LETTER TO HONORABLE STANSFIELD TURNER FROM DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN

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October 7, 1977
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DANIEL P,. MOYNIHAN A~p"r~v8I~l`For Release 2004/06 : CIA-RDP80 's~UCrrif ?b '$fafez '$enaf e WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510 Dear Admiral Turner: We had a good talk bin Tuesday and I look forward to the next chapter. Here is the Podhoretz article i promised. Honorable Stansfield Turner Director The Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D. C. 20505 Approved For Release 2004/03/16 : CIA-RDP80M00165AO01800060019-0 Approved For Release 2004/03/16 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800060019-0 THE CULTURE OF APPEAS11pblAMENT A naive pacifism is the dangerous legacy of Vietnam HAS THE UNITED STATES re- covered from Vietnam? The general feeling seems to be that it has. Just this past In- dependence Day, for example, Tom Wicker of the New York Times deliv- ered himself of the view that it was "a familiar sort of Fourth"-the kind, he said, "that was commonplace, even predictable, before the long, succes. sive traumas of Vietnam and Water- gate brought Americans a decade of self-doubt, self-criticism, self-loathing, on the one hand, and responding de- nials, anger, and chauvinism on the other." Of course, Wicker's rhetoric loads the case; it is in fact so reminis- cent of the fevered atmosphere of the Vietnam era that in itself it casts doubt on the return to normalcy he then goes on to celebrate. But such subtle- ties aside, many people would agree that we have recovered from Vietnam and that we are back to normal again. I am not one of those people. I think that, far from having put Vietnam be- hind us, we are still living with it in a thousand different ways. It is there everywhere, a ubiquitous if often eerily invisible presence in our political cul- ture. And it has left us a legacy of influence which threatens to have an even more destructive effect on future than it has already had on past. our our Perhaps the most obvious evidence of this influence is in the new Ameri- can attitude toward war. The idea of war has never been as natural or glamorous to Americans as it used be to the English or the Germans the French. We have always tended this country to think of war as at best a hideous necessity, not as a "contin- uation of politics by other means" or, alternatively, as an opportunity for heroism, glory, and honor. War to Americans is a calamity when it hap- pens, it is a dirty business while it lasts, and the sooner it can be gotten over with the better. But negative as this attitude may be, it is still a far cry from the undifferentiated fear, loathing, and revulsion that the pros- pect of war now seems to inspire in the American mind. No doubt a rise in pacifist senti- ment is inevitable in the wake of any war, especially a war that ends, as Vietnam did, in humiliation and de- feat. No doubt, also, the way the war in Vietnam was reported as well as the way it was opposed (a distinction more easily made in theory than it was ever observed in practice) helped to stimulate a vaguely pacifist response. All one heard about and saw was the horrors of war-unredeemed, as it ap- peared, by any noble purpose. No he- roes emerged, only villains and vic- tims, and nothing good was accom- plished by American troops and Amer- ican arms, only evil: only destruction, misery, murder, and guilt. Norman Podhoretz is the editor of Commen- tary and the author of Making It and Doings and Undoings. by Norman Podhoretz This is how pacifist ideologues look upon war in general, and the promi- nent position of pacifist organizations in the protest movement against Amer- ican military involvement in Vietnam probably influenced the way the war came to be conceived and described. (It is worth noting, however, that the pacifist world was split between those who, in the traditional pacifist spirit, regarded all wars as equally evil and those who, in a newer spirit, were will- ing to justify and even celebrate "wars of national liberation" and to con- demn only "wars of imperialist ag. gression," such as they imagined the United States was waging in Vietnam.) But be all that as it may, so power- ful did the pacifist tide become that it even reached backward to engulf World War II, probably the most pop- ular war in which the United States had ever participated. To this "Viet- namization" of World War II, as we may call it, two immensely success- ful novels of the Sixties, Joseph Hel- ler's Catch-22 and Kurt Vonnegut's Slaughterhouse-Five, made perhaps the largest contribution. Although written without reference to Vietnam and pub- lished in 1961, just before American troops began to be sent there, Catch- 22 achieved full cultic