are a wide variety of recipients of HEW-adminis-
tered federal financial assistance including approximately
16,000 elementary and secondary school districts, 2,700
higher education institutions, 7,000 hospitals, 4,000 skilled
nursing facilities, and almost all state and local agencies
dealing with health, education or welfare.
The Department's May 17, 1976, Federal Register notice
resulted in over 300 written comments directed to a wide
range of issues raised by the proposed regulations, ranging
from the question of what constitutes "reasonable accom-
modation" actions to allow a handicapped person to
perform, to the question of what steps funding recipients
must take to make handicapped persons with impaired
sensory or speaking skills aware of available social services.
Wide Variety of Opinion
While the comments received reflected little disagree-
ment over the goals of the proposed regulations, as might
be expected, there was a wide variety of opinion over the
question of what measures should be employed to achieve
the goals. For example, at least one federal agency, the U.S.
Civil Service Commission, submitted comments indicating a
belief that one proposed regulation would not only be
impractical, if adopted, but also might actually serve to
undermine the objective of eliminating employment criteria
which may unfairly discriminate against the handicapped.
Section 84.13 (a), which is almost identical to the parallel
section of the Title IX regulation and to the EEOC
regulations, provides that no test criterion for employment
that has a disproportionate, adverse effect on the employ-
ment of handicapped persons or any class of handicapped
persons may be used unless it has been validated as a
predictor of performance in the position in question and
PA NEWS & VIEWS, OCTOBER 1976
alternative tests that do not have such a disproportionate
effect are unavailable. This standard is based upon the
principle established under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.
In its comments in response to HEW's May 17, 1976,
notice, the Commission recommended against any proposal
to pattern employment selection guidelines for handi-
capped persons along those established under Title VII by
EEOC for minorities and women, strongly recommended
against adoption of section 84.13 as presently drafted, and
cited several problems with the proposed approach.
The Commission argued that without sufficient numbers
of handicapped individuals in the work force and candidate
population it is impossible statistically to determine
whether there is an adverse effect. The problem of
determining who among the candidate population and work
force are handicapped was also cited as a drawback.
Furthermore, the Commission argued, the problem is
compounded by the different and sometimes multiple
disabling conditions which are considered separately, since
the extent and even existence of adverse affect for an
examination depends largely on the nature of the handicap.
The Commission feels that if this is indeed a proper
interpretation of the proposed regulation, that reasonable
criteria for making determinations will not be available.
Another problem cited by the Commission was the
possibility that the necessity of defending the validity of
selection methods, even when affirmative action is taking
place, may result in the adoption by employers of a
defensive posture rather than a positive, cooperative one.
For example, employers may resist restructuring jobs so
that handicapped persons can perform the duties that
comprise the essential nature of the work. In the Commis-
sion's view, if the job substance is altered, the validation
would have to be redone, and an average cost for a
predictive validity study may be over $40,000 per job.
The staffs of both the Office for Civil Rights of the
Department of Health Education and Welfare and the Civil
Service Commission planned to meet in late September to
clarify further their positions and attempt to arrive at a
workable, effective means of insuring equal employment
opportunity for handicapped individuals.
Reasonable Accommodation
Many of the more than 300 comments received by HEW
pertained to "reasonable accommodation," a concept
which represents an attempt to draw the line between
persons who, except for their inability to perform certain
job-related tasks in the normal manner because of their
handicap, would be fully qualified to perform the job in
question, and persons who, despite reasonable accommoda-
tion, would be unable to perform an essential aspect of the
job.
See HEW, page 18
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Changing Direction of Public Employment Law
By Carl F. Goodman*
In a series of recent Supreme Court
decisions ? some reflecting bitter dis-
agreement among the Justices, others
such unanimity that only a summary
order or per curium opinion was called
for ? the high Court this past year
dramatically affected the law of public
personnel administration. Most of the
cases related directly to state or local
employee/employer relations; and, except for a mixed
record in the equal employment opportunity area and one
case in the field of political belief, the employer was
successful in upholding its management prerogatives. This
"track record" is not without significance in and of itself,
but more specifically several perceptible trends appear in
the Court's decisions.
The Court exhibited a growing concern for the right of
locally elected officials to deal with personnel questions.
Thus, in one case, after accepting the proposition that
under local law striking school teachers are entitled to a fair
hearing before discharge, the Court stressed that such a
hearing must be fair and must be presided over by an
unbiased adjudicator. The Justices found, however, that the
locally elected school board may be sufficiently impartial
for this purpose, even though it was the breakdown in
teacher/board negotiations which precipitated the strike.
The school board had been elected to run school district
affairs and was granted authority to dismiss teachers under
state law ? under such circumstances the presumption of
honesty and integrity of public officials carrying out their
duties overcame the presumed bias arising out of the
board's intimate involvement in the strike (Hortonville
Joint School District v. Hortonville Education Ass'n).
This disposition to uphold the management prerogatives
of state and local public employees was given further
expression in a decision in which the Court found that the
federal government lacks authority under the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution to legislate wages and hours for
state and local employees. According to the Court, internal
government operation is matter reserved to state sov-
ereignty under the 10th Amendment (National League of
Cities v. Usery ? the NLC case). Yet, temporary federal
measures designed to combat a national emergency, such as
a temporary wage freeze to deal with nationwide inflation,
may be permitted.
The ripple effect of the National League of Cities case is
as yet unknown, although it would clearly appear applica-
ble to any federal attempt to mandate local public
*The views expressed herein are those of the author and not
necessarily those of the U.S. Civil Service Commission. Carl F.
Goodman is general counsel of the U.S. Civil Service Commission
and adjunct professor of law at Georgetown University Law
Center. He has previously served with the U.S. Department of
Justice, U.S. Department of State, and was associated with the
Law Firm of Surrey, Karasik and Morse.
employee collective bargaining or to legislate concerning
strikes by such employees. Moreover, while NLC dealt with
only one part of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the logic of
the opinion should be applicable to other portions of the
Act such as the extension of the Age Discrimination in
Employment provisions ? a matter of great significance
since the Supreme Court upheld Massachusetts' mandatory
retirement at age 50 for police officers (Massachusetts
Board of Retirement v. Murgia). NLC does not, however,
completely prohibit federal legislation affecting state em-
ployment ? it affects legislation passed under the authority
of the Commerce Clause; legislation to carry out the Equal
Protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment may
be supported by the grant of legislative authority found in
that Amendment, since the Amendment was expressly
aimed at state action (Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer).
Greater Discretion to Local Officials
The greater discretion being given to local officials in
employment matters is also reflected in the Court's
separation of the public employee from the public-at-large
when dealing with constitutional issues. While the state may
not have the authority to legislate hair length regulations
applicable to the general public, such regulation is valid
when applied by Suffolk County to its police force (Kelley
v. Johnson, Quinn v. Muscare ).
To successfully attach the regulation the employee must
demonstrate that it "is so irrational that it may be branded
as arbitrary." This is a very difficult burden for a plaintiff
to meet. It is one, however, that, while variously stated, the
Court has not been reluctant to place upon public
employees or applicants for public employment. For
example, it also forms the basis for the Court's action in
upholding Philadelphia's requirement that firemen be resi-
dents of the city at the time of their appointment and
remain residents thereafter (McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil
Service Commission). In McCarthy, while not deciding the
issue, the Court uses language implying that the distinction
between the public employee as citizen and the public
employee qua employee could justify legislation wherein
localities require local residence for a period of time prior
to public employment.
As a corollary to greater public employer discretion, the
Court limited the rights of employees to hearings when
claiming that actions of their public employer have resulted
in a constitutional deprivation. It has been well settled that
a tenured public employee is entitled to a due process
hearing when discharged. The Court did not abrogate this
rule, but its decision in Bishop v. Wood shows that it is less
likely to fmd the existence of tenure than it has in the past.
Indeed, Bishop appears to say that if the state courts (or
lower federal courts) interpret state law or city ordinance in
such a way as not to grant tenure, the Supreme Court will
not interfere. Thus, a city ordinance providing for a
six-month "probationary" period after which the employee
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is classified as "permanent" did not provide tenure because
the district judge had held that since the ordinance made no
provision for hearing, the "permanent" employee could be
discharged at will (a rationale rejected by the Supreme
Court in Amett v. Kennedy, decided shortly after the
District Court's opinion in Bishop).
Bishop reemphasizes that if the local legislation does not
unambiguously provide for tenure, the employee may have
no constitutionally protected property interest in con-
tinued employment. The point is that while the Constitu-
tion is available to protect pre-existing property rights ? for
example, by mandating a due process hearing to protect the
"property interest" that an employee has in his or her
continued tenure ? it does not itself create such rights. This
is left to the legislature or to the employer/employee
bargaining process. The message is that the Court will
protect whatever "rights" the public employee may have to
continued employment, but the employee will first have to
obtain those "rights" from the legislature or in some other
manner. According to the Court, it is not for it to decide
what tenure arrangements a public employer wishes to
make with its employees.
Right to Associate
On the other hand, where a specific "core" constitu-
tional right is involved, such as the First Amendment's
Freedom to Associate, the public employer must demon-
strate that its interest in effective management, etc.,
outweighs the employee's right to freely associate ? a
substantially different test from that articulated in the hair
length case of Kelley v. Johnson. Since the public employer
could not meet this burden of justification in Elrod v.
Burns, the Court, by a bare majority, held that patronage
discharges of nonpolicy-making, nonconfidential employees
New ASPA Membership Benefit
ASPA is pleased to announce a new membership
benefit that will be available very soon ? 24-Hour
Accidental Death and Dismemberment Insurance for
the member and the member's family.
The National Safety Council tells us that accidents
are the leading cause of death for those under age 45,
and one of the three leading causes of death for all
ages. There's an accidental death every five minutes in
the United States.
Accidental death insurance is important protection
for both you and your family; that's why the Board
of Trustees of ASPA's insurance program has ap-
proved this new plan for ASPA members.
Members will be allowed to select from $50,000 to
$200,000 of 24-hour protection. A special provision
is included covering loss of speech or hearing.
You will receive very shortly in the mail materials
describing the plan in full detail ? outlining the
benefits and low cost. Take the time to read it
carefully; we feel it is in your best interest.
because of their political beliefs is unconstitutional. Elrod
represents a major restriction on the patronage spoils
system ? nonconfidential, nonpolicy-making employees
who perform satisfactorily may not be discharged because
of political beliefs even if they obtained their positions as a
consequence of patronage hiring (the Court specifically
refused to address the issue of patronage hiring). Elrod
leaves open the question as to whether "political activity"
(i.e., campaigning such as is now permitted by state and
local employees under the 1974 amendments to the Hatch
Act) is to be distinguished from "political belief." It must
be recalled, however, that as recently as 1973 the Court
upheld the right of both the federal government and state
and local governments to condition continued public
employment on abstention from certain forms of partisan
political activity.
As it had several years earlier in regard to state
employment, the Court struck down across-the-board citi-
zenship requirements for federal employment, but with a
substantially different rationale and approach. The U.S.
Civil Service Commission had promulgated regulations
under which federal competitive service jobs were reserved
for U.S. citizens. States lack authority to legislate regarding
aliens, but the federal government is given that authority by
the Constitution. The U.S. Civil Service Commission's
regulation was stricken because it served no valid merit
system function. There are indications in the opinion that
such a prohibition adopted by executive order or through
legislation could be upheld. In other words, and while the
Court did not definitely speak to the issue, it may be that
the problem was simply that the alien employment prohibi-
tions were promulgated by the wrong federal entity. For,
the Court did clearly recognize that the federal government
? as distinguished from the U.S. Civil Service Commission
? does have a valid interest in the area of alien employment
(Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong).
Equal Employment Opportunity
In the equal employment opportunity area, the Court
gave federal employees the same right to a full court trial in
discrimination cases as employees in the private or state
employment sector (Chandler v. Roudebush ), although
federal employees must follow the procedures of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and cannot rely on other
authorities (Brown v. GSA). In so ruling, the Court
appeared to concede that full Court review of such matters
is somewhat at odds with Congress' purpose in providing
for administrative treatment of discrimination claims. At
the same time, however, it concluded that Congress had
decreed it to be such, suggesting that any anomalies that
resulted were for Congress to deal with.
Finally, in Washington v. Davis the Court questions a
long line of Court of Appeals decisions involving employ-
ment (and other) discrimination occurring prior to 1972,
the date of extension of the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Act to state and local government employment. The
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public administration recruiter
PUBLISHED BY THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
The ASPA Personnel Exchange is a professional, computerized nationwide job bank of more than 4,500 ASPA members. It and the P.A.
Recruiter are services to assist governments to obtain qualified administrative and managerial personnel and to help universities fill related
teaching and research positions. Public and private sector employers are encouraged to list entrance level, middle management, and top man-
agement professional positions as well as paraprofessional opportunities. To allow adequate lead time for publication and distribution of
News and Views the closing dates of advertisements must not be earlier than the last day of the month in which the advertisement appears.
ASPA policies strongly endorse nondiscrimination In public employment. All employers using this publication have indicated their com-
pliance with this policy.
Employer fee of $50 per listing of up to 75 words. A search of the ASPA Personnel Exchange with submission of names and resumes will be
made unless appropriate names are not available or employer specifically indicates that search and submission of list is not wanted. If a pro-
spective employer desires only a Personnel Exchange search without a Recruiter listing, the fee is $35. To list a job or obtain further informa-
tion contact: Recruiter Desk, American Society for Public Administration, 1225 Connecticut Avenue N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, (202)
785-3255.
general govt.
CITY MANAGER. Salary in $40's.
Pontiac, Michigan (85,000). Two per-
sons holding position of City Manager
since 1964. Appointed by seven-
member Commission elected for two-
year concurrent terms. Full range of
municipal services with central city
characteristics. $50 million-plus oper-
ating budget, including stadium, and
approx. 1,100 regular employees.
1975 All-America City. Required mini-
mum 6 years exp as City Manager or
top management position. Send
resume to Mayor Wallace E. Holland,
450 Wide Track Drive, East, Pontiac,
48058, marked "City Manager Appli-
cation."
LABOR RELATIONS. Salary
$16,995-23,793. Saginaw, Michigan.
Responsible to the Personnel Director
for representing the City in all phases
of negotiations, arbitration and review
of grievances. Require possession of
Masters Degree in industrial relations
and four years of progressively respon-
sible exp in labor relations work in-
cluding collective bargaining; or an
equivalent combination of training and
experience. Contact: John F. Graves,
City of Saginaw Personnel Director,
1315 Washington, Saginaw 48601
[phone] ext. 316.
EXAMINATION VALIDATION
SPECIALIST. Salary $17,035-20,529.
San Jose, California. Large personnel
dept. needs key person for validation
unit. Requires equivalent to BA in
Industrial Psych or personnel selection
and two yrs prof. exp. in test develop-
ment and validation. Apply: City of
San Jose, Personnel Dept., 801 N. 1st
St., Room 207, San Jose 95110(408)
277-4204.
DIRECTOR CHEMICAL DEPEND-
ENCY SERVICES. Salary $15,000
Omaha, Nebraska. Division Director
shall be responsible for the design,
monitoring, and coordination of a
network of chemical dependency serv-
ices in Region VI; contract manage-
ment and program coordination of
chemical dependency programs under
ENHSA; program and case consulta-
tion to chemical dependency programs
in ENHSA; and other programs in
Region VI as requested; and insure
that proper demographic forms are
used by all appropriate agencies. Edu-
cation and Experience: Master's degree
in one of the Social Sciences, Public
Health Administration, Psychology or
Professional Education preferred; with
three to five years Post Master's degree
exp. in Chemical Dependency Services.
Special Skills: Administrative skills are
essential (budgeting, grant writing and
monitoring, supervision). Apply to:
Eastern Nebraska Human Services
Agency, 855 So. 72nd Street, Omaha
68114.
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR. Salary
$17,500. Moorhead, Minnesota. De-
gree in planning, civil engineering or
Public Administration; minimum three
years exp in metropolitan and trans-
portation planning. Ability to manage
staff of approx six personnel. Ability
to communicate and coordinate work
activities with elected officials and
technical staffs. Send resume and ref-
erences to G.H. Bromenschenkel,
Chairman; Fargo-Moorhead Metro-
politan Council of Governments; 44
Foss Lane; Moorhead 56550.
MUNICIPAL FINANCE SPECIALIST.
Salary $1,705-2,072 per month. San
Diego, California. Comprehensive Plan-
ning Organization. Duties: prepares
and presents (written and oral) analy-
ses of public financing alternatives;
fiscal impacts of specific capital pro-
jects; growth and development pro-
posals; general plans. Knowledge of
local government fiscal structures,
budgetary processes and federal, state
and local government financial analysis
guidelines. Excellent writing and pub-
lic speaking skills necessary. Preferred
education: Masters in Business Admin-
is t r ati on , Public Administration,
Finance or Economic. Preferred Ex-
perience: Significant responsible pro-
fessional exp in municipal finance or
urban economics. Applications: Sub-
mit resume and obtain application
form by October 31, from, Associate
Director for Finance and Administra-
tion, Comprehensive Planning Organi-
zation, 1200 Third Avenue, Suite 524,
San Diego, 92101 [phone].
TOWN MANAGER. Salary $20,000
plus fringes. North Branford, Connec-
ticut. (Population 12,000.) Town
Manager appointed by 9 member
Council, elected at large on a partisan
basis for 2 year term. Budget approx 6
million dollars. 55 employees. Previous
managerial exp highly desirable. Exp
in personnel and labor relationships,
public works and sewer construction
program. Should have good knowledge
of grants, both state and federal. Bud-
get preparation exp. necessary. Assist-
ant exp acceptable. Send resume to
Deputy Mayor Albert A. Doyle, 493
Village Street, North Branford 06472.
DIRECTOR OF FINANCE. Salary
$31,450-$44,260. Miami, Florida. The
City of Miami is currently searching
for a Director of the Finance Depart-
ment. This position will provide over-
all direction for the operations of the
Finance Department in the areas of
fiscal administration and financial
transactions; will manage the disburse-
ment and investment of city funds;
will provide coordination assistance in
the preparation of the annual budget
and annual financial reports. Demon-
strated knowledge required in the
principles and practices of municipal
finance, including centralized financial
management systems, modified cash
and accrual accounting, treasury man-
agement, and revenue and license ad-
ministration; a four year degree
required in finance or accounting,
preferably a masters degree in business
administration, public administration
or a related field, a minimum of ten
years' operating experience in local
government financial management and
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planning is preferred. Send resume to:
Joseph R. Paredes, Assistant City Man-
ager, City Hall, 3500 Pan American
Drive, Miami, 33133.
JOB DEVELOPER (EXPERIENCED).
Salary $1,144-1,307 per month.
Peoria, Illinois. Excellent fringe bene-
fits. Coordinates all job development
and placement activities of the Peoria
Consortium (CETA Prime Sponsor).
Requires: Two years exp in job devel-
opment and job placement, preferably
under CETA, plus BA Degree in Man-
power Planning, Personnel, Business
Administration or related field. Apply:
Qualified applicants should send their
resumes to the Personnel Office, City
Hall, Room 204, 419 Fulton Street,
Peoria, 61602.
MARINE MAMMALS AND ENDAN-
GERED SPECIES PROGRAM AD-
MINISTRATOR. Salary $26,861
(GS14) or $31,809 (GS15) (Depend-
ing upon qualifications). Washington,
D.C. Position is in the Career Civil
Service. Duties: Administers the pro-
visions of and conducts programs
under the Marine Mammals Protection
Act of 1972 and the Endangered
Species Act of 1973. Coordinates or
directs marine mammals and endan-
gered species research and activities for
the National Marine Fisheries Service.
Bachelor's degree or a combination of
related education and general exp
equivalent to a Bachelor's degree is
required, plus three years of relevant
professional exp. which has demon-
strated a capability in and a thorough
knowledge of the principles of admin-
istration, organization, and manage-
ment. Send SF-171 to: Department of
Commerce, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, 3300
Whitehaven Street, N.W., Page Bldg
No. 2, Washington, D.C. 20235,
Atten: AD412:MQueen. Applications
accepted until October 30, 1976.
ASSISTANT SANITATION PLANT
SUPERINTENDENT. Salary
$1,030-1,380 per month. Simi Valley,
California. Under general supervision,
assists in the operation, maint., and
supervision of the District's waste-
water treatment plant; keeps reports;
and supervises or performs various lab
tests and analyses. Requires: grad.
from high school or equiv. and 4 yrs.
or increasingly resp. exp. in the opera-
tion & maint. of a wastewater treat-
ment plant; possession of a wastewater
treatment plant operator's Grade HI
Certificate issued by State Water Re-
source Control Board and a valid Cal.
Driver's License. Grade IV Certificate
is preferable. Apply: City of Simi
Valley, 3200 Cochran Street, Simi
Valley, 93065 [phone]. Filing
deadline: Friday, October 28, 1976 at
5:00 p.m.
ASSISTANT CITY MANAGER. Sal-
ary $2550-3500 per month. Berkeley,
California. The City of Berkeley is
seeking qualified applicants for Assist-
ant City Manager, who works under
general direction of the City Manager,
acts in his/her absence and assists the
City Manager in the administration
and supervision of City affairs. REQ:
Degree in public/business adm., ac-
counting, economics, or closely related
field plus five (5) years progressively
responsible full-time broad managerial
and administrative exp. Apply to: City
of Berkeley, Personnel Department,
2100 Grove Street, Berkeley 94704,
644-6460.
TOWN ADMINISTRATOR. Salary ne-
gotiable. Kill Devil Hills, North Caro-
lina. Pop. Summer 30,000; Winter
500. Budget $500,000. Departments:
Finance, Streets, Sanitation, Water,
Public Safety. Further information
furnished upon request. Town Clerk,
P.O. Box 719, Kill Devil Hills 27948.
SENIOR PROGRAM ANALYST. Sal-
ary $1 0,94 6-15,4 02. Savannah,
Georgia. In Community Development
agency. Responsible for developing
and instituting an evaluation system
for municipal programs and services.
Trains and supervises staff. Capable of
analysis of impact as well as outputs of
programs. Strong research methods,
statistical and computer background
required. Bachelors in social research
or related field required. Masters pre-
ferred. Resume of training and exp
should be sent to the City of Savannah
Personnel Office, 10 E. Bay Street,
Savannah 31401.
personnel and
training
PERSONNEL DIRECTOR. Salary
$17,628. Wenatchee, Washington. A
sharp, aggressive, self-starter who has
successfully demonstrated superior
management and personnel skills is
needed to develop a complete per-
sonnel administration program. Job
re s ponsibilities: administering new
classification and pay plans, EEO, af-
firmative action, recruitment and
selection, labor relations, training and
safety. Job rewards: opportunity,
challenge, and quality living (hunting,
fishing, swimming, boating, and ski-
ing). 4 yrs. of progressively responsible
exp in 3 or more specialized areas of
personnel or as a personnel generalist.
Graduate study in personnel or public
administration may be substituted for
some exp. Send detailed resume by
October 31, 1976 to: Mr. David
Thrush, Finance Director, P.O. Box
519, Wenatchee 98801 (509)
663-0551.
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL. Salary
open. Concord, New Hampshire. Pro-
viding professional personnel technical
assistance, training and research serv-
ices to local governments. Applicants
should have degree and/or experience
in public personnel/labor relations, re-
cruiting and evaluation, pay and classi-
fication systems, and training. Reply
by October 30, 1976 to NHMA, PO.
Box 617, Concord 03301.
PERSONNEL DIRECTOR. Salary
$28,530-40,145. Miami, Florida. The
City of Miami is currently searching
for a director of the newly established
Human Resources Services Depart-
ment that will be responsible for City-
wide personnel management systems.
This position will provide overall direc-
tion for the development of programs
and operations of the department in
the areas of position management,
personnel procurement, manpower de-
velopment, equal employment oppor-
tunity, and employee services. Demon-
strated knowledge required in merit
system administration, management
planning and quantitative methods
used in personnel procedures; a four
year degree required or preferably a
master's degree in Public Administra-
tion, Business Administration or a
related field; substantial public sector
operating exp req in directing a major
personnel unit. Send resume to Joseph
R. Paredes, Assistant City Manager,
City Hall, 3500 Pan American Drive,
Miami 33133.
planning and
community
development
ASSISTANT CITY PLANNER. Salary
$17,945-23,815. Peekskill, New York.
Minimum qualifications ? Master's
degree in planning or related field with
5 years exp or equiv combination of
training and exp. Some exp in urban
design preferred. Position involves
working with 701 Program, $12 mil-
lion CD Program, zoning and sub-
division administration, Planning Com-
mission and Zoning Board of Appeals.
Apply to Director of Planning and
Development, City of Peekskill, 901
Main Street, Peekskill 10566.
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SENIOR PLANNER. Salary
$12,366-17,400. Savannah, Georgia.
Plus fringe benefits. In a Community
Development Agency. Responsible for
initiating and developing a social and
economic development plan for sea-
port City of 118,000. City Manager
form of government, Supervisory
responsibility over two to four staff
members. Masters in planning and
three years exp in planning or planning
related activity required. Knowledge
of statistics, social service research
methods and economics or public
finance; ability to demonstrate an
understanding of and sensitivity to the
citizens' needs; and, creativity are
essential. Teaching, supervisory exp
and knowledge of housing planning are
desirable. Resume of training and exp
should be sent to the City of Savannah
Personnel Office, 10 E. Bay Street,
Savannah 31401.
professional assns.
DIRECTOR OF PROGRAMS. Salary
$19,500-21,700 depending on quali-
fications. Washington, D.C. American
Society for Public Administration.
MPA preferred. Provides professional
staff services to various ASPA sections
and committees. Liaison with con-
gressional committees, government
agencies and public interest groups.
Other duties include writing articles,
staffing for the ASPA national confer-
ence, and serving as project manager
for small grants. Skills needed in
report writing, policy analysis, re-
search and facilitation of the work of
small, voluntary groups. To apply
please send a resume to: Director of
Programs Search Committee, Ameri-
can Society for Public Administration,
1225 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20036 by November
1, 1976.
special programs
TALENT BANK. New York Univer-
sity's Graduate School of Public Ad-
ministration maintains a talent bank of
junior and senior level administrators
available for immediate employment.
Preferred locations vary widely. Em-
ployers seeking confidential assistance
with recruitment are invited to Con-
tact: Dr. Marcia R. Fox, Director of
Student Services, 4 Washington Sq.
North, New York, New York 10003
(Telephone [phone]).
teaching, research
DIRECTOR, SCHOOL OF CRIM-
INAL JUSTICE. Salary open. East
Lansing, Michigan. Applications are
invited for the above position. The
School seeks a Director who is an
established scholar and teacher in the
field of Criminal Justice or related
areas. In addition, the Director should
provide a link between the School and
the Criminal Justice system. Conse-
quently, applicants should have aca-
demic credentials and interest which
would justify a senior level appoint-
ment at a major university, as well as
exp in or with Criminal Justice agen-
cies. The qualifications considered
essential for this position include the
following: PhD or equivalent; college
level teaching exp; administrative exp.;
demonstrated research competence.
The effective date of the appointment
will be no later than September 1,
1977. Chairpersons and Directors at
Michigan State University are reviewed
at intervals of five years or less. Fac-
ulty status is not contingent upon
reappointment as Director. Applica-
tions, together with vita, full details of
qualifications and names and addresses
of three references should be sent to:
Dr. Terence Dungworth, Chairperson,
Director's Search Committee, School
of Criminal Justice, Michigan State
University, East Lansing 48824.
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR. Salary
$12,392 with fringe benefits. Balti-
more, Maryland. Starting February
1977. PhD. required. Teach graduate
and undergraduate courses in public
administration. Competence primarily
in research methods, budgeting, and
personnel. Send resume to Dr. Joseph
Harrelson, Political Science Depart-
ment, University of Maryland, Charles
at Mount Royal, Baltimore 21201.
CHAIRPERSON. Salary negotiable.
Arlington, Texas. University of Texas
at Arlington. Seeking Chairperson for
a political science department of 17
members. Candidates applying should
have a reputation as a concerned,
effective teacher, be an active, recog-
nized scholar, and have a strong inter-
est in administration. Starting date is
September 1, 1977. Reply with cre-
dentials by December 1, 1976. To:
Search Committee, Department of
Political Science, University of Texas
at Arlington, Arlington 76109.
ASSOCIATE TO FULL PROFESSOR.
Salary $12,200-15,500. Chicago, Illi-
nois. University of Illinois. The De-
partment of Criminal Justice offers a
permanent position at competitive
salary for Fall 1977. No. 3 Assoc. to
Prof. to teach public admin. course
(complex org., bureaucracy, manage-
ment, systems, in criminal justice con-
text). Must have DPA or PhD in a Soc.
Sci. Av. course load a mix of 5
grad/undergrad. courses in quarter
system. Record of research and publi-
cations, and supervision of PhD
students desirable. You must specify
"position No. 3 being applied for."
Cutoff date: 12/15/76. Reply with
resume and 3 letters of recommenda-
tion and full particulars to: Prof. Hans
W. Mattick, Chairperson, Recruitment
Committee, Dept. of Criminal Justice,
LTICC, Box 4348, Chicago 60680.
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR. Salary
open. Athens, Georgia. To teach grad-
uate and undergraduate public admin-
istration courses. Strong background
in budgeting and finance is required.
Preference will be given to those with
some work exp. and some knowledge
of program evaluation, information
systems and the use of computers in
financial management. PhD or DPA or
equivalent degree. Send vita, creden-
tials and recommendations to Prof.
Felix Nigro, Department of Political
Science, Baldwin Hall, University of
Georgia, Athens 30602.
CHAIRPERSON HEALTH SCIENCE
PROGRAM. Salary open. Miami,
Florida. Florida International Univer-
sity. The Health Science Program is an
interdisciplinary area in the School of
Health and Social Services. It is pres-
ently comprised of a management,
education and general track but has
projected many more tracks and areas
of development. We are seeking a
person of a generalist background with
a high level of creativity and leadership
ability. Any interested parties should
address their application to: Chair-
person, Search and Screen Committee,
Health Science Program, Florida Inter-
national University, Tamiami Trail,
Miami 33199. Application deadline:
December 3, 1976.
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OR ASSO-
CIATE PROFESSOR: Salary nego-
tiable. Miami, Florida. Public Adminis-
tration Program of Florida filter-
national University, Miami, has :two
faculty openings for 1977. Candidates
should have doctorate with teaching
and research experience. Particularly
welcome is Latin American experience
with a knowledge of Spanish and/or
Portuguese, as the Program is presently
engaged in overseas activities. First
Position: Teaching undergraduate and
graduate courses in public finance,
budgeting and quantitative methods.
Second Position: Teaching under-
graduate and graduate courses in re-
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gional and urban planning, urban and
local management. Correspondence,
including curriculum vita with refer-
ences, should be sent to: George
Sutija, Chairman, Public Administra-
tion Program, Florida International
University, Tamiami Trail, Miami,
33199.
COMMUNITY SERVICE DIRECTOR.
Salary low 20's. Charlotte, North
Carolina. Institute for Urban Studies
and Community Service, University of
North Carolina at Charlotte. Respon-
sible for directing Institute's Com-
munity Service Division. Efforts focus
upon technical assistance and non-
credit mid-career training for local
government. Hard money continuing
position. Non-tenure track academic
appointment may be possible. Qualifi-
cations include PhD in political
science, public administration, urban
affairs, or other relevant field, compe-
tence in fields such as governmental or
organization, personnel administra-
tion, public financial administration,
budgeting, program planning, and
ability to organize and work with
multi-disciplinary faculty teams. Ap-
plicants with exp. in mid-career train-
ing programs and with public sector
practitioner exp will be given prefer-
ence. Available January 1, 1977.
Application deadline November 1,
1976. Send resumes to Dr. James L.
Cox, Director, Institute for Urban
Studies and Community Service,
UNCC, UNCC Station, Charlotte
28223.
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR. Salary ne-
gotiable. St. Louis, Missouri. One posi-
tion in Administration of Justice.
January 1, 1977. Ph.D. and teaching
experience preferred. Applicants who
have a terminal degree plus extensive
experience in an agency of justice will
also be considered. Teach two courses
each semester. Additional responsi-
bilities include a heavy involvement in
continuing education-community serv-
ice type programming in all com-
ponents of justice. The ability to
communicate-cooperate with opera-
tional personnel along the complete
justice spectrum essential. Contact
Professor Henry Burns, Jr., Chair-
person, Department of Administration
of Justice, University of Missouri-St.
Louis, St. Louis, MO 63121.
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR. Salary
open. Raleigh, N.C. N.C. State Univer-
sity. January/August, 1977 appoint-
ment. Teaching responsibilities in man-
power, human resources development,
and labor relations, primarily graduate
courses in an established MPA pro-
gram, but expect interest in under-
graduate political science program.
PhD and graduate teaching exp re-
quired. Send reference to: Dr. Jackson
M. McClain, Department of Politics,
North Carolina State University, P.O.
Box 5305, Raleigh 27607 (919)
737-2504. Closing date of December
1, 1976.
POLICY ANALYSIS/PUBLIC AD-
MINISTRATION. Salary open. Mid-
dletown, Pa. The Pennsylvania State
University, Capitol Campus, an-
nounces opening to teach under-
graduate and graduate courses in pub-
lic policy analysis, administration of
justice, state and local government and
urban affairs effective January, 1977.
Background in economics and quanti-
tative analysis desirable. Opportunities
to supervise interns in the Harrisburg
area. Rank open. Send vita and sup-
porting materials to Dr. Robert J.
Bresler, The Pennsylvania State Uni-
versity, The Capitol Campus, Middle-
town 17057.
FACULTY. Salary open. Fullerton,
California. California State University,
Fullerton (CSUF) seeks applicants for
a position in Public Administration to
begin in September, 1977. A specialist
in public finance and/or planning
would be particularly desirable. Prac-
tical experience would also be an asset.
We will prefer to make an appoint-
ment at the Assistant Professor rank,
but the possibility of a higher rank is
not excluded. CSUF is located in
northern Orange County, California, in
the general Los Angeles area. It is a
growing university which will enroll
over 1 5,000 full time-equivalent
students in Fall, 1976. Public Adminis-
tration is an integral part of a Depart-
ment of Political Science which will
include more than 25 faculty. In addi-
tion to the B.A. and M.A. in Political
Science we offer a bachelor's level
concentration in Public Administra-
tion, and two separate M.P.A. pro-
grams, one on-campus and another
sited at Orange County's Civic Center,
offered primarily for mid-career public
servants. All personnel policies con-
form with the requirements of Execu-
tive Order 11246, Title IX of the
Higher Education Amendment of
1972 and other federal regulations
regarding nondiscrimination. Please re-
turn application materials to: Dr.
Barbara S. Stone, Chair, Department
of Political Science, California State
University, Fullerton 92634.
EXTENSION PROFESSOR. Salary
open. Hartford, Connecticut. Institute
of Public Service, University of Con-
necticut. Position to be based in Hart-
ford, Ct. with extensive travel to
Nigeria and other developing coun-
tries. Serve as trainer and consultant to
the Nigerian Government and other
developmental countries, assessing
training needs of participants in the
areas of project management and pub-
lic policy analysis related to economic
and social development. Prepare and
revise training designs and materials,
conduct classes and workshops, per-
form administrative coordination of
training projects, program develop-
ment, and contract negotiation with
training sponsors. MA & 9 yrs exp, or
PhD, DPA, or equivalent & 7 yrs exp
in project analysis and management
training consultancy required. Training
exp to emphasize practical understand-
ing and use of experiential methods
such as the Cloverdale method, simula-
tion and application workshops. Pro-
gram development and grantsmanship
ability required. Practical understand-
ing of human relations training
"andragogy" and instructional systems
design is highly desirable. Working/
living exp in Africa is important.
Apply to John S. Tabor, 1380 Asylum
Avenue, Hartford, 06105.
OPERATIONS RESEARCH ANA-
LYST. Salary $1,434-1,645 per
month. Peoria, Illinois. Excellent
fringe benefits. Researches operational
problems in the Peoria Police Depart-
ment and related agencies. Assists
Chief of Police and other management
personnel in understanding problem
solving techniques; determines pro-
gram effectiveness and makes appro-
priate recommendations; writes and
publishes professional journal articles.
Requires: Bachelors Degree special-
izing in organizational research, sys-
tems analysis, management science or
other closely related subjects with
some professional exp in the field of
specialization, accompanied by
thorough knowledge of and skills in
use of required statistical research
techniques. Apply: Send resume to
Personnel Office, City Hall, 419 Ful-
ton Street, Peoria, 61602.
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR. Salary
open. Chicago, Illinois. Graduate
(MPA) and undergraduate Public Ad-
ministration Program at Roosevelt
University. Position available January,
1977. Terminal degree and teaching
and administrative experience re-
quired. Applicants should have some
combination of interests in: Theory,
Administrative Science, Fiscal, Per-
sonnel, and one or more substantive
fields such as Health, Justice, or Muni-
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cipal. Applications must be received
by November 1. Send vita and four
letters of reference to: Director, Public
Administration Program, Roosevelt
University, 430 South Michigan
Avenue, Chicago 60605.
URBAN POLITICS. Salary open. Nor-
man, Oklahoma. Seeking candidate
with PhD to fill tenure track Assistant
Professor position in urban politics
beginning January, 1977. Courses to
be taught are at undergraduate and
graduate levels. Prefer candidates with
interest in urban policy analysis and
knowledge of quantitative techniques.
Additional qualifications might in-
clude interest in urban management,
state government and/or urban sys-
tems. Send resume, transcripts and
three letters of reference to Chair-
person, Professor Hugh G. MacNiven,
Department of Political Science, Uni-
versity of Oklahoma, Norman 73019.
DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR POLICY
STUDIES AND PROGRAM EVALU-
ATION. Salary open. Springfield, Illi-
nois. To assume leadership of and
provide direction to applied research
and service activities relating to policy
and policy analysis concerns of state
government agencies. A joint faculty
appointment in public administration
with teaching responsibilities. Doctor-
ate, related experience, and demon-
strated interest in policy studies de-
sired. Application deadline January 1,
1977. Inquiries and credentials to:
Geoffrey Cornog, Sangamon State
Univ., Center for Policy Studies and
Program Evaluation, Springfield
62708.
HEALTH PROJECT DIRECTOR.
Salary open. Medford, Massachusetts.
The Lincoln Filene Center for Citizen-
ship and Public Affairs at Tufts Uni-
versity is seeking an individual to de-
velop new training programs for mem-
bers of citizen consumer and profes-
sional groups involved in the design
and implementation of Health Care
Services. This individual must under-
stand the major policy issues effecting
health care delivery systems and be
capable of designing related adult
education programs. Ability to raise
and administer funds from public and
private sources to support such pro-
grams is necessary. A graduate or
professional degree is required and
qualified candidates will have the pro-
fessional training relevant experience
and self-starting temperament both to
de sign interdisciplinary University
training programs and to adapt such
programs for a variety of community
groups and settings. Please submit
resume and requirements in confi-
dence to L.J. Lerner, Personnel Man-
ager, Tufts University, Medford
02155.
DIRECTOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN-
FORMATION SERVICE. Salary
$18,000-25,000. Columbia, Missouri.
The Institute of Public Administration
and interdisciplinary faculty in Public
Administration seeks a Director for
the Public Affairs Information Service.
PAIS provides research and informa-
tion To government agencies, industry,
faculty students and others. The Direc-
tor's duties include securing contracts,
managing research and information
services and directing a staff of 14
professional and technicians. Current
PAIS activities include the administra-
tion of an economic planning project
for the State of Missouri, operation
and management of a census summary
tape processing center, management of
the Missouri Occupational Training
Information System and several other
information service and research
projects. Preference will be given to
individuals who possess a doctorate.
Applicants should have some combina-
tion of the following abilities, pro-
gramming, econometrics, statistics,
public data base management, design
and administration of research. The
closing date for applications is Novem-
ber 1, 1976. Applicants should for-
ward a resume and letters of reference
to: University of Missouri-Columbia
Personnel Services, 309 Hitt Street,
University of Missouri-Columbia,
Columbia 65201.
FACULTY. Salary open. Albany, New
York. The School of Criminal Justice
at the University at Albany, seeks to
fill a faculty opening for the Fall
semester of 1977, subject to final
budgetary authorization. Rank and sal-
ary will be dependent upon qualifica-
tions and budget approval. Candidates
are being sought who possess a PhD or
JD or equivalent degree. Since the
School of Criminal Justice awards only
the PhD and MA degrees, faculty must
have a capacity for teaching in a
graduate program and a demonstrated
ability to conduct sophisticated re-
search in criminal justice as evidenced
by books or articles published in re-
ferred journals. Criminal justice is de-
fined broadly and is meant to include
a variety of perspectives in law,
history, and the social, political, and
behavioral sciences. The closing date
for applications is February 1, 1977;
however, resumes should be sent as
soon as possible. Resumes should be
forwarded to Vincent O'Leary, Dean,
School of Criminal Justice, The Uni-
versity at Albany, 1400 Washington
Avenue, Albany 12222.
STUDENT PLANS ANNOUNCED FOR ASPA CONFERENCE
The ASPA 1977 National Conference in Atlanta,
Georgia, March 20 to April 2, will contain a large number
of opportunities for student personal and professional
development, according to Joan Geiszler and Henry Zim-
mer, coordinators for student participation.
In urging students of public affairs and public adminis-
tration to start making plans to attend the Conference, the
coordinators cited three major areas of student emphasis:
(1) the Placement Center, which will offer opportunities to
contact employers from all levels of public service; (2) a
panel on conferencing, scheduled at the beginning of the
Conference, to introduce first-time attendees to the ASPA
National Conference and explain how to best take ad-
vantage of Conference opportunities; and (3) student
involvement in panels, both in presenting papers and
discussing issues. All topic area leaders have been en-
couraged to seek as much student participation as possible.
Panel topics cover a broad spectrum of interests in public
administration.
Student Housing
Students will be housed in the American Hotel, directly
across the street from the Peachtree Plaza, the Conference
hotel. Rooms will cost approximately $4 to $5 per person,
with four to a room. For further information on student
activities, contact Henry Zimmer, 224 Robinhood Court,
Athens, Georgia 30601, or Joan Geiszler, P.O. Box 1810,
Wilmington, North Carolina 28401.
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_practitioner's_
bookshelf
Basic Documents of Public Administration
A new publication, coming along appropriately in the
bicentennial year, is Basic Documents of American Public
Administration, 1776-1950, selected and edited by Fred-
erick C. Mosher, a long-time ASPA member and former
editor of the Public Administration Review.
The volume undertakes to present, in chronological
order, the major official documents most relevant to the
development of American public administration. It is
divided into four parts. Part I contains some of the basic
documents of the pre-Constitutional and organizing period
of the new Republic. Part II covers what the author terms
the "management movement," the half-century between
1880 and 1930. This is followed by a section on the
documents issued or adopted during the second term of
President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Part IV consists of
selected documents between World War II and 1949.
Each of the four parts is introduced by an editorial
statement discussing the period under consideration, its
temporal boundaries, and its social and political context,
followed by a few sentences on each of the documents that
follow, relative to their origins, precedents, rationale, and
impact.
Copies of Basic Documents of American Public Adminis-
tration, 1776-1950, published by Holmes & Meier Pub-
lishers, Inc., New York, are available for $14.00 hardcover
and $6.95 paperback.
NIMLO Publishes Book on Liability of
Municipal Officials
The National Institute of Municipal Law Officers has
just published a 349-page volume on Tort Liability and
Immunity of Municipal Officials, designed to provide a
comprehensive, authoritative statement of the current
status of the law regarding personal liability of municipal
officials. The volume was authored by Charles S. Rhyne,
executive director; William S. Rhyne, research director; and
Stephen P. Elmendorf, research assistant ? all of the
NIMLO staff.
Included in a section on the liability of municipal
employees are discussions on judicial officers of the
municipality, executive and administrative officers, city
legislators, and city policemen. Other portions of the book
are devoted to an introduction to the tort liability of
municipal officers, a functional approach to official im-
munity, recent developments, and administration of tort
responsibility.
Copies of Tort Liability and Immunity of Municipal
Officials are available for $10.00 each from the National
Institute of Municipal Law Officers, 839 Seventeenth Street
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006.
Canadians Produce Case Program in
Public Administration
The Institute of Public Administration of Canada has
initiated a case program which will produce cases and
simulations designed for use in university courses and for
in-service training programs at all levels of government.
The Canadian Institute expects to produce 15 cases per
year over a three-year period. Each case and simulation
includes a "player's manual" containing all the documenta-
tion needed for participation and an "instructor's manual,"
containing notes to the instructor.
Cases produced to date include The M.T.L. Simulation ?
Public Sector Collective Bargaining, by Gene R. Swimmer
and Claude P. Parent of the School of Public Administra-
tion, Carleton University; and A Conflict of Loyalties, by
Kenneth Kernaghan of the School of Administrative
Studies, Brock University.
For information on the Case Program in Canadian Public
Administration, write The Director, Case Program in
Canadian Public Administration, Institute of Public Admin-
istration of Canada, 897 Bay Street, Toronto, Ontario, M5S
1Z7, Canada.
Progress Reported in
Environmental Protection
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has reported
that a total of 6,702 formal enforcement actions in the air,
pesticides, noise, and water pollution program areas were
initiated by the Agency during the period from December
1, 1974, to December 31, 1975. This brings the total
number of such actions taken in EPA's five years of
operation to nearly 13,000.
Of the 6,702 formal enforcement actions, 36 per cent
involved cases where compliance was obtained or underway
without resorting to criminal or civil proceedings; 36 per
cent related to cases in which administrative and formal
court or agency proceedings were pending or results not yet
reported; and 28 per cent were cases which required formal
civil or criminal court proceedings or agency civil proceed-
ings. The resulting penalties/fines amounted to $1,382,608,
bringing the total fines and penalties imposed by EPA-
initiated actions during the five-year period to $9,932,841.
In addition to directly initiated actions, EPA is also
involved in supporting environmental enforcement activities
by state and local governments.
The types of actions involved in the individual program
areas, the names of the entities against whom EPA initiated
enforcement actions, and other key information concerning
each action are provided in EPA Enforcement, A Progress
Report, December 1974 to December 1975, which may be
obtained from the EPA Public Information Center, PM-215,
Washington, D.C. 20460.
PA NEWS & VIEWS, OCTOBER 1976
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ADMINISTRATION IN SOCIAL WORK
...the quarterly journal of human services management
EDITOR:
Simon Slavin, Ed.D., ACSW
Dean, School of Social Administration
Temple University
ADMINISTRATION IN SOCIAL WORK
is the first journal devoted entirely to
administration, supervision, and manage-
ment in social work and human services.
Articles aim to help social work admin-
istrators, sub-executives, and middle-
managers improve their practice and
methods of administration.
Topics cover case methods in administration; theoretical
articles; applying management theory and practice to
the social work setting; and the practical aspects of ad-
ministrating social work and social welfare agencies and
departments.
Additional topics include:
- effective relations with agency boards
- strategies for organizational change
- introducing innotive methods of organization
- relating effectively to staff
- problems in fund-raising and fiscal management
- grantsmanship for the social work administrator
- recruiting board members and delegating board
responsibilities
- dealing with host institutions
Articles in the journal will also be geared
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(and their students) in schools of social work and other
schools concerned with the development of careers
in administration and management.
The Journal will also provide articles on
social work administration in socially advanced
countries (such as in Scandinavia). Because adminis-
tration is so closely related to social planning and policy
development, the Journal will also present articles that
bear upon these interrelated areas. Vol. I. No. 1 - Spring 1977
Price: $20 for individuals; $32 for
libraries & agencies
Periodicals of Related Interest
? AUTHOR'S GUIDE TO JOURNALS
IN
PSYCHOLOGY, PSYCHIATRY
& SOCIAL WORK
Edited by Allan Markle, Ph.D. &
Roger C. Rinn, Ph.D.
Here is the first comprehensive
guide to more than 425 "core"
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and social work.
Detailed information on each
journal includes:
- publication lag time
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- topics the editor usually rejects
- early publication options
- review period lag time
...and other important facts that an
author should know before he or she
submits a manuscript for consider- NAME
ation. Almost all of the information
provided in this guidebook is not INSTITUTION
available in the journals themselves.
ADDRESS
Price: $12.95 (Fall 1976) Lizi, STATE ZIP
? SOCIAL WORK IN HEALTH CARE
This journal is devoted to practice, re-
search, administration, and theory of
medical and psychiatric social work in
hospitals psychiatric clinics, and other
health care settings. Also included are
articles relating to the psychological and
social aspects of physical disability and
disease. Vol. I, No. 1 - Fall 1976
Price: $15 for individuals; $30 for
libraries & institutions
?CHILD & YOUTH SERVICES
A new "current awareness" newsletter
for all professionals working with
children & youth in settings of all
types. Provides rapid abstracts from
the fields of psychiatry, child care,
social work, psychology, nursing, law,
and health---AND the authors' addresses
for reprint requests. Vol. I, No. 1 - Jan 1977
Price: $14 for individuals; $24 for
libraries, institutions & agencies
III OFFENDER REHABILITATION
A new professional journal devoted to
all aspects of offender rehabilitation,
including psychiatric, psychological, and
social work services for prisoners and ex-
offenders. Articles also deal with effect-
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incarceration. Vol. I, No. 1 - Fall 1976
Price: $16 for individuals; $30 for
libraries & institutions
II COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH
REVIEW
This new type of "current-awareness"
newsletter provides current abstracts
of journal articles relating to commun-
ity mental health, from the major journal
literature of psychiatry, psychology,
social work, rehabilitation, sociology, and
health care. The authors' mailing addresses
are included so that readers can request re-
prints of needed articles. Other features
include a major review article in each issue,
covering a critical area in community men-
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books. Vol. I, No. 1 - Jan 1976
Price: $14 for individuals; $24 for libraries,
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Progress Is Being Made
on Publications Committee Recommendations
Considerable progress has been made in recent months in
implementing the recommendations of the ASPA Publica-
tions Committee, presented to the National Council last
December. At that time, the Council voted to accept the
report, adopt those recommendations which did not have
financial implications, and refer the items with financial
implications to the appropriate committees of the Society
for consideration in the 1976-77 budget.
The following April, when the 1976-77 budget was
under consideration, the Publications Committee requested
a budget allocation of $47,000 ? $25,000 to expand P.A.
