LETTER TO (Sanitized) FROM C. N. VALENTI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R003700100025-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 88
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2003
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: March 1, 1960
• Content Type: LETTER

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41110011111141Dik MANUFACTURING CORPORA TION
AEROSPACE DIVISION
HILLTOP AND FREDERICK ROADS
BALTIMORE 28, MARYLAND
RIDGEWAY 7-0200
March 1, 1960
Zil Barton Hall
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.
At your request, forwarded with this letter is a copy
of the Space Strategy presentation which was recently
given to you by Dr. Peter A. Castruccio, Technical
Director of the Aerospace Division of the Aeronca
Manufacturing Corporation.
We are sincerely pleased at your evidence of interest
in the Aerospace Division's capability, as demon-
strated by the presentation, and hope you will keep
us in mind should your requirements fall into the
areas of our capability.
As Dr. Castrucci? pointed out, and as the enclosed
brochure will illustrate, the Aeronca Manufacturing
Corporation offers a capability ranging from elec-
tronics through airframe special structures, as well
as space-oriented studies and hardware.
As we are a young and vigorously expanding division,
we can give your requirements the same enthusiasm
with which the Space Strategy presentation was given,
and offer the same calibre of development acuity.
At our recent presentation to you, the comment was
made that a more thorough discussion of the develop-
ments and the hardware necessary to implement space
strategy was lacking from the presentation. These
were necessarily omitted due to the classification
level of the presentation, and for lack of time. We
shall be happy to arrange another meeting with you
at a higher security level, to discuss our proposals
for necessary space development and hardware.
(FIE
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17 ENCLOSURES ARE WITHOLL',WN (OR NO - AT 'ACHE
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CONFIDENTIAL
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We frankly and openly solicit your requirements based
on our capability to handle anything from the simpler
electronic development and production to complete
space systems.
Sincerely,
0 )0
C. N. Valenti, Manager
Military Requirements
Marketing Department
gl
Ends.
IDWIAL
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Man's destiny has brought him to the threshold of
space. The first Astronaut soon will belong to the ages.
But even before he does, men of bold vision are planning
for lunar and interplanetary exploration. This is an
exciting, challenging, profound moment in history.
We are privileged to witness mankind's transition
into the horizonless Space Age.
To meet the challenge of space and the future,
Aeronca has established the Aerospace Division . .
:1 scientific facility dedicated to astronautics and the
.oractical application of advanced tech l?,,Togicul
knowledge Tiw, 1_,00kiet (171,
,24-,_T facility. it.: people. cupubilities and sert tre.,;
P. A. Castrucci?
Technical Directo-
ECOLOGISTS
F
AERODTNAMICISTS
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ELECTRONIC
ENGINEERS
GUIDANCE
ENGINEERS
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CO 4C.A.
AEROSPACE means creative engineering for air weapon
and astronautic systems
Aerospace Division offers unique capabilities in missile and space engineering
and manufacturing. A fully integrated facility, it specializes in research,
development, design, test and prototype manufacture of air weapon and
missile sub-systems and components.
In recognition of the importance of flexibility, authority and economy in
project management, the delegation of responsibility has been given prime
consideration in this division's organization. All operations are coordinated
to assure strict adherence to each customer's needs and directives in all
matters . . . contractual, technical, managerial and administrative.
In addition to its creative services, Aerospace provides competent contracting,
purchasing, accounting and general administrative support on all programs.
TYPICAL STUDIES t,Nr.: PROJECTS
Attitude Control System
for Space Vehicles
my-Temperature Ceramic Adheslves
Computer Programmers
- ? ?
,ntrared and Ult,-akJic let Rese.arch
Guidance & Navigational
in ?i?pace r-ignt
Lunar Landing Techniques
Midcourse Guidz!nce
Space Vehcles
s71-:
Space Communications
Techniques
Strategic Lular System
Strategic Interplanetary Sys..em
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CP RI CAM
AEROSPACE?
CAPABILITIES
There is much to be learned and accomplished
before man can successfully probe the edge of
Infinity. Studies indicate that space will be a
hostile environment . . . both physiologically
and psychologically. Even unmanned space
probes present critical challenges to contempo-
rary knowledge.
The responsibility for reliable, assured per-
formance in space as well as missile systems
lies with the people capable of creating them.
Recognizing this obligation. Aerospace person-
nel are relentless in their search for perfection.
Their goal is optimum results and quality
assurance on each project.
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AEROSPACE provides Management, Research, Development, Design and Production Services for...
SYSTEM STUDIES
Missiles ? AICBM Threat and Defense
Weapon System Studies
Space ? Strategy, Logistics and
Military Applications
Space ? Environment, Exploitation,
Earth Orbital, Lunar and
Interplanetary Studies
GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, CONTROL
AND STABILIZATION SYSTEMS
Inertial
Radar and Radio
Magnetic and Advanced
Optical, Ultraviolet and Infrared
Trajectory Individualization,
Computation and Control
COMMUNICATIONS AND TELEMETRY
Radio
Light
Sound
Antennas
Transmitters, Receivers and
Decoders (HF to Microwave)
DETECTION, TRACKING AND RECONNAISSANCE
Radar
Radiation
Electronic Counter Measure and Anti-Jamming
Active! Passive Detection
Optical, Ultraviolet and Infrared
ECOLOGICAL, HUMAN PROTECTION,
CAPSULE DESIGN
Open and Closed Loop Systems
Radiation and Temperature Protection
Physiological/Psychological Studies
Capsule Instrumentation and Design
SIMULATION AND TRAINING
Space
Navigation and Communication
Missile and Radar
Research
DIGITAL AND ANALOG COMPUTATION
AND DATA PROCESSING
Data Translators
Multiplexers
Data Loggers and Processors
Electromechanical Systems
TEST, CHECKOUT AND INSTRUMENTATION
Automatic System Monitoring Equipment
Special Electronic and Electro-
mechanical Instruments
Weather Recording, Automatic and
Semiautomatic
,reo,oveo r
01
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travr,lp rn,ss!!er, opains? *ee
e.reerre e c,,borne system and group support
units developed by Aeronca.
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CPRICA
AEROSPACE
Key to successful systems manage-
ment is a thorough knowledge of
military requirements and weapon
systems. To assure efficient management.
Aeronca utilizes the closed loop". A
single manager, with a full-time staff, is
responsible for coordination of schedule
planning . . integration of research, de-
velopment, design and test efforts to
meet performance specifications . direc-
tion and supervision of subcontractors.
Aerospace research is directed to
provide support for concepts and
techniques based on system IT-
quirements. Effort is oriented to: k a) de-
velop background necessary to seleiit
best possible techniques for system de-
sign, (b) develop competence for proper
integration of system equipment, (c) ad-
vance state-of-the-art to meet future
space requirements. To accomplish this
mission, Aeronca has established versa-
tile and fully staffed research and labora-
tory facilities.
