OVERVIEW OF SPAIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A002100010034-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: March 25, 1977
• Content Type: MEMO

pproved or MOM -
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert Gallagher
Office of National Security
Department of the Treasury
The attached memorandum is in response to
your request of 23 March for a paper for
Secretary Blumenthal on the current Spanish
political situation.
/s/ Stansfield Turner
STANSFIELD TURNER
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Director of Central Intelligence
FRM
5075 IoI EDITION510U5
2 8 MAR 1977
I00 10034-4 Executive Registry
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 Dal # j 3e)-- ?
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT Overview of Spain
1. Spain has come a long way in a remarkably short
time. During the 16 months since Franco died the country
has shrugged off most of the trappings of his moribund
dictatorship and moved purposefully toward establishing
a western-style democracy.
2. The single most important factor in the relatively
smooth transition has been the widespread popular support
for peaceful change and the nearly universal desire to avoid
excesses that could lead to another Civil War.
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--The opposition has by and large behaved responsibly.
--The self-styled "civilized" right has accepted the
inevitability of change.
--The die-hard Francoists of the far right have turned
out to be ineffectual and few in number.
--Even the security forces have shown comparative
restraint.
3. King Juan Carlos has also played a major role.
Though he withdrew early in his reign from the public poli-
tical arena, he remained active behind the scenes, and when
the Arias government bogged down last summer moved quickly
and decisively to replace it with a younger team less
associated with the Franco era. Juan Carlos was reportedly
instrumental in winning crucial military support for the new
government, and he has gradually replaced die-hard rightists
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in the military leadership with men who are more in tune with
the liberalization effort. The King's boldest stroke to date,
his appointment last July of a young, relatively unknown
minister to the prime ministry, has been an unqualified
success. An extremely able politician, Adolfo Suarez has
adroitly balanced demands of the left and right while pushing
ahead vigorously with the reform program. The King seems to
have given Suarez considerable latitude to act on his own,
but they consult frequently and the Prime Minister probably
Blears all major decisions.
4. The reform process has gathered momentum since the
new government took office last summer. Carefully working
through the Francoist institutions in order to make the
reforms more palatable for a broad range of the political
and military establishment, Suarez and his cabinet have:
--Secured the backing of the military for their reform
program.
--Opened a dialogue with the leftist opposition, drawing
them into the political process for the first time
since the Civil War.
--Persuaded the hide-bound Francoist parliament to vote
itself out of existence.
--Won overwhelming popular endorsement through a national
referendum in mid-December.
--Legalized the major non-Communist political parties.
--Amnestied most of the remaining political prisoners.
5. Suarez' chief concern how is to maintain the momentum
and make sure that the election takes place as planned. Three
major issues--aside from the economy, which may pose the
most urgent problem of all--are preoccupying the government
as it enters-the homestretch.
6. Terrorism: The government weathered a series of
terrorist attacks by both the far right and the far left in
January, as well as the kidnapping of two prominent officials.
More terrorist attacks are likely during the next two months,
as the ultra-right make's a last ditch effort to derail the
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reform process and provoke a military coup while splinter
groups on the far left pursue similar tactics to bring about
a popular uprising. The government has demonstrated its
ability to contain sporadic violence without overreacting.
An added complication, however, is uncertainty about the
reliability of the security forces, many members of which
sympathize with and reportedly support rightwing terrorists.
7. Communist Legalization: In an attempt to mitigate
the political impact of the decision on legalizing the com-
munist Party, the government has turned the party's applica-
tion over to-the Supreme Court. A verdict will probably be
delivered by mid-April. Though now given a legal veneer,
the decision is basically political and it could have pro-
found repercussions.
8. If the party is rejected, Communists could still
participate in the election as "independents," but the
fragile bond of cooperation between government and opposition
would be jeopardized. Banning the party would cast doubt on
the democratic qualifications of the election--especially
if some other leftist parties were to pull out in solidarity--
and weaken the ability of the next government to tackle the
pressing and difficult issues. that it will face as soon as
it takes -office.
9. Legalizing the party, on the other hand, would
increase the likelihood of rightwing violence in the pre-
election period and raise the specter of unrest in conser-
vative quarters of the military and security forces. The
military is loyal to the King, however, and will reportedly
accept a court decision. The odds now slightly favor legali-
zation of the party before the election.
10. Regionalism: Basque and Catalan demands for autonomy
have been shelved by the government--in the face of military
opposition to any weakening of the central authority--until
after the parliamentary election. Catalan nationalists seem
willing to bide their time, but tension remains high in the
Basque provinces which have been the scene of sporadic violence
against the government for many years. Concessions by the
Madrid government on relatively minor issues will probably
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keep the lid on until the election, but unless the new
government moves quickly to tackle the central issue of
granting more autonomy to the regions, sustained violence
and disorder is likely to break out again.
11. A genuinely free legislative election for a bicameral
parliament with constituent powers now seems assured. No
date has been set, but it will, probably take place in June.
Predictions are exceptionally difficult in a country that
has not had free elections in over 40 years, but the election
seems likely to produce a.centrist majority in the proportion-
ately elected lower house (this house will be more important--
and also less conservative--than the upper house).
12. The true test of whether democracy will work in
Spain will come when this new parliament tries to cope with
the serious problems it will inherit and sets about rewriting
the constitution.
13. Suarez, who is far and away the most popular figure
in Spain today, will probably carryon as Prime Minister. He
has not yet announced whether he will run in the election--he
need not since he would in any case be appointed by the King--
and if he decides to do so it'will probably be in order to
rally the fragmented centrist coalitions and boost their
appeal. The base for his working majority in the next parlia-
ment will be a disparate alliance of Liberals, Social. Democrats,
Christian Democrats, and other centrists who will probably
control some 40-50 percent of the seats. To gain an absolute
majority, the Prime Minister will probably have to rely on
support from moderates in the rightist alliance--which may
garner 15-30 percent of the seats--or on leftists--who will
probably win a similar share of seats--depending on the issue
at stake.
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Blue note from DCI.to Robert Gallagher, Treasury,
transmitting paper: "Overview of Spain"
CONCUR:
Deputy Di rector for -Inte i gence Date
Distribution:
Orig - addressee
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
2 I
ODDI/ks/ (25 Mar 77)
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 MEMORANDUM
App{@vRgC!bRIpRelease 2004/03/1(.. CIA-RDP80MO
Treasury Secretary Blumenthal is seeing a
"senior Spanish official" on 31 March. On
23 March, he asked, via Bob Gallagher of
Treasury's Office of National Security, for
a memo summarizing the Spanish political
situation. Gallagher.specifically said he
did not need anything on the economic side.
Gallagher needs the memo by opening of
business, 28 March, at the very latest.
Date 25 March 1977
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