News and Views coverage by adding a full-time staff person;
$12,000 to expand Public Administration Review coverage
by adding 96 pages per year or the equivalent of one
additional issue; and $10,000 for expanded publications
activity. Of this total allocation, and due to budgetary
limitations, the Finance and Administration Committee
recommended and the National Council voted an expendi-
ture of $8,000 to increase the size of the Review by 64
pages.
Although additional funding for publications has been
very limited, many of the Publications Committee's recom-
mendations have been achieved. The recommendations fall
into four distinct groups: (1) P.A. News and Views, (2)
Public Administration Review, (3) Special Publications
Services, and (4) Publications Advisory Group. Listed
below is a brief rundown of the progress that has been
made in each of these areas:
P.A. News and Views
Although no additional funding was made available to
add a full-time staff member to P.A. News and Views, many
of the recommendations of the Publications Committee are
currently being implemented. Three new services were
recommended to be added immediately to the newsletter.
These services were determined as the result of a study of
ASPA members conducted by Publications Committee
Member Thomas Vocino to learn what features P.A. News
and Views readers wanted to be added to their newsletter.
"1. Government Update. Quite brief reports of most
significant federal, state, and local government develop-
ments, reports, and publications are needed." General items
in this area have always been included in P.A. News and
Views; however, in recent months a greater effort has been
made to publish more items of current developments. The
review of Supreme Court decisions in the personnel field in
this issue, the articles by Alan Beals, Charles and William
Rhyne, and Jerry Wurf on the Fair Labor Standards Act
Decision, and the analysis of the Sharon Report on alleged
merit system abuse within the U.S. Civil Service Commis-
sion during the Nixon Administration are examples of this
new emphasis. And of course, a publication couldn't get
much timelier during the national election campaign than
by publishing articles by the presidential candidates. ASPA
members are encouraged to suggest subjects for future
feature articles.
"2. Administrators' Bookshelf Quite brief notes on
current books (and possibly periodicals) are needed." In
this issue, for the first time, we are bringing together brief
reports on new books and reports of interest to adminis-
trators under the Practitioner's Bookshelf heading. This
feature will be run in succeeding issues as a number of brief
reports are available.
"3. Practitioners' Exchange. Short reports of current
practices and developments of general practitioner interests
in administration are needed." Some items in this area have
been published; however, in the future greater efforts will
be made to establish a network of practitioner writers or
advisors to give greater input.
The Publications Committee also recommended a P.A.
News and Views Advisory Group to consult with the
executive director and the professional ASPA staff who
produce the newsletter "with respect to improvements in
format and style, general content, and such specifics as may
be required by the professional staff." President Nesta
Gallas has appointed the following advisory group: Ray-
mond L. Bancroft, Public Information Office, Bureau of
the Census, and former managing editor of Nation's Cities
Magazine; Leigh Grosenick, director, Graduate Program in
Public Administration, Virginia Commonwealth University;
Edward P. Pazicky, staff personnel representative, The Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey; and Wanda C.
Woolcot, director, Public Affairs, the University of Alaska.
A fifth member is still to be named to this group.
Public Administration Review
In addition to funding for the 64 new pages per year,
other improvements to PAR are planned or under way. The
Publications Committee agreed that "increasing quality
must remain the hallmark of PAR as the principal journal
of the discipline of public administration." It further noted
that practitioner needs merit specific, continued attention,
particularly with respect to writing styles and format. The
committee recommended that existing PAR guidelines for
writers and symposia editors be revised to stress PAR's
interest in straightforward English and professional journal
style. Work is now being done on the revision of the
guidelines, and future issues of PAR will feature this
emphasis on clarity in writing.
The committee also recommended the increase in
publication capacity, with additional space allocated to
practitioner-oriented materials which meet quality stand-
ards. A meeting was held in Washington at the end of
September with PAR Editor-in-Chief Dwight Waldo, ASPA
staff members, and several practitioners to start working
out the details of a practitioner-oriented section of PAR
which will be started early in 1977, utilizing some of the
additional 64 pages voted in the 1976-77 ASPA budget.
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Special Publications Services
The Publications Committee also recommended a series
of special publications activities to be provided and/or
considered as ASPA professional services, generally as
cost-centered or revolving-fund activities.
In July the Executive Committee of the National
Council approved a recommendation by the executive
director to establish a cost center for publication services,
promotion, and advertising and to employ a business
manager for publications. The Executive Committee
authorized a working fund loan of up to $20,000 from
ASPA reserves for three years repayable at the median
interest rate of other ASPA investments at the time of
repayment, but with first priority given to current income
from expanded membership as a source of funds. In
September Nicholas Gorski was hired as publications
business manager.
One of the first actions of the new publications business
manager was to launch a campaign to obtain increased
advertising in the annual National Conference program and
in the Public Administration Review. In addition, it was
decided that effective immediately, P.A. News and Views
would also carry advertising. This current issue is the first
to carry such material. Also in the planning stage is a
promotional campaign to increase the sale of ASPA
publications and hopefully establish enough additional
finances to produce special publications, such as a collec-
tion of previously published PAR articles on a given topic.
Also in the area of special publication services, the
following recommendations of the Publications Committee
have already been put into effect:
1. Reprints of PAR articles should be made available.
Copies of single Review articles are now available for $1.00
for one copy, 75 cents each for two to nine copies, and 50
cents each for 10 or more copies of the same article.
2. A coordinated publications list should be published.
Such a list was published in June and is now being sent to
each ASPA member with his or her renewal notice, as well
as to others requesting publications information. In addi-
tion, a list of available ASPA publications was published in
the last two issues of the Public Administration Review and
in the July issue of P.A. News and Views. Anyone wishing
additional copies of the publications price list may obtain
them by writing to ASPA Headquarters.
3. Periodical subscriptions options should be considered
as a possible service. Currently negotiations are in process
with the Institute of Public Administration of Canada to
enable ASPA members to subscribe to their journal,
Canadian Public Administration, at a reduced rate.
Publications Advisory Group
As a final recommendation, the Publications Committee
suggested that a Publications Advisory Group be created,
consisting of those members of the PAR Editorial Board
who are also National Council members; the member (or
members) of the P.A. News and Views Advisory Group who
is/are on the National Council; and two others to be
PA NEWS & VIEWS, OCTOBER 1976
selected for their interests and knowledge in publications
services.
The Publications Committee noted that the Publications
Advisory Group is not to be a group which is superior to or
which oversees the PAR editor and Editorial Board or the
P.A. News and Views Advisory Group, but that rather it is
to serve as a committee to consider (1) publications
proposals or review requirements submitted to it by the
National Council and (2) funding sources and opportunities
for ASPA publications.
President Gallas has named the following to the advisory
body: Robert C. Harrall, Fred A. Kahn, and A. Lee
Fritschler, who are National Council members serving on
the PAR Editorial Board; Edward P. Pazicky and Wanda C.
Woolcot, National Council members serving on the P.A.
News and Views Advisory Group; Walter Broadnax of the
Federal Executive Institute, and Chester A. Newland of the
School of Public Administration, University of Southern
California, who was chairman of the 1975-76 ASPA
Publications Committee. President Gallas has named New-
land chairman of the Publications Advisory Group.
The advisory group held its first meeting in Washington,
D.C., in August at which time it discussed the charge for
the group, the new publications cost center, and the
direction ASPA should be taking in the publications field,
as well as the funding for additional publications.
A good deal of attention was devoted to the subject of
special publications, including the issuance of special
collections of PAR articles by functional areas such as
MBO, PPBS, labor relations, OD, etc., to be used in the
academic and training market. ASPA members with sugges-
tions for topics for special collections and for editors
should send their ideas to the Publications Advisory Group
in care of ASPA, Suite 300, 1225 Connecticut Avenue
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.
Also under discussion were methods of funding special
issues of PAR and other ASPA publications. The Advisory
Group will continue its deliberations on December 3 at the
Airport Marina Hotel, Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, so it can
make recommendations to the ASPA National Council
which meets in the same location the following day.
?Barbara Byers Judd, ASPA Staff
Want Additional Copies of This Issue?
As this issue of P.A. News and Views was going to
press, we received an order from the Federal Execu-
tive Institute for 700 extra copies because of the
articles by the presidential candidates.
We have run additional copies of this special
presidential issue, which are available from ASPA
Headquarters for $1.00 each, with discount rates on
larger quantities. Copies may be ordered by writing to
the Publications Manager, American Society for
Public Administration, 1225 Connecticut Avenue
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. For single copies,
please enclose payment with your order.
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Commission Calls for FY 1977
IPA Grant Proposals
The U.S. Civil Sell/ice Commission has announced that
$12,408,000 is available in Intergovernmental Personnel
Act (IPA) formula grant funds for Fiscal Year 1977 and has
called on state and local governments to submit grant
applications to Commission regional offices.
According to the CSC announcement, state and local
governments can use these funds to strengthen their
management capacities and to train their professional,
administrative, and technical officials and employees.
The Commission may approve grant support for up to
50 per cent of the cost of eligible projects. At least one-half
of each state's allocation must be used to meet the needs of
local governments. Under the IPA, the term "local govern-
ment" also means the recognized governing body of an
Indian tribe.
In announcing the funding allocations, the Commission
encouraged state and local governments to place emphasis
on projects which will have lasting impact or which can
serve as demonstration models for other jurisdictions
wishing to improve their management capacities.
In addition to grants, the IPA authorizes technical
assistance in personnel management, temporary assignments
of personnel between federal agencies and state and local
governments or universities, attendance of state and local
employees at federal training courses, and cooperative
federal-state-local recruiting and examining programs.
Further information on these assistance provisions is
available from Commission regional offices.
HEW, from page 6
Under the proposed regulation, a recipient shall make
reasonable accommodation to the known physical or
mental limitations of a handicapped applicant or employee
unless the recipient can demonstrate that the accommoda-
tion would impose an undue hardship on the operation of
its program. Where reasonable accommodation will not
suffice to neutralize the effects of a person's handicap or
will cause undue hardship, failure to employ or advance the
handicapped person will not be considered discrimination,
since the failure is due to objective and necessary criteria
rather than to the fact that the applicant is handicapped. A
recipient may not deny an employment opportunity to a
person on the ground that reasonable accommodation will
be necessary to enable that person to perform adequately
on the job.
Under the concept of "reasonable accommodation,"
HEW funding recipients would be obligated to undertake
such measures as job restructuring to shift duties and
activities in a manner that will enable the handicapped
person to perform the duties essential to the job or making
facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable
by handicapped persons. Such actions might take the form
of architectural modifications, the addition of elevators,
and the location or relocation of particular offices or jobs
so that they are in areas of the employer's facilities that are
CHANGING DIRECTION, from page 8
Davis opinion enunciates a different rule for cases involving
alleged unconstitutional discrimination (the state must have
an intent to discriminate and adverse racial effect is not
sufficient to demonstrate this intent) than for cases under
the EEO Act (disparate racial or sex impact raises a
presumption of discrimination). Moreover, for the first time
the validity of an employment test was upheld by the
Supreme Court in the face of adverse racial impact.
The Court appears to recognize that any professionally
accepted form of validity/study (e.g., criterion related,
content or construct) will suffice, a standard which is
different from that contained in the EEOC Guidelines (the
Guidelines recognize a preference for criterion-related
validity). Of signal significance is the importance which the
Court attributes to Washington, D.C.'s successful affirma-
tive action program. While proportional representation is
not constitutionally called for, success in affirmative action
not only blunts the claim of discrimination but also appears
to impact on the quantum and quality of proof of validity
which is acceptable.
In sum, the Supreme Court appears to have embarked on
a course where, except for intrusions on specific "core"
constitutional protections, public employers may set such
standards for employees as desired, provided only that they
are not so irrational as to be branded arbitrary. Greater
discretion in employer/employee relations is assured for
locally elected officials who are protected by National
League of Cities against certain kinds of federal intrusion
and by Bishop and Kelley from previously expanding
judicial oversight. Public employees who have tenure are
still entitled to a due process hearing after discharge, but
the Supreme Court will not interfere with a state court's (or
lower federal court's) narrow interpretation of tenure under
state law.
Editor's Note: The Bureau of Intergovernmental Per-
sonnel Programs of the U.S. Civil Service Commission has
just issued a revised edition of Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Court Cases, a compendium of summaries of a cross
section of civil rights court cases dealing with personnel
administration. Copies are available from the Bureau of
Intergovernmental Personnel Programs, U.S. Civil Service
Commission, Washington, D.C. 20415.
already accessible to and usable by handicapped persons.
Such modifications need not be made if they would impose
an "undue hardship" to the recipient. In determining
whether an accommodation would impose an undue hard-
ship on the operation of a recipient's program, the
department will consider such factors as the size and type
of recipient's program and the nature and cost of the
accommodation required.
Further information on the proposed regulations may be
obtained by contacting the Office for Civil Rights, U.S.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 330 Indiana
Avenue S.W., Washington, D.C. 20201.
Tom Parker, ASPA Staff
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MEETINGS OF INTEREST TO ASPA MEMBERS
Information has been received in ASPA Headquarters on
several meetings which are of interest to various segments
of the ASPA membership. Below are brief descriptions of
these sessions.
Labor Law ? Finance
The American Bar Association will be presenting na-
tional institutes on "Public Sector Labor Law" and
"Municipal Finance" during the coming months. The
institute on "Public Sector Labor Law" will be offered at
the Ambassador West Hotel in Chicago November 18-19.
Two institutes on "Municipal Finance" are scheduled, the
first December 2-3 at the Shoreham Americana Hotel in
Washington, D.C., and the second December 9-10 at the
Fairmont Hotel in San Francisco. Information on all three
institutes is available from John F. Foley, National Insti-
tutes Program, American Bar Association, 1155 East 60th
Street, Chicago, Illinois 60637.
Police Intelligence
The Police Management and Operations Divisions of the
International Association of Chiefs of Police is currently
accepting applications for a workshop on "Police Intelli-
gence Management," which will be held November 29 to
December 3 in San Diego, and a workshop on "Police
Intelligence Analysis," which will also be held in San Diego
December 6-10. Further information about both of these
workshops is available from Ray Garza, Police Management
and Operations Divisions, IACP, Eleven Firstfield Road,
Gaithersburg, Maryland 20760.
Regulatory Policy
The American Management Associations will hold the
first National Forum on Business, Government and the
Public Interest, bringing together leaders from the ranks of
business, public interest groups, labor, and government
December 1-3 at the Shoreham Americana Hotel in
Washington, D.C. The Forum will open with a session
entitled "The Regulation of American Business ? Govern-
ment Regulatory Policy," featuring speeches by Senator
Harrison Williams, chairman of the Senate Committee on
Labor; Ralph Nader of the Center for Study of Responsive
Law; and Jack Hanley, chairman, Monsanto Company. For
further information, contact the Registration Department,
American Management Associations, 135 West 50th Street,
New York, N.Y. 10020.
Managing in a Tight Economy and Communications
The National Training and Development Service has
announced a series of workshops on the topics of "Man-
aging in a Tight Economy" and "Communications." Three-
day workshops on managing are designed to provide public
officials with new management tools to enhance their
management skills and the productivity and effectiveness of
their organizations. Workshop dates and locations are as
follows: December 8-10, Seattle; December 15-17, Boston;
January 12-14, 1977, San Francisco; February 2-4, Atlanta;
and February 23-25, Dallas. For additional information on
the Managing in a Tight Economy Workshop, contact Chip
Morrison, National Training and Development Service,
5028 Wisconsin Avenue N.W., Washington, D.C. 20016.
A series of two-day regional communications workshops
will be conducted by NTDS, beginning in December. The
workshops will focus on improving internal and external
communications including the techniques and concepts for
maintaining better communications with special interest
groups, the news media, the organizational staff, other
governmental agencies, and the general public. Workshop
dates and locations are: December 16-17, Washington, D.C.;
January 20-21, 1977, Atlanta; February 17-18, Memphis;
March 3-4, Newport Beach, California; and March 17-18,
Dallas. For further information, contact Scott B. Walker,
Director of Communications, at the above NTDS address.
President Gallas Reports on 28th Annual Conference of the
Institute of Public Administration of Canada
by President Nesta Gallas
At the invitation of C. Les Usher, National President of
the Institute of Public Administration of Canada, I partici-
pated in the 1976 Canadian Conference in Halifax, Nova
Scotia, September 8-10.
A key topic introduced at the opening plenary and
discussed at subsequent concurrent sessions was "Openness
of Public Documents: The Policy Issues, and Implications
for the Administrator." An American paper on the topic
was presented by Harold C. Relyas, specialist in American
government, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Library
of Congress. A second plenary session topic was "Oceans:
The Role of Governments in Realizing the Potential of
Economic and Coastal Zone Resources."
The similarity of interests between ASPA and its
Canadian counterpart was evident in the subjects discussed
at the various sessions, including "Governing the Cities:
Financial Issues," "Collective Bargaining in the Public
Service: Criteria for Setting Wages and Salaries," "New
Structures of Policy Administration," "Whither Canadian
Federalism: The Challenge of Regional Diversity and
Maturity," "The Administration and the Participating
Public," and "Trans-Border Relations: Provinces and
States."
During the Canadian Conference I met with various
members of the Institute's Executive Committee and
Executive Director J.M. Galimberti to discuss matters of
mutual interest including the potential for cooperative
efforts between the two professional societies. Other ASPA
members participating in the Conference were Professors
Frank X. Steggert from Rensselaer, Richard H. Leach from
Duke, and Rolf Haugen from the University of Vermont.
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Features in This Issue
Presidential Candidates on "The Management of the American Governmental System," page 1.. ..Were You There?
? the birth of ASPA, page 2.. ..New HEW Guidelines Pending on Prohibiting Job Discrimination Because of Physical
Handicaps, page 6. . ..Changing Direction of Public Employment Law, page 7. . ..Student Plans for ASPA Conference,
page 13... .Practitioner's Bookshelf, page 14. ...Progress on Publications Committee Recommendations, page
16. . . .Meetings of Interest to ASPA Members, page 19.
Four ASPA Regions Schedule October Meetings
Four ASPA regions have scheduled regional sessions
during the month of October.
Region IV, which includes the states of Delaware,
Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia, will
meet October 13-15 at The Carousel Center Hotel in Ocean
City, Maryland, to discuss the theme "Public Administra-
tion: Today and Tomorrow." The program is divided into
six tracks covering the following topic areas: Public
Accountability, Personnel Administration, Public Policy,
Problems of Intergovernmental Management in the 1970s
and 1980s, Organizational Development, and Tools of the
Professional Manager. In addition, there will be special
panels on Women in Work and the Student Role in Region
IV Activities.
Regions I and H, including the states of Connecticut,
Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and
Vermont in Region I and New Jersey and New York in
Region II, will meet October 14 and 15 at the Hilton Inn at
Logan Airport in Boston. The two-day session will include
panels on the following subjects: Intergovernmental Man
A Few More Important ASPA Dates
The September issue of P.A. News and Views ran a
series of important ASPA dates from September
through April. Here are two more dates to add to that
list:
October 21, Professional Standards Committee, Wash-
ington, D.C.
December 3, Policy Issues Committee, Dallas., Texas
agement, Professional Development, Judicial Administra-
tion, Growth Policy, Financial Administration, Collective
Bargaining, Urban Management, Organizational Practices,
Professional Standards and Ethics, Media, Smaller Govern-
ments, Evaluation, Productivity, Human Services, and a
special session for the National Association of Schools of
Public Affairs and Administration (NASPAA).
"Post Birthday Blues ? Public Alternatives to Orwell's
1984" is the theme of the Southeast Regional Conference
which will be held October 19-22 at the Deauville Hotel in
Miami Beach, Florida. The Southeast Region, Region V,
covers the states of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Tennessee.
The three-day meeting will feature ten tracks covering
the following topics: Big Government and Accountability,
Collective Bargaining, Criminal Justice, Education and
Public Administration, Environmental Interests, Human
Resources Administration, Minority Affairs, Public Admin-
istration and the People, Public Administration and Public
Policy, and Potpourri.
ASPA Membership Tops 16,000 Mark
ASPA membership has topped the 16,000 mark,
according to Membership Department figures. Al-
though the official computer verification isn't avail-
able yet, informal month-end figures show ASPA
with a membership of 16,150, the highest in our
history.
news eN views
American Society For Public Administration
1225 Connecticut Ave., N.W.. Washington, D.C. 20036
POSTMASTER: PLEASE FORWARD
Second Class postage
paid at
Washington. D.C.
and at additional
mailing offices
?plir p
* * * * '1("1
?
?
TO ADVANCE THE SCIENCE PROCESSES
AND ART OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.
H. George Frederickson
President
Dwight A. Ink
President-Elect
AMERICAN SOCIETY
FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
1225 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036
[phone]
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Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002400150014-8
WHAT IS ASPA?
The American Society for Public
Administration is a national organi-
zation dedicated to the improvement of public
service. This intent is achieved through a variety
of programs for professional development at the
chapter, regional, section and national levels.
With its inception in 1939, ASPA expounded
the idea that public administration in any juris-
diction anywhere can be analyzed, evaluated,
and improved and that a body of professional
knowledge can be developed for both education/
training and practitioner guidance.
Today, the goals and principles of ASPA are
supported by a broad based membership which
includes individuals from all categories of gov-
ernment?local, state, federal and foreign?as
well as academicians, researchers, students, and
interested members of the business community.
All of these individuals are committed to ad-
vance the science, processes, and art of public
administration. ASPA strongly supports equal
opportunity for minorities and women.
STRUCTURE OF ASPA
ASPA is organized into over ninety
chapters within a ten region struc-
ture. T e governing board of the Society is its
National Council, comprised of the President,
President-Elect, and the three most recent Past-
Presidents, nine members elected nationwide,
three representatives elected from each of the
ten regions and one representative from each of
the organizations affiliated with the Society.
CHAPTERS
Chapters elect their own officers, and plan
and organize their own programs based on the
interests of their membership and on issues of
local concern.
REGIONS
Regions plan and organize an annual Regional
Conference which gives the Chapter members an
opportunity to get together to discuss issues of
mutual concern.
SECTIONS
Sections bring together public administrators
interested in a specific area of administration
without regard to geographic boundaries. Sec-
tion membership is available for an annual dues
of $5.00, and Section officers are elected by
their membership. ASPA's Sections include:
? Conference on Minority Public Administra-
tors Section (COMPA)
? Section on Criminal Justice Administration
(SCJA)
? Section on Human Resources Administra-
tion (SHRA)
? Section on International and Comparative
Administration (S ICA)
? Section on Management Sciences (SMS)
? Section on Natural Resources and Environ-
mental Administration (SN REA)
? Section for Professional Development (SPD)
? Section on Science and Technology in
Government (SSTIG)
COMMITTEES
Committees provide basic policy guidelines
for the functional operation of the Society. Both
Committee Chairpersons and members are ap-
pointed by the Society President. ASPA's Com-
mittees include:
? Committee on Higher Education/Govern-
ment Relations
? Committee on Internships
? Committee on Professional Standards and
Ethics
? Committee on Women in Public Adminis-
tration
? Policy Issues Committee
? Relations with Business and Industry Advi-
---sory Committee
? Special Committee on Public Service Fu-
tures
? Committee on Military Public Administra-
tors
? Committee on Budgeting and Policy Analy-
sis
? Committee on Semi-Retired Public Adminis-
trators
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NASPAA
The National Association of Schools of Public
Affairs and Administration (NASPAA) is currently
ASPA's only affiliate organization. A profes-
sional education association dedicated to the
advancement of education and training in public
affairs and public administration, NASPAA fos-
ters goals and standards of educational ex-
cellence and represents the concerns and in-
terests of member institutions in the formulation
and support of national policies for education in
public affairs/public administration.
CD
MEMBERSHIP BENEFITS
? National Conference
The National Conference provides an oppor-
tunity for the membership to keep abreast of
current trends and issues in public administra-
tion. Topics are chosen to meet the many fa-
ceted interests of the members, the Chapters,
and the functional areas of Society Sections and
Committees.
Future National Conferences will be held:
April 9-12, 1978 ?Phoenix, Arizona
April 7-10,1979?Baltimore, Maryland
April 13-16,1980?San Francisco, California
April 12-15, 1981 ?Detroit, Michigan
? Publications
ASPA's publications program is designed to
inform the membership of professional develop-
ments and Society events. The Public Adminis-
tration Review is a bi-monthly -journal which is
the leading source of information, opinion, and
comment on public administration. The Public
Administration News and Views is a monthly
newsletter featuring news of the Society and
highlighting current issues affecting the public
service. ASPA periodically publishes special re-
ports and publications on_matters of immediate
concern to the public administration commu-
nity.
? Personnel Exchange
The Personnel Exchange and Recruiter Service
gives university and public employers access to
a public administration talent reservoir of more
than 6,000 persons, which monthly refers some
500 resumes to potential employers. There is a
five dollar annual charge for member participa-
tion in this program.
? Semi-Retired Program
The Semi-Retired Public Administrators Serv-
ice, added in 1976, through a grant from the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
emphasizes the identification of prospective em-
ployers willing to utilize the talents of semi-
retired persons to provide needed public serv-
ices.
? Group Insurance
Four Group Insurance Programs are cur-
rently available through ASPA and include the
following: a) low-cost group term life coverage
up to fifty thousand dollars ($50,000), b) a hos-
pital income plan providing cash payments up
to seventy five dollars ($75) a day directly to
members, c) accidental death and dismember-
ment coverage providing coverage of up to two
hundred thousand dollars ($200,000), and d) a
disability income insurance plan providing four
hundred dollars ($400) per month payment for
up to two years, after thirty days of disability,
which will be in effect in the fall of 1977.
? Voting Rights
Right to vote and hold office in Chapters,
Sections and at the National level.
? Professional Study Tours
Group Professional Study Tours abroad are
available to ASPA members. The 1976 program
was a two week study tour to USSR. Plans for
the current year include a study tour of the
Peoples Republic of China and a seven day study
tour of Cuba.
? Discount on Books
Members are offered discounts from time to
time on professional books and publications of
special interest to public administrators.
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Administration Review ? P.A. News & Views ?
Complimentary publications ? Free listing in
the monthly Recruiter ? Complimentary regis-
trations to the Annual ASPA Conference ? Dis-
count rates for quantity purchases of ASPA pub-
lications ? Reduced rates for ASPA mailing list
for approved mailings. These benefits have a
membership fee schedule based on agency or
organization budget size. Contact the Director
of Conferences, Membership & Chapter Devel-
opment, ASPA headquarters, for information on
Agency Affil late Membership. 202/785-3255.
A'SPA's Regional Structure
(Including Number of Chapters by State)
Puerto
Rico
Vt. (1)
N.H. (0)
Mass. (1)
R.I. (1)
Conn. (1)
N.J. (1)
Del. (1)
Md. (1)
W. Va. (1)
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AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL COUNCIL 1977-78
Anita F. Alpern
Assistant Commissioner (Planning
and Research)
Internal Revenue Service
1111 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Room 3017
Washington, D.C. 20224
[phone] or 566-4420
Warren Bennis
President
University of Cincinnati
Cincinnati, Ohio 45221
[phone]
Raymond D. Bodnar
Professor and Extension Specialist
Department of Government Services
Rutgers?The State University
of New Jersey
New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903
[phone]
Brent W. Brown
Office of Economic Planning and
Development
1700 West Washington
Executive Tower?Room 505
Phoenix, Arizona 85007
[phone]
Michael A. Carroll
A.I.P.
Office of United States Senator
Richard G. Lugar
Special Assistant for Indiana
Old Federal Building
Room 447-46 East Ohio Street
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204
[phone]
C. C. (Chuck) Christie, Jr.
Associate Professor of Administration
Department of Public Administration
California State College
5500 State College Parkway
San Bernardino, California 92407
[phone]
Patrick J. Conklin
Associate Director
Federal Executive Institute
U.S. Civil Service Commission
Highway 29 North
Charlottesville, Virginia 22903
[phone]
Ronald j. Cristando
Executive Director
Valley Regional Training Center
1221 Van Ness, Suite 302
Fresno, California 93721
[phone]
R. L DeCair
Executive Director
Virginia Municipal League
Post Office Box 753
Richmond, Virginia 23206
[phone]
Michael Fischetti
Associate Professor of Political Science
Montgomery College
Rockville, Maryland 20850
[phone]
Vinton D. Fisher
Extension Professor
165 Elizabeth Street
Hartford, Connecticut 06105
[phone]
Picot B. Floyd
Hillsborough County Administrator
P.O. Box 1110
Tampa, Florida 33601
[phone]
H. George Frederickson
President
Eastern Washington State College
Cheney, Washington 99003
[phone]
A. Lee Fritschler
Dean, College of Public Affairs
Ward 301, The American University
Washington, D.C. 20016
[phone]
Nesta M. Gallas
Associate Dean ?
Office for Graduate Studies
John Jay College of Criminal, Justice
The City University of New York
444 West 56th Street
New York, New York 10019
[phone], 3520
Kathryn H. Godwin
Acting Director
Bureau of Public Administration
University of Maine at Orono
162 College Avenue
Orono, Maine 04473
[phone]
Allen C. Haile
Secretarial Representative
Western Region
United States Department of Commerce
450 Golden Gate Avenue
San Francisco, California 94102
[phone]
Randy H. Hamilton
Dean
Graduate School of Public Adminis-
tration
Golden Gate University
536 Mission Street
San Francisco, California 94105
[phone], ext. 216
John G. Hatch
Operations Supervisor
Central Iowa Regional Association
of Local Governments
2600 Bell Avenue
Des Moines, Iowa 50321
[phone]
Beverly J. Hawkins
White House Fellow
C/O President's Comm. on White
House Fellows
Washington, D.C. 20415
[phone]
Dwight A. Ink
Director
Sponsored Research and Continuing
Education
College of Public Affairs
Ward Circle Building, Room 203
The American University
Washington, D.C. 20016
[phone] or 51
David M. Jackson
Education Program Specialist
HEW (ROB-3)
7th and D Streets, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20202
[phone]
Maynard Jackson
Mayor
City Hall
68 Mitchell Street, S.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
[phone]
Gilda Harris Jacobs
Special-Assistant to the Chairman
United States Civil Service Commission
Room 5A09, 1900 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20415
[phone]
Norman J. Johnson
Associate Dean
School of Urban and Public Affairs
Carnegie-Mellon University
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213
[phone]
William A. Jones, Jr.
Director
Institute of Government Administration
Georgia State University
University Plaza
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
[phone]
Fred A. Kahn
Labor Economist
Office of Policy, Evaluation and
Research
Employment and Training Admin-
istration
U.S. Department of Labor
601 D Street, N.W., Room 9424
Washington, D.C. 20213
[phone]
Elliot H. Kline
Director
Institute of Public Affairs and
Administration
Drake University
Des Moines, Iowa 50311
[phone]
Morton Kroll
Professor of Political Science and
Public Affairs
Graduate School of Public Affairs, DP30
University of Washington
Seattle, Washington 98195
[phone]
Walter N. Lambert
Special Assistant for Federal Relations
605 Andy Holt Tower
University of Tennessee
Knoxville, Tennessee 37916
[phone]
Arthur L. Levine
Associate Professor
Department of Public Administration
Baruch College
The City University of New York
17 Lexington Avenue
New York, New York 10010
[phone]
Ann C. Macaluso
Assistant Director of Studies
Commission on Federal Paperwork
1836 Park Road, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20010
[phone]
Douglas R. Martin
Administrative Director
New York State's Comptroller's Office
A. E. Smith State Office Building
Albany, New York 12236
[phone]
Richard L McDowell
Dean
Suffolk University
47 Mt. Vernon Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02116
[phone], ext. 330
Addie C. Page
Personnel Consultant
Department of Community Affairs
P.O. Box 155
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120
[phone]
Echvard-P-Pazicky
Senior Persabel Representative
One World Trade Center, 61 North
New York, New York 10048
[phone]
John Rehfuss
Center for Governmental Studies
Northern Illinois University
DeKalb, Illinois 60115
[phone]
Godfrey E.-Richey
Housing Rehabilitation Administrator
Rehabilitation and Property
Conservation Division
823 East Jefferson Street
Phoenix, Arizona 85034
[phone]
Philip J. Rutledge
President
National Institute of Public Management
1612 K Street, N.W.
Suite 810
Washington, D.C. 20006
[phone]
Wendell G. Schaeffer
Graduate Program in Public Affairs
and Administration
Texas Christian University
Fort Worth, Texas 76109
[phone], ext. 410
Walter F. Scheffer
Director
Graduate Program in Public
Administration
455 West Lindsey Street, Room 205
University of Oklahoma
Norman, Oklahoma 73019
[phone]
Laurence R. Sprecher
Director
Department of General Services
State of Oregon
1225 Ferry Street, S.E.
Salem, Oregon 97310
[phone]
Graham W. Watt
President
National Training and Development
Service for State and Local
Government
5028 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20016
[phone]
Ralph R. Widner
President
Academy for Contemporary Problems
1501 Neil Avenue
Columbus, Ohio 43201
[phone]
Arthur G. Will
County Administrator
651 Pine Street
Martinez, California 94553
[phone]
Wanda C. Woolcot
Director of Public Affairs
University of Alaska. Anchorage
2651 Providence Avenue
Anchorage, Alaska 99504
[phone], ext. 530
CIA-RDP80M00165A002400150014-8
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MEMBERSHIP CATEGORIES
The Society offers several cate-
gories of member participation:
FULL MEMBER: $30 ? Includes
$6.00 Chapter rebate. Full ASPA membership
rights and privileges which include ? Public
Administration Review ? P.A. News and Views
(including Recruiter)? Member Discounts ? Life
Insurance Eligibility ? Right to hold national
office and to vote on Society Affairs ? Chapter
Membership.
STUDENT MEMBER: $15 ? No Chapter rebate.
Same benefits as Full membership. The Student
Membership Category is limited to full time stu-
dents, regardless of age, whose primary occupa-
tion is being a student, with employment, if any,
incidental to this, as defined by the institution in
which the student is enrolled and as certified by
a faculty sponsor.
CONTRIBUTING MEMBER: $50 ?Includes
$10.00 Chapter rebate. Full membership services
plus selected meeting reports ? National recog-
nition given.
LIFE MEMBER: $1,000 ?Includes $6.00 Chap-
ter rebate yearly. Special support of ASPA pro-
gram and development ? National recognition
given ? Payable in one to four annual install-
ments ? Additional information available on re-
quest.
ASSOCIATE MEMBER: $20?Includes $4.00
Chapter rebate. A form of introductory member-
ship into the Society. Maximum period of mem-
bership in this category for any individual, three
years. Services include ? Right to hold national
office and to vote on Society Affairs ? P.A. News
& Views ? Life Insurance Eligibility ? Chapter_
Membership.
FOREIGN MEMBER: $35 ? Includes $6.00
Chapter rebate. Same benefits as Full member-
ship. This category is to cover those members
whose address is outside the United States (ex-
cluding persons receiving mail at an APO or FPO
address).
AGENCY AFFILIATES: Sliding Scale ?ASPA
has an institutional membership category which
offers to agencies and public service organiza-
tions the opportunity to participate in the So-
ciety. Membership benefits include ? Public
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Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002400150014-8
American Society for Public Administration
Organization as of
June 30, 1977
Membership: 16,751
Representatives
National Council: 46
Elected
Units
Chapters: 95
Regions: 10
Geographical
Executive
Finance and
Administration
Program
Planning
Council Committees
COMPA
Criminal
Justice
International and
Comparative Admin.
Sections
Standing or
or
House Committees
Ad hoc or Special
Committees
S
Affiliate
Groups of which ASPA
is a voting member
Support services
Insurance Trustees
Women in
Public Admin.
Public Administration
Review Editorial Board
Public Service
Futures
Membership and
Chapter Development
Human
Resources
Policy Issues
News and Views
Advisory Board
Budget and
Policy Planning
Semi-Retired
Public Administrators
Nominating
Management
Science
Dimock Award
Publications
Advisory Group
Military Public
Administrators
Internships
National Association of Schools of
Public Affairs and Administration
American Consortium for
International Public Administration
Staff. 22 FTP
Natural Resources
and
Environmental Admin.
Grant Garvey
Award
Higher Education
and
Government Relations
Professional Standards
and Ethics
Relations with Business
and Industry
Consortium on Education for
the Public Service
Professional
Development
Annual
Conference
--I Steering
--I Program
HSpecial Events
and Arrangements
Science and Technology
in Government
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EJ,,VW.,I_L[1!?1,'0,7,A1
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A
0
0
r L L
0
A
L,
1.c-qCD.
PUBLISHED
1,!?`,
efivgEf 9tftgIksK2Act4
JULY/AUGUST 1977
315 Editorial ? And in Conclusion .. . .
Symposium on National Security and Public Administration
319 Introduction
321 Public Administration and the Military
334 The Budget Process in the Department of Defense: 1947-77:
The Strengths and Weaknesses of Three Systems
347 Department of Defense Research and
Development Management
357 Policy Organization in American Security Affairs:
An Assessment
Articles on
368 Local Government, Information Systems, and Technology
Transfer: Evaluating Some Common Assertions About
Computer Application Transfer
383 What Is and What Should Be in University Policy Studies?
Other Features
391 From the Professional Stream ? Staffing International
Organizations: The Role of the International Civil Service
Commission ? The Challenge of Public Administration
400 Public Management Forum ? What We Are Trying To Do ?
Zero Base: Federal Style /400/ ? Stress and the Public
Administrator /407/ ? Why Not Qualitative Analysis? /415/
418 Book Reviews ? Urban Politics, Urban Policy, Case Studies,
and Political Theory ? On Terrorism
434 Book Notes and Notices
436 Communications
(I)
11:
EtR
TRATEON
Approved For Release 2004/03/12
American Society
For Public Administration
H. George Frederickson
President
Dwight A. Ink
President-elect
Keith F. Mulrooney
Executive Director
Council
Anita F. Alpern
Warren Bennis
Raymond D. Bodnar
Brent W. Brown
Michael A. Carroll
C.C. (Chuck) Christie, Jr.
Patrick J. Conklin
Ronald J. Cristando
R.L. DeCair
Michael Fischetti
Vinton D. Fisher
Picot B. Floyd
H. George Frederickson
A. Lee Fritschler
Neste M. Gallas
Kathryn H. Godwin
Allen C. Haile
Randy H. Hamilton
John G. Hatch
Beverly J. Hawkins
Dwight A. Ink
David Jackson
Maynard Jackson
Gilda Harris Jacobs
Norman J. Johnson
William A. Jones, Jr.
Fred A. Kahn
Elliot H. Kline
Morton Kroll
Walter N. Lambert
Arthur L. Levine
Ann C. Macaluso
Douglas R. Martin
Richard L. McDowell
Addle C. Page
Edward P. Pazicky
John Rehfuss
Godfrey E. Richey
Philip J. Rutledge
Wendell G. Schaeffer
Walter F. Scheffer
Laurence R. Sprecher
Graham W. Watt
Ralph R. Widner
Arthur G. Will
Wanda C. Woolcot
Public Administration Review is pub-
lished bimonthly by the American Soci-
ety for Public Administration, 1225
Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington,
D.C. 20036. Second-class postage paid at
Washington, D.C. and at additional
mailing offices.
The Review is indexed in Public
Affairs Information Service, Social
Sciences Index, and Book Review
Index. The contents are microfilmed
by University Microfilm, Ann Arbor,
Michigan.
Subscription (libraries and insti-
tutions only): $25 a year. Single copies:
$4.50. Annual membership (includes Re-
view subscription): Regular $30, Con-
tributing $50, Full-time students $15.
From membership fees, $12.50 is allotted
to Public Administration Review. 0
1977 by American Society for Public
Administration, 1225 Connecticut Ave-
nue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036. All
Rights Reserved.
POSTMASTER: Send Form 3579 to
Public Administration Review, 1225
Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington,
D.C. 20036.
DWIGHT WALDO, Editor-in-Chief
FRANK MARINI, Managing Editor
BARBARA BYERS JUDD, Production Editor
THAD L. BEYLE, Editor, Book Reviews and Notes
H. GEORGE FREDERICKSON, Editor, Research and Reports
FREMONT J. LYDEN, Editor, Developments in Public Administration
CARL W. STENBERG, Editor, Public Management Forum
EDITORIAL BOARD
Frank Aleshire
Norman Beckman
Don L. Bowen
Kenneth N. Bragg
William D. Brincldoe
Ross Clayton
Picot Floyd
A. Lee Fritschler
Bruce L. Gates
Lawrence Graham
Lloyd F. Hara
Robert C. Harrall
Adam W. Herbert
Roger D. Hoffmaster
Norman Johnson
Jong S. Jun
Fred A. Kahn
John J. Kirlin
Ray J. Lora
Sven Lundstedt
Ann Macaluso
Marjorie Maki
Jerry McCaffery
Beryl A. Radin
Rose Robinson
Christine Rapking-Allen
Walter A. Scheiber
Carl W. Stenberg
James Sundquist
Orba F. Traylor
Marco Walshok
A. Lizette Weiss
Robert W. Wilson
Frank P. Wise
Communication and Routing
General articles, Professional Stream, and Communications: Frank Marini,
Managing Editor, School of Public Administration and Urban Studies,
San Diego State University, San Diego, California 92182.
Developments in Public Administration: Fremont J. Lyden, Feature
Editor, Institute for Administrative Research, Graduate School of
Public Affairs, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington 98105.
Book Reviews and Notes: Thad L. Beyle, Book Review Editor, Depart-
ment of Political Science, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill,
North Carolina 27514.
Public Management Forum: Carl W. Stenberg, Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations, 726 Jackson Place, N.W., Washington,
D.C. 20575.
Research and Reports: H. George Frederickson, President, Eastern
Washington State College, Cheney, Washington 99004.
Advertising and Publication Sales: Nicholas Gorski, Business Manager,
American Society for Public Administration, 1225 Connecticut Ave-
nue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.
Business matters: Barbara Judd, Production Editor, American Society for
Public Administration, 1225 Connecticut Avenue N.W., Washington,
D.C. 20036.
Review policies and symposia: Dwight Waldo, Editor-in-Chief, The
Maxwell School, Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York 13210.
VOLUMES 1 through xxhig vaa
t
from Kraus Reprint eo go-or Release 2004/03/12
East 46th Street, New York, N.Y.
10017.
: CIA-RDP80M00165A002400150014-8
Information for authors, see p. ii
Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002400150014-8
Public Administration Review
Volume 37 jULY/AUGUST 1977
Number 4
And in Conclusion. . . .
SYMPOSIUM
National Security and Public Administration
Dwight Waldo 315
Frank N. Trager, Symposium Editor 319
Introduction Frank N. Trager 319
Public Administration and the Military Chris L. Jefferies 321
The Budget Process in the Department of Defense: 1947-77: The Strengths and
Weaknesses of Three Systems Lawrence J. Korb 334
Department of Defense Research and Development Management Albert G. Dancy 347
Policy Organization in American Security Affairs: An Assessment Barry H. Steiner 357
ARTICLES
Local Government, Information Systems, and Technology Transfer: Evaluating
Some Common Assertions About Computer Application Transfer Kenneth L. Kraemer 368
What Is and What Should Be in University Policy Studies? Stuart Nagel and Marian Neef 383
FROM THE PROFESSIONAL STREAM: CURRENTS AND SOUNDINGS
Staffing International Organizations: The Role of the International
Civil Service Commission John P. Renninger 391
The Challenge of Public Administration Milton Pikarsky 396
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT FORUM
What We Are Trying To Do Carl W. Stenberg 400
Zero Base; Federal Style Donald F. Haider 400
Stress and the Public Administrator
David E. Morrison, M.D. 407
Why Not Qualitative Analysis? Eileen Siedman 415
BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES
Urban Politics, Urban Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory
The Politics of Progress, by Raymond E. Wolfinger ? Power in the City:
Francisco, by Frederick M. Wirt
On Terrorism
Lester M. Salamon 418
Decision Making in San
Abraham H. Miller 429
International Terrorism: National, Regional, and Global Perspectives, by Yohan Alexander (ed.) ?
Transnational Terror, by J. Boyer Bell ? Black September: Its Short Violent History, by Chris-
topher Dobson
Book Notes and Notices 434
Communications 436
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INFORMATION FOR AUTHORS
Editorial Orientation. The goal of Public Administration Review is that of the
Society of which it is an organ: "to advance the science, processes, and art of public
administration." To this purpose it seeks to increase communication and foster
understanding among practitioners, teachers, researchers, and students.
The aim of the editors is to publish material pertinent to the interests of the
broad spectrum of public administration. Opinions expressed are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the policy of the organizations in which they
work, of ASPA, or of the editors.
Writing Style. All authors should give special attention to the problem of com-
municating across the broad spectrum of interests and specializations. Clarity is
prized and relative brevity necessary. Plain English is preferred over professional
jargon. Notes and references should be minimized. In general, the style of noting
and referencing should be that of recent issues of the Review.
Manuscript Specifications. Manuscripts submitted for consideration should not
exceed 4,000 words, and those ranging from 2,000 to 3,000 words are particularly
welcome. All material should be double-spaced, on one side of the page only, and
have margins of one and a half inches. Notes and references, if any, should also be
double-spaced and should be placed at the end of the text. A title page should show
the name(s) and position(s) of the author(s), but the first page of the text should
show only the title of the manuscript.
Four copies of the manuscript should be submitted, routed as indicated below.
Routing and Handling. Three copies of the manuscript should be submitted to
the managing editor, one copy to the editor-in-chief. (See inside front cover for
addresses.)
An abstract of not more than 150 words and a brief biographical statement in
the Review style should accompany manuscripts.
Normal procedure calls for review by at least two readers, usually but not always
members of the Board of Editors.
Authors are requested to notify the editors if the manuscript is being submitted
concurrently to any other journal.
If authors request the return of manuscripts this will be done if possible. Since
loss or damage may occur, however, return cannot be guaranteed.
A Word of Advice. Prospective authors should spend some time with recent
issues of the Review. This will help to orient the author with respect to the tone,
style, and content of the Review. At minimum, authors should review recent issues
to determine the relationship of their manuscript to previous material on the same
or related subjects.
SEE INSIDE FRONT COVER FOR COMMUNICATION AND ROUTING
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And in Conclusion . . . .
With this issue I conclude a 19-year editorial connection with the Review, eight
years as a member of the Board of Editors and 11 years as editor-in-chief. So far as
the evidence of mastheads signifies, this is the longest editorial connection in the
history of the Review. It therefore seems proper to offer some observations and
reflections on the enterprise. Indeed, I feel an obligation to do so.
I begin with a look at achievements, proceed by noting some failures, and then
take another look at the central problem of the Review.
Changes in the Review
In my 11 years as editor-in-chief, the Review made the transition from a
quarterly to a bimonthly publication. Additionally, the size of each issue increased;
and an occasional extra issue has been made possible by outside assistance. Various
changes in format and layout were made, aimed at increasing attractiveness and
readability.
Several new features were introduced. One is the symposium which most issues
carry. Those who have read my annual editorial statements know that I regard the
symposia as posing a continuing question: undoubted "pluses" (intellectual and
material) result from the symposia, but it is still not clear that this is the best use of
limited pages.
From the Professional Stream: Currents and Soundings was introduced early in
my tenure to solve a problem, namely, a place or medium for items of varied size,
provenance, and subject that seemed proper for publication, but did not fit into
any then existing feature or space: items such as speeches and short pieces not quite
"essays."
Developments in Research was introduced as an attempt to solve the problem of
presenting research findings with economy of space for the Review and economy of
time and effort for the "consumers."
Book Notes and Notices was introduced to respond to requests that the Review's
coverage of our literature be broadened and quickened. To respond to the requests
seemed eminently desirable; but I resisted the suggestion that the "cluster reviews"
or "review essays" be abandoned to do so. The review essay struck me as an
excellent "genre," and almost the identifying feature of the Review. I now note
with satisfaction that other journals are moving toward the review essay, not
abandoning it.
The Communications feature was not so much introduced as encouraged. Some
hold the view, I know, that this is a questionable use of space. I justify the use of
the space with the rationale that communication is what the Review is about.
(Additionally, I confess a personal interest in the responses and exchanges evoked;
and confess further that for some journals ;to which I subscribe I seldom get beyond
the communications.)
With this issue a new feature is introduced, Public Management Forum. It is
introduced in an attempt to speak more directly to the interests of practicing
administrators. It is inherently the most problematic of the features, for while the
desire for more information, more "help," is strongly held, it is by no means clear
how it is possible for the Review to respond to the desire. In recognition of the
difficulties, this feature is being approached with special arrangements and in an
experimental mode.
One feature was abandoned soon after its introduction ? Documentation. The
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316 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
intent was to make widely available to the public administration community
documents bearing importantly on our enterprise, say an Executive Order dealing in
a central or significant way with personnel, organization, or funding. But however
useful this might be, it was judged not the best use of scarce space.
While the above-noted changes are hardly a matter of dispute, whether they
represent, individually or collectively, "improvement" is of course a matter of
opinion. It is worth noting that subscriptions (i.e., apart from memberships) have
risen in the past decade from approximately 1,700 to nearly 4,000. Whatever some
members may think, some non-members like us!
To the extent to which the above-noted changes elicit a favorable response, the
credit must be widely distributed. Naturally, I am pleased to have played a part in
the "accomplishment." But what has been done has been a collective effort. The
Society is indebted to my editorial associates, the members of the Board of Editors,
the officers and Council members, the contributors ? to a large company that has
given support in one way or another.
Some Failures
Various problems (as I judged them to be) I have failed to solve, though the
solution to some of them would appear to have been within my power (in terms of
resources and authority).
One of these is the expression of opinion in an "editorial" fashion. Though it
had been the custom for the editor-in-chief to write an editorial for each issue, I
quickly concluded that I did not have the energy (or wisdom) to write an editorial
for each issue. I then experimented ? boldly, I thought: I invited the members of
the Board of Editors to contribute editorials. To my surprise, no response. I then
invited the ASPA president, executive director, and Council members to submit
editorials. I braced for a torrent. But I received not even a trickle. I then extended
the invitation to the members of the National Academy of Public Administration
(at that time still a part of the Society). Still no response. Eventually two editorials
were received from members of the Board.
Perhaps I only think there is a problem. Anyhow, I am still of the opinion that
editorials would be desirable, and hope a "solution" can be found.
Another problem I have not been able to solve is bringing humor into the
Review in a regular and appropriate way. Some feel humor has no place in the
Review, and indeed I received criticism for publishing some "light" pieces at the
same time I was requesting funding for more pages. But I continue to believe that
some humor would be a desirable addition to the professional "menu."