?Complex weapons impose severe
performance criteria which dictate
that each individual program be
carefully planned and directed from the
beginning. The parameters which must
be planned into a project include de-
termination and allocation of specifica-
tions, establishment of reliability, opera-
tional and environmental aspects and
establishment of design factors. This can
be accomplished only by a well-balanced
organization staffed with experienced
personnel. Aeronca has demonstrated an
outstanding ability to achieve this ob-
ject ive
P80601676R003700100025-6
SERVICES
Approved For Rel /08/
A worthwhile design based on the
I1) parameters set forth by the Re-
search and Systems Engineering
teams is the goal of the Design group.
Producibility of all components and sub-
systems is given prime consideration be-
cause Design, to be successful, must be
transformed into workable hardware.
Aeronca's Design Engineering people
have a wealth of skills and experience to
Meet this ultimate design goal.
0 Aerospace's Development Engi-
neering group combines awareness
of feasibility with the knowledge of
design philosophy and techniques neces-
sary to develop successful systems. With
reliability, ease of operation and main-
tenance as their prime objectives, these
specialists give Aeronca the capacity for
new and diversified systems of all types_
The personnel who comprise Aeron-
ca's Experimental Fabrication
team are among the most skillful
craftsmen in the industry today. They
close the gap between the design/develop-
ment engineers, blueprints and workable
hardware.
0 Broad experience and a wide range
of specialized skills are required
of Product Engineering. This group
must be competent in component relia-
bility, manufacturing methods and proc-
esses and have an intimate knowledge
of military specifications and test pro-
cedures. in addition, it is responsible for
integrating methods and techniques for
irnpvc,e,-. pr-,,i---4' ?
The Test Group utilizes laborato-
ries and special equipment to check
out components and systems under
actual as well as simulated environmental
conditions. In addition, they assist in
establishing specifications for new com-
ponents, help select suppliers, conduct
qualification tests and enforce specifica-
tions.
?Transition of a project from draw-
ing board to actuality is the re-
sponsibility of Production Engi-
neering. Special talents in engineering,
planning, scheduling, estimating, ma-
terials and manufacturing are blended
into a practical, economical plan of ac-
tion. As a result, final specifications and
changes as well as realistic costs are
quickly established.
Aeronca's extensive Manufactur-
ing facilities are equipped with the
most advanced machines and quali-
ty assurance test equipment. Manned by
experienced personnel, these versatile
facilities have the flexibility and capacity
to mass-produce components . . . and
expedite delivery . . . to complete cus-
tomer satisfaction.
*Based wherever required, the
Follow-Up team renders these
services:
1 Installation and maintenance of
equipment.
2. Instruction of customers in theory,
operation and maintenance.
7; Modification or relocation at exist-
ing equipment.
4. Planning and provisioning of spare
6R003700100025-6
CUSTOMERS
Aeronca and its Aerospace Division
work closely with prime contractors
and the Military. This partial list
shows organizations with whom a
working relationship is maintained.
U. S. Air Force
U. S. Army
U. S. Navy
U. S. Marine Corps
Arma Division, American Bosch
Arma Corporation
Aluminum Company of America
Bell Aircraft Corporation
Bendix Aviation Corporation
Boeing Airplane Company
Corwair, Division of General
Dynamics Corporation
Douglas Aircraft Company, Inc.
Federal Communications Commission
General Electric Company
Grumman Aircraft and
Engineering Corporation
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
North American Aviation
Sperry Gyroscope Co., Division
Sperry Rand Corporation
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TYPICAL PROJECTS
This list illustrates the type of projects
that Aeronca has produced, Establish-
ment of the Aerospace Division supports
and expands the capabilities and services
required to accomplish these projects,
*
*
Airborne Antenna Assemblies
Air Transportable Support Shelters
Aluminum Honeycomb Structures
(Bonded)
Boeing 707 Components
B-52 Components and Subsystems
B-58 Components (Stainless Steel
Honeycomb)
B-70 Components
Ceramic Adhesive Development
Program
Ceramic Bonded Honeycomb
Structures
Jupiter Missile GSE Shelters
KC-135 Viiing Center Sections
Missile Components and Subsystems
Missile Substructures
P-106 and P-107 Target Missiles
P6M Beaching Vehicle
Pogo-Hi Target Missiles
A2-F Speed Brake
Stainless Stee' Horeycomb Strut es
(Brazed)
Radomes
Target Drones
Radar Transmitter and Receve
Reflectors
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FACILITIES
CORPORATE
With more than 650,000 square feet among its
three divisions, Aeronca has the capacity to
handle a wide range of research, development
and production programs for air weapon, missile
and space systems. New and expanded facilities
already have been planned to keep pace with
the growing demand for Aeronca's services.
Within existing plant areas, Aeronca has the
precision production equipment required to fabri-
cate complex weapon systems and components.
Modern supporting laboratories also are main-
tained, including an Environmental Laboratory
capable of qualifying equipment to all present
military specifications. In addition, Air Force
certified procedures and methods are employed
,s,^ev7Trit
CO 1111 CAW
AEROSPACE
in fabrication of air weapon structures.
AEROSPACE DIVISION
Present facilities include 28,000 square feet of
engineering space and a 2900 square foot Model
Shop. An additional 20,000 square feet are being
acquired to meet scheduled expansion plans.
Present location is a 14-acre landscaped tract at
Frederick and Hilltop Roads, Catonsville (Balti-
more 28), Maryland.
Aerospace's Model Shop has the necessary equip-
ment for prototype fabrication, and is manned
by highly skilled electronic specialists and ma-
chinists. It has produced a variety of complex
electronic and electromechanical assemblies for
R & D projects.
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As a leading supplier of aircraft and air weapon
system components, Aeronca has established an ex-
tremely versatile and fully integrated manufacturing
facility. In addition to standard tools, Aeronca uti-
lizes a variety of highly specialized machines and
equipment developed especially to meet the rigid
specifications inherent in high-performance weapon
systems. Among these are ultraprecision contour
mills used for high speed milling of unsupported
honeycomb structures, an electronically controlled
90-ton spar mill, the most modern and largest non-
destructive X-ray inspection equipment and en-
vironmental facilities.
The General Electric brazing furnace illustrated at
left is typical of Aeon-a's special equipment This
and other furnaces are capable of brazing stainless
steel panels up to la' x 20'. Behind the furnace
ieft background) is a freezer capabit of su:-' Ined
?100 F. temperature.
MANUFACTURING
Al? Air ? ? ? on..
1111-1FQ
a Rd IIMAk
AEROSPACE
Numerically controlled, this 12' x 45' skin mill is the larg-
est and most modern machine of its kind in the Midwest.
