LETTER TO HONORABLE JOHN MCCLELLAN FROM STANSFIELD TURNER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A001700150007-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 22, 1977
• Content Type: LETTER

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:~ :ate-utlvo $egJatty
The Director of Central Intelligence
ltiishingon. D. C. 20505
Honorable John McClellan, Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
.Dear Mr. Chairman:
At my meeting with the Intelligence Operations
Subcommittee on 16 March, you asked about the legal
authority for the conduct of covert activities. I thought
you would be interested in the enclosed statement of
Mitchell Rogovin, former Special Counsel to the Director,
before the House Select Committee on Intelligence on
9 December 1975.
Yours sincerely,
:'d Turner
STANSFIELD TURNER
Admiral, U. S. Navy
Distribution:
Original - Addressee w/encl
1 - DCI wo/encl
1 - DDCI wo/encl
ER w/ encl
1 - OLC w/ encl
OLC/GLC:baa (22 Mar 77)
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 ROUTING AND RECORD,SHEET .
Zing)
`puty Director
I
?irector
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
In-view of Chairman McClellanis
interest in the legal authority for
the conduct of covert actions, I
thought it appropriate for you to-
send send him the attached.
LOLC (for mailing)
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
SECRET [] CONFIDENTIAL
CIA-RDp8O NI OO 165AO017O01.500Q7~
INTERNAL
USE -ONLY..
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.Statement of
Mitchell Rogovin
before
The House Select Committee on
Intelligence
December 9, 1975
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 Re: The Constitutional, Statutory and Legal
analysis of these fundamental legal sources. Before proceeding with
this analysis, however, it is useful to set forth a description of the
kinds of activities which are comprehended by the term "covert action."
covert action.
The major portion of this memorandum is devoted to an
this responsibility to the CIA derives from three fundamental sources,
each of which" . in itself, constitutes a sufficient legal basis for the
delegation. The three fundamental sources are: (1) the inherent con-
stitutional power of the President with respect to the conduct of
foreign affairs; (2) the National Security Act of 1947; and, (3) the
ratification, by Congress, of the CIA's authority to plan and conduct
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October 24, 1975
Basis for Covert Action
By means of explicit, formal instructions to the Director of
Central Intelligence, the President and the National Security Council
have directed that the Central Intelligence Agency assume responsibility
for planning and conducting "covert action" in support of this country's
foreign policy objectives. The legal authority for the. delegation of
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I. COVERT ACTION DEFINED
In general to ,ns covert action means any clandestine activity
designed to influence foreign governments, events, organizations or
persons in support of United States foreign policy, conducted in such
manner that- the involvement of the United States Government?is not
apparent.
There are four general categories-of covert actions -
(1) Covert Political Action or operations designed to exercise
influence on political situations in foreign countries; this could
involve funding a political party or other group, or the use of an
agent in a high government position to influence his government-s
domestic or foreign policy in a :canner beneficial to the United
States;
(2) Covert Propaganda or the covert use of foreign media assets
including newspapers, magazines, radio, television, etc.,'to disseminate
i nfoitiati on supporting United States foreign policy or attack the
policies and actions of foreign adversaries;
(3) Intelligence deception operations involving the calculated
feeding of information to a foreign government or intelligence
service for the purpose of influencing them to act or react in a
manner favorable to our purpose; and
(4) Covert paramilitary action, the provision of covert.
military assistance and advice to foreign conventional and
unconventional military forces or oraani zati ons .
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II. FUNDAMENTAL SOURCES OF LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR CIA TO ENGAGE IN
CO E_RT ACTION`!
As indicated above, the legal authority for the delegation of
covert action responsibility to the CIA by the President and the
Naomi anal Security Council derives from three fundamental sources:
(1) the inherent cons constitutional power of the President 0i th respect to
the conduct of foreign affairs; (2) the National Security Act of ig 7;
and, (3) the ratification, by Congress, of the CIA's authority to
plan and conduct cover-, action. Each of these fundamental sources is
discussed separately below. -
A. INHERENT CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OE THE PRESIDEt1T WITH RESPECT
TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The Supreme Court, the Congress, and the framers of the-
Constitution itself, have all recognized that the President possesses
broad powers with respect to the conduct of foreign affairs. ' No less
a constitutional authority than John Marshall, in an address to the
House of Representatives, declared:
"The President is sole organ of the nation.in its external
relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations-"*j
The United States Senate, at an early date in its history,
acknowledged the supremacy of the President with respect to foreign
affairs, and recognized that he has broad powers in that area- In
1310-, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee issued a report which
concluded:
J 10 Annals of Congress 613 (1800), reprinted in 5 Wheat.