The problem, however, is a difficult one to solve. The risks are great, and the
costs of failure great. An "elephant dance" would be an embarrassment; and one
person's administrative humor is (I've discovered) another's crashing bore or bad
taste.
Another problem I have failed to solve is getting "feedback" on any regular and
reliable basis. Surprisingly (it surprised me), it is difficult for the editors to know
whether the Review is communicating, to whom, and with what effect. Letters, or
oral responses, praising this or damning that, are very rare. Repeatedly, I have
"intended" to get a clearer picture of reader reactions and preferences; by
questionnaire, tear-outs, or whatever. But didn't get to it.
A continuing failure and frustration has been the inability to get better and
quicker reporting on developments in, or of import for, public administration.
Developments of great importance may not be noted until a year has passed. Or
indeed three years, depending on the interests and opportunities of contributors.
However, as against those cases in which I feel I could have solved the problem
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AND IN CONCLUSION . . . . 317
myself with more energy and determination, I believe the solution is beyond the
reach of the editor-in-chief. I believe that this problem can only be solved by having
staff writers, available and competent, to follow developments and report and
interpret them promptly. This means in turn that a solution may not be possible,
unless and until the Society can hire the staff.
Still another failure: how to incorporate foreign and comparative materials into
the Review in a timely, pertinent, economical way. Of course, I am aware that some
members feel that I am creating a problem for a solution: the solution of simply
ignoring foreign experience. After all, we have problems we can't handle
immediately and pressingly before us; and foreigners ignorant of our situation are in
no position to be helpful ? and we have no interest in their problems. True, in
some ways. But quite false, I think, in others. For what it is worth, I believe the
Review would be improved by expanded foreign coverage.
The Central Problem and Some Options
For the first issue of the Review under my supervision I wrote an editorial in
which I stated that I perceived the central problem to be addressed, that of bridging
the interests of the Society's two main constituencies, the practitioners and the
academics. Eleven years later my perception has not changed.
True, a number of developments have occurred that make the problem
somewhat different than it was a decade or two ago. I believe it is the case that
there now are more "pracademics," persons who move back and forth or have
interests and positions that make them difficult to place on either side of a dividing
line. But of the reality and importance of two centers of gravity, two communities
of interest, I have no doubt.
What then follows, with respect to the Review? If we assume that the purpose
and rationale of the Society is to frame and contain the whole spectrum of interests
that "public administration" implies, then the strategy followed by the Review
since its inception is a proper one. For the basic strategy from the beginning has
been to try to communicate among all interests and constituencies.
To the extent it has succeeded this has been the Review's greatest success. To
the extent it has failed this has been the Review's greatest failure. In any case, this
has been the basic problem for the editors to try to solve. During my 11 years,
approximately one-third of my professional time and energies have gone into the
Review, and this problem has been given ? directly ? many hours indeed. I judge
that I have been only moderately effective in the Cause: but I do claim earnest and
arduous labor on its behalf.
To question the bridging strategy of the Review may seem equivalent to
questioning the function and legitimacy of the Society. But I do not believe this is
true. Permit me to suggest an alternative strategy, if only that, in rejecting it, the
bridging strategy may be reaffirmed ? with its benefits and costs, its rewards and
pains, made clear and recognized as necessarily complementary.
I note first that the Society is not alone in its purpose and in its publication
strategy. The American Association for the Advancement of Science seeks to unite
all persons in the large and diverse area of "science"; and its weekly publication,
Science, is a broad-spectrum publication with "something for everyone." It
contains much "hard" and specialized science, but also less formidable essays,
reporting in public affairs affecting (or affected by) science, and so forth.
Presuming this is a successful effort ? and certainly I so judge it ? to what extent
does it present a model that can be followed, an example that might even (in time)
be improved upon?
Consider, however, the American Psychological Association. This is also a large
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318 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
"house," with many more members than this Society, and with interests so varied
there are more than 30 "sections." In this case the diversity of interests prevails,
and there are many specialized publications. Again, for all I can observe, the
strategy is successful. By recognizing varied interests the Association holds them
together?
I draw no conclusion and point no moral. My point is simply that the Society in
general and those responsible for its publications in particular need to reflect
carefully on the options and to make decisions with as much deliberation as
possible. And having made them, be prepared to move with both care and
determination.
The above posing of widely different alternatives was meant only to be
suggestive. There is a case for two (or more) types of journals. Some academics feel
that I have failed because I have not made the Review "respectable" in
scientific-scholarly terms. Some practitioners feel that I have failed because I have
not made the Review comparable to media they consider more practical and
readable. Certainly if there were two journals, the interest of both constituencies
could be catered to more precisely. Could be, but this does not follow as an easy
and necessary consequence, for many problems in financing and staffing would
have to be solved. But assuming adequate funding and scucess in the planning and
launching operations, would the Society be damaged, perhaps destroyed? Or
possibly strengthened? Who can say with certainty?
But there are alternatives beyond one journal versus two journals each appealing
to a main constituency. The recent increase in the size of News and Views and its
obvious strengthening is relevant. Retain the Review much in its present mold, but
supplement it with a lively News and Views performing functions unsuitable or
even impossible for the Review? Adding if and when appropriate specialized media
for whatever purpose? (In my opinion public administration has two needs that are
now not adequately served: (a) as medium for reporting on theory-based research
and (b) as a medium of information and discussion in the large and growing
education-for-public-administration community.) One "house," broad-spectrum
journal plus two or more "constituency" organs? All options should be kept in view
as the Society evolves and needs change.
And a Note of Thanks
I thank the Society and its officers who have made this experience possible for
me. There has been much labor and "pain" of one kind or another, but obviously I
have felt challenged and rewarded or I would not have continued for so long. I
thank all of the members of the Board of Editors ? a "population" of about 100 ?
who have assisted with the enterprise during these 11 years. I extend a special
thanks to the feature editors, who have given generously of their time and talent.
And above all I thank the managing editor, Frank Marini, and the production
editor, Barbara Byers Judd. These two able and agreeable colleagues have, over a
decade, performed magnificently.
Plus a Caution
It should be understood by the readers that no abrupt change in the Review is
possible. There are organizational and financial constraints, plus commitments to
authors and editors (symposia are commissioned about two years in advance of
publication). A new editor-in-chief will, of course, wish to make changes, perhaps
major ones, but they will take time to effect.
Dwight Waldo
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319
A Symposium
National Security
And Public Administration
INTRODUCTION
The undersigned was invited to arrange for and
edit the articles in this symposium on national
security. The symposium grew out of discussions
between the editor of this journal, Dwight Waldo,
and some of the leaders of the International
Studies Association, Section on Military Studies.
The article by Major Chris L. Jefferies, U.S. Air
Force Academy, indicates the minimal role this
interdisciplinary subject matter has played in the
pages of this Review during the past decade. The
contributors and I are therefore indebted to
Editor-in-Chief Dwight Waldo for his invitation to
redress at least in part this imbalance.
We see no need to argue that national security
as a field of teaching, research, and publication
belongs as much to the discipline of public
administration as it does to several other
disciplines represented in the curriculum of the
university. We hope that, however limited our
effort, the symposium will prove to be a stimulus
to our colleagues. Further information about
teaching, research, and publication in national
security affairs may be secured by writing to the
undersigned. The authors of the articles in the
symposium were deliberately chosen from among
the younger generation in our midst.
The phrase "national security," as Arnold
Wolfers observed some time ago, is an "ambiguous
symbol."1 Although Wolfers' remark specifically
refers to governmental operations, it could,
likewise, be applied with equal force to the
growing, interdisciplinary field of national security
studies.2 The intellectual perimeters of this field
Frank N. Trager, Symposium Editor
are yet to be definitively drawn. However, even
casual inspection reveals that the study of national
security in the United States includes a great many
great issues flowing from the Constitutional
requirement placed on the federal government to
"provide for the common defense." The requisite
powers to so provide were divided between the
President as Chief Executive and Commander-
in-Chief and the Congress as having the au-
thority to "declare war," mobilize national
resources, create armed forces.3
Debate on how best to provide for the
"Common Defense" of the United States of
America may be said to have been begun by the
framers of the Constitution. It has continued
year-in, year-out ever since and will continue to be
debated by the federal establishment and the
citizenry as long as America remains a democratic
polity. The terms of the debate vary, but in recent
decades, especially since World War II, there is
wide agreement on the inclusion of such issues as:
the theory and use of strategic and conventional
force; the organization of the defense establish-
ment; the formulation and execution of specific
defense policies; civil-military relations; arms
Frank N. Trager is professor of international affairs and
director, National Security Program, New York
University; and director of Studies, National Strategy
Information Center. He has divided his professional career
among universities, the federal government, and nonprofit
agencies. He is currently the general editor of the National
Security Studies Series, published by the Regents Press of
Kansas, and is the co-author and co-editor of National
Security and American Society.
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320
control and military alliances; the size, cost, and
methods of recruitment of military manpower;
research, development, and acquisition of
weapons; the gathering and estimating of overt and
covert intelligence, and others. Most, if not all,
students of national security, whatever their
disciplines, agree that national security is a rather
complex and sometimes elusive area of study.
Although a consensus is obviously not yet to be
found, the following definition may be considered
both useful and helpful in one's analysis. National
security is that "part of government policy having
as its objective the creation of national and
international political conditions favorable to the
protection or extension of vital national values
against existing and potential adversaries."4 The
ultimate purpose of national security policy is the
protection and extension of certain national values
which the state considers as "vital." Such values or
fundamental principles upon which the very
existence of the state are based may be derived
from a variety of sources, e.g., law, custom, etc.
These principles or values are considered "vital" if
"their elimination or radical alteration would
substantially change the character of the state or
the political system within which it operates."
The usefulness of such a "value-oriented"
approach to national security studies has been
demonstrably shown within the academic environ-
ment; its utilization ? by, among others, the
public administration sector ? is the very "stuff"
of what was referred to above as "the debate."
In the United States integrated machinery for
developing national security policy has been
formalized only in relatively recent years. In
enacting the National Security Act of 1947,
Congress stated that one of the purposes of the
Act was "to provide for the establishment of
integrated policies and procedures for the
departments, agencies, and functions of the
Government relating to the national security." As
amended, this Act has had extraordinary effects
on the defense establishment of the U.S. ? effects
infrequently noticed and rarely studied by public
administration professionals.
The Act (as amended), celebrating, if that is the
right word, its 30th anniversary in 1977, brought
about the following organizational innovations. It
combined the two cabinet-level departments of
War and Navy, created in our 18th century, as one
Department of Defense (DOD) with a civilian
cabinet secretary. The latter, corresponding to the
Secretary of State, is the principal adviser to the
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
President on matters of defense. It provided that
the three military services, Army, Navy, and (the
then newly created, separate) Air Force, be each
placed in a second DOD tier of sub-cabinet level
departments, each presided over by a civilian
secretary, subordinate to the Secretary of Defense.
It created for the first time in our history a Joint
Chiefs of Staff, headed by a chairman and
composed of the chairman and the three service
chiefs (the Marine Commandant sits in with the
joint chiefs when a subject pertinent to the
Marines is on the agenda). The chairman and joint
chiefs are the official senior military officers in
peace time and war time. It also created for the
first time the National Security Council as a
statutory body advising the President at the
President's discretion; and, again for the first time
in our history, it created an institution known as
the Central Intelligence Agency, whose director is
also head of what is called the U.S. Intelligence
Board, with members representing the various
departments and agencies charged with an
intelligence function ? including the Department
of State.
There are other innovative features brought
about by the National Security Act of 1947
(Amended), for example, the special and regional
combined commands of the military services that,
together with the foregoing and the traditional
aspects of the common defense (such as the annual
presentation to and resolution by the Congress of
the defense budget), help to define the field of
national security.
In the intervening years since the enactment of
the National Security Act, academicians and
specialists alike have focused their attention on (a)
the meaning of "national security," particularly
the values, objectives, and interests which we
attach to the concept; (b) the influence of such
factors as stability/instability, threat perception,
and the Cold War, and the consequential military,
political, economic, and psychological ingredients
of national security; (c) the interaction between
the Executive and Legislative Branches of the
government upon the formulation, funding, and
execution of national security policy; (d) the
theoretical considerations of "war," be it nuclear,
conventional, limited, or guerrilla; (e) the various
strategic defense policies pursued ? unilateral,
bilateral, or multilateral, nuclear or otherwise; (1)
deterrence and the consequential problem of arms
control (Salt I and II?); and (g) the economics of
defense and the allocation of defense resources.
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NATIONAL SECURITY
Although this listing is not in any rank order, nor
is it comprehensive, it is clear that the
consideration of some or all of the above have
serious implications for national security and
should be seriously considered by scholars whose
disciplines, including public administration, are
related to public policy in our conflict-ridden
world.
The following four articles, each of which
analyzes a specific aspect of the national security
field, address themselves in part to the above need.
While each article has its own focus, the respective
authors also address the relationship of their
subjects to the public administrative sector as a
whole.
? Frank N. Trager
321
Notes
1. Arnold Wolfers, "National Security as an Ambiguous
Symbol," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. LXVII, No.
4 (December 1952), and Discord and Collaboration
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), P. 47.
2. Cf Klaus Knorr, "National Security Studies: Scope
and Structure of the Field," in Frank N. Trager and
Philip S. Kronenberg (eds.), National Security and
American Society (Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 1973), pp. 5-16.
3. Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1961). Parts III, IV.
4. Frank N. Trager and Frank L. Simonie, "An
Introduction to the Study of National Security," in
Trager and Kronenberg, p. 36.
5. Ibid., p. 38.
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE MILITARY
Chris L. Jefferies, Major, USAF, US. Air Force Academy
A new student of public administration trying
to relate his/her academic studies to the practical
field of public administration soon finds that the
practical focus is narrow; with few exceptions, it is
tranditionally concerned with the executive
branches of national, state, and local governments
and their efforts to carry out public policy.
Indeed, one "standard" text specifically excludes
the judicial and legislative agencies within
government even though they are also clearly
involved in the administration of public policy.'
The student discovers that the focus narrows
even further, however, as he/she becomes aware
that within the Executive Branch, public adminis-
tration concern lies with the administration and
carrying out of domestic public policy; almost
conspicuous by its exclusion from the "tradi-
tional" field is concern with the administration of
public foreign or international policy. Hence, it is
not surprising to the student that the field of
public administration also excludes concern with
military administration and its effects on public
policy, since the military is an instrument of
"foreign" policy.
Likewise, the student of military administration
soon finds the military neither readily nor easily
The views expressed herein are those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States
Air Force or the Department of Defense.
? This article addresses the problem of the lack of
interaction between military administration and public
administration. The author argues that the two fields
are indeed compatible and that there is a definite need
for more interchange between them.
The major causes for this lack of interaction lie
with both the military and public administrators. The
author describes three such causes: the military's
adoption of business techniques for planning and
efficiency and its reliance on private industry; the
supposed uniqueness of the military profession; and
lack of interest on the part of public administrators.
The mutuality of the two fields is demonstrated
not only by the implicit allusions by public
administration as a field to the relevance of the
military to itself, but also by means of specific
examples of mutual interest. The author concludes by
advocating a more appropriate orientation of military
administration than its present "business" orientation.
"Is not military administration public adminis-
tration?" he asks.
perceives of its administration as being "public."
Indeed, administrative emphasis in the military
appears almost exclusively to focus on the
Major Chris L. Jefferies, USAF, is an assistant professor of
political science at the U.S. Air Force Academy. His
interest in military and public administration has grown
from research conducted while undergoing graduate study
at the University of Pittsburgh. Major Jefferies has served
as consultant to the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the Office of Doctrine, Concepts and Objectives,
Headquarters, USAF.
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322
"private" or "business" side of the tenuous
public-private line, with administrative and man-
agement techniques and procedures typical of
private business often appearing to be directly
applied to military administration with little
apparent regard to the "public" nature of the
armed forces.
If the field of public administration does not
consider military administration to be a legitimate
area of its concern, and if military administration
does not perceive of itself as "public" adminis-
tration, why the lack of interchange? Clearly, the
armed services are public agencies as well as
departments of the Executive Branch of national
government and thus fall within the milieu of
public administration. Is the field of public
administration incompatible with military adminis-
tration, or are there other factors which have
influenced the lack of a public-military adminis-
tration interchange? More importantly, should
there be more interchange and interaction between
the two fields? This article attempts to address
these issues by arguing that military administration
is indeed public administration, and that the two
fields are mutually relevant and important. It will
attempt to do so first by examining indications
that the two fields do not currently interrelate,
together with an analysis of the apparent lack of
interchange, and second by examining some
current public administration "issues" in the
military context to demonstrate mutuality and to
suggest areas in which public administration
scholars and analysts might direct their efforts.
Military Administrative Doctrine and Philosophy
Indications that the military does not relate to
the field of public administration lie in the
"private" or business orientation of military
management and administration, which can be
inferred from several sources. The first is the
military operating manuals which state current
administrative doctrine and philosophy. Hence,
Air Force Manual (AFM) 50-20, USAF Manage-
ment Process, provides useful examples.
On page A1-2 of AFM 50-20, the management
philosophy of the Air Force is stated: "The Air
Force will maintain the most effective force
possible, incorporating maximum efficiency and
economy in all operations consistent with planned
objectives."' Of significance to our consideration
are the terms "effective," "maximum efficiency,"
and "economy." In addition, the manual lists
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
services available to Air Force managers from the
Air Force Management Engineering Service,
organizations that conduct management studies
and surveys, establish performance standards,
recommend management improvement, document
and install systems and procedures, and generally
provide information and assistance to the manage-
ment process. The unit considers the organization
structure, work measurement, production con-
trols, work simplification, forms and reports
design, testing and rating systems, and shop and
office layout.3
Of importance to our thesis is the fact that the
terms employed, functions described, and ap-
proaches taken, as we have listed above, come
directly from organization and methods manuals
and texts long used by business schools, and,
together with the military characteristics of
specialization (Military Occupational Specialty and
Specialty Codes), are highly suggestive and
reminiscent of those formulated by Frederick W.
Taylor, the founder of the "efficiency" movement
known as scientific management which had an
almost revolutionary impact upon the early
development of both business and public adminis-
tration.4
A problem inherent in such an approach,
beyond the fact that it tends to overlook the
importance of individuality, motivation, and
human behavior, is the same reason why even
business interests seldom employ Taylor's con-
cepts in a strict manner; concern with efficiency,
economy, and effectiveness quickly and easily
becomes an end in itself, rather than remaining
merely as a means. Indeed, the same problem is
manifest even more significantly in public
administration with its more broadly conceived
public ends. The important point for our
consideration is that these concepts used by the
military were developed by Taylor in response to a
perceived business need; the accomplishment of
business ends.
A second example is found on page A1-2 of
AFM 50-20, on which are listed several "es-
sentials" of Air Force management. One essential
is ".. . the process of organizing and using
resources to accomplish predetermined ob-
jectives," a quotation taken almost verbatim from
the writings and concepts of Peter F. Drucker,
long an advisor to American business corporations
on business policy and management.'
An important aspect of Drucker's approach is
management by objectives, a technique widely
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utilized in the business world. "Objectives are
needed in every area where performance and the
results directly and vitally affect the survival and
prosperity of the business."6 (Note the emphasis
on "survival" and "prosperity.") While his con-
cepts and ideas have unquestioned utility in
business and are also of some benefit in the public
sector, ". . . the process of organizing and using
resources to accomplish predetermined objectives"
(his concepts translated into Air Force terms as
quoted above), and the management by objectives
technique it implies, also carries the risk of
obscuring the broader public service ends of the
military by emphasizing Air Force or organiza-
tional objectives at the expense of public interest
objectives; the two are not necessarily the same.
Indeed, one of the seven tenets of the Air Force
management philosophy as stated in AFM 25-1,
USAF Management Process, is that ". . manage-
ment policy must assure progressive achievement
of Air Force objectives."' Air Force objectives
imply Air Force interests, an approach consistent
with the business concept as developed by
Drucker: "Objectives are needed in every area
where performance and the results directly and
vitally affect the survival and prosperity of the
business."8
A major point here needs to be emphasized:
The purpose of analyzing the business orientation
of military administration is not to argue or imply
that the techniques, philosophies, doctrines, and
concepts incorporated into it are not valid, that
they cannot be relevant to military needs and
requirements, nor that with a stronger public
administration orientation the same techniques
would not be employed with the same resultant
problems. Indeed, to a great extent, the fact that
they are utilized by both the military and business
illustrates the generic quality of much of
administration and management, regardless of the
milieu.
Nonetheless, one of the unique contributions
public administration makes to management and
administration in the public sector ? of which the
military is unquestionably a part ? must be that
governmental administration should serve public
ends; not private or self-interest ends. The business
techniques we have reviewed can be and are used
in business with little fear of obscuring business
ends (competitive advantage, adequate ? if not
maximum ? profits, a secure financial position
and market, and organizational viability) since
they are designed to serve them. Their use in the
323
public sector (not just within the military) without
an appropriate public orientation, however, may
carry the risk of causing a too narrow interpre-
tation or formulation of public ends; that is,
organizational ends may predominate at the
expense of public ends. Is it not in part because of
this fact that public administration as a field has
evolved beyond an early mechanistic, deperson-
alized technique approach to administration in
government to a broader emphasis on, and concern
with, the dynamic political-sociological-public
policy aspects of administration? That the military
may not have done so yet, as indicated by its
administrative doctrine, suggests a consequence of
the lack of military-public administration inter-
change and a useful contribution that public
administration can make to the field. Indeed,
might not the recent revelations of improper (if
not illegal) interactions between the military and
defense contractors be traced in part to too great a
business orientation in military management?
Military Education Programs
Beyond the business orientation of military
administrative doctrine and philosophy as an
indication that the military does not relate to
public administration lies a second and perhaps
more important indication, one implied by
military-sponsored administration and manage-
ment education programs ? an area most
significantly reflecting current military attitudes
and interests. Beginning with an assumption that
the individuals most directly concerned with
military administration and management are
military officers, a review of two undergraduate-
level precommissioning programs and their
approach to administrative training is useful: Air
Force ROTC and the Air Force Academy, the
former important because it is the source of the
greatest number of Air Force officers; the latter
because it is the source of officers probably most
likely to rise to high-level administrative positions.
Air Force ROTC management training is
conducted during the last two years, or the
advanced portion of the program. The text for
that portion of training, used since the 1975-76
academic year, directly supports our point.
Entitled Managing; A Contemporary Introduction,
it is written by two professors of business
administration at the University of Kentucky9 and
is intended for use in an undergraduate business
administration course. While it does address the
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generic management issues, no attempt is made in
the text to relate the issues to the public context.
Thus, while the ROTC program provides officer
candidates with limited exposure to administration
and management, the orientation is clearly toward
a business approach beyond the minor generic
emphasis. Why does the program not use a public
administration text?
The other significant source of commissioned
officers is the Air Force Academy. Combining
intensive military and academic training, the
Academy offers baccalaureate degrees in 22
academic majors in areas ranging from engineering
and basic sciences to humanities and social
sciences. Of interest to our thesis is, first, a course
in public administration taught by the Department
of Political Science and Philosophy, and second,
an academic major in management administered
by the Department of Economics, Geography and
Management.
The public administration course is, necessarily,
a brief overview of the field.' ? Its greatest
limitation, beyond its abbreviated form, is the
limited exposure cadets, many of whom will be
future high-level military administrators, have to
it. Offered during one semester, average course size
is less than 40 cadets. Thus, out of an average
graduating class of 780 cadets, only 40 at most (5
per cent) will have participated in the course and
thus benefitted from even a limited exposure to
the public orientation toward military adminis-
tration and management.11
The management academic major is not limited
by such an abbreviated consideration, allowing an
extensive in-depth study of management concepts
and principles. Eight courses are required to
complete the program. With few exceptions, the
required subjects are overwhelmingly business
oriented.' 2
With regard to the public context, then, the Air
Force Academy approach to management and
administration is limited either by depth of
consideration and exposure (the public adminis-
tration course), or by its clear and definite leaning
toward conventional business or private adminis-
tration (the management academic major). Indeed,
considering that the Academy graduates will
probably constitute the major future source of
general officers, the business orientation will be
significant in the future Air Force: out of a total
of 6,257 graduates over the past eight years, 700
have majored in management (13 per cent of the
total), a significant deviation from a uniform
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
distribution of cadets over the 22 academic
majors.13 Compare this 13 per cent with an
in-depth exposure to business methods with the 5
per cent who will have had marginal exposure to
public administration. Again, the distinction
between the public and business approach to
administration in the military may mean the
difference between public and private organiza-
tional interests in the military.
A review of Air Force-sponsored graduate-level
degree programs confirms the implication of our
thesis that there is little military-public adminis-
tration interchange. Air Force Manual 50-5, USAF
Formal Schools Catalog, lists 76 management.
related course categorized as short or long, and
ranging from three days (Pricing for Procurement
Management) to two and a half years (a doctoral
program in business administration)." Of rele-
vance to our thesis are the long courses conducted
either at military facilities or in civilian universi-
ties.
These programs, leading to graduate degrees,
are unquestionably business oriented: business
administration, business statistics, economics,
engineering management, facilities management,
logistics management, and an MBA program in
personnel management. Conspicuously absent
from the list is any reference to public
administration or a public-related management
program.
An additional Air Force Manual, 300-4, Data
Elements and Codes: Personnel," gives greater
detail with regard to the specific academic
graduate programs in which military personnel
participate. It lists two major academic fields of
interest to our thesis: business administration and
public administration. While listing the field of
public administration and its specialties implies
that the military may, after all, recognize the
relevance of a public administration approach to
administration, an implied relevance falls far short
of acceptance as is indicated by the number of
degrees awarded to participants in the programs
under Air Force sponsorship. During a five-year
period there were 1,670 graduate degrees awarded
in business administration, compared to only 34
awarded in public administration, a ratio of 49 to
1.16 While personal preference for an MBA
program over an MPA program may have some
significance, it is likely to have very little in these
Air Force-sponsored programs, since the number
of spaces allotted to each program is carefully Air
Force controlled and reflects its perceived needs.
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To be complete, brief mention should be made
of two more Air Force-sponsored educational
programs in administration and management. The
first is the Minuteman Education Program which
integrates full-time graduate study with the regular
duty schedule of interested Missile-Launch Control
Officers. Of the six programs, each affiliated with
a nearby civilian university, five offer MBA degrees
and one a degree in economics.' 7
The other program is centered in four high-level
executive "special" short courses reserved for
high-ranking military officers. Two, the Senior
Executive Course and the Intermediate Executive
Course, are one-week courses conducted by the
Department of Defense. The other two, both of
significantly longer duration ? and thus providing
greater in-depth study ? are conducted by the
Harvard and Boston MA Schools of Business and
Management: the Harvard Advanced Management
Executive Development Program (nine weeks) and
the Program for Management Development (14
weeks).18
While few would question the value of senior
military-executive training in administration and
management, their conduct in business schools,
with their private rather than public orientation,
may raise questions, particularly when one
considers that the U.S. Civil Service Commission
conducts a course for senior executives that has an
appropriate and relevant public orientation ? the
Federal Executive Institute. Founded in 1968, its
goals are to heighten career executive respon-
siveness to national needs and goals; to increase
career executive appreciation of the totality of the
governmental system; and to improve career
knowledge of the managerial process in a public
context.' 9 Of an eight-week duration, the school's
courses are specifically directed to the needs of the
federal executive in the "very top career grades."
Yet, considering that the course goals are
eminently appropriate to military executives as
well, that senior military officers qualify in every
degree as senior public servants, and that the
curriculum covers subjects and areas appropriate
to the military services as well as to the Civil
Service, it is most surprising that of 1,600
graduates of the school over a six-year period, only
four have been military officers.2?
In summary, then, what does our survey of
military administrative doctrine, philosophy, and
educational programs indicate that is relevant to
our thesis? It indicates the validity of the thesis
implication that there has been little interchange
325
between military and public administration. Most
important, however, may be a consequence, the
tendency of the armed forces to obscure
distinction between organizational, self-interest
ends and public interest ends ? the significant
issue. Thus, greater interchange between the
military and the field of public administration ?
particularly coming from the field of PA ? might
do for the military what it did for the traditional
public service over the past several decades:
provide a greater emphasis on the "public" nature
of its functions.
On the Public Administration Side
Our examination thus far has focused on the
military side of the issue of the lack of a
military-public administration interchange. Moving
the focus to the PA side suggests that we look to
public administration to determine what cause for
the lack of interchange may lie there. One
implication is that the field of public adminis-
tration has not demonstrated its relevance to or
interest in military administration. Indeed, it is
precisely this aspect of the issue that is of concern
to a writer in the Public Administration Review,
Robert Miewald, who argues that ". .few
students of public administration have been moved
to heed the periodic cries that the military
organization be considered an integral part of their
field of study." Continuing, he laments, ". . in
the literature of public administration, there are
neither sufficient theoretical foundations nor
adequate empirical data available to enable us to
comprehend the intricacies of operating this
massive consumer of public energy and wealth!"21
That such indifference to the military has not
been shared by academic fields other than public
administration is illustrated by the disciplines of
political science and sociology, both important
contributors to the field of public administration.
Since the early 1960s, for example, sociology has
steadily increased its attention to the interest in
the study of military organizations by social
scientists and military personnel. The increased
interest in military organization as a social system
appears to be due to recognition that military and
defense issues permeate the center of American
political, economic, and social life.
The "parent" discipline of public adminis-
tration ? political science ? has traditionally
included consideration of the military role in
foreign policy formulation and, more importantly,
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326 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
in domestic policy in terms of such issues as the
economic impact of the Defense budget. Examples
of political scientists addressing military issues
include Graham Allison in Essence of Decision,
Bruce Russett in What Price Vigilance? and
numerous political scientists in several readers
including American Defense Policy; Arms, Men
and Military Budgets; and Modules in Security
Studies.2 2 Nevertheless, public administration as a
field has been slow to follow suit. Surely these
traditions of interest in the military, established by
sociology and political science, are equally relevant
and appropriate to the field of public adminis-
tration. That Miewald's observation is accurate,
and that the lack of a military-public adminis-
tration interchange has been influenced at least in
part by public administration indifference is
important to consider in our study.
Public Administration Education and the Military
Conspicuously absent from the field of public
administration appears to be an articulated interest
in and concern with military administration. This
assertion is most surprising as public adminis-
tration is the field that most appropriately
"should" have a continuing interest in and concern
with the military, since it is within its realm of
endeavor ? administration of public enterprise.
Evidence of the assertion comes first from the
area of public administration education. The
landmark "Honey Report," for example, an
oft-quoted extensive review of the adequacy of
public administration education conducted by the
Public Administration Review, had as its aim to
address the role of public administration in
government and its needs, together with the role
of PA education in fulfilling those needs.23 It
included the following quotation: "Insofar as the
professions are assuming places of dominance in
many of our public agencies and increasing
importance in the shaping of public policy, it
behooves [public administration] to look at the
process whereby such men are chosen, developed
and educated, oriented and experienced."24
Honey then concludes by listing the "professions"
which he feels are important to study because they
are ". . assuming places of dominance . .. and
increasing importance in the shaping of public
policy."
Notably absent from his extensive list is any
reference to the military profession, which
unquestionably plays a role in "shaping public
policy," both domestic and international.25
Surely the implication is that Honey, and by
extension, public administration education
(indeed, there were no "letters to the editor"
pointing out this omission), does not consider
study of military education, training, and adminis-
tration as relevant to the field. It is an implication
that can be supported by a review of public
administration school catalogs and course de-
scriptions. The few which do address defense
issues do so in terms of policy processes in the
political rather than the military milieu.2 6
The Public Administration Review and the Military
Evidence of the assertion that interest in and
concern with military administration is absent
from the field of public administration comes
secondly from the Public Administration Review,
a journal dedicated to ". .. advancing in distinctive
ways the science, processes and art of public
administration. . . ."
The Review is the place where the larger dimensions and
longer range developments of administrative theory and
practice should be accurately described and critically
examined. . . . It can assume the sharing of administrative
thinking and experiences .. . across professions and
disciplines, across the borders between public and private
administration and those between politics, adjudication
and administration.2 7
With this ambitious goal of PAR in mind, this
writer made a survey of the journal to determine
the extent to which the military professions were
included in the "professions and disciplines"
across whose borders sharing in administrative
thinking and experience was to be assured.
The same issue in which the above goals were
published indicated an auspicious beginning. In
symposium form, the issue of "Decision Making in
Defense: The Role of Organization" was addressed
in light of the President's plan to reorganize the
Department in Defense in 1958. Most important
for our consideration, the introduction to the
symposium concluded by stating that ". . the
Review ? accustomed to bringing outside views to
administrators ? in this article provides instead
public administration insights on a question of
importance to the general citizenry"28 (emphasis
added). Then followed four pieces by PA scholars
and political scientists: Frederick C. Mosher, Paul
Y. Hammond, Laurence I. Radway, and Max
Kampleman. The symposium is an excellent ex-
ample of the mutual relevance of military-public
administration ? the essence of our thesis.
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The promise of relevance implied by the first
article was not born out in subsequent issues,
however. From the issue mentioned above,
published in the summer of 1958, until the
July/August issue of 1969, PAR's interest in
military affairs was limited to an occasional review
of books dealing with military-related subjects."
The year 1969, however, serves as an important
milestone in our consideration. Not only were four
books relating to defense and the military services
reviewed, but a full article addressing the issue of
defense was published, the first in 11 years.30 In
1970, five more military-related books were
reviewed, and, more importantly, a full article by
Robert D. Miewald was included entitled
"Weberian Bureaucracy and the Military
Model."31 Ostensibly an attempt to present an
organizational theory analysis of Weber and the
German military, it appears that his real purpose is
to illustrate that public administration is a useful
and appropriate approach to the study of military
administration: "By recognizing the military as
being within its sphere of competence, and by
making a serious attempt to appreciate its relevant
conclusions, public administration could be doing
itself and the society a valuable deed."32
Miewald's plea appears to have had little
impact. During the next two years, not even
military-related books were reviewed. However, in
1971 an article by Frederick C. Thayer was
published in which he addressed presidential use of
the National Security Council which, by implica-
tion, concerned the military.33 A symposium in
1972, "Productivity in Government," included
one article entitled "Productivity Management in
the Defense Supply Agency," by Melvin H.
Baker.34 However, even though both articles are
related to defense issues, they only tenuously
relate to the military; Thayer emphasizes the
benefits of a more interactive process in
presidential use of the NSC, but only mentions the
military once, and the Defense Supply Agency is
largely manned by civil service employees.
In 1973, an article by Stephen W. Harman was
included, the first full article to extensively and
directly address a public administration-military-
related subject since 1958, or, in 15 years: the role
of the military in the federal budgetary process
("Why is the Pentagon such a rugged competitor in
the appropriations process?")." 1974 appears to
be a banner year, with six military-related books
reviewed (all by the same reviewer) and no less
than two full articles included which directly
327
addressed military-public administration issues."
1975, however, had only one article which could
be even remotely related to the military: an article
by Mazmanian and Lee about the Army Corps of
Engineers, an organization of 300 military officers
and 30,000 civilian employees involved in public
works projects.37 Through the July/August
edition of 1976, no military-related articles were
included.
With regard to our thesis, then, over a period of
18 years PAR reviewed only 20 books that were
more or less military-related, published an initial
four-author symposium, and printed seven full
articles, only four of which were directly
concerned with public administrative issues in a
military context. Indeed, the 44 symposia
published (1968 through July/August 1976)
included only two articles (two of the four cited
above) dealing with military-public adminis-
tration-related subjects. The record hardly sup-
ports ". . a sharing of administrative thinking and
experience . . . across professions and disciplines
.." between military and public administration.
Together with a lack of interest by public
administration education, then, PAR confirms the
assertion that public administration has not
considered military administration relevant to its
field and has thus contributed significantly to the
lack of interchange between the two fields.
The Lack of Interchange: An Analysis
Establishing the lack of interchange between
military and public administration, however, does
not explain why it has occurred, perhaps the most
important part of our consideration. A major
reason for the lack of mutual interest may first be
functional; that is, public administration grew up
as a subdiscipline of political science, concerned in
its formative years with the reform and develop-
ment of the domestic economy and agencies of the
government. The study of international relations
(which includes the military as an instrument of
foreign policy), another subdiscipline of political
science, grew up in a divergent direction with
little, if any, interaction between it and its
"fellow" subdiscipline. Indeed, the distinction
between domestic and international affairs has
been so extensive and pervasive that the editor of a
study which addresses the relationship between
national and international politics found it
necessary as recently as 1966 to state that:
... the comparative of the interaction of domestic and
foreign politics has quite often been a no-man's land ?
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neglected not because students of politics have thought
the topic unimportant, but because the divisions between
the two fields have tended to foster this neglect"38
(emphasis added).
Contemporary awareness of the close inter-
action between the domestic and foreign policy
processes has succeeded in narrowing the dis-
tinction between public administration and the
study of international affairs (examples: Allison,
Essence of Decision, and Halperin and Kanter,
Readings in American Foreign Policy, both
addressing the issue of governmental organiza-
tional and bureaucratic processes as they affect
foreign policy formulation, a key issue of PA; and
Thayer; An End to Hierarchy! An End to
Competition! which addresses the issue of an
expanded, interactive process of policy formu-
lation in general, explicitly linking domestic and
foreign policy processes).39 However, little prog-
ress has been made in specifically linking public
administration and the military, as this article is
attempting to illustrate.
With regard to the apparent military lack of
interest in the field of public administration, one
reason might be, as Adam Yarmolinsky calls it,
and as we have already explored, the business
orientation and "civilianization of the military";
that is, ". . its dependence upon advanced
industrial technology and management systems . . .
which cannot be bought off the shelf and which
must be designed to meet special military
needs."49 Indeed, the days have long passed when
military production was undertaken by govern-
ment arsenals. In response to its dependence upon
civilian industry to provide military goods, then,
the military services necessarily developed "busi-
ness," rather than "public," technical and
managerial skills and abilities ? both for
communication and also to be certain that the
development proceeded as specified. It is just in
response to this need that the Air Force, for
example, offers its programs of procurement and
acquisition management, cost and price theory,
and contract management theory ? as well as
extensive business management graduate programs
? all justifiably and narrowly directed toward a
business rather than a public approach.
A significant, if not major, influence might also
be the preparation by military personnel for a
second career to be entered upon separation or
retirement, careers in business and industry being
very popular. This fact undoubtedly accounts for
much of the individual preference for training
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
related to ? if not a direct counterpart of ? skills
and experience in demand in civilian industry and
business. Thus, background in business adminis-
tration rather than public administration appears
to be an asset, with some applicability to a
military career now as well as to a later civilian
career, and probably accounts for the popularity
of many off-duty or self-sponsored educational
programs in business administration.
Looking beyond the pressures of "civiliani-
zation" and "industrialization" which may have
influenced the private orientation of military
administration lies the perhaps more important
question of why the military, in spite of its public
and governmental nature, has not identified more
strongly with the public service ? the civil service
? and executive agency public activities, and
hence with public administration.
At the heart of the issue is probably the
perceived military need to maintain a separate and
unique identity, one distinct from the civilian
world. Hence, the military code of honor once
required that the military man isolate himself from
his former civilian life so that he would ". . place
the highest value on successful conformity with
military reality."'" This perceived need no doubt
had a functional origin since military disciplinary
standards, training, and value systems, as
Yarmolinsky suggests,
... clash with the democratic and egalitarian values of
civilian society at many points. The military's group-
oriented value system based on rank consciousness, unit
loyalty, desire for combat, unquestioning patriotism, and
instant response to commands runs counter to the
egalitarian, individualistic, inquiring humanistic ideals of
American civil society.4 2
While the sharp distinction drawn by Yarmolinsky
is less significant today than formerly, the point
may still be valid: without a distinct identity, the
military would find it difficult to inculcate the
military attitudes and values necessary "to bear
arms." Thus, the perceived need to maintain a
distinction from the rest of society has probably
extended to a hesitance to identify too strongly
with a civilian or "civil service" orientation typical
of the remainder of the Executive Branch of
government.
A closely related influence may stem from the
traditional definition of military honor which
requires that the professional soldier be above
politics in domestic affairs; the traditional
"formulation" versus "execution" distinction.
Indeed, Mills observes, it is drummed into every
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military manager that he is to "back away" from
anything resembling a political decision; that he is
to stay "well on this side" of anything resembling
a line dividing his responsibility and civilian
authority.4 3
While the pervasiveness of these phenomena is
open to question today, particularly in light of the
fact that the observations were made years ago,
their role in influencing a distinction between
military and the public service is probably not.
The early dislike of politics by the military
unquestionably extends to the civil service since it
is controlled and directed by politicians, and is
thus unorganized, parochial, and "political" in
contrast to the military which is "professional."
Turning now to the field of public adminis-
tration, yet remaining unaddressed is the issue of
why there is a lack of interest from public
administration in the military and its adminis-
tration. An important factor must first be lack of
opportunity. This issue, although in a broader
context, was addressed by Fred Riggs during a
conference on the theory and practice of public
administration. Lamenting that fact, he views the
field of public administration as being limited
because it does not try to influence and teach ". . .
future politicians who will become cabinet
members.., nor businessmen, engineers and
lawyers who may become political appointees.
Nor do we teach cadets who become military
officers ..."" (emphasis added). The lack of
opportunity, he feels, stems largely from the
failure of public administration to think about
government as a "total system."
Secondly, just as we isolated the military dislike
or fear of becoming involved in politics and the
need to maintain a separate identity as reasons
influencing a trend in the military away from the
public service and thus from public administration,
we can probably isolate the same phenomenon
influencing public administration attitudes toward
the military. Certainly the same factors addressed
by Yarmolinsky which create the need for a
distinct identity in the military (those which " . . .
clash with the democratic and egalitarian values of
civilian society at many points") also operate to
create a fear or apprehension among civilian
administrators to identify too closely with the
military, at least outside the Department of
Defense. Thus, the fear of equating and combining
the military and public politics ? a fear probably
stemming from the possibility that by so doing,
civilian military control may suffer ? together
329
with a distrust of the military "mind" and its
technical and esoteric areas of concern and
interest, has also worked to maintain a distinction
between public and military administration. In
other words, public administration has perhaps not
considered military administration as properly
appropriate to its area of concern; that is, it may
not have accepted the idea that there is no purely
military sphere in American society and policy.
In summary of the "why" of an apparent lack
of military-public administration interchange,
then, we can see three factors which may have had
an influence: first, the "civilianization" of the
military resulting in the adoption of "business"
techniques for planning and efficiency, and
reliance on the industrial sector (private) for
procurement and development of systems; second,
pressures within the military and American society
which emphasize the uniqueness and distinction of
the military profession; and third, a lack of
opportunity and interest from the field of public
administration itself.
Mutuality: PA Issues in the Military Context
Most important to our thesis is the demon-
stration of mutuality between military and public
administration by illustrating specific issues and
problems that public administration and civilian
analysts should address ? thus encouraging a more
appropriate orientation to military administration
than the present "business" orientation. Mutuality
can be implied, paradoxically, first by the field of
public administration. Dwight Waldo, also a
participant in the above-mentioned conference on
the theory and practice of public administration,
states in "agenda of important and urgent
matters" of concern to public administration two
points relevant to our study. The first concerns
external and internal security: since government
originated in and evolved as an enterprise of
collective security against aggression, ". . how
could public administration be ignorant of and
indifferent to the main issues and activities of.
security? Public administration has responded only
weakly and marginally to . . . the effects of a large,
permanent military-industrial complex."'" The
second concerns government by "osmosis and
symbiosis," that is, the network of relationships
between government and private enterprise
through government contracts which blurs the line
between public and private endeavor. Both points
? external security and the use of government
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330
contracts ? are fundamentally part of both
military and Oublic administration.
Robert Miewald states that by not considering
military organization as an integral part of public
administration, ". . there are neither sufficient
theoretical foundations nor adequate empirical
data available to enable us to comprehend [the
military] .
'46 Emmet V. Mittlebeeler argues that
extensive defense-related research by public
administration is needed, particularly with regard
to the administration of defense agencies, their
relations with civilian branches, their financing and
spending, and their effects on civilian societies.4 7
Finally, Paul Van Riper, in response to the Honey
Report, argues that education in public adminis-
tration should emphasize "some substantive
understanding" of a broad field of public policy,
including civil-military relations.48
In summary, public administration as a field,
implicitly and explicitly, alludes to the relevance
of the military to itself. Yet as our review of
education in public administration and the Public
Administration Review indicates, action in that
regard has been slow in coming, even though
closely related disciplines such as sociology and
political science have set the pattern by making
the military an increasingly important object of
study.
Mutuality can be illustrated, secondly, by
isolating the relevance of military phenomena and
issues in terms of public administration issues to
which civilian analysts should direct their atten-
tion. The first example is the classic policy
formulation-execution dichotomy exemplified by
the political involvement of military officers.
Samuel Huntington, a sociologist/political scien-
tist, addresses the possibility of the phenomenon
by pointing out that political involvement of
military leadership takes two forms: (1) espousing
and recommending policies derived from non-
military sources, unrelated or contrary to the
professional military viewpoint, in which case they
assume a substantive political role; and (2) playing
an active part in the public defense or
merchandising of policies before Congress and the
public. In these political roles, military officers
have:
... pleaded for foreign aid appropriations, urged the
ratification of treaties, defended the assignment of
American troops (abroad), justified the dismissal of
General MacArthur, defended the conduct of. .. war, and
explained the Administration's decisions on force levels
and budgets . ... Before both Congressional Committees
and civic groups they acted as political advocates.4 9
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
Indeed, as an agency in the Executive Branch,
the procedural role of military officers is difficult
to distinguish from that of any other public
agency; political officials must necessarily turn to
them for policy advice and recommendations with
regard to the highly technical and esoteric matters
of their specialty ? in the case of the military,
issues of defense.
To deal with Congress, for example, the
military is well prepared and endowed in its offices
of legislative liaison for which, in 1967, $4 million
was appropriated." The liaison offices allow
intensive and extensive interaction between the
military and Congress in many matters, particu-
larly in the areas of budget requests and military
procurement. Yarmolinsky speaks of a "carrot and
stick" approach the military takes with Congress:
the biggest contract awards have tended over the
years to go to districts of key members of the
military committees, who, in turn, usually vote for
the particular program." He quotes a high Nixon
Administration official experienced in lobbying
for the Pentagon as saying that most defense
lobbying was done as joint Pentagon-industry
ventures after the Pentagon had approved a
weapons system and, wanted to sell it to Congress.
"The Pentagon had Congress organized like a
Marine Corps landing, with generals, admirals, and
top civilians always ready to run up to the Hill
whenever a problem develops."' 2
Is the observation that military officers have
"political" roles valid, or are other explanations
more appropriate? Surely such political activities
are appropriate for consideration as an "issue" of
public administration and worthy of civilian
interest. If the military continues to perceive of
itself as a policy neutral and thus impacts policy in
a manner neither intended nor understood, then it
is in the public interest to be sure they are aware
of it. If military officers do not have political
roles, then Yarmolinsky should be challenged.
Indeed, such activities are by definition public
administration, being part of the administration of
public agencies in the political (public) environ-
ment. Yet few, if any, military or public
administration sources directly address these
aspects of the vital formulation-execution dichot-
omy with so many significant ethical, normative,
political, and public interest issues at stake.
A second example illustrating mutuality, and to
which civilian analysts might turn their attention,
concerns the tenuous line dividing public and
private endeavor as the activities, interest, and
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responsibilities of both public and private
organizations become increasingly similar with
significant overlap ? an issue almost universally
alluded to by students and practitioners of public
administration. An important link causing this
interpenetration and overlap of public and private
organizations and activities is found in the
government contract, a means by which public
functions are performed with private resources.
One of the greatest users of this device in the
federal government is the military. In fiscal year
1968, for example, public expenditures by
contract amounted to $71.5 billion, or 41 per cent
of the federal budget of $172.4 billion. Of this
amount, military-related expenditures accounted
for $43.8 billion, or 61 per cent of the total
contract expenditures.53 The figures represented
the direct employment by contract of three
million individuals, effectively increasing defense
"manpower" by 38 per cent.54 While the figures
may represent a somewhat skewed view since they
represent the height of the Vietnam conflict, they
nonetheless illustrate the point: the military is one
of the greatest users of such contracts.
Although the practice of conducting public
business using private resources raises many issues
of concern to economists and political scientists,
including the issues of the proper or desirable mix
of public-private enterprise and the takeover of
public functions by private interests, the issue
relevant to our consideration concerns control and
accountability; does government adequately
develop and maintain policy direction and control
over private organizations performing under
contract, or do the private organizations unduly
influence governmental policy? If private
(hence, minority) interests do have a direct policy
link with government through the contract, where
does sovereignty lie ? with the public through
responsible and accountable public officials, or
with private business/minority interests? Indeed, it
is just this issue of control and accountability that
has led to the suggestion that the military and
industry, linked by government contract, may
control and direct American foreign and defense
policy.
The issue of control and accountability raised
by the interpenetration of public (military) and
private organizations is legitimately one of concern
to public administration and civilian analysts.
Thus, beyond the larger issue of the desirability of
such extensive governmental use of this device to
conduct the public business lies the fact that it is
331
through the administration of these contracts that
is determined the extent and influence of the
reciprocal public-private interpenetration if it
exists; that is, the interface between the two ? the
"blurred line" ? lies squarely in the realm of the
military administrators as they administer the
contract, and centers in the question of public
versus private interest. As Yarmolinsky argues,
"... this [interpenetration] does not guarantee
either a more efficient or a more effective military
establishment, but it is a process likely to continue
and therefore it needs to be taken into account of
in any effort to modify the [reciprocal] impact of
the military establishment on the economy and
the society."55 Indeed, in what field or discipline
will the phenomenon "be taken account of" if not
in public administration? The issue deserves
analysis.
These two examples of public administration
issues in the military context ? the "political"
roles of military officers interacting with Congress
in such areas as military procurement, and the
administration of military contracts ? illustrate
specifically the types of issues and problems which
public administration scholars will find and to
which they should address themselves in an effort
to encourage greater interaction between the two
fields. Indeed, analysts can expect to find the same
problems inherent in administration of the
military as in the other public agencies more
traditionally associated with the field of public
administration: "open" versus "closed" personnel
systems; the "politics" of the defense budget
formulation; the "new federalism" inherent in
relationships between state-controlled national
guard and federally controlled military budgets
and command and control; the possibility and
policy impact of military unions and collective
bargaining; and the political-bureaucratic processes
by which the Joint Chiefs of Staff arrive at a
"corporate" decision among the services on
matters of policy and budget. In the military
context, these are issues over which the military
has traditionally exercised almost complete auton-
omy, but which in the public context may have
policy implications which extend beyond purely
military concern. These are the types of issues
civilian analysts are likely to find and, most
importantly, the study of them will lead to a
greater military-public administration interchange
and thus greater awareness of the "public interest"
implications ? an awareness which may presently
be lacking in the military due to an over-reliance
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332
upon business or "private" administrative methods
and techniques.