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Approved For Release 2003/08/18 : Cl
Aeronca's production capabilities are geared to sup-
ply. ... on schedule and at competitive cost. . . structures,
components and finished products of the highest
quality. Aeronca is proud of its advanced state-of-
the-art knowledge, skills and equipment for fabri-
cating exotic materials and complex structures. In
fact, we currently are recognized as a prime source
for brazed stainless steel honeycomb sandwiches.
The full scope of Aeronca's current facilities cannot
be illustrated with pictures or outlined in words.
Therefore, we invite your personal inspection of our
plants. We would like you to see how we operate
dnd to get acquainted with our people. We sincerely
believe you would be favorably impressed with all
phases of Aeronca's operations.
Main Offices and
Plants located in
Middletown, Ohio.
Aerocal Division
Plants, Torrance,
California.
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CO IRA 4CA.
AEROSPACE
ORGANIZATION
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It is the people . . . those who make the policies and those who
transform them into action . . . who really make a company out-
standing in its field.
This organizational chart shows the key men of the Aerospace
Division. Each is a qualified specialist, fully trained and experi-
enced in his field of endeavor. Collectively they represent a tre-
mendous range and depth of knowledge_ These are the men who
will handle your jobs. They are one of the most talented manage-
ment teams in the industry today.
AERONCA
MANUFACTURING CO,
J. A. Lawler
President
MANPOWER
The chief factor in manpower is ability . based on education,
experience and inherent talents. This is especially true in the field
of missiles and astronautics. Conventional military systems re-
quire collaboration of a selected group of engineers and scientists.
In space systems . . where technology is advancing beyond
established scientific frontiers . . special skills peculiar to this
challenging area are required. Aere.,space Division has been orrpn-
ized and staffed with top scientists possessing these abstract
capabilities. Their experience has been obtained through acival
participation in space studies and developments.
In addition to its key people, Aerospace has outsta.nding profes-
sional talents in. its skilled nersmanel. Recruited i7rom aircraft
and missile sources, they are oriented into a coordinated team
c.inc.,aest Of sna.i.
MIDDLETOWN
!
r---4 DIVISION
l MIDDLETOWN. OHIO
I
I
AEROSPACE
DIVISION
BALTIMORE, MD.
C. G. Felix
Vice Pros.
AEROCAL
DIVISION
TORRANCE CALIF
rii111111,111111?11111111111111N11111,
MARKETING
DIRECTOR
J. A. Wascavage
F
Adm. Asst.
to
Technical
Di rector
TECHNICAL
DIRECTOR
P. A. Castruccio
NIFFNIIINICTP111
IADMINISTRAT1
DIRECTOR
W. W. Whittle
EJ
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CHIEF
ENGINEERING
SERVICES
CHIEF
PROJECTS
ENGINEER
CHIEF
ENGINEER
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Drafting
Technical Publ.
Engineering Shop
Engineering Lab.
HEngineering Adm.
Test Facilities
MECHANICAL DESIGN
& PACKAGING
ASTRONAUTICAL &
STRUCTURAL DESIGN
DETECTION &
RECONNAISSANCE
CHIEF
ADVANCE SYSTEM
STUDIES & ANALYSES
CHIEF
SCIENTIST
Adm. Asst.
to
Chief Engr.
Asst. Chief Engr.
Propulsion
Aux. Power
Astrophysicists
L...,
Math & Mechanics
Planetary Chemistry
*O. tAllit
ito
COMPUTATION &
DATA PROCESSING
HUMAN
FACTORS
H COMMUNICATIONS
& TELEMETRY
GUIDANCE &
NAVIGATION
TEST
EQUIPMENT
Subcontracts &
Tech. Services
Contracts
Military
Requirements
Marketing
Services
Operations
Security
Personnel
Quality
Control
Purchasing
A LountIng
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I I4 ill.]
25,000,000
22.500,000
20,000,000
17,500,000
15,000,000
12,500,000
10,000,000
7,500,000
5,000.000
NET SALES (IN DOLLARS)
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1,600 000
1,400,000
1.200,000
-,000,000
800,000
600,000
400,000
200,000
PROFITS (IN DOLLARS)
IIIIII Profit otter Feuer& UN Income TQXCS
Income Taxes
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
801301676RaVAM293416
The keynote to success in tomorrow's complex
space systems is reliability. It, begins with the in-
ception of the system idea. Design simplicity,
Aeronca's constant objective, is a prime requisite
because complexity multiplies the probability of
failure. Environmental factors affecting a system
in shipping, storage, installation, operation and
maintenance also must be considered to establish
sound design requirements. Exhaustive tests must
be performed before delivery to further verify de-
sign reliability. After delivery, reports from field
service men help to assure even greater reliability
as production continues. This Aeronca philosophy
and procedure assures customers of consistent and
dependable performance.
QUALITY ASSURANCE
Quality Control is responsible for maintaining a
,rmtinuous evaluation of all materials, tools, fabri-
cation processes and assemblies as well as final
acceptance of finished units. No effort is spared to
assure the absolute accuracy inherent in military
systems. All services or materials purchased from
suppliers are checked by traveling inspectors. Items
received by Aeronca are subjected to intensive
tests to verify compliance with specifications. In
addition, Aeronca's own fabrication and assembly
operations are under constant surveillance. Gauges,
test and other precision equipment are checked
periodically for accuracy.
SECURITY
Because of the classified nature of military systems,
Aeronca maintains a rigid and vigilant security
program. All three divisions are completely fenced
and guarded. All facilities are cleared to handle
projects through Secret. Key Aeronca personnel
are cleared through Top Secret.
DOCUMENTATION
Aeronca has considerable experience in the prepa-
ration of drawings, preliminary specifications, pro-
visioning documents, reports and handbooks. Hav-
ing engaged in military work since its inception,
Aeronca is thoroughly familiar with military speci-
fications and federal cataloging.
B01676R003700100025-6
'
HISTORY
OF
CI I %11
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Aeronca was the world's first lightplane manu-
facturer. Established in 1928, the company
designed twelve different aircraft types and
produced more than 12,000 private planes up
to 1951.
During World War II, Aeronca put its entire
capacity into the war effort and was the first
lightplane firm to be awarded the coveted
Army-Navy "E" for excellence in production.
War programs included production of more
than nine hundred L-3 "Grasshoppers", over
nine hundred PT-13 and PT-23 trainers and
the TG-5 training glider. In 1944, Aeronca be-
came a major airframe supplier for the C-46,
B-17 and SB-2C programs. In addition, the
complete G-1 and G-2 Glide Bombs were de-
signed and produced in this period.
Aeronca also supported the Korean War effort
by supplying more than six hundred L-16
aircraft.
As a result of its extensive and diversified ex-
perience in aircraft design, engineering and
fabrication, Aeronca has become a leading sub-
contractor of major airframe components and
sub-systems for contemporary jet aircraft and
missile systems. The transition from tube-and-
fabric through conventional stressed skin con-
struction to high-temperature structures fabri-
cated from exotic materials has encompassed
all phases of advanced aeronautical research,
design, engineering and manufacturing.
