LETTER TO (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R004100110001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 28, 1954
• Content Type: LETTER

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z June 1954
/is*1re
Hanson sl'diearix~e THE NEW YORK TIMES
New York, New York
Dear H*nsow.
As rM know, I welcome constructive criticism, particularly
from one like yourself, who has a deep aeaad abiding interest in intelli-
gence and Is sincerely working to see that the govern et gets better
inteelligeaco. And it is in this light that I have studied your article in
THE TIMES of 3 June 1954. These cants. which I would like to
supplement when we next got together. are intended merely as friendly
comments.
lstivee problems whereas we have relatively few questions of this nature.
In fact in the three years and more that I have been here, we have
only sought ? ne very minor and uncontested piece of legislation to
establish the position of Deputy Director. I have also felt that it was
wise to build up the existing relations between this Agency and the Armed
as the-: ipresent situation discloses, has frequent and complicated legs
here of many, many times the funds allocated to CIA. Also, : -. ABC,
As regards the Mansfield Bill, I have not adopted an attitude
of opposition and the only statement 1, have made on the subject is in
the attacked interview In U. S. NEWS AND WOR1.0 REPORT (March
19, 1954). 1 am convinced that Senator Mansfield, whom I know well
and respect, has at heart the desire to improve our intelligence and
to protect it from destructive attack. It does not seem to m.ee, however,
that the analogy with the Atomic Energy Commission is particularly apt.
The Coxamaiassfon has to deal with a somewhat unusual situation where
a government Agency is directly involved in a major business enterprise
involving large scale operations in the United States and the expenditure
Services and Appropriations Committees. Their roles are move than
;;cursory. " Here we have established secure and satisfactory relation
ships. Naturally I recognize the great importance of having sponsors
in the Congress to protect us from unwarranted attack.
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STAT
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The reference to our intelligence estimates on Indo-China in
your article are not substantially accurate. While there was no formal
estimate when Dien Bien Phu would fall, our current appraisals as to
t situation, viewed now from hindsight, were reasonably accurate.
the first estimate made sometime before the fall of Dien Bien
widely repeated in THE NEW YORK TIMES and elsewhere. We do not
propose to disclose this figure, but the total you have given is so
many times out of-line as to be thoroughly damaging. I realise that
you did not intend this and that as long as our figures are secret we
will continue to be the victims of guess ork in an age when millions
too easily become billions.
a billion dollars for CIA expenditure which you have implied has been
held up for political reasons, we may never know with complete
accuracy the exact date when that redeployment was completed.
The, most serious and. frankly damaging misstatement in
your article relates to our annual budget. The figure of approximat
Phu as to the time required for redeployment to the Delta, may have
been off by a couple of weeks, the estimates made immediately after
the fail and when the matter became an important problem. were
"right on the nose. " Since the attack on the Delta has probably been
It is only because I respect your judgment and enjoy and profit
by your writings that I have felt justified in commenting on your
article in this detail. Naturally, it is purely personal, as I do not
wish to get into public print on the subject.
Sincerely yours.
Allen W. Dulles
Director
AWD:hea
Distribution:
Addressee - Orig
DCI file - 1 cc
ER -I cc
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5 June 1954
1. On 3 June 1954 there appeared in the New York Times an
article by Hanson Baldwin which among other things said:
Recently our intelligence estimates of
Indochina have erred badly; we expected
Dienbienphu to hold out longer than it did,
and the redeployment of the Vietminh Armies
into the Red River delta area has occurred
much faster than expected,
2, The national intelligence record on the two specific points
made by Mr. Baldwin follows:
a. How long Dienbienphu would holds
This question was not dealt with in any NIE. However an
assumption that DBP would hold out longer than it did
underlay an estimate of when VM forces committed at DBP
would be available for major operations elsewhere. Thus
in NIE 63-54,* para. 2, we concluded that "The fall of
DBP would not in itself substantially alter the relative
military capabilities of French Union and Viet Minh
forces in Indochina during the next two or three months"
g.e., until late June or late Jull7.
b. How fast VM forces would be redeployed to the Delta;
This question was dealt with in two,NIE's.