These issues also serve to illustrate the validity
of the thesis that military administration is public
administration; that it can and should be studied
and evaluated in the public administration
context; and that by so doing, "... public
administration could be doing itself and the
society a valuable deed."56 To this must be added
that studying military administration in the public
administration context can also do the military a
valuable service.
Conclusion
To concerned students of both public and
military administration, it is evident that little or
no interchange occurs between the two fields.
Partly as a cause and as an effect of this fact,
military administration and management is almost
exclusively oriented toward a business or private
enterprise approach rather than a public approach,
a situation which raises issues of public versus
private ends. Is it not more appropriate to view
military administration as public administration?
A wide range of issues suggest that it is (a few of
which we have explored here), and that the two
fields are, indeed, mutually relevant and impor-
tant.
Notes
1. Herbert A. Simon et al., Public Administration
(New York: Knopf, 1950),,p. 7.
2. U.S. Air Force, Air Force Manual 50-20, Guide for
Military and Civilian Supervisors (Washington D.C.:
Department of the Air Force, March 1972), p. A1-2.
3. Ibid., pp. 112-116.
4. D.S. Pugh et al. (eds.), Writers on Organization
(Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1971).
pp. 97-101.
5. Ibid., pp. 112-116.
6. Ibid., p. 114.
7. U.S. Air Force, Air Force Manual 25-1, USAF
Management Process (Washington D.C.: Department
of the Air Force, August 1965), p.1.
8. Pugh, p. 114.
9. Joseph L. Massie and John Douglas, Managing: A
Contemporary Introduction (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1973).
10. The course covers the following: PA as a field of
study, administrative theory, organizations and the
administrative process, organizations and the indivi-
dual, the policy process, public management. Source:
U.S. Air Force Academy, Department of Political
Science and Philosophy, Syllabus, Pol. Sci. 385,
Public Administration (Fall 1974).
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
11. Figures provided by the Department of Political
Science and Philosophy, U.S. Air Force Academy, by
telephone, November 14, 1974.
12. U.S. Air Force, Air Force Academy Catalog, 1974-75
(U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado, 1974), pp.
109-110, 133. A review of the Military and Naval
Academy curricula indicates that neither has a course
in PA or a management major.
13. See Note 11.
14. U.S. Air Force, Air Force Manual 50-5, USAF
Formal Schools Catalog (Washington D.C.: Depart-
ment of the Air Force, September 1973).
15. U.S. Air Force, Air Force Manual 300-4, Vol. 2, Data
Elements and Codes: Personnel (Washington D.C.:
Department of the Air Force, August 1973), pp. 2-91
to 2-92, 2-120 to 2-121.
16. Air Force Institute of Technology/CIV, Letter to
Capt. Chris L. Jefferies, November 4, 1974.
17. U.S. Air Force, Air University, Air Force Institute of
Technology, Catalog 1974-76 (Wright-Patterson Air
Force Base, Ohio, 1974), p. 152.
18. Air Force Manual 50-5, p. 547.
19. U.S. Civil Service Commission, Historical and
Progress Report of the Federal Executive Institute
(Charlottesville, Va.: Federal Executive Institute,
1969), p. 4.
20. Figures provided by the Federal Executive Institute
(October 22, 1974), and the Bureau of Executive
Management (Washington D.C., November 1974, by
telephone). The military graduates up to that time
were three Navy captains and one brigadier general,
service unknown.
21. Robert D. Miewald, "Weberian Bureaucracy and the
Military Mode," Public Administration Review, Vol.
30, No. 2 (March/April 1970), p. 219.
22. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston:
Little, Brown & Co., 1971); Bruce M. Russett, What
Price Vigilance? The Burdens of National Defense
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970); Head and
Rokke (eds.), American Defense Policy, 3rd edition
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973),
4th edition due August 1977; Williams and Tarr
(eds.), Modules in Security (Lawrence: University
Press of Kansas, 1974); and Schneider and Hoeher
(eds.), Arms, Men, and Military Budgets (New York:
Crane, Russak, 1976). The interested reader can
pursue this by looking at those articles by political
scientists and sociologists in Frank N. Trager and
Philip S. Kronenberg, National Security and Ameri-
can Society (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,
1973); John Greenwood (comp.), American Defense
Policy Since 1945 (Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 1973); and Kurt Lang, Sociology of the
Military (Chicago: Center for Social Organizational
Studies, 1969).
23. John C. Honey, "A Report: Higher Education for
Public Service," Public Administration Review, Vol.
27 (November 1967), pp. 294-320.
24. John C. Mosher, The Professions, Professional
Education and the Public Service, as quoted by
Honey, p. 313.
25. Honey, pp. 313-314.
26. A catalog which appeared to be typical of several
surveyed is the University of Pittsburgh Graduate
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NATIONAL SECURITY
School of Public and International Affairs, Course
Descriptions, MPA Degree, Academic Year 1973-74.
In addition, New York University has awarded several
PhD degrees, in public administration and national
security.
27. James W. Fesler, "The Role of the Review," Public
Administration Review, Vol. 18 (1958), p. 271.
28. Public Administration Review, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1958),
p. 169.
29. Four in 1959, three by one reviewer in 1968, none
during the years between.
30. Books were reviewed in the July/August issue; article
was by Edward A. Kolodziej, "The National Security
Council: Innovations and Implications" (November/
December 1969), which indirectly addresses the issue
of military administration.
31. Reviews were in the January/February, July/August,
and September/October issues; on the article by
Robert D. Miewald, see Note 21.
32. Miewald, pp. 129, 133.
33. Frederick C. Thayer, "Presidential Policy Processes
and 'New Administration,' " Public Administration
Review, Vol. 31, No. 5 (September/October 1971),
pp. 552-559.
34. Melvin H. Baker, "Productivity Management in the
Defense Supply Agency," Public Administration
Review, Vol. 32, No. 6 (November/December 1972),
pp. 771-776.
35. Stephen W. Hartman, "The Impact of Defense
Expenditures on the Domestic American Economy,
1946-1972," Public Administration Review, Vol. 33,
No. 4 (July/August 1973), pp. 379-390.
36. The January/February issue reviewed six defense-
related books by the same reviewer, pp. 82-88;
articles were by Richard Stillman, II, "Racial Unrest
in the Military: The Challenge and Response"
(May/June 1974), pp. 221-229; and by Thomas D.
Morris, "Merit Principles in Military Officer Personnel
Administration" (September/October 1974), pp.
445-450.
37. Mazmanian and Lee, "Tradition Be Damned: The
Army Corps of Engineers Is Changing," Public
Administration Review, Vol. 35, No. 2 (March/April
1975), pp. 166-172.
38. R. Barry Farrell, "Preface," in R. Barry Farrell (ed.),
Approaches to Comparative and International Politics
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University, 1966), p. vi.
39. Allison, op. cit.; Morton H. Halperin and Arnold
333
Kanter, Readings in American Foreign Policy
(Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1973); and Frederick
C. Thayer, An End to Hierarchy! An End to
Competition! (New York: New Viewpoints, 1973).
40. Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment
(New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 70.
41. C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1959), p. 70.
42. Yarmolinsky, p. 174.
43. Mills, p. 200.
44. Fred W. Riggs, "Professionalism, Political Science,
and the Scope of Public Administration," Theory and
Practice of Public Administration (Philadelphia:
American Academy of Political and Social Science,
1968), p. 38.
45. Dwight Waldo, "Scope of the Theory of Public
Administration," Theory and Practice of Public
Administration, pp. 18-20.
46. Miewald, pp. 129-133.
47. Emmet V. Mittlebeeler, "Trends in Teaching and
Research in Public Administration in the United
States," International Conference on Trends in
University Teaching and Research in PA in Africa
(Ife, Nigeria: University of Ife, 1970).
48. Paul R. Van Riper, "Hit 'Em Harder John, Hit 'Em
Harder," Public Administration Review, Vol. 27
(November 1967), pp. 339-342.
49. Samuel Huntington, "The Political Roles of the Joint
Chiefs," in Ambrose and Barber (eds.), The Military
and American Society (New York: Free Press, 1972),
p. 39.
50. Yarmolinsky, p. 42. The exact amount is $3,310,458,
more than ten times the $277,524 in lobby expenses
reported by the United Federation of Postal Clerks,
the largest among groups that year required to report
spending under the Federal Regulation of Lobbying
Act.
51. Ibid., p.41.
52. Ibid., p. 52.
53. Bruce L. R. Smith et. al., in Smith and Hague (eds.),
The Dilemma of Accountability in Modern Govern-
ment (New York: St. Martins, 1971), pp. 20-21; and
Clarence H. Danhoff, Government Contracting and
Technological Change (Washington D.C.: The Brook-
ings Institution, 1968), p. 124.
54. Yarmolinsky, p. 15.
55. Ibid., p. 71.
56. Miewald, p. 133.
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THE BUDGET PROCESS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 1947-77:
THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THREE SYSTEMS
Lawrence J. Korb, U.S. Naval War College
Budgeting and the budgetary process are
critical in any organization because, to a great
extent, "dollars are policy." If the funds for a
particular activity cannot be acquired, planning
becomes fruitless and execution impossible. In the
Department of Defense (DOD) the budgetary
process is especially important. This importance
arises from three factors. First, DOD has a very
thin legislative base. Nearly all of its programs
must be acted on annually by the Executive and
Legislative Branches in the budget process. Unlike
other federal agencies, the Pentagon receives no
long-term commitments from the Congress. This is
different from most other federal agencies where
the budget process consists mainly of costing out
approved and continuing programs.
Second, approximately 65 per cent of the
controllable expenditures in the entire federal
government are in the area of national defense.' In
FY 1976, $63.8 billion in a DOD budget of $92.8
billion was controllable. In contrast, only $20
billion of HEW's total budget of $127.7 billion
was controllable. Therefore, defense appropri-
ations are the easiest to manipulate in order to
implement a particular fiscal policy. For example,
during the fall of 1975, President Ford directed
the Pentagon to make a $7 billion reduction so
that he could keep his FY 1977 Budget under
$400 billion.
"Third, the decisions made in a particular
budgetary evolution in DOD have profound
long-term implications. For example, a surface
ship funded in the FY 1976 defense budget will go
to sea in 1983 and will remain operational until
2013.
Since the unification of DOD in 1947, three
different budgeting procedures have been em-
ployed within the Pentagon. The first system
extended from 1947 through 1961; the second
prevailed during the 1961-68 period; while the
third has been operative since 1969. In this article,
we will outline the procedures and the conceptual
underpinnings of each of these three systems and
then the strengths and weaknesses of each system.
? The article describes the procedures and conceptual
underpinnings of the three basic budgeting processes
used in the Department of Defense since its
unification in 1947 and evaluates their strengths and
weaknesses.
The first period was that of the Truman-
Eisenhower years, and the system of fixed allocations
to each service used pleased no one, its only advantage
being the early imposition of a spending ceiling. The
second, the McNamara Period, is best characterized by
the complete control exercised by the Secretary of
Defense and by the introduction of the planning
programming and budgeting system (PPBS). The third
system is that in use since 1968; its most important
aspects are the decentralization of power and modified
retention of PPBS. Despite the improvements in the
system, there are still serious shortcomings in the
budgeting process.
The author concludes that while much progress
has been made in the budgetary process, there is still
considerable room for improvement. Two primary
constraints, however, will remain: its inherent political
nature, and the near irrelevancy of planning.
The Truman-Eisenhower Period
The Process
From the creation of the Department of
Defense in 1947 through 1961, the budget format
or process within the department was virtually
unchanged.2
The budget process would begin about a year
before the budget was to be submitted to the
Congress. The first step would be the imposition
of a ceiling on DOD by the Administration. Under
President Truman, the Pentagon was allotted a
fixed one-third of the total federal budget. Prior to
the Korean War, the President refused to budge
from the ceiling even when events in the
Lawrence J. Korb is a professor of management at the
Naval War College, as well as an adjunct scholar for
federal budget analysis of the American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research. He also serves as
chairperson of the International Studies Association
Section on Military Studies. His latest book is a history of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
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international arena appeared to dictate an increase
in defense spending. For FY 1950, the total DOD
budget was $13.3 billion, and in FY 1951 the
Truman Administration asked Congress for only
$12.2 billion, a decrease of 8 per cent. The defense
budget went down because federal revenues had
dropped in the interim, and Truman was
determined to keep the budget balanced. Yet, in
the period between congressional approval of the
FY 1950 defense budget and submission of the FY
1951 request, the Communists had taken over
China and the Soviet Union had exploded an
atomic bomb.3
President Eisenhower was also concerned with a
balanced budget and decreed that no more than 10
per cent of the GNP would go to defense. Like his
Democratic predecessor, the former general held
steadfastly to his ceilings in spite of changes in the
international environment. In January 1957
President Eisenhower requested $35.5 billion for
DOD during FY 1958. Within the next ten months
the Soviet Union shocked the American public and
the world by launching the first ICBM and orbiting
the first Sputnik satellite. In light of these
dramatic Soviet advances, the Congress and the
public expected some spectacular new initiatives in
the FY 1959 defense budget, but none were
forthcoming. In January 1958 Eisenhower re-
quested an increase of only 5.6 per cent in defense
authority. Overall defense spending increased by
only 12 per cent over the entire eight years of the
Eisenhower era.4
After the imposition of the ceiling, the
Secretary of Defense would allocate the amount
among the three services. Each of the services
would in turn prepare its basic budget submission
by dividing its own ceiling among its own
functions, units, and activities. Throughout this
period, except for the Korean War, the services
received virtually fixed shares of the total defense
budget: The Air Force 47 per cent, the Navy 29
per cent, and the Army 24 per cent.'
In preparing their budgets, the services were
supposed to be guided by two planning docu-
ments, the Basic National Security Policy (BNSP)
Document and the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
(JSOP).6 The BNSP was issued annually by the
National Security Council (NSC). Theoretically
the BNSP was a comprehensive statement of
American strategic policy which would provide
guidance to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the
services in their planning for force and weapon
levels. Although the NSC devoted a great deal of
335
time and energy to the drafting of the BNSP, the
document was essentailly useless for budgeting
purposes. Rather than resolving the sharp dif-
ferences of opinion over what the strategic policy
of the United States should be, it glossed over
them to make the document acceptable to all
parties.'
After completion, the BNSP was sent to the
JCS to serve as a guide for their Joint Strategic
Objectives Plan (JSOP). The JSOP is a document
of two volumes that assesses the threat and then
prescribes the military forces that the JCS believe
are required to carry out our military strategy and
national objectives. Because the BNSP could be
interpreted in so many ways, each service Chief
stressed that portion of the BNSP that enhanced
the primary mission of his service. Consequently,
the JSOP was really three separate plans added
together and called a joint plan.8
There was in effect no definitive guidance on
how to structure the armed forces. In building
their budgets the individual services were free to
emphasize those portions of their programs which
contributed most to organizational health or
organizational essence. Moreover, each service
could legitimately claim that it alone had to
provide for our security. Therefore, it would
justify exceeding its budgetary ceiling. Thus, the
budgets that were sent to the Secretary of Defense
each October not only were unbalanced but
exceeded the ceilings by some 15 per cent.
The first eight Secretaries of Defense used a
variety of approaches to attempt to get the JCS to
scale down these requests and thus share
responsibility with them for the final budget.
These approaches ranged from direct commands to
pep talks about being team players, but the results
were always the same. The Chiefs were unwilling
to perform this function for the Secretary. They
were so concerned with safeguarding the interests
of their own services that they could not agree on
where to make the reductions.
The task of reducing the requests thus fell to
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).
Usually the Secretary of Defense or the comp-
troller made across-the-board cuts to bring the
requests into line with the ceiling. For example, in
December 1953, Secretary of Defense Charles
Wilson ordered an across-the-board reduction of
10 per cent in military personnel to bring the FY
1955 budget requests of the military services down
to the level imposed by the Administration.9 On
at least one occasion, a Secretary of Defense was
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unable to decide where to make a reduction and
appealed to Congress for help. In 1959 Secretary
of Defense Neil McElroy suggested that Congress
"hold our feet to the fire" by choosing either the
Army's Nike-Hercules or the Air Force's Bomarc
as our continental air defense missile.1?
Advantages and Disadvantages
Although this form of budgeting existed in
DOD for 15 years, it really pleased no one. The
only advantage of the system was the imposition
of a ceiling early in the budget process. This gave
the Secretary of Defense and the services the
opportunity to face up to fiscal realities and to set
priorities if they so desired. However, this
advantage was more than offset by the many
weaknesses which existed in the Pentagon in the
pre-1961 period. These weaknesses may be placed
into five categories." First, there was no
integrated planning done that was relevant to the
budget process. There was some planning done by
the military, but it was bifurcated and completely
unrelated to fiscal reality. The forces necessary to
implement the plans produced in the 1940s and
1950s would have tripled the funds available for
defense.
Second, there was a great deal of duplication of
effort by the services in certain areas. For
example, each of the military departments was
trying to stake out a role for itself in the
prestigious strategic offensive area. Consequently,
they all were working on their own ICBMs.
Third, many other areas of national defense
were neglected and thus our defense posture was
not very well balanced. The Air Force, which gave
overriding priority to its bombers and missiles,
neglected the tactical air units needed to support
the Army's ground operations and the airlift units
needed to move the ground troops. The Navy,
which gave priority to the attack carrier, neglected
its anti submarine warfare (ASW) and escort
functions. The Army preserved its 14-division
force even though this meant that all of the
divisions lacked the necessary equipment and
supplies.
Fourth, each service came to feel that it was
entitled to a fixed share of the defense budget.
This situation led each of the services to believe
that it would receive its fixed share regardless of
the effectiveness of its programs in meeting
national needs. Moreover, if anyone in OSD
favored a new program, that person would have to
find funds for it. For example, in the late 1950s
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
the Navy refused to devote very much of its
budget to Polaris. When it was confronted with
arguments, based on urgent national need, for
increasing the Polaris program, the Navy argued
that Polaris was primarily a national program and
should not be financed out of the Navy's 29 per
cent share of the defense budget.
Fifth, the whole focus of those involved in the
defense budget was on the upcoming fiscal year.
This limited horizon resulted in decision makers
placing an undue emphasis upon current costs and
thus usually neglecting future costs and effective-
ness. For example, in 1957 Secretary Wilson
refused to approve pay increases in skill areas
which were in short supply, even though the
Cordiner Commission demonstrated that the
present pay increases would more than pay for
themselves because the higher retention rates
would mean future reductions in training costs.
Sixth, the Secretary of Defense had no rational
criteria for choosing among the competing
programs put forth by the individual services. On
some occasions his decisions were based upon
intuition or experience rather than a standard by
which he could judge which system or combina-
tion of systems would best produce a desired
result. Other times, the Secretary sought merely to
arbitrate or find a compromise which satisfied the
services but did not necessarily serve the national
interest.
The McNamara Period
When Robert McNamara agreed to become
Secretary of Defense, he did it on condition that
he could in fact make defense policy and manage
the Department. As discussed above, in DOD the
budget process is the key to the functioning of the
Department. Therefore, in order for McNamara to
gain control of DOD he had to gain control of the
budget process. He already had the authority.
What he needed were the management tools to
allow him to view DOD at a level above the
services. At the Rand Corporation, a planning,
programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) had
been used to analyze defense issues at the program
or OSD level since the mid-1950s. In staffing the
Pentagon, McNamara recruited two of the Rand's
most distinguished analysts, Charles Hitch and
Alain Enthoven, and together with them intro-
duced PPBS into the Pentagon.
The Cycle
PPBS divided the budgetary process into three
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clearly defined cycles which lasted nearly 20
months.12 Thus, preparation of the FY 1966
budget, which was to become effective in July
1965, and was to be submitted to the Congress in
January 1965, got underway in the spring of 1963.
The foundation for PPBS in DOD from 1961
through 1968 was the Five-Year Defense Plan
(FYDP). This document was the master plan for
the budget process and contained the programs
approved by OSD with their estimated costs
projected for five years. The initial FYDP was
produced in 1961 and projected programs and
costs through 1965. Each year the FYDP was
updated by decisions made during the budget
process.
The planning cycle was the first and longest of
the cycles. It began in May and lasted until
February, and was composed of three steps. The
first step involved production of Volume I of the
JSOP by the JCS. This volume was an assessment
of the military threat facing the United States and
of our national commitments projected for five
years. Neither the NSC nor the Secretary of
Defense provided any guidance to the JCS in
developing JSOP I. Consequently, the military
made their own assessments. Since these were so
much more conservative or pessimistic than
McNamara's, the JSOP had no impact in the
budgetary cycle.
The second step of the planning cycle consisted
of the submission of force level recommendations
by the services and unified commands to the JCS.
These recommendations were based upon the
threat and commitments outlined in Volume I of
the JSOP. The third and final step of the planning
cycle involved the completion of two major
documents. The JCS finished Volume II of the
JSOP. This part recommended the optimum force
levels that the military chiefs considered necessary
to meet U.S. requirements.
While the JCS were completing the JSOP, OSD
produced a Major Program Memorandum (MPM)
for each of the ten mission areas and support
activities of the defense budget." These mem-
oranda summarized the OSD position on the major
force levels, the rationale for choices among
alternatives, and the recommended force levels and
funding. Although the MPM were programming
documents theoretically based upon the planning
in the JSOP, their authors in fact ignored the
JSOP, and the MPM became both a planning and
programming document.
The programming cycle began with the
337
Secretary's receipt of the JSOP and MPM. This
cycle lasted about six months, through the end of
August. McNamara normally reviewed those
documents for about 30 days and then provided
guidance to the services for preparing Program
Change Requests (PCR), suggested modifications
to the FYDP. The primary factor shaping this
guidance was the MPM.
The services normally submitted about 300
PCRs annually to the Office of Systems Analysis,
whose decisions were nearly always negative. The
rejection of the PCRs was attributable to three
factors: the services used poor analytical tech-
niques, their requests did not convey a sense of
priority in relation to the base program, and their
cost.
Theoretically all the program decisions should
have been made before budgeting began, but often
this was not the case. Many of the program
decisions were negotiated during and after the
budgetary cycle. An OSD official reported that for
FY 1968 and FY 1969, 90 ,per cent of the final
program decision documents were not written
until after December 28 ? after the conclusion of
the budgetary cycle.' 4
While Systems Analysis was reviewing the
PCRs, the JCS were reviewing the MPM. The
Chiefs' comments on the memoranda were sent to
the Secretary in July. For the remainder of the
summer, McNamara and the JCS met about 15
times to discuss the Chiefs' adverse comments.
These meetings were primarily pro forma.
McNamara was not interested in the JCS opinions.
He had his own clearly defined views on strategy
and he used these meetings to attempt to persuade
the chiefs to accept his position or to divide the
JCS! 5
The budgetary cycle officially began in
September when the services were asked to
prepare their budgets in the traditional categories,
i.e., each service separately rather than in program
packages, for submission to OSD by October 1. In
issuing his call for budget submissions, McNamara
emphatically pointed out, year after year, that the
services were not to feel bound by any budgetary
ceiling, real or imaginary. They were to be guided
only by decisions made in regard to the MPM and
the PCRs. The Secretary repeatedly stated that
this country could afford whatever was necessary
for defense. Theoretically, the budgetary cycle was
to consist only of costing out approved programs.
Despite McNamara's rhetoric, most of the key
figures in DOD had a very good idea of what the
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defense total would be. On most occasions, it was
matter of simple arithmetic. It was more than a
mere coincidence that what this country could
afford for defense from FY 1963 through FY
1966, before the Vietnam buildup, came within
one per cent of $46 billion each year and that the
Army, Navy, and Air Force shares of the budget
were a fairly constant 27, 32, and 41 per cent
respectively. A service Chief, who served under
Eisenhower and McNamara, said that in regard to
budget ceilings there was no real difference
between either Administration.' 6 Another Chief
remarked, "Weapons systems became more and
more difficult to justify as we approached our
portion of $46 billion." 2 During the last two
years of the McNamara period the comptroller
actually issued an informal memo which provided
estimates of defense, service, and program totals.
However, in the absence of specific fiscal
constraints, the services felt that they had to
request much more than could be expected or
even supported. To do any less would cause the
service leaders to "lose face" with their
subordinates. Consequently, during the McNamara
period the requests sometimes exceeded the final
budgets by as much as 30 per cent. During the last
four years of the McNamara period, the requests
of the services were an average of $18.1 billion
above the amount finally approved.' 8
From October through December, the Comp-
troller's Office reviewed these budgets. In order to
reduce those budgets, the office normally had to
initiate some 600 subject issues, i.e., area of
potential savings. Although these issues were
theoretically technical, e.g., the cost of a
submarine or the cost of equipping an infantry
battalion, the issues actually reflected intuitive
feelings on the part of personnel in the
Comptroller's Office about where they felt cuts
ought to be made. McNamara reviewed the
budgets personally and, with the subject issues as a
guide, made about 700 budgetary decisions
annually. Often his decisions concerned the
smallest matters, such as the color of belt buckles.
The executive phase of the budgetary cycle
concluded in late December when the President
met with the Secretary and the JCS for about four
hours. Despite vigorous opposition on the part of
many members of the JCS during their "days in
court," the President invariably sided with
McNamara. The only major issue on which
President Johnson ever overruled the Secretary
was the ABM.' 9
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
The Chiefs were not the only ones who were
unsuccessful in inducing the President to overrule
McNamara. The Secretary's final budgets were not
altered by a single penny by the Bureau of the
Budget. For all other departments, the Budget
Bureau could make any changes it wished. If
the departments involved objected, they could
appeal to the White House. But if the Bureau
wanted to alter DOD's budget, it had to seek
permission from the White House. Gardner
Ackley, . Chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisors, stated that during the McNamara years
fiscal policy was forced to adapt to defense
spending, rather than vice versa.20
Merely looking at the steps in the PPBS cycle is
not sufficient to understand the change that this
system brought into the budgetary process in the
Pentagon. In order to appreciate the total
significance of PPBS in DOD, we must also
consider its structural, analytical, and adminis-
trative?organization aspects.21
Structural Aspects
PPBS relies upon a structural program budget.
The chief feature of this budget is its output
orientation. The program budget allows the
activities of several agencies to be assembled in
terms of specific output packages, i.e., programs
and sub-programs of various convenient levels of
aggregation. For example, one of the goals of DOD
is to achieve an assured destruction capability
against the Soviet Union ? destroy 20-25 per cent
of the Soviet population and 50 per cent of Soviet
industry. To achieve this broad goal, which is one
aspect of a strategy of deterrence, allocation
decisions must be made. Assured destruction can
be achieved through ICBMs, SLBMs, manned
bombers, or some combination thereof. These
three sub-programs compete with each other for
defense funds in the strategic program. Each of
these in turn is made up of alternative
sub-programs, which compete with each other for
resources, as inputs for achieving assured destruc-
tion.
Ultimately, the program budget identifies
elements down to the input level of the basic
building blocks of the various required resources:
manpower, materials, equipment, buildings, land,
etc. These blocks are known as program elements,
and in the DOD budget there are approximately
1,700 of them. These elements are then combined
into various packages that produce desired outputs
(e.g., assured destruction). Breaking down and
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combining data into useful building blocks allows
decision makers to reconstruct the program budget
at their particular levels of responsibility according
to articulated objectives or goals.
PPBS also requires that the outputs be to some
extent quantifiable so that the projected expendi-
ture data, which appears in the budget, can be
meaningfully related to projected performance.
For example, in order to make a meaningful
judgment about the Trident, we would want to
know the amount of destruction that could be
caused by a Trident Missile.
The final structural aspect of PPBS is its
extended time horizon. The pre-1961 organization
of budgetary data in DOD rarely offered a profile
of future expenditures linked to or implied by
current investment decisions. But to make rational
choices, the decision maker must know something
about the future expenditure implications of
decisions made today. In DOD, the five-year
defense plan (FYDP) provides this extended time
horizon. It is a series of force tables giving an
eight-year projection of forces and a five-year
projection of costs and manpower, displayed in
the mission-oriented programs.
Analytical Aspects
Analysis and evaluation are integral parts of the
PPBS process; without them PPBS is really a shell.
They include the study of objectives and of
alternative ways of achieving them, of future
environments, and of contingencies and how to
respond to them. Since defense planning and
budgeting need to be done over a number of years
into the future, explicit recognition must be given
to the uncertainties of the future. Budgetary
analysis in DOD draws on the economic theory of
choice over time or capital theory and benefit-cost
analysis, referred to by some as cost-utility
analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, or simply
systems analysis.
Benefit-cost analysis is mainly concerned with
resource allocation efficiency and attempts to
relate total costs to benefits produced by a
particular program. It permits the use of explicit
criteria and systematic comparison of several
alternative courses of action that might achieve a
certain objective for some future time period.
Benefit-cost analysis requires information in
addition to that likely to be presented in the
program budget. It takes into account all costs, by
whomever incurred, and all benefits, to whomever
they accrue. The benefits are the value of the
339
added output, while the costs of a program are the
resources sacrificed if that action is taken. If
benefits and costs were exhaustive, certain, and
commensurable, efficient resources allocation
would result from a policy calculated to yield the
greatest present value of net benefits. When
financial constraints force the Secretary to choose
from many desirable programs, he should select
those with the highest net present value, until he
reaches the point at which his budget is spent.
However, in DOD benefits and costs are rarely
exhaustive, certain, and commensurable; therefore,
in virtually no case can a complete estimate of the
present value of net benefits be obtained. But with
care the analyst can obtain partial estimates of the
benefits and costs of some systems and can furnish
the decision maker with partial qualitative
information on others. In practice then, the
analyst, instead of maximizing one's present
values, is usually satisfied with identifying
preferred solutions; i.e., he/she suboptimizes.
Budgetary analysis also involves the careful,
explicit treatment of uncertainties and their
implications for planning and budgeting. These
arise largely because of the extended time horizon
required for rational decisions. Some of the tools
for handling these uncertainties are sensitivity
analysis, contingency analysis, and a fortiori
analysis.22 Analysts also concern themselves with
designing decision strategies and operations which
offer preferred solutions under different types of
uncertainly, e.g., sequential decision making,
parallel activities, and investments in flexible
multipurpose projects.
Administrative-Organizational Aspects
If PPBS is to be effective, it is not enough
merely to establish programs and to use analytical
tools. Someone outside of the agency must have
jurisdiction over programs that transcend that
particular agency or department, and the group of
people who perform the analysis must be
responsive to that individual. Prior to 1961, the
Secretary of Defense had jurisdiction over DOD,
but the men who occupied that position had
neither the staff nor the inclination to exercise
their authority. But Robert McNamara, who came
to the Pentagon in 1961, was determined to be an
active leader rather than simply a judge or referee,
waiting for his subordinates to bring him problems
for solution or alternatives for choice. To help him
carry out this active leadership role, McNamara
first established the Office of Systems Analysis in
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the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) and then raised systems analysis to
the Assistant Secretary level. He used this tool to
transfer decision-making power from the services
to his office. So complete was this transference of
power that McNamara's tenure was referred to by
some as the "McNamara Monarchy."2 3
PPBS also brought about organizational changes
in the three military departments. Initially the
military services complained bitterly about the
introduction of analysis into the Pentagon. They
claimed that cost-benefit analysis denigrated
military experience. Soon they realized that it was
not analysis to which they objected but the style
of the analysts. Eventually all of the services
established their own analysis capabilities.
Advantages and Disadvantages of PPBS in DOD
in the McNamara Era.
Even its harshest critics will concede that PPBS
offers certain potential improvements in decision
making in the budget process in DOD. The
improvements or benefits can be classified within
six broad headings.24
First, PPBS allowed officials to make decisions
in the budget process based more upon the explicit
criteria of the national interest. Previously the
Secretary of Defense sought to find a compromise
among the various institutional, parochial, or other
vested interests in DOD. But under PPBS there
exists openly defensible national purposes that the
program is meant to serve, alternative ways of
achieving these purposes, and criteria by which to
judge competing alternatives.
Second, PPBS considered military needs and
costs together. Decisions on forces and budgets
should be made together. When needs and costs
are separated, there will inevitably be an imbalance
between objectives and forces and ultimately an
imbalance between planned forces and the actual
budgets and programs provided to support them.
Third, PPBS provided for the explicit considera-
tion of alternatives at the top decision level.
Through the various programming documents, the
Secretary of Defense was offered several balanced
feasible solutions in which costs forces and
strategies have been considered together.
Fourth, PPBS permitted the decision makers to
judge the future implications of current decisions.
The FYDP deals with forces and costs in a
comprehensive manner, bringing together at one
time and in one place all the relevant information.
Fifth, PPBS made use of open, explicit analysis.
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
Each analysis was made available to all interested
parties so that they could examine the calcula-
tions, data, and assumptions and retrace the steps
leading to the conclusion. All the calculations,
data, and assumptions were described in such a
way that they could be checked, tested, criticized,
debated, discussed, and refuted by other agencies.
Sixth, under PPBS the base program competed
equally with new programs. Previously, the budget
process in DOD began by accepting the base and
then examined only incremental departures from
it. This caused the Pentagon to transfer the present
into the future with a few small variations. New
programs and radical initiatives had very little
hope of being accepted. Since PPBS concentrated
on objectives, the base program was sacred only as
long as it conformed to the objectives.
The introduction of PPBS by McNamara into
the Pentagon greatly improved the quality of
budgetary process within DOD. However, PPBS as
practiced by McNamara was by no means a perfect
process. It too had several weaknesses. Those
weaknesses may be placed into four categories.
First, the process was overcentralized. Too
many decisions were left to the Secretary of
Defense. By his own admission, McNamara made
some 700 budget decisions annually. It is simply
impossible for one man to make that many
high-quality decisions. Moreover, the subunits of
DOD and agencies outside of the Pentagon were
virtually excluded from the process. The military
services and the JCS could only comment on or
attempt to change the initiatives of the Secretary.
McNamara and his staff did the real planning and
programming, and in their review of the service
budget submissions they penetrated to the depths
of the individual budgets. No item was too small
to escape their scrutiny. Similarly, the agencies
outside the Pentagon had almost no input into or
impact upon the defense budget. The NSC offered
no guidance for formulating the budget, the
Bureau of the Budget could not set a ceiling on or
change the defense budget, and there was no
mechanism to review it for conformity with
national policy. It was more than symbolic that
the only comprehensive foreign policy statements
made during the Kennedy-Johnson years were
McNamara's annual statements on the defense
budget.
Second, McNamara downgraded the value of
experience. This was a mistake because systems
analysis is more of an art than a science. There is a
great deal of reliance upon judgment and intuition.
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Oftentimes the objectives are either unknown or
subject to change. For many of the crucial
variables there was no mathematical function that
could express the desired relationship. Finally,
there may be no single criterion for judging results
among conflicting objectives. Therefore, the
military professionals by virtue of their experience
could have brought many insights into the
analytical process. The way in which McNamara
constructed the budgetary process virtually made
it impossible for them to make any meaningful
contributions. Had he listened to this "voice of
experience," McNamara may not have insisted on
developing the ill-fated Joint Air Force-Navy
Fighter, the TFX or F-111.
Third, facets of PPBS frequently collapsed
under the stress of time constraints that are
inherent in the budgetary cycle. Rarely, if ever,
were all of the programming decisions completed
before the budgetary cycle commenced. Indeed,
on some occasions the program decisions were
made after the budgets were finished. If the
programs do not drive the budgets, much of the
rationale for PPBS is gone.
Fourth, the failure to give specific fiscal
guidance early in the process made it necessary to
reduce the budget requests by very large amounts
in a very short period of time. As noted above,
from FY 1966 through FY 1970 the Comptroller's
Office had to cut an average of $18.1 billion in
some two months. This process was so hectic that
it often led to hasty and ill-conceived decisions.
Post-1968 Period
The Concept
Melvin Laird, who had observed McNamara's
revolution from his seat on the House Subcom-
mittee on Military Appropriations, felt that
McNamara's methods had led to over-
centralization in decision making. Accordingly,
when he became the tenth Secretary of Defense,
Laird instituted certain changes in the defense
budget process to redress this situation. The
essence of these changes was contained in a
"treaty" signed by the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, the service Secretaries, and the Chairman
of the JCS. This treaty, "negotiated" soon after
Laird assumed the helm at the Pentagon, provided
that the Secretary of Defense would look to the
services and the JCS in the design of forces and
that the Systems Analysis Office would limit itself
341
to evaluation and review and not put forward
independent proposals of its own.25 In return for
this concession, the Secretary of Defense expected
the services to work within the stringent budget
ceilings which he would promulgate early in the
cycle. These changes have been institutionalized
by his successors, James Schlesinger and Donald
Rumsfeld.
In addition to the changes made by the
Secretary of Defense, the budgetary process in
DOD was also affected by changes made in the
National Security Council system. Under the
direction of President Nixon and Henry Kissinger,
his assistant for national security affairs, the NCS
issued 127 formal National Security Decision
Memoranda (NSDMs) between 1969 and 1972.
These documents spelled out in fairly specific
terms what our policy was. For example, NSDM 3
directed the Pentagon to plan to fight no more
than one major and one minor war simul-
taneously.26 Similarly, Nixon and Kissinger
created the Defense Program Review Committee
(DPRC), chaired by Kissinger. The committee was
composed of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the
Undersecretary of State, the Chairmen of the
Council of Economic Advisors and the JCS, and
the Directors of OMB and Central Intelligence.
The task of the DPRC was to assess the political,
economic, and social consequences which would
result from changes in the levels of defense
spending, budgetary, and force levels.
The present budgetary process is outlined in
Figure 1. As is indicated in that schematic, the
length of the process is still 20 months and the
foundation remains the FYDP. However, because
of the innovations made within DOD and the NSC
system, the emphasis within the process has
changed. The JCS inaugurate the planning cycle by
producing Volume I of the JSOP, i.e., the strategic
assessment, and sending it to the Secretary of
Defense. After his review of the JSOP, the
Secretary issues a coordinated, complete, and
current strategic guidance document for the entire
defense community, the Strategic Guidance
Memorandum (SGM). This document is issued in
January ? the SGM for FY 1972 was issued in
January 1970. The JSOP and SGM are supposed to
reflect the guidance contained in the various
NSDMs.
In January the Secretary also issues a Tentative
Fiscal Guidance Memorandum (TFGM) projecting
dollar constraints for the next five years. While the
elements of DOD are reviewing the TFGM, the
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Secretary
of
Defense
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PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
FIGURE 1
1972 PLANNING ? PROGRAMMING ? BUDGETING CYCLE
October
1971
Dec.
1972
February
May
August
October
Nov.?Dec.
Policy &
Planning
Guidance
Planning &
Programming
Guidance
1
Program
Decision
Mem.
Budget
Decisions
Military
Departments
& Agencies
Program
Objective
Memos
Budget
Estimates
JSOP = Joint Strategic Objective Plan
JCS completes the force structure portion of the
JSOP, i.e., Volume II. This is prepared from a
purely military perspective, without regard to the
fiscal constraints of the TFGM. The Secretary
reviews the comments on the TFGM and Volume
II of the JSOP and then completes the planning
cycle by issuing a Fiscal Guidance Memorandum
(FGM) in February. The FGM sets definite ceilings
on the total budget and on each service, and builds
fences around the major program areas.27 The
SGM and FGM are often referred to as Planning
and Programming Guidance (PPG).
The ceilings decided upon by the Secretary are
primarily a reflection of the condition of the
economy and the current economic game plan of
the Administration. Since the late 1960s, defense
expenditures have become the greatest part of the
controllable outlays in the formal budget. In the
early years of the Nixon Administration, the
President and his fiscally conservative advisors
slashed defense spending in an attempt to achieve
a balanced budget and thus slow inflation. Ceilings
on the defense budget have eased since 1972 as
Presidents Nixon and Ford adopted the full
employment budget philosophy.2 8
The programming cycle begins in April when
the JCS draw up a Joint Force Memorandum
(JFM), which presents the Chiefs' recommenda-
Review & Comment
tions on force levels and support programs that
can be provided within the fiscal constraints of the
FGM. The JFM also includes an assessment of the
risks in these forces as measured against the
strategy and objectives of JSOP, Volume 1, and a
comparison of the costs of its recommendations
with the FYDP. Finally, the JFM highlights the
major force issues to be resolved during the year.
In May each service submits to the Secretary of
Defense a Program Objective Memorandum (POM)
for each major mission area and support activity in
its portion of the defense budget. These
memoranda express total program requirements in
terms of forces, manpower, and costs and must
provide a rationale for deviations from the FYDP
and the JFM. Analysts within OSD review the JFM
and POM and prepare "issue papers" based upon
the points raised in these documents. Both of
these programming documents are part of the
Laird innovations and represent the decentrali-
zation of power from OSD to the services. OSD no
longer prepares its own programming documents.
Its role is to respond to those prepared by the
military.
The Secretary of Defense reviews these issue
papers during July and by the end of the month
usually issues a Program Decision Memoranda
(PDM) for each issue area. Beginning in the first
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part of August, the services, the JCS, and the
defense agencies are given the opportunity to
contest (Reclama) the PDMs. The Secretary
concludes the programming cycle by holding
major issue meetings with the Secretaries of the
military departments and the JCS to resolve any
disputes over the PDM.
The budgetary cycle commences on September
30 when each agency submits its budget to OSD.
In the post-1969 period, the budgets of the
military departments have never been more than
five per cent above the established ceilings. During
the remainder of the calendar year the budgets are
reviewed jointly by the comptroller and repre-
sentatives of OMB. Although these reviews are
supposed to be merely technical, many of the
questions raised in this review have programmatic
implications.
Issues which cannot be worked out between
OSD, OMB, and the services are sent to the
Secretary or the White House for the decision. The
budget is transmitted to the White House in late
December or early January. The President
generally meets with the JCS before making the
budget final. In the post-McNamara period these
meetings have been more than formalities and on
occasion the chiefs have prevailed upon the chief
executive to reverse the decisions of the Secretary
of Defense or the Director of OMB.
Strengths and Weaknesses
The introduction of specific fiscal guidance
early in the budgetary process and the decentrali-
zation of decision making cured some of the
weaknesses of the McNamara period. Between FY
1970 and FY 1975 the budget requests of the
services never went more than five per cent above
the ceilings and oftentimes were within one or
two per cent of the final budget." This meant
that during the hectic days between the
submission of the budgets and their completion,
the comptroller only had to make marginal
changes, as opposed to the wholesale reductions of
the McNamara period.
Decentralization forced upon the services the
burden of making the tough choices about which
areas to cut during the 37.2 per cent reduction in
the real level of defense spending which occurred
in the 1969-75 period. If OSD had taken on the
task, they doubtless would have experienced a
great deal of resistance and foot dragging from the
services. As it turned out, the military services
slashed their manpower and weapons inventory
343
about 40 per cent in the 1969-75 period with a
bare minimum of bureaucratic resistance.3?
Although the innovations made in the
post-1969 period have solved some of the
weaknesses that existed in the McNamara era, they
have by no means eliminated all of these problem
areas. In addition, these innovations have created
some new difficulties. The present budgetary
process has six serious shortcomings.31
First, the present system extends over too long
a period of time. From the time that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff start work on JSOP I until the
budget is submitted to Congress, nearly two years
elapses. The inherent overlap in this 24-month
cycle tends to confuse many participants about
where they are in the cycle. For example, JSOP I,
which contains the unconstrained JCS advice on
broad objectives, military strategy, and defense
planning scenarios, and the JFM, which contains
the Chiefs' recommendations on the force
structure which ought to be achieved within the
prescribed fiscal constraints, are both issued in
May. Each of these documents pertains to a
different fiscal year.
Second, there is some disparity between the
planning and programming guidance issues by the
Secretary of Defense and the force planning
guidance issued by the JCS. In a real sense, DOD
has two parallel planning systems going on
simultaneously, a military and a civilian system.
Theoretically, JSOP I should be considered by the
Secretary when he issues his strategic guidance.
Similarly, JSOP II (JCS views on the forces the
United States needs to implement defense
strategy) should be influenced by the Secretary's
strategic guidance. Finally, the fiscal guidance
issued by the Secretary should take into account
the prudent risks outlined by the Chiefs in JSOP
However, in reality there is very little
connection between the documents of the JCS and
OSD. The Secretary and his staff denigrate both
volumes of the JSOP as "blue sky" recommenda-
tions and hence valueless to the programmer.
Therefore, OSD does not even comment on them.
Moreover, the strategic guidance of the Secretary
is usually published too late to permit timely,
detailed consideration by the JCS during develop-
ment of the JSOP II. In some cases, the JCS and
OSD give conflicting guidance on specific con-
tingencies.
Third, program decisions are still not made
until the budget itself is completed. This occurs
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because there are too many opportunities for the
services to request that the program decisions
issued by OSD be reconsidered and because the
comptroller has become increasingly involved in
program issues. Theoretically, the programs should
be set by the end of the summer, prior to
submission of the budgets. But, because of the
generous reclama cycles, program decisions are still
open through the end of December. Theoretically,
the Comptroller's Office should confine its budget
review to technical areas, for example, the cost of
an XM-1 or an F-18. However, in recent years the
comptroller's review has reopened several program
areas during the budgetary cycle. For example, the
recommendation was made that F-14s be pur-
chased rather than F-18s.
As a result of these deficiencies, there has been
a great deal of confusion both at the headquarters
and field level. The policy maker or operator who
receives a JSOP I and JFM simultaneously cannot
but wonder why these two JCS documents
disagree. Similarly, the planner who compares the
guidance issued by OSD with that put forth by the
JCS is understandably confused about the
premises on which plans should be based. Finally,
the program managers within the services can
never by certain about the status of their
programs.
Fourth, although PPBS is an excellent device
for making a budget, it offers little assistance in
keeping control of the program elements after the
budget is formulated. Decision makers can
aggregate forces, manpower, and cost together in
making the budget. But all of the elements in the
program are not together when the budget is put
into execution. Congress appropriates money, not
by program, but by five separate accounts:
military personnel; operations and maintenance
(O&M); procurement; research, development, test,
and evaluation (RDT&E); and military con-
struction. Moreover, within each of these five
accounts there are numerous line items and
sub-line items which control the alloca(iion of
funds. In the FY 1975 budget there were 750 line
items in the DOD budget. The building blocks for
a particular program element may be in all five of
the accounts and in several different line or
sub-line items within each account.
Fifth, the JCS do not actually make any
independent or joint military recommendations
concerning the forces which can be procured
within the fiscal constraints. Their JFM is merely a
compilation of the POMs of the individual services.
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
Thus, the Secretary has no independent military
review of the programs of the separate services.
Sixth, the NSC initiatives were too short-lived.
During the first three years of the Nixon era,
approximately 130 NSDMs were issued. These
documents laid out reasonably specific guidance
on our national security policy. However, these
have not been updated to reflect changes in our
foreign policy which have occurred since 1972.
For example, the NSDMs do not reflect our new
relationship with China. Thus, the budgeters in the
Pentagon are once again in the position of making
their own foreign policy.
Similarly, the DPRC never worked as intended.
In its first year of operation the Committee
reviewed the defense budget after it had been
completed by the Pentagon, but before it went to
the President. This meant that DPRC has less than
two weeks to deal with the budget, hardly enough
time to fulfill its mandate. When the Committee
tried to become involved earlier in the DOD
budgetary process, it was rebuffed by Secretary
Laird, who perceived this as an attempt by
Kissinger to encroach upon his area of responsi-
bility. Thus DPRC could not have any substantive
impact on the defense budget. Eventually the
committee atrophied as its chairman became
personally involved in conducting several areas of
U.S. foreign policy.3 2
Conclusion
In the summer of 1977 the Department of
Defense will mark the 30th anniversary of its
unification. During the past three decades it has
made considerable progress in the manner in which
it produces its budgets. The manner in which
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld formulated
his FY 1978 budget is light years ahead of the
manner in which the first Secretary of Defense,
James Forrestal, grappled with the FY 1949
budget. This does not mean that the Pentagon has
reached the "synthesis" of its budgerary evolu-
tions. As this article has shown, there is still
considerable room for improvement in the manner
in which the Pentagon carries out this vital
function. Thus, there will most probably be
modifications as new Secretaries and Adminis-
tration tackle the problem of deciding "How Much
Is Enough." Whatever the future changes, the
experience of the past 30 years has demonstrated
that there are two primary constraints on the
process which will be operative no matter what
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NATIONAL SECURITY
form the defense budgetary evolution takes.
First, the budgetary process will be inherently
political. The ceilings on the budget will always be
affected by the political situation of the President.
There never will be any formula to determine the
size of the defense appropriation. Within a range
of about plus or minus 10 per cent, a particular
defense budget can support the same foreign
policy objectives. The final figure will be decided
by whether the President desires to have a
balanced budget like Truman and Eisenhower,
whether he chooses to use the defense budget to
stimulate the economy as did Presidents Kennedy
and Nixon, or whether, like Presidents Johnson
and Ford, he wishes to keep the entire federal
budget below a certain amount.33
Similarly, the disposition of funds within the
defense budget will always reflect the desires of
the subunits of DOD to maintain their organiza-
tional essence. Regardless of how much analysis is
done, it will be very difficult to dissuade the Army
from trying to increase the number of its combat
divisions, the Navy its aircraft carriers, or the Air
Force its manned bombers.34 The entire structure
of each of those services is predicated around
those entities. OSD can mute the desire for these
ABM
ASD
ASW
CNO
DOD
DPRC
FGM
FY
FYDP
GNP
ICBM
JCS
JFM
JSOP
MPM
NSC
NSDM
O&M
OMB
OSD
PCR
PDM
POM
PPBS
RDT&E
SGM
SLBM
TFX
Glossary of Terms
? Anti-Ballistic Missile
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Anti Submarine Warfare
? Chief of Naval Operations
Department of Defense
? Defense Program Review Committee
? Fiscal Guidance Memorandum
Fiscal Year
Five-Year Defense Plan
? Gross National Product
? Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
? Joint Chiefs of Staff
? Joint Forces Memorandum
Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
? Major Program Memorandum
? National Security Council
? National Security Decision Memorandum
? Operations and Maintenance
? Office of Management and Budget
Office of the Secretary of Defense
? Program Change Request
? Program Decision Memorandum
Program Objective Memorandum
Planning, Programming, Budgeting System
? Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation
Strategic Guidance Memorandum
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
? Tactical Fighter Experimental
345
systems somewhat, but it will not find it very easy
to eradicate them. Since DOD is too big to be run
by any one individual, the Secretary must delegate
some of the decision-making authority down to
the services and must rely on their services for
implementation of other decisions. The services
will use this authority to enhance their organiza-
tional essence.
