ASSESSMENT OF CUBAN AND AFRICAN REACTIONS TO A US DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE RE ANGOLA AND MOZAMBOQUE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A002200010001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 6, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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6 July 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
VIA
FROM
SUBJECT
. Deputy to the Director for National Intelligence
National Intelligence Officer for Af3 is
Assessment of Cuban and African Reactions to a US
Diplomatic Initiative re Angola and Mozambique
1. Action Requested: That you approve and forward the attached Agc>r
assessment to Ambassador Young, together with the cover memorandum wt ha'=c>
drafted for your signature.
2. Background: When Ambassador Young lunched with you on 27 June,
he askec what the prospects might be for a US diplomatic initiative =:owa c'
Castro, Neto and Savimbi to bring about a compromise settlement in AAigol;;..
In the Lmbassador's concept, such a move could lead to a reduction in th,
Cuban military presence in Angola and to the exercise of some degree of
moderation by Castro in regard to sending troops to Mozambique, or even
Ethiopia. The attached assessment responds to this request: we bel._eve
the reaction of the parties in Angola would be negative at this time an(
that Castro would see no merit in such an initiative unless his posi:._ion
in Angola had deteriorated substantially beyond where it is now. We see
no signs that the USSR would find compromise attractive, either.
3. Recommendation: That you approve the assessment and send i-: to
Ambassador Young
APPROVED:
Director of Central Intelligence
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 the Director
Cc Intelli nce An
Approved For Rase 004/6'3/411 : CIA-RD
18 July 1977
Dear Mr. Ambassador:
I am attaching an appreciation by our analysts in CIA
regarding the Angolan and Cuban reactions that could be
expected to a US diplomatic initiative of the kind you
outlined during our lunch on 27 June. I'm afraid the
prospects at this time do not appear bright to our people,
but I believe that their discussion of the factors involved
may be helpful to you nonetheless.
We very much appreciate these opportunities to share
in your thinking; please call upon us again if you have
further questions. ;
25X1
l ra.tSTM V.
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 Approved For Rel1se 2004/03/11 CIA-RDP80M00165A?01200010001-9
NIM 77-016 6 July 1977
MEMORANDUM: Assessment of Cuban and African Reactions to a US
Diplomatic Initiative re Angola and Mozambique
Cover memo: TO: Ambassador Andrew Young
FROM: DCI
Cover memo: TO: DCI
FROM: NIO/AF
O/DCI/NI0/AF
Original: Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - D/DCI/NI
1 - AD/DCI/NI
0- ER
3 - NIO/AF c'..vl e f
9 - NIO/RI ( -%'o rrn~ ~?. -r. vs~
2 - ORPA/AF (w/o cover memos)
1 - C/DDO/AF/Intel (w/o cover memos)
1 - NIO/LA
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 SECRET
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6 July 1977
SUBJECT: Assessment of Cuban and African Reactions to a US
Diplomatic Initiative re Angola and Mozambique
This is not an optimum time for a US initiative to achieve a comprom:.
in Angola and moderation of Cuban activities in. Mozambique. In Angola, wb3Le
there is talk of compromise in the wake of the abortive coup of 27 Maa', Nt? t ) ` z,
terms toward UNITA do not appear to have changed, and Savimbi, enjoying nvv
successes, is preparing for a longer term struggle to overthrow Neto rath=x
than bring him to compromise.
The Cubans, we believe, still see themselves as architects of a new
socialist state in Angola, and would view a compromise settlement there a:
destroying much of what they are working for in Africa and the Third IIorli
generally. The Cubans thus would force Neto to the conference table only ai
the military situation became desperate. A few months from now, the Afris:el_I
factors might be more amenable, but the Cubans (and Soviets) would be mor-.
open to compromise only if their position had meanwhile deteriorated eery
seriously.
African Reaction to a US Initiative
1. We doubt that the African elements in the Angola situation euld
brought to accept compromise easily at this time, unless possibly the US
initiative could be presented as a dramatic "diplomatic revolution," come .lnul-
taneously and seriously from Havana as well as Washington, and have a bag #
economic aid attached. This would be an offer hard to resist, but the ch.,-ce s
of Havana's participation seem very slight.