Appendix note I, at 26 (U. S. 1820).
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"The President is the constitutional representative
of the United States ,,ii th regard to foreign nations
manages our concerns with foreign-nations and must
necessarily be most competent to deter; ine when, hc,c
and upon what subjects negotiation may be_ urged with
the greater ` prospect of success."
Each of these statements was c; ted approvingly- by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Curti ss-Wri cht Exoort Corp-, 299 U _S . 31 1
(1936) . I n that case, the Court up'hel d the power of the Presi derrt to
proclaim it unlawful for United States citizens to supply arms to any
Of the belligerents. in the Chaco War in South America. Although tae
Court could have rested its opinion solely on the* grounds that the
proclamation was issued pursuant to a Joint Resolution of Congress,
it cited the statements of Marshall and the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee excerpted above and spoke at length of the inherent
constitutional powers of. the President with respect to foreign affairs..
Specifically, the court spoke of:
"[T]he very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the
President as the sole organ of the Federal government
in the field c f international relations---a power which
does not require as a basis for its exercise an act
of Congress..." 299 U.S. at 320.
The Court has frequently real f i rand the constitutional
doctrine set forth in Curti ss-Ylri ch L that the President is supreme
in the area o foreign affairs and that his powers in that area are
"plenary." For example, in United States V. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (19 2),
a case i n ;;hi ch the Court upheld the Do,-rer of the President to re ogni ze-
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foreign governments and to conclude executive agreements' with there
"the President... is the `sole organ of the Federal government in the
field of international relations. t" 315 U.S. at 230. Then the
Court added:
"Effec+- ~l ?
G, veness in handling the delicate prohleg-i3s of -
foreign relations requires no less. Unless such
a power exists, the power of recognition might be
thwarted or seriously diluted. Uo such obstacle
can be placed in the way of rehabilitation of
relations be ween this country and another nation,
unless the 'historic conception of the powers
and responsibilities of the President in the -
conduct of foreign affairs.. .is to be drastically
revised." Id.
which have the force of domestic law, the Court repeated.tha
has made it clear that the President may: proclaim it unlawful for United
si bi l i ti es of the President in the conduct of foreign a - fai rs," the Court
Pursuant to this "historic concept ion of the powers and respon-
States citizens to supply arms to foreign belligerents, Curti ss-. ri ant, su cra :
with them, Pink, suora; use military force to protect United States citizens
recognize foreign governments and conclude binding executive agreements
and property abroad, in Re tieagl e, 135 U.S. 1, 6^ (1890} ;
The court has never considered the precise question of .-ihether the
President may direct an agency of govern ~ient to parfor-m covert action
in foreign countries. However, in view of the Co'ur'~'s recognition o"
the hrc powers of the President with respect to the conduct Hof foreign
affairs, and in i vew oil the overrlhel icl' ng historical precedents, it i s
clear p -o F~'orrHcleg31nf~e~h-WDPO0A00165A0017001500Y07-4
and repel an arr-red attack by meeting "force with force," Prize Cases,
2 Black 635, 663 (18552).
 by Thomas Jefferson when he, on his own authority, sent the Navy
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The historical precedents are every bit as cornpall ing as the
strong language used by the Supreme Court. Chief among these precedents
is the longstanding practice whereby Presidents, acting on their own
authority, have dispatched. troops to foreign countries and authorized
the use of-military force short of war. This practice was originated
to combat the Barbary pirates in an effort to protect American
shipping. By 1970 it was esti ted that Presidents, on their own
Although the Constitution vests Congress with the power to "declare
authority, had asserted the right to send troops abroad in "more
than 125" ins-Lances widely in purpose and magni tude. */
war (Article 1, Section 8,* Clause 11), Presidents have, throughout
history, insisted on and exercised their right to use force short
of war. President Taft, who later served as Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, wrote:
The President is the Commander-in-Chief
Of the arm-my and navy, and the militia when
called into the service of the United
States. Under this, he can order the
army and navy anywhere he wills, if the
appropriations furnish the means of
transportation. "**/
/Sac}cground In f or.m,a t i on on the Use of United States Armed Forces in
Fore-;c_ i Countries, 1970 Revision by the Foreign A fairs Division,
Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, for the Sub- -
Co~~ iii t tee on National Security Policy and Scientific Development
of the Houses Committee on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong. 2d Sess.