Second, planning will remain almost irrelevant
for the budget process. Political leaders cannot be
expected to give very definitive guidance to the
military planners about how they will act in
specific contingencies, because they themselves are
not sure what they will do. By their very nature,
political leaders develop skill in keeping their
options open. Without this definitive guidance,
military leaders cannot be expected to develop
plans that are very relevant for budgetary process.
Even if the military did receive guidance from the
White House, the plans would not be of much
value because of their extended time horizon. The
JSOP I for FY 1978, which begins on October 1,
1977, was completed in May of 1975. At that
time, the JCS could not know who our President
would be, much less what our foreign policy
would be.
Notes
1. The Budget of the United States Government, Fis-
cal Year 1977, p. 34. Controllable expenditures are
those which can be increased or decreased without
changing substantive law.
2. Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Ma-
chinery, Organizing for National Security, 87th
Congress, 1st Session (October 16, 1961), pp. 4-5.
See also Charles Hitch, Decision Making for De-
fense (Berkley: University of California Press,
1970), pp. 3-20.
3. For an excellent analysis of the Truman budgeting
procedures see Warner Schilling, "The Politics of
National Defense: Fiscal 1950," in Warner Schilling
(ed.), Strategy, Politics, Defense Budgets (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 5-266.
4. The best sources on budgeting during the Eisen-
hower years are Glen Snyder, "The New Look of
1953," in Schilling; Edward Kolodziej, The Un-
common Defense and Congress (Columbus: Ohio
State University Press, 1966); Maxwell Taylor, The
Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper, 1959);
Matthew Ridgway, Soldier (New York: Harper,
1956); and Samuel Huntington, The Common
Defense (New York: Columbia University Press,
1961).
5. All budgetary figures are from the Budget of the
United States Government for the appropriate year.
6. The JSOP was first developed in 1955.
7. Taylor, pp. 82-83.
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8. Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is
Enough (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp.
92-93 and Hitch, p. 25.
9. Ridgway, p. 287.
10. Enthoven and Smith, p. 15.
11. The weaknesses of the budget process prior to
1961 are well summarized by Enthoven and Smith,
pp. 11-30; Taylor, pp. 82-123; Hitch, pp. 23-26.
12. There are numerous sources on the budgeting
procedures of the McNamara era. Among the best
are: Enthoven and Smith; John Crecine, Defense
Budgeting: Organizational Adaptation to External
Constraints (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, March
1960); William Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy
(New York: Harper, 1964); James Roherty, The
Decisions of Robert S. McNamara (Coral Gables;
Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1970); and
Lawrence Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The
First Twenty-Five Years (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1976).
13. McNamara divided the Defense Budget into 10
programs. These same program categories are still
used today.
14. Crecine, p. 41.
15. Interviews with four members of the JCS who
served under McNamara.
16. Interview with General George Decker, USA, Chief
of Staff, 1960-62.
17. Interview with Admiral David McDonald, USN,
Chief of Naval Operations, 1963-67.
18. U.S. Congress, Department of Defense Appropria-
tions Hearings for FY 1972, statement of Secretary
Laird, p. 1146.
19. Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign
Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institu-
tion, 1974), pp. 154-157.
20. Quoted in John Crecine, "Making Defense Bud-
gets," in Appendix K, Volume IV, Report of the
Commission on The Organization of the Govern-
ment for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (June
1975), p. 83.
21. This breakdown of PPBS is adapted from Werner
Hirsch, "Toward Federal Program Budgeting," Pub-
lic Administration Review, Vol. 26 (December
1966), pp. 260-262. See also Ralph Sanders, The
Politics of Defense Analysis (New York: Dunellen,
1973), and Clark Murdock, Defense Policy Formu-
lation (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1974).
22. Sensitivity analysis is a technique which involves
the repetition of an analysis with different values
for cost or performance assumptions. Its purpose is
to compare the effects of the substitution with the
results of the basic analysis. If a small change in an
assumption brings about a proportionately greater
change in the outcome, then the results are con-
sidered to be "sensitive" to that assumption. Con-
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
tingency analysis is a form of sensitivity analysis
which alters the environment of a decision situa-
tion by varying the relevant factors which describe
the environment. Its purpose is to determine the
effects of a change in the environment on the re-
sults of the basic analysis. A fortiori analysis de-
liberately biases the variables in favor of the altern-
atives to a choice which has been previously judged
as the best. If the best solution continues to re-
ceive a favorable comparison, in spite of the
weighted analysis, its position is strengthened.
23. Hanson Baldwin, "The McNamara Monarchy,"
Saturday Evening Post (March 9, 1963), p. 8. See
also Kaufmann, p. 90.
24. The advantages are summarized by Enthoven and
Smith, pp. 33-47.
25. Enthoven and Smith, p. 334. See also House Com-
mittee on Appropriations, Hearings on Department
of Defense Appropriations for FY 1971, Volume
III, pp. 480-481.
26. Crecine, p. 88. See also John Leacacos, "The
Nixon NSC: Kissinger's Apparat," Foreign Policy
(Winter 1971), pp. 2-24.
27. This prevents the services from shifting funds away
from a less glamorous area, e.g., Airlift.
28. George Mahon (D-Tex), chairman of the House
Appropriations Committee, forced Secretary of De-
fense Schlesinger to admit that there were funds in
the FY 1975 budget which had as their primary
purpose stimulating the economy. Press conference
of the Secretary of Defense, May 22, 1974.
29. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller).
30. A good example of this was the 50 per cent re-
duction in the number of ships by the Navy. This
program was initiated by the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions in order to transfer funds from maintenance
into procurement. Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, On
Watch (New York: Quadrangle, 1976), chap. 3.
31. The weaknesses were perceived by the author when
he participated in the process as a consultant to
the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the
1974-76 period.
32. In 1976, the DPRC was replaced by the Defense
Review Council under the chairmanship of the
Secretary of Defense. It confined its activities to
long-range questions.
33. Secretary Schlesinger's failure to heed this fact led
to his untimely firing. He refused to trim $7 billion
off of the proposed FY 1977 defense budget so
that President Ford could keep his election year
budget below $400 billion.
34. It has taken the Air Force over a decade to over-
come the opposition to a new manned bomber of
several Secretaries of Defense, service secretaries,
and analysts in OSD, and dozens of congressmen
and senators. But it has prevailed!
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NATIONAL SECURITY
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT
Albert G. Dancy, Systems Management Institute, University of Southern California
Presently the cost of research and development
(R&D) for new weapons systems and equipment
for national defense exceeds $12 billion annually,
exclusive of management and administrative costs
within the Department of Defense (DOD) and
costs of further development during the procure-
ment phase following initial R&D. This is expected
to grow to $16 billion annually in the next few
years and dwarfs in comparison the $1 billion
spent by General Motors in 1975, the largest R&D
expenditure to date of any private corporation in
the United States.
It was not always so. Prior to World War I,
R&D costs within the military were negligible. In
1940, just prior to the build-up for World War II,
they amounted to a scant $30 million annually.
That there is a tremendous price tag on the
development of today's weaponry is general
knowledge. The evolution of the present system of
management within DOD for R&D accompanying
this tremendous cost growth is not so well-known,
yet such knowledge is vital to an understanding of
the full extent of today's national defense
expenditures for R&D and of the present defense
research and development management environ-
ment.
This evolution took many twists and turns.
However, of the many changes within DOD in the
organization and methodology of R&D manage-
ment, there are eight that stand out above all the
others as the chief determinants of the present
DOD management system (see box). This article
traces both the growth of R&D for national
defense and the evolution of the present
management environment in relation to these
fundamental changes.
The Unique Nature and Background of
the Defense Acquisition Process
The most important participant in the defense
weapons and equipment acquisition process by far
is the government as buyer and user. As the sole
347
? This article traces both the growth of research and
development for national defense and the evolution of
its present management environment in relation to the
fundamental changes brought about by such growth.
The author details the unique nature and background
of the defense acquisition process, one in which the
most important participant, the government, has
constant control over the R & D process of a product.
However, such control is a relatively new procedure,
and three general periods in its development are
delineated.
Prior to World War II there was little R & D
coordination between the Army and Navy Depart-
ments, and a heavy reliance on commercial "ready
made" items for military use, as well as on foreign
weaponry. In the second period ? from 'NW II to the
early 1960s ? five fundamental changes are noted in
the R & D management environment, including the
centralized control of R & D and the separation of it
from procurement. During the third period, beginning
with the McNamara Secretaryship, three additional
modifications come about. But, it is concluded, it is
still too early to determine the effectiveness of these
new procedures.
buyer of a unique commodity, it first decides what
to buy and then implements this decision through
the continuous control of the R&D process and
the following procurement process. Although the
first decision as to what to buy is critical, the
implementation of this basic decision involves
many successive decisions over the long and
arduous process of development. The successful
end-product of this is a prototype representing
only an increased military potential, and results in
the need for even more time and more money to
Albert G. Dancy, Sr., is a consultant with the Planning
Research Corporation, McLean, Virginia, and is on the
faculty of the Systems Management Institute of the
University of Southern California. He has been an
instructor at the Defense Systems Management School,
and his status as a Registered Professional Engineer of
New York State has led him to such varied positions as
that of district engineer, Saudi, Arabia, District, U.S.
Corps of Engineers, and comptroller, The Engineer
Center.
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EVOLUTION OF DEFENSE R&D
MANAGEMENT SINCE WORLD WAR II
*Advent of extreme competition among the
three services
*Centralization of top-level control under
DOD
*Separation of R&D from procurement
*Establishment of Special Program Offices
*Introduction of the prime contractor
approach
*Implementation of PPBS
*Issuance of DOD Directive 5000.1
*Effects of increased congressional control
of R&D funding
procure these systems in quantity before an
increased military capability is achieved.
Prior to World War II, there was little formal
coordination of research and development activi-
ties between the War and Navy Departments.
Within these departments, management of R&D
was largely a matter left to the various specialist
branches and bureaus. There was no separate
congressional appropriation for R&D, and funding
was provided from the other military appropria-
tions, mainly the procurement appropriation.
The level of R&D effort was extremely low.
Most Navy R&D work was done in the Navy's
laboratories and ordnance testing stations under
the various Navy bureaus. These included the
Bureau of Ordnance, organized in 1842; the
Bureau of Aeronautics, organized in 1921; and the
Bureau of Ships, formed in 1940 through the
merger of the Bureau of Construction and Repair
and the Bureau of Steam Engineering. The Army's
R&D activities were conducted in arsenals, proving
grounds, and special laboratories under the various
technical services ? the Ordnance Corps, Chemical
Corps, Signal Corps, Corps of Engineers, and the
new Army Air Corps Material Division at Wright
Field.
There were other distinguishing characteristics
of this pre-World War II era. One was the heavy
reliance on commercial items for military use.
Most military needs could be obtained directly in
the civilian market with little or no modification.
If modifications were required, manufacturers
could provide prototypes for testing in military
arsenals and proving grounds. Another dis-
tinguishing characteristic was a very heavy reliance
on foreign weaponry. As a carry-over from World
War I, most of the Army's artillery guns and
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
howitzers were modifications of British or French
weapons. Many improvements of other types of
weapons and equipment also had their origin in
foreign military R&D.
Just prior to World War II, as a result of the
new technology displayed in German armaments,
there was a growing recognition of the increasing
role which science and technology would play in
U.S. weapons development. This recognition came
not from within the military but from the civilian
scientific and technological professions. As a
result, in 1940 the National Defense Research
Committee was formed and in 1941 it was
expanded into the Office of Scientific Research
and Development (OSRD) as a strictly civilian
agency with its own separate budget and with
authority to decide what military R&D efforts to
initiate. As later stated by Irvin Stewart, the first
deputy director of OSRD:
Modern science had progressed to the point where the
military chieftains were not sufficiently acquainted with
its possibilities to know for what they might ask with a
reasonable expectation that it could be developed. . .
what was needed was an organization which could
make its own assessment of what the Armed Services
needed and which could then, preferably with the
assistance of the services but over their opposition if
necessary, go about the business of getting the necessary
weapons developed.1
The OSRD achieved an outstanding record
during World War II in connection with develop-
ment of the atomic bomb, anti-aircraft gun
directors, microwave radar, the proximity fuse,
and many other new devices and systems.
However, after the war, with the return to
peacetime austerity, the OSRD was allowed to
disband, and military research and development,
with the exception of atomic energy, reverted
almost exclusively to the various Army and Navy
agencies and bureaus.
One issue that emerged with the military
build-up on the eve of World War II was whether
the coordination and top-level control of R&D and
procurement activities within the War and Navy
Departments should be the responsibility of
civilian or military officials. The proponents of
military control emphasized the close relationship
between military operations and the provision of
equipment and weapons for these operations.
Alternatively, consolidation of top-level direction
under civilian authority would give a broader
perspective and would be more in keeping with the
national policy of control of the military by
civilian authority. Despite this controversy, up to
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and including World War II, procurement and
R&D within the Army and Navy generally
remained a military function, leaving the question
of top-level control to be settled in the post-World
War II era.
Major Changes in R&D Management
Following World War II
In the evolution of the present defense R&D
management environment, the period between
World War II and the early 1960s was one of
tremendous growth and increasing importance.
Five fundamental changes mark this period:
1. Increased competition among the services.
2. Centralization of top-level control under
DOD.
3. Separation of R&D from procurement
within the services.
4. Establishment of the special program office.
5. Introduction of the prime contractor
approach.
If the period prior to World II can be
characterized as a period during which there was
little if any coordination and cooperation in R&D
matters between the Army and Navy, the period
immediately following World War II was one of
intense rivalry among the three military services ?
rivalry over limited defense resources for R&D,
over what to obtain with these resources, and over
which of the three should take the lead in
development of weapon systems of common
interest. Immediately following the war there was
the struggle between Air Force advocates of
long-range strategic bombing and Navy advocates
of the aircraft carrier. Later there was the conflict
over the emphasis placed on preparation for
massive retaliation at the expense of preparedness
for a limited war threat. There was also
competition for common-use physical resources.
As an example, there was particularly heavy
competition for use of the limited facilities at the
Cape Canaveral Missile Test Range. Similarly, there
was competition for the limited physical and
human resources of specific defense-oriented
industrial firms and for critical civilian expertise
within DOD.
The most heated interservice rivalries, however,
concerned competition for priority in developing
and operating weapons which were quite similar if
not identical in nature. Fundamental changes in
weapons technology had made traditional roles
and missions distinctions obsolete. For example,
349
the ballistic missile was considered by the Army as
an extension to long-range artillery, by the Navy as
an extension to the Navy's big guns and attack
aircraft, and by the Air Force as a supplement to
strategic manned bombers. This led to the
Thor-Jupiter-Polaris competition. Likewise, there
was much rivalry concerning whether the Army or
Air Force was to develop surface-to-air guided
missiles, as these missiles filled both the Army's
antiaircraft artillery mission and the Air Force's
manned interceptor mission. This resulted in the
Nike Hercules-Bomarc conflict of 1958-59.
With the centralization of top-level control
under DOD, and the advent of the planning,
programming, budgeting system (PPBS), these
conflicts were generally resolved in favor of one of
the services over the others. However, this solution
did not always reduce bitterness nor the wasteful
duplicate use of resources. In a further attempt to
reduce interservice rivalry in weapons develop-
ment, the concept of a "lead service" in
development of specific systems was put into
effect wherein the service deemed to be the
primary user was given the role of leadership in
coordinating and, to a degree, in controlling
developmental effort. However, despite these
efforts, rivalry among the services still persists
today.
Centralization of Top-Level Control under DOD
In the first major reorganization action after
World War II, Congress passed the National
Security Act of 1947, which established the Air
Force as an independent organizational entity
under DOD and created the National Defense
Establishment under the Secretary of Defense as a
central coordinating agency for what was in effect
a federation of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.2
Coordination in military procurement matters was
implemented through the Munitions Board, and
for military R&D through the Joint Research and
Development Board. Consolidation of centralized
power under the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) came later in 1949 when the 81st
Congress passed Public Law 216 which created the
Department of Defense to replace the National
Defense Establishment.3 In 1958 Congress passed
Public Law 599, and centralized control by DOD
was further strengthened.4
Centralization of R&D took place initially in
1950 when the Secretary of Defense appointed a
director of guided missiles who assumed broad
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responsibilities over guided missile development
and production throughout DOD. In 1953 both
the Munitions Board and the Joint Research and
Development Board were abolished and their
functions transferred to the new Assistant
Secretaries of Defense for Supply and Logistics
and for Research and Development. Centralized
DOD control over R&D increased even further in
1958 with the establishment of a new and more
powerful position directly under the Secretary of
Defense ? the director of defense research and
engineering (DDR&E). In addition, Congress
created the Advanced Research Projects Agency
(ARPA) which involved the OSD directly in
implementation of major systems R&D within the
three services. Both the DDR&E and ARPA exist
today as centralized R&D control and coordi-
nating agencies of DOD.
At the same time that this centralization of
top-level control was taking place, there was also
an opposing trend from DOD for research and
development in the two new semi-military fields of
technology which originated during the war. These
were the fields of nuclear energy and space
technology. The Atomic Energy Commission was
established in 1946 as an independent agency
concerned not only with the development of
atomic weapons but also with the application of
atomic energy for commercial uses. Similarly, the
National Aeronautics and Space Agency was
established as an independent agency to conduct
research and development in military as well as
civilian uses of space and aeronautics. Both of
these agencies received the major portion of their
initial resources from within the military and both
continued to perform the mission of developing
military applications in their respective fields of
technology. Yet from this time on, top-level
control of these two important segments of
military R&D passed from the military into the
hands of independent agencies.
Segregation of R&D from Procurement Activities
Another significant milestone during the period
immediately following WWII was the separation of
R&D activities from their parent procurement
agencies for R&D with independent budgets and
programming. In 1946 the Office of Naval
Research was organized within the Navy to
monitor all basic and applied research, and in 1950
the Air Research and Development Command (the
forerunner of the present Air Systems Command)
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was established within the Air Force with a similar
mission. Although development functions, as
contrasted with basic and applied research,
initially remained with the production and
procurement organizations, there was a gradual
separation of these functions also. All three
services designated top-level civilian assistant
secretaries and military deputy chiefs of staffs who
were expressly responsible for both R&D program
coordination and the formulation of R&D policy.
With the separation of R&D from other
procurement activities, there was a concerted
effort made to improve R&D budgeting and fiscal
control. In the early 1950s the Army's R&D
appropriation was narrowly defined, with large
amounts of financial support provided from the
Procurement of Equipment and Missiles, Army
(PEMA) appropriation. By 1958, however, both
R&D and PEMA support for research and
development were combined, and the single
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
(RDT&E) appropriation was introduced for all
three services. R&D thus became a separate entity,
fulfilling the express requirement of developing for
the military establishment equipment and weapons
for which there was no commercial counterpart
and responsible for its own programming and
budgeting.
Establishment of the Special Program Office
In the evolution of the present environment of
Defense R&D, no event has had a greater influence
than the establishment of separate special program
or project offices (SPOs) for major development
programs. These SPOs integrate the many diverse
functional and technical areas of a particular
weapon system or equipment acquisition program
under a single organizational and control structure.
The concept of a separate program office did not
originate within the military. Program offices had
been widely used in industry when large complex
development and marketing programs were under-
taken with the matrix system of organization. This
procedure has also been used effectively in Russia
where an extreme form of "projectizing" is
employed for weapons development.
As first introduced within DOD, the program
office served both as a central authority for
identifying and resolving interfunctional conflicts
and as a communications center for ensuring that
each of the interrelated parts of the program was
coordinated with the others. Within the three
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services, the SPO originally took on several forms,
depending largely upon the amount of authority
granted the program manager and the location of
the program office within the organizational
hierarchy. The most common form of SPO was a
project group constituting a single weapons
program within an agency like the Air Force
Systems Command or the Army's Rocket and
Guided Missile Agency. The following describes an
Air Force office during this early period:
The typical special program office is set up for a single
weapon system such as the F-105 fighter-bomber or
the Skybolt air-launched ballistic missile. Within the
group are technical specialists on airframes, propulsion,
guidance, control, flight testing, contracts, program
phasing, production engineering, maintenance, and field
support, all under the direction of a System Program
Director. . . . These specialists are assigned full-time to the
project office, working on behalf of the program
director. . . . The project office Chief's job is best
described as one of coordination. Generally, he has no de
jure authority to resolve interfunctional disagreements by
issuing orders to functional groups outside his office. He
can persuade, but if a serious difference of opinion exists,
the matter must be passed out of the project office and
up the military chain of command for decision. .
However, the project director may in practice have
considerable de facto authority, depending upon his
personal effectiveness in reconciling diverse view-points.5
Since difficult questions could not be settled
within the SPOs as initially conceived, there was
considerable agitation to increase the authority of
program managers. Higher-ranking officers were
assigned to these positions, program offices were
placed higher in the command hierarchy, and
other measures were taken to increase authority of
the SPO. However, it was not until the 1970s
under Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and his
deputy, David Packard, that this problem was
resolved.
Establishment of the Prime Contractor Approach
During this early period following WWII, one
final development in R&D management of
considerable importance today was the prime
contractor approach, under which one principal
contractor was selected to integrate the various
subsystems comprising the entire system. The
prime contractor in turn subcontracted specific
segments of the developmental work to other
contractors. Each subsystem supplier thus became
a subcontractor to the system prime contractor.
This procedure shifted responsibility for contract
management of subsystem integration from the
351
SPO to the prime contractor. It also enhanced
development within the defense-oriented firms of
the special program office-type of organization for
management of defense R&D contracts.
From the Implementation of PPBS to the Present
The evolution of the present system of
management control of R&D of major defense
systems from the early 1960s, when Robert
McNamara took office as Secretary of Defense, to
the present can be characterized by adoption of
new policies for decision making with the DOD
and the three services, by refinements in the
system of selection and control of individual
programs, and by increasing interest and control of
defense R&D by Congress. Several principal events
stand out in this period:
1. The implementation of the planning, program-
ming, and budgeting system (PPBS) in the DOD.
2. The issuance of DOD Directive 5000.1,
"Acquisition of Major Defense Systems," by
Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard.
3. The limitations imposed by Congress in the FY
1972 Defense Authorization (bill and subsequent
legislation).
The advent of PPBS has had by far the greatest
impact on management control within the
Department of Defense since the unification of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force. In describing the
political and historical background of PPBS,
Lawrence Korb stated:
. .. when Robert McNamara accepted Kennedy's offer to
become the eighth Secretary of Defense, he persuaded the
President-elect to postpone the subject of reorganization
of DOD until he (McNamara) could assess the situation
personally. Nevertheless, Kennedy gave McNamara two
objectives: first, develop the military structure required
for a firm foundation for our foreign policy without
regard to budget ceilings; second, operate this force at the
lowest possible price.
Armed only with these two directives and without ben-
efit of any new legislation, McNamara made so many
changes, both formal and informal, organizational and
procedural, that he brought about not just a reorganization,
but a revolution in DOD. Nowhere was this revolution more
accurately felt than in the budget process where the
Secretary of Defense introduced the Planning-
Programming-Budgeting System. . . .6
The conceptual background for PPBS began
earlier, however, in 1960 when two economists,
Hitch and McKean, building on earlier studies by
David Novick, published The Economics of
Defense in the Nuclear Age.' The thesis of this
book was that DOD management is really a matter
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of economic trade-offs to maximize benefits from
limited resources, and that to derive the optimum
from these resources, defense strategic planning
must be linked with sound financial management.
During the years prior to PPBS, financial
management and military planning were accom-
plished separately. Each had been treated as
independent activities: management under the
comptroller, and planning under the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the planning organizations of the
three services. Military planning was in terms of
outputs: military forces and major weapons
systems and equipment projected over periods of
five, ten, or even 20 years. Alternatively,
budgeting was in terms of inputs: organized
financial categories acceptable to the Congress in
an approved annual budget format. It was quite
apparent that planning and budgeting were
completely separate and independent activities. As
stated by Main C. Enthoven, Assistant Secretary
of Defense under McNamara:
It was to bridge the gap between these two functions
[of military planning and financial budgeting] that we
installed the "programming" system. By linking military
planning and budgeting in a unified planning-
programming-budgeting decision making process, we were
able to produce a single departmentwide blueprint for the
future known as the "Five Year Force Structure and
Financial Program." This program projects not only the
military forces needed to meet the requirements of our
long-range military plans but also the personnel,
equipment, supplies and installations required to support
them... .8
In addition, prior to PPBS, there was no
organized procedure by which tradeoffs among the
various alternative programs could be made. The
JCS and the service chiefs periodically made
presentations of recommended programs to the
Secretary of Defense. These would ultimately have
to be accepted or rejected in the light of available
funding. As stated by the former Assistant
Secretary of Defense, Systems Analysis, before a
Senate committee in May 1966:
Although Systems Analysis is a reasonable and
straightforward concept, it was not an easy one to
implement in the Department of Defense. In conducting a
sound cost-effectiveness study you must be able to
associate both the benefits and costs with the alternatives
to be examined. The Defense management system as it
existed five years ago did not permit this.9
Assistant Secretary Hitch, defense comptroller,
describing the problems encountered by the
Secretary of Defense resulting from the lack of an
organized trade-off procedure among alternative
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
programs, stated as follows:
In 1961, the chief, in fact the Secretary's only
systematic and comprehensive vehicle for the allocation
of resources in the Defense Department, was the annual
budget. For the task which it was being asked to perform,
it was deficient in several respects. The budget focused on
the financial problems of a single upcoming fiscal year,
thereby discouraging adequate consideration of decisions
whose near term dollar impact was slight but whose
impact in later years was very large. . . .10
PPBS affected the defense research and
development process in two principal areas. The
first of these was in the establishment of what has
been termed the "systems analysis approach" to
individual program selection. PPBS in this sense
could be viewed as a methodology and a
conceptual scheme for optimizing the use of
available resources in reaching a particular military
objective or capability. Bernard H. Rudwick lists
six key management questions that must be
answered in formulating decisions concerning
particular acquisition projects under PPBS:
1. What is the system objective?
2. When will the proposed system be operationally
available?
3. How well does the proposed system meet the
objective?
4. How much will it cost to implement the system?
5. Is this the best way of meeting the objective?
6. What are the risks and uncertainties involved in
obtaining the stated system performance on schedule
and at the estimated cost ... ?II
Under PPBS systems analysis gives the decision
maker a visualization not only of program costs
but also of the alternative methods of accomplish-
ing the military objective. To the individual
program manager this means that the program, to
be selected, must prove itself to be the best
alternative. The program must thereafter remain
viable throughout the various stages of program
development not only with respect to fulfilling its
own particular objective but also in comparison
with the other developmental programs in
attaining various military capabilities requiring
R&D effort.
Another major impact of PPBS on the defense
systems acquisition process was in the integration
of a particular systems development with its life
cycle of operational use in terms of budgeting,
scheduling, and operational performance. As a
program element or sub-element in the Five-Year
Defense Program (FYDP), each system under
development held a unique position in terms of
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future defense operational capability. Integral
planning elements included projected cumulative
development costs, follow-on procurement and
system operational costs, and the military
operational capability of the system. At every
milestone event in the R&D of a system, its
progress was evaluated by the Defense Systems
Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) in terms of
overall contribution to the future defense posture.
However, despite the many advantages to R&D
management resulting from the initial implemen-
tation of PPBS, there were also several justifiable
criticisms. These included the increased central-
ization of authority for decision making under the
Secretary of Defense and his immediate staff
within the DOD, the downgrading of professional
experience and judgment of military experts
within the three services, and the sheer impossi-
bility of attempting to fit decisions on specific
development programs into the time constraints of
an annual review cycle. These disadvantages were
to a large extent later eliminated by Secretary of
Defense Melvin Laird and his deputy, David
Packard.
The Issuance of DOD Directive 5000.1
As one of the most recent major statements of
R&D management policy, DOD Directive 5000.1,
"Acquisition of Major Defense Systems,"1 2 has
had a far-reaching effect on the conduct of the
development of major defense systems. This
directive, prepared under the direction of Deputy
Secretary of Defense David Packard, established
new and in some respects revolutionary manage-
ment principles for defense R&D. Its main thrust
was to provide more decision-making authority at
the lower levels of management and to reduce the
layers of authority above program managers.
Packard emphasized that the successful develop-
ment of weapons systems is primarily dependent
on three ingredients: competent people, rational
priorities, and fully defined responsibilities. As
stated in the directive . .. "responsibility and
authority for the acquisition of major Defense
systems shall be decentralized to the maximum
practical extent consistent with the urgency and
importance of each program."1 3 New policies
which corrected other serious defects in the
acquisition process included the following require-
ments:
1. That each service designate a single indivi-
dual responsible for each major program and that
353
he be given both the resources and authority
necessary to carry out his mission;
2. To establish cost as a design parameter and
give it an importance equal to that of technical
performance and schedule performance;
3. To consider all system operational life cycle
costs as design parameters;
4. That the system must be stated in
operational terms and challenged throughout the
acquisition process;
5. That technical uncertainty be continually
assessed and that test and evaluation be started as
early as possible and continued throughout the
entire program development.
Under this directive, the three services were
given the responsibility of identifying their needs
for new systems and for the development and
follow-on-production of these systems through
their designated program managers. In turn, OSD
was given responsibility for establishing the initial
acquisition authority and for review of programs
at the completion of specific stages of develop-
ment and at other times where cost overruns,
schedule slippage, or performance shortfalls had
reached predetermined danger points.
Effects of Increasing Congressional Control
Thus far this article has been concerned
primarily with the evolution of defense R&D
management resulting principally from changes
generated within the services and DOD. For most
of the period following World War II, con-
gressional interest and influence in the manage-
ment of defense R&D was at a minimum. In the
rare instance when Congress did exert its
influence, it was done through the annual
appropriation process. One authoritative assess-
ment of congressional influence as late as 1962 is
as follows:
Of course, Congress also plays a role in the weapons
program process, although it is not nearly as active a role
as is commonly supposed. For example, during the 1950's
Congress appropriated all or nearly all of the military
research and development funds requested by the
Executive Branch, and the few congressional cuts which
were made were much smaller than cuts made by the
Secretary of Defense and the Budget Bureau in service
requests.14
However, with the separation of R&D funding
from the procurement appropriation and the
increased costs of development of new weapons
systems there was an increased interest by
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Congress to assert its influence. Senator John
Stennis, former chairman of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, very pointedly voiced the
congressional concern over the rising costs of new
weapons when he stated in 1971:
If we can afford a permanent force structure of only
one-fifth as many fighter aircraft or tanks as our potential
adversaries ? because our systems are about five times as
expensive as theirs ? then a future crisis may find us at a
sharp numerical disadvantage.1 5
In the Senate Armed Services Committee report
on the FY 1972 authorization of the Safeguard
anti-ballistic missile system, the warning was
given that "the multiplying cost of weapons
system development and procurement is reaching
such prohibitive levels that the country may be
unable to afford some of the most vital weapons
systems.""
Not only were the programmed costs of
development of new systems far in excess of costs
of previous systems; there was also a sizable cost
growth experienced by these new systems during
the development stages. Data contained in a 1973
General Accounting Office (GAO) report showed
that the increased costs of development of the 45
most costly systems under development on June
30, 1972, amounted to $31.5 billion, or 39 per
cent of the original estimated costs of develop-
ment of these systems.' 7
Concern was also mounting in Congress, as
well as DOD, that notwithstanding these increased
costs of development, some of the larger and more
glamorous systems were not performing as well as
expected. As stated in 1970 by Assistant Secretary
of Defense David Packard in an address before the
Armed Forces Management Association dinner
concerning these new systems: "The Defense
Department has been led down the garden path for
years on sophisticated systems." 18 The initial
problems with the F-111 in Vietnam is mute
testimony to this statement. The C-5A is another
example of an expensive, sophisticated system
which has not performed as well as originally
planned, particularly in its designated rough
terrain capability.
Congress controls funding for defense R&D
principally through the separate but interrelated
functions of authorization, appropriation, and
expenditure review. Historically, only a portion of
the DOD budget requires annual authorization by
the Senate and House Armed Services Committees.
Authorization for operations and maintenance and
part of procurement requirements are made solely
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on the basis of a continuing resolution. However,
in 1959 budget review of the Armed Services
Committees was increased to require prior
authorization before appropriation for procure-
ment of aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels. This
law was amended in 1962 to require similar
authorization for R&D of these three categories of
procurement and in 1963 to require annual
authorization for the entire RDT&E appropria-
tion. As a result of the Budget and Impoundment
Act of 1974,19 additional review is now required
by the Senate and House Budget Committees.
In the Fiscal Year 1972 Defense Authorization
Bil1,29 the Senate imposed two restrictions on the
funding for defense research and development
(R&D) that were to have extremely important
consequences:
1. Funds appropriated by the Congress must
be obligated not later than the end of the fiscal
year following the year for which appropriated.
2. Research and development work to be
accomplished by the services under contract or
in-house must be programmed on an annual basis,
and budgets submitted to the Congress must be in
work increments designed to be accomplished
within a twelve-month period. This period was
generally to coincide with the annual budget cycle.
The first of these restrictions reduced defense
R&D funding from what was essentially a no-year
cycle to a two-year cycle. It also required the
immediate obligation of approximately $1 billion
in as yet unobligated funds appropriated in FY
1972 and preceding years. The second restriction
required that DOD in the future ask Congress for
only those funds necessary for utilization during
the coming appropriation year. Through these
restrictions Congress could better review past
accomplishments on specific programs annually
and provide for continued development of these
programs through the following year. This would
thus add impetus to the annual review cycle of
defense research and development desired by
Congress.
Although the above restrictions were not
altogether inconsistant with previous congressional
requirements for R&D, they did represent a
quantum jump in increased congressional interest
and control of defense spending.
There can be no doubt but that the basic intent
of Congress at this time was to gain better control
over the acquisition process of major defense
systems. It was on the larger programs ? those
included under the Systems Acquisition Report
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(SAR) ? that Congress had focused its interest.
Specifically, the stated purpose was to reduce
major systems development costs by enhancing the
annual congressional review process on these
systems and by requiring annual incremental
budget submissions. Congress wanted to keep
closer tabs on development progress and to cancel
poorly achieved programs as early as possible in
the development cycle. The providing of funds to
DOD for these programs for use in future years
and the build-up within DOD of appropriated yet
unobligated funds precluded this control; hence,
these practices had to be eliminated. Other
purposes of apparent lesser importance were to
reduce overall defense costs, to provide funds for
the other, more politically popular, social
programs, and to instill within DOD and
particularly the major program offices better
financial accountability and responsibility.
As to the long-term effects of these restrictions,
there is no assurance that they will have in the
future either a beneficial or a harmful effect
within DOD in terms of planning for future
research and development or in actual program
development operations. It would appear from the
opinions expressed during discussions that the
flexibility of planning and operations might, in
fact, over the long run be somewhat enhanced
within the SPOs and the lower echelons of the
hierarchy above the SPOs within the services. This
would be especially true of the newer programs
where funding was on a more current basis at the
time of these restrictions. In the higher echelons of
R&D management and control within the services
and at the DOD level, flexibility of planning and
operations over the long run will be somewhat
lessened. This results primarily because the
Congress by these restrictions has taken over a
considerable amount of top-level managerial
responsibility previously held at these higher
levels. There is also the problem facing DOD of
coordinating the annual program review cycle
required by Congress and the program milestone
accomplishment review required by the Defense
Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC).
These two reviews do not come at the same time
nor cover the same aspects of program progress,
yet continued program development depends on
their close coordination.
Subsequent to the FY 72 restrictions, the
Congress has continued to strengthen its control
over the management of defense R&D, the most
notable recent legislation being the Budget and
355
Impoundment Act of 1974.21 Whereas the former
restrictions were directed specifically at the
management of R&D programs within DOD, the
latter provided sweeping changes across the board
for all federal agencies.
Salient features of the 1974 Act with their
impact to date on defense R&D are as follows:
1. Establishment of a starting date of October
1 for the new fiscal year with the stipulation that
all appropriation bills would be enacted by this
date, thus eliminating the requirement for
continuing resolutions to bridge the gap between
the start of a new fiscal year and appropriations
for this year.
2. Establishment of the Congressional Budget
Office and new Budget Committees for both the
Senate and House. Although this should result in
more coordinated annual funding for all federal
agencies, it also requires hearings before these new
committees on funding requests in addition to the
Authorization and Appropriation Committees of
the Senate and House.
3. Prohibition of impoundment of appropria-
ted funds by the President except in certain
specified instances agreed upon by Congress, and
preclusion of the administrative withholding of
funds within the hierarchy of the executive
agencies.
4. Requirement that all requests for authoriza-
tion of new programs be submitted 161/2 months
prior to appropriation of funds and that programs
of more than one year's duration specify funding
required for the first two years of the program.
This, together with the additional time between
the formulation of the executive budget and the
new fiscal year, requires a considerable stretch-out
of the PPBS and FYDP calendars of events for
development programs for new systems.
5. Requirement that commencing in FY 1979,
budget requests be structured by priority in terms
of functions and subfunctions. This will require
submission of funding in rank order for new and
existing programs. It will probably also mean, at
long last, Congress will accept budget requests in
the PPSB format utilized within DOD.
The changeover to the new fiscal year has just
been accomplished. As yet it is too early to
determine the many problems that will be
encountered over the years as a result of this new
legislation or the advantages and disadvantages
that will result to the management of defense
R&D.
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Notes
1. Irvin Stewart, Organizaing Scientific Research for
War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1948), p. 6.
2. U.S. Congress, House, National Security Act of 1947,
PL 80-253, 80th Congress, 1st Session, 61 Stat. 495,
1947.
3. U.S. Congress, House, National Security Act of 1949,
PL 81-216, 81st Congress, 1st Session, 63 Stat. 578,
1949.
4. U.S. Congress, House, Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1958, PL 85-599, 85th
Congress, 2d Session, 72 Stat. 514, 1958.
5. "USAF Decentralizes Management of Weapon Sys-
tems Development," Aviation Week (September 26,
1960), p. 31.
6. Lawrence J. Korb, "The Secretary of Defense and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff," Naval War College Review
(December 1971), p. 30.
7. Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The
Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, RAND
Paper P-1462 (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation,
1960).
8. Main C. Enthoven, The Systems Analysis Approach,
presentation prepared for the Special Subcommittee
on the Utilization of Scientific Manpower, Senate
Labor and Public Welfare Committee, 86th Congress,
2d Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, May 17, 1966), reprinted in Henricks
and Taylor, Program Budgeting and Benefit-Cost
Analysis (Pacific Palisades, Calif.: Goodyear Pub-
lishing Co., Inc., 1969), p. 164.
Bureaucrats,
Politicians, and
Peasants in Mexico
A Case Study in Public Policy
Merilee Serrill Grindle
Grindle analyzes the activities of one im-
portant federal agency as its officials
planned and pursued a new policy for
rural development under the Echeverria
administration (1970-1976). The study
yields valuable insights into policy for-
mation?how national priorities are de-
termined, how support for new policies is
mobilized, to what extent personal alli-
ances among bureaucrats, politicians,
and constituents shape the content and
implementation of public policy.
239 pages, 34 tables, 13 figures, $12.50
At bookstores
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
9. Ibid., p. 164.
10. Samual A. Tucker (ed.), A Modern Design for
Defense Decision ? A McNamara-Hitch-Enthoven
Anthology (Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of
the Armed Forces, 1966).
11. Bernard H. Rudwick, Systems Analysis for Effective
Planning: Principles and Cases (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1969), p. 6.
12. U.S. Department of Defense, Acquisitions of Major
Systems, DOD Directive 5000.1 (July 13, 1971).
13. Ibid., p. 1.
14. Peck and Sherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process:
An Economic Analysis (Boston: Harvard University
Press, 1962), p. 76.
15. U.S. Congress, Senate, Authorization for Appropria-
tions for Fiscal Year 1972 for Military Procurement,
Research and Development and for Other Purposes,
p. 17.
16. Ibid., p.9.
17. U.S. General Accounting Office, Cost Growth in
Major Weapons Systems (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
General Accounting Office, March 28, 1973), p. 64.
18. David Packard, Address to the Armed Forces
Management Association Dinner, Los Angeles,
August 20, 1970 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense).
19. U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, PL 93-344, 93d
Congress, 1st Session, H.R. 7130, 1974.
20. U.S. Congress, Senate, Authorization.
21. U.S. Congress, House, Budget and Impoundment
Control Act.
The Politics of
Efficiency
Municipal Administration and
Reform in America, 1880-1920
Martin J. Schiesl
The late nineteenth and early twentieth
century marked the fundamental reor-
ganization of municipal administration
and the creation of a new system of pub-
lic decision making. Schiesl examines the
content and character of American urban
political reform in these years, focusing
on the impact of efficiency upon govern-
mental operations and services. The self-
conscious municipal reformers of that
era looked for rational and innovative
solutions to political, social and economic
problems in the cities. How well they
succeeded and what this has meant to the
governing of American cities to this day
is carefully chronicled in this book.
312 pages, $11.75
6, URIVERSITY OP CAUPORRIA PRESS
BERHElEY 94720
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NATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY ORGANIZATION IN AMERICAN
SECURITY AFFAIRS: AN ASSESSMENT
Barry H. Steiner, California State University, Long Beach
National security policy, like all foreign policy,
is a matter of reconciling necessary behaviors with
resources that are available to support them. This
article is about one kind of resource to support
national security objectives: the policy organiza-
tion of states, which defines what national
objectives are necessary, distinguishes alternative
uses of capabilities to attain them, decides among
these alternatives, and then implements the actions
decided upon.
Policy organization, as Klaus Knorr has pointed
out, can be an element of a state's power in its
own right, insofar as it makes more effective
whatever levels of other human or nonhuman
resource strengths that state possesses at the
moment.' Like those other forms of capability,
security objectives are enhanced for a given
purpose when capabilities are increased, or,
conversely, when limitations upon mobilizing
putative capabilities are reduced. A well-developed
structure of policy making can substitute in part,
although not completely, for weaknesses in other
forms of national security capability. At the same
time, policy organization has its own sources of
inevitable limitations, one being that the inevitable
narrowing of choice in decision making may
exclude some potentially useful courses of action.
The major interest here is in how policy
organization can be, and is, refined to widen the
net of pertinent information and options for state
behavior brought to the attention of national
leaders for decision, and to enhance generally the
preconditions of national achievement.
Special attention will be given in what follows
to changes in the organization and forms of policy
making as they have developed in the United
States over the last 30 years, a focus that can have
at least two important wider applications. First,
recent American experience offers one of the best
illustrations of how major emphasis can be given
over a lengthy period of time to elaborating upon
and improving the policy-making process in
national security affairs. Second, the scope of
these changes has been so large in relation to
comparable developments in nonsecurity policy
357
? This article is concerned with the ability of the U.S.
policy organization to support national security
objectives and how to improve that ability. Special
attention is given to the development of this
organization and to forms of policy making over the
last 30 years.
The author outlines five major ways in which
national security policy making affects American
security interests and evaluates their effectiveness. The
article then proceeds with a survey of policy making
since World War II, focusing on the National Security
Council and its development.
Organizational politics will always play a large role
in national security decision making, the author
concludes. Further, the five noted criteria have been
unequally served. We must determine not only
whether organizational elaboration is an effective
response to national security problems, but also
whether these national security policy-making organi-
zations themselves fulfill the purposes for which they
were created.
areas as to suggest the primacy of substantive
concerns in national security over other major
concerns of the American national government.
Uses of Policy Organization
We may distinguish at the outset at least five
uses of policy organization (by which we refer to
authoritative leaders, their immediate staffs, and
the departments over which they have responsi-
bility). First, it can enhance national authority and
leadership, additionally in a democracy providing a
central mechanism for public definition and
popular understanding of issues. Second, it can
supply continuity in the making of decisions by
adapting decisions in advance to several different
and plausible environments. Third, it can be a
Barry H. Steiner, is an associate professor of political
science at California State University, Long Beach. He has
devoted much of the past two years to research on the
comparative study of armaments competition while on
leave from his regular appointment, to which he has now
returned. During that time he has served as a visiting
scholar in residence at Columbia University, Institute of
War and Peace Studies, and he has held a Warburg
Fellowship.
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358
means of realizing consensus on policy matters by
responsible officials who may often approach
issues in different ways. Fourth, it can supply
administrative guidance and direction to specific
national efforts in the security field. And finally, it
can encourage thorough debate about alternatives
prior to the making of decisions. While these uses
of policy-making structure can apply to any major
set of policy undertakings, the following discusses
each of them in a national security context.
The argument for strengthening the national
government in security affairs, despite the
American tradition of democracy and division of
governmental powers, rests on the perceived need
to be prepared for energetic, forceful action to
cope with extraordinary needs.2 Following the
Second World War, the United States came to
engage far more heavily than before in peacetime
commitments abroad, particularly in Europe, and
these commitments transformed the American
security position by multiplying the number of
situations that would bring American involvement
in war. Adding to the transformation was the
Soviet Union's development of an atomic weapons
capability, which brought about for the first time
the vulnerability to major attack of the con-
tinental territory of the United States. Under-
standably, the more amibitious the security
objectives of a nation, and the more vulnerable the
security position of that nation, the more
important and central becomes the fundamental
vitality of its government. Such vitality can enable
it to avoid paralysis even in the face of threats that
might appear paralyzing to many.
Continuity in the making of decisions becomes
a security issue insofar as the conditions in which
policy decisions take effect are constantly
changing. Conditions change even where policy
remains the same, and even small changes in these
conditions may sharply lessen the usefulness of
security behaviors. Since there are political and
temporal limits to the frequency with which
policy decisions can in practice be reopened (one
political limit being the vested interests those
entrusted with carrying out the policy have to
continue that policy, even in the face of
unanticipated obstacles), policy decisions need to
be made adaptable in advance to important trends
and shifts in the operational environment, instead
of otherwise being rendered outmoded or obsolete
by such changes. Moreover, many of the trends
and shifts that matter for security policy will not
be foreseen, so that it is prudent for states to allow
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
for surprise events as well in their planning.
Policy can and often is revised in time of crisis,
but there are limits to what can be usefully
accomplished through crisis responses. Crises often
bring rapid decision making, improvised actions to
perceived threats, and shortsighted objectives; in
an age of nuclear weapons, it is prudent to see
what can be done in a less-emotion-charged
atmosphere to make policy relatively independent
of crisis occurrence. However, it is usually only in
crisis where there is widespread agreement that
prevailing policy has serious shortcomings and
needs to be reevaluated. Ways are needed to
reopen policy decisions prior to the time that
crises point the way to shortsighted shifts in
behavior.
Divergent points of view of individuals and
institutions in national security matters are, as
elsewhere, the product of dissimilar precon-
ceptions, perceptions, and judgments of indivi-
duals and their different institutional responsi-
bilities and roles, but these divergences are often
stronger and deeper for being the bases of
disagreements over "core" value concerns (e.g.,
survival and status) which participating policy
makers feel so strongly about. Each individual
in policy process tends to take a self-inter-
ested view of the issues, setting forward
his/her personal view in the name of the interest of
the entire nation.3 Certainly at the highest
authoritative levels of the American government,
national defense matters in the nuclear age have
not been viewed as routine matters; their alleged
special importance has been an especially powerful
motive in bringing individuals to get involved over
them. Yet, as important as they may actually be,
there is no provision in the policy process for
imposing some solution over them from some
source holding special formal powers. Instead,
with effective power over decisions dispersed, and
with disagreements persisting, the "strain toward
agreement" in national security decision making
has produced substantive decisions that, at worst,
have been provisional, partial, superficial, and
compromised.4 Easing this "strain toward agree-
ment," especially at the most responsible levels of
government, is a major need of policy organization
in national security affairs, even as differences
between participating individuals will persist.
A fourth way in which national security policy
making affects American security interests is by
supplying administrative guidance and direction to
specific defense efforts. This function has been
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NATIONAL SECURITY
particularly important for the United States in
coping with long-term conflict with the Soviet
Union, as well as in finding enough accommoda-
tion to avoid nuclear war; these two interests have
rendered necessary unusually sensitive coordina-
tion of diplomatic initiatives designed to prevent
war, military deployments designed to prepare for
that same eventuality, and intelligence-gathering
and evaulation operations. If anything, nuclear
weapons have led to ever more delicate refine-
ments in simultaneous diplomatic, military, and
intelligence activity in recent years, because of the
realization that there are many ways in which an
undesired war might begin, and many ways in
which a nation might be unprepared for a war that
it might decide upon. In addition, for the first
time, the scale of American defense preparations
has not been commensurate with the scope of
eventualities envisaged. Unlike the First and
Second World Wars, when the United States
fought an "all-out" or unlimited war with the aid
of virtually unlimited resources, in the post-war
period it has been necessary to prepare for such
hostilities with much less than full mobilization of
resources toward this objective. In the post-war
period, therefore, there has been greater scope for
administrative ingenuity and choice about accept-
able levels of effort, and also greater uncertainty
about the "best" security posture for long-term
superpower competition.
Finally, policy organization can encourage
thorough debate about alternative courses of
action prior to the making of decisions. There is a
tendency for those in the policy process struggling
for attention to, and adoption of, particular
behaviors to provide overly optimistic assessments
of the usefulness of those behaviors they favor in
order to enhance the chances of their recom-
mendations being widely accepted. Since policy
makers cannot be expected to discount the weight
of their own prejudices in their policy recom-
mendations (to do so might require them to
abstract themselves from the very impulses that
led them to make the policy recommendation in
the first place), recommendations that are
accepted uncritically and even on a superficial
basis could help to bring about a policy consensus
on ultimately indefensible grounds.' To prevent
such a consensus from forming, contrary points of
view must be expressed in the decision-making
process, and the process should require policy
makers at authoritative levels to seek out and value
the views of those critical of projected and already
359
implemented policy. Critical contributions of this
kind would help deflate high policy expectations
(which may be a product of feeling that policy
somehow needs to succeed because of the high
national security stakes resting upon it), reduce
the rhetoric of policy recommendations, and, most
importantly, serve as a self-correcting mechanism
whereby policy options that do not survive
sustained criticism do not become active choices.