NIE 63-54, para. 11, stated that "prior to the
rainy season" the redeployment of VM forces from DBP
to the Delta "would require at least three to four
weeks" after the fall of DBP. This has proven to be
accurate.
-IE 63-54, ICons equences within Imiochina of the Fall of~ien ien
Phu", had as its basic assumption the fall of DBP and was dated
28 April. DBP actually fell on 7 May.
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Para. 11 also stated that "After the full onset
of the rainy season, which is unlikely before mid-Tay,
the movement would take between two and three months to
complete."
However, para. 2 of the Conclusions rested in part
on the built-in estimate (or implicit assumption) that
the fall of DBP was not imminent and hence that DBP
would not fall until after the onset of the rainy season.
We therefore concluded "That the bulk of the Viet
Minh forces released by the fall of Dien Bien Phu would
probably not be able to move, regroup, and re-equip in
time to be employed in new major operations during the
next two or three months, although some lighly equipped
infantry battalions might be made available more rapidly
for operations in the Delta region."
These errors in military judgment -- underestimating
VM capabilities and overestimating French initiative -
were corrected in NIE 63-3-54* produced after the actual
fall of DBP. Therein we stated that "The major portion
of the forces at Dien Bien Phu with their heavy equipment
could not assemble in the Delta area before 7-i5 June,
although . . . lightly equipped units could complete the
movement by 31 May."
3. Attached are verbatim excerpts from NTE's and ONE memoranda
produced since early 1952. (Tab "A" and Tab "B") These excerpts
bear directly on Mr. Baldwin's general statement that "Recently
our intelligence estimates of Indochina have erred badly. . ."
11. On looking over NIE production since early 1952 we conclude
that the intelligence community has fully and repeatedly analyzed
the major trends. The projections of these trends have been borne
out by events to a remarkable degree. On the other hand, certain
analyses of tactical trends have not stood up as well and in some
cases have been contradicted by events.
'Probable Military Political Developments in Indochina over
the Next 30 Days", dated 20 May.
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5. In short, on certain narrow military questions, where the
it had to rely principally on the judgment of a single agency
I I we have at times
been wrong. However, on broad po ica tart' questions,
where the judgment of the entire community could be brought to bear,
the estimates have been sound, and the policy maker put on notice
well in advance of events.
25X1
Acting Assistant irec or
National Estimates
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 TAB "Ate
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1j LCERPTS Fly H13 IS ON :LODCHINA
PBOJSCTTON OF MA3OR THE O-8
A. NIE 35/1= Prob"ble
oontinus their war
We believe that the French will now
1, the period of this estimtimate*
intents,
effort in Indochina during the protection of French
ever heir C.Mi.tments in Indochina
xhile insisting upon t t and by seeking
Will attsraPt limit
the Fy
rees s-1 US financial assistance
by demanding addition military support in the defense of Indo-
eamatments for US-UK
china. (paragraph 1)
ThrQugh mid-1952 s the probable outlook Indochintnamse 2 ? deterioration of the Franco make
is one of gradual deWe believe that the Viet Mid will 'victory
military positiono but will not score a decisive
some territor91 f~this estimate. (paragraph 6)
during the period v*~
term outlook is for aontinro
the Viet Mand an
3. The longer
mart in the combat effectiveness of ~Vis
"Z Franc s*
increased Viet Minh pressure agait the this growing
defenses
Unless present trendsa re re ver
coupled with the difficulties which rfa in both
pressure: in supporting ma'or military withdrawal
continue to face lead to an eventual French
Europe and Indoch~aph 7)?
from Indochina.