15 at sec. and Aooendi ces I and I I , (hereafter, "Background Information.")
**/ T aft, W. H., Our Chief Magistrate i-nd His Po'.?;ers, pp. -94-95 ?(1915) .
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Recent examples of presidential. use of force short of war include:
President Truman's peacetime stationing of troops in Europe; President:
Eisenhower's sending of Marines to Lebanon in 1953 to prevent foreign
i n ter,.,en ti on in the affairs of that country; President vennedy's
iinpcsition of a naval "quarantine" on Cuba during the 1962 missile crisis,
and his sending of planes to the Congo to evacuate civilians in 1960;
President Johnson's sending of troops to the Dominican Republic in
1966 to prevent form ation of a hostile government;*/ and, President-
i=ord's use of force against. Cambodia in 1975 to obtain the
release of American seamen held by Khmer Rouge troops.:'
Congress has formally acknowledged that the President has. i nhererrt
cons 1--i to ti anal authority to use military force short of war. This
acknowledgment is implicit -i n he ellar Powers Resolution, which became
effective on November 7, -1973. *r I n Section 3 of that Resolution,
it is provided that:
"The President. in every possible instance shall consult
with Congress before introducing United States Armed forces
into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement
in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances,
and after every such introduction shall consult regularly
with the Congress until United States Armed Forces are no
longer engaged in hostilities or-have been removed from
such sit-uati ons ." -
11,1,oreover, the Resolution specifically states, in Section 3(d)(l),
that it is not intended in any way to "alter the constitutional
auth,ri ty" of the President: .
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"Nothing in this joint resolution--
" (1) i s i ntended to al ter, the constitutional authority
of the Congress or of the President, or the provisions
of existing treaties..."
If the President has the power to dispatch troops to oreigri
countries and to use mi.litar,r force short of war--and the foregoing
discussion clearly deronstrates that he does--then it would logically
10111m4 that he has the power to send civilian personnel to - oreign
countries to engage in covert action, since such action, is rarely, i
ever, as drastic as the use of military force. In fact, the historical
precedents in support of the President's Rower to conduct covert action
in foreign countries are every bit as clear as those in support of his
power to use military force.
Long before the CIA was established, Presidents; acting on their
own authority, directed executive agents and executive agencies to
perform what has core to be known as covert action. Beginning with
George Washington, almost every President has appointed "special agents"
to engage in certain activities wi th,.or against, foreign countries;
although the activities conducted by these executive agents have -
included such overt assignments as negotiating treaties and conferring
with wartime allies, they have frequently included covert action as
well . In the first. century of the nation's existence al one-, more than
100 such agents were appointed by the Presi dent. k/
*/S. Doc. ?o. 231, 55th Cong., 2d Sess, part 8, a.t.337-62 (1901);
H.R. Doc. 1?1o. 387, 65th Cong., 1st Sess, part 2, at 5 (1919).
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Early examples of covert action performed by these agents are
legion- The -ollo:,;ing three are typical: (1) in 1843 President Tyler
secretly dispatched an agent to Great Britain to meet pri vat?ly with
i ndi vi dual government- and opposi ti ori. 1 eaders. and to attempt to influence
public opinion with respect to natters affecting the two countries,
wi -L.. El ever disclosing that he was a representative of the United
was on the verse of ceding California to Great Britain, he secretly
dispatched an agent to California for the purpose of "defeating any
States Government; (2) -in 1845, when President Polk feared that -'lexico _
attempt which may be made by foreign ggovarr.ments to acquire a control
over that country;" (3) in 1869, when the United States had territorial
designs on central and western Canada, President Grant sent an agent to
that area to foment sentiment for separation from Canada and union
with the United States. / .
