SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING JUNE 20, 1977

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A001600070001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 11, 2014
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 20, 1977
• Content Type: MIN

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SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING
June 20, 1977
Time and Place: 3:00 p.m. - 4:30 p.m., White House Situation Room
Subject: SALT
Participants:
State
Secretary Cyrus Vance
Leslie Gelb
Defense
Secretary Harold Brown
Charles W. Duncan
Walter Slocombe
JCS
General George S. Brown
Lt Gen William Y. Smith
CIA
Robert Bowie
ACDA
Paul Warnke
Spurgeon Keeny
NSC
Zbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron
William Hyland
Victor Utg off
Roger Molander
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
Non-Circumvention/Non-Transfer
Paul Warnke described the state of play in Geneva with respect to the
Soviet proposals for non-circumvention and non-transfer provisions.
The Soviet non-circumvention provision is fairly general and refers to
circumvention of the agreement through a third state or in any other
manner. Their non-transfer proposal is highly restrictive and includes
a commitment not to transfer strategic weapons or to assist in their
development by third countries.
Warnke indicated that he feels it is time to consult with our Allies and
move on these issues on the grounds that some kind of non-circumvention
provision is unavoidable and that facing this issue now is preferable to
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to leaving it to the final stages of the negotiations. He described two
alternative non-circumvention provisions that we would hope would serve
as a solution to both the non-circumvention and non-transfer provisions.
These two provisions differ only in that one refers explicitly to the possi-
bility of circumvention through another country, whereas the other speaks
only to circumvention in general.
Warnke expressed the view that the Soviets would prefer a provision
that does call out the possibility of circumvention through third countries,
and that we recognize this and could also accept such a provision.
Secretary Vance indicated that he supported Paul Warnke's proposal that
we take up this issue now with the Allies in anticipation of initiating nego-
tiations with the Soviets in the near future. He indicated a preference
for starting wit:h the non-circumvention provision that does not refer to
third countries and falling back to the one that does when the Soviets
raise objections to the first approach.
Dr. Brzezinski raised the issue of just what our intentions were with
respect to such a non-circumvention provision. Secretary Brown indi-
cated that he thought it was simply a political assurance that would
assuage some of the Soviet concerns with respect to such issues as the
Germans obtaining large numbers of GLCMs on which they might put
French warheads.
Secretary Vance indicated that we also had an interest in such a provision
as a basis for objecting to possible future Soviet actions. Secretary
Brown pointed out that there was no danger of the Soviets circumventing
the agreement through third countries.
General Brown raised a question of whether we would gain as much
politically with the Soviets through such a provision as compared to the
cost with our Allies, who in general would prefer no non-circumvention
provision of any type. There was general agreement that such a pro-
vision is probably unavoidable and will have to be handled carefully with
the Allies. Paul Warnke indicated that he thought the approach of cover-
ing both non-circumvention and non-transfer with a single non-circum-
vention provision could be sold to the Allies.
The SCC then discussed how Paul Warnke might respond to Allied ques-
tions about the meaning of a non-circumvention provision to include such
issues as whether we could transfer cruise missiles, TERCOM, geodetic
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data, etc. It became clear that some of these questions were difficult
to answer. In this context, David Aaron reaised the issue of whether we
might not be better off with some specific non-transfer provisions to
remove some of the ambiguity on this issue. Secretary Brown said that
he saw any provision as a vehicle which the Soviets could use for making
mischief with the Alliance which he believed to be their principle objec-
tive in seeking non-circumvention and non-transfer provisions. It was
agreed that we should continue on the track of a general non-circumvention
provision, that this should be discussed with the Allies, and that in
preparation for this discussion, the Working Group should tune up the
Q's and A's in the paper which was provided for the meeting.
Definition of Cruise Missile Range
Dr. Brzezinski then asked for comments on the issue of the definition
of cruise missile range. Secretary Brown described the fundamental
problem associated with this issue; namely, the differences in flight pro-
files for various cruise missiles, the difficulty in verifying maximum
ranges, etc. His conclusion is that we should pursue a cruise missile
range definition based on the maximum system operational range or the
maximum demonstrated range, whichever is greater.
