MEETING OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM, 23 NOVEMBER 1977

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A001600120010-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: November 28, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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ADMINISTRATIVE/INTERNAL USE ONLY E.-Scvtive Re----- ~~
E -J6=)
'MEMORANDUM FOR: Legislative Counsel
FROM
SUBJECT
Meeting of Executive Committee. for Combatting
Terrorism, 23 November 1977
PARTICIPANTS State
Justice
Defense
JCS
Treasury
Transportation
Energy
NSC
Commerce
0MB
Ambassador Heyward Isham, Chairman
Thomas Crockett
Been. James M. Thompson
RAdm. Mark P. Frudden
Richard Davis, J.Robert NcBrien
Daniel A. Ward
H. Laessle Taylor
Col. William Odom
Elizabeth Godley
Ed Henriksen
Robert Burnett
Joe Yardumian
Daniel H. 'Taft
The main subject of the meeting was the Ribicoff Bill and
Ambassador Isham's office is responsible for preparing the official
minutes which I will get to you as soon as I receive them. In the
interim, here is a brief report on what transpired to keep you up to
date.
1. Isham reported that Senator Sparkman has asked for a coordina-
ted response from the Executive Branch and OMB has agreed that the
Executive Committee will be the focal point for coordinating that
response.
2. The Department of Justice tabled its letter of 23 November
to Isham as being its preliminary analysis of the Ribicoff Bill
(attached).
3. Paragraph 3 of your letter to me pointing up our concern with
,,,protection of sources and me iods. as noted and accepted.
)E 2 IMPDET
\L BY 08103
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4. On the subject of the mandatory sanctions as required in the
Ribicoff Bill, both State and Justice expressed concern, with Justice
commenting on this issue in their letter to Isham.
5. Isham concluded by stating that the problem is to decide what
kind of bill would be useful and workable since he is convinced that
pressure in the Senate is so strong that some kind of legislation will
inevitably be adopted. Therefore, a working group was established
under State's leadership to include Treasury, Justice and Transportation.
Since our views were accepted I saw no need for Agency representation
in this working group and our participation is not required at this time.
I attach also a summary prepared by State of the positions taken
by the member agencies of the Executive Committee on the various pro-
visions of the Ribicoff Bill.
25X1
Attachments:
1. Justice Letter, 23 November 77
2. Summary of Positions -
cc: C/PCS/ITC
25X1:
Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee
1 C/PCS/ITC
1 - SA/DDCI
1 - ER
ADMINISTRATION/INTERNAL USE ONLY
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OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
November 23, 1977
Honorable Heyward,Isham
Director
Office for Combating Terrorism
U. S. Department of State
Room 2238
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20520
Dear Ambassador Isham:
The Department of Justice is in the process of analyzing
the full impact of the proposed Ribicoff Legislation
entitled "Omnibus Anti-Terrorist Act of 1977". Our analysis
is not yet completed. However, it does not appear that the
Department of Justice will be able to support this legis-
lation. The bill removes all flexibility from U. S. foreign
policy and probably insures non-cooperation from other countries
in the world. Moreover, it appears to place constitutionally
impermissible strictures on the President's responsibilities
for the conduct of foreign affairs. For example, it purports
to authorize-a one-house blacklisting or delisting of a parti-
cular country exceeding, in our view, the boundaries set by
the constitutional principle of separation of powers (sec. 105.)
The bill takes a blunderbuss approach to terrorism at a time
when the Executive Branch is attempting, through a revision
of Executive Order 11905, to define the responsibilities of
various agencies in this field and set limits on the techniques
they may employ. Similarly, the Select Committee on Intelli-
gence in the Senate is attempting to. deal with matters of
international terrorism through its preparation of charters
for the intelligence community and the intelligence agencies.
Any efforts in this area should be coordinated.
The definition of terrorism in the bill is broad enough to
encompass civil war within a particular country and thus will
raise real problems as to what properly constitutes terrorism
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sufficient to bring down the sanctions of the bill. Not all
countries view the same acts in the same manner. Cuba, for
example, may view the Bay of Pigs invasion or the attempted
assassination of Castro to be acts of terrorism but this
country is providing "safe haven" to persons who engaged in
those activities. Similarly, we have provided "safe haven"
to Hungarian Freedom Fighters of the fifties even though the
present-Hungarian government may view them as terrorists.
We have also granted "haven" to defectors who have hijacked
ft to come to this country and aided and abetted
i
rcra
small a
the Japanese in giving haven to the soviet pilot who flew the
MIG plane to Japan. As the bill is drafted, these actions
would justify the rest of the world in cutting the United States
off from trade, commerce and air travel.
