SUMMARY REPORT FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND REACTION OF THE SPECIAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE MEETING, JUNE 7, 1977

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TOP SECRET/SE NSITIVE/XGDS
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SUBJECT:
TS-770172
CIA cy #
TOP SECRET
Summary Report for Your Information and
Reaction of the Special Coordinating
'Committee Meeting, June 7, 1977
Time and Place: 3:30 p. m. -5:00 p. m., White House Situation Room
Subject:
Participants:
State:
Secretary Cyrus Vance
Leslie Gelb
ACDA:
Paul Warnke
Spurgeon Keeny
Defense:
Secretary Harold Brown
General George S. Brown (JCS)
Lt. Gen. Edward Rowny (JCS)
Walter Slocombe
CI,!(:
Admiral Stanfield Turner
Dr. Robert Bowie
NSC:
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron
William G. Hyland
Dr. Victor Utgoff
Dr. Roger Molander
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
Secretary Vance summarized the outcome of his meeting with Gromyko
in Geneva and his view of where we stood on the major issues. He said
we had achieved an adequate framework for negotiations. He highlighted the
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
NSC review(s) completed.
State Dept. review completed
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major unresolved issues as: (a) Cruise missiles; (b) Limits on Soviet
heavy missiles; (c) How to handle the Backfire question; and (d) The
problem of reducing both the aggregate level of 2400 and the MIRV level
of 1320. On the question of whether we should maintain our current
positions or introduce modifications, all of the participants agreed that
we should adhere to our current substantive position, leaving it to the
Soviets to make the next move. However, it was also agreed that the
Working Group would need to undertake various tasks to clarify and
elaborate our position.
I. The Treaty Through 1985
The SCC agreed that our position is that by October 1979 there
should be a reduction in the 2400 aggregate by 10% (to 2160) and a reduc-
tion in the 1320 MIRV level down to about 1200. The Soviets might
compromise on the aggregate at 2200 (from their current position of
2250) but would probably resist,at least in the immediate future, reduc-
tion in the MIRV level.
It was agreed by all participants that we should adhere to our current
position, and that Secretary Vance in his discussions with Dobrynin should
explore: (1) why the Soviets are resisting a reduction in the MIRV level
(since it would impact on the US first); (2) the Soviet rationale for pro-
posing a reduction to 2250; (3) the Soviet rationale for proposing "after
1980" as the effective date for reductions.
It was agreed that we should continue to reject Soviet proposals to include
in the long-term treaty a limitation on heavy bomber ALCMs and to count
each such bomber in the 1320 ceiling on MIRVed launchers. We will
maintain our position that this was a subject for the Protocol. (A.s dis-
cussed below.)
II. The Three Year Protocol (US and Soviet positions are summarized
in the attached table)
Cruise Missiles:
Dr. Brzezinski raised the question of whether the Soviets fully
understood the linkage between our proposed 250 limit on ALCM-carrying
heavy bombers and a ceiling of 250 on Backfire. Secretary Vance and
Paul Warnke both said that they believed this was understood but it was
agreed that the position should be specifically reconfirmed with the Russians.
TOP SECRET/SEN'SITIVE/YGDS
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On sea-launched and ground-launched cruise missiles, Dr. Brzezinski
asked specifically whether the Russians understood the intricacies of
our position, especially on our testing of the TOMAHAWK missile from
aircraft up to 2500 km. Secretary Vance said that he had carefully
read this position into the record in Geneva but could not be sure that the
Soviets fully understood it at that time. It was agreed that the best course
would be to clarify our position and that Paul Warnke would undertake to
do this with Dobrynin.
Dr. Brzezinski asked to what degree the Allies understood our position
and the discussion that followed suggested that they did not. It was
agreed we should have another round of discussions with the Allies which
Paul Warnke would take care of on his way back from the Indian Ocean
discussions in Moscow in late June.
Secretary Brown noted that he will be discussing cruise missiles with the
Allies at the NPG in Ottawa this week. He said we would have to follow
a careful line between not encouraging the Allies on cruise missiles, and
not looking like we are holding back or suggesting that the cruise missile
system would not be useful to the Allies.