~!/2 probable Devel nts in Indochina taro b
Bo IdIE 7/ d-~~ 3 ugust 9
through mid-1953 is for
4 . The outlook 'oth sides p3 aye a waiting gam ?
stalemates with both some slight
continued Union forces during
We believe that ,but w wi will not win a decisive victory
territorialp 'graph 1)
this period. conduct a
5e We belie" that Fr a 1 oa?,oma to believe
"holding action." The French has -tart' decision in "do"
an no longer achieve can only be solved within
that they c at the Indochina problem
some form of over-all settle erna~ ~h the Far
china and that
the cOItMt following the Korean waro
perhaps
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6. However, we estimate that if present trends continue,
the difficulties which France will face in supporting major
military efforts in both Europe and Indochina and in maintaining
its position in North Africa, will in the longer run weaken
the French Union's ability and determination to continue re-
sistance in Indochina. (Paragraph 6)
C. VIE 91: Probable Developments in Indochina through
9 9
7. Unless there is a marked improvement in the French
Union military position in Indochina, political stability in the
Associated States and popular support of the French Union effort
against the Viet Minh will decline. We believe that such marked
improvement in the military situation is not likely, though a
moderate improvement is possible. The over-all French Union
position in Indochina therefore will probably deteriorate during
the period of this estimate. (Paragraph 1)
8. The lack of French Union military successes, con-
tinuing Indochinese distrust of ultimate French political
intentions, and popular apathy will probably continue to prevent
a significant increase in Indochinese will and ability to re-
sist the Viet Minh, (Paragraph 2)
9. We cannot estimate the impact of the new French
military leadership. However, we believe that the Viet Minh
will retain the military initiative and will continue to attack
territory in the Tonkin delta and to make incursions into areas
outside the delta. . . . (Paragraph 3)
10. If present trends in the Indochinese situation con-
tinue through mid-1954, the French Union political and military
position may subsequently deteriorate very rapidly. (Paragraph 8)
D. HIS 63/1: Probable Short-Term Developments in French
Poli (24 cy November 9
11. In Indochina, we believe that even if the Laniel
Navarre Plan is successful the French do not expect to achieve
a corrplete military victory in Indochina and probably aim only
at improving their position sufficiently to negotiate a poli-
tical settlement. (Paragraph 7)
12. If no negotiations take place within the next 18
months, France would probably continue its effort in Indochina,
-2m
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vided that: (a) the US assumed virtually the total financial
burdens of the war; (b) the planned buildup of Vietnam forces
permitted reduction of French forces (c) the Indochina states
remained in the French Union; and (d) France continued to re-
ceive US suP~ rt for its position in Europe and North Africa.
(Paragraph 8)
13. If the above French conditions were not largely
satisfied France would probably propose UN intervention or direct
military participation by the US. Failing in this, France would
probably seek in time to negotiate directly with the Communists
for term which would permit withdrawal with minimum lose.
(Paragraph 9)
II. TACTICAL MILITARY JUDCMNTS
E. NIB 91: Probable Developments in Indochina through
_..... _.._...._
mid 1954 WJim 1953)
114.. Militarily, the Viet Minh are unlikely to expand
greatly their armed forces because they are already experiencing
manpower difficulties. Their combat efficiency probably will
increase, however,, as the result of a modest augmentation of
their unit firepower and a steady improvement in staff planning
and coordination of forces. The Viet Minh probably will continue
to receive a steady flow of material assistance from. the Chinese
Communists, and the amount may increase at any time. The Viet
Minh do not have, and probably cannot develop within the period
of this estimate, the capability to make such effective use of
heavy equipment - artillery, armor, and aircraft - from the
Chinese Communists as to permit successful attacks against strong
concentrations of regular French forces. Over a longer period,
however, a great increase in Viet Minh capabilities, including
the development of an air force, is possible. (Paragraph 32)
F. NIB 63-54 : Cone ences Within Indochina of the Fall
of Dien Bien u..).... ~_._.. ..,_
15. The fall of Dien Bien Phu would not in itself
substantially alter the relative military capabilities of French
Union and Viet Minh forces in Indochina during the next two or
three months unless there were large-scale desertions from the
French Union forces. The victorious Viet Minh troops at Dien
Bien Phu would have suffered heavy casualties and their efficiency
would be reduced. In order to bring these forces up to full
strength, the Viet Minh would probably move them from Dien Bien