These examples show that the practice of appointment of special
agents by the President for the purpose of conducting covert action
in foreign countries is deeply-rooted in our national history- The
practice is so deeply-rooted that historians have acknowledged the
existence of a bread presidential discretion with respect to
appoint,:_ent of such agents and assignment of functions to them.
According to Henry M. Wriston, for example: -
Henry i':erritt, Executive Agents in rrerican Foreign Relations,
Sal ti r; ore, i,d. , Johns Hop.--Ins Press (1929) , repri ate-I Glous ter, Mass,
Peter Smith (1967).
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"Among all instruments ava i1 ab1e 'to the ' Presi d ntt-.
in his conduct of foreign relations, none is more
flexible than the use of personal representatives. He
is free to employ officials of the government or
private citizens. He may give them such rank and
title as seem appropriate to the tasks....He may send
his agents to any place on earth that he thinks desirable
and give them instructions either by word of mouth,
or in writing, or through the Department cf State, or
in any other manner that seems to him fitted to the
occasion...
"Their missions may be secret, no one- ever being
informed of them....The President may meet their
expenses and pay then such sums as he regards as
reasonable. In this matter there is no check upon
him except the availability oil funds which has never
proved an insoluble problem. In short, he is as
nearly coma i etel y untrammeled as in any phase o f hi s
.executive au t^;, r i ty." x./ (Emphasis added..)
Individual agents, appointed by the President, were the exclusive'
means by which covert action was conducted prior to World War II..
During the ;?,ar, the President created the Office of Strategic Services-,.
and charged it with responsibility for secret subversive ooerati nr,r
against the enemy, as well as general intelligence activities; the OSS thus
became the first governmental agency to be assigned the task of planning
and conducting covert. action. The OSS exercised this task until it
was disbanded in September 1945. Then, in January 1946, President
Truman, by Executive Order, established the Central Intelligence Group-.,"/
Although the CIG was primarily a centralized intelligence organizatiorr,
it was also assigned the function of conducting covert action.
*/3o Foreign Affairs 219 (1960).
Executive Order 969 January 26, 19 6. 11 Fr-d- Reg1337, 1339 (February 5, 19416).
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What these historical precedents show is that, beginning long
before the CIA ;vas established, Presidents exercised their inep`ndent
power to direct executive agents and executive agencies to per f o sic
covert action in foreign countries. Consequently, when the CIA was
established in 1947, and when, shortly thereafter, it :?tas delegated.
the* responsibility for covert action, there was no attempt by the.
President to assert or exercise any new or theretofa-e unrecognized
executive authority; he was merely delegating to the CIA various
executive functions which were previously assigned to ad hoc
special agents and other executive agencies.
In sum, the decisions of the Supreme Court, the actions of Congress,
and the constitutional precedents developed by historical example
clearly establish that the President has broad, inherent powers with
respect to foreign affairs, and that these powers include the
authority to assign an executive agency, such as theF CIA,. the
responsibility for planning and conducting covert action i n support
of this country's foreign policy objectives-
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B. NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
The Mational Security Act of 1947 provided for the establishment-
of the CIA- However, the idea for a central intelligence organization
was actually conceived three years earlier. In 19?" , Colonel (l a-ter
Major General) William J. Donovan, head of the wartime O. -ice of
Strategic Services, prepared a plan for President Roosevelt which cal'fed.
for tf e establishment c f: a centralized intelligence servic`. Donovan. `s
plan envisioned an agency similar to his own OSS, which i;eu1d procure
intelligence by overt and covert means and which would be responsibl&
for "secret. activities" such as "clandestine subversive opara ons_"
The OSS i tsel -`, as indicated above, was disbanded at the close.
of World War II in September 1945. However, Donovan's plan, as-
developed and amended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reached f rui ti or. _
on January 22, 1946; on that date, President Truman, by Executive
Order, established the Central Intelligence Group (CIC)_x/ The.CIA
thus became the first peacetime central organization in American history
? f
devoted to intelligence matters. Heading the CIG was a Director of
Central Intelligence, whose duties were to:
"(a) Accomplish the correlation and evaluation of.
intelligence relating to the national security, and.-
the appropriate dissemination within the Government
of the resulting strategic and national intelligence
policy . . .