Soviet Heavy Missiles
Secretary Vance noted that this was an extremely important aspect of
our position and that we should not recede from our proposal to limit
the number of MLBMs to 190. But he added that the Soviets were very
strongly resisting this limitation on grounds that the question of limitations
on heavy missiles had been agreed in the Vladivostok Accords.
In light of the Soviet opposition, there was a discussion of whether the
same objective of limiting the buildup of Soviet ICBM counterforce could
be achieved by freezing SS-17 and SS-19 silo conversion. It was agreed
that we should maintain our position on limits of SS-18 silos to 190, but
that the Working Group should undertake an analysis of limits on SS-17s
and SS-19s as a possible alternative position.
Ban on New ICBMs
There was a discussion of whether we understood our own position on
banning the testing of new ICBMs in sufficient detail. Secretary Brown
asked, for example, whether a change in only the "front end" of the
missile would constitute a new ICBM. It was agreed that the Working
Group should prepare a paper on the alternative definitions for new ICBMs.
It was also agreed that once this paper was completed and a US position
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firmly established, this whole subject could be taken up by the SALT
Delegation in Geneva.
Ban on the Deployment of Mobile ICBMs
In order to help verify a ban on mobile ICBM deployment in light of the
difficulties posed by the Soviet SS-20 IRBM, it was suggested that we
should include a ban on mobile ICBM production -- which the Soviets
have indicated they could accept. Admiral Turner noted that such a
production ban could be verified by CIA with reasonable confidence.
The SCC agreed to add this to a formal presentation of our position.
The participants also agreed that we should continue to press the Soviets
to suggest satisfactory arrangements for verification, and that this issue
should be pursued by the SALT Delegation in Geneva (even though no one
knew what might be done in this regard). Paul Warnke noted that his
counterpart Semenov would not enter into such a discussion unless
instructed to do so by Moscow; therefore, Dobrynin should be asked that
Moscow provide appropriate instructions to their Delegation in Geneva.
Backfire
On the Backfire issue, Secretary Vance said that he believed the ball
was definitely in the Soviet court -- that Gromyko had said he understood
our positions and would think about them and specifically that he tinder-
stood our concern about tankers, about training activities, and about a
ceiling on the total number. On the question of how the Soviets would
formalize their position on the Backfire, Secretary Vance said that
what the Soviets had in mind was a unilateral statement outside the
SALT framework. It was agreed that we should press the Soviets for
specific language so that we would obtain a better appreciation of just
what they are willing to do.
III. Principles for SALT THREE
On the question of how specific we should be in stating the
principles for SALT THREE, it was agreed we should propose specific
numbers for the aggregate and MIRV level --- i. e. , reductions to a level
not greater than 1800-2000 for the aggregate, and 1000-1100 for the MIRV
level. It was agreed that the Working Group should now develop specific
language for the proposed principles. The issue of whether the statement
of principles should be only those on which both sides could agree or
whether each side would put in certain unilateral statements was left for
later SCC consideration.
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IV. On Negotiating Strategy
TOP SECRET
There was agreement that we should, in general, sit tight
for now and let the Soviets come to us. In particular we would listen
to what Dobrynin might have to say on SALT in a meeting scheduled
for next week. There was also an agreement that it would not be a
wise tactic to press the Soviets to put their position into writing.
Secretary Vance noted that he would meet twice with Gromyko, first
between the 1st and 10th of September and then later in September in
the US.
V. Other Issues
Soviet Silo Concealment
It was agreed that possible concealment practices by the
Soviets at ICBM sites, if widespread, would be contrary to the spirit
of the present agreement and not a precedent that we would like to see
established for the next agreement. -
It was agreed that this issue should be pressed with the Soviets, both
as part of the SALT TWO negotiations and by the SALT Standing Con-
sultative Commission.
Non -Circumvention /Non - T r an sf e r
It was agreed that the Working Group should analyze possible approaches
and work up language to prepare for Paul Warnke's consultation with our
Allies.