status only later in the decade, when it could be seized upon to discredit the one war from which something good had almost uni- versally been thought to have come. Not even World War II, the war against Hitler, was worth fighting, said Catch- 22, to the acclaim of millions; nor, added Vonnegut in his story of the bombing of Dresden, had we acted any less criminally in that war than we were acting in Vietnam. S THE PAST was namized, so is the being subjected to thus Viet- future now the same treatment. We have, that is, reached a point at which any Amer- ican military action, anywhere in the Approved For Release 2004/03/16 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800060019-0 THE CULTURE OF P 'AS world, in support o any o'jec whatever, has become difficult to imag- ine. Officially, of course, the President and those who speak in his name con- tinue to declare that we will "honor our commitments." But does anyone take it for granted any longer-as everyone did before our defeat in Viet- nam-that we would do so if it meant going to war? And even short of actually going to war, there is the matter of our will- ingness to maintain the military forces necessary to deter the Soviet Union from moving any further ahead. Here, too, just as we officially remain com- mitted to the defense of Western Eu- rope, Japan, Israel, South Korea, and perhaps one or two other countries, we are also officially determined to prevent the Soviet Union from achiev- ing the kind and degree of military superiority which would make a mock- ery of that commitment. But again ap- pearances are misleading. Every year, it seems, the struggle against military spending grows more intense. While the Soviet Union engages in the most massive military buildup in the his- tory of the world, we haggle over ev- ery weapon. We treat our own mili- tary leaders as though they were wearing the uniform of a foreign pow- er. Everything they tell us about our military needs is greeted with hostil- ity and suspicion, and when, in re- sponse to sentiment of this nature, the President decides to scrap the B-1 bomber, one would think from the an- swering cheer that our mortal enemies had suffered a grievous defeat. Now it may be that the decision to de- velop an updated B-52 fleet armed with cruise missiles instead of the B-1 was sound from a strictly military point of view, as well as from an economic one. But it would be naive to suppose that the campaign against the B-1 was fueled by a desire for the most effec- tive possible weapons system at the lowest possible cost. No doubt this was what the President and some others had in mind, but cost-effectiveness was hardly the factor which made for the tremendous passion over the B-1. The real goal of the campaign against it, according to a spokesman for Clergy and Laity Concerned (a group which is itself a legacy of Vietnam, having been spawned in opposition to that war and having survived to fight an- other day), "was to raise fundamen- faT questions abou[ the meaning-671-5:' idea " Tliat-yri ricans- consume more tional security and the militarization than their "fair share" of resources. of American foreign policy, using the From this it is concluded that a vol- B-1 as symbol par excellence." We untary reduction in the American can, therefore, expect that the next standard of living (a kind of unilateral stage of the campaign will be an ef- economic disarmament) is all that is fort to prevent development of the needed to facilitate a more equitable cruise missile. For "to the extent that distribution of wealth throughout the the Administration is allowed to re- world, as though prosperity were a place an obsolescent technology (the zero-sum game and as though we did manned bomber) with a new and even not in any case produce more wealth more dangerous technology (the cruise than we consume. And anti-American- missile), it can be assumed that the ism is present in the view that the public, the press, and the Congress main threat to the liberties of the have failed to learn the most crucial American people is the American gov- lessons of the B-1 campaign." Those ernment itself. From this it is argued lessons being presumably that we that preventing the FBI and the CIA ought to have no weapons at all. from using questionable methods of surveillance in the attempt to catch spies and terrorists is a more urgent N ADDITION TO pacifism, Vietnam order of business than doing anything has left us with a legacy of native when the KGB employs the same anti-Americanism. Obviously, the methods against American citizens in explicit anti-Americanism which America on a vastly larger scale. surfaced on the radical Left in the late Indeed, immediately after the news Sixties has receded into virtual invisi- broke this past summer that the Soviet bility. No longer do we see the name