LETTER TO THE HONORABLE NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER FROM W. W. ROSTOW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R004300080004-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 10, 1955
• Content Type: LETTER

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Quantico, Virginia
June 10, 1955
The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Dear Mr. Rockefeller:
At your invitation, a group of eleven persons
knowledgeable in many fields important to the American-Soviet
Struggle, have met as a Panel at Qu.antico, Virginia, from 5-10
June, to explore methods of exploiting Communist bloc vulnera-
bilities at this crucial state of world affairs. As your
designated Chairman, and on behalf of my colleagues, I am
herewith transmitting the reports and recommendations of our
group.
All of us appreciate the freedom of action you gave us
to develop our on guidelines of investigation. We soon
discovered that several significant vulnerabilities could be
identified and that fruitful courses of action could be
ileceloped cnly if we looked at the total political and security
problems facing the U.S. at this juncture.
We have no expectation that we have produced either a magic
formula for positive U.S. action or a substitute for the staff
considerations currently under way in the responsible Government
Departments. We offer these recommendations and the papers
that underlie them as a supplement to those coniderations. It
is our hope that responsible officials will find our efforts
constructive and that use can be made of the many concrete
suggestions included in the Panel results.
The over-all report of the Panel and its four. appendices
represent a general group consensus. We had neither the time
nor the data to make, as individuals, definitive commitments
of judgment on all the recommendations and on every line of text.
But we forwarded these documents confident th-t they deserve serious
consideration by the Government. We are also submitting ten
papers prepared by individual Panel members. Many ideas from
them have found their way into our joint recommendations; but
time did not permit the Panel to evaluate the texts fully. I
personally deem them an extremely interesting product of the
week's work.
All of us appreciate the contributions made by govern-
mental represent4.tives toward this Panel and, in particular,
the willing help of the responsible officials from your office,
the Departments of State and Defense, of CIA, USIA, NSC, and
OCB, who took of their precious time to join us periodically
in our discussions.
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The one impression which stands out in my mind is the
unanimous belief of the Panel members that the U.S. now en-
joys a significant but transitory period of over-all strength
vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc. The next two or three years afford
the United States the opportunity to negotiate from a strong
position for genuine concessions by the enemy without sacrifice
of essential positiQns of strength. Such negotiation.. along
with a vigorous and urgent development of potential Free World
strength, could create the conditions for victory in the cold
war,
May I express our appreciation for having had this
opportunity to serve.
Dr. Frederick Dunn
Director, Center of International Studies
M.r. C,, D. Jackson
TIME LIFE
Dr. Ellis Az, Johnson
Director, Operations Research Office
Dr. Paul Linebarger
School of Advanced International Studies
Dry, Max Millikan
Center of International Studies., NIT'
Dr. Philip Mo sely
Director, Russian Institute
Dr., George Pettee
Deputy Director, Operations Research Office
Dr. Stefan Possony
Air Intelligence Specialist,, Department of the Air Force
Dr, Hans Speier
RAND Corporation
Dr. Charles A. H. Thomson
Brookings Institution
W. W. Rostow
(Center of International Studies., MIT)
Panel Chairman
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SUR4ARY OF BEGO T NOA.TIONS
QUANTICO VULLIERABILITIES DANIEL
PURPOSE. This report (1) makes recommendations regarding operational
positions and actions the U.S. might take vis-a-vis the USSR (as for
example at the coming round of East-West conferences) that will permit
the exploitation of Soviet vulnerabilities, and (2) offers suggestions
for related actions advantageous to the U.S.
The Panel assessed the current strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet
Bloc and the Free 4orld. It concluded that the next several years afford
the United States the opportunity to act from a strong positit+n and to
exact from the enemy genuine concessions without sacrifice of deterrent
strength by us. A full exploitation of the enemy's transitory position
of relative weakness and the Free World's actual and potential foundations
for strength requires a wide range of U.S, initiatives and actions which
transcend the area of negotiation with the Soviet Union.
RECOM TA.TIONS
In the light of this assessment we develop in our submissions a
strategy and a broad tactical line for the forthcoming conferences and
we submit the following specific recommendations:
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A. Actions Prior to the Conference,
1. The United States should insist that the Soviets
lift the Berlin toll blockade prior to the conference.
