SOVIET BLOC EFFORTS AT PENETRATION OF LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R004200160018-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2003
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: March 14, 1958
• Content Type: MF

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STAT
A. J.Oi
la batlike Aar
Ume =art* at Penetration
America
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ammA (14 Moral 1956)
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on in Latin
tory
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past two years, countries of the Soviet Bloc, led by
the tJSS, have demonstrated an awakened Interest in the political and
oconcitic life of Latin America. This interact has manifest itself in
a closer and more active direction of local Communist Parties, in new
diplomatic ties, and in an expansion of economic relations.
:stale all of these interests have been pursued simultaneously,
they have, for the meet part, been separate endeavors, coordinated
at high policy love's in the Soviet Union, but assigned separate opera
tional direction. Since: the information which permits an identifica-
tion of these interests is available primarily from analysis of Bloc
operations in Latin America, this paper summarises these activities
under two operational categories: (I) subversion and diplomacy;
(II) economic penetration.
1. subversion. and Diplome=
!ince 1955, the Communist movement in Latin America, with
.;oviat and Chinese guidance and support, has adopted more effective
political tactic*, has improved its regional coordination, has trained
its leaders in both overt and clandestine methods of work, has streng-
thened the various national party organizations, and has renewed its
drive to infiltrate significant national and international organiza-
tions and opinion media. raus, although there has been no great over-
all increase in regional membership, the Communists are better pre-
pared to register rapid gains in influence under favorable conditions.
gest and best organised Communist parties are those
of Argentina 7040,000), Brazil (50,60,000), Chile (20.000), Uruguay
(2,800-3,000), Cuba (12,000), and Mexico (three Marxist parties total
MAXIM= of 80,000). Throughout the area, the Cemmnnist Parties have
accepted the flexible popular front line of the CPSU sad are iacreas-
ingly willing to forego leadership in order to participate with, or
infiltrate into, leftist and nationalist groups. There is evidence
of the success of this tactic. In Brasil, the Communist Party has
succeeded in identifying itself with extreme nationalist elements
which have considerable strength in the leftist seaters of all par-
ties and in the armed farces. In Chile "unity of action" has been
achieved with the Socialist Party. lu Argentina, the Party increased
its membership by 25 percent in 1957 (in part through recruiting same
keronist elements) and, having openly endorsed the winning presiden-
tial candidate in the recent election, has augmented its political
prestige significantly. In Urogney the liberal political atmosphere
combined with a deteriorating economic situation has enabled the
legal 0,earsimiet Party to score notable advances in the labor movement.
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In histenala, the relaxation of political controls surrounding the recent
election permitted Communists to infiltrate the now-Commoniet left. Many
top Communist leaders have returned from exile and the Party is currently
rebuilding its Zeroes. In Venesuela, Communists actively partieipated
with other groups in organising the general strike whiCh resulted in the
overthrow of President Peres Jimenez: exiled leaders have returned and
the Party's opportunities are greatly enhanced. In Cuba, a very well
organised clandestine party which claims to be issuing twice the prop-
aganda it did under legal conditions -- is favored by widespread oppo-
sition to %LUAU, and is seeking to promote the same general itrike tac-
tics that proved advantageous in Venezuela. In Nati, Peru, and Colombia
conditions have become more favorable for the Communists, and in countries
such as Srasil, Bolivia, Chile, and Mexico individual Communists or sym-
pathisers continue to have significant influence within the governments.
Cies with the Soviet Union and Communist China have been strengthened.
In November 1957, Latin American Communist Party delegates to the Fortieth
nniversary Celebration in Moscow participated in two well-organised
eret meetings:
(1) A plenary session of representatives from 65 Communist
Parties throughout the world, at which the over-all strength
of 4orld Communism, the danger of war, the importance of the
ommunist Nam, Movements and the need to aid the "indepen-
dence" movements in colonial and semi-colonial oeuntries was
emphasised by Khrumihchev, Suelov, and other.. (The Secretary
31enere1 of one party, in reporting on the meeting, explained
that Latin America was the meat vital area in the entire world
ns it =wises the principal "forced market" of the United
states.)