Union had been monitoring an untold of the country spelled with a k to sug- number of phone conversations in this gest an association with Nazi Germany. country, that this had been known to Nor do vilifications of American so- the authorities for at least the past four ciety fill the papers and the airwaves years, and that nothing had been done to the exclusion of any other idea as about it for fear of endangering de- they did only a few years ago. Eldridge tente, Tom Wicker rushed into print Cleaver has become a born-again to express his outrage at electronic Christian and a patriot. Rennie Davis eavesdropping-by American law-en- has become an insurance salesman. forcement agencies. The next day, Tom Hayden has joined the Demo- while the President was denying that cratic Party. Jerry Rubin is off the there was anything "aggressive" about streets and "into" the pursuit of ma- this Soviet activity, the New York turity. Abbie Hoffman has disappeared. Times reported on another page that But this does not mean that the anti- civil suits had been filed against American attitudes they and others agents of the FBI associated with a like them did so much to propagate former colleague named John Kearney have also disappeared. These attitudes who had "headed an internal security are still here and, in the subtler forms unit known as Squad 47 [and who] they now assume, are perhaps even has been charged with five felony more widespread, and certainly more counts stemming from allegedly illegal respectable, than they ever were be- mail-openings and wiretaps that his fore. men conducted in a search for fugitive They are present, for example, in members of the Weather Underground, the notion that the main obstacle to a terrorist group." nuclear disarmament is the American The third major legacy of Vietnam military establishment. From this it is with which we are still living is the concluded that unilateral "restraint" altered American attitude toward Com- in the development of weapons by the munism. Before Vietnam the spread of United States is all that is needed to Communism was regarded as the sin- make the Russians follow suit, as gle greatest danger to American se- though the only reason they have con- curity and American values. .Today structed so awesome an arsenal is that no less an authority than the Presi- we have set them a bad example which dent of the United States stigmatizes they have been forced to imitate. Anti- this old attitude as an "inordinate fear Americanism is also present in the of Communism" and congratulates 26 Approved For Release 2004/03/16 : CIA-RDP80M00165AO01800060019-0 Approved For Release 2004/03/16 : CIA-RDP80M00165AO01800060019-0 himself and his fellow Americans on having overcome it. One may wonder how the fear of a totalitarian system armed, as Solzhe- nitsyn puts-it, "to the teeth," aggres- sively on the move, and sworn to de- stroy the political system to which we ourselves are presumably committed, could ever be inordinate. But Mr. Car- ter is almost certainly right in observ- ing that no such fear is widespread in America today. A few individuals like Henry Jackson, Paul Nitze, and Elmo Zumwalt, and a few small groups like the Committee on the Present Danger and the Coalition for a Democratic Ma- jority keep trying to alert American public opinion to the unprecedented di- mensions of the Soviet military build- up, but they are rewarded for their pains with accusations of hysteria, paranoia, servility toward the Penta- gon, and worse. While the number of strategic nuclear missiles in the Soviet arsenal increases, while Soviet war- ships now appear for the first time in distant waters which no Russian navy ever thought necessary or desirable to patrol, while Soviet conventional forces are strengthened and multiplied on the Western front, while Soviet probes are made into Africa through Cuban sur- rogates with the evident intention of enabling the Russians to control sea- lanes vital to the commerce of the en- tire West, and *hile Communist par- ties move closer and closer to power in Italy and France-while all this goes on, elaborate exercises in statistical manipulation and sophistical rationali- zation are undertaken to explain it all away as unreal or as insignificant or as understandable or as unthreatening. Nor are such exercises confined to articles in the liberal press. They even come out of the CIA and the Depart- ment of Defense, whose reassuring es- timates of the Soviet-American mili- tary balance are obversely reminiscent of intelligence reports which also told a series of Presidents what they wanted to hear about the progress of the war in Vietnam. What Presidents Kenne- dy, Johnson, and Nixon wanted to hear was that the war could be won and that it was going well; what Pres- ident Carter wants to hear is that de- fense spending can be cut without en- dangering the security of the United States. Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon were given wishful intelligence anal- By this logic, the spread of Commu- nism into non-Communist countries ought to be encouraged by the United States rather than resisted, and Amer- ican power used not to make the world safe for democracy but to make it safe for Communist regimes which declare their independence of Soviet control. Yet no Communist regime outside the Soviet orbit, not even the one in Yugo- slavia, countenances any political lib- erty at all within its own borders, while some independent Communist regimes, notably the one in China, are more totalitarian than the Soviet Union itself. Jean-Francois Revel, the distinguished French political commen- tator, puts it with characteristic sharp- ness when he says in his recent book The Totalitarian Temptation that "de- Russification does not mean democrati- zation"; to which one may add that it does not mean any lessening of hostili- ty to the cause of liberty in international affairs either. But, clearly, Revel's view is on the defensive nowadays in the United States, where we seem to be moving beyond our new freedom from the "inordinate" fear of Communism to an even headier freedom from any fear of Communism at all. Or is it perhaps the opposite which is true? Have we, that is, been plunged by Vietnam into so great a fear of Communism that we can no longer summon the will to resist it? j N SPECULATING ON this possibil- ity, I have been struck very forc- ibly by certain resemblances be- tween the United States today and Great Britain in the years after the first world war. The British, of course, were on the winning side in that war, whereas we were the losers in Viet- nam. But World War I took so great a toll of lives and ideals that for all practical purposes it was experienced by the British as a defeat. Especially among the upper-class young-as Mar- tin Green shows in his brilliant "Nar- rative of `Decadence' in England After 1918," Children of the Sun-there de- veloped many of the same tendencies we see all around us in America today. Thus, for example, words such as sol- dier and fighting, which had previous- ly carried a positive charge, now be- came so distasteful that the Iliad, with its celebration of the martial virtues, yses and inflated body counts; Carter the Soviet Union than it is to the West. could no longer be comfortably read. Approved For Release 2004/03/16 : CIA-RDP80M00165AO01800060019-0 is given the CIA Team A and the De- partment of Defense Presidential Re- view Memorandum 10, whose contents, in William Safire's description, "feed the hopes for a smooth road to peace, with reduced American military ex- penditures leading to easily balanced budgets." But denying the realities of the So- viet military buildup is only one of the forms our new freedom from the old "inordinate fear of Communism" has been taking. Another variant ac- knowledges that this buildup is real but regards it as a development to be welcomed by the United States rather than feared. The reasoning behind this bizarre notion is that only when the United States and the Soviet Union are equal in strength-when, in the jargon of arms control, "parity" has been achieved-will both sides feel se- cure enough to put a halt to the arms race and even to begin cutting back. In accord with these assumptions, Richard Pipes, the former director of the Russian Research Center at Har- vard (who also headed a team of non- governmental experts appointed during the Ford Administration to review the CIA's estimate of Soviet military ca- pability), writes, "The United States in the mid-1960's unilaterally froze its force of ICBM's at 1,054 and disman- tled nearly all its defenses against ene- my bombers.... The Russians were watched benignly as they moved to- ward parity with the United States in the number of intercontinental launch- ers, and then proceeded to attain nu- merical superiority." A similarly benign attitude has been developing toward the progress of Communism in Western Europe. In this case, government officials, under Nixon and Ford and now under Car- ter, have lagged behind the "advanced" sectors of public opinion and the for- eign-policy establishment in continu- ing to see the entry of Communist par- ties into the governments of Italy and France as a danger to NATO (not to mention to democracy). But the in- dications are that the gap is being closed. Already Secretary of State Cyrus Vance has spoken in much milder terms about Eurocommunism than his predecessor did; echoing the latest conventional wisdom on the sub- ject, he has suggested that Eurocom- munism may be more of a threat to Nothing good coul be said about ers in the British Union of Fascists, "trained up to become pseudo-homo- war: it was wanton