Section 104 of the bill would require public reports to the
Congress of terrorism investigations unless publication would
jeopardize an informant or compromise a covert intelligence
operation. Withholding of information would apparently not
be permitted in circumstances in which it would jeopardize
an investigation or prosecution or disclose confidential
grand jury material in violation of Rule 6(e) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Important and sensitive cases
such as the Letelier investigation would be jeopardized, if
not aborted, by such a requirement.
Section 104(-b)(2) would impose sanctions on any country which
grants "safe haven" to a terrorist. This raises the question
as to whether failure to have an extradition treaty with the
United States would be providing a "safe haven" within the
meaning of the treaty.
Section 105 would cut off air traffic to any country which
supports terrorism and is therefore unsafe for Americans to
live in. How will the Americans get home from the unsafe
country if air traffic is cut off?
Section 105(a)(4) excludes from the United States any person
coming from a blacklisted country. We have grave doubts that
the United States can exclude an American from returning home
because he has exercised his constitutional right to travel.
Deportation (or this equivalent) for American citizens has
never been permitted except in Edward Everett Hale's Man Without
a Country. Section 105(a) would also appear to mandate that
other countries perform baggage inspection and plane inspection
on behalf of the United States regardless of whether they have
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the inclination, the personnel, the equipment or the
funds.
The Sections concerning dangerous foreign airports (Section
107 and 108) likewise appear troublesome. Unless a foreign
airport meets U.S. safety criteria, all commercial air ser-
vice between that airport and the United States is banned.
Even indirect service from that airport by air carriers of
that country or the United States is prohibited.
Furthermore, Section 107 apparently assumes a right on the
part of the United States and its personnel to inspect foreign
airports at will. We suspect that most sovereign nations are
unlikely to concede this right on our part. Consequently, a
probable effect of the bill would be to isolate the U.S. from
the rest of the world or increase sea travel immensely.
We defer to Department of State concerning the reorganization
within that Department mandated by Title II of the bill. How-
ever, Title III's creation of a new component in the Department
of Justice entitled "Office for Combating Terrorism" under an
Assistant Attorney General, is~in our opinion unnecessary and
undesirable. The Deputy Attorney General, has at his disposal
all components of the Department of Justice needed to coordinate
the Department's involvement in anti-terrorism efforts.
Regarding Title I,.we-do not see the advantage in creating by
statute a Council to Combat Terrorism. The administratively
created NSC/SEC working group on terrorism, created after several
months of review under PRM-30, should be adequate to furnish
executive leadership and assure coordination on this subject.
At any rate, the new structure should at least be given an op-
portunity to. function,. prior to creation of a new unit..
The Department strongly supports Title IV which in substance
corresponds directly with its legislative proposal to implement
the Montreal Convention and otherwise improve airport safety.
The Department's legislative proposal was cleared by the Office
of Management and Budget and was formerly submitted to Congress
on November 11, 1977.
As we develop other thoughts regarding this legislation, they
will of course be forwarded to you.
Sincerely,
arry S. Gibson
Associate Deputy Attorney General
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Section 3 - Declaration of Findings
State: Fully endorses and shares the objectives of
this proposed legislation with respect to the serious
threat to human life posed by terrorist acts.
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Section 4 - Declaration of Purposes
Treasury: Believes Section 4(h) and Section 102(d)
recognize critical area of terrorism intelligence and
supports, as a minimum, a Congressional call for major
improvements in USG capabilities.
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Section 5 -? Definitions
DOD: Suggests enlarged definition of terrorism:
"(a) 'terrorism` for the purposes of this Act includes
but is not limited to the willful use of violence,
or the threat of violence to obtain political goals,
or to seek other goals by acting through, imposing
upon, or compelling members of the public including
public officials to serve such goals, through instilling
fear, intimidation of coercion."
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Sec. 101 - Establishment of a Council to Combat Terrorism
Sec. 102 - Council Functions
Sec. 103 - Council Membership
Sec. 109 - Transfer to Existing Functions and Property
General: The consensus is that these sections already
have been implemented in large part by the Executive Branch
by the establishment of the NSC/SCC Working Group and its
Executive Committee under the direction of the Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs.
CIA: Section 102(d) is already being addressed
through recent developments in the organization and manage-
ment of foreign intelligence activities in support of U.S.
counter-terrorism programs, i.e. PRM-30, the intelligence
subcommittee of the Critical Collection Problems Committee,
and the proposed new Executive Order governing U.S. foreign
intelligence.
Treasury: The Executive's new organizational
arrangement could be endorsed by a Senate Resolution. See also
earlier comment on Section 102(d.) made under Section 4.
DOD: Objects to possible "Council" authority to
evaluate military plans to combat terrorism, if covered
under Section 102(e).
NRC: Supports objective of Section 102(d) from a
nuclear safeguards perspective.
State: The NSC/SCC Working Group could be codified
by statute and redesignated as the Council to Combat
Terrorism.