With fully integrated Design-Tool-Produce
capabilities, Aeronca has paced . . . and ad-
vanced. . . state-of-the-art technology in soph-
isticated weapon systems concepts. In fact,
Aeronca currently is the leading producer of
complex brazed stainless steel honeycomb
structures for supersonic air weapons.
To meet the steadily growing demand for its
versatile and specialized capabilities, Aeronca
has expanded its facilities rapidly but soundly.
An example of this planned expansion is the
recent formation of the Aerospace Division.
This new division, incorporating the original
Aeronca research laboratory, is concerned with
the management, research, design, development
and fabrication of missile and space systems,
sub-systems and components.
Today, Aeronca has three Divisions: MIDDLE-
TOWN (Headquarters and main plants),
AEROCAL (Torrance, Calif.) and AERO-
SPACE (Baltimore, Md.). Current facilities,
long-range plans and the "Aeronca spirit" as-
sure the company of a firm foundation for the
future.
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AEROSPACE
SALES AND SERVICE
These are the men responsible for
customer contact and program
coordination. Their active and skillful
liaison assures close cooperation
on every requirement and contract.
CO RI CAL
MANUFACTURING CORPORATION
AEROSPACE DIVISION MIDDLETOWN DIVISION
Ffeclerick & Hilltop Rds.
Baltimore 28, Maryland
AEROCAL DIVISION
Germantown Roaa 24751 S. crensho S,-cl
Middletown, Ohio Torrance, California
i
J. A. Wascavage I R. F. Hermes
Di-ectar of Marketine i V. P,-Tech Services
I'-con Rldgeway 7-0200 Phone: GArden 2-2751
REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D, 0. NEW YORK, NEV f ORK
J. P. Lawler, vice l''''es_ C. Freeman
1001 Connecticut Ave., NAV. 8 Pittis Avenue
I
DIVISIONS Phone, Dlstric 7 18,eIE Allendale, New Je-sey
Phone: DAvis 7-6388
REPRESENTATIVES
BOSTON, MASSACHI...ISFT-S,
R. V. Ridpath DAYTON, OHIO
:;epat Pood /*4'
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D. Ninteman
Sales Manager
Phone: DAvenoort
CINCINNATI, OHIO
W. Watkins
5325 Myerdale Drive
Phone: SYcamore 1-6699
WICHITA, KANSAS
1. Stanley
170 Hillsdale Driye
Phone: REgent 3-7443
ANGELES, CALITOPVA
P. Scherer
2208 Pcy.cieca
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CONFIDENTIAL
CI
MANUFACTURING
AEROSPACE
BALTIMORE 28,
CORPORA T ON
DIVISION
MARYLANr
RACF STATI-GY
DECEMBER 22,1959
This document contains information affecting the national defense of the
United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C.,
sections 793 and 1411prove4r1Eorsileleasfe AUCI363808td cGhterliDP 8 0 BO 1676ROt 0 1 OD 0.2
dNFIDENTIA1
In any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
a I. I I I & I I I 11
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SPACE s_I RiFFGy
L.1.10.10
PRESENTED BY
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SPACE STRATEGY
A basic question faced by military planners today can be pised
as follows: Is the Urited States justified in going into space? If
so, what strategic advantages does space present from the militar
standpoint? What are the basic space missions and what are their
'Modus Operandi"?
In order to answer these questions properly, one should brictly
glance back to the origin and roots of the military establishment and
of military strategy.
What is the proper role of the military in a nation's life?
This role depends upon the structure of the particular society being
considered.
Looking back into history, we find that from the early dawn of
pre-history to approximately 10,000-7,000 BC, human economy was
based on food gathering Man was basically a "hunter and gatherer"
of the products of vegetation. We find even at that early date that
man was a social animal, banding together in groups; most of the in-
dividuals of the group engaged in the business of gathering t000
vhich left very little time for other occupations. These groups
ruled themselves apparently by a form of natural democracy, with
Chiefs elected primarily for their qualities of physical or menial
powers for the safeguard of the group. The total population of he
globe was apparently very small; it is estimated that approximat,ly
200 to 400 people inhabited the British Isles about 15,000 years
ago, with similar densities holding throughout the remainder of
the inhabited world.
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FOOD
GATHERING
ECONOMY
FOOD
GATHERING
RAIDS
1ST INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION
TACTICAL AND
STRATEGIC PREVENTION
OF RAIDS WARS OF
CONQUEST
UR MEMPHIS NINEVEH,
2ND INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION
WARS OF
:)EFENSE
RISE OF
u NATIONAL POLICY"
vi
,
NATIONAL
DEMOCRACY
DEMOCRATIC CITY STATE
, -
L '?)
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Historians hold that human society at that time wa,q basical,y
peaceful except for occasional clashes over hunting grounds; the
was, therefore, no military organization as such. From appr)xit,-::ly
10,000-7,000BC, a phenomenon occurred which historians call he "First
Industrial Revolution". certain food-gathering tribe-; discow-rec that
food could be produced more efficiently by planned cultivation in-
stead of haphazard gathering and by herding of domesticated inim Is
rather than by hunting. This period witnesses the rise of the
ri-
cultural and pastoral structure of society. The phenomenon did -.ot
develop all at once, nor did it occur simultaneously throughout he
inhabited area of the world. It originated first in the Nile Vf ley
and in the Middle Eastern "fertile crescent" and spread slowly t )
neighboring areas? The "invention" of cultivation and shepherd:ng
increased the efficiency of food production so that each person ot
the group was able to produce more than he could cons.ume; this ied
to the freeing of a portion of the group's members for other tur-
suits. This is the real significance of the "revolution"; name,
the fact that man was not completely bound any longer by the so
task of producing food, but acquired some idle time which enabled
him to think about other problems The groups that adopted the new-
found "invention" became rapidly wealthier than the surrounoing
groups
It developed, though, that certain of these surrounding groops
discovered that it was profitable to raid the wealthy agricultu: I
and shepherding groups and acquire the fruits of their labor by )
temporary expenditure of force. We witness here the first rise
a para-military organization, whose task was primarily "militarr
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food gatheria" The raided groups had no choice but to def:nd
themselves, and created in turn a warrior or military organizatioa
to prevent (tactical defense) and punish the raiders (preventi.re t
taliatory, or strategic defense). Since the agricultural and
pastoral groups were aver-producing, they were in a position to Iree
a number of their members for such military defensive enterpris
Also, they discovered that in these retaliatory operations taey
could capture members of t-he enemy group and use them profit 3b1
as labor force. In turn, this freed more of the members of the
original group for other occupations, so that the pastoral and bnep-
herding groups tended to grow in wealth.
As a consequence of these military operations, the agricult, al
groups discovered that it was desirable to conduct military :Ter -
tions from strongholds in which a number of warriors were comsted.