carnage pure and as well as prominent writers like D.H. simple. Nor was it ever justified: the Lawrence and Wyndham Lewis, sym- things that matter, Aldous Huxley de- pathized with or actually supported clared, can be neither defended nor Hitler and Mussolini (Osbert Sitwell, imposed by force of arms. When war anticipating a similar fantasy of to- comes, wrote Brian Howard in verse day about Italian Communism, once more typical in its sentiments than argued that Italian Fascism offered an gifted in its language, it is "because escape from the equally horrible al- a parcel of damned old men/Want ternatives of Russian Bolshevism and some fun or some power or some- American capitalism) ; others, like thing." It was in an atmosphere suf- W.H. Auden, Stephen Spender, John fused with such ideas and attitudes Strachey, and Philip Toynbee, were at- that the Oxford Pledge never to fight tracted to Stalin and to Communism. "for King and country" was taken by And there were even some for whom so many thousands of British under- being a democrat was so wet that they graduates in the early 1930s. were willing to commit treason against For England itself had been dis- the democratic country in which they credited by the first world war in the lived. About treason, at least, there eyes of an entire generation of the was nothing wet. Whereas "to many privileged young. It was a wicked English people," Rebecca West later country because it had senselessly sent wrote, patriotism had "something the flower of its youth to the slaughter, dowdy about it," treason had "a cer- and it was doomed because it rested tain style, a sort of elegance." More- on obsolescent social and political over, it was understandable that trea- foundations (by which some meant son should be committed against that there was too much inequality and England. Thus when Guy Burgess, who others meant there was not enough). had been a Soviet agent while pre- Worst of all from the point of view tending to work for British Intelli- of not a few of these "bright young gence, fled to Moscow in the Fifties things" of the postwar period, En- just as he was about to be caught, gland was dull and philistine. The arts Auden said that his old friend had were more exciting in France and life become a Russian citizen for the same was more interesting in Germany. En- reason that he himself had become an gland was in fact so stodgy in its American citizen-"it was the only tastes, so puritanical in its morals, and way completely and finally to rebel so drearily middle-class in its culture against England." that almost any alternative society was That Auden and Burgess were both to be preferred. homosexuals clearly had something, Politically this hostility to England perhaps everything, to do with their could find expression equally well on need "completely and finally to rebel the Left and the Right. Perhaps the against England." And indeed, it is most striking example was the Mit- impossible to read books like Chil- ford sisters, daughters of the coun- dren of the Sun or Paul Fussell's The try's highest aristocracy, one of whom, Great War and Modern Memory with- Unity, became a Nazi and another, out being struck by the central role Jessica, became a Communist. In his homosexuality played in the entire recent book on Unity, David Pryce- rebellious ethos of the interwar pe- Jones tells the story of a British dip- riod in England. Much of the litera- lomat who was set upon by the two ture of the first world war itself, says sisters during a visit to their country Fussell, who has made a very thorough estate in the early Thirties. Are you, study of it, was "replete" with homo- they demanded of him, " `a Fascist or sexual passion. Soldiers had been a a Communist?' and I said, `Neither, common object of fantasy and desire I'm a democrat.' Whereupon they an- for Victorian homosexuals because of swered, `How wet."' "their youth, their athleticism, their There were a good many others in relative cleanliness, their uniforms, the upper reaches of British society and their heroic readiness, like Adonis who also thought that being a demo- or St. Sebastian, for `sacrifice.' " It is crat was "wet" (or, as I suppose we therefore not surprising that young would say today, square). Some, like officers fresh out of schools where, ac- Sir Oswald Mosley and his follow- cording to Robert Graves, they were sexuals" (Graves's name, by the way, was stricken from the rolls of his own school, Charterhouse, for revealing this in his great memoir of the war, Goodbye to All That) regularly fell in love with each other or, more fre- quently, with the lower-class "lads" under their command. BUT IF HOMOSEXUAL feeling was aroused by the war, ho- mosexual feeling also ac- counted for a good deal of the pacifism which rose out of the trenches and into the upper reaches