"(b) Plan for the coordination of such of the activi-
ties of the intelligence agencies of /other/ depart-
rents as relate to the national security and recwmend.
k/ Executive Order 9690, supra.
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to the National Intelligence Authority [composed of the
Secretaries of State, War and Navy, ar?d a personal repre-
sentative of the President] the establishment of such
overall policies and objectives as will assure the most
effective accomplishment of the national i ntel l i gance
mission.
"(c) Perform, for the benefit of said intelligence
agencies, such services of come on concern as the
National Intelligence Authority determines can be
more efficiently accomplished centrally. .
"(d) Perform such other I unctions and duties related
to i ntel i i eence affecting the national security as the
Presi den t and the Nan onal intelligence Authori t it a
from time to time di rect. ?x ' (Emphasis added_)
The National Security Act of 1947 called for the _CIA to ila,re~
the same powers and responsibilities as were accorded the CIG Erndez-
the 1946 Presidential Directive. Accordingly, when the House
Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments' held hearing on
the 1947 Act, i t paid special attention to the broad authority :
delegated to the CIC by subsection (d).*/ Durina these hearings-,
for exam 1e, Representative Clarence Brown questioned Lt_ Gen. Hoyt S_
Vandenberg, Director of Central intelligence, about the authority
which subparagraph (d) conveyed:
Id. at 1337.
"""/Hearings before the House Coti t ~e e oo'I Expenditures in the
Lxecu.,l`.!e Cepar_:-e^t,, June 27, 1>-7 'dd2ndum 1 to
Volume i (hereafter "Hearings").
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REP. SR0 4~E: "[T] his other section (i.e., subparagraph, (d) )
was so broad that you could do about anything that you
decided was either advantageous or beneficial, in your
mind?"
LT. GEl. VAj~;DEil3ERG: "Yes, sir."
PEP. GHOI: ,in other words,. i f you decided you wanted
to go into direct activities of any nature, almost,
why, that could be done?"
LT. GEN. VANDENS G: "Within the foreign intelligence
field, ii" it was agreed upon by all of the three
agencies concerned [i.e., State, War and iNavy., the
three agencies represented on the NIAJ_"--
A subsequent witness, Peter V i sher, the draftsman of the
Presidential Directive establishing the CIG, recc mended to the corm ttea
that i t pass the Act without authority for the CIA to pert o . any
"other functions related to intelligence affecting the national
security." He called this provision a "loophole" because it enabled the-
President to direct the CIG to perform almost any operation_** Various
members or" the corrsni t tee discussed the provision with the witness***
It is significant, then that when the bill was reported out, and wherr
it was passed, it authorized the CIA to:
"perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence
affecting the national security as the National Security Council
(which replaced the iNIA) may from ,time to time direct.." (Section
102(d)(5)).
In other words, the committee, with full knowledge of the broad
implications of subparagraph (d) of the 19^5 Presidential Directive,
conferred the identical powers and responsibilities on the CIA. This
legislative history indicates that the ccmrifi ttee, by including Section
102(d)(5) in the final bill, intended that the CIA have the authority,
subject to di recti ons f ro i the i,a ti cna Securi ty Counc i 1 , to conduct
a broad range of direct operational ass ignrieints.
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p. 88
xicz/ i,{ nn 7R_l(1r1
 through, the mechanisms it has established for funding the Agency, has
continually appropriated funds to the Agency for these activities..*
The Justice Department, in its 1902 metmoranc`u..r1 discussed
oversight. s ubcomri Ltees i n both the House and Senate. Moreover, Congress,
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C. CONGRESSIONAL RATIFICATION OF CIA AUTXORITY TO PLAN
CON000i COVERT ACT ION
Throughout the 28-year history of the CIA, the Agency has
reported its covert action programs to the appropriate members of its
generally that a portion of it. goes for clandestine
activities, although knowledge of specific acti vi i es
is restricted to the group specified above and occasional
other members of Congress briefed for specific purposes-
covert activities has been reported on a number of occasions
to the leadership of both houses, and to members of the sub--
comiiii -t-tees of the Armed Services and Appropriations Com--
mittees of both houses. It can be said that Congress as
a whole knows that money is appropriated to CIA and knows - .