In turn, these warriors had to be supported with food, weapons, Ale
other services, so that the stronghold sttracted a variety ot 0- er
supporting individuals We witness at this time, the beginting
that. historians call the "Second Industrial Revolution"; the '4inve- n
of urbanization.
People soon discovered the advantages of banding together tr
cities; more and more specialization of industries and trades de-
veloped, with better tools being generated, not only for warfare',
but. also for food prodactiono Thus, less of the population becaJte
concerned with the mere task of producing food, while the rsmain_ct
specialized in other tasks, The rise of the cities brought the
necessity for a much closer and direct supervision and, thus.
Ef_12II21_g2=Dment emittles, either led by a single individusl or
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by groups of the most powerful and wealthiest citizens. We witness
during this period the gradual rise of the concept of State vested
in the ruler. The military become fully specialized as an Just-
ment of power for the state which meant essentially power for ti).
ruler or rulers. The military also develop the task of police
power, to prevent other members of the State from plotting against
the ruler or seizing power themselves. During this period, the
military are thus the arm of the ruler for acquisition to himsel of
more absolute power and for the defense of the ruler's possessiors
against neighboring rulers with the same objectives.
Approximately 600 BO, we witness the rise of another pheno-
menon; the democratic City States of Greece. The almost miracu :us
Greek concept considers all citizens as equal voting units, with
conformance to the laws of the state as a self-imposed discipline
in the interest of common welfare. Every major decision in the
Greek city state was taken by the citizenry as a whole with tho,l,ands
of votes cast and counted.
This presented a giant step forward in governmental techniques,
but was obviously not practical beyond the scale of a city state.
Sometime later, about the fourth century BC, we witness the rise of
national democracy in the Raman State, in which the citizens did
not vote on every issue, but confined their elective powers to :re
naming of representatives appointed for fixed periods of time. Rere
for the first time, we see the beginning of the modern concept
democracy; namely, rule by the will of the majority, delegated tttrough
elected representatives. In the Roman state we witness the rise. in
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a modern sense, of the concept of "foreign policy"; the miliary
become the implementors by force of the State's foreign polity.
the Roman concepl, the military are subject to civilian rowel- at
all times and are used in conjunction with other branches of the
.4 state, such as civil representatives (our diplomatic service
After the fall of Rome and during the dark ages, society fal
...g
back to a more primitive state in which power is fractioned amona
.01
.01
numerous local rulers and military forces return to the ancient
of implementing the power of each ruler
With the Renaissance and the rise of Couunercialism (the
ing Republics, the flarseatic League), we witness the gradual
Trac-
for=
mation of national.States with emphasis on trade. The foreign
policy of these groups extends to the protection of sea lane ct
commerce, and the fosterirg of commercial competition. The militiry
acquire a new connotation. in the Trading States, as thc arm of
trade; comuercial competition by force, In other national entities
they are still the arm of whatever foreign policy that State elec:ed
to pursue This state of affairs lasts until the industrial rev:
lution of the early 19th century, which some historians call the
"Third Industrial Revolution". Prior to the third revolution th
basic economic fact was the constancy of production per cTi-a
typical of artisanship Thus the "economic good" was control ov
as many producing units as possible, which was equivalent to co
over as many people as possible The control could be either ccv
mercial or political, with political control generally following
The basic goods were land and peasants (the agricultural producit!;
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-YPICAL
UTAPY
Ra
IMPLEMENT
NATI,J;L,L.
POLICY
FE
FEUDAL
1.I.GRIfs:ULTURF
S
PREVALENT
ECONOMIC
SYSTEM
POLITICAL
SYSTEM
AGRICULTURE
HUSBANDRY
(Trade)
COMMONWEALTH
CAESAR ROMAN EMPIRE
43 5,-,
45
AND
HUSBANDRY
FEUDALISM
DARK AGES
ARM, OF 'P
I tVvER NS,TRUMEN7
TRADE
SEMI-DEMOCRATIC
MODERN
CITY STATES CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY
MONARCHY
TRADE
AND
AGRICULT
N'.3TRUME.NT
1`,IATDN A L.
L. 1.3F.RAUON.
INDUSTRY
ABSOLUTE MONARCHY
RISE OF
TR CM;
REPO& ICS
I 00
HANSOATIC
LEAGUE
SPAIN
AND
PORTUGAL
2nd
ENGLAND INDUSTRIAL
AND RE VOLD rION
FRANCE
18'15
117761
Figure 3 - Evolution of Military Role to tile 3rd Industrial Revolution
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TOTAL COST OF PRODUCTION
INTIAL CAPITAL
INVESTMENT
ARTISAN
ECONOMY
INDUSTRIAL
ECONOMY
NO. OF UNITS PRODUCED
Figun. t.Le onoLy Be torc. 6. L'ae iccI RTOi.UtiL,-
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II I
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UNIT COST OF PRODUCTION
In the Artisan economy (pre-3rd Revolution)
the unit cost of production is approximately
constant. In the industrial economy (post-3rd
Revolution) the unit cost of production is a
sensitive function of the quantity of good pro-
duced. To compete, an industrial nation must
operate in the lower part of the curve. This
requires a constant flow of adequate raw ma-
terials. Thus, procurement of same in the
industrial economies of the 19th Century become
a vital national and military matter.
ARTISAN ECONOMY
NO. OF UNITS PRODUCED
Figure 5 - Basic Economic Factors
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units cities and artis, ns (the industrial producing units). sei
lanes and concessions in foreign commercial ports (commercial p
ducing units)
With the Third I-Tdustrial Revolution, there occurs a b*sic
economic change. Man learns to produce more and more with the h,1p
of mechanical power, in quantities vastly beyond the irdivieual'-
need, Under these circumstances, a national nucleus could in theory
live completely self-sufficiently if all necessary raw materiels
were to be found within its borders. Thus, land "per ie" as an
agricultural producing unit becomes less important; the ecovomic
goal becomes the accession of capital equipment, skilled worker's.
and raw materials The military, as an instrument of foreign policy
acquire during this period (19th century and first half of l'Oth
century), a further connotation aimed at procuring raw materials
or securing their possession This is the typical pattern Cf tnk
19th century British Empire, of German expansion, etc
In evolution and motivation, the United States stands tniqu,
since it originated "ab novo" at the dawn of the Third Revoluti.yr,,
and was thus free from earlier traditions of conquest by force E,r
pure power or commercial needs It rapidly acquired territcry vest
enough to hold practically all of the required raw materials fT
took advantages of the industrial revolution to the highest degrc,
and rapidly evolved to a self-supporting and self-sufficient
national entity with extremely high standards of living Altho11
the United States started with a military operation, and wat
characterized by military operations during its early life, OT1
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U.S. CITIZENS
ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES
DOMESTIC AFFAIRS
OTHER CIVILiAtl DOMESTIC
CHANNELS OFFICIALS
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MILITARY
SER'/ICES
THE ARM OF
FOREIGN POLICY
THE
-r
Figure 6 - Structure of the State in _the_ U
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I &A_
discovered it had little to gain by further
territorial expa,osic- be-
yond. its borders for the following reasons
(a) Wars of conquest would merely take over national. groups )1
lesser standards of living, which would
consti?u e A dr-
on the national economy rather than an advantage
(b) The U. S. possessed most raw materials; therefore, chert is
little incentive to seek others outside its borders
The U. S had. sufficient economic power from in err-
sources to purchase those few raw materials necded, an
felt confident of victory in the case of active opp)sitly-t
to such purchases
Its geographic position and national aims did not tteri e
with the aims and goals of other major powers Thu, tri
U. S. was able to live without interference and fel_ cc-fi-
dent of an assured commerce with other nations of the flcid
The United States, hcving borrowed the majority of its -olitical
concepts from the most successful democracy of ancient -imes tl!