2. Suggestions should be made to the USSR, to the UK, and to
France, that they should be prepared to exchange ratifications of the
Austrian Treaty on the occasion of the conference.
B. Actions During the Co e ence.
1.. The United States should be prepared to make a series of
proposals designed to Love towards the control of armaments, These include :
a. Discussions of:
(1) A proposed agreement for mutual inspection of
military installations, forces? and armaments, without limitations
provisions.
(2) A convention insuring the right of aircraft of any
nationality to fly over the territory of saris country' for peaceful purposes.
(Proposed with reservations rioted in the text.)
b. Proposal of a disarmament plan to the USSR;after rejection
of the plan, the U.S. to make every effort to win the arms race as the
safest way of forcing the Soviet Union to accept a satisfactory arms
convention.
20 The United States should be prepared to make a series of
proposals concerning exchange: of persons, information and goods, covering:
a. An agreement for the expansion of East-West trade.
b. An agreement greatly increasing the freedom of persons
to travel anywhere in the world for peaceful purposes.
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c. A convention providing for free and unhampered inter-
national communications for the exchange of information and ideas,
conditioned on conclusion of an anti-jamming agreement.
d. Further exploration of peaceful uses of atomic energy
and a world-wide fund for cooperative economic development of the under-
developed areas.
3. The United States should pursue the following sequence in
dealing with German matters:
a. Rapid implementation of rearmament provisions.
b. Proper conditions for free elections.
c. Free election
d. Unification of goverrmenit .
Conclusion of a peace treaty not predetermining Germany's
international status.
f. Withdrawal of troops only after a unified Germany has
reemerged as a strong military power and has become an integral part of
NATO. If Germany abstains from joining NATO, she should be permitted to
rearm to a level sufficient to meet her security needs.
4, The United States should take the following actions to bring
about greater Allied unity on Far Eastern policy, and to worsen difficulties
between the Soviet Union and Red China:
a. Take steps to put strains on the Moscow-Peiping alliance.
b. Keep the Japanese fully informed of progress at the
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c. At least once during the conference, the Department of
State should obtain for the President the advice of the Japanese Govern-
ment on a specific Far Eastern point at issue in the Conference.
C, Actions Outside of the CorifereLice.
Outside of the conference, either concurrently with it or subsequent
to it, the United States should take the following actions:
1. General
a, Propose an international scientific conference of all
powers producing atomic weapons on the problem of reducing the danger of
radioactive fallout.
b. The United States should convene at an early date an
exploratory conference to discuss implementation of the economic and
other non-militaxr,; provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty.
c. Accelerate the revival of Japan as a great power and
treat her as a diplomatic equal in developing Far Eastern policy.
2. In relation to Europe, the United States should:
a, Invoke the peace treaties with Bulgaria, Rumania, and
Hungary, and the provisions of other wartime: and postwar agreements
relating to the limitations of arms in Eastern Europe, demanding
inspection to determine compliance with the limitations of these agreements.
b.
defense, passive
a.
Take early and forceful steps to assure improved air
and active, for our European allies.
Seek the establishment, organization and support of
research and development in the NATO countries on an ambitious scale.
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d. Relax to the maximum restrictions preventing the flow
of necessary technical intelligence to European scientists working in
behalf of a Free World.
e. Request SHAFE to make a maximum effort to find tactical
solutions to NATO defense which. minimize the possibilities of civilian
casualties.
f. Explore seriously concrete recommendations designed to
reduce present fears in NATO nations concerning atomic weapons.
Develop with NATO countries a joint policy for accelerated
economic growth in the underdeveloped countries of the Free World.
3. In relation to Asia, the United States should:
a. Greatly increase the flow of investment resources to
the underdeveloped countries, including Sapan, South Asia and Southeast
Asia.
b. Advise the Chinese Nationalist Government that its good
relations in the South and Southeast Asia are a matter of interest
to the U.S. U.S. diplomatic and other authorities in Formosa should
openly sponsor informal news and cultural connections there.
c. Convince Asians that the U.S. is capable and willing to
deal by means short of major war, with Communist military aggression.
d. Prevent a Communist take-over in Southern Vietnam.
e. In. order to convert a major free world problem into an
assetflaunch a positive U.S. political and economic program for Formosa.
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