2. The abortive coup in Luanda has certainly put the idea of cotpro:n :;e
in the air, however. According to a Portuguese interpretation, based on I Sirst
hand report to President Eanes by an emissary who visited Luanda in late -hne,
the events of 27 May amounted to a purge of Neto's left-wing enemies, and -`..t:h
these people out Neto is now free to pursue a more openly moderate, genera:_._y
non-aligned course. The MPLA is also supposed to have put out feelers to -lie
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leaderships of both UNITA and the FNLA, but it is said to be recognized in
Luanda that there is "too much bad blood" between Neto and Savimbi. Ttis
kind of pro-compromise analysis also draws on the idea that Neto is no.
extremely suspicious of the Soviets -- whether or not they really triec' to
help Alves -- and is now looking to the West for support at least to bztlance
them and the Cubans.
3. There may be merit in this line of thinking, but we believe ii. is
ahead of where the game stands. As we see it, Neto's immediate need from Lai,
perspective is to reestablish his authority over the MPLA. The perception c1
the part of black radical elements in the NPLA that Neto has catered to mu.iu:i:o
and foreign elements was the major factor behind the disturbances of 27 May
He needs now to demonstrate effectiveness not only in bringing dissidents {.r4
his own ranks to heel, but also be coping more effectively than heretofore
with the insurgents, especially Savimbi. The Cuban reinforcements thar harrarrived almost certainly are to help him do this, as well as to defend aga[.f-,,d
attack from Zaire. Until this task is accomplished, Neto cannot afforl to
appear to be dealing from weakness, even if he goes down in the process.
4. Savimbi's present situation is the other side of the coin. Be is
enjoying successes unprecedented since the height of the civil war. His
forces have the Cubans and FAPLA cooped up in the towns inside UNITA's sout:F. >ru
zone of influence; his survival has attracted or seems about to attract furrlier
foreign support, from Zaire, South Africa and ' possibly' elsewhere; he has pins
both for an attack on FAPLA-held southern towns and for a northern offensi'
aiming to open a supply corridor to Zaire and, ultimately, to carry gLerril_.3
warfare into Neto's home territories. Savimbi apparently is preparing for L
protracted struggle, and all reporting indicates that he has revised his c'b--
jectives so that he now aims to overthrow or oust Neto entirely rather thGr
to force a compromise.
5.. We doubt that Savimbi will be able to accomplish all of these ob,Ecsr-
tives -- in fact, we do not believe that, short of an MPLA collapse, 1UNITA
expand its zone of influence very far beyond its present territorial ?iml -
But it will take some time, possibly as long as six months, for Savimbi t,?
either realize his limitations or to prove us wrong. If he should prove '
wrong, he will be even less inclined to consider compromise than he i:> no''',
because he will really have Neto on the run and the effect of an initiatis
from us would appear to him as a misguided effort to save the Communi3ts' If we turn out to be right. about his prospects, Savimbi should be a good
more open to suggestions for compromise several.months hence; but the moment.
would have to be chosen with care -- the danger is that by that time Neto ,ouid
feel strong enough to turn us aside, assuming that he still had Cuban sup-),rt.
In Angola, we are not easily going to reach a point where the local partie
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will be willing to deal rather than keep going for the whole bag. In part:-ular,
we do not think that the US could "deliver" Savimbi to the conference tabl
at this time.
6. The reaction of the Machel government in Mozambique would likely
mixed. Machel would resent and resist an initiative that appeared to put
restraints on whom he could invite to helpiinthe struggle against Rhodesia
and defend his own country from Rhodesian attack. If, however, this aspect
could be veiled or, better yet, accompanied by some positive action on our ?)art:
to assist the Zimbabwe liberation process, we believe that Machel would no=
find the initiative too painful to swallow. Whatever' their rhetoric, we a ?sild
certainly have the help of the other front-line presidents (except Neto, w,o
does not really count much in this situation at'this point). The presence
of foreign troops makes all of the presidents nervous,-to some degree, and
they have no interest in allowing the action in regard to Rhodesia to slio
away from them, as it would surely do if Cubans came to Mozambique in for--_.
But they see no way to avoid this happening unless there is some real movement
on the Rhodesia front, and at the moment there is little they can point to,
Again, a period several months from now, when the next round of British Fo.eign
Secretary Owen's negotiations will either be showing signs of success or w=1,
have been supplanted by some more forceful initiative against Smith, would
appear to be a more propitious time.
7. The problem in the interval would be to find means to enable Machtt_~_
better to defend himself politically from the effects of Rhodesian militar.
and counter-guerrilla action. The UN resolution this week is one such mesa:.;
encouragement to US and European humanitarian organizations to play a more
active role in the refugee camps might be another. Token military help fr