THE GOLDEN TRIANGLE: POLITICAL SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A000700110048-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 2004
• Sequence Number: 48
• Publication Date: June 16, 1977
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUBJECT: The Golden Triangle: Political Situation
1. Shan State is Burma's portion of the opium-pro-
ducing Golden Triangle. Populated by ethnic minorities
rather than the dominant Burman stock of lowland Burma, it
is an area where both tribal and communist rebellion against
the central government thrives. The government controls the
towns and--with armed escorts--the roads between them, but
the hinterlands are largely under insurgent control, with
only occasional intrusions by Burmese security forces.
2. The situation in Shan State, which has prevailed
since Burmese independence in 1948, is not the central
government's only problem. Burma is nagged by a multitude
of insurgencies that have stemmed from the country's ethnic
fragmentation. The Burmese army is capable of confining the
insurgencies so that they are no threat to the government in
Rangoon, but only by committing about half of its military
resources. This, of course, puts an added drain on the
weakening economy.
3. The most formidable insurgent force is an arm of
the Burmese Communist Party (BCP), called the Northeast
Command (NEC). Sponsored by the Chinese Communists, it
began operations in northern Shan State in 1968. The BCP is
composed of an ethnic melange of some 10,000 troops, with
only a scattering of Burmans, and controls most of the
northern half of Shan State east of the Salween River. Its
minority ethnic composition, however, appears to be a major
bar to Northeast Command expansion into Burman-populated
lowland Burma.
4. Rangoon has failed to persuade Peking to renounce
its association with the rebels, but Chinese material aid to
the Burmese Communist Party has been reduced as more cordial
state to state relations have developed. BCP profits from
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the narcotics trade may have compensated for declining
Chinese support and given the insurgents greater operational
independence from Peking. In any case, this year the
insurgents conducted forays farther west across the Salween
than before.
5. The Shans, Burma's second largest minority after
the Karens, make up half the population of heterogeneous
Shan State. Shan insurgents, at least ostensibly fighting
for independence from Burma, probably number in excess of
5,000. Their organization is diffuse and fluid, with
constantly shifting alliances, making their threat less than
numbers alone would suggest.
6. The most prominent Shan groups at the moment are
the Shan State Army (SSA) and the Shan United Army (SUA).
The SSA is loosely divided into three regional commands,
which seem at times to be in competition rather than in
company, as evidenced by the northern faction's current
alliance with the BCP. The SUA, under the leadership of
Chang Chi-fu, a notorious opium-runner, is a major narcotics
trafficker.
7. The 4,000-man Kachin Independence Army (KIA)
operates in northernmost Shan State, but the center of its
activities are farther north in Kachin State. Formerly busy
in the opium trade, the KIA has been forced to cut back on
its trafficking by Burmese army pressure and by the disarray
following the assassination of KIA leaders in northern
Thailand last year.
8. Rangoon would be hard pressed to cope with a
unified insurgency in Shan State, but consolidated action by
the various groups does not appear likely. Alliances between
some groups have been formed mainly for practical reasons of
mutual help, but these have been short-lived because of
ideological differences, competing interests, and intertribal
suspicions. At the present there are formal alliances
between the KIA and BCP, and between one Shan faction and
the BCP. Neither appears to have much substance.
9. Burma's Shan minority spills over into northern
Thailand, which facilitates the maintenance of camps on the
Thai side of the border. The Thai provision of sanctuary to
rebels from Burmese military operations has been a major
irritant in Thai-Burmese relations and the chief obstacle to
Thai-Burmese cooperation in narcotics suppression. Bangkok
sees Burmese rebel elements as an integral part of its
border defense in the remote area in northern Thailand where
Thai military and police forces are spread thin.
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10. The Thai take a similar view of the Chinese
Irregular Forces (CIF), remnants and descendants of Republic
of China army units forced out of China in the early 1950s
after the Communist takeover. The roughly 5,000 troops of
the CIF are spread along more than 100 miles of the Thai
border with Burma and Laos. There are two major groups, the
3rd CIF Army under General Li Wen-huan and the 5th CIF Army
under Tuan Hsi-wen. The CIF is deeply involved in the
narcotics trade. It and the SUA account for some 80 percent
of the trafficking out of Burma into Thailand.
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200 Miles
200 Kilometers
Shan State
Kengtung'
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SUBJECT: The Golden Triangle: Political Situation
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Ls. -
(date)
Distribution:
Orig - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - Exec Registry
2 - DDI
1 - D/ORPA
1 - ORPA
1 - ORPA/ECS
1 - ORPA/EAPD
1 - ORPA/EAPD/SEA
DDI/ORPA/EAPD/SEA
(16 June 77)
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM Executive Assistant to the DCI
The Director asked for a back-up paper on
the political situation in the Golden Triangle
area of Burma, Laos, Thailand.
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