Roman Republic - having refined them with the experience of he rif,at
successful commercial democracy in the world - the Brit:sh DripirE
and having gleaned to the fullest extent the benefits of the Thiif
Industrial Revolution, experienced a particularly trouble-fr e Bp;
(c)
( d)
fortunate youth. This happy experience thus formed ;,md
U. S. national concepts and impregnated the policy of U
life.
In the U. S concept, the State is an instrument of The
The "will of the_pE2ple" iF thus the main spring and root of
activities of the State. The will of the people is embodied
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ORGINAL POUTICAL CONCEPTS
ROMAN REPUBUC
BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY STATE
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS:
FREEDOM FROM WANT
FREEDOM FROM FEAR
:7)
CZ:
E:3
ECONOMIC FACTORS:
3RD INDUSTRIAL REV.Zt?
PSYCHOLOGICAL9 BACKGROUND(TENETS & BELIEFS)
WILL OF THE PEOPLE
FOREIGN POLICY
\I\
MANDATE TO MANDATE TO
MILITARY DIPLOMATIC
SERVICE
STRATEGIC POLICY
STRATEGIC PLANS
DOMESTIC POLICY
MANDATE TO
OTHER CIVILIAN
SERVICES
PSYCI-rLOGICAL FORCES IN THE STATE
Figure 7
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",\ I
' L
the duly elected representatives, whose job it is to give concrete
body and aim to a foreign policy reflecting the character of the
nation.
Within this framework, the basic mandate to the military is
implement by force the national fol-21,0_2211a, The military mus
thus shape a "Strategic Polia" to enable them to carry out tbe
mandate.
The military are thus the arm of the people in implementin2 )v
force (actual or potential) a foreign policy which is the concret
embodiment of the "will of the peokle".
It should be noted that the foreign policy is not imautible,
since the will of the people can change as a natural response ot
adjustment to outside pressures. The military must, therefore, be
prepared to change their strategic policy. For instance, on ol
the principal U. S tenets today is "The United States will neve
-
start a war".
This may conceivably change at some time in the future if f
herence to this policy should court excessive risk of nalional
destruction.
It should also be noted that the Strategic Policy is Invar,ant
with the state of hostilities, since it represents basic aims whlch
do not change except by a major change in the military's mardate
from the people.
Today the United States faces the greatest challenge o its
history, and with it, all the civilized world. This challerge
presented by an alien philosophy backed substantially by the
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resources of a group of 200 million people It is important at tlis
point to analyze the U.S.S.R. desires and motivations, and the r( -
suiting U.S.S.R. foreign policy and strategic policy.
First, there is not in the Soviet Union a "will of the peop
manifesting itself in appointed representatives. There exists rather
the will of a minority which tends to direct the psyche of the popu-
lation, either by persuasion or by force, along lines of its own
Correspondingly, there is a relatively sharp distinction between
the "will of the people" and the "will of the government" with the
latter tending to mold popular thinking rather than follow the
people's desires,
This cleavage represents one of the most interesting possil ill-
ties from a long range military standpoint It is important to
analyze briefly the psychological make-up of the Soviet people 1),,-
fore discussing the aims and policies of their government.
The origin of the modern Soviet Union begins in the 9th Cell
tury. AD. The land which is now European Russia was settled by
primitive Slavic tribes (tile "Scythians" of the Greeks and Roma-)
living under a form of natural democracy. In the 9th Century,
vasions from the northern Varigs, a people closely akin to the
Normans, gave the land its first rulers. The "Land of Rus" be-
came divided into a number of principalities with rather freque-1:
shifts of owners and of territories. Christianity began to appe.r
approximately 1000 AD. Econopically, a mixture of primitive fo7;
gathering, mainly hunting, operated side-by-side with rather pr d-
tive agriculture and with trade for which the large rivers prov( _ed
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RULE OF THE PRINCES
I?, SLAVIC
cr TRIBES
i (SCYTHIANS)
VARIG
INVASIONS PRINCIPALITIES
DUCHY OF MOSCOW 'VANE PETER KATHERINE
1 I 1 I I __L _I I I I t !
"TI
C:t
rn
tts
r?
RULE OF THE
MONGOLS LAND SERVITUDE ABSOLUTE MONARCHY COMMUNISM
THE
MONGOLS
Rh- LIMITED
MONARCHY
1905-17
WESTERNVATION
REVOLUTION
CONQUEST OF REACTION /
SIBERIA
COMMUNISM
800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1800 1900
PROFILE OF RUSSIAN HISTORY
Figure 8
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excellent channels. In the 13th Century the Mongols invaded the
land, spreading to the shores of the Adriatic and then withdrawing
into the Transuraian region. According to Mongol policy, thr.y left
two concentric zones around the territory in which they settled: an
outer ring of burned land and an inner ring of tributary people.
The region of European Russia found itself in the second ring and
became thus tributary of the Mongols, while still retaining their
vassal princes.
Although the Mongols, in general, treated their vassals milclv
and brought considerable civilization to the region, a strong popu-
lar movement grew up agains them. It is during these two centuri,2s
of Mongol domination that the concept of a National Russia slowly
rose.
During that time, a heretofore obscure city grew steadily into
prominence by the skillful management of its leaders. Moscow,
strategically located near a center of river trade, gradually acquired
the connotation of Mother City of Russia. Its rulers became more or
less the head of the liberation movement against the Mongols whicl
were finally driven out from all of European Russia at the begitrAng
of the 15th Century. The principality of Moscow continued to grow
under skilled commercial management until in the middle of the 16th
Century Ivan IV was crowned Czar of Moscow. During his reign tee
Russian land workers were by edict bound to the land and became
"servants of the land". The reign of Ivan IV is followed by inces-
sant internal troubles between the depressed people and the lord.,,
and between the lords and the czars. It is peculiar of the Slayi:
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mind, however, that the numerous popular revolts were never aimec
against the concept of absolute rule itself, but rather against tne
existing corrupt government. It was as though the people accepted
absolute rule as a necessity: this is still a fundamental trait of
the Soviet psychology.