Phu to their main supply and training areas adjacent to the Red
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River delta. Prior to the rainy season, this redeployment would
require at least three to four weeks. After the full onset of
the rainy season, which is unlikely before mid-May, the move-
ment would take between two and three months to complete., We
therefore estimate that the bulk of the Viet Minh troops at Dien
Bien Phu would not be available for major operations elsewhere
in Indochina during the next two or three months, although some
lightly-equipped infantry battalions might be made available
more rapidly for operations in the Delta region. (Paragraph 11)
G. NIB 63-3-541 Probable Military and Political Deve9pmente
May -l9~51J
16. If major units now at Dien Bien Phu are redeployed
as rapidly as possible, the Viet Minh can within the next 30
days attain a capability for launching a heavy assault against
French positions in the Delta. Preparations are now being made
for moving the bulk of the Viet Minh units from Dien Bien Phu
toward their bases in the Delta area, and there are indications
that redeployment has begun, We believe that approximately one
division will remain initially in the vicinity of Dien Bien Phu.
The major portion of the forces at Dien Bien Phu with their heavy
equipment could not assemble in the Delta area before 7-15
June, although it is believed that their lightly-equipped units
could complete the movement by 31 May. However, the gradual
increase in intensity of rains during the month of June, com-
bined with French aerial attacks on Route 41, may slow down the
movement. (Paragraph 4)
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EXCERPTS FROM RECENT 0/NE MEMOR .Idl)J ON ' DOCHfl
I? PROJECTION OF
TAR TF?EIJ S
A? Memrandumd of AD/NE for DCI of 25 May 193n
Probable Developments in Indochina's =-9:~ a
le The central point of the estimate is that the French
have lost the initiative. Possibly General Navarre can recapture
the initiative; but when the whole picture is a ned - i n France
as well as locally - this seems unlikely. Therefore we expect
the French Union position to deteriorate. If it does deteriorate
through raid-1954 8ubsequentlry it May decline very rapidly.
(Paragraph 2)
B. Memorandum of AD/NE for DCI of 30 Juac 3.953: ?Po rsible
Major Shifts in French Policy"
2, Above all, France es determination to maintain its
position in Indochina is seriously weakening, and a major shift
in France s Indochina policy may soon take place, The Korean truce
mrL almost certainly stimulate french demands for tome settlement
of the Indochina war. At the same time, the deteriorating French
financial situation and Francois awareness that Indochina outlays
are undermining its ' European position vie-a.?j vtny treats
increasing pressures for a cutback of Indochina coats. Therefore,
unless there is soon a clear improvement in the Indochina outlook,
we believe that them will be a serious Political reaction in
France. While the French probably would not abruptly
of I ochina, they might, in increasi de ~1 out
policies (such as negotiation with the Co ursts aWor to
of French forces) which would endanger the Western posit in
all Southeast Asia. (Paragraph 7) Position in
C- 0/NE Staff Memorandum No. 1a,54 of 11 January 1954:
"Military Developments in Indochinalf
3. Military developments in Indochina are rapidly approach-
ing a critical stage. It is entirely possib3 a that the events
of the next several, weeks will mark a decisive turning point in
the Indochina war- (Paragraph 1)
4. It is not possible to predict either tine military
courses of action which the VM and the French will select or the
military Outcome of such courses one undertmken. We believe,
however, that an authentic and considerable mill
Indochina, in coming weeks is necessary in order both to cease in
present pressures in Paris for a negotiated settlement and to
Prevent a decline in the French military position. In our opinion,
if a mi373.tary stand off should emerge from the present situation
at Dien Bien Phu and in Laos the French will have suffered a
strategic defeat, although not technically a mil.i.t
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over-all strength has been enhanced by an increasing consolidation
of the Viet Minh position within the Tonkin Delta, and by the
psychological benefits accruing from the successful Laotian campaign
of last April. (Paragraph 5)
0. Memorandum of AD/NE for DOI of 24 March 1954: "The
Probable Outcome at Dina Bien Phu and its Implications"
80 The outcome of the battle at Dien Bien Phu remains in
doubt? but we believe on the basis of information presently available
that the French will be able to hold. ... The all-out Viet Mush
attacks on this prepared position have, in fact, given the French
command the opportunity they have long awaited to engage the enemy
in force, (Paragraph 1)
9. The over-all French military position in Indochina will
probably not be decisively affected by the outcome at Dien Bien Phu.