of the culture after the war was over. In war poem after war poem and in memoir after memoir, the emphasis was on the youthful, masculine beauty so wantonly wasted by the war, the bodies meant for embrace by their own kind that were consigned so early to the grave. Fussell writes of Wilfred Owen, possibly the best of the English war poets and himself a homosexual and a casualty of the war: "What he encountered at the front was worse than even a poet's imagination could have conceived. From then on, in the less than two years left to him, the emotions that dominated were horror, outrage, and pity: horror at what he saw at the front; outrage at the inabil- ity of the civilian world ... to under- stand what was going on; pity for the poor, dumb, helpless, good-looking boys victimized by it all." And the way "the sight and touch of beauti- ful lads ending with their frightful death in a wanton slaughter" gave rise to the new postwar surge of hos- tility to British society is altogether explicit in the case of one Capt. Ralph Nicholas Chubb, who, in the words of his biographer, watched the slaughter of a boy, a creature such as those he had al- ways mentally, and once physically loved. He was the curly-haired, sev- enteen-year-old son of a blacksmith. ... His death symbolized for Chubb all the horrors and taboos of socie- ty. The boy, a beloved object, was not only forbidden by law to be loved by an adult male but was le- gally sacrificed by the same laws in the service of his country. No wonder, then, that so many of those who resented their own country 30 Approved For Release 2004/03/16 : CIA-RDP80M00165AO01800060019-0 Approved For Release 2004/03/16: CIA-RDP80MO to the point of pledging never to fight ual apologists described by Fussell for it and even, in a few instances, to and Green, even when he is being the point of joining forces with its most up to date. For example, review- enemies, should have been, or should ing a recent book by Christopher have chosen to become, homosexuals. Isherwood (who figured centrally in For whatever else homosexuality may the culture of England during the inter- be or may be caused by, to these war period before he emigrated to young men of the English upper class America, and who is thus a living link it represented-as Martin Green so between that culture and our own), convincingly demonstrates-the refusal Vidal praises homosexuality for serv- of fatherhood and all that fatherhood ing the alleged ecological need to con- entailed: responsibility for a family trol population growth. But even this and therefore an inescapable implica- trendy rationalization echoes one of tion in the destiny of society as a his English forebears, John Addington whole. And that so many of the privi- Symonds, who once wrote: "It would leged young of England "no longer not be easy to maintain that a curate wanted to grow up to become fathers begetting his fourteenth baby on the themselves" also meant that they were body of a worn-out wife is a more ele- repudiating their birthright as succes- vating object of mental contemplation sors to their own fathers in assuming than Harmodius in the embrace of a direct responsibility for the fate of Aristogiton." the country. The great influence of this complex The list of these young men is al- of attitudes in the mid-1930s provoked most endless, ranging from dandies George Orwell to an outburst against and aesthetes of the Twenties like Brian "so-called artists who spend on sodomy Howard and Harold Acton, to expatri- what they have gained by sponging. ate writers of the Thirties like Auden Even to wish to write about such peo- and Isherwood, to Soviet agents like ple, as Cyril Connolly had just done Burgess and MacLean- It was through in his novel The Rock Pool, was to their writings, their political activities, "betray a kind of spiritual inade- and the way of life they followed that quacy" and "a distaste for normal an indispensable element was added to life and common decency." Thinking the antidemocratic pacifism of the in- no doubt of the contribution this terwar ethos: a generalized contempt "sluttish antinomianism" was making for middle-class or indeed any kind of to the paralysis of British will in the heterosexual adult life. To be hetero- face of an ever-growing Nazi threat, sexual -was to be "an utterly dreary Orwell added, in a sentence which af- middleclass bore." At Oxford, said John ter forty years retains every last bit of Betjeman, it was only "state-subsidized its original force and relevance: "The undergraduates [who were] generally fact to which we have got to cling, heterosexual." The best people looked as to a life-belt, is that it is possible to other men for sex and romance. to be a normal decent person and yet Anyone familiar with homosexual to be fully alive." apologetics in America today will