COORDINATION OF MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS DEVELOPMENT WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE CRITICOMM SYSTEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R004300120008-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 23, 2007
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: May 1, 1959
• Content Type: MF

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May 1, 1959
MEMORANDUM TOR DR. J. R. ILLL.&N, JR.
FROM: W. 0. Baker
NSA review completed
-J -tlF
SUBJECT: Coordination of Military Communications Development with
Particular Reference to the CRITICOMM System
A letter from Dr. J. R. Killian, Jr. to the Honorable Neil H. McElroy.
September 19, 1958, pointed out the opportunity for coordination of communi-
cation systems, in the forthcoming extension and improvement of national
military and intelligence networks. As noted therein, certain studies in the
President's Science Advisory Committee have been concerned with this
subject. In the ensuing months the studies have been continued and intensified.
(However, there is not yet a completed review of all the relevant scientific
and technological factors which enter into the exceedingly complex problem
of providing adequate comm'Lanications for national security.)
Since the letter of September 19, 1958, the Office of Director of Defense
Research and Engineering has been activated. It has certain responsibilities
concerning the acquisition of new communications systems. Likkewise, in
this period the organization of the Directorate for Communications-Electronics
0:6) in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has resulted from the reorganiza-
tion plan for the Department of Defense and a Director and a Deputy Director
have been appointed. The chief communicators of the three services are
represented in the 36 activity by a Military Communications Electronics Board,
of which the Director of 36 is chairman.
Also in this
riod, various large, military programs have been started.
the 480 Global Air ores
Communication System, the UNICOM Global Army Communication System
(sponsored by the Signal Corps), and particularly the CRITICOMM system
for timely transmission of critical intelligence. The CRITICOMli system
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is the implementation of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 7
and for this the Department of Defense Directive S-5100.19 was approved on
March 19, 1959. The Secretary of Defense, in accord with the NSCID No. 7,
has acted as executive officer and has designated the Signal Corps to carry
out this project.
All this organizational and project activity is superficially impressive.
However, on examination it does not seem to be leading very fast to the desired
objective of a single, integrated system adequate to the country's needs. On
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T73; I7:~.36 1
NSC review(s) Oj y
completed.
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the contrary, it appears that the effectiveness of some of the new projects
may be limited by some essentially arbitrary consequences of the present
fragmentation. Moreover, the proposed project plans, in their efforts to
provide advanced physical h.axdware, do not always seem to take adequate
account of the possibilities of making better use of what we already have.
(Indeed, the picture conjured up seems close to that of some day turning
off all our working communications and switching to an untried system.)
The following comments are directed primarily at the CRITICOMM project,
but somewhat more general remarks along the same lines are given at the
end of this report.
(I) There is already a serious limitation on the physical facilities
available for the CR TICOMM system because of the wording
11A ? f the DOE) Directive S-5100.19. Here it is
stated that the CRITICOMM system will consist essentially
of existing COMINT facilities plus whatever modification of
those facilities were proposed in a JCS CRITICOMM plan dated
kulust 22, 1958.
Critical intelligence, as n
should have accessible for its
of military convrrsunications .
tenet of overriding priority,
andling all of the capabilities
(2) The limitation of CRITICO M facilities mentioned in (1) may,
of course, be attributed to the special encryption and consequent
switching center requirements of intelligence messages, but
this" just emphasizes another difficulty of the present approach.
That is, that the CRITICOMM system as presently interpreted
is completely separated from transmission requirements and
facilitiee s . A communication system of highest importance is
being discussed while ignoring the central position of trans-
mission. Vague assumptions of the separability of elaborate
switching centers such as are proposed, and will be mentioned
, from the qualities of transmission systems of the several
services are made.
ion should. be reorganised in a way that provides
stic engineering relation of switching caters to optimum
utilization of available and planned transmission links . This is
particularly import ant because most transmission for some
time to come must be by the notoriously erratic. B. r. links,
and we need fle.dbility of signaling rate to cope with adverse
conditions of propagation and maximum flexibility of routing
to provide as much reliability as possible in the complete system.
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(3) These preceding basic difficulties only highlight a a'
more pressing problem. This is that ,axis fn facilities
should be first and fully exploited for CRITICONM purposes.
(If this is properly done, the proposed new system will
probably not appear as the drastic Improvement that it
purports to be.) For example, if the present switching
centers were modified and reorganised so that urgent
messages could be retrieved from reels when there is an
over-s.11 transmission delay, immediate improvements
would result. This can be done, for instance, through
"stunt-boxes" which teletype circuits can signify the presence
of certain message types. By suitable combination of such
alarms which would reveal the receipt of critical messages
in existing centers, and a reasonable modification of circuits
and procedures, there could be acquired within six months
a valuable Improvement in present intelligence handling. We
would also obtain some very constructive experience on the
real requirements of an ultimate system. and would develop
a basis for deciding when we could make use of existing
s..cilities in such a system, and when we should ask for
new.