In the beginning of the 17th Century, the conquest of Siberia
began. This conquest was basically peaceful: it has many resem-
blances to the American conquest of the West. Waves of diS-,atilq-
field people swept eastward toward new land, closely followed b
others which constantly penetrated beyond each of the previous new
lines of settlement. It. is interesting to note that these Russian
people driving East in discontent with their home conditions stiLl
remained loyal to the Muscovite czar and claimed all their conquests
in his name: no attempt was made to set up independent states. In
fact, new settlers were followed closely by Government bureaus
which claimed the land officially for the Czar.
All of Siberia was practically Russian by the middle of the 17th
Century, a fantastically rapid advance. This interesting combination
of immense energy with obedience to authority is still a typical
trait of Soviet psychology.
At the beginning of the 18th Century, Peter the Great started
the Westernization of Russia which was later continued by K8thel7ine.
This period witnessed the beginning of Russia as a modern military
power and the chains of servitude became stronger around tht
peasants.
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After the Napoleonic Wars, during which a glimmer of the hote
of freedom filtered down to the Russian masses, a period of vioLent
governmental reaction set in The 19th and early 20th Centtrie-i are
.4
punctuated by a violent class struggle between the government an,
the nobility on one side and the masses of the people on the ot
This state of affairs ended in 1917 with the Bolshevist Revolut
Since then, and except for a brief initial period of hope, the
patient Russian people have been subjected to a yoke in effect itavier
than that of the Czars with, however, one basic difference: pe) le
were now working - or at least were told so - for their own imp,: ,ve-
ment rather than for that of a distant class of noblemen The vAe
considerably lightened since the death of Stalin, and psycholog;
is now being strongly manipulated to make Communism appears as 3
national goal worthy of all efforts.
In conclusion, the Soviet people are an immensely enervett: and
hard working group, at the same time a malleable group taugt-t b7
tradition and upbringing to respect authority almost without (1112 cion.
History has shown that psychological forces at work in the bovia.t
people are quite slow to operate, but after they gather suf
momentum explode with great violence. All in all, the Soviet p.?Jple
form an ideal nation of raw material for their Communistic ruler-
Let us now briefly examine the motivations and policieb of The
Communist leaders of the Soviet Union.
Modern communism derives its basic tenets from the works ot Marx,
Engels, and their followers. Marx believed in the unavoidable exist-
ence.of class rivalries caused by the economic problem of distribution
of wealth. These rivalries inevitably would result in a clash between
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capital and labor which would, in turn, inevitably lead to civil war
with the ultimate inevitable result of socialization of each stt e
and finally of socialization of the entire world.
The foundations of this philosophy and belief still form the.
essence of the communistic state, although notable changes in tt_(
method have been effected since the time of Marx. Lenin, the gr,at
expounder of Communism after Marx and the creator of the Russian
state, modified the Marxian intran.sigance by adding that: t'Man:i sr
goals can and need be obtained by borrowing certain methods (nobiy from the capitalist bourgeoisie". Furthermore, aftet
some period of practical experience with the Bolshevik state, Le. in
realized that a transition period had to be gone through before final
Communism was reached. Thus, the efforts of the Communistic state
were aimed at initial "socialization" before final "Communizatior ".
Stalin contributed in concrete form the policy that conimun,_
goals must be achieved by psychological warfare as the prelude
the "inevitable" armed struggle.
From a study of Communistic literature, statements, an.d ac.ton.s,
it is quite clear that the ultimate goal of the Communist leadel-- is
the communization of the entire world. Because the leaders are
Russian, this mystical and quasi-religious goal is variegated wiAh
elements of Russian Nationalism and colored with the age-old RU3 .ian
yearning for expansion. Thus, a more accurate phrasing of the
Communistic goal is the following:
Communization of the world under the leadership of Moscow.
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FEAR
HISTORICAL. WANT
FACTORS ?
AUTOCRACY
POLITICAL MAXIMS
MARXISM
LENINISM
ARTISAN ? AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC
ECONOMY I FACTORS
WILL OF THE OLIGARCHY,_
FOREIGN POLICY
OTHER CIVILIAN MILITARY DIPLOMACY COMINTERN
CHANNELS
MANDATE: COMMUNIZE WORLD
Figure q
DOMESTIC POLICY
GOAL: INTERNAL STRENGTH TO
SUSTAIN FOREIGN POLICY
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Russian foreign policy can thus be simply stated,
Communization of the world under the leadership of Moscow
using any possible means within the disposal of the, Soviet t-tat-
military, diplomatic, political, propaganda, technological.
The role of the military in Russia is to serve as the t
arm of forsigr policy The strategic policy is thus one o: -3tr. L,4t
and preparedness for the two fold purpose of armed attacK where,
a weak spot is presented, and defense of the homeland agaim,t
zation.
Russia constitutes at present the principal if not the ?onl,
focal point for our foreign policy. Towards Russia, we havi lc y
of containment of Communism, which constitutes the key and TIU3 in )0 -
jective of all our efforts.
This is a relatively novel situation: the rivalry with
is not caused by a struggle for markets, or by territorial
but is pan_s_ipgally an ideol2g.i. struggle. As such, it must 12
garded, and as such it must be fought.
In light of the foregoing, the basic mandate to the U S.
tary is: Contain Coamiunism.
Specifically, the mandate is: Contain communism by avidir
war,. If war is necessary, win it. Protect the allies and The
c committed, If possible , rebut communism.
While the military must operate in furtherance of taest gce
conjunction and in harmony with the other services of the State. ),1
them devolves the heaviest task z assuring that the state i-,
tarily strong. Without this basic prerequisite, all efforts of
the civilian branches are futile.
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I f?--
In order to fulfill their mandate, the military have at: tl-EL
disposal several means or strategies, some of which thty cantrci
fully, while in others they can play a powerful foster-3/-1g r-)le
Let us examine these mean4. They are:
Classical military strategy
Psychological strategy
Technological strategy
Economic warfare.
A. Classical Military Strategy
By classical military strategy, we will define thot,e
methods and means which involve the physical use of militar-, fol
This use of force is, of course, not restricted to active wrr, 1-
operates in potency during peace as well.
To the mandate of the civilian authorities discusstd a) rve
the military respond with a Strategic Policy which lays dowt th
basic ground rules for implementing the mandate As of now th
U. S. strategic policy can be summarized as follows:
- Create and maintain a strong deterrent force
- Create and maintain a strong capability for retalat
offense
Strong defense of the homeland.
Defense of allies and uncommitted nations.