These five criteria for the adequacy of policy
organization are in no sense logically fully
consistent with one another. But it will be helpful
to measure the effects of changes in American
decision-making organization for national security
against the description above of how policy
organization could have (and, some would say,
needed to have) national security benefits.
Policy Organization in the Postwar Period
In examining American policy organization in
the postwar period, it is striking how the
institutional changes that were brought about, and
the climate of opinion supporting them, were so
much a legacy of American participation in the
Second World War, even though that war posed
very different challenges to the United States than
did the postwar period. During the war with the
Axis powers, it was generally agreed in the United
States that the widely dispersed and diverse
military operations of this country should be
subject to central direction at the highest levels of
government (cutting through political and
economic bottlenecks holding back the war-making
effort), unified direction (limiting needless sacri-
fice of life and inefficient production), and secret
direction (preventing the Axis powers from
anticipating and hampering American strategic
operations). Each of these considerations justified
leadership by a relatively few people over an
enormous military machine geared to achieving
total victory. With the onset of deepseated and
widespread hostility between the United States
and the Soviet Union shortly after the conclusion
of the Second World War, informed Americans
believed that some similar policy organization to
that which had been so effective against the Axis
should be employed to manage American security
concerns in relation to the Soviet Union. The
difference was that whereas the wartime organi-
zation was a product of presidential directive, the
postwar policy structure was designed to endure
longer than the tenure of particular Presidents.6
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There was no partisan debate about these
matters: indeed, the tradition of bipartisanship
born during the Second World War persisted in the
postwar period to support the institutionalization
of extraordinary forms of organization, born in
war, with which to wage the peace. Leaders of
both major political parties agreed that party
differences were not to intrude into the making of
vital decisions as urgent as those dealing with
national security, and the same kinds of unusual
organization that kept political differences from
impeding the earlier war effort were to be utilized
to meet threats to the United States from the
Soviet Union.
If anything, institutional developments follow-
ing the war moved still farther in the direction set
by wartime trends. For example, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, once having been created during the war,
could act only by unanimous consent. In
December 1945, President Truman proposed
organizational changes entailing creation of a
single department of national defense with
"unified direction of the land, sea, and air forces
at home as well as in all other parts of the world
where our armed forces are serving," and
envisioned defense "strategy, program and budget
[as] all aspects of the same basic decisions." The
National Security Act of 1947, a major landmark
in postwar American legislation on policy
organization, did not approve full unification of
the services; rather, it provided for what has been
called "a confederation of three military depart-
ments presided over by a Secretary of Defense
with carefully enumerated powers." The creation
of the Office of Secretary of Defense, however,
represented a perceptible move in the direction of
adding to the unification of the military services
beyond World War II levels, and subsequent
developments extended this trend still further. By
1961, after a number of intervening changes, it
could be argued that the Department of Defense
had in fact moved to the form desired by Truman
in 1945.7 Growing unification of the services had
been accomplished by enormous growth, first in
the numbers and centrality of civilian specialists
serving in the Department of Defense, and second
in the authority of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense over the military services. (These trends
were reversed somewhat by the early 1970s, but
not enough to mitigate the importance of the
above observations.)
The National Security Act was designed to
provide for unification, for centralization, and for
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
secret deliberations in other ways. It created a
National Security Council (NSC) with statutory
members including the President, the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director
of the Office of Defense Mobilization to
coordinate policy making on political and military
affairs and to provide policy guidance from
qualified, senior-level individuals in the policy
process to the military establishment. The NSC
was formed specifically to move away from the
informal decision-making system utilized by
President Franklin Roosevelt during the war to
one in which specified people would participate on
a consistent, regular basis from their institutional
responsibilities in national security policy making.
To aid the NSC, the National Security Act
established the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
as an independent department of the government,
empowered to recommend to the NSC coordina-
tion of intelligence activities of the other federal
departments having interests and operations in
national security.
The function of this new agency was also
strongly affected by perceptions of events in the
recent war. Policy makers wished to prevent the
conditions that had permitted the Japanese
surprise attack at Pearl Harbor to happen by
providing a more unified intelligence establish-
ment, one that was better able to discriminate
between "signals" and "noise" and to communi-
cate that refinement to the highest levels of
government.'
Finally, the 1947 Act established the Air Force
as a distinct military service, recognizing the strong
role of air power in the previous war and allowing
for the strengthening of long-range American air
forces as a separate element of war preparation.
Underlying all these developments were two
ideas: first, that the efficiency of military,
political, and economic undertakings would be
enhanced if duplication and competition for
national security-related activities could be held to
a minimum; and second, that unification at the
highest levels of government was a prerequisite to
unity of will on the part of the American people
for what many expected to be a long seige of
hostile relations with the Soviet Union.9 But these
changes in decision-making organization produced
neither appreciable reduction of duplication and
competition, nor much stronger unity of will
within the American governmental leadership.
Each of these points will be discussed in turn.
Duplication, competition, and disunity came
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NATIONAL SECURITY
about in part from the perceived urgencies of the
security situation. It was to be expected that the
greater the perceived threat to the nation's
security from abroad, the more unified would be
the nation's response to meet the threat.' ? In the
1950s, the Soviet military threat to the United
States was conceded by most informed Americans
to be considerable and growing, especially in
connection with Soviet successes in the develop-
ment of fission and fusion weaponry, ballistic
missiles, and space satellites, and with the
outbreak of the Korean War. But what mattered
most in meeting that threat was the perception of
organizationally positioned individuals, and these
individuals tended to factor the Soviet threat in
ways caluclated to meet the needs of their
organization.
Each organization, in general, tended to take
responsibilities for the new security situation on
itself, looking to expand its plane of operations on
the grounds of the same urgency it attributed to
the nation's security more generally. Intense levels
of Soviet-American conflict, instead of bringing
general agreement on ways to manage that
conflict, paradoxically stimulated organizational
differences on how to act in what virtually every-
one conceded were extraordinary times. For
example, the CIA was plagued from the start with
a running dispute with the military services over
the collection of intelligence, the services insisting
on excluding the CIA as much as possible from
that activity, and CIA officials looking to
intelligence production to strengthen their basic
research, analysis, and coordination efforts.11
There were perennial differences between the
military services as to their respective warmaking
responsibilities, and these differences were ac-
centuated by the continuing emergence of new
technologies that were difficult to categorize
under previously settled demarcations.
These differences and others contributed in
part to extensive duplication in national security
affairs: for example, in 1951 there were as many
as 24 different American government agencies and
departments producing economic intelligence.' 2
Again, duplication in weapons research and
development among the military services was
stimulated because allocated defense expenditures
did not expand to keep pace with the rising
political urgency, and authorization to deploy
expensive new weapons was a major way to help
subsidize other service activities that were starved
for funds. 3
361
There was also competition and rivalry within
given agencies. Within the Navy and Air Force,
those championing the cause of new ballistic
missile technologies were in conflict with those
favoring improvements of more traditional forms
of weaponry, including airplanes and airplane
carriers. Within the CIA, those producing and
evaluating intelligence were almost completely cut
off from those dealing in covert operations
overseas, and the two branches emerged from
completely different policy needs.' 4
These difficulties were no doubt due in part
to the loose character of the federal administrative
structure, described earlier. In this connection,
Paul Hammond has suggested that the more
pluralistic administrative politics are, the more
resources will participants direct to gain accurate
perceptions of the real world, even at the expense
of internal consistency.' 5 But the newness of
many of the organizational networks and the
novelty of most of the important security
problems faced by the United States were also
factors. The fund of ideas on how to apply newly
found American capabilities to policy problems
did not grow as rapidly as did the institutions
created to manage those problems." And with
good reason: the same conditions of world politics
which stimulated expansion of policy organiza-
tions also posed the most serious and bewildering
requirements for the coordinating machinery.
The Soviet-American rivalry, though free from
major superpower warfare, was one fraught with
the danger of such warfare occurring; the
relationship between the United States and the
Soviet Union lacked consistency insofar as it was
not dominated by the use of any particular
instrument or technique (as reflected, for example,
in any earlier instance of warmaking), yet it
obviously raised the values of the use of a
combination of instruments and techniques. It was
not clear ? and it still is not ? how the
superpower rivalry would end, and what could be
done to reliably and tolerably hasten its end.
Understanding of the requirements of the nuclear
age in the midst of these uncertainties came
slowly.
The second idea, that more unified policy
leadership would contribute to greater national
unity of will, was compromised by the fact that
unity at highest governmental levels was mainly in
form, not in fact. Until 1960, the NSC was
hampered by the expressions, within itself, of the
same divisive institutional forces that had earlier
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362
justified its creation in the minds of many. It did
not change individual loyalties to parochial
organizations or outlooks, but instead served as a
field in which those loyalties were expressed.' 7 In
addition, Presidents continued to value the special
counsel of some NSC members and their
immediate associates given outside the formal NSC
process, and the strategy of getting direct access to
the President to provide such counsel remained a
prized one for those officials able to choose it.
This raises another paradox of American
national security policy making: though the NSC
system worked best when its members understood
presidential purposes and interests, those members
who had such an orientation were more likely than
others to have special access to the President,
which sometimes counted more for the making of
policy than formal NSC deliberations. In the
1960s, Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B.
Johnson relied increasingly on high-level officials
known to be more loyal to their President than to
the interests of their respective departments, and
the role of the NSC declined. President Richard M.
Nixon, on the other hand, allowed very few people
outside the White House direct access to him, and
the resurgence of the NSC during his adminis-
tration (to be discussed later) was therefore
especially important.
The Record of NSC Activity
Reviewing the public record of NSC activity,
it is useful to focus, first of all, on the effects
diplomatic emergencies involving the United States
have had on NSC deliberations. For example, the
NSC was stirred into one of its most useful
activities ? developing a comprehensive national
security policy for the country, particularly in
relation to the Soviet Union ? more than a year
after its inception and in the wake of diplomatic
crisis. The earliest request to the NSC for such a
policy statement came from Secretary of Defense
James Forrestal shortly after the start of the Berlin
Blockade, and President Truman accepted an NSC
recommendation to prepare the statement after
the initial Soviet testing of an atomic bomb. The
initial statement of this kind, known as NSC-68,
was approved by Truman after the start of the
Korean War and served as the foundation of that
part of the American military buildup during the
war aimed at the Soviet Union. In this case as well
as others, NSC plans prepared prior to crisis
incidents came to condition American behaviors
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
when crises occurred.
The NSC was frequently put in a position of
coping with diplomatic emergencies and with
limited war situations, and this work was naturally
of an overriding priority to any other NSC
concern. But it was not usually well-equipped for
speedy deliberations.' 8 It worked best when it
worked slowly, between recurring international
confrontations, to integrate wide-ranging consider-
ations into unified national purposes. Without
integrated planning of this kind, policy makers
would have lacked agreed-upon standards to guide
their responses in time of severe diplomatic
tension, even as different sectors of the govern-
ment struggled for approval of their preferred
solutions. And policy makers would be especially
tempted to take actions for short-term reasons in
crisis, such as new force positioning or new
political commitments, that could prove difficult
or even impossible to reverse once the emergency
ended.' 9
The NSC made another important contribu-
tion in between moments of crisis by leading its
participants, and staffs, to focus on a longer
time-range for policy than the usual one in which
policy questions were most often addressed. It also
examined the ways in which the intentions and
capabilities of other countries, particularly the
Soviet Union, would affect the security interests
of the United States during this longer period,20
and it developed contingency preparations whose
triggering would depend on the perceived form
which those intentions and capabilities took over
time.
In addition, the NSC stimulated a great
variety of interagency contacts and coordinating
devices. Such "lateral coordination" has been a
major development in postwar American national
security policy organization,2' and a central
method of reaching consensual policies, both at
authoritative and at working levels, amidst
divergent institutional approaches to policy
problems. To prepare for such arrangements,
departments have drafted positions on policy
issues that increasingly have taken into account
anticipated views of other departments whose
clearance is required for authoritative policy
decisions.
Other pertinent organizational needs have been
given less attention in the NSC system, in part
because the above functions have been so
time-consuming, but also because the other
priorities seemed to detract from those considered
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NATIONAL SECURITY
more important. For example, because of
perceived security imperatives, national leaders
believed that departments and agencies dealing
with those imperatives should have the widest area
of choice to pursue the mandate given them by the
policy leadership. One of the most serious
deficiencies of the work of the NSC was the lack
of adequate policy guidance to national security
organizations, including the military establishment
and the intelligence agencies.2 2 Policy guidelines
provided were very general, and major initiative
for the work of those organizations was left
dependent on the sense of urgency of those
entrusted with them. Given prevailing organiza-
tional and political tendencies, this deficiency
encouraged disunity and competition inside the
organizational structures.
Another deficiency of the NSC was in the
failure to encourage dissent to prevailing policy
assumptions. Given the lack of policy guidance,
the assumptions of policy might be widely shared
even as operational behaviors following from those
assumptions were not well-coordinated. But the
policy assumptions were not investigated as
frequently as they should have been. One
persuasive study suggests a large number of crisis
decisions of the NSC in which prevailing American
strategic orientations were permitted to control
the crisis response, without any significant
opposition." What this seems to show is that
departments and agencies looking to take policy
initiatives had a much stronger interest to show
how these initiatives were consistent with policy
already decided-upon ? which rendered un-
necessary high-level approval ? than to argue for a
change in policy as a way of gaining approval for
them. Ironically, this orientation satisfied both the
departments and the high-level decision makers,
but seriously compromised the national security
interests of the country. The policy makers
assumed that the departments were acting
consistently with national policy, especially as
information to the contrary was not immediately
available to them; and the departments permitted
policy makers to believe that the policy they
approved continued to be satisfactory, even
though it often was not. The political conflict
necessary to getting the policy revised by showing
that it was no longer suitable was discouraged.
Until relatively recently, departmental rivalry was
not utilized ? as it might have been ? to
encourage genuine debate about policy goals and
instruments in the NSC.
363
This failure must not only be ascribed to the
failings of the NSC: weak leadership in some
departments was also a factor. The State
Department, for example, frequently acted to seek
autonomy in a limited area of national security
behavior ? the area of "political" relations
between states, however defined ? rather than act
to gain a dominant role in wide policy matters.
The Pentagon did not respect the division of
responsibilities envisioned by State (especially
with the effective work of the Pentagon's "little
State Department," its International Security
Affairs division).24 Those departments which were
vigorously assertive in seeking broad policy
coordination in the NSC as elsewhere were, of
course, the most influential over the substantive
policies adopted, a point which helps to explain
the growing prominence of the Pentagon in
post-war American national security policy mak-
ing,25 but the more passive stance of other
departments, including State, undoubtedly
lessened the chances of using the NSC as a
challenger of fashionable assumptions.
Still a third weakness of the NSC, particularly
in its early years, was the tendency of its policy
papers to refrain from discussing how policy
objectives would be supported by material re-
sources.2 6 One reason for this is that many
products of the NSC system were not designed to
culminate in action programs; some, including the
NSC-68 document already referred to, were put
together for educational and polemical pur-
poses.2 7
NSC-68 set out a strong case for a major
increase in American defense spending to ward off
Soviet threats to the security of American Western
European allies, but key elements of the analysis
(including the definition of the Soviet threat to
the United States, as well as the extent of the
resources required for the arms buildup) were
purposely left inexact in order to gain clearance
from both the Secretary of State and the Secretary
of Defense, who disagreed sharply on strategic
matters.
The impetus for NSC-68 came from several
individuals inside the Department of State who
sought to challenge prevailing American attitudes
on defense spending. But in asking the President to
choose among alternatives without providing the
costs of those choices, NSC-68 made choice more
difficult and ultimately brought no choice at all
(until the outbreak of the Korean War in June
1950 changed popular American thinking and
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364
made its recommendations acceptable). The case
of NSC-68 is an example of how coordination
within the NSC system can afford some
satisfaction to participants and enhance consensus,
yet fail to make the system an instrument of
presidential leadership.' 8
Product of Style
Policy organization is not, of course, merely an
outcome of perceived urgencies in international
conditions. It is also the product of style,
temperament, and individual preference. Some
Presidents have chosen to downplay the im-
portance of the statutory authority behind the
NSC and depend instead on informal policy-
making methods to make national security
decisions. They did so, despite having to deal with
a series of foreign policy crises during their
administrations, because they valued diverse
channels of communication from advisors, in-
dependent sources of information, and maximum
flexibility in policy making. Both Presidents
Kennedy and Johnson seem to have viewed
informal channels as a way of keeping large
numbers of people dependent on presidential
access, and therefore, as a way of enlarging
presidential authority.29
More recently, during the Nixon and Ford
Administrations, there has been a return to
vigorous use of the NSC system, though with a
number of important refinements. First, there has
been a major effort within the NSC to spell out an
overall foreign policy strategy to serve as the
context for particular national security decisions.
One of the major purposes behind the definition
of such a strategy has been to gain widespread
agreement on major long-range objectives and
needs, and on varying ways of meeting them and
allocating priorities among these approaches. Such
a blueprint, reached independently of the
deadlines and sudden developments conditioning
decisions on specific actions, would serve to ease
the strain toward agreement on more immediate
questions.3? One difficulty has been that the head
of the planning effort, Henry Kissinger, has also
had extensive responsibilities for carrying out
policy, and his operational activities have limited
NSC strategic planning to a relatively small
number of areas. Some issues that have only more
recently emerged as national security matters on a
continuing basis ? for example, questions of
international economic policy ? were initially
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
dealt with outside the NSC framework.31
A second important contribution to national
security decision making in recent years has been a
comprehensive and systematic review of American
policy on virtually all national security issues.
Almost all of these have been undertaken under
White House initiative, and directed in the form of
National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM) to
appropriate departments and inter-agency groups.
The objective behind the large number of reviews
(126 in all between February 1969 and April
1971) has been to sharpen the focus on policy
choices, and, particularly to have ventilated policy
options that had previously not received attention
at authoritative levels. A number of American
national security policies have been changed in this
way, by permitting middle-level officials to bring
new options to NSC consideration, and to
presidential decision, even though department
heads to which those officials are responsible have
not supported the options.32
The NSSM procedure has been limited in three
respects: first, by the large amount of time
required to prepare departmental reviews; second,
by the tendency of the NSC staff and a
Kissinger-chaired NSC Review Group to rewrite
the departmental reviews to suit their needs; and
third, by the fact that the NSSM procedure has
not extended to implementation of policy changes
once they have been decided upon. But it has
served as a means whereby the NSC and the
President can make use of lower-level depart-
mental disputes to reconsider policy that was
allowed to persist by being insulated from
challenge.
Conclusion
Perhaps the major theme in this evaluation of
American national security decision making is
that, regardless of the high stakes and urgencies of
security matters, organizational politics will have
an important place in determining how those
stakes and urgencies are addressed. The struggle
for political attention, the protection of organiza-
tional vested interests, and the competition for
effective operating authority will continue to
affect what the United States does in national
security affairs; in addition, the perception of
national security issues of "overriding" importance
will stimulate these political effects, despite what
appear to be moral imperatives for "unified"
action. Any effort to adapt American policy
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NATIONAL SECURITY
toward national security requirements ? whether
through the NSC or otherwise, and irrespective of
what those requirements are ? must take account
of these political effects and allow for them, since
they are a constant feature in highly consequential
issues as well as in less important ones. They affect
the level of political support for even the best
policy; but, beyond that, they contribute political
zeal that can vitiate the intended effects of policy
despite providing the necessary political support
for it.
Raising again the five criteria discussed earlier
in this article for evaluating the effectiveness of
policy organization in national security affairs, a
survey of the record of American national security
policy organization indicates that they certainly
have not been equally served, and intentionally so.
The largest priority has been given in successive
administrations to enhancing presidential leader-
ship in protecting national interests, and this
irrespective of varying styles of policy making. A
somewhat lower, but still very high priority has
been given to identifying long-term directions and
objects of policy, and this concern has been, and
continues to be, a major defense of the formal
NSC system. Another very significant priority has
been given to easing disagreement among leading
policy makers on substantive "core" concerns.
Here again the formal NSC system made a major
contribution, though easing the "strain toward
agreement" at authoritative levels did not always
require heavy reliance on the formal NSC system,
as the record of the Kennedy and Johnson
Administrations shows.
The other two of the five criteria have not been
as well provided for. Though opening channels for
challengers of prevailing policy to make themselves
heard can enhance the organizational and political
strength of those dissenting from policy ? and
there are always dissenters around ? the
encouragement of dissent runs contrary to another
widely accepted organizational and political rule
of action, namely, that departmental staffs refrain
from challenging policy views held by those to
whom they report. Department heads, as I.M.
Destler has pointed out, frequently see their staffs
as their instruments for implementing their policy
once it has been decided, not as lobbyists against
it.33 Despite a major effort in the Nixon and Ford
Administrations to encourage what has been called
"multiple-policy advocacy," it is not yet clear
whether an adequate number of advocates have
yet come forward, or whether more can be done
365
to seek them out.
Finally, supplying comprehensive policy guid-
ance to middle-level officials has been de-
emphasized since the early 1960s because of a
belief that, regardless of contrary effort at
authoritative policy levels, departmental officials
would resist institutionalization of the values of
NSC participants, if those values were at odds with
their own. In fact, one of the reasons for a growing
centralization of authority in recent years in the
NSC structure, both in decision-making and policy
execution functions, has been to counter the
ability of less-responsible officials with vested
interests in current routines to block actions
decided at higher levels.
A curious aspect to the present national
security policy organization in the United States
has been that, while reliance on policy advocates
from within the bureaucratic structure to promote
policy change has been one of the weaker, if still
necessary, foundations of recent policy making,
preventing middle-level officials from obstructing
change has been regarded as a still more important
objective, and leading officials like Mr. Kissinger
have frequently tended to work around the
bureaucracy, rather than through it. And, despite
the formal "open door" to multiple policy
advocacy, the most important stimulus for new
policy has come from the top of the policy
structure, rather than from within.
One concluding observation needs to be made
about the political climate in national security
affairs, which importantly helps define the kinds
of national security questions that must be
decided ? and, indeed, that are open to choice. To
an overwhelming extent in the past 30 years, issues
in national security affairs, and the answers to
those issues, have been defined by the President
and his closest advisors. The prevailing climate of
opinion has permitted this situation to persist and
to grow.34 This may easily be justified in the
popular American need to have strong leadership
to deal with dangerous and unpleasant con-
tingencies, and some would argue that the trend
has been unavoidable. But it is now necessary to
take a closer examination of the political price
Americans pay for this growth in executive
authority, and to understand the national security
policy organization for what it is, rather than what
we would like it to be.
It can never be enough for the organizational
structure and its capabilities to enhance the
national and international position of the Presi-
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366
dent, as important as that be. Nor, on the other
hand, will it do to demand that the policy
organization satisfy each and every one of the
criteria for national security policy making defined
above, for that does not seem feasible. Acceptable
performance levels of the policy organization
between these two extreme positions must be
distinguished and, to permit this, the prevailing
climate of opinion must be broadened so that it
focuses not only on national security problems for
which organizational elaboration is a response, but
also on the adequacy of the organizations
themselves for the purposes for which they were
initially created.
Notes
1. Klaus Knorr, The War Potential of Nations (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1956), chaps. 6-8;
also see Harold and Margaret Sprout, Toward a
Politics of the Planet Earth (New York: Van Nos-
trand Reinhold, 1971), pp. 181-182, 184-185.
2. For a forceful argument to this effect, see John
Spaniel and Eric M. Uslaner, How American Foreign
Policy is Made (New York: Praeger, 1974), pp. 13-27.
3. On this point see Roger Hilsman, The Politics of
Policy-making in Defense and Foreign Affairs (New
York: Harper & Row, 1971), chap. 1.
4. Warner R. Schilling, "The Politics of National
Defense: Fiscal 1950," in Warner R. Schilling et al.
(eds.), Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 23-26,
218-222.
5. I am indebted to Alexander L. George, "The Case
For Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy,"
The American Political Science Review, Vol. 66
(September 1972), especially pp. 769-783, for all the
ideas in this paragraph.
6. Walter Millis, (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (New York:
Viking Press, 1956), pp. 62-120; Paul Y. Hammond,
"The National Security Council as a Device for
Interdepartmental Coordination: An Interpretation
and Appraisal," The American Political Science
Review, Vol. 54 (December 1960), pp. 899-902; and
William T.R. Fox, "Diplomatists and Military
People," in Stephen D. Kertesz and M.A. Fitzsimons
(eds.), Diplomacy in a Changing World (Notre Dame,
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), p. 47.
7. For the matters discussed in this paragraph, see
Charles J. Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1965), pp. 14-17. The text of the National
Security Act of 1947 is included in C.W. Borklund,
The Department of Defense (New York: Praeger,
1968), pp. 317-333.
8. "History of the Central Intelligence Agency," in
Book IV of Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on
Foreign and Military Intelligence, Final Report of the
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
with Respect to Intelligence Activities, U.S. Senate,
94th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 7. Since this
history, compiled from internal CIA histories, was
written by Anne Karalekas, it will be cited
henceforth as "Karalekas."
9. On the first point, see Schilling, pp. 108-114; on the
second point, see Hammond, "The National Security
Council," pp. 899-901, 908.
10. Arnold Wolfers, "The Actors in International
Politics," in Arnold Wolfers (ed.), Discord and
Collaboration (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press,
1962), pp. 13-14.
11. Karalekas, pp. 13-15.
12. Ibid., p. 21
13. Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp.
369-384.
14. Karalekas, pp. 46-47.
15. Paul Hammond, "A Functional Analysis of Defense
Department Decision-Making in the McNamara
Administration," The American Political Science
Review, Vol. 52 (March 1968), p. 63.
16. See, for example, Schilling, p. 250.
17. I am indebted for the ideas in this paragraph to Paul
Hammond, "The National Security Council as a
Device for Interdepartmental Coordination,"
American Political Science Review, Vol. 54 (1960),
p. 905.
18. President Eisenhower occasionally went outside the
NSC organization when he wanted decisions taken
rapidly, as in the case of the Quemoy-Matsu crisis of
1958. Keith C. Clark and Laurence J. Legere (eds.),
The President and the Management of National
Security (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 242. Under
the Nixon Administration, however, a high-level crisis
deliberation panel was established under the NSC
system known as the Washington Special Actions
Group, and it functioned frequently in such
situations.
19. For example, the initial stationing of American B-29
bombers in England took place after the start of the
Berlin Blockade, and American strike aircraft have
been based there ever since.
20. Paul Nitze, in congressional testimony June 17, 1960.
Included in hearings before the Senate Subcommittee
on National Policy Machinery, Organizing for
National Security (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1961), Vol. 1, pp. 879-880.
21. I.M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign
Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 14.
22. Hammond, "The National Security Council as a
Device for Interdepartmental Coordination," p. 902;
Karalekas, pp. 32, 34.
23. George, passim.
24. Destler, pp. 160-162.
25. Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment
(New York: Harper & Row, 1971), is notable in part
for stressing this trend.
26. Nitze, pp. 878-879.
27. See Paul Hammond, "NSC-68: Prologue to Rearma-
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NATIONAL SECURITY
ment," in Warner R. Schilling et al. (eds.), Strategy,
Politics and Defense Budgets (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1962), P. 372. The full text of
NSC-68, recently declassified, may be found in Naval
War College Review (May-June 1975), pp. 51-108.
28. Hammond, "NSC-68," pp. 369-370; Destler, p. 227.
For another example in which American policy
makers have paid a significant price for their
emphasis upon building and maintaining policy
consensus, see Leslie Gelb, "Vietnam: The System
Worked," Foreign Policy, No. 3 (Summer 1971), pp.
140-167.
29. Destler, pp. 112-117.
30. Ibid., p. 138.
31. Ibid., pp. 149-150
32. Ibid., pp. 132-137.
33. Ibid., p. 291.
34. This permissive climate of opinion was most notable
in the provision of authority to the President from
the Congress in the National Security Act.
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368
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Local Government, Information
Systems, and Technology Transfer:
Evaluating Some Common Assertions
About Computer Application Transfer
Kenneth L. Kraemer, University of California, Irvine
Everywhere we go nowadays faith is expressed
that some modern technology is waiting in the
wings to make our lives better. This extends to
local governments where large programs have been
instituted to facilitate "technology transfer" ?a
concept that usually refers to the process of
moving a piece of technology developed at a high
cost in one place to another place at a lower cost
than would be required to develop the technology
locally.2
The appeal of technology transfer is consid-
erable and stems from several notions:
1. Technologies are interchangeable from one site
to another, having "plug-in" features in the
sense that they are relatively self-contained,
prepackaged, readily learnable, and their imple-
mentation can be buffered against the impact
of the larger environment.
2. High value is potentially redeemable from R &
D investments which create or "spinoff' tech-
nologies that can be transferred extensively.
3. Users who are able to transfer can obtain high
This article is part of a research project entitled
"Evaluation of Information Technology in Local Govern-
ment" (URBIS), supported by a grant from the RANN
Division of the National Science Foundation (APR74-A01
& A02). The author gratefully acknowledges the intellec-
tual stimulation and support provided by John King and
Joseph Matthews, and the helpful comments on manu-
script drafts by James Danziger, John Dever, Edward
Hearle, Rob Kling, Robert Metzgar, Jim Maxwell, Alan
Siegel, Myron Weiner, and Willis Ware.
? The "faith in technology" attitude prevalent in the
U.S. extends to local governments, where large pro-
grams have been instituted to facilitate technology
transfer. This article examines the technology transfer
of computer applications among and into city and
county governments. It compares the benefit claims
about application transfer, as expressed in seven key
points most often found in literature about computer-
ized information systems, with new data on local
government transfer activity and the harsher realities
of actual transfer experience. This article neither
supports nor discredits claims about transfer of com-
puter applications in local government. Rather, it
attempts to fill part of the void in rational discussion
about transfer by offering broad perspectives on why
more transfers do not occur and, in some instances,
why they shouldn't occur.
quality, sophisticated technologies without the
need for making substantial development ex-
penditures.
4. Certain technologies, such as management tech-
niques, are instruments of political and admin-
Kenneth L. Kraemer is director of the Public Policy
Research Organization and associate professor of adminis-
tration at the University of California, Irvine. He cur-
rently is a principal investigator on the URBIS Project, a
nationwide study of information systems in local govern-
ments. He served as a consultant to the federal USAC
Program and as a national expert to the Panel on
Information Technology and Urban Management of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD).
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COMPUTER APPLICATION TRANSFER
istrative reform, capable of "modernizing" pub-
lic administration.3
Thus, the Federal Council on Science and
Technology sees technology transfer as:
... critical to assuring that the results of an annual
Federal investment of over $15 billion in research and
development are being applied to improve the services and
quality of life of the Nation.
And, the importance given to technology transfer
as:
... partly stimulated by the often quoted Presidential
Message to Congress on Science and Technology in March
1972. Perhaps more important was the move toward
"New Federalism" and revenue sharing, and the concern
expressed by leaders at each level to actively spur the
application of Federally sponsored research, and develop-
ment to state and local problems.4
Nowhere can the trend towards technology
transfer be seen more clearly than in attempts to
transfer computer applications between and
among local governments. Computer application
transfer in local government offers a classic case of
technology transfer. General-purpose local govern-
ments appear similar in their functions and re-
quirements. Computers are very alike in the
functions they perform and are promoted for their
interchangeability in handling different computer
applications. Institutional support for application
transfer exists in the form of policy support,
financial aid, packaged programs, and technical
assistance. Indeed, most of the current literature is
highly enthusiastic about application transfer,
highly optimistic about the ease and speed with
which transfer can occur, and highly promotional
about the dollar benefits to be derived.5
The image created about the transfer process is
sometimes extreme.6 An urban technology trans-
fer agent appears at city or county hall, carrying
an arsenal of off-the-shelf, generalized, and pre-
packaged computer programs ready to be plugged
into the government's computer system. The
technology agent has something for just about any
operational or management problem ranging from
utility billing to fire station location to collective
bargaining negotiation. Without any difficulty,
operating managers and data processing staff
choose the application that fits their computer.
Then the technology agent installs it, saving
everyone the normal agony associated with devel-
oping computer applications in-house from
scratch.
"Saving the day" is one of the images that
makes application transfer appealing to local gov-
369
ernments. The touting of dollar savings makes
software transfer irresistable. The following com-
ments of a systems consultant typify the appeal:
As a concept, a design and an implemented system,
GBIS [Geographic Base Information System] costs some-
thing on the order of a quarter of a million dollars.
[Southern city A) will install this system for under
$40,000 plus a few man-months of data processing time.
[Southern city B] has saved something in excess of
$50,000 in choosing to accept PROVES [Property Value
Estimation System] rather than designing their own
system. Further, it is apparent that PROVES can be
transferred to other cities at even more significant savings.
These facts speak for themselves: there is big money to
be saved through the transfer of major systems. So for
those of you who feel that yours may be better than
mine, mine's cheaper than yours and it works, too!!
One would expect substantial software transfer
to occur, based on these positive claims. Yet, the
current level of applications transfer in the United
States appears low in comparison to the amount of
total development. In a survey we recently made
of the transfer experience in cities over 50,000 and
counties over 100,000 population in the United
States,' we found that only 22 per cent of the
responding governments had transferred applica-
tions in the last two years.8 Twenty-three per cent
of the responding cities and counties plan such
transfers within the next two years (Table 1).9
Additionally, the average number of computer
applications transferred per site over the past two
years is not very great-1.4 applications in cities
and 1.6 applications in counties (Table 2). The
average number of applications planned for trans-
fer over the next two years is similar, for both
governments.' ?
Thus, in spite of the positive claims for transfer,
relatively few local governments are transferring
computer applications at all, and of those that are,
few transfer more than one application. The major
positive sign in the transfer patterns?one sugges-
ting successful past experience?is that 60 per cent
of the sites with transfer experience plan addi-
tional transfer during the next two years (Table 3).
Nevertheless, the low level of transfer casts
doubt about the ease and benefit claims of
application transfer. If the dollar savings are as
great as transfer promoters say, why hasn't more
transfer occurred? Why aren't more transfers
planned? If transfer is so easy, why have most
governments with transfer experience averaged
only one application in the last two years? and,
why are 40 per cent of the experienced govern-
ments planning no additional transfers during the
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370 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
TABLE 1
SURVEY RESPONSE REGARDING TRANSFER
OF COMPUTER APPLICATIONS IN CITIES
AND COUNTIES
Cities Counties Totals
Total number of
local governments
responding to
URBIS survey 381 288 669
Per cent of govern-
ments responding
to transfer experi-
ence portion of
URBIS survey a 75% 59% 65%
Per cent of sites
with transfer
experience among
responding local
governments 18% 29% 22%
Per cent of govern-
ments responding
to transfer plans
portion of
URBIS survey b 66% 52% 60%
Per cent of sites
with transfer
plans among
responding local
governments 22% 25% 23%
a. Number of respondents = 284 cities and 171 counties.
b. Number of respondents = 250 cities and 151 counties.
next two years (Table 3)?
The usual explanations for limited technolog-
ical innovation offered in the literature focus on
technical complexity, institutional constraints, and
human frailties that create barriers to innova-
tion." These barriers undoubtedly operate with
regard to transfer of computer applications as with
other technologies. However, another explanation
for the low level of application transfer may be
more basic: "who" really benefits from transfer of
computer applications simply is more unclear than
with other technologies, and given this uncer-
tainty, few potential transfer participants are
willing to risk engaging in transfer without outside
stimulus (e.g., a crisis, or external financial sup-
port).
Theoretically, application transfer should ben-
efit all participants. Local government managers
get modernization at a reduced price, within the
constraints of their strapped budgets. Federal and
state agencies, which assist local transfers or
develop computer applications for transfer, get
high leverage from a relatively low investment by
demonstrating nationwide benefits from their R &
D programs. The data processing professionals,
who are providers of the technology, get status,
recognition, and sometimes profit from their
broker function. The department users in local
governments get new tools for performing their
jobs more efficiently and effectively. Ultimately,
the taxpayer gets better service at a lower cost.
But, in reality, are the benefits of transfer ,
TABLE 2
FREQUENCY OF TRANSFER AND NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS TRANSFERRED
IN CITIES AND COUNTIES
Cities
Counties Totals
Have Transferred
Governments with transfer experience 51 49 100
Total number of applications
transferred 69 80 149
Average number of applications
transferred 1.4 1.6 1.5
Plan To Transfer
Governments that plan to transfer
applications 54 37 91
Total number of applications
planned for transfer 59 59 118
Average number of applications
planned for transfer 1.1 1.6 1.3
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TABLE 3
OVERLAP OF CITY AND COUNTY
GOVERNMENTS THAT HAVE TRANSFERRED
AND PLAN TO TRANSFER COMPUTER
APPLICATIONS
Plan To
Transfer
Have Transferred
Yes No Total
60
31
40
305
Yes 91
No 345
Total 100 336 436
aThe chi square statistic is greater than the predicted chi
square with a significance level of .001 having one degree of
freedom. Thus, the data indicates that a site which has
transferred in the past is more likely to transfer in the
future.
always this clear cut? Actual experience with
application transfer suggests that transfer is more
complex than the "plug-in" process usually por-
trayed. More importantly, experience suggests
application transfers do not always serve every-
one's best interests. Some participants may gain
important benefits, while giving up others. Some
participants may gain very little in relation to the
investment required of them.' 2
Claims and Realities
Differences between the benefit claims and the
harsh realities of actually performing transfer can
be seen by examining some popular assertions
found in the literature on information systems in
local government: 3
1. Transfer of computer applications prevents
each government from having to reinvent the
wheel.
2. Everyone benefits from application transfer.
3. Computer applications can be transferred and
adapted for a small fraction of the time and
money needed to develop them in-house from
scratch.
4. Transfer makes badly needed computer applica-
tions available at low costs to all local govern-
ments.
5. Application transfer is a short cut for local
governments seeking an advanced state of EDP
(electronic data processing) development.
6. Technical factors, such as the lack of standard-
ized computer hardware and programming lan-
guages, are major barriers to application trans-
371
fer among local governments.
7. More application transfer would occur if there
were a National Clearinghouse and Resource
Center that would make information and com-
puter applications available to local govern-
ments.
1. Transfer of computer applications prevents
each government from having to reinvent the
wheeL
An underlying assumption behind application
transfer is that having each government develop its
own applications is inefficient, if not wasteful.
Therefore, application development projects
should be done centrally and transferred to local
governments in order to prevent costly duplication
of effort. This prescription may be true, but it
overlooks the important learning benefits derived
from reinventing the wheel.
The process of developing computer applica-
tions offers individuals and the local government
an exceptional opportunity to develop computing
capability, within the constraints of local skill,
time, and money availability. Computing staff
professionals engaged in in-house development
learn about various government functions. Depart-
ment users learn about computing. And, both
develop working relationships that support future
operation, maintenance, and expanded use of
computing. By contrast, application transfer may
actually prevent learning. This is particularly true
when transfer is performed by outside agents and
the application exceeds local capabilities, as the
computing staff and users are frequently under
great time pressure and easily overwhelmed by the
outside experts. In this situation, staff/user learn-
ing usually occurs later when the application is in
operation and the staff has time to discover what
the application really does and what assumptions
underlie its models of reality. They, of course, also
may discover that the application is ill-suited to
local operations. Since computer applications,
unlike a car, carry no warranty, there is no
recourse with application "lemons."
Given that computing is still in its infancy in
most local governments, learning opportunities
that build in-house capability are especially valu-
able. Ironically, it is these governments with
relatively undeveloped computing that are most
often targeted for software transfer by the transfer
agents on the deceptively rational grounds that
transfer is most beneficial where local capability is
weakest.
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Contrary to this popular belief, the best candi-
dates to *undertake transfer may be the govern-
ments with highly developed EDP. Being sophis-
ticated, these governments can better assess the
potential of applications before they are imple-
mented by outside experts. In addition, they are
capable of undertaking the complexities of their
own independent search, evaluation, and transfer.
Considerable evidence supports this view. The
survey of U.S. cities and counties cited indicates
that the greatest amount of transfer tends to occur
in the larger governments and particularly in
governments with an advanced state of EDP
development. Table 4 shows that a greater propor-
tion of larger cities and counties have transfer
experience than smaller governments. Table 5
shows that the transfer governments tend to have
higher EDP expenditures, spend proportionately
more of their operating budget for EDP, have
larger computer core capacity, have more applica-
tions operational, have more applications on-line,
and have more applications documented than the
average city or county in the survey, all of which
indicates a relatively advanced state of develop-
ment.
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
That the majority of these governments origi-
nally developed their own applications might be
one important reason why they have become
relatively sophisticated users of computing. In
addition, transfer probably involves fewer risks for
the larger more experienced governments because,
unlike smaller inexperienced governments, they
have sufficient skill to overcome adaptation prob-
lems and sufficient size to absorb unanticipated
costs.
2. Everyone benefits from application transfer.
If application transfer yields all the beneficial
things claimed for it, who could possibly resist
transfer efforts? Depending on the situation, both
the EDP and user departments might object.
Consider first the data processing professionals
and users. In addition to the learning benefits,
computing professionals and users stand to gain
the personal and professional satisfaction that
comes from their own design embellishments of
the wheel. Since design is the sine qua non of the
computer profession, the design-development
phases of automating provide the most challenging
TABLE 4
PER CENT OF TOTAL URBIS CITIES AND COUNTIES TRANSFERRING COMPUTER
APPLICATIONS, BY POPULATION*
Transfer Experience
Categories
Cities
URBIS
Respondents
(A)
Have Transferred
in Last Two Years
(% of A)
Counties
URBIS
Respondents
(B)
Have Transferred
in Last Two Years
(% of B)
Totals
284
18%
171
29%
Population Groups
500,000 and over
19
42
38
34
250,000-499,999
27
22
46
28
100,000-249,999
74
15
87
26
50,000- 99,999
164
16
Transfer Plans Cities
Categories
URBIS
Respondents
(A)
Plan To Transfer
in Next Two Years
(% of A)
Counties
URBIS
Respondents
(B)
Plan To Transfer
in Next Two Years
(% of B)
Totals
250
22
151
25
Population Groups
500,000 and over
15
27
32
25
250,000-499,999
23
30
41
22
100,000-249,999
66
23
78
26
50,000- 99,999
146
19
*119 cities and 139 counties failed to answer this question
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TABLE 5
COMPARATIVE STATE OF EDP DEVELOPMENT AMONG CITIES AND COUNTIES
THAT HAVE TRANSFERRED-IN APPLICATIONS
373
Indicators of EDP
Development Status
Cities
Counties
Transfer
Sites
All URBIS
Cities
Transfer
Sitesa
All URBIS
Counties
Average EDP expenditures
$891,031
$554,444
$1,345,933
$965,155
Average EDP expenditures as a
percent of total operating budget
1.4%
1.0%
1.8%
1.7%
Average total core capacity
in bytes
596K
346K
598K
450K
Average total operational
applications
44
31
39
32
Average total operational
applications on-line
11
6
7
6
Average total operational
applications with documentation
25
15
24
18
aThis includes only places that have transferred-in. As might be expected, places that have transferred-out have somewhat
higher values.
and creatively fulfilling jobs for many program-
mers and analysts. By contrast, the transfer adop-
tion process is generally viewed as unstimulating,
even drudgery.'
"Professional practice" is to department users
what design is to the computer staff. User depart-
ment people develop small differences in local
practice as a means of maintaining and building
recognition and professional superiority over their
counterparts in other governments. Users fre-
quently assert that "we are different from City
A," "our department does not function like
County B," "our procedures are better than
theirs." Thus, many user departments are precon-
ditioned to reject a system developed for another
local government with a "different" situation.
Their position frequently is reinforced by the
patchwork of state and local statutes governing
local governments' operations and the already
differing pattern of standard operating proce-
dures.15
Data processing professionals and users are not
the only ones who might resist transfer. Bureau-
cratic incentive and resource politics enter into
considerations about transfer, particularly for the
managers in the EDP and user departments. When
development is done in-house, or when transfer is
done by in-house staff, the monies essentially go
to increase staff in the EDP department, the user
department, or both. When software is transferred
in by an outside agent, a large portion of the
money that could otherwise be used for develop-
ment goes outside to the transfer agent. While the
local staff is strained with the transfer burden, it
generally receives no additional budgetary support.
The net effect is that the EDP and the user
department managers lose a substantial basis for
future budgetary increases and must use the "slack
resources" under their control to assist in the
transfer effort.
These erosions of operating funds might be all
right with the managers if they were rewarded for
efficient resource use. But generally they aren't.
There is no more professional prestige for man-
agers than the staff from transfer-in; and, there
aren't additional resources either. In fact, the
budgeting-from-past-history practices of local gov-
ernment means that managers generally will be
rewarded with increased budgets only for accumu-
lating staff in-house rather than for using outside
resources, and for using their current staff ineffi-
ciently rather than efficiently.' 6
Thus, both managers and staff in the EDP and
user departments, accustomed to traditional bu-
reaucratic incentives and practices, are precondi-
tioned to find shortcomings with the transfer
process and have built-in technical and profes-
sional arguments to support local development
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374
rather than transfer. The combination of such
technological and professional arguments usually
has a significant impact on other decision makers,
such as chief executives who might otherwise
strongly favor transfer from another govern-
ment.17
3. Computer applications can be transferred and
adapted for a small fraction of the time and
money needed to develop them in-house from
scratch.
This benefit holds the strongest attraction for
software transfer and provides the dominant basis
for promotional claims. Undoubtedly, substantial
cost savings can occur from transfer because most
of the front-end development costs have been
borne by others. The transferee bears only the
costs required to adopt the application locally. In
reality, however, such savings only occur under the
best of conditions: when the automated task is
truly general, when the application has been well
documented and designed for transfer, when the
computer programs fit the transferee's current
computing capability, and when the application is
relatively self-contained. Unfortunately, it is com-
mon for any or all of the following technical
problems to occur:
The automated task is poorly suited to the local
situation. Some computer applications have low
transfer potential across state or regional lines
because of differences in state and local inform-
ation requirements and operating procedures. This
is particularly true with regard to sophisticated
applications such as real property appraisal models
and complex operational applications such as
integrated utility billing and on-line customer
inquiry. Simpler models, such as Fire Station
Locator, and report generators, such as Uniform
Fire Incident Reporting System (UFIRS), are
easier to transfer.' 8
The application is poorly documented. Poor
programming documentation can be worse than no
documentation because it can mislead transferees
about the net benefits of transferring the applica-
tion and may lead them far along the wrong paths
in converting and debugging the programs for the
local situation.
The application is poorly designed. One city
that transferred-in an accounting package discov-
ered that the programming audit trails were
woefully inadequate. The city had to redevelop
the program at considerable expense, in addition
to bearing the cost of the initial transfer failure.
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
The application is not designed for transfer.
Some otherwise well-designed applications simply
have not been designed with their potential trans-
fer in mind. Therefore, the cost of their modifica-
tion for transfer exceeds the potential develop-
ment savings.
The application is part of an integrated system,
and thus contains features not required for stand-
alone use, or delivers its benefits only in an
integrated EDP environment The first of these
conditions is pointed out by an observer of the
Charlotte USAC Project:
Remember that in taking an IMIS [Integrated Municipal
Information System] product you are taking a part of a
system, but the system doesn't exist [in your situation].
So there may well be programming niceties, data hand-
ling, and so forth that are unnecessary and turn out to be
costs rather than benefits.1 9
The second situation occurs in applications such as
Detective Investigative Support where the real
benefits of the application come from integrating
the data in many normally separate police opera-
tional files. Here the transferee can obtain the
applications benefits only by building an inte-
grated system, at least for those aspects of the
police function that provide the operational data.
4. Transfer makes badly needed computer applica-
tions available at a low cost to all local
governments.
Even if there are no problems in transfer and
development savings do occur, the savings are
meaningful only if the transfer-in application
meets a real need in the government and is
economical to implement, operate, and maintain.
Thus, application transfer should be viewed in
terms of priority needs rather than simple availa-
bility, and in terms of full life cycle costs, rather
than the mere saving of development costs.
Assessing the need for transfer-in applications is
a universal problem. Thinking that they are "get-
ting something for nothing," many local officials
are lured into application transfer when in fact
they may be getting something they don't need, or
which meets local needs only marginally. This
problem occurs because some applications pro-
moted for transfer to local governments are
designed primarily to serve non-local needs, such
as state and federal needs for criminal data nad
national statistics, and thus have only secondary
local value, if any, to the local government.
Transfer in local government sometimes is induced
by promotional literature extolling the benefits of
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the applications, and by offers of technical assis-
tance and financial support for the transfer-
adaptation phase. Once implemented, local
officials may discover that the application doesn't
live up to the benefits claimed for it, yet it
requires a continuing financial commitment for
maintenance as part of the federal-local agree-
ment.2 ? This general situation has led one obser-
ver to quip that USAC's Integrated Municipal
Information System (IMIS) project is "another
example warning the cities to beware of Greeks [in
this case, the feds] bearing gifts."2
Another consideration for application transfer
is its net benefit over its full life cycle.2 2
Development savings from transfer may pale in the
face of costs for operation and maintenance. Some
applications simply are expensive to operate
because they were not designed with operation
and maintenance costs in mind. Others are expen-
sive because the originators issue frequent changes
or enhancements that have to be implemented.
Other applications are expensive because they
require new data collection and updating proce-
dures not previously performed by the local
government. This is particularly true of federal-
agency proffered applications that establish a new
reporting system or get the local government to
accept responsibility for an activity not previously
performed locally.2 3
Thus, local officials who make the transfer
decision on the basis of development savings alone
may discover that unforeseen costs exceed these
savings when they encounter technical problems,
low benefits, or life cycle costs connected with the
automated task.
5. Application transfer is a short cut for local
governments seeking an advanced state of EDP
development.
This notion of 'a quick technological fix is
sometimes used to promote application transfer
and, although appealing, it simply doesn't square
with reality. As mentioned already, transfer is not
occurring at a rapid pace, and most governments
with transfer experience transferred only one
application in the past two years (Table 2).
These findings should not be surprising for
several reasons. First, the search for transferable
applications requires extensive professional con-
tacts, at least within the same state, because the
small number of applications available and accep-
table are difficult to find even with the aid of
various computer software catalogs.24 A rich
375
network of professional relationships is likely to
be developed only in larger, experienced installa-
tions that have overcome pressures to show
immediate payoffs and adapt to vendor equipment
changes.
Second, the assessment of somebody else's
software is complex and requires that the trans-
feree government have personnel with experience
and sophistication comparable to the source's EDP
staff and user department personnel.