MIRV Verification
The Soviets have indicated that they can accept our MIRV counting rules
if the 120 SS-19 type launchers at Derazhnya and Pervomaysk (which we
believe currently contain SS-l Is) are made an exception to those rules.
Paul Warnke proposes that we ask the Soviets to provide us with a
description of any arrangements that they could undertake to satisfy us
that these silos, which are also used for the MIRVed SS-19, are not in
fact converted to SS-19s. He believes that we can undertake such a dis-
cussion without prejudice to our final decision on whether to grant an
exception for these 120 silos. Secretary Brown and General Brown believe
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it would prejudice such a decision. They see an exception for these
120 silos as a significant US concession which might be made part of
a package deal to limit Soviet MLBMs to 190.
In light of the disagreement at the meeting, the President's guidance
will be sought. In considering this issue it should be noted that, while
virtually everyone is resigned to at some time making a concession
on these 120 launchers, there is very little chance that the Soviets
could undertake any arrangements (short of on-site inspection) that
would give us high confidence that these launchers do not contain SS-19s.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
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US AND SOVIET POSITIONS
ON
ALCMs AND % .UBMs
A.LC'is on Heavy Bombers
ALCMs on Aircraft Other
Than envy Bombers
TOP S!C u;T/SENSITIVE
US Fosition
In the Free-Year Protocol:
-- Ban testing cruise missiles
from heavy bcmbers to ranges
beyond 2500 km,
Bar. deployment of cruise mis-
siles Capable of a rare in
?excess of 2500 km on heavy
bombers.
-- Limit of 250 on the number of
heavy bombers equipped with
600-2500 k m cruise missiles.
In the Three-Year-Frotocol:
-- Ban testing of cruise missiles
capable of ranges in excess of
600 km from aircraft other than,
heavy bombers.
-- Ban deployment of cruise missiles
capable of r n,es in excess of
G00 k:, on aircraft other than
heavy bon,bcrs.
In the Three-Year Frotocol:
Limit of 190 or. the number OR
launchers of heavy missiles
equipped with YaRVs (to include
those operational and under con-
version).
Soviet Position
In the 1985 Treaty:
-- Ban testing of cruise missiles
capable of ranges in excess of
2500 k-n from heavy bombers.
-- Bar. deployment of cruise mi(
?es
capable of a r3-Te in excess of
2500 km on heavy bombers.
-- Count heavy bombers equipped with
600-2500 km cruise missiles in
the MI $V level.
In the 1985 Treaty:
.(Same as US Position
In the 1985 Treaty:,
...,_,I
No change from Vladivos
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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INFO
X
X
Remarks: Please note sensitivity of the attached.
ecutive Secretary
14 Jun 77
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 Approved For Releas O l &3 t VaIA P80M00165*U66407QQ1.6-4.;
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505
Eaftwutive R iAi:v I
7 JUN 1977
JUN 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Harold Brown
Secretary of Defense
At the President's request, we analyzed probable
Soviet views of strategic implications of our Geneva
SALT proposals in the same fashion as we earlier
analyzed the Moscow proposals. I gave the attached
paper to the President on Friday and want to share
.it with you as well.
STANSFIELD TURNER
Attachment
An Assessment of Soviet
Perceptions on SALT -
May 1977
0,24,11114 FEE
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Cyrus R. Vance
Secretary of State
it /UV
At the President's request, we analyzed probable
Soviet views of strategic implications of our Geneva
SALT proposals in the same fashion as we earlier
analyzed the Moscow proposals. I gave the attached
paper to the President on Friday and want to share
it with you as well.
STANSFIELD TURNER
Attachment
An Assessment of Soviet
Perceptions on SALT -
May 1977
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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Cyrus R. Vance
Secretary of State
The Honorable Harold Brown
Secretary of Defense
SUBJECT : An Assessment of Soviet Perceptions on SALT - May 1977
Distribution:
1 - Vance/SecState
1 - Brown/SecDef
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - D/DCI/NI
1 - AD/DCI/NI
1 - NIO/SP
1 - DDI
1 - D/OSR
1 - OSR/SEC
1-
1 -
2 - NIO/USSR
1 - NIO RI
NI0/USSR-EE
~
(6 June 1977)
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