LETTER TO THE HONORABLE WALTER D, HUDDLESTON FROM STANSFIELD TURNER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A000700020021-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: September 10, 1977
• Content Type: LETTER

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l0 September 1977
The Honorable Walter D. Huddleston, Chairman
Subcommittee on Charters and Guidelines
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
My apologies for taking so long to respond to your letter of
July 21st (R#9090) with its questions on the importance to the Central
Intelligence Agency of retaining. section 102(c) of the National
Security Act of 1947, which authorizes termination of Agency. employees
"in the interests of the United States" notwithstanding the provisions
of other law. As I mentioned to you briefly orally, I believe that
this particular provision of law is am essential ingredient maintaining
both a secure and effective intelligence service for our country.
The sensitivity and the delicacy of the activities legally and
properly performed by the Agency for our Government simply demand
that we must have the- utmost confidence in those individuals to whom
we delegate the authorities for carrying out various of these activities.
We cannot, in many instances, afford to determine by trial and error
whether a man can be tasted to perform in accordance with legality
and the standards of propriety which have been established for him by
his superiors. If there is any doubt in our minds as to the total
reliability of one of our officers on such sensitive assignments, we
simply must forego the execution of that assignment- Put in another
way, I simply cannot come to the Senate Select Cora - ttee on Intelligence
and other oversight bodies and give assurance of the Central Intelligence
Agency's performing in the way the Congress and the President have
directed if I lack confidence in those to whom I must entrust the
execution of our programs.
Enclosed are the statistics you asked for on the use of this
authority over the past 15 years. Unfortunately, this Agency does not
maintain statistics on those employees terminated under section 102(c)
who were later declared eligible for U.S. Government employment by the
U.S. Civil Service Commission, as the responsibility for obtaining
Civil Service eligibility rests with the employee- Please note, however,
Unclassified when separated
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that although this authority has been used sparingly in the past,
the existence of such authority has been very instrumental in the
management of our personnel. In the seven months I have held this
office, I have personally given the option to four employees of
resignation/retirement or involuntary termination under the
provisions of section 102(c). In two of these instances, the
individuals had mixed their official business at the Agency with the
conduct of favors for friends who were former members of the Agency.
In so doing, they placed the Agency and the U.S. Government in a position
of apparent involvement in activities with which we neither had nor desired
any part. The other two, employees had each specifically failed to
carry out orders of their superiors in the field. It was my opinion.
that if we cannot count on subordinates carrying out their orders and.
being truthfua to us about what they are doing, the operations arm of
our Agency will soon be out of control. All four of these individuals
elected to resign/retire. I do not believe that they could have been
induced to do so under the normal Civil Service regulations for separation,
or at least not for an extended,period of time. I would further add
that perhaps the greatest benefit to the Agency in these four cases was
the message it transmitted of our policy with respect to these types of
activities In short, limited functioning of the authority under
section 102(c) can be a powerful yeast in the meal.
It is, of course, equally important that. our employees be protected.
against arbitrari ess on the part of any Director in the execution of
this authority. from a position of prejudice, I can only say
that I believe the oversight procedures now extant are adequate to -
inhibit or at the least uncover such arbitrariness if it existed. Not
the least of these is the existence of the--Intelligence Oversight Board.
to which any aggrieved eriployee.may appeal. Beyond that, the existence
of both the Senate Select Committee and the House Permanent Select
Comrrrittee on Intelligence serves much the same. function. Finally, I can
only say that I have personally agonized over the four decisions I
mentioned to you. I do not believe that any Director could, do less in
the face of the responsibilities involved.
I would be most happy to discuss this matter with you or your-
SubcoTani.ttee in person or to provide further information if this would.
be of assistance.
Yours sinc
enclosure
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