Even if the application bears the "Good House-
keeping Seal of Approval" from a national public
interest group, the transferee still requires
adequate staff skill locally for implementation.
Should the application be installed by an urban
technology transfer specialist, the transferee still
will need a local staff skillful enough to maintain
the application after the transfer-adaptation phase
ends.
Thus, successful application transfer requires
technical sophistication by the host government
that is similar to that needed to develop the
application. It is not a quick, easy way to get such
sophistication.
6. Technical factors, such as the lack of standard-
ized computer hardware and programming
languages, are the major barriers to application
transfer among local governments.
The considerable variety in computer main-
frames, operating systems, and peripheral devices
used among local governments creates compat-
ibility problems in adapting applications from one
computing environment to another.' Most of
these compatibility problems now have known
solutions and do not present the same transfer
barriers as in times past.2 6 In addition, diversity of
programming languages represents a lessened
barrier to transfer today, since most local govern-
ments have adopted COBOL as their common
programming language for administrative applica-
tions and FORTRAN for scientific-engineering
applications.
While transfer barriers due to hardware and
languages are lessening, "design for transfer"
looms large as a barrier primarily because of
institutional and behavioral factors. Local agencies
tend to design computer applications only to fit
local conditions rather than to be generalized
because frequently there are no special incentives
to design for transfer. Generalized approaches take
? more time and money to develop, involve commit-
ment to greater hardware and software expendi-
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tures for operation, and inevitably result in com-
promises for local users. Without special incen-
tives, therefore, local agencies are unwise to bear
these costs. However, sometimes this position is
taken even by system designers working on feder-
ally supported projects where special monetary
incentives are provided to develop generalized
applications for use by other governments.2 7 This
human tendency to design suboptimally for local
conditions may result from lack of knowledge
about how to design for transfer, or from lack of
personal/professional incentives, or both.
A related tendency of some computer profes-
sionals is to design for "leading edge" technology
rather than within the mainstream of existing
technology. "Leading edge" design offers many
incentives for the designer. It actually enhances
the designer's job because the more advanced
technology automatically provides many functions
the programmer previously had to design as part of
each application, and it permits sophisticated
niceties to be built into the application.' 8 The
designers sometimes are aided by enthusiastic users
who can think up frills that the designers may have
overlooked.2 9 These features, which make the
application unique and bring professional distinc-
tion to EDP staff and department users alike, can
also render the application difficult to transfer to
less advanced EDP installations.
Thus, the lack of instutional incentives for local
agencies to design for transfer and the behavioral
tendencies to design suboptimally for local condi-
tions and for leading edge technology?frailties
which affect the EDP and user staffs alike?
probably constitute greater current barriers to
transfer than the lack of technical standardization.
7. More application transfer would occur if there
were a National C7earinghouse and Resource
Center that would make information and com-
puter applications available to local govern-
ment.
Some proponents of application transfer cor-
rectly argue that the greatest benefits of transfer
will occur when a particular computer application
is installed nationwide among many local govern-
ments. To effect this, they would establish a
National Clearinghouse and Resource Center for
application software. The clearinghouse would
keep current information on each local govern-
ment's computing system, application availability,
and future needs and thereby "broker" exchanges
of applications among local governments with
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
comparable application-technology mixes. Among
other things, the resource center would collect and
maintain well-designed and documented "applica-
tion packages" that it would transfer or make
available to interested governments under member-
ship or contract arrangements.3?
Although the idea for some kind of national
center might be a good one, and indeed is
supported by local government officials,31 there
are several problems with the above conceptions.
A clearinghouse capable of storing and updating
information on each government's applications
and host computing system would be costly to
build. Updating the information might be a prob-
lem since frequent changes in local computing
technology could require keeping information on
each "version" of an application. Therefore, the
costs of maintaining the clearinghouse information
could swamp the start-up costs.
Moreover, local motivation to contribute infor-
mation about applications to the clearinghouse
could lessen as each government's costs become
clear. Periodically, each participating government
would need to update its information profile in
the clearinghouse and each would need to bear the
cost of documenting its applications, something
few governments now do. Those governments with
a "popular" application would need to control the
"versions" of the application every time it under-
went technology changes or design enhancements.
And each government would have to bear the cost
associated with handling inquiries and visits from
other governments exploring the possibility of
transfer.
Assuming exchanges result, governments with
few applications to offer but much to gain from
exchanges would have the greatest incentive for
participation, while governments with extensive
applications might be deluged with requests for
information and assistance with little to gain in
exchange. When the costs became too great, these
governments might withdraw from the clearing-
house causing an end to the operational feasibility
so dependent on the participation of the more
advanced (but not necessarily the most sophisti-
cated) governments.
Participation might be maintained and the
clearinghouse might have value commensurate
with its costs if focused on facilitating the search
phase of application exchanges, thereby limiting
the scope of data collection, maintenance, and
exchange. Most initial searches involve looking for
a particular application of interest available on a
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comparable computing system. Once preliminary
information indicates a fit, there is need for
follow-up search and inquiry that requires more
detailed information than need be kept in a central
information bank, along with direct personal
communication with potential application sources.
Thus, the feasibility and value of a clearinghouse
to information transfer about computer applica-
tions appears reasonable if its operation is limited
to facilitating the initial search for applications,
and local follow-up.
While a limited clearinghouse function is
potentially useful to information transfer, the
resource center would be of low utility to physical
transfer of computer applications. The assumption
underlying the resource center?that most applica-
tions can be transferred nationwide from a single
center?is problematic given the current pattern of
transfers. Table 6 shows that the dominant pattern
of current application transfer involves transfers
from one local government to another ("local to
local") rather than transfers from "centers" such
as federal or state agencies, or urban technology
transfer agencies. Table 6 also shows that, overall,
more transfers occur within the SMSA or state (47
per cent) rather than cross-country (37 per cent).
However, the pattern varies considerably
between cities and counties. Forty-eight per cent
of the cities transferred applications from "outside
the state" and 28 per cent transferred from "inside
the state" or "inside the SMSA." This difference
between cities and counties may be related to the
pattern of federal funding support for transfer
which has favored cities until recently.
377
There are several practical reasons for the
overall pattern of "local" transfers despite these
differences between cities and counties. One
reason is that state-to-state differences in adminis-
trative procedures reduce the likelihood that suit-
able applications, particularly operations-oriented
applications, will be found in another state if they
can't be found locally. Another reason for the
dominance of intra-state transfer is that local
governments restrict out-of-state travel more than
local travel. Also, the need for communication
(user-to-user and analyst-to-analyst) throughout
the transfer-adoption process is extensive and is
greatly facilitated by geographic proximity which
reduces travel time and costs. Lastly, computer
professionals rely heavily upon personal know-
ledge of the skill and programming practices of
other computing installations in making software
transfer decisions, and this knowledge is gained by
frequent, extensive peer contacts which also tend
to be circumscribed by state or regional bound-
aries.
It is also significant to note that the primary
kind of application packages currently available
from federal agencies and other urban technology
transfer agencies tend to be stand-alone, manage-
ment-oriented applications such as reporting
systems, resource allocation models, and facility
location models. These are relatively easy to
"standardize" and to transport from one place to
another. Yet, these kinds of applications have
relatively low priority locally as shown in Tables 7
and 8.
Most local governments place first priority on
TABLE 6
SOURCE AND LOCUS OF TRANSFERRED APPLICATIONS
Transferred From:
Cities
Counties
Totals
Source of Application
Local to locala
78%
(54)
95%
(76)
87%
(130)
Federal state to localb
22
(15)
5
( 4)
13
( 19)
Totals
100
(69)
100
(80)
100
(149)
Locus of Transfer
Inside SMSAe
14%
(10)
16%
(13)
15%
(23)
Inside state
14
(10)
48
(38)
32
(48)
Outside state
48
(33)
16
(13)
31
(46)
Unknownd
24
(16)
20
(16)
22
(32)
Totals
100
(69)
100
(80)
100
(149)
a. From either a city or county to another city or county.
b. From a federal or state agency or an urban technology transfer agency.
c. Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area.
d. Source of transferred application not indicated in response.
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TABLE 7
KIND OF APPLICATIONS TRANSFERRED
Kind of Application Cities Counties Total
Management-
oriented
25
18
43
Operations-
oriented
44
62
106
Total
69
80
149
automating the "bread and butter," operations-
oriented tasks of government (Table 8). Increas-
ingly they also place priority on making these
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
applications "on-line" and "integrated" (data not
shown). However, even simply operations-oriented
applications tend to have low transferability
because of differences in local administrative
procedures. When these applications are addition-
ally on-line and integrated, it is nearly impossible
to transfer them without replicating the original
EDP system and application in the new host
environment.32 While transfer makes these sys-
tems cheaper, they are still very expensive and
complex; thus, there are likely to be few of such
transfers.
The nonstandardness, complexity, and cost of
TABLE 8
APPLICATIONS TRANSFERRED BY GOVERNMENT FUNCTION
Number of Applications
Transferred
Function Cities
Counties
Total
Police/Sheriff
Law enforcement
statistics/crime
reportinga
3
1
4
Law enforcement
"package"
3
3
Other law enforce-
ment
5
3
8
Fire
Fire incident
reporting
4
4
Fire station locator
3
3
Courts
Jury selection
7
7
Other court appli-
cations
3
9
12
Emergency Preparedness
Accounting
General accounting/
financial manage-
ment
5
6
11
Payroll preparation
and accounting
5
7
12
Treasury/Collection/
Assessment
Personal property
records
2
2
Real property tax
records/billing
4
4
Other tax records
5
3
8
Budgeting and
Management
Budget monitoring
2
2
Number of Applications
Transferred
Function
Budget preparation/
Cities
Counties
Total
accounting
2
4
6
Purchasing
1
2
3
Personnel
3
3
Geoprocessing
5
1
6
Data Processing
2
1
3
Public Information
Clerk/Recorder
1
2
3
Public Buildings
1
1
Central Garage/Equip-
ment Management
3
2
5
Planning and Zoning
1
1
Housing and Urban
Renewal
1
1
Transportation
4
1
5
Utilities
Water/electric billing
3
3
Public Health
1
3
4
Public Welfare
Assistance records/
food stamps/dis-
abled/general
2
6
8
Information and
referral
1
2
3
Other
1
1
Libraries
Catalogue/circulation
3
3
Vital Statistics
Voter Registration
Registration records
1
2
3
Vote counting
3
3
Miscellaneous
2
2
4
Totals
69
80
149
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many operations-oriented applications means that
they probably cannot be handled as a "product"
by the resource center. Therefore, the applications
with greatest local demand and priority probably
would not be handled by the resource center.
Rather, the center would be limited to handling
applications that many local officials might regard
as "management frills" and might therefore ignore
until they have completed more basic automation
locally. Thus, the value of the resource center may
be questionable.
One area in which the resource center could be
of great value is the professional evaluation of
application software, particularly standard pack-
ages promoted by federal agencies or private
vendors. But, because it is too controversial, the
center is unlikely to perform this function. In
order to obtain continuing financial support from
various federal agencies, the center could become
a promoter for government-produced applications.
Consequently, it could exacerbate, rather than
help solve the evaluation problem for local govern-
ments.
Summary and Conclusion
Application transfer is a logical idea and has
substantial benefit, providing everything works
right. But, the experiences of cities and counties
show that frequently something goes wrong.
Therefore, local officials who must decide whether
to transfer a computer application from outside or
to develop it in-house must soberly assess the
complexity of the transfer-adaptation process and
the technical and behavioral factors that constrain
it. Much of the literature on transfer will not be of
much help to them because of its strong promo-
tional bias. Some of the government and private
agencies aren't very helpful either, since these
agencies have a potential conflict between their
interest to promote their own or others' applica-
tion software to local communities and their
purported interest in assisting local governments.
This article has tried to fill part of the void in
rational discussion about application transfer by
critical examination of some popular beliefs. Not
surprisingly, the assessment brings neither acclama-
tion nor disproof of the basic merits of application
tranfers. Rather, it has offered broad perspectives
on why more tranfers don't, and in some instances
shouldn't occur. One perspective focused on the
necessary conditions for any real cost savings to
occur from transfer. Another focused on real and
imagined technical barriers to application transfer.
379
Still another perspective pointed to behavioral
factors in transfer, which are the heart of technical
and cost problems, but which are important barriers
to effective transfer in their own right.
The issues raised here about application transfer
may be applicable to urban technology transfer
generally. They point to the need for more critical
examination of basic tenets in the field. They also
point to the need for systematic research into the
transfer process and into the relative costs and
benefits of transfer for different local government
activities and functions. Lastly, they suggest that
further critical examination of proposals for a
National Clearinghouse and Resource Center for
information technology may be warranted.
Notes
1. An excellent overview of the major programs is
contained in Robert Crawford, "The Application of
Science and Technology in Local Governments in the
United States," Studies in Comparative Local Gov-
ernment, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1973), pp. 1-19; and Federal
Council on Science and Technology, Directory of
Federal Technology Transfer (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1975).
2. The idea of transfer is expressed differently by
different organizations, Defense and space programs
describe technology transfer as the process of em-
ploying a technology for purposes other than that for
which it was developed. For example, see National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, Spinoff
1976: A Bicentennial Report (Washington, D.C.:
NASA, Technology Utilization Office, 1976), p. 3.
The Federal Council for Science and Technology
defines technology transfer more broadly as "the
process by which existing research knowledge is
transferred operationally into useful processes, pro-
ducts, or programs that fulfill actual or potential
public or private needs." Federal Council for Science
and Technology, p.v.
3. In the latter sense, technology transfer has been part
of the experience of American public administration
at least since the '50s. See William J. Siffin, "Two
Decades of Public Administration in Developing
Countries," Public Administration Review, Vol. 36,
No. 1 (January/February 1976), pp. 61-71; and
"Policy Management Assistance ? A Developing
Dialogue," Public Administration Review, Vol. 35,
Special Issue (December 1975).
4. Federal Council for Science and Technology.
5. For example, see: The Urban Institute, The Struggle
to Bring Technology to Cities (Washington, D.C.: The
Urban Institute, 1971); "Managing Data for
Decisions," Public Management, Vol. 53, No. 10
(October 1971); "Innovations in Local Government,"
Public Management, Vol. 57, No. 4 (April 1975);
Robert Wilson, "An Planned Program," Urban and
Regional Information Systems: Information Research
for an Urban Society, Vol. II, Papers from the Tenth
Annual Conference of URISA (Urban and Regional
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380
Information Systems Association) (Claremont,
Calif,: URISA, 1973), pp. 95-98; James R. Paul and
John L. McCarty, "FAMIS ? A Study of System
Transferability," ibid., pp. 99-115; and Joseph E.
Staszak, "Financial Management Systems: Transfer
for Results," Urban and Regional Information
Systems: Perspectives on Information Systems, Vol.
II, Papers from the Twelfth Annual Conference of
URISA (Claremont, Calif.: URISA, 1974), pp. 21-26.
6. This has always been a problem with the images
conveyed by equipment vendors and software firms
who market computer applications, and has led to
their claims being treated skeptically by knowledge-
able buyers. Some of the more surprising offenders in
recent years are federal agencies and federally spon-
sored urban technology transfers groups. Since their
claims might be taken more seriously, this develop-
ment bears watching.
7. The survey is part of a research project called URBIS,
for Urban Information Systems. The project objec-
tive is to evaluate information technology in local
government. Two questionnaires ? one dealing with
the computing installation's environment and another
with computing applications ? were sent to the data
processing managers, and one questionnaire was sent
to chief executives dealing with their perceptions of
computing. An overview of the project is provided in
Kenneth L. Kraemer and John Leslie King, "The
URBIS Project: A Policy-Oriented Study of Com-
puting in Local Government," Computers, Local
Government and Productivity, Vol. I, Papers from
the Thirteenth Annual Conference of URISA
(Chicago, Ill.: URISA, 1976), pp. 406-429.
8. The questions asked about transfers from another
local government (i.e., city, county, school district,
special district, or regional agency). The survey did
not specifically request information about transfers
from federal or state agencies, computer manufac-
turers, software vendors, or organizations which
specialize in urban technology transfer (e.g., Public
Technology, Inc.). These data were collected indirec-
tly through a checklist of computer applications
which included major "transfer packages," particu-
larly those available from federal agencies. In addi-
tion, some of the respondents listed computer appli-
cations from these non-local-government sources in
their replies about transfers from other local govern-
ments. These non-local sources are included in the
data presented here and treated separately wherever
possible. However, since the survey did not specif-
ically ask about these non-local-government sources,
the data about these sources should be considered
only suggestive.
9. By contrast, we estimate that 65 per cent of the
responding cities developed one or more applications
in-house during the last two years and 67 per cent of
the responding counties developed applications in-
house. These percentages are conservative estimates.
In addition, 87 per cent of the cities and 83 per cent
of the counties plan to develop applications in-house
or to transfer-in applications over the next two years.
10. By contrast, we estimate that the average number of
computer applications developed in-house per site
over the past two years is 6.3 in cities and 5.4 in
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
counties. These averages are conservative estimates.
In addition, the average number of applications
planned for development and transfer over the next
two years is 28.6 in cities and 24.2 in counties.
11. The literature on innovation is vast, but the following
studies specifically focus on "barriers" to innovation:
Arthur D. Little, Inc., and Industrial Research Insti-
tute, Inc., Barriers to Innovation in Industry: Oppor-
tunities for Public Policy Changes (Washington,
D.C., 1973); Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, The Conditions for Success in
Technological Innovation (Paris: OECD, 1971); Pro-
ject SAPPHO, A Study of Success and Failure in
Innovation (Brighton, England: Science Policy Re-
search Unit, University of Sussex, 1971).
12. Anthony Downs was the first to suggest that
computerized information systems would have
political impacts in addition to technical ones in "A
Realistic Look at the Final Payoffs from Urban Data
Systems," Public Administration Review, Vol. 27,
No. 3 (1967), pp. 204-210. Downs focused on
political impacts from the "information" contained
in automated systems rather than from the systems
themselves. For discussion of this distinction and
political impacts from automated systems per se, see:
Kenneth L. Kraemer and John Leslie King, Compu-
ters, Power and Urban Management: What Every
Local Executive Should Know (Beverly Hills, Calif.:
Sage Publications, 1976); and Rob Kling, "Auto-
mated Information Systems in Public Policy-
making," Working Paper No. 76-16 (Irvine, Calif.:
University of California, Public Policy Research
Organization, 1976).
13. This evaluation, though conducted without an evalua-
tion research design, is nevertheless systematic and
empirically based, using data from the URBIS survey,
reported experiences from the USAC projects,
exploratory case investigations in several local govern-
ments, and case descriptions in published literature.
The URBIS survey is described in Note 7 above. The
USAC (Urban Information Systems Inter-Agency
Committee) projects were sponsored by a consortium
of ten federal agencies, conducted in six municipal-
ities, and involved research and development of
information systems for municipal governments with
transferability as a major objective. Sources of
information on the USAC experiences include the
publications of individuals associated with the
projects, official project reports, and the author's
personal involvement and visits to the project sites
over a period of five years. Some observations from
the case work are reported in James N. Danziger,
"Computing, Local Governments, and the Litany to
EDP," Public Administration Review, Vol. 37, No. 1
(January/February 1977).
14. Danziger, p. 28. For example, talks at the annual
conferences of the Urban and Regional Information
Systems Association (URISA) tend to focus on new
applications, new approaches or plans for transfer
rather than on "successful transfer experiences." One
reason may be that the realities of transfer involve
difficulties and uncertainties that few people are
eager to talk about. The difficulty and uncertainty
surrounding transfer is cautiously conveyed in the
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following "abstract" from a URISA conference paper
by a participant in the City of Fresno's experience
with transfer of a complex financial information
system from the City of Dayton: "An increasing
number and variety of requests for financial informa-
tion indicated that the City of Fresno was outgrow-
ing its existing system for providing information.
Through a long and difficult process spanning more
than two years the City has developed and 'trans-
lated' a new Financial Information System based on
the City of Dayton model. The investment in the
system has been high but with the continuing
involvement and support of management it is antic-
ipated that this tool will mature to the point that the
monitoring, increased control, and flexibility it pro-
vides will be worth the effort," (p. 245). See Don
Nolan, "The Fresno City Experience in Transfer or
'Translation' of a Financial Information System
Using USAC Technology," Computers, Local Govern-
ment and Productivity, Vol. II, Papers presented at
the Thirteenth Annual Conference of URISA
(Chicago: URISA, 1976), pp. 245-252. The com-
plexity of this transfer effort was mainly due to its
size, involving many batch programs and integrated
data files, and covering the areas of payroll/per-
sonnel, accounting/disbursing, treasury management,
purchasing, and a program/project activity recording
structure for accounting and budgeting.
15. Danziger.
16. These tendencies are documented in John P. Crecine,
"A Computer Simulation Model of Municipal Budge-
ting," Management Science, No. 13 (July 1967), pp.
786-815, and Governmental Problem Solving: A
Computer Simulation of Municipal Budgeting
(Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1969).
17. In the URBIS survey, we asked chief executives
whether it was better to develop an application
in-house, transfer it from another local government
or transfer it from a private vendor. Over half (52%)
of the chief exeuctives favored transferring the
applications from another government. Yet, only 22
per cent of the cities and counties have transfer
experience. The chief executive's preference seems to
make a difference in the transfer sites. The number of
chief executives who preferred to transfer an applica-
tion from another local government was higher in the
transfer sites than in the URBIS population (66%
versus 52%).
The chief executive's preference also seems to be
understood by the data processing managers in the
transfer sites. The number of data processing man-
agers who felt that the availability of low cost
transferable applications was "important" or "very
important" also was higher in the transfer sites than
in the URBIS population (47% versus 37%). Addit-
ional information on the transfer issue and the
preferences of chief exeuctives is contained in
William H. Dutton, "Major Policy Concerns Facing
Local Executives," Nation's Cities, Vol. 13, No. 10
(1975), pp. 33-36.
18. Both of these programs are relatively small, inde-
pendent of other programs, and operate in the batch
mode. The Fire Station Locator, distributed by
Public Technology, Inc., is a computer program for
381
comparing and evaluating alternative fire station site
proposals using "response time" as the location
criterion. UFIRS, Uniform Fire Incident Reporting
System, is a computer program for generating man-
agement reports and analyses from fire incident
records. It was developed jointly by the National Fire
Protection Association and the Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development (HUD) and is distributed
by HUD.
19. George C. Hemmens, "Implementing the Integrated
Municipal Information Systems Concept: The Char-
lotte, North Carolina Case," paper presented at the
57th Annual Conference of the American Institute of
Planners, San Antonio, Texas, 1975, p. 19.
20. The GBF/DIME system promoted by the U.S. Bureau
of the Census illustrates the problem. The system,
which is a method of coding data to geographic
locations, was originally designed to assist the Bureau
in its mail-out-mail-back procedure for census taking.
The system requires verification and periodic updat-
ing locally because urban geography changes. The
Bureau secures local assistance through "agreements"
wherein the local governments receive matching
financial support and technical assistance to imple-
ment and maintain GBF/DIME and access to various
Bureau programs that will turn the system into a
"tool for local decision making."
The system serves local policy makers and
managers directly mainly through its utility to
various kinds of planners for community analysis,
location studies, and service boundary studies. How-
ever, the system is inadequate to meet day-to-day
operational needs for geographic data such as in
police and fire dispatch; therefore, the local cost of
maintaining the system is considered by some local
governments to exceed the benefits for planning
alone. The geoprocessing studies of the USAC cities
discuss this issue and alternatives to GBF/DIME. See,
for example: Public Safety Subsystem Project, Geo-
graphic Indexing Support System Conceptualization
and System Requirements (Long Beach, Calif.,
1973).
21. Hemmens, p. 14.
22. Life cycle costing refers to the calculation of costs
and benefits over the expected useful life of a system.
Costs and benefits are calculated for three major
phases: investment (comparable to design-devel-
opment phase), implementation (comparable to
transfer-adaptation phase), and operation and mainte-
nance. For a system, or a computer application, to be
cost-beneficial, there must be a net benefit when all
three phases are considered together. Savings in one
phase such as design-development may be outweighed
by expenditures with no corresponding benefits for
implementation, operation, and maintenance phases.
23. The Census Bureau's GBF/DIME system is perhaps
the best example. Local agencies that adopted the
system in connection with the 1970 census are now
being asked to assist with updating it for the 1980
census. See Note 20.
24. Software catalogs might become an important aid to
application transfer among local governments, but
currently they aren't. Catalogues specifically dealing
with local government computer applications are
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nonexistent. The catalogues currently available rarely
cover local government applications. For example,
neither the Spring 1975 issue of Skinny (abbreviated
version of ICP Software Directory) nor the 1974
NTIS Directory of Computerized Data Files and
Related Software contains many "systems or util-
ities" software that is potentially useful to the
operation of local government data processing instal-
lations; about half of the directory consists of such
software. International Computer Programs, Inc.,
Skinny (Carmel, Ind.: International Computer Pro-
grams, Inc., 1975); and National Technical Informa-
tion Services, Directory of Computerized Data Files
and Related Software Available from Federal Agen-
cies (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Com-
merce, 1974).
25. The great variety in mainframes and operating sys-
tems is not only due to the variety of makes and
models available at any time, but also due to the
many changes that occur over time to the mainframe
and operating systems. In addition, the applications
themselves evolve through enhancements. Thus, for a
particular computer application to be transferable, it
must exist in multiple versions, and "version control"
becomes a major problem in itslef. One consultant's
experience with these technical problems in relation
to a financial management system is reported in
James R. Paul and John L. McCarty's `TAWS ? A
Study in System Transferability."
26. Equipment compatibility also may be a lesser prob-
lem today because a few computer vendors dominate
the local government market. The URBIS survey
shows that 60 per cent of the cities and 70 per cent
of the counties over 10,000 population use at least
one IBM computer mainframe. The number of IBM
mainframe users increases with government size. For
example, about 40 per cent of the cities between
10,000-25,000 use IBM mainframes and 75 per cent
of those between 250,000-500,000 use IBM main-
frames. After IBM, the smaller governments (between
10,000-25,000) use NCR and Burroughs computer
mainframes about equally (25%). See Kenneth L.
Kraemer, William H. Dutton, and Joseph R.
Matthews, "Municipal Computers: Growth, Use and
Management," Urban Data Service, Vol. 7, No. 11
(Washington, D.C.: International City Management
Association, 1975); and Joseph R. Matthews, William
H. Dutton, and ',Kenneth L. Kraemer, "County
Computers: Growth, Use and Management," Urban
Data Service, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1976).
The survey also shows that transfer is more likely
to occur among local governments with the same
information manufacturer. Fifty-nine per cent of the
cities with the transfer experience had similar main-
frame manufacturers and 71 per cent of the counties
had similar vendors. Thus, the dominance of local
government computing by a few vendors probably
facilitates transfer among major groups of govern-
ments.
27. Fossum and Gottlieb question whether the result of
design for transfer is worth the price either for the
development city or another transfer city. See
Bernard Fossum and Steven Gottlieb, "The Wichita
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
Falls USAC Project Viewed in Perspective," Urban
and Regional Information Systems: Information Re-
search for an Urban Society, Vol. I, Papers from the
Tenth Annual Conference of URISA (Claremont,
Calif.: URISA, 1973), pp. 280-285.
28. Data base management systems are a good example
of an advanced technology that facilitates the design-
er's job but reduces the possibility of widespread
transfer of applications developed on them. For
example, Donald Luria, the former technical director
of the Charlotte, North Carolina, USAC project,
points out the following barriers to application
transfer from these systems: "Computer programs
that run under a particular data management system
rarely, if ever, can be transferred to run under
another data management system.
... The structure of an integrated data base is a
more subtle barrier to program transfer. In a job or
application-oriented (non-integrated) system the files
are structured to meet the processing requirements of
a single or relatively small number of programs. In an
integrated data base the files should be structured to
optimize the service to a multitude of users. It
follows then that computer programs that work
efficiently against one file structure may be far from
efficient against another file structure. Since the
structure is a function of the nature and variety of
applications and these will vary from city-to-city,
another barrier to the transfer of programs is set in
place" (p. 290). Donald D. Luria, "Success Depends
on Transferability," Urban Regional Information
Systems: Information Research for an Urban Society,
Vol. I, Papers from the Tenth Annual Conference of
URISA (Claremont, Calif.: URISA, 1973), pp.
286-293.
29. Even without frills, user-oriented design reduces the
likelihood of transfer. For example, Luria (p. 286)
says: "... there is an inverse relationship between the
degree to which the system is operations based and
integrated and the degree to which the systems
programs are transferable. First, the more operation-
ally based a system is, the more interactive it is. The
more interactive it is, the more the programs become
tailored to specific user-oriented procedures."
30. The characterization of the National Clearinghouse
and Resource Center is simplified here for analytical
purposes and is based upon participation in meetings
and discussions with the USAC Support Panel,
Assembly of Engineering, National Research Council,
Local Government Information Systems?A Study of
USAC and Future Applications of Computer Tech-
nology (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of
Sciences, 1976).
31. Ninety-four per cent of the city and county chief
executives responding to the URBIS survey felt
"There should be some central place (independent of
computer manufacturers) where local governments
can go for technical advice and training in computing
and data processing." (N=563)
32. This is one of the central conclusions of two
observers from the Charlotte, North Carolina, IMIS
project. See Hemmens and Luria, particularly the
quotations in notes 28 and 29.
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What Is and What Should Be
In University Policy Studies?
Stuart Nagel and Marian Neef, University of Illinois
As its title indicates, this article is designed to
serve two purposes. The first purpose in the order
presented is to describe what is happening in
university policy studies activities within political
science departments and within interdisciplinary
programs. The second purpose is to analyze a set
of prescriptions for improving policy studies
activities which have been recommended by
academics and by government practitioners. By
policy studies activities in this context we mean
research, teaching, and related activities that deal
with the applications of political and social science
to the study of the causes and especially the
effects of alternative governmental policies. Causes
include among other things the role of public
administrators in making policies or prospective
decisions, and effects include the varied imple-
mentation of governmental policies.
In order to determine what is and what should
be happening according to knowledgeable persons,
we conducted a survey in 1976 of chairpersons of
political science departments and directors of
interdisciplinary programs. We also conducted a
related survey in 1975 of members of the
American Political Science Association who were
holding positions in federal, state, or local
governments. This article emphasizes the results of
the university survey. A previous article em-
phasized the results of the practitioners survey,'
but comparisons will be made throughout this
article between the responses of the academics and
the practitioners.
The schools surveyed include all universities or
colleges that offer either a PhD degree or MA
degtee in political science as indicated on the
chairperson mailing lists of the American Political
Science Association. The schools surveyed also
include the interdisciplinary policy studies pro-
grams that are included on the membership list of
the National Association of Schools of Public
383
Affairs and Administration which have a political
science component, but that are not exclusively
political science, public administration, or business
administration programs. Of the 298 schools
surveyed, 42 per cent at least partly responded,
and information was obtained for 10 per cent of
the others from a similar survey made in 1973.
The exact wording of the questionnaire, the
verbatim responses of the respondents, and various
tabular presentations are all available elsewhere
and need not be repeated here.' Instead, this
article will emphasize the highlights of the results
of the survey with regard to such policy studies
activities as (1) special degrees, (2) research, (3)
teaching, (4) interdisciplinary activities, (5) fund-
ing, (6) journal publications, and (7) hiring and
placement. It will also emphasize the recommen-
dations for improving those activities especially
with regard to research, training, and communi-
cation among academics and government practi-
tioners. Part of the analysis will include a
comparison with an earlier survey of academics in
1973 so as to bring out trends in policy studies
activities. The quantitative presentation is supple-
mented with example quotations and a synthe-
sizing analysis of the controversial issues raised by
the respondents.
Stuart Nagel is a professor of political science at the Uni-
versity of Illinois and a member of the Illinois bar. He is
secretary-treasurer of the Policy Studies Organization and
coordinator of the Policy Studies Journal. He has been
an attorney to the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Admin-
istrative Practice and Procedure, the Office of Economic
Opportunity, and the National Labor Relations Board.
Marian Neef is a PhD candidate in political science at the
University of Illinois. She is the coauthor of two books
with Stuart Nagel and is the coeditor of the Policy Stud-
ies Directory, Political Science Utilization Directory,
and Policy Grants Directory.
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I. The Questionnaire Responses
Present Policy Studies Activities
Of the 103 respondents to the item asking
about special degrees related to policy studies
(other than the MA and PhD degree in political
science), 74 per cent answered yes. They were
generally referring to an MAPA which variously
stands for a master's degree in public adminis-
tration, public affairs, or policy analysis. Special
degrees also included doctorates in public
administration or policy analysis, and masters
degrees in public systems engineering, planning,
public service, criminal justice, and science policy.
The most special degrees seem to be offered by the
University of Michigan's Institute for Public Policy
Studies, which offers (in addition to the MA and
PhD in political science) a master of public policy,
master of public administration, master of science
in public systems engineering, and a doctorate in
public policy. Many departments responded like
North Texas State University by saying, "We do
not have a separate field for teaching and research
in policy studies, nor a separate degree. However,
we have been increasing our course offerings in the
area and expect this trend may continue."
Fifty-two per cent of those responding
indicated they had organized policy studies
research programs other than just relevant
individual faculty research. These specialized
programs emphasize research in such policy fields
as health (e.g., NYU), environmental protection
(Davis), science policy (Purdue), communications
(Michigan), energy (MIT), transportation (Tufts),
foreign policy (Johns Hopkins), urban policy
(Northwestern), housing (Minnesota), policy
theory (Indiana), poverty (Wisconsin), education
(Columbia), criminal justice (Albany), population
(North Carolina), teaching policy studies (Syra-
cuse), and agriculture (Iowa State).
Many schools mentioned not having a spe-
cialized research program but extensive research
activities, such as the response from Ohio State
University which said,
We do not have a single policy studies research program in
our department. However, several projects have developed
to the point that they have served as a source of
employment for graduate students, have provided a focus
for course offering, and have provided a basis for M.A.
theses and Ph.D. dissertations. These projects focus on
policy-making in the executive branch, foreign policy
decision-making, the implementation of employment
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
legislation, and the implementation of compensatory
education programs.
Research integrated into the teaching curricula
seems especially strong at the LBJ School at the
University of Texas, where its respondent said,
"Students in their second year pursue an
independent research project which generally
includes analysis of a public policy issue for a
public sector client, agency, or legislative com-
mittee."
Sixty-nine per cent of the respondents indi-
cated they have a special teaching curriculum or
field within political science called something like
policy studies. At the graduate level, the
University of California at Riverside said,
Public policy is, and for four or five years has been, one
of the six fields a student may elect in our Ph.D. program.
The public policy field, as we define it, includes both
substantive areas of policy (such as government and
business, government and science, intergovernmental
relations, educational policy and politics, etc.) and the
major policy making institutions (courts, Congress,
Presidency).
At the undergraduate level, MIT said, "MIT has a
number of programs in policy studies . . . in
addition, we are planning an undergraduate
concentration in public policy." Other schools
often indicated public policy is treated as a
sub-field within American government (e.g.,
Georgetown) or as an interdisciplinary outside
field (e.g., Duke).
Sixty-four per cent of the respondents indi-
cated their schools have an organized interdisci-
plinary policy studies program. For example,
Idaho State said,
Research generated through the Government Research
Institute has involved some fifty students over the past
three years in projects that are interdisciplinary and have
conceptual relevance to policy studies and their analysis
in the classroom. These programs have been organized and
supervised by a team of faculty members representing
Political Science and Sociology disciplines, with an
occasional input from the Department of Economics.
Minnesota also said,
Students are urged to include courses from outside the
department. In addition, a weekly colloquium offers
students and faculty the opportunity to hear speakers on
varied aspects of public policy. Joint degrees are in effect
with the Law School, Program in Hospital and Health
Care Administration, and School of Social Work.
The interdisciplinary policy studies programs like
those at Harvard, Michigan, Washington, and
elsewhere by definition include people and
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perspectives from a variety of social science
disciplines and sometimes also natural science,
humanities, and the professional schools like law,
social work, education, and business.
Fifty-one per cent of the respondents indicated
their departments or schools were recipients of
special funding concerning policy studies activities.
The sources particularly included the National
Science Foundation, Ford, LEAA, DOT, HEW,
HUD, NIMH, DOD, Sloan, Carnegie, NASA, and
the Office of Education. The Ford Foundation has
been especially helpful to about a dozen
interdisciplinary policy studies programs like those
at Duke, Yale, Princeton, and Stanford. Money,
however, seemed to be a problem partly as
indicated by the relatively low percentage of
schools indicating a willingness to take over the
operation of the journal of the Policy Studies
Organization given the financial burden that might
mean. The University of Massachusetts said,
"Sorry, we're broke," and the University of
California at Davis said, "Possibly, if suitable
budgetary arrangements could be made," although
Georgia State said, "We would be glad to discuss
the possibility."
Although the political science marketplace in
general is rather tight because of budgetary
problems, 40 per cent of 95 respondents indicated
they were hiring in the policy studies field. Un-
like other political science fields, the number of
schools hiring exceeds the number of schools
seeking to place public policy graduates, since a
lower 24 per cent of 71 respondents indicated
they had people available to place. The market for
hiring and placing in the policy studies field seems
to be especially active at the junior level for lack
of funds to hire senior people, and possibly
because junior people may be more likely to have
relevant policy analysis training. The University of
Washington at Seattle said, "The Graduate School
of Public Affairs plans to make two or three
appointments for .the fall of 1976." A typical
response illustrating that hiring is greater than
placing in the public policy field (as contrasted to
other fields) came from Cornell which said,
One of the currently vacant positions is in American
Government/Public Policy, but no other openings are
likely as Cornell has generally frozen hiring. Our program
is only beginning to have Ph.D.'s with a program in Public
Policy, so we do not have any placement experience yet.
The analysis of policy studies activities could
have been broken down into the PhD departments,
the MA departments, and the interdisciplinary
385
programs? Doing so would indicate that the
interdisciplinary policy studies programs are the
most active in the sense of having special degrees,
organized research, special teaching, interdisci-
plinary activities, special funding, a willingness to
participate in the PSO journal, and hiring and
placement. The PhD departments are the next
most active, and the MA departments third,
although there are many MA departments that are
more active than some PhD departments.
Among the PhD departments, the degree of
activity correlates positively with the ranking of
the department by the American Council of
Education. This indicates that policy studies has
acquired a greater respectability among the higher
ranked departments than was the case with the
1973 academic survey (which resulted in the first
Policy Studies Directory3), where that correlation
was negative. It may also indicate that the
higher-ranked departments are now less likely to
leave policy studies exclusively to the interdisci-
plinary programs at those schools. The correlation
analysis also shows that if a department responds
favorably on one item, it is also likely to respond
favorably on each other item given that policy
studies tends to relate simultaneously to many
aspects of the operations of political science
departments.
Changes in Policy Studies Activities
A subgroup of the respondents reported an
increase, a decrease, or no change in each of the
seven items. That subgroup consisted of those 36
who responded to both the present 1976
questionnaire and the previous 1973 one, thereby
holding constant those respondents across both
surveys. We cannot meaningfully compare the
total percent saying yes in the new 1976
questionnaire with the per cent saying yes in the
old 1973 questionnaire, since the first one only
included PhD departments and not MA de-
partments or interdisciplinary programs, and since
the same PhD departments did not respond to
both questionnaires.
A department shows an increase on an item by
having said no in 1973 and sort of or yes in 1976,
or by saying sort of in 1973 and yes in 1976. A
department shows a decrease by having said yes in
1973 and something less than yes in 1976. The no
change category generally involves saying yes to
both questionnaires on an item, although some-
times saying no to both, or sort of to both. With
regard to the first item involving special degrees,
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386
50 per cent of the 36 departments who responded
to that item in both '73 and '76 showed an
increase, 50 per cent no change, and 0 per cent a
decrease. A net increase on each item was
calculated by subtracting the per cent decrease
from the per cent increase and ignoring the no
change category. Thus, the net increase on the
special degrees item was 50 per cent (or 50 per
cent-0 per cent).
There was a substantial net increase in
departments reporting special policy studies
degrees, extension training of government person-
nel, organized research, special teaching, and
organized interdisciplinary activities. More moder-
ate net increases occurred in newsletters, special
funding, and miscellaneous policy studies activ-
ities. Net decreases, however, occurred in hiring
and placement activities given the increased
tightness of the academic and governmental job
markets. Hiring and placement, however, is still
quite active in the policy studies field as indicated
by the fact that 40 per cent of all the respondents
said they were hiring, and 24 per cent said they
were placing. A net decrease was also reported in
willingness to take over some of the publication
activities of the Policy Studies Organization,
possibly due to a feeling that the costs would be
too great in view of the expanded nature of those
activities and the contracted nature of depart-
mental budgets.
Recommendations for Improved Research,
Communication, and Training
The second part of the questionnaire was
designed to provide recommendations and other
ideas for improving the policy relevance of
political science research, communication, and
training. Those were three key topics discussed in
the recent Political Science Utilization Directory
(Policy Studies Organization, 1975) by present or
former government practitioners in federal, state,
or local government who were members of the
American Political Science Association. In offering
recommendations for research, the responding
political science departments and interdisciplinary
-
programs emphasized the need for research on
methods of decision making and policy evaluation.
The practitioners from the earlier survey, on the
other hand, placed less emphasis on research
methodology and policy formation, and more
emphasis on substantive policy and public
administration.
Both groups emphasized the need for more
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
evaluation and impact studies, as is illustrated by
the practitioner respondent from the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration who com-
mented,
We need prescriptive rather than descriptive research.
Simply to tell a political decision-maker that a policy will
be endorsed by one constituency rather than another
probably only repeats something he already knows.
A small but substantial subgroup from both the
academics and the practitioners also emphasized
economic analysis, cost-benefit analysis, and
related research. Respondents from the inter-
disciplinary programs especially emphasize the
need for interdisciplinary research, such as the
respondent from the Maxwell School who said,
"Political scientists should be employed in
evaluative studies of the impact of existing
programs, along with other social scientists."
In offering recommendations regarding how
political scientists might better communicate their
research to people in government and receive
feedback in return, the respondents emphasized
the need for exchanges of research summaries,
conferences, and workshops with practitioners.
The practitioners also advocated similar devices, as
indicated by the respondent from the National
Institutes of Health who said,
Academic political scientists should spend some time in
government as advisors, consultants, interns, residents,
special assistants to Cabinet members and Congressional
committees, etc. Government employees should spend a
semester or two at a university every five years. There is a
great need for such continual interchange.
Given the agreement on both sides, all that is
perhaps needed are some facilitating personnel and
funds in various governmental line agencies and
research agencies designed to encourage relevant
research utilization. The academics and practition-
ers also agreed on the need for journal articles with
less jargon. The main disagreement relates to the
fact that the academics may be more optimistic
regarding what academic research has to offer than
the practitioners are. The interdisciplinary policy
programs at Berkeley, Harvard, and Yale partici-
pate in publishing the useful policy journals: Policy
Analysis, Public Policy, and Policy Sciences,
respectively, although the respondent from the
Princeton Woodrow Wilson School mentioned that
we need "the preparation of far better reviews of
the state-of-the-art than have been issued either by
government or the research community."
Recommendations were also offered for how
political science training can better prepare people
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for working in government, or doing work outside
of government that is relevant to government
decision making. Here as in research, the
academics emphasized methodology, especially
quantitative techniques, whereas the practitioners
emphasized substantive knowledge about how
government actually functions, and expertise in
specific policy areas. Both groups strongly endorse
internships in government and field experience,
and they both endorse the increased emphasis on
public policy studies.
The methodological emphasis of the academics
is illustrated by West Virginia University, which
responded by saying, "Presently, many institutions
turn out people who may be well-trained in the
substantive aspects of American politics and
government or applied policy science, but do not
have a solid grounding in the science of political
science," or the response from Cornell which said,
"A first requirement is that political scientists have
a solid training in economics . .. because the
discipline is most relevant to the framing of
questions of choice and because so many choices
are framed in economic terms." A representative
practitioner involved in planning at the statewide
level said,
The best training we have found is the actual experience
in doing policy analysis for elected decisionmakers. Some
kind of actual training which required taking an issue,
looking at it, and preparing recommendations for
particular action is the most effective preparation for
people in our kind of an agency.
Optimism as to the meaningfulness of the new
interdisciplinary training programs is expressed by
the respondent for the Berkeley Graduate School
of Public Policy who said, "A profession is now
developing in which people are trained to examine
alternative approaches to public policy programs,
to evaluate the effects of policies, and to facilitate
the implementation of programs."
Although the PhD departments may have more
policy studies activities, the respondents from the
MA departments tended to be more articulate with
regard to offering recommendations for research
needed, improved communication, and improved
training. Perhaps becoming more involved in trying
to operate a policy studies program makes one
more cautious about making recommendations
after seeing more of the complexities involved. On
the other hand, some of the PhD departments may
be overly cautious not only with regard to making
recommendations, but also with regard to getting
involved in the application of political science to
387
important policy problems. Perhaps an error of
holding back when one could make a significant
theoretical and practical contribution may be
much more costly in terms of the opportunity
costs than an error of moving forward with
recommendations and programs before they are
fully tested.
H. Issues Involved in Having a Balanced Policy
Studies Program
1. To what extent should the program be an
undergraduate rather than a graduate program and
a PhD rather than an MA program?
For political science departments that only
have undergraduate courses, this is not an issue,
although they could be thinking about main-
taining a balance between the policy studies train-
ing of undergraduates who are not likely to do
graduate work and those who are. The depart-
ments in the 1976 questionnaire all offer at least
a master's degree, and for them the undergraduate-
graduate distinction is relevant. A program that
involves undergraduate MA and possibly PhD pol-
icy studies work provides diversity of faculty ex-
periences and student interaction, an increased
quantity of students to generate the critical mass
that might be needed for amore effective program
and a recruitment source for the more advanced
aspects of the program. Teaching policy studies to
undergraduates can be especially helpful with
regard to learning how to simplify the presentation
of materials that might otherwise be unduly
quantitative or theoretical, and such simplification
can also be helpful with regard to improved
communication with government practitioners.
Establishing a three-level program can be made
easier by including a number of advanced
undergraduate courses that can be taken for either
graduate or undergraduate credit. Further discus-
sion of the undergraduate aspects of a policy
analysis program is included in David Smith,
"Policy Analysis for Undergraduates" (Ford
Foundation Public Policy Committee, 1975).
2. To what extent should the program train
people for government work as contrasted to
teaching work?
This issue is related to the first issue in that
PhD programs tend to emphasize teaching, and
undergraduate or MA programs tend to emphasize
government work, but not necessarily. There is an
increasing demand for PhDs to do government
policy evaluation work as indicated in the
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responses to the Political Science Utilization
Directory (Policy Studies Organization, 1975).
Likewise, the undergraduate and MA programs
could have a component which encourages going
on for a PhD teaching degree. It is desirable to
have interaction between students who are
oriented toward becoming policy evaluation
practitioners and students who are oriented
toward becoming teachers and research authors,
since both groups have perspectives and ideas that
may provide insights to the other group as well as
to the faculty.
3. To what extent should the program be a
political science program as contrasted to an
interdisciplinary program?
Since we are mainly talking about policy
studies programs within political science depart-
ments, it follows that these programs will basically
be political science programs although with
interdisciplinary elements. Of all the social
sciences, political science is the most relevant to
discussing the institutional aspects of policy
formation and policy implementation with regard
to the roles of federal, state, and local legislators,
chief executives, administrators, and judges. Polit-
ical science also provides relevant knowledge and
theories with regard to the roles of parties, interest
groups, public opinion, and political philosophy in
policy formation and implementation. Those
concerns are enough to make political science a
meaningful focus for a policy studies program,
although a more nearly comprehensive program
would require substantial supplementing from
other disciplines like economics, sociology, law,
psychology, and philosophy, as is discussed in
Policy Studies and the Social Sciences (Nagel (ed.),
Lexington, 1975). The supplementing can take the
form of required outside courses, a required
minor, political science courses that emphasize the
substance and method of other disciplines, and
also recommended electives.
4. What about the balance between substance
and method?
Both substantive and methodological knowl-
edge are needed for policy studies. If students are
just well-versed in policy evaluation methodology,
but they have had no depth in any substantive
policy problem area, then their work is likely to be
overly abstract and possibly impractical for lack of
that concrete knowledge. On the other hand,
individuals who are well-versed in a specific policy
problem area (like poverty, environmental protec-
tion, foreign policy, economic regulation, etc.)
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
could not consider themselves to be policy studies
or policy analysis persons if they do not have some
generalized methodological skills for analyzing
policy alternatives across policy problem areas.
Relevant substantive problems of special interest
to political scientists are those included in Policy
Studies in America and Elsewhere (Nagel (ed.),
Lexington, 1975), such as civil liberties, electoral
policy, and foreign policy. Relevant methodologies
include those dealt with in books like Sciolo and
Cook, Methodologies for Analyzing Public Policies
(Lexington, 1975), and Delbeare, Public Policy
Evaluation (Sage, 1975), such as case studies,
inductive statistics, and deductive modeling.
5. To what extent should policy studies be a
separate field within political science rather than a
pervasive approach in all fields of political science?
Policy studies can be both a separate field and a
pervasive approach. As a separate field, policy
studies is distinguished from other political science
fields partly by its methodology which emphasizes
(1) causal analysis in explaining policy variations
over time, across places, and across subject
matters, as well as a methodology of (2)
means-ends analysis for evaluating alternative
public policies especially, but not exclusively, in
terms of their impacts on the political system. It is
also distinguished by its substance which empha-
sizes a concern for poverty, environmental
protection, foreign policy, economic regulation,
and other policy problem areas. As a pervasive
approach, a policy studies perspective can be
included within every field of political science
including international policy, comparative policy,
policy theory, administering policy, judicial
policy, state and local policy, legislative policy,
and policy dynamics. The relevance of all fields of
political science to a given policy problem is
illustrated by Environmental Politics (Nagel (ed.),
Praeger, 1974).
6. To what extent should the program balance
classroom and field experience?
It is highly desirable to give policy studies
students some experience in government work,
especially policy evaluation work, to supplement
their classroom learning. The difficult problem is
how to provide that experience. One method at
least for PhD and MA students is through
internships, especially in state government. The
need for providing more experience to more
students can also be partly satisfied by having the
students work with faculty members who are
involved in real world consulting projects. Playing
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simulated roles in policy gaming situations such as
those that relate to urban planning, environmental
protection, foreign policy, criminal justice, and
other problem areas can also provide many useful
insights. Inviting practitioners to teach and speak
within the policy studies program can provide
some vicarious experience to supplement the more
abstract classroom and textbook experience. For
further information on policy studies internships,
see the publications of the Washington-based
National Center for Public Service Internship
Programs, such as Public Service Internships:
Opportunities for the Graduate, Post Graduate and
Mid-Career Professional (1975).