Dr. Brzezinski raised the verification issue with respect to these defini-
tions and there was general agreement that verification of other than
demonstrated range was extremely difficult. Paul Warnke indicated that
we had no idea as to how the Soviets viewed this issue, although their
proposals for cruise missile range limits were consistent with a maxi-
mum system operational range definition. He also described his recent
discussions with Dobrynin and, in particular, Dobrynin's reaction to his
emphasis on the distinction between the testing limitations and the deploy-
ment limitations in our cruise missile position. He came away with the
impression that Dobrynin may, in fact, understand our position although
It is still not certain. He noted that Dobrynin had once described the testing
limitations as meaningless. This led to a discussion of our cruise missile
range requirements and their impact on the range definition.
There was general agreement in the end that a range definition was required,
that the preferred range definition appeared to be maximum system opera-
tional range or maximum demonstrated range, whichever is greater, that
there was no urgency in getting to the Soviets on this issue, and that the
Working Group should review its analysis of this issue on the basis of the
SCC discussion.
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Cruise Missile Definition
Secretary Vance offered his view that we should go with a cruise missile
definition that includes all armed cruise missiles, but that unarmed
cruise missiles (i.e. reconnaissance vehicles) should not be included.
Secretary Brown raised the problem of using the same airframe for
reconnaissance vehicles and weapons delivery systems. This led to the
discussion of the possibility of demanding that reconnaissance vehicles
use different airframes from armed cruise missiles.
Secretary Brown offered his view that cruise missile limitations should
apply only to nuclear-armed cruise missiles, since otherwise the impact
on conventional weapons systems was potentially too great. This led to
a discussion in which David Aaron questioned whether we had really
thought out what we really wanted in terms of cruise missiles. Paul
Warnke defended our current approach on cruise missiles as being con-
sistent with permitting consideration of this issue while we negotiate
cruise missile limitations in a follow-on agreement. Secretary Brown
expressed skepticism that we would be able to change the cruise missile
limitations in such a follow-on negotiation, and that we really did need to
consider at this time what the impact would be if these limitations were
made part of a long-term agreement. Warnke disagreed with this view
on the basis that the proposed protocol did not prejudice the eventual
cruise missile limitations to that degree.
Secretary Brown expressed strong concerns about the cruise missile
range/payload trade-off problem and its lack of verifiability. He argued
that in the light of this problem, we should propose a cruise missile
definition which was in our interest -- which in his view was a definition
that only covered nuclear-armed cruise missiles.
David Aaron again raised the question of when we will know what we
really want in terms of cruise missiles, which led to a discussion of
the tradeoff between cruise missiles and aircraft and at what point in
terms of aircraft attrition (e.g., five percent) cruise missiles became
a more attractive alternative.
William Hyland raised the possibility of deferring the cruise missile
definition issue until the follow-on negotiations. Under this approach,
the cruise missile definition would be considered at the same time that
long-term cruise missile range and platform limitations were under
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negotiation. This approach could provide some additional negotiating
leverage in the follow-on negotiations. Paul Warnke raised the
question of what we would say if the Soviets accepted our current
position and then asked whether the limitations covered both
conventionally-armed and nuclear-armed cruise missiles. This led
to further discussion about what our long-term interest was on
cruise missiles. Dr. Brzezinski questioned whether we were using
them to exact concessions from the Soviets or whether we really
needed these weapons systems. Discussion on this issue was
inconclusive, but there was general agreement that at this point in
time, it was very difficult to make a judgment about what cruise
missile requirements for us and the Allies would be in the long
term. On the issue of what the Soviets' interpretation might be, it
was pointed out that our Moscow proposal for a 2500 km
across-the-board cruise missile range limitation was explicitl.y
stated to cover both conventionally-armed and nuclear-armed cruise
missiles.
It was finally agreed that views on the cruise missile definition issue
would be prepared and. provided to the President, with Secretary Vance
and Paul Warnke providing the argument for a definition covering all
armed cruise missiles and Secretary Brown providing the argument
for a definition that applied only to nuclear-armed cruise missiles.
It was also decided to notify the Congress of our intent to move on the
non-circumvention issue with the Soviets.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE June 28, 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR
TS-770181
Copy #
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
Attached is a copy of the Summary of Conclusions of the June 20,
1977, SCC meeting on SALT, which the President has reviewed
and approved for distribution.
pET
Attachment
Zbigniew Brzezinski
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XODS
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