LETTER TO THE HONORABLE DANIEL K. INOUYE FROM STANSFIELD TURNER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A000700030012-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 31, 2006
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: November 28, 1977
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved For Release 2006/081df ' 'f -R DP80M00165A000700030012-2
Central Intelligence Agency
28 November 1977
Honorable Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
I am sure you are aware that the President is very concerned about
the widespread dissemination of sensitive intelligence and is studying
measures to reduce the number of people exposed to such information.
The purpose of this letter_.is to acquaint you with some problems we are
:racing with regard to dissemination of sensitive intelligence information
in compartmented categories and to ask your support for the policies I
am following in this matter.
On several occasions during this past year I have been asked by
Members of Congress to grant clearances for access to compartmented,
information to employees of their personal staffs. On all such occasions
I have followed our established policy of granting compartmented access
clearances only to permanent staff members of Congressional committees
which have a jurisdictional interest in such matters. Were I not to follow
this established procedure, the number of potential persons who could be
given access to compartmented information would be formidable, given the
fact that there are 535 Members of Congress. The problem has been
complicated in the Senate somewhat by the concept of staff designees which
permits a Member to designate a member of his personal staff to assist
him in his work on a specific =committee and authorizes the funds to pay
that staff member. With the :concurrence of the committee concerned, we
have treated such individuals as personal staff members, rather than as
committee staff.
There are good reasons for granting compartmented access only to
staff members of the Congressional committees having a need for access
to such, sensitive intelligence information. The chairman of a particular
committee is in the best position to determine a staff member's actual
need to know which is the basic principle, governing access to information
even though a person possesses a particular clearance. Also, committees
have established rules and-procedures for handling and storage of compart-
mented information which personal offices of Members of Congress do not
have. In addition, a committee staff member is subject to committee
discipline for violation of such rules and procedures.
MORI/CDF
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These reasons, in addition to the sheer number of persons who could
obtain compartmented information were we to grant such clearances to
members of personal staffs, lead me to the conclusion that I must
continue the established procedures. You might be interested to know
that the limitations I have placed on compartmented access do not apply
only to Congress. I have recently frozen the number of such clearances
within the Executive Branch and expect soon to issue instructions for net
reductions.
I am sure you can understand the concerns I have outlined above.
We will continue to study this matter and, in the event w-change in our
established policy is dictated, I will certainly notify you.
Yours sincere
STANSFIELD TURNER
Approved For Release 20,06/08/01: CIA-R.D.P80M00165A0007Q.00 QQ_1.2-2 __,._..- _