(4) The preceding proposal is also appropriate for the testing
of the critical urgent-intelligence processing system being
planned in General Goodpaster' a office at the direction of the
President. For instance, this testing as presently proposed
could yield significant Information on the reflex time for a
suitable C TICOMM systeern. This reflex time, which is a
pre-ernineent quality of the system, is not controlled by switch-
ing center behavior alone, to that present CRITICOl4 plans
cannot tell us all we would like to know about the basic needs
of the system.
(5) There are many specific deficiencies in the projected systems
development which it is believed would be corrected by a firm
coordination of the development engineering and operations
through 36 and the Director of Defense Research and Zngineering.
For instance, the alternate routing implied in the characteristics
of the proposed system is largely illusory. Most of the messages
will go out on a -very few radio links, even though it may look,
in the switching center, as though a selection from a large
number of choices is being made. Actually, as remarked
earlier, many important transmission links are denied to the
system through formal restrictions, such as that they are not
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This marked improvement over the 5-unit stop-start tele-
re of the present teletype network was deesigneed to
take advantage of existing systems. It is reliable and fast,
and without the need for start and stop pulses, it can send
at the maximum rate allowed by the transmission medium
being employed. As a flexible digital system, it is convenient
for the Cyrillic alphabet. In contrast to some much more
elaborate proposals, this scheme might even work into present
switching centeris by using a torn tape prosedure. In any case
the opportunity for prompt improvement of present facilities
should be exploited.
(10) As implied above, major technical problems of the CkITICOMM
system and related communications planning seem to be con-
nected to at least six parallel authorities partaking in manage-
rnMnt. A system whose (1) development and engineering were
managed by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering
(who might desilpiate a service as Development Agent), and
whose (2) operation was assured by 36-JCS, in accord with
(3) the requirements of the Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense (Special Operations) and DIR.NSA, might yield more
effective progress. Such needed progress is not assured by
the present arrangements for military communications planning.
In summary, the present plans for communications development appear
still to exhibit the fragmentation, duplication, and overlapping of authority
among the various agencies which have been noted and deplored by many
observers earlier. While it may be possible to achieve a gradual integration
of the now projects with each other and with existing systems, the road to
this result is by no means plain.
should be emphasized that this scattered and fragmented attack on
our global communications problem is not only uneconomic, it is also
dangerous. Nothing is more likely to fail in a crisis than a collection of
individually minimal non-reenforcing, non-exchangeable global communications
works. Moreover, the grandiose planning to which competition amon
the
g
interested agencies naturally leads tends to diminish interest in what may be
done in improved global communications in the next few years, which may be
among our most critical times.
"PROVED BY THE PANEL, PRE DEIMe$ 5C VISORY
CE317'TEE:
H. W. Bode
D. Huffman
I. R. Pierce
W W. 0 . Baker
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Noted by 0,100
mar Mr. Quarle s s
May 2, 1959
. 'Baker, Dr. McMillan and I discus sod
with you and Dr. York some of the technological aspects of
our future communications development In the Gover
sad in particular in the Department of Defense, a panel of
the President's Science Advisory Committee which concerns
itself with communlcations has given to me they attached
memorandum. The panel was originally formed by me to
uad*rtakee studios requested by the Pre tdent's Board of
Consultants on Foreign intelligence Activities and at my re-
quest, has more recently broadened its studies in the field
of communications.
Mace the teechniques of communications concern
many diverse areas of Government, the advantages of co-
operation across departmental lines are especially strong
in communications research and development. Particularly
in the critical matters of military and intelligence communi-
ca-thons, combinations of systems objectives, technologies,
and operations can yield facilities both better and lees costly
than separate systems provide.
Hence, the importance has been noted of unWed
nt in largo new communications projects
id. Attached herewith is a preliminary
report by part of a panel of the President's Science Advisory
Committee which discusses The integration of existing and
ming programs. It also suggests some measures which
wed help in advancing especially the most urgent communi-
ca e capabilities of the Government.
Your comments on the issues raised in the memo-
my other reflections you may have will be welcome.
Yours s> ?i ere y 2a t
J. R. itiliian, Jr.
The Honorable -:)onsld A. Quarles
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Washington 25, L. C.
G o p y t o Mr. Allen Dull a rs
?7. th cffc I rrnt^ C -; 1 1 7J~3..
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