(2) A regional session, presided over by the Soviet Communist
eartes Latin American specialist and attended by Chinese Com-
munist and all Latin American delegates. This session approved
an action program calling for increased coordination and sup-
port among Latin Ameriean Communist Parties, the revival of
the Pease lovement through a Peace Conference to be held in
Argentina in mid-1958, the holding of a conference of Northern
Latin American Communist Parties, the eventual holding of con-
ferences in defense of Latin American culture and economy, and
the stimulation of anti-American sentiment. (One leader has
stated that "all the Communie, Parties must unite with the
national bourgeoisie in support of complete economic indspen-
dence or the United States, and pressure governments to estab-
lish restrictions on foreign investment".) Ways and means of
strengthening the Communist-front Latin American Confederation
fA! Labor (CM) more also discussed.
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soneiderable evidence that the Communists are actively
this Moscow action proan on a priority basis. Mexico
ther developed as a coordinating center for CP activities
rn part of Latin America, and the development of one or
more siniler centers in South America (in Uruguay, Argentina, Brasil
or Ch also apparent* Evidence free natty countries also indicates
continued training of top Latin American Communist Party leaders in the
ussa and China, with special emphasis en the techniques of illegal or
clandestine work* Party leaders with up to two year* training in the
USSR have recently returned to Mexico, Brasil, El Salvador, Paraguay,
Cuba. Guatemala, and probably other countries* It is known that
increased training in the USSR and China is scheduled for the future,
and that specie' wheels and training oversee, are being established
within Latin America* Paler desementatioft, altered peyvical appear-
ance, irregular travel route scheduling, and other yeah devices are
Increasingly used Whore necessary. Intensified efforts are being
made to reconcile dissident Communists and former leaders and to con-
solidate the movement where It has been split.
Increased front activity is being undertaken. WFDT representa-
have been traveling throughout Latin America to spur orgenisa-
coordinate activities, and plan infiltration. Strengthening and
&Using the labor front (CTAL) is being discussed, and training
labor leaders undertaken. The Pease Revenant is being reorganised,
in some cases under a different same. Activities faveringbunan rights
and civil liberties are being formed as part of the drive to gain legal
statue for Communist Pesti*** Communist and pro-Cammenist journalists,
sparred by the International Organisation of Journalists are imams-
ingly cativo, and evidence suggests that a network of correspondents
under Soviet control is now being. formed.
rho Latin American Communists, particularly in Brasil, are vigor-
ously supporting the 3ino-Soviet bloc campaign to expend diplomatic
es, broaden economic relations, and increase cultural contacts* Chi
nose Communist leaders have promised aid to the Latin American parties
through commercial channels, which have aloe been used by the USSR and
its satellites to finance Communist activities in Latin America.
total membership of the Communist and pro-Communist parties
Latin American area (including European poosessions) is esti-
t approximately 295,000* Total sympathisers of the.. parties
some 570,000* Theme figures are higher than those used in the
partment or State Intelligence Report Bo* 4489 3,10, dated January
1958, but are based an the most recent information available to this
office.
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tratien
can economic ties with the Soviet Sloe declined in
g the early part of 1957, bet a reversal ef this trend
-end. By the close of 1957 the slim, countries *ads
is suggesting the possibility of eeonomic assistance
trade agreements, and encouraged an expansion of
"amorally.
eor the Janmarr-October 1957 period Bresilts trade with the
aloe totaled 667.5 million compared with $73.$ million for the same
period in 1956. A number of efforts have been made to reverse this
trend. On Deoember 3# the Communist newspaper ;pram 114p14, pub-
lished an interview with Mikita iresehev in Whith he pointed to the
possibility of extemeive deviet-Brasillan trade. 'reward the end of
1957, a Polish mission visited the Bramillen State of Minas Cerais.