Even if the Viet Minh were to wipe out the French force at Dien Bien
Phu, the French losses relative to their over-all strength would be
a fraction of those the Viet Minh would almost certainly sustain.
We estimate that the Viet Minh would have to sacrifice roughly half
of their total striking force in Indochina in order to achieve such
a victory at Dien Bien Phu. On the other hand, the French do not
stand to advance their military position greatly unless they are
able to grind up the bulk of the Viet Minh attacking force at Dien
Bien Phu, (Paragraph 3)
iao We believe it likely, however, that the outcome at
Dien Bien Phu Will be inconclusive and that the French, although
retaining their hold on the positions will be effectively contained
for some time to come by the Viet Minh forces. (Paragraph 5)
-3-
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011SS 1
 CONFIDENTIAL
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22 December 1954
Mr. Kirkpatrick said that you thought I should telephone Bill Costello
and invite Ed Murrow and Costello to meet with you together and go over the
proposed radio broadcast by Costello, a copy of which he s$nt to us. I checked
with your appointment clerk and learned that Monday or Tuesday of next week,
27 or 28 December, at 3:30 p.m., was the most desirable time due to your
other engagements.
I phoned Costello, and he said Tuesday was out of the question because
he has to be in New York on Tuesday to work on a New Year's program, that he
would phone Ed Murrow who, he said, rarely comes to Washington. Costello
called me back at 1:30 p.m. today to say that he had located Ed Murrow at his
country place in Pawling, New York and that Murrow had not received the copy
that Costello had sent to him. Costello then read the copy to him over the
phone, and Murrow said that he could not be in Washington next week, but
to say for him that he likes the copy very much and he would like to have
Costello use it on the air tomorrow, Thursday night. He said that if there
is anything in it that really bears on national security, they would not
use such part if we would point it out. I told him that this was something
that was difficult to do by telephone. Mr. Murrow is a reasonable man,
Mr. Costello said, and Mr. Costello suggested that perhaps Mr. Dulles might
want to telephone to Murrow
I told Costello I would pass on his message and would call him back.
Recommendation: (1) That you not telephone Murrow thus going over
Costello's head, particularly since Murrow has approved the copy. (2) That
you authorize me to invite Costello over to see you today and go over the
copy with him pointing out where national security is involved.
STAt Y J. GRO
cc. to Mr. Kirkpatrick
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25X1
25X1
44-0881
 25X1
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Mr. Bill Costello
Broadcast House
40th and Brandywine Sts., N. W.
Washington 16, D. C.
security reasons.
Your letter of December 17 enclosing a copy of f& script you
have sent to Ed Murrow for his consideration has ben received. I
note that you invite any suggestions we may haver national
We believe the over-all tenor of the a icle is not in the
national interest, and in addition there are some statements which
are not completely accurate. For examp1 , you say, "Democratic
Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana has ce protested against the
present system of letting the CIA ope ate without any kind of check
from the legislative branch." We d 1 with certain members of the
Appropriations Committees and of t e Armed Services Committees of
both the House and the Senate, w do know in general what our acti-
vities are; but the number who ow is kept small for good national
security reasons. So there i in fact some check by the legislative
branch. We are, as you know an agency that operates under the
National Security Council, ch is part of the executive branch of
the government, but our r ations with the committees of Congress
vitally concerned in our operations are close and highly secret.