appropriation of funds for such programs:
"Congress has continued over the years since 19"7 to
appropriate funds for the conduct of such covert..
activities- We understand that file existence or suc'rr
reporting of its covert action programs to Congress, and Congressional
supra, provided the following description o l" the history of CIA
.In effect, therefore, CIA has for many years had
.general funds approval from the Congress to carry
on covert cold-war activities..."*/
Y/The history of CIA reporting of covert action programs and Congressional
appropriation dates bact to 1948. In April D48, when the House Armed Sar'ices
Co"? ; ttee ','/as considering the CIA Act (ul ti,mately adopted in 1949), Director
of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter told the committee that the-Act was
needed to enable the Agency to, inter al i a, do research on and purchase
explosives, utilize and supply underground resistance movements in overrun
countries, purchase printing presses for the use of agents, and do
research for psychological warfare purposes. Passage of the Act clearly
reflects Congress' de~Lermination that the Agency be able to conduct
activities, such as covert action, sir,-. lar to those conducted by the ()SS;
or exai p: , the permanent appropriations iaauaye in the (hill Act`. `:/.as
:-cdelled after the appropriations langtage for the OSS because of its
flexibility and its provision for confidentiality of appropriations for
secret o orations.
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The law is clear that, under these circumstances, Cang- ess has
effectively ratified the authority o -IF the CIA to plan and conduct covert
action under the direction of the President and the National Security -
Council. The leading case on this point is Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S_
334 (l 941 } . In that case, a 1934 Act of Congress au ^,ortz`d ? I ..e es tab-
i i shme t o -F livestock grazing districts on certain federally-owned -
land, and charged the Secretary of the Interior with responsibility -cr~
administering and maintaining these districts; although the powers
F sr.. were broad, the conferred ed ~ on Sec ..r~.ry were , th.. Act did not explicitly
authorize him to require persons wishing to utilize the land to purchase
i censes. Pievert:heless, the Secretary promulgated regulations which-
imposed a license requirement, and sought to bar respondents who had
- not purchased a license, from utilizing a particular grazing dis trfct.,
In the Supreme Court, the Secretary argued that, even though the
1934 Act did not explicitly authorize him to require users. of federal . -
grazing lands to purchase licenses, his exercise of this authority was
lawful because Congress, by its own actions,- had ratified it. The
Secretary argued that, on several occasions, he fully i nfor:ed the
appropriate Congressional committees that he had imposed a license
requirement and that, in light of this info rma ti on, Congress
continually appropriated funds for the operation of the grazing district -
prograZ; this, he contended, amounted to a ratification of his
authority to institute the license requirement-
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The Supreme Co rt agreed that -Congress, by ;.'Wti nuz ng to appro-
priate funds with knowledge of the Secretary`s actions, ratified those
actions. The Court explained:
"The info ,nation in the possession of Ccngress was plentiful
and front various sources. I t knew from the annual reports of the'
licenses. The repeated appropriations or the proceeds
of the fees thus covered and to be covered into the Treasury,
the temporary licensing system was in force and that as much as
- $1,000,030 had been or would be collected in fees For such... .
Secretary of the Interior that a systen of temporary
l i scensi ng was in force. The same information was furnished
the Appropriations Committee at its hearings. Not only was.
it di sclesed by the annual report of the Department that
no permits ;rere issued in 1935, 1937 and 1938, and that
permits were issued in only one. district in 1939, but it was
also disclosed in the hearings that uniform fees were being
charged and col 1 ect`d for the issue of temporary licenses.
And members frm the floor i n f ors ed the Congress that
not only confirms the departmental construction of the
' -
statute, but cons ti tut es a rat ~ifi ~ i~.a~7on of the action.
of the Secretary as the agent of Congress in the
administration of the act.". (Footnotes omitted.)
313 U.S. at 360-361. .
The Brooks case requires the conclusion that Congress
has ratified the CIA's authority to plan and conduct covert.
action. Relying on Brooks, the Justice Department reached
precisely that conclusion:
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"It is well-established that appropriations
for administrative action of which Congress
has been informed amount to a ratification
of or acquiescence in such action. 3rco`