3ulgaria and Rumania also were applying oentinued pressure for expended
trade relations.
iy in peoember the Beenenic Minister of the Bruin= Foreign
4 that he had written offers tram Poland for the develop-
er* and other resource)* in Minas Chorale with supplementarY
the USSR if needed. A few weeks later he reported that
ffered to purchase an unspecified amount of coffee with
nt in sterling.
4&t, very little has neseof these efforts.eland has
aed a contrast for the delivery, within a year and a half, of
metric tone of rails and accessories for a total 'oleo of
417.7 million. No new trade or payments agreements have been
-d or appear to be ender negotiation, but the existing Polish
slevakian agremeents have been extended for six months. The
Coffee Institute has recently announced the sale of $6 million
Wee to Cesehoslevakia. Finally, Brasil is 'wiling sugar to
Chine, perhaps as much as $10 million worth in 1955.
4,:mtAn
Argwetinalm tade in 1957 with the Bloc declined free the
level reached in 1956. On the basis of data for the first 9 seethe,
estimated that total Bloc trade will be less than half of the
level. Nevertheless, Argentina escaladed new trade and payment
agrememIte with Yawed. Cseehoslovekia, Renory, em4 Rumania, and is
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gotiating her trade and payment
f the decline in trade during 1957, verious factors
volume in 1958. Argentina is faced with. growing
nay and with a continually pressing need for
and easential materials such as oil and coat.
ted substantial credit balances in her
with various Bloc countries.
To take advantage of these credits and to .ecm needed
rt a purchasing mission seat to the Bloc in Jaruary concluded
for the purchase of about t27.3 million, mostly steel rails,
and equipment, and pipe. Some of the machimory and equipment
however, was purchased on 4year credit terms; the mission also nolo.
tinted a number of sales. These include a sale of 5,000 tons of tool
to the USSR and exports of apgroximately $15 million to Csechoslovakia.
Argentina will thus be left with substantial credits within the Bloc
upon which she may drew. Argentina has offered to he an additional
Purchase of $20 million in rails.
ven before the purchasing mission left for Eastern Europe,
Argentina signed a contract with ?Oland for the purchase of 600,000
as of coal ($12.6 million).
The 50th anniversary celebration of the YFF (state petroleum
monopoly) contained a large xhibit ttr the USSR.
Urge%
Uruguay's trade with the Bloc during the first half of 1957
was pproximately equal to the level reached in th. first six months of
but trade declined during the second ha of 1957*
Me Moe has made several imp3rtant offers of trade and aid
vitbin the last few month*. Csechoslovakia has offered telecommuni
ostion equipment at prices 40 to 50 pigment below those offered by
Western bidders, for the expansion of the Nentovideo telephone system.
.arly in the Fall of 1957 Csedhoslovakia,
bucked by the USSR, vas offering financial assistance for the rebsbili-
tation of the Uruguayan railroad system. The USSR and Rumania have
offered to sell Uruguay petroleum' at "surprisingly competitive* prices.
Finally, the USSR has announced that it will henceforth make its wool
Purchailes directly from Orugogy, rather than through third countries.
then Gojintri..
obit, has recently sold
100,000Spanish Lang Tons of
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raw sugar valued at about $SO aj11in dollara. This is the rirst USSR
purchase of 1958 from Cuba. In 1957, the USSR purchesed 350,000 tons.
Colorable has decided to accept a Rmsnian offer of 20,000 tone
of Syrianat in eschew for coffee. Thie follows the visit of a two
man Russian trade delegation from the Soviet, Embessy in %swift City.
Chile has recently ooncluded contracts for the sale of at
least 3,500 tops or eopper wire to the Ulm. 'Aber sales say be con-
mded in the neer future.
14 March 1958
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