Your reference t the Western Enterprises, Incorporated, on
Formosa, to Ajax P1 ing in Japan, and to the Southeast Asia Supply
in Thailand brings p the question of whether a public information
medium does not h e a national security responsibility equal to
that of a loyal ~nerican citizen. In implementing the National
Security Act of/1947 the Congress determined "that the Director of
Central Intelgence shall be responsible for protecting intelli-
gence source` and methods from unauthorized disclosure", and that
the Agency-will not disclose its "organization, functions, names,
official itles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed." It
there e would be improper to comment upon your allegations. But
were these organizations ours, it would seem that the public interest
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served by your bringing to our attention the allegati
t b
b
e
es
would
that you make, rather than giving them publicity, which will corm
in some cases Communist accusations and in other cases may g e them
confirmation of beliefs because they are expressed by a r table
American broadcasting company announcer*
Your comment that in Thailand agents of SEup
assigned to train leaders of the Siamese poli7e fore
ou as
sive activity also may not be given offici answer*
should carry on such an operation inste of leaving it to the mili-
tary or point 'Four, and you say, "The4IA will offer two arguments."
This is completely inaccurate. T CIA will offer no arguments mntshad
no explanation. We do not comma upon anything published
regarding the Agency, regardl s of whether it is accurate or inaccurate.
Your later statement that the CIA was created solely as an
intelligence agency, that CIA should not "be engaged in fighting
communism or anythi else" may not completely jibe with the National
Security Act of 19 , Section 102, which states that the CIA will
"perform such of r functions and duties related to intelligence
affecting the tional security as the National Security Council may
from time to me direct."
T you for inviting our comments on your proposed talk, and
be assur d of our good will toward CBS and you, with our most sincere
belief that your talk as now written would not be in the national
inte est, and would give some aid and much comfort to the enemy.
Sincerely,
Allen W. Dulles
Director
~(Cd 0/ _tx~ 1~,w a_ztw~~
6 S., ewe
Lee, awn Rez
d-I , ~
lr~
duC 4a~
25X1
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CBS RADIO
A Division of GoIumbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
BROADCAST HOUSE
4071 AND BRANDYWINE STS., N. W., WASHINGTON 16, D. C. -EMERSON 2-9300
Dec. 17, 1954.
Dear Mr. Dulles:
Here is a copy of the script I have sent Ed Murrow for his
consideration. We may revise it -- probably will in fact --
and I certainly want to make any revisions you might care
to suggest for national security reasons. I have discussed
the matter with Senator Mansfield, and feel that I am on
reasonably solid grounds so far as policy is concerned.
I am, believe me, most grateful for having had the opportunity
to discuss the problem with you; and I assure you that you
may count on my fullest cooperation in any matter affecting
your fundamental intelligence operations. I might add, in
passing, that I omitted all reference to you by name because
I suspect you inherited some policy and were saddled with more.
I assure you of my sincere respect for you personally.
Yours,
,5111 Costello
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Here in Washington, the Central Intelligence agency is seldom
discussed publicly, and then only in the vaguest kind of generalities.
E'en congressional committees receive only partial and secret briefings
on the activities of CIA; and congress annually is asked to appropriate
substantial sums of money on faith, The argument for this procedure is
that the CIA is JO Uncle Sama clearing house for the topmost secrets of
the cold war; and an intelligence agency cannot function properly if it
has to do its work in the glare of the public spotlight. One member of
coneresa ONNOW -- Democratic Senator Mike Mansfield of
Montana -- has twice protested against the present system of letting the
CIA operate without any kind of check from the legislative branch; he has
introduced bills to provide for a monitoring conunittee of some kind; and
he is preparing to introduce a third bill in January calling for the
creation of a joint house -senate committee somewhat similar to the
joint committee dealing with atomic energy matters,
It is considered likely that Senator ?, ansfield's proposal will
get more serious attention next year than it has previously, Reason is
that the CIA has ceased to be what it was originally -- a non-controversia
,1
intellgence,,agency. With the passage of times basic policy has been
modified; and the CIA has accumulated certain operational aspects having
nothing to do with intelligence. This correspondents on a recent survey
trip through Asia was made aware of ~i~is^rialrt the CIA's activities
repeatedly. It certain areas the agency has made itself so conspicuous
that it cannot be ignored.