7. To what extent will the program be
balanced with hard money from university budget
lines as contrasted to soft money from grants and
possibly contracts that relate to policy evaluation?
The hard money is needed to give the program
security and also respectability. The soft money is
needed to give the program some extra funds and
also to provide the kind of research projects that
may be especially useful as learning experiences
and for developing some PhD dissertations, MA
theses, and seminar papers. Obtaining some soft
money grants and contracts may also stimulate the
university to appropriate regular budget money for
the program on a seed money basis or a continuing
basis. On the other hand, obtaining hard money to
establish the program can facilitate getting
research grants and training grants from founda-
tions and government agencies. Outside grant
money may be especially facilitated if the political
sicence policy studies program can link up with an
academic research institute which already has a
good track record for policy evaluation research,
as do some institutes of government research at
public and private universities. Policy studies
grant-getting is the subject of the forthcoming
Policy Studies Grants Directory (Policy Studies
Organization, 1977).
8. To what extent should the program be
exclusively a teaching and training program as
contrasted to being exclusively a policy studies
research institute with no substantial teaching
component?
A meaningful training program would have to
have a research component because part of the
training logically involves training to do research
regardless whether the program is training (1)
academics who teach and research or (2)
government practitioners who administer or
produce research, or at least consume research. To
389
acquire research skills, one needs to be involved in
research projects. Thus, the policy studies program
should encourage research on the part of its
faculty and its graduate students. That research
will increase the visibility of the program, aid its
recruitment, aid its placement, and aid in getting
grants and contract money. On the other hand, a
pure research program would be hurt by the
absence of graduate students and possibly
undergraduates who would be part of the training
component. Those students help generate ques-
tions, comments, and ideas which improve the
research. They also provide people who can
participate as research assistants and research
collaborators. A pure research program might have
difficulty attracting sufficiently creative personnel
who welcome faculty-student stimuli and who
consider being exclusively in a research institute
too much like a 9 to 5 job lacking the
independence that is associated with a two course
per semester teaching schedule in which one may
work well into the night, but on self-motivated
research.
9. To what extent should the program
emphasize the causes of variation in public policy
rather than emphasize the evaluation of alternative
public policies?
Increasing emphasis is now being placed in
political science on quantitatively evaluating
alternative public policies. That emphasis is in
response to (1) new methodoligical tools and data
banks, (2) job opportunities and grants, (3) the
stimuli of intense public concern over govern-
mental policy in the late '60s and early '70s, (4)
reaching a possible saturation point with regard to
the application of duplicative quantitative research
to relatively unimportant political matters, and (5)
the momentum of policy-relevant research, teach-
ing, and institutions in political science in the
mid-1970s. That evaluative emphasis is especially
relevant to the mainstream of political science if it
deals with evaluating alternative public policies
that relate to how chief executives, public
administrators, legislators, or judges ought to
operate, or if it relates to subject matters that are
especially within political science like international
relations, civil liberties, or electoral policy.
That evaluative emphasis may also be quite
relevant to political science regardless of the type
of public policies being evaluated so long as the
concern is with the authoritative allocating of
things of value rather than with natural science,
humanities, or other non-political science topics.
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On the other hand, one cannot meaningfully
evaluate alternative public policies without taking
into consideration what causes some policies to be
adopted and others to be rejected by policy
makers, policy appliers, or policy recipients. To
ignore that kind of causal analysis is to ignore the
important evaluative criterion of political feasibil-
ity. Causal analysis is also quite relevant to
evaluation or optimizing work in the sense that
one cannot evaluate alternative public policies
unless one knows something about the causal
relations between those policies and whatever
goal-criteria are being used. That kind of
means-ends causal analysis is different from what
causes a type of policy or decision to be adopted,
but the same kind of methodology applied to
either kind of causal analysis.
III. Some Conclusions
The main conclusion to be drawn from the
questionnaire responses is that policy studies are
alive and well in political science departments and
interdisciplinary programs across the country, and
still growing rapidly although possibly at a less
rapid rate than in the early 1970s. Additional
quantitative support for that conclusion is given in
the recent 1975-76 APSA Survey of Political
Science Departments which again shows that the
public policy field is the fastest growing political
science field as measured by course enrollment
trends. Of the 49 PhD departments with 21 or
more faculty, 53 per cent reported a gain in the
public policy field, and only 9 per cent reported a
loss, for a difference of 42 percentage points,
which is higher than any other field. There was a
similar difference of 45 percentage points in
1974-75, and 52 percentage points in 1973-74,
indicating some plateauing of the trend. It is
difficult, however, every year to have almost SO
per cent of those political science departments
report another gain in the public policy field, as
they have been since the APSA survey began. The
related field of public administration has been
maintaining a close second with regard to the per
cent of departments reporting a gain rather than a
loss in course enrollments.
The main conclusion to be drawn from the
discussion of issues in Part II of this article and the
recommendations included in Part I is that there
are a variety of policy studies perspectives
regarding the relative importance of such matters
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
as (1) method versus substance and (2) policy
formation versus policy evaluation. Those two
issues particularly divided academics and prac-
titioners, although they agreed on the need for (1)
more policy studies within political sciences, (2)
more academic-practitioner interaction, and (3)
more field experience for policy students. There
were also some differences of emphasis (1)
between PhD departments and MA departments,
as for example, on method versus substance, and
(2) between political science departments and
interdisciplinary policy studies programs, as for
example, on policy formation versus policy
evaluation and interdisciplinary emphasis. There
does, however, seem to be general consensus that
those perspectives are not incompatible, but rather
are simultaneously needed to provide balanced
policy studies programs either within political
science departments or in interdisciplinary pro-
grams.
Thus, we can conclude that a lot is happening
with regard to university policy studies, but that
more probably should be happening, especially
with regard to simultaneously having (1) PhD, MA,
and undergraduate emphasis, (2) training for
government and teaching, (3) political science and
interdisciplinary emphasis, (4) substantive and
methodological training, (5) policy as a separate
subfield and a pervasive perspective, (6) more field
experience to supplement the classroom, (7)
support money from diverse sources, (8) teaching
and research activities, and simultaneously having
(9) causal and evaluative emphasis in the policy
studies programs. Adoption of these considera-
tions should help to bring closer together and
make more effective the fields of policy studies,
political science, and public administration.
Notes
1. Nagel and Neef, "The Use of Political Science: The
Practitioner's Perspective," PS, Vol. 8 (1975), pp.
376-380; and Nagel and Neef (eds.), Political Science
Utilization Directory (Policy Studies Organization,
1975).
2. Nagel and Neef (eds.), Policy Studies Directory (Policy
Studies Organization, 1976). Copies of this 152-page
directory can be obtained for $1.00 to cover
administrative and mailing costs from the Policy
Studies Organization, 361 Lincoln Hall, University of
Illinois, Urbana, Illinois 61801. The Directory was
published with the aid of the NSF Office of
Intergovernmental Programs.
3. Ibid.
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From the Professional Stream
CURRENTS and SOUNDINGS
STAFFING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: THE ROLE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
John P. Renninger, United Nations Institute for Training and Research
After having been largely ignored for many
years, personnel issues have begun to again receive
attention at the United Nations.1 Since approxi-
mately 70 per cent of the UN's budget is devoted
to personnel costs, such attention is long overdue.
However, one very important recent development
seems to have passed almost unnoticed. This is the
creation of the International Civil Service Commis-
sion. In this article we will briefly discuss the
establishment of the Commission. Its functions
will be described and its initial activities analyzed.
We will conclude with some thoughts on the major
challenges facing the Commission in the future.
The International Civil Service Commission
As long ago as 1945 the Preparatory Commis-
sion of the United Nations recommended the
creation of an international civil service commis-
sion and the General Assembly adopted that
recommendation at its first session in 1946.2 This
initiative was, however, never pursued, and instead
the International Civil Service Advisory Board
(ICSAB) was set ui5 in 1948 to advise the United
Nations system of organizations on personnel prac-
tices.
The International Civil Service Advisory Board
was instrumental in shaping the evolution of the
United Nations "common system" of personnel
policies and practices. Beginning in 1946, special-
ized agencies such as the ILO and other organiza-
The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of
various United Nations staff members in preparing this
article. The views expressed are personal and do not
necessarily reflect the official position of the United Na-
tions Institute for Training and Research.
tions affiliated with the UN entered into certain
agreements with the United Nations thus creating
the common system. The common system consists
of common salaries and allowances, a common
grading system, participation in a common pension
fund, and a common administrative tribunal.3 The
common system now includes all of the specialized
agencies (with the exception of those located in
Washington, D.C.4) and other organizations in the
UN system such as UNICEF and UNDP. Despite
these arrangements, there has never been a unified
international civil service. Differences and dis-
crepancies in personnel practices and policies exist.
Such a situation is perhaps inevitable when a large
number of organizations, each of which must re-
port to different legislative bodies, is involved.
By the 1970s the international civil service had
greatly increased in size. The secretariats of the
organizations comprising the United Nations com-
mon system now employ approximately 40,000
individuals, and it became clear that more effective
coordination of personnel practices of the differ-
ent organizations was needed in order to maintain
and strengthen the common system. In addition
there was continuing uncertainty over what salary
scale was appropriate for the United Nations sys-
tem. In 1970 the General Assembly created a
special committee to review the salary system. But
its massive report, issued in 1972, was inconclu-
sive.5 Finally, there was a good deal of dissatisfac-
John P. Renninger is a research associate at the United
Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR).
In addition to international administration, he is inter-
ested in international development issues, particularly as
they concern Africa. His articles on these topics have
appeared in various scholarly journals.
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tion, particularly among Member-States, over what
were perceived as inadequacies in personnel poli-
cies and practices.6 In brief, it can then be said
that the desire to maintain the common system
with an appropriate salary scale and eventually to
create a unified international civil service plus con-
siderable dissatisfaction with existing policies and
practices are the main factors which explained the
General Assembly's decision to create the Inter-
national Civil Service Commission.
The General Assembly decided to establish the
Commission in 1972.7 It was later decided that
the statute of the Commission should be referred
to governments for comment. It was therefore not
until the 29th session of the General Assembly in
1974 that the statute was approved and the Com-
mission formally came into being.8 The Commis-
sion consists of 15 members of whom only two,
the chairman and vice-chairman, serve full-time.
Raul Quijano of Argentina was named chairman.
The vice-chairman is A.L. Adu of Ghana.9 Accord-
ing to its statute, members of the Commission
shall serve "in their personal capacity as indi-
viduals of recognized competence who have sub-
stantial experience of executive responsibility in
public administration or related fields, particularly
in personnel management." Members are also to be
chosen "with due regard for equitable geographical
distribution." Of the first 15 members of the Com-
mission, five are from the Western, developed
world, two are from Socialist bloc countries, and
eight come from developing countries. No two
members may be from the same country.
In exercising its functions, the Commission
should aim "at the development of a single unified
international civil service through the application
of common personnel standards, methods and
arrangements." According to the statute, the fol-
lowing matters fall within the Commission's
mandate: (1) broad principles for the determina-
tion of the conditions of service of the staff; (2)
scales of salaries and post adjustments for staff; (3)
allowances and benefits of staff; (4) staff assess-
ment; (5) methods by which the principles for
determining conditions of service should be ap-
plied; (6) classification of duty stations for the
purpose of applying post adjustments; (7) job
classification standards; (8) standards of recruit-
ment of international civil servants; (9) develop-
ment of recruitment sources, including the estab-
lishment of central rosters of qualified candidates;
(10) organization of competitive examinations or
alternative selection procedures; (11) career devel-
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
opment, staff training, and staff evaluation pro-
grams; and (12) the development of common staff
regulations.
Although the Commission will exercise certain
powers itself, on most matters it will make recom-
mendations. The Commission will carry out its
functions "in respect of the United Nations and of
those specialized agencies and other international
organizations which participate in the United Na-
tions common system and which accept the pre-
sent statute." To date, ten organizations, in addi-
tion to the UN itself, have accepted the statute.19
It is anticipated that all organizations, except the
four in Washington, D.C., which have traditionally
had separate personnel procedures, will accept it in
the future.
The full Commission meets twice a year. Thus
far the Commission has had four sessions. The first
was devoted almost entirely to organizational
matters. The General Assembly, in establishing the
Commission, asked that it review the United Na-
tions salary system "as a matter of priority." The
Commission dealt with the salary review at its
second, third, and fourth sessions. A report on
salaries for the international civil service has now
been completed and submitted to the General
Assembly for its consideration.11
In addition to conducting the salary review, the
Commission has assumed responsibility for such
technical tasks as the monthly revisions of the
schedules of daily subsistence allowances (for UN
staff members travelling in all parts of the world)
and of post adjustment classifications. It also now
has responsibility for carrying out cost-of-living
surveys required for the calculation of various
rates and salaries. In the 1976-77 budget period
the Commission's total staff will number approxi-
mately 38 and its annual budget will be approxi-
mately $1.5 million.' 2
The Commission and the Future of the
International Civil Service
Given the interdependence of the world com-
munity and the resulting increase in the activities
to be conducted by international organizations, it
seems likely that the size of the international civil
service will increase in the future. This assumption,
however, is valid only if the international civil serv-
ice proves itself capable of discharging these in-
creased responsibilities with a certain degree of
competence. Otherwise, governments will seek
different avenues for dealing with global problems.
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The evolution of the international civil service
then is a matter of considerable importance. The
International Civil Service Commission will un-
doubtedly play a large role in this evolution. The
general environment in which the Commission
must operate is not an auspicious one. The day has
long since passed when there was an accepted
model of the international civil service. The model
that emerged from the League of Nations experi-
ence, and the one that was adopted without
serious question by the founders of the United
Nations, is the traditional model of the interna-
tional civil service. The traditional model is based
on the principles of merit, independence, and im-
partiality. In 1945, it was expected that the
United Nations would conform to this model in its
staffing arrangements. This expectation is quite
clear in Article 101, paragraph 3, of the Charter
which states:
The paramount consideration in the employment of
the staff and in the determination of the conditions of
service shall be the necessity of securing the highest stand-
ards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard
shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on
as wide a geographical basis as possible.
It was clearly the founders' intention that merit
take precedence over geographical representation
and it was on this basis that a career international
civil service was established. But the traditional
model never received unqualified support from
Member-States. The Soviet Union questioned the
concept from the beginning, and the United States
also played a part in weakening it." 3 Despite these
challenges and the natural inclination of Member-
States to put forward their own nationals for
vacant posts, the essential elements of the concept
of an international civil service remained intact
until the early 1960s. Until that time debates on
personnel questions were rather tepid.' 4
This period of relative tranquility came to an
end in the 1960s. The Socialist bloc countries,
gravely concerned over the tendency of the Secre-
tary-General and the secretariat to act indepen-
dently, expressed strong reservations on the con-
cept of an international civil service. Also in the
1960s, a large number of African states gained in-
dependence and became members of the United
Nations. According to Professor Leland Goodrich:
The new members were still in the mood of revolt
against colonialism, all too often identified with Western
influence, and were impatient in their demands for recog-
nition. They were anxious, on grounds of state equality
and national prestige, to obtain quick and full acceptance
393
of their claims to equal participation in the work of the
organization, not only in the political organs but in the
Secretariat as wel1.15
In the 1960s, questions regarding the interna-
tional civil service became much more contentious
and the subject of intense debate in the Fifth
Committee of the General Assembly. This trend
has continued in the 1970s. As the Third World
nations became increasingly militant on interna-
tional political and economic questions, they also
sought to increase their influence within the secre-
tariats of the UN system of organizations, many of
which were perceived to be dominated by Western-
ers.' 6 Personnel questions have hence become
highly politicized and support for the traditional
model of the international civil service has under-
gone considerable erosion. It should also be noted
that another important factor contributing to the
erosion of the traditional model is the change in
the nature of functions of the organizations in the
UN system. As the organizations have become
deeply involved with questions of development, it
has inevitably been found necessary to recruit
more staff with technical skills and specialized
types of knowledge. For a variety of reasons, it is
more feasible to employ such individuals on a
fixed-term rather than a permanent basis and this
has brought into question the concept of career
secretariats.
This erosion of support for the traditional
model has alarmed Western observers, and the con-
ventional wisdom has been to link the decline in
support of the traditional model to what are said
to be declining morale and standards of compe-
tence of the staffs of international organizations.
Indeed a number of reports and analyses have
come to the conclusion that the quality and com-
petence of the staff were not what they should be.
For example, a 1972 symposium on personnel
problems of the UN Secretariat came to the con-
clusion that "a major effort is needed to improve
the quality of the Secretariat."17 A Joint Inspec-
tion Unit report issued earlier stated: "General dis-
satisfaction and real problems which are not
properly solved but grow worse from year to year:
these seem to me to be the essential features of the
present situation with regard to personnel ques-
tions in the United Nations."18 A more recent
analysis also came to the conclusion that the
morale and quality of staff are deteriorating.' 9
But it must be recognized that the evaluations
which have taken place are largely impressionistic
and indeed it is difficult to say what criteria
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should be utilized to evaluate performance in
international organizations. Other observers deny
that standards are declining and assert that empha-
sis on geographical representation has strengthened
the system, since only staffs which represent the
cultural, racial, ideological, and linguistic diversity
in the world can hope to function effectively in
today's international environment.
Although at first glance it might appear as if
most of the Commission's functions are of a tech-
nical, non-political nature, political questions can-
not be avoided. For example, questions relating to
career development fall within the Commission's
mandate. One of the major issues in career devel-
opment is whether staff should be recruited on a
career or short-term basis, which is an issue of
great controversy among Member-States. Indeed
personnel practices are related to general personnel
policies which are ultimately derived, whether im-
plicitly or explicitly, from some model of the
international civil service. The Commission then
cannot avoid indicating what model of the inter-
national civil service it deems most appropriate.
This will be difficult at a time when no consensus
exists as to what model is to be preferred and
when almost all issues relating to the international
civil service tend to be contentious.
The environment in which the Commission
must operate is also a difficult one for other
reasons. In a time of economic difficulty, Mem-
ber-States are closely scrutinizing the budgets of
the United Nations and related organizations. The
largest items in these budgets are personnel costs,
and the Commission is expected to suggest reforms
that will maximize the return on resources devoted
to personnel. At the same time the Commission
must deal with the increased militancy of staff
associations which are pressing for increases in
salaries and benefits, which some Member-States
already regard as being excessive. This militancy
has already resulted in a strike by general service
staff at the United Nations office in Geneva and
several threatened strikes in New York.2?
Since the Commission has been in existence for
a relatively short time and has yet to assume some
of the functions assigned to it, it is perhaps pre-
mature to evaluate its performance. Yet conclu-
sions can be made on how well the Commission's
composition and powers prepare it for discharging
its functions in the present environment.
The geographical spread of the Commission's
membership is about what would be expected,
given the prevailing political environment at the
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
United Nations. All permanent members of the
Security Council, with the exception of China,21
are represented, and Third World nations have a
majority. The statute of the Commission, as pre-
viously noted, states that members of the Commis-
sion should be "individuals of recognized compe-
tence who have had substantial experience of
executive responsibility in public administration or
related fields, particularly in personnel manage-
ment." A review of the backgrounds of the 15
Commission members however reveals that other
criteria were apparently considered of more im-
portance. Only five of the members seem to have
backgrounds in personnel management, and only
slightly more than half the members have had
"substantial experience of executive responsibility
in public administration."
The backgrounds of the members rather clearly
reveal that they have been drawn primarily from
what one might term the "foreign affairs establish-
ment." Seven of the members are former ambassa-
dors, one is a former Minister of Foreign Affairs,
and several others have had careers in their coun-
tries' foreign service. A substantial majority of the
Commission have had lengthy experience dealing
with the UN either as an ambassador or delegate, a
senior staff member, or member of various com-
missions and bodies. The first chairman of the
Commission characterized the membership as "a
happy mixture of administrative expertise and
political representation.' The political side
seems to be more heavily weighted, which is not
surprising. Undoubtedly, it is indespensable to
have on the Commission individuals who are
knowledgeable about UN operations and pro-
cedures and who have a political sense of what is
feasible in the UN environment.
However, it might be asked if the Commission
is perhaps too dominated by what might be
termed "old UN hands." Only one Commission
member is under 50 years of age and the mean age
is 61. One would also hope that the Commission
might be a source of fresh, innovative ideas, which
is somewhat unlikely given the present composi-
tion. Members of the Commission, although for-
mally proposed by the Secretary-General and
appointed by the General Assembly, are in the
first instance suggested by governments. The fact
that most governments have put forward indi-
viduals with political and diplomatic backgrounds,
rather than administrative ones, indicates that they
are fully aware of the political implications of the
Commission's work.
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The composition of the Commission of course
cannot be considered in isolation from the Com-
mission's role and functions. Although the Corn.
mission, in inspiration at least, might be seen as an
equivalent of national civil service commissions, in
reality its role is somewhat different. At least in
the Anglo-American tradition, the role of civil
service commissions is to insulate the civil service
from undue political pressure. Thus in the United
States and the United Kingdom most appoint-
ments to the civil service are made by supposedly
impartial civil or public service commissions which
also perform a variety of other executive functions
such as recruitment and job classification.
The International Civil Service Commission has
a somewhat different role. It does not have respon-
sibility for personnel administration, including re-
cruitment, training, salary determination, classifi-
cation, etc. Appointments to the secretariats will
continue to be made by the executive heads of the
various organizations who are also responsible for
most aspects of personnel administration. The
Commission is given the responsibility for dis-
charging a few functions by itself, but on most
matters of importance it .can only make recom-
mendations, either to the General Assembly or to
the organizations which have accepted its statute.
The success of the Commission will then de-
pend largely on its ability to persuade various
affected groups to accept its recommendations.
With this in mind, the dominance of "old UN
hands" on the Commission takes on a different
perspective. Such individuals should have the
proper "connections" to convince the various
interested parties to accept the Commission's
recommendations.
Conclusion
In conclusion, what can be said of the Commis-
sion's prospects? Can it indeed meet its objectives
of creating a unified' international civil service that
will effectively and efficiently serve the organiza-
tions of the UN system? At this point one can
only speculate, but it can safely be said that the
challenge before the Commission is a great one. At
a time when personnel issues are becoming in-
creasingly politicized, it must attempt to reach
agreement on a variety of controversial issues.
Once agreement is reached, it must then persuade
elements with often conflicting interests ? Mem-
ber-States, staff organizations, management of
organizations ? to accept its conclusions. One can
395
envision this scenario working, but the possibility
of the Commission not having much of an impact
must also be considered.
Notes
1. The United States government, for example, recently
accused Secretary-General Waldheim of not resisting
political pressures in making appointments to the
UN Secretariat. See Kathleen Teltsch, "U.S. Says
Waldheim Is Yielding to Pressure on Jobs," New
York Times, October 12, 1976.
2. See General Assembly Resolution 13 (I).
3. Not all organizations that are part of the common
system participate in all these arrangements.
4. These are the four organizations in the World Bank
Group: the IBRD, the IMF, the IDA, and the IFC.
5. Report of the Special Committee for the Review of
the United Nations Salary System (A/8728), 3 Vol-
umes (New York: United Nations, 1972).
6. For background see Richard F. Janssen, "UN Bu-
reaucracy Begins to Feel Uneasy," International
Herald Tribune August 16, 1976.
7. See General Assembly Resolution 3042 (XXVII).
8. The Statute is attached to General Assembly Resolu-
tion 3357 (XXIX).
9. Other members of the Commission are Pascal Fro-
chaux (Switzerland), Jiri Nosek (Czechoslovakia),
Doudou Thiam (Senegal), Toru Hagiwara (Japan),
Robert E. Hampton (United States), A.H.M. Hillis
(United Kingdom), Antonio Fonseca Pimentel (Bra-
zil), Jean-Louis Plihom (France), Amjad All (Pakis-
tan), Michael 0. Ani (Nigeria), A.S. Chistayakov
(U.S.S.R.), P.N. Haksar (India), and Halima Warzazi
(Morocco).
10. These organizations are ILO, WHO, FAO, UNESCO,
IMCO, ITU, UPU, WIPO, ICAO, and WMO.
11. See Report of the International Civil Service Com-
mission (A/31/30) (New York: United Nations,
1976). The report on salaries, "Report of the Inter-
national Civil Service Commission on the Review of
the United Nations Salary System," is part two of
this document.
12. See Proposed Programme Budget for the Biennium
1976-1977 Report of the International Civil Service
Commission (A/C.5/1700) (New York: United Na-
tions, 1975).
13. When it was revealed that a small number of Ameri-
cans working for the United Nations had refused to
answer certain questions before a grand jury, the
United States government demanded that they be
dismissed and they eventually were. For background,
see Howard Wriggins and Edwin A. Bock, "The
Status of the United Nations Secretariat" (New
York: Woodrow Wilson Foundation, 1954). See also
Shirley Hazzard, Defeat of an Ideal: A Study of the
Self-Destruction of the United Nations (Boston: At-
lantic Monthly Press, 1973).
14. See Richard N. Swift, "Personnel Problems and the
United Nations Secretariat," International Organiza-
tion, Vol. XI (Spring 1957).
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15. Leland Goodrich, "Geographical Distribution of the
Staff of the U.N. Secretariat," International Organi-
zation, Vol. XVI (Summer 1962), P. 470.
16. See, for example, General Assembly Resolution
3417 (XXX) adopted by the 30th General Assembly
which noted that "64.5 percent of the staff members
who occupy senior posts in the Secretariat are na-
tionals of the developed countries," while "develop-
ing countries constitute 73 percent of the member-
ship of the United Nations." The resolution went on
to request the Secretary-General to take appropriate
steps to "increase the number of staff members re-
cruited from among nationals of developing
countries for senior posts in the Secretariat."
17. Richard Gardner (ed.), The Future of the United
Nations Secretariat (New York: United Nations
Institute for Training and Research and the Institute
on Man and Science, 1972), p. 26.
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
18. Report of the Joint Inspection Unit on Personnel
Problems in the United Nations (Bertrand Report)
(A/8454) (New York: United Nations, 1971), p. 16.
19. Seymour Max Finger and John Mugno, "The Politics
of Staffing the United Nations Secretariat," Orbis,
Vol. XIX (Spring 1975).
20. For background on the strike in Geneva, see Joint
Inspection Unit, Report on Some Aspects of the
Strike at the United Nations Office at Geneva from
25 February to 3 March 19 76 (HU/REP/76/6)
(Geneva: United Nations, 1976). The staff of the
specialized agencies in Geneva did not participate in
the strike.
21. China declined to recommend a candidate for a seat
on the Commission.
22. See Fifth Committee Provisional Summary Records
(A/C.5/SR.1744), p. 5.
THE CHALLENGE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Milton Pikarsky, Regional Transportation Authority of Northwestern Illinois
The following material was adapted from an address by
Milton Pikarsky to the Chicago Chapter of ASPA on
February 8, 1977.
I have been asked to speak on the challenge to
the public official who is often found in the
midst of confrontations of one sort or another.
This is a situation with which I am sure many of
you are reasonably familiar, if less publicly than
myself.
Our situation is related to the observation that
during the past few years there have been im-
portant changes in the way things happen within
our government. These changes greatly affect what
an administrator does, but the changes are not all
that apparent to the public, nor always to the
news media either.
One reason why the public, the constituents we
serve, and the media are not aware of these
changes is that things are happening so fast.
Newspaper and magazine articles tell us that the
taboos about things which could not be presented
just a few years ago on TV and motion picture
screens would seem ridiculous today. In fact, it has
become popular for TV shows to humorously
present clips from shows only a few years before;
people are amused and astonished at how quickly
tastes and values have changed. Recently a local
newspaper carried a story of how an actress had
received an academy award for a part in a movie
about avant garde life of the late 1960s which
today seems very dated. So the lack of awareness
of rapid social change has itself become a topic of
our times.
Another reason why the public does not always
sense the changes in government practices is that
they were never much aware of how government
really worked in the first place. I recall that when I
first became commissioner of public works,
trained as a civil engineer, it came as quite an
education to learn how decisions and choices were
really made. In college for example, we were
taught what the choices in bridge design were, and
how to make the best determination of design
based on need, physical properties, and to a great
extent, economics. Mainly our considerations had
to do with computing stress loads, material avail-
able, projected use, and safety considerations. But
Milton Pikarsky is chairman of the Regional Transporta-
tion Authority of Northeastern Illinois. He earlier chaired
the Board of the Chicago Transit Authority and served as
commissioner of public works for the City of Chicago
from 1964 to 1973. He is a member of the National
Academy of Engineering, and is an adjunct professor at
the University of Illinois at Chicago Circle.
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FROM THE PROFESSIONAL STREAM
in the practical world many other factors enter.
The choices as to which priorities will receive
consideration and what funding decisions will be
made depend on many socioeconomic considera-
tions that the engineer would not have taken into
account. For example, a church in the right of way
of a large expressway may not be given much
notice by the planning engineer, who is looking to
optimize safety and minimize construction costs.
But this same church will receive a great deal of
attention from the political representative of those
people who value the church itself and who for
religious reasons would not want to see the church
moved or altered in any way. So the administrator
working in public service must learn to work
comfortably in such an environment, an environ-
ment in which the technical facts may receive less
recognition than social implications or perceptions
and the administrator must learn ways to resolve
differences. That professional planners have found
this situation frustrating is apparent from the
well-known saying: "The planner proposes, the
politician disposes."
These factors are especially evident when any
new regional government is formed, and the RTA
(Regional Transportation Authority of North-
eastern Illinois, a six-county regional government
including the City of Chicago) is no exception. Let
us take a moment to consider the RTA situation.
The major role of the RTA is to develop a
workable transportation system for the six-county
area. We have a highly pragmatic orientation at the
RTA ? given that much of our work is doing what
must be done to keep existing systems operating,
while at the same time forging ahead on new
development. Our responsibility is to approach
what comes, head on, to get this job done.
It is imperative that we solve daily operational
problems which confront us as they occur ? be it
the bankruptcy of a rail line, insufficient equip-
ment, or a major disaster. We have to deal
effectively with the situation whether we had
anything to do with.the difficulties or not. At the
same time, we must implement sound operational
policies, both in terms of meeting present needs
and in setting precedents for the future. Especially
we must work with the labyrinthine complexities
of the federal government: the red tape, the
bureaucracy, both good and bad, and all the
agencies which provide the federal funds essential
to getting our job done.
Very little of this is understood by the general
public or even the media. In fact, part of what
397
happens sometimes defies understanding. The
media seize on items they consider newsworthy,
but must report in their limited space a highly
complicated issue in the briefest, simplistic terms.
It becomes then, a most challenging task to
communicate the facts of these issues to the
public. We diligently address ourselves to this
cause, and there is evidence that we are beginning
to succeed.
Consensus Building
We have assembled competent, qualified people
who are skilled in their fields and know what they
are doing. We frequently find ourselves involved in
situations where the operating alternatives are very
limited ... situations where there are strong, prac-
tical constraints on what can and cannot be done.
In this environment, we find ourselves in the area
of consensus building: in negotiating and arbitrat-
ing various interests and balancing various trade-
offs to work out a step-by-step operating policy.
These tasks become highly challenging in the
public administration area because of the close
associaton with the political forces of the com-
munity, especially in view of the basic distinctions
between those trained for the political world and
those in a professional discipline, such as engineer-
ing, planning, or administration.
What happens then, in a general way, is that the
professional trained in a given discipline tries to
give as exact a description of the material world as
possible. Much of a professional person's life is
spent in determining fact from non-fact, and in
being as clear and accurate as possible in defining a
given situation. The person usually does not
appreciate the social consequences of his or her
recommendations.
By contrast, politicians, who live in a world of
people ? all types, shapes, and sizes of people ?
do not as a rule deal in facts alone and may be
uncomfortable when too careful or precise a
description of any issue is drawn. For most trained
professionals, the basic facts do not vary from day
to day. But in the political world we attempt to
react to the needs and desires of our present
constituencies and do not adequately address the
needs of future generations.
Those in the political world are known to favor
a less distinct shaping of issues, because any
subject not now in debate may suddenly be up for
negotiations. It is wise to keep as many options
and alternatives open as possible to enhance
bargaining power.
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398
Thus it is not so much a question of basic
personal conflicts as to what is right or wrong, but
a question of emphasis and priority.
The practice of circumlocution to obscure the
endorsing of an idea is another method of practice
common to the political world but foreign to most
managers and professionals. In transportation es-
pecially, many of the principal participants, skilled
in negotiation, may well be more interested in
developing compromising language than in the
technical facts that transportation planners and
engineers may feel of paramount importance.
Again, the facts of the situation do not carry the
same weight as other considerations.
For example, the first documented use of the
term "operating assistance" rather than the more
descriptive "operating subsidy" was in 1965 by
Hollman D. Pettibone, chairman of the Mayor's
Central Area Committee. Pettibone had a talent
for finding terms on which conflicting interests
could agree. He managed to draft a statement that
all members of the committee found acceptable,
including Wayne A. Johnson, president of the
Illinois Central Railroad, who had emphatically
opposed subsidies for the Chicago Transit Authori-
ty, saying, "I don't get one. Why should they?"
But Johnson was willing to agree to a compromise
using the words operating assistance, in place of
subsidy.
This same problem is with us today. In a recent
bill before the Congress, we had hoped to get an
increase in the federal share of the operating
assistance which we now receive to help cover our
operating losses in transportation. The staff of the
Senate Banking Committee, which prepared the
bill, have stated they feel there would be sub-
stantial resistance to gaining passage of anything
larger than the 50-50 sharing we now have.
However, they realize something must be done to
get more funds to the transit-dependent cities for
operating losses, so they have used a tactic of
forming a large reserve fund which can be used as a
discretionary fund by the Secretary of the Depart-
ment of Transportation. They feel this Senate Bill
208, presented by Senator Williams, has a good
chance for passage. It is therefore not so much a
case of the facts of the funding but rather the
perception of the principles involved.
Although there are some public administrators
who are not directly involved with the activities of
the federal government, most of us do find
ourselves heavily involved in legislation, guidelines,
regulations, and all that goes with obtaining
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
federal funds. Because of the way the tax system
works in this country, the federal government is
the only source of the massive funds needed for
most public programs, and this is especially true
for public works and transportation. Success in
this endeavor is essential to the performance of
any public official. It means both working with
the legislature to get the funding authorized and
working with the bureaucracy to get the funds
delivered for the needed projects.
Streamlining Bureaucracy
The workings of the bureaucracy have become
so cumbersome that streamlining their activities
has become a major goal of the new Adminis-
tration. These projected activities portend well for
us in public administration. However, there are
reasons for concern that things will not improve as
fast as we might like. First, there is the basic
objection to change which any bureaucracy ex-
hibits. If you have been following Senator Adlai E
Stevenson's recent work in reform of the Senate's
Committee System, you know he was chairman of
the Committee on Reform and his plan was
approved by a vote of 80 to 1, but not before
extensive surgery was worked on the plan.
Originally he proposed cutting in half the
present 31 Senate committees. In the end, only
ten were eliminated. Those of us in transportation
noticed that Senator Edmond Muskie managed to
keep authority for highways and mass transit in
the Public Works Committee on which he serves,
instead of the planned transfer to the Commerce
Committee on which he does not serve. The single
vote against the plan was from a senator who was
chairman of one of the committees which was
eliminated. Senator S. I. Hayakawa, a former
university professor and now a freshman senator
who has long battled with rigid institutions which
resist change, observed, "I am startled to find
some of my liberal colleagues standing in the way
of change." Many of us in public administration
will perhaps not be quite so startled at the lack of
change in the proposed streamlining of bureau-
cratic functions, much as we would like to see
such change. But any improvement is of course
welcome.
The fact is that most people probably do not
comprehend the workings of the bureaucratic
world. And to those who do take time to try and
understand the bureaucratic decision-making proc-
ess, it may not seem at all rational. In some sense,
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FROM THE PROFESSIONAL STREAM
it is not rational. Certainly it would seem reason-
able that since the government bureaucracy, es-
pecially the large agencies created to carry out the
wishes of the Legislative and Executive Branches
of government, presumably seeks the same goals as
the rest of the nation, the decisions ought to
reflect this shared concern. It would follow that
actions might then be presumed to flow directly
and unambiguously from these decisions. But the
reality of the situation is much more complicated,
as any public administrator knows.
The decisions of the bureaucracy, especially
regarding priorities as to what is handled and what
is laid aside, has in part to do with how these
decisions affect the careers of the people involved,
the goals and missions of their organizations, and
the prestige which these organizations have within
the government hierarchy. Government organiza-
tions often do things which seem strange on the
local level but are completely understandable from
the national level, however detrimental to local
interests they may be. Some organizations will, for
example, reject new functions which tend to lead
to joint control operations with another organiza-
tion, since this type Of activity is seen as diluting
their strength .. . even if the new function may be
needed by local interests. An agency may also
accept a function initially to keep others from
having it, only to later deprive funds and key
personnel from that function if it is viewed as
peripheral to the agency's self-interest. The same
function of course may not be at all peripheral to
the interests of local governments.
Any successful agency, and we think the RTA
is proving to be a good example of this, must deal
effectively with these problems. We have to face
the question, given all these complexities, how can
we get something done? What are the tactics and
strategies which a public administrator can use to
get things accomplished that need to be ac-
complished and in a time frame that will be
acceptable to the -public that is served?
The ad hoc task force is one mechanism which
lends itself to this needed activity very well. Long
known for effectiveness where special skills or
access are required or in situations where inter-
mediaries are needed, the ad hoc task force offers
a way for getting things done when traditional
methods fail, and has become a valuable tool for
many public administrators.
The truly effective task force is private in
nature, and therefore is usually without recog-
nition as an entity in itself. In most cases, only the
399
accomplishment is publicized. An interesting ex-
ample of such a task force occurred in the fall of
1974. At that time, most transit properties
throughout the nation were in dire economic
straits for operating assistance funds, then pro-
hibited by Congress. Efforts to interest the Depart-
ment of Transportation had proven fruitless. Con-
sequently, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, unable
to get a hearing with the Secretary of Transporta-
tion, formed a consortium of city mayors, transit
experts, an automobile manufacturer, and other
authorities in transportation, and gained a meeting
with President Ford. At this meeting, economists
pointed out that unless operating assistance were
provided, the transit industry would have no
recourse but to raise fares substantially. It was
estimated that about $350 million would be taken
out of the economy through fare increases to meet
operating deficits. However, the effect of this
economic drain on the consumer price index
would be such that procurement offices of the
U.S. government would find it necessary to spend
an additional $500 million for the same goods
planned for purchase. Since it was actually cheaper
for the federal government to give the operating
subsidy rather than pay the inflated price in-
creases, the President called together the necessary
congressional leaders to bring about, within a few
weeks time, the legislation that for the first time
provided federal operating subsidies. The National
Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1974, a
milestone in transit legislation, was the direct
result of this task force effort.
This is just one example of how public adminis-
trators and others work to overcome apparent
obstacles and a strategy in which many of you
have been involved. It is probably fair to say that
most share the same goals and objectives and are
motivated toward the same hopes and accomplish-
ments for our communities. The individual de-
cisions made by various individuals along the line
do not always reflect these shared concerns. The
decisions tend instead to reflect the backgrounds
and perceptions of the various participants. And
the issues themselves are as complex as the
time ... reflecting the puzzles and contradictions
of our rapidly changing life style.
Public administrators thus find themselves in a
lively environment. We must use our competence
in every way to achieve the greatest possible good
for the lasting betterment of those we serve. It can
be both challenging and rewarding if we are willing
to do our best.
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What We Are Trying To Do
The purpose of Public Management Forum is simple to state but difficult to
define. This feature focuses on the practitioner, and the challenges and oppor-
tunities associated with managing public sector organizations at all levels of
government. Since the areas of greatest interest to administrators and the most
desirable and feasible ways to deal with them are not readily identifiable, in
subsequent issues our approach will be experimental ? substantively as well as
stylistically.
"Forum," of course, is not the only place in PAR where practitioner-oriented
material will appear. But, as the name implies, this space will be devoted to sharing
experiences, raising issues, discussing solutions, and looking ahead. We intend to do
so in as informative, insightful, provocative, and straight-forward a manner as
possible. While our concern is with public management, our hope is that this feature
will appeal to the broad spectrum of ASPA's membership, and that practitioners,
academicians, students, and others will contribute to its development.
All of this will take time and patience. Bear with us ? and let us hear from you.
Carl W. Stenberg
Zero Base; Federal Style
Donald F. Haider, Northwestern University
During the 1976 presidential campaign, Jimmy
Carter repeatedly stressed that "The greatest
need facing the United States today is for a
well-managed structure of government." Focusing
upon the federal budgeting process specifically,
Mr. Carter characterized it as being "inefficient,
chaotic, and virtually uncontrollable by either
the President or the Congress." He pledged that
if elected, he would initiate a complete overhaul
of the federal bureaucracy and budgeting system.
Following the November election, any doubts
federal officialdom may have had about the
President-elect's commitment to ZBB were soon
dispelled when he announced that an executive
order would be issued "immediately after my
inauguration requiring zero base budgeting for all
Federal departments, bureaus, and boards."
There immediately sprang up throughout
Washington a zero-base training industry. The
U.S. General Accounting Office, Department of
Agriculture Graduate School, U.S. Civil Service
Commission, Association of Government Ac-
countants, local universities, and management
consulting houses began ZBB training programs.
Peter Pyhrr's book could be found in the
window of nearly every bookstore within a mile
radius of the White House. Management and bud-
get subgroups formed within federal agencies to
begin training personnel, developing and applying
ZBB. As one high-ranking Office of Management
Donald Haider is an associate professor of public manage-
ment at the Northwestern University Graduate School
of Management. During 1976-77 he served as a White
House Fellow in the Office of Management and Budget,
where he participated in the birth of zero-base budget-
ing ? federal style.
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PUBLIC MANAGEMENT FORUM
There immediately sprang up
throughout Washington a zero-base
training industry.
and Budget careerist observed, "Never has any
management fad so completely taken over this
town."
Ordering first that a zero-base review be ap-
plied to the White House and its operations,
President Carter next issued instructions to heads
of departments and agencies on February 14,
1977, "to develop a zero base system within
your agency in accordance with instructions to
be issued by the Office of Management and
Budget."
OMB Director Bert Lance and Deputy Direc-
tor James T. McIntyre, Jr., met with the new
Cabinet officials that same day to explain zero-
base budgeting and to lay out a timetable for its
implementation for the FY 1979 budget. Presi-
dent Carter and Director Lance reiterated the
Administration's commitment to implementing
ZBB at successive Cabinet meetings. The Presi-
dent emphasized his expectation that individual
department heads should become familiar with
and fully utilize zero-base budgeting in the
months ahead.
The more immediate challenge for Lance and
McIntyre involved selling their own agency,
which, by March, had to develop general ZBB
guidelines for agency review and comment, issue
final instructions by mid-April, and revise its
Circular No. A-11 giving specific instructions to
agencies on preparation and submission of budget
estimates for FY 1979 by June.
"Introducing ZBB in a state with five million
people, 79,000 state employees, a $5 billion bud-
get with 14 budget analysts is one thing," re-
marked a veteran OMB division chief. "However,
designing and implementing a ZBB system for a
nation of 203 pillion people, five million federal
civilian and military personnel, a $460 billion
budget, and doing this with 180 budget exam-
iners ? all in six months ? is quite another."
OMB veterans bore the institutional memories
of prior efforts to introduce program-planning-
budgeting (PPB), management by objectives
(MB 0), presidential management initiatives
(PMI), and a host of circulars aimed at imple-
menting new management techniques across
government. These past OMB efforts to mandate
detailed operations in the federal agencies had
401
nearly always ended in a controversy, not to
mention a failure. ZBB was to be different.
Institutional skepticism notwithstanding, re-
sponsibility for designing the ZBB system and
preparing OMB instructions was left to the Bud-
get Review Division in cooperation with the
budget examining divisions. Led by Dale
McOmber, Assistant OMB Director for Budget
Review, the chief of the Resources Systems
Branch, George Strauss, and his key aide, David
Levthold, OMB developed a framework for ap-
plying ZBB.
A general OMB philosophy governing its
implementation also emerged, namely that far
greater wisdom on how to implement the new
procedures and also to determine operating in-
structions geared to individual program structure
and accounting systems resided with the agencies
rather than OMB. "We'll set the framework, prin-
ciples, and general rules, but you tell us how to
apply ZBB," became OMB's operating philosophy.
OMB staff recognized that the size and diversity of
federal operations precluded the application of a
single set of detailed operating instructions to
direct all federal agencies.
McIntyre, in turn, set the charge to budget
examiners and their division chiefs. "The success
of ZBB is in your hands," he exhorted them, "the
President is committed, the Cabinet Secretaries are
committed, and your task is to get the Under
Secretaries and chief fiscal officers of your depart-
ments and agencies committed."
McIntyre had served under Governor Carter as
the director of the Georgia Office of Planning and
Budgeting. Not only was he totally familiar with
zero-base budgeting, but he also had a keen sense
of what President Carter expected from OMB.
During the spring, budget examiners attended
special in-house seminars with instruction provided
by those who had worked with ZBB in Georgia.
The President received periodic briefings from
McIntyre and Lance on ZBB's progress, as did key
congressional officials and staffs ? the Appropria-
tions Committee, Budget Committees, the Con-
gressional Budget Office, and the U.S. General
Accounting Office. All were afforded the oppor-
tunity to offer suggestions and advice which fed
back into OMB's design of ZBB instructions. By
late February OMB had completed a working draft
of its zero-base guidelines which it shared with the
chief fiscal officers of federal agencies for review
and comment. OMB's message was direct: "Help
us design a system that recognizes your problems
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402
and recognizes our goal of implementing the sys-
tem this year."
On April 9, 1977, OMB issued Bulletin 77-9,
containing instructions to heads of departments
and agencies on zero-base budgeting. This docu-
ment concluded, "Should additional discussion be
necessary, agencies should contact their OMB
budget examiner." One week later the President
instructed agency heads that "implementation can
be effected better by the diligent efforts of OMB
and agency career staff familiar with the Federal
budget process and procedures than by consultants
from outside sources." To further such linkages
between OMB budget staff and the agencies, each
department and agency designated two senior
members of their budget staff to serve as liaison to
OMB on ZBB. On May 23, the President met
personally with several hundred agency ZBB liai-
son people to assure them of his commitment,
followed by OMB providing the agencies with an
advance copy of that portion of OMB Circular No.
A-11 ("Preparation and Submission of Budget
Estimates") pertaining to zero-base budgeting.
The President has partici-
pated at all stages ? exhorting and
selling the Cabinet, meeting with
agency careerists assigned to ZBB im-
plementation, and commenting upon
ZBB pro gresss reports.
OMB and the federal agencies collaborated
extensively on developing guidelines and concepts
within which each agency would develop proce-
dures to meet its requirements and in preparing
the A-11 instructions for fall budget submissions.
On the budget examiner and division level, OMB
worked with individual agencies in "reaching
agreement" on specific issues related to decision
package preparation: consolidation and rankings,
relationships between the budget account struc-
ture and the decisions identified in the agency
justification materials, coding of decision pack-
ages, and on other technical issues.
The President, in turn, has participated at all
stages ? exhorting and selling the Cabinet, meeting
with agency careerists assigned to ZBB implemen-
tation, and commenting upon ZBB progress re-
ports. From late May through June, the President
scheduled some 25 hours for the Spring Budget
Review at which agency and department heads
participated in the tentative planning for the Presi-
dent's FY 1979 Budget. One purpose of these
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
unprecedented joint reviews is to reach decisions
on which agency programs should be highlighted
for presidential attention in ZBB fall reviews and
on budget guidelines. The introductory stages of
zero-base budgeting have been relatively smooth,
far better than ZBB critics anticipated. Step-by-
step progress has been achieved through a strong
working relationship between OMB careerists and
their agency counterparts.
ZBB Applied
Probably no two users of zero-base budgeting
apply this management tool in exactly the same
way. Zero-base budgeting, federal style, is to be a
management process that provides for systematic
consideration of all agency programs and activities
in conjunction with the formulation of FY 1979
budget requests. It will be central to the federal
budget process and will provide the basis for
agency justification of budget requests. OMB's
overriding concern has been one of simplifying the
zero-base process by developing broad, flexible
guidelines within an overall framework. A mutual
concern which links OMB to federal agencies is
avoiding a paperwork explosion both within the
agency and in what is eventually sent to OMB. The
essential concept OMB has tried selling and, in-
deed, the key to ZBB's full utilization, is that this
management tool requires the active participation
of managers at all levels in the planning, budgeting,
and evaluation processes.
As can be seen in the accompanying figure,
zero-base begins with the identification of decision
units and program or unit objectives. Generally,
decision units are the lowest organizational or
program level at which the manager makes major
decisions on the amount of spending and the
scope, direction, or quality of work to be per-
formed. Interaction between top-level and lower-
level managers is necessary for identifying program
and organization objectives in terms of output
measurements and in aiding each successive man-
agerial level in ranking budget requests. Unit ob-
jectives, namely what one is trying to measure, can
affect the choice of decision units. So can current
federal budgeting practices affect choice to the
extent that it is desirable to fit a decision unit
within a single budget account, one budget sub-
function, and an existing organization structure.
Since agencies are still required to submit budget
requests to Congress in terms of appropriation
accounts, ZBB, in some cases, will require the
agency to develop two related budget justifications
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PUBLIC MANAGEMENT FORUM
DECISION PACKAGE RANKING AND CONSOLIDATION PROCESS ILLUSTRATED
Managers A, B,
and C each rank
packages for their
units and send to
Manager X
Manager X re-
ceives packages
and evaluates and
ranks them with-
in each unit
Manager X ranks
packages for units
A, B, and C
against each
other, and sends
to Manager R
Manager R eval-
uates packages
from Managers X
and Y, and then
ranks them
against each other
403
Manager R pre-
pares some con-
solidated decision
packages before
submitting bud-
get request to
next higher level
Decision
Unit A
Decision
Unit B
Decision
Unit C
Package Funding Funding
* Incremen Total
Al
100
100
A2
15
115
A3
5
120
A4
30
150
131
B2
B3
B4
I35
Cl
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6
Revised Manager X
Package Funding Funding
# lncremen Total I
Al
100
100
A2
105
=