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Section 104 - Report on Terrorist Enterprises
CIA and DOD: Are concerned that this may raise
problems involving disclosures CIA wants a broader
exception clause allowing classified reports of intelli-
gence sources and methods.
DOT: Supports idea of terrorist incident reporting
and has so recommended to the NSC. DOT believes legislation
is not required.
State: Believes formalized, incident-by-incident
reporting requirements of Section 104 are unduly burdensome.
The Working Group now produces a quarterly, unclassified
summary of significant international terrorist incidents
which could be expanded, if necessary, to meet the Congressional
requirements. Re CIA, DOD concern on classified reports:
If Section 104 were enacted, State believes exceptions to
unclassified reports noted in 104(c) are sufficiently broad
to protect sources and programs.
Treasury: Supports Section 104.
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Section 105: List of countries aiding terrorist enter-
prises (LOCATE)
State:
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Section 106 - Sanctions Against Countries Aiding Terrorist
Enterprises
General: Discretionary authority to apply sanctions
is preferable to mandatory sanctions in the bill.
DOT: Existing law provides for discretionary aviation
sanctions.
DOE: Section 106(a)(9) is already covered by pending
Nuclear Anti-Proliferation legislation before Congress
which has passed the House, been reported favorably by
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and is supported
by the Administration.
NRC: Deletion of Section 106(a)(9) is recommended.
The ban on nuclear exports is artificially included on the
list of sanctions and would be difficult to administer.
Many other types of licensed exports are of equal or
greater national security concern.
State: Section 106(4) regarding passport visas is
an inappropriate sanction against innocent parties and
does not stand good chance of influencing the governments
concerned.
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Section 107 - List of Dangerous Foreign Airports
DOT: Foresees problems of legal access to foreign
airports for inspection purposes and prefers using ICAO
to develop a list of countries filing "differences" with
the newly proposed screening standard.
State: Questions whether legal access argument
advanced by DOT is sufficient basis for assuming those
legislative proposals cannot be effectuated. However,
State believes that US experts could not be expected to
evaluate every airport in the world. State suggests that
heading "Dangerous Foreign Airports" be retitled to "Security
Deficient Foreign Airports."
Treasury: Supports Section 107.
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Section 108' - Sanctions Against Dangerous Foreign Airports
DOT: Existing legal authority provides for sanctions
on airlines of nations with security standards below ICAO
minimum. DOT believes cooperative assistance more effective
than sanctions approach.
Treasury: Defers to DOT regarding best means for
improving security at foreign airports. However, Treasury
believes consideration must be given to restrictions on
travel to and from such terminals if voluntary compliance
fails.
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Sec. 201 Establishment of a (State) Bureau for Combatting
International Terrorism
State: developing position
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Section 203 - Priorities for Negotiation of International
Agreements
DOD: Section 203(b)(1) establishing an international
working group is vague regarding what authority it would
have.
DOE: Section 203(b)(4) already covered by pending
nuclear anti-proliferation legislation now before Congress.
Also conc
d
erne
about piecemeal legislative efforts on
non-proliferation policy impairing development of com-
prehensive approach.
State: is actively engaged in various diplomatic
efforts to achieve most of the objectives set forth i
n
Sec. 203, with the exception of establ.ishing a permanent
international working group. Department of State will
explore the feasibility of such a body.
NRC: Supports Section 203(b)(1) and 203(b)(4) from
a nuclear safeguards perspective. Generally supports
the provisions of Section 203(b)(4)(A) and (B).
Treasury: Re Section 203(b)(4)(C), exceptional care
should be exercised regarding-long.range stability and
trustworthiness of -governments with which we exchange
information regarding physical security for nuclear
nonproliferation purposes.
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Section 204 - Implementation of Montreal Convention
General: Legislative proposals submitted by
Attorney General to both Houses in November 1977.
DOT: Recommends this be handled separately from
S.2236 to expedite.
State: Has no objection to inclusion in S.2236. It
might be well to have this legislation advanced through
as many committees as possible since it has not been acted
upon when submitted in previous sessions of Congress.
Treasury: Defers to Justice and Transportation on
best means of achieving these legislative objectives.
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Section 303 - Extension of Existing Safety and Security
Measures
DOT: Regarding air charter security, FAA has
sufficient authority and is reevaluating the need to
extend security requirements to supplemental air carriers.
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Section 304 - Mandatory Use of Explosive Taggants
DOT: Supports concept but notes that primary DOT
objective is detection of explosives on aircraft before
explosion. Legislation should address general research
on explosive detection.
Treasury: Treasury has already submitted
l
a
egislative
package which would establish a required system of explosives
tagging.
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Title IV -- Airport Sabotage and Piracy
DOT: Supports this effort to fill present gaps in ability
to prosecute aviation-related crimes. Notes that
the legislative proposal submitted by Attorney
General in November 1977 has the same features as
Title IV.
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