Probably the most conspicuous of all the CIA operations over-
seas is a setup known as Western Enterprises, incorporated, on the
island of Formosa. Ostensibly it's a business concern, but how anybp#y
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imagines it could be mistaken for a legitimate business is hard to
understand. Everybody talks about it -- including the communist radio
in Peiping. Politisal sophisticates are makin it the butt of political
jokes. As one British correspondent pat it in a dispatch, the activity
is an sons top secrdt. The agents are flippantly referred to as "the
C-A Heir wives and children
spooks, n They have a cozy compoun Bring a hilltop near
Taipeh; they have their own transport planes shuttling agents bas-z and
forth; they have a private. bar in Taipeh to prevent convivial spooks
from talking too much to strangers. The spooks are so carefully
insulated from all contamination that t;,e - have their own supply system;
you can see their warehouses any day aka alongside the road to
Keelung where I made inquiries in Septembefs.
Western Enterprises and the Spooks still talk in figurative
whispers, but that doesn't prevent the Chinese from snickering at the
United States and its cumbersome system of intelligence. Actually,
there is probably no reason to snicker at the Pmerican W intelligence
system; it operates ax just as eecrrtly and efficiently as any in the
LG the serious detriment of
world. What people are laughing lAmerican prestige,o
11a11iis an awkward cold war operation being conducted with a
pretense of secrecy. On October 21 this year, the Peiping radio broadcas,
a complete description of the manner in which Western Enterprises has
been reesiting, training and arming Chinese nationalist guerrillas
for work on the mainland. Anyone visiting Taipeh for two weeks would
know that the communist account was substantially correct. That being
the case, it is unrealistic to pretend Western Enterprises is a secret
operation.
Officially, in both Taipeh and Washington: American authorities
still refuse to discuss Western Enterprises. But it is possible to
determi, r~F l tl /1 !~1 - ~ O41g~'1~1 1 ~y, officials
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say it, is not fair to condemn an operation just because its cover has
been exposed. They say, sooner or later all covers wear off, and have
to be abandoned; In some cases, even if a cover is exposed, it is still
possible to complete a mission.
Despite this rationalization, ttee re is good reason to believe
that CIA is ready to abandon Western Enterprises as rapidly as its
personnel can be reassigned. Even if the operation is Formosa is
discontinued, the really fundamental issue raised by Senator ansfield
has not been resolved. For, in Japan t=sere is a similar phoney business
setup known as Ajax Plumbing; and in Thailand there is another called
Southeast Asia Supply and abbreviated SEA Supply. The fact that the
pattern of the cover is so similar in all three countries is explained by
the fact that westerners with white skins sl! cannot easily be concealed
in Asia; but no one seriously contends that the atra#egem is really
deceptive. The minute you assemble three or four dozen Americans, with
no visible means of support, and put them in contact with foreign
officials on a footing of a diplomatic privilege, then anyone can
alt identify them as secret agents. in Thailand, for example, the agents
in SEA Supply have been assigned the task of training leaders of the
Siamese police force In anti-subversive activity.
If you ask why CIA should earry on such an operation -- instead
of leaving it to the military or Point Four -? the CIA will offer two
arguments, First, they will say, foreign governments don;t want to have
Americans coming in openly to engage in training police or guerrillas,
and the CIA is able end willing to work sub-rosa. Second, they say, this
is just one more way of fighting communism*
It is this last argument that gets close to the heart of
congressional uneasiness. The CIA was establiscied as an intelligence
age cy'iApptoVe or a ease 123-CIQsx1~ "1Rf6 184*60 d be ready at
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all times with an informed estimate of conditions in friendly and enemy
countries. The terms ender which the CIA was created did not provide
that the CIA would be engaged in fighting communism or anything else.