rec- One wonders: to what extent did the ognize these attitudes. Suitably up- policy of appeasing Hitler which the dated and altered to fit contemporary British government followed in the American realities, they are purveyed Thirties derive from the fear that a by such openly homosexual writers as generation raised on pacifism and con- Allen Ginsberg, James Baldwin, and tempt for the life of its own society Gore Vidal-not to mention a host of would refuse or be unable to resist less distinguished publicists-in whose so powerful and self-confident an en- work we find the same combination emy as Nazi Germany? It would be of pacifism (with Vietnam naturally very hard to say, although we know standing in for World War I), hos- that at least one prominent English- tility to one's own country and its man of the day, the press magnate putatively dreary middle-class way of Lord Rothermere, believed that "a life, and derision of the idea that it moribund people such as ours is not stands for anything worth defending equipped to deal with a totalitarian or that it is threatened by anything state." We know, too, that Hitler him- but its own stupidity and wickedness. self thought the British would never Vidal in particular often reminds one fight. As he went from strength to in his tone and style of the homosex- strength they seemed to grow more Approved For Release 2004/03/16: CIA-RDP80M00l Funny' sha V. and Provocative ??? ascholarlyf celebratio lish B1ack6g today relates the p, book that truly linguistic contribueoe n l Blacks to the Am language a serious; l behead work, and one that w by the people about whom it Essence MagpZine speaks. - 1 11 11 ~ ee? ` Significant savings on distinguished prints for the collector and lover of fine art. "NEW EXPERIENCES" by PATRICIA DOBSON Now available for the first time, high-quality prints from a renowned contemporary artist. Patricia Dobson is gaining a national reputation for her depth and understanding of western subjects. The original of "New Experiences" is priced at $3,500 in graphic. Now-you can own a high- quality print reproduced on the finest quality stock from this distinguished artist for only $9.95 in 8" x 10" size-or only $27.95 in 16" x 20" size. Both are highly suitable for framing or for gifting.- Thou Art Gallery N P.O. Box 9092. San Diego, CA 92109 Plan. smd (q...l _ _ Donis 16" . 20" 5 $2795 exh and (qua.l 8'. 10" pnnrc @ 39.95 each Tod .m6s.d 3 .e C.o.o. Charge to Master Charw # Charge ro Ban ax,.o and # si nalura g caul nudants include 6% sa4s tae 9... Addreo 5 0019!10 t9 TIDE CULTURE ftOr U Release 2004/03/16: CIA-RDP80M00165AO01800060019-0 and more fearful. Except for a few lonely figures like Winston Churchill who were generally dismissed by their own countrymen as hysterical war- mongers, they blinded themselves to his intentions, rationalizing away his ev- ery aggressive move, and proclaiming that every advance he made was bring- ing the world closer and closer to peace. What else could this mean but that they had already given up? j T IS OF THE greatest interest to note that Brezhnev today has ex- pressed similar sentiments about the United States. Not so long ago, in a speech to Communist party leaders in Prague-to which as little attention has been paid in this coun- try as was paid in England to equally revealing speeches by Hitler in the 1930s-Brezhnev bragged of the ad- vances the Soviet Union had been making under cover of detente and predicted that they would lead to an irreversible shift in the balance of power by the 1980s. One imagines that he was led to this conclusion by the response of the United States to the Soviet military buildup, a response which has uncannily followed the pat- tern of British response to the Ger- man buildup of the Thirties. The historian Walter Laqueur divides the British response into four distinct stages. In stage one, it was claimed that the reports of German rearmament were grossly exaggerated; in stage two, the reports were acknowledged as true, but it was alleged.that Germany was so far behind that it could never catch up; in stage three, it was admitted that Ger- many had achieved parity with or even surpassed Britain, but it was also said that this did not constitute a military threat since the Germans had to defend themselves against potential enemies in the East as well as in the West; and in stage four, when the full extent of Ger- man superiority was finally faced, it was said that survival now had to be the overriding consideration, and the coun- sels of appeasement prevailed. Com- pare this to Richard Pipes's description of the American response to the Soviet military buildup of the past few years: The frenetic pace of the Soviet nuclear buildup was explained first on the ground that the Russians had a lot of catching up to do, then that they had to consider the