BRIEFING OF JACKSON COMMITTEE ON 29 APRIL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R004300070003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 14, 2003
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 16, 1953
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2003/05/0&t-JRDP80B01676R004300070003-7
w M011 ti Al t
16 April 1953
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Briefing of Jackson Committee on 29 April
Here are some suggestions as to statements which you might
wish to make to the jacks-on Committee in your discussion on 29 April.
I have numbered them in accordance with the numbers used by Robert Blum
in his letter to you of 3 April.
1. Covert operations should be an adjunct of foreign policy
to accomplish those objectives of the highest priority which cannot be
accomplished by overt means. It is essential that those persons con-
cerned with foreign policy, particularly high ranking military officers,
understand at least the basic fundamentals concerning covert operations.
These fundamentals are that covert operations in most instances are
extremely delicate and difficult to mount and require considerable time
for the planning and mounting. Thus, covert operations should generally
never be used in emergency situations unless the hand of the United
States can be revealed and consequently should only be used for backing
long term plans so that sufficient time can be allowed for careful
planning and mounting. The principal scope and problem of covert opera-
tions in relation to foreign policy as a whole, should be to provide the
intelligence information necessary to insure that the foreign policy is
wisely conceived and correctly directed. Sound and adequate intelligence
information is not only necessary for the support of foreign policy, but
is also a requirement for successful covert operations. Further, covert
operations should never be mounted unless there is adequate intelligence
information to fully support the operations and give reasonable assurance
of their success.
2. Our present ability to conduct successful covert opera-
tions is limited by two principal factors. These are: limited intelli-
gence information in the most critical areas where covert operations
are needed; and secondly, too few trained professional personnel in the
field of covert operations. With the passage of time both of these
limiting factors are being gradually eliminated. However, it will be
a number of years before the ability of the United States to conduct
covert operations approximates that of other countries who are more
experienced in the field, particularly the Soviet Union.
3. To a large extent the organization and control of covert
operations should be vested in the headquarters in Washington. This is
necessitated to a certain degree by the necessity of utilizing the
central files of a worldwide counterespionage system. It is also
advisable so that the operations can be manipulated to conform to
modifications or changes in policy. On the other hand, senior officers
in the field should be given sufficient authority to modify covert
Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : Q .
 `
Approved For Release 20ON 1
at 80B01 676R004300070003-7
operations to fit changing situations. However, these senior officers
should keep Washington fully advised of all actions which they take upon
their own initiative.
I feel very strongly that the CIA should have the full
responsibility for all covert operations conducted by the government.
To allow another government agency or agencies to enter the field of
covert operations without the benefit of CIA's counterespionage files
would be an invitation to continued blunders and fiascos. This is
particularly true in view of the limited number of potential agents
for operations in the more critical areas of the world.
In Washington, the CIA should work closely with the Depart-
ment of State as far as policy guidance and direction on covert opera-
tions. State should be generally advised concerning covert operations.
The same is true concerning the senior diplomatic representatives
throughout the world.
4. It is my opinion that, generally speaking, the policy
followed by the Voice of America for beaming to the world strictly factual
information concerning the successes and the failures, the good and the
evil of the United States, has not been successful. While I believe that
as an honest republic we should not make any attempt to hide our failings
from the rest of the world, I do feel that to air it on our own propaganda
mechanism is a serious error. Consequently, I believe that the VOA has
failed to accomplish as much as could have been accomplished had it been
supported by a gray propaganda system which could handle considerable
material that VOA could never touch. I think that gray propaganda should
be very closely associated. in its preparation with white propaganda.
Therefore, there appears to be no major reason why the same agency could
not be responsible for both. However, where gray propaganda must be
disseminated through covert means then that agency should undoubtedly
utilize the facilities of CIA.
5. Psychological warfare is a technique. It is a technique
of gaining mens minds through the utilization of all facilities of
communication. It should not distort foreign policy if properly con-
ceived and executed. As a consequence, it would be my recommendation
that the Psychological Strategy Board be reconstituted as a sub-committee
of the National Security Council. The board would be composed of the
same members as at present, plus the head of any new propaganda agency.
The board would receive its policy guidance from the National Security
Council and would utilize a small staff contributed by the member
agencies for guidance as to the implementation of the policy. In other
words, the staff of the Psychological Strategy Board would recommend
to the board the possible actions that could be taken by the various
member agencies to assist in the implementation of foreign policy.
Member agencies would act in the field of covert operations and psycho-
logical warfare only after direction by the Psychological Strategy
Board which would keep the National Security Council advised of its
actions.
Approved For Release 2003/05/05: CIA-RDP
SE Inspector General
25X1