There are other fighting agencies in the government, The CIA was
envisaged as a highly skilled watch-dog, capable in the lent extremity
preventing: another Pearl Harbor. In the, view of Senator Mansfield and
others who agree with him, CIA has strayed into the operational field
because it is not accountable to corn ?ress for t'a manner in which its
funds are spent, and it is not subject to congressional review of policy.
With the Democrats taking control in the next congress,. a
showdown seems to be in the making. Unless the CIA voluntarily
relinquishes its extra-curricular activities, congress may insist on a
housecleaning, and a reassertion of CIA's original mandate.
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Bill C-06tailo, soda a Viral sarviuy
MUTUSAW
a to report
t
2, attd Vmr- ssv
t abo" er^efore to s c rep t
foreign parts as it it :
ttkrs CIA is Eat
ra eats .
"Wiest m' m# o; the s: htmat effort to lei for tea, css
sctisttlesp the s .JaCtt um r*;watedly tscuoit s` attaa .
in torts in arm the s s itslf so
comam t of bar ram d p, And it be a 41ASOrrte.
is e * policy of seers
pbiic is that tin agcy is 01010 &MV
the te'p 'at s t. or t *e sold war. And in-
CA IL f t3eft prspaaril U it to do its
lie epetli t.
'mss nw*mwof Cam, Boa retie sm t Bsms!tsld at
l et a bias pcotosted adat t tbapmt eys1 o 1.tt3.at the CU
qpw*U b CU* adequate, S(p~i 1 'Us ism.
~,, 1, twi `'
btU* ds Vor a t#1 of saw* ki. a
Amd
,/r
be is ~?i to istav6m a ~ * 4). in jammy o~ f,
w" Um of a jaint Pc issa- att. erc-Amb t sildll ` is
milt
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ukwj~y that beyawattaasr Ifi 's PrOPOO&I most
uA than it saes W is i. Ttw
start it appears t be and I
t: sis1 nubject itself to amay
fide ria w-
tae CU U t t saa tla aisalaaat, to
artatia arsts madavo Via`
#m agpialrial ate. The
tb. Pr,.i rt and tb atia SOCUOLt ' C tl
as well as a calla ct or Of rotas
`or ? most Part tb psa tc to not ins of
i r i s . OVIONOW are made +a n tdaa is UAW an the tas *t the CIA# s
secret tudVt and t * tvmmw ran all the as fraw s ,t a
isr an tit as i8W,i , . t am is aastw-wV has ever
emoumod a daaftaaitnr flare. And s i peril is dam to cra
that *very- aspect at the ateaWs work is v*U" in
in Asia than veil of saarsiq is pa+ett MwW. ftvbWy
of all the CU op zat# a i Asia to a as -vp
as ro t t*rWjAsa, at", on tape is"laud of Trim*.
it#s a mss cam. t sa am* to C%Mmtv". Dwery-
a ou its nv2sa t C at r at ,,pia .
making it the butt of politiaa1 3*ae. As
itA in a dt spa ch, the t&viti is an Span
Tbo and
a have a *my, sempowed eoverSoj a fl top a
am tromapert pUma wbatt1i o atis back and
bar in Taipei to pr OOOVIVIAX stela
Ith Otr".rars. "' are so sa
t Uca that they htrs their am s
the read to
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 tba
U. iz*t poop'*
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ast dtamit
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24 January 1955
Executive Registry:
Please file the attached under "Bi
Costel }{ There is a possibility we will be
calling for it again. Thanks.
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. I e+ssr -
BROADCAST Q U.S
U: ;A:GE i
.
HOUSE DEC27 54
ye - ,
~~ ~+ a
03
P gqME.ER
U.116o71
Mr. Allan Dulles
CIA Director
2430 E St. N.W.
Washington, D.C.
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COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.
.n~ cT T_T ~. `!;T SHINGTON 16, D. C.
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