Chi- nese threat, and finally on the grounds that they are inherently a very insecure people and should be allowed an edge in deterrent capa. bility. We have, then, reached stage three. Are we about to move into stage four? The Russians, at any rate, evidently think we already did move into it dur- ing the heyday of detente. In fact, ac- cording to a highly placed source with- in the Carter Administration recently quoted by the New York Times, the reason the Russians are so furious with the new Administration's human- rights initiative is that it seems to spell a reversal of what they previously saw as the inexorable decline of American will and American power. One can only hope that they are right; and yet the doubts grow with every new asser- tion by the President or the Secretary of State that this policy is not intended to "single the Soviet Union out," and with every new article in the press warning against the use of human rights as a political weapon in the service of a "mindless anti-Commu- nism." The Soviet Union, after all, has noth- ing to fear from a policy directed no more against them than against some of our own allies, or against right- wing military dictatorships which, however viciously they treat their own citizens, pose no threat to the United States, whether military or ideological. For, as Daniel P. Moynihan has point- ed out, with the passing of Nazi Ger- many and the disappearance of Fas- cism as a plausible political creed, it is only Communism-or, if one pre- fers, Marxist-Leninism-which chal- lenges liberal democracy in the world of ideas, values, ideologies. Small Com- munist or Marxist-Leninist countries attack us as viciously as, and often more effectively than, big ones. Of these countries one may say what St. Augustine said of children: their vir- tue resides not in their wills but in the weakness of their limbs. (Where they are not weak, as in their systems of internal control, they are fully capable of rivaling the Russians and the Chi- nese in political barbarism and cruelty, and sometimes, as in Cambodia, even of surpassing them.) But no such vir- tue attaches to the Soviet Union. As the most powerful of all the Commu- nist states, it is by that very fact the most dangerous enemy of liberty, de- mocracy, and human rights on the face of the earth. There was a time when all this was well understood in the United States, but that was before Vietnam. The de- feat of .our effort to halt the spread of Communism in Southeast Asia has left many who supported and even su- pervised that effort with the feeling that there is nothing we can do to stem the tide of Communism any- where, not even in Western Europe. They have thus ironically become the de facto allies of those who are so lit- tle opposed to Marxist-Leninism and so much opposed to the United States that they think nothing should be done by America to stem the Communist tide. In short, these repentant hawks (so many of whom have found a perch in the upper levels of the Carter Ad- ministration), having been wrong on the one side are now making up for it by being wrong on the other. They were wrong in their hawkishness to- ward Vietnam-not because they wanted to hold the line against an advancing Communist tide but because they failed to see that the costs of holding such a line in Vietnam would inevitably turn out to be too high. And now, once again, they are wrong, this time in their dovishness toward the Soviet Union- not because they want to reach an ac- commodation with the Russians, but be- cause they fail to see that the Russians are after something larger and more am- bitious than an accommodation with us. To be.sure, how we can prudently and effectively deter the Soviet Union and resist the advance of Communism generally without unleashing a nuclear war is a serious and difficult question -the most serious and the most dif- ficult question of the age. But even to begin answering it requires the reali- zation that the democratic world is under siege, the conviction that it is worth defending, and the understand- ing that American power is indispen- sable to its defense. Until this realiza- tion, this conviction, and this under- standing become as widespread in the United States as once upon a time they used to be, I for one will regard all talk of recovery from Vietnam as a delusion and a deceit. Meanwhile, the parallels with England in 1937 are here, and this revival of the culture of appeasement ought to be troubling our sleep. ^ HARPER'S/OCTOBER 1977 Approved For Release 2004/03/16 : CIA-RDP80M00165AO01800060019-0 Approved For Release 2004/03/16 : CIA-RDP80M00165AO01800060019-0 cn febzfofez , enccfe ALV+IAYS Honorable Stansfield Turner Director The Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D. C. 20505 Approved For Release 2004/03/16 : CIA-RDP80M00165AO01800060019-0