It should be said in passing that this is a typical pa, 1-,e
defense policy. Historic311y, this type of policy has alwals p- -cd
deletarious since it leaves the strategic initiative to the adv
sary. While the basic mandate prohibits initiative in offersivo
military operations, since this is repugant to the electorate
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-71
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: CONTAINMENT OF COMMUN ISM rat
MANDATE TO MILITARY: CONTAIN COMMUNiSM
BY AVOIDING WAR
IF WAR NECESSARY, BY WINNING IT
IF POSSIBLE, REBUT COMMUNISM
Figure 10
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u,
memo
rri
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U.S. STRATEGIC POLICY:
I- STRONG CAPABILITY TO OFFEND (DETERRENT)
2-STRONG DEFENSE OF THE HOMELAND
3-DEFENSE OF ALLIES
4-PREVENT COMMUNIZATION OF THE UNCOMMITTED
Figure 11
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STRATEGIC POLICY INSTRUMENTS 751
A ? CLASSICAL MILITARY STRATEGY
oN B ? PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY
C TECHNOLOGICAL STRATEGY
D ECONOMIC WARFARE
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whole, the military must consider in their plans a policy of enrive
defense. As will be shown, this policy can best be implement
within the basic mandate by aggressive psychological and tech'
logical warfare
.4 The strategic policy is implemented by a Strategic PL)n
which constitutes the concrete embodiment of the basic policy 1-,rin-
ciples. The plan is formulated, taking into account our resources,
both monetary and manpower, enemy resources, and geographic fa ts.
Thus, the strategic plan is apt to change from time to time; a; a
matter of fact, flexibility is one of its prime virtues.
We have discussed enemy intents and resources as welt as
own resources. This leaves the area of geography.
The geographic area affected by the strategic plan, area
which thus can become a potential battlefield, constitutes the
"Theater of Operations", The "Theater" thus is not only the area
where battle or war is actually waged, but any area in which war
can potentially be waged.
Figure 13 shows the U S Theater of Operations from -
ception to the present. This area has in somewhat less than two
centuries expanded to cover the entire planet. Strategically. the
two dimensional theater has been exhausted (although tacti,:all-
there is still room for expansion) - thus any further expansicn, if
needed, must of necessity occur in the third dimension. The
question is: is it advantageous to go into the third dimensicn and
?4
why?
We do not here make a question of "space vs atmosphere" nor
of the technological difficulties imposed by the space medium.
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U.S. THEATER OF OPERATIONS
1776 - 1960
Figure 13
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El\ 11.
The fact that above a cer
that the motion of bodies
a secondary
should prove.
consideratioti
in altitude the atmosphere cease afi
therefore, must obey different 1* s.
if expansion into the third dfmtnsio-
strategically desirable, the technological meant
to
overcome natural difficulties must be explored and be found,
To properly answer the question, let us first lay- dDlon i self-
evident ground rule; to wit- Operations in the third dimenSion
(space) are only useful if they affect I1.22_power balance on ,,arth.
This ground rule can be expected to hold fast and true at le3st
until 1980. After this period, and assuming space deve')nments will
proceed at the expected pace, a different era begins to aawn the
era of planetary settlement In this era, if certain conditions
should be satisfied we can anticipate a gradual growtl- of nlare-
tary colonies with eventual possible commercial rivalrit, This
situation would open up the possibility of military ?per-aims
space not directly aimed at affecting the power balance on piane
earth.
Figure 14 shows a recapitulation of the fundamental Pri)-
ciples of War, as formulated for twenty-four centuries by ha gr.'
strategists from Sun Tsu to Clausewitz,
The Dual Column in the figure indicates the princip$1
action to be taken to foil the enemy's application of Che Princi-
ples.
Among the various military operations of strategio and TAC-
tical importance there are four which clearly would benefit from
a three-dimensional. expansion_ These are
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STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES
DIRECT
MAINTAIN INITIATIVE
CONCENTRATION OF POWER
ECONOMY OF FORCE
SURPRISE
MOBILITY
SECURITY
ONTPOL OF OWN .PCE
t
esmips,
DUAL
r-
DISPERSE FORCE'
EARLY WARNING
TIE-DOWN
R7CONNAISSANCE
CaMMUNrATIO
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f
- Strategic and tactical reconnaissance
- Communications
- Own location (navigational)
- Defensive early warning and identification.
The benefits accrued by the third dimension stem directly
from geometric factors of shape and size of the earth as well as
from the current status of interceptor technology. All these are
too well known to warrant a detailed explanation here The princi-
pal point to be node is that we are not here concerned with the.
technological difficulties of performing these functions: we are
primarily concerned with whether going into the third dimension
yields substantial advantages. Second, we are concerned with whether
the contemplated operations are reasonably feasible within present
or future state-of-the-art and within the resources of the nation.
Reconnaissance from a satellite has the very obvious advant-
age that it can cover a large area thus affording more potential
information than lower altitude reconnaissance: further, it is vul-
nerable not so much because of the difficulty of destroYing a satel-
lite, but more importantly because of the present psychology of the
cold war. That satellite reconnaissance is theoretically feaEible
can be quickly shown by Figure 16 which shows the aperture diemeters
required to resolve a one meter target from an altitude of 300 kilo-
meters It can be seen that this degree of resolution is optically
achievable, although obviously a number of problems lie in the path.
At this point, a military planner would ask the question: "Hot,
much is this reconnaissance worth and how much will it cost?". This
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EARLY MILITARY OPERATIONS FROM SPACE
RECONNAISSANCE
OWN LOCATION
COMMUNICATIONS
WEATHER
TACTICAL
SURFACE ACTIVITY
STRATEGIC
TACTICAL
NAVIGATION
TACTICAL
STRATEGIC
? EARLY WARNING a IDENTIFICATION ( DEFENSIVE )
Figure 15
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assessment of costs forms the next step of the investigatim and
is, therefore, not discussed here, although the question should be
answered at least within a range of values in order to justify he
mission thoroughly.
It is true that any satellite-based system immediotelv raises
questions of vunerability, jammability, etc. The answer to these
questions is broadly two fold:
- First, all these systems are useful, not only durina
active conflict, but first and foremost during state-of-readiness
conditions. Thus, the question of vunerability is only of partial
importance.
- Second, these basic missions apply to practically al _
weapons systems and it is the role of the designer to minimize 3dverse
affects by proper choice of parameters. The airplane, for instcnce,
is a particularly vulnerable machine, yet a number of technoloal_cal
improvements have been and are being applied to reduce its vulner-
ability. In spite of a relatively high degree of vulnerability, no
one would question the usefulness of the airplane as a military
instrument?
A second group of operations is the delivery of the weapon,
generally considered the classical ultimate purpose of military
operations. With respect to weapon delivery operations, use or the
third dimension is only useful if:
a. It permits the employment of weapons peculiar to the
space conditions and environments and effective against earth.
bu It permits particularly useful and effective means of
weapons delivery.
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CONclY NTIAt
APERTURE DIAMETER
!KILOMETER -
I METER
CZ)
t=3 CENTIMETER
rrl
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4-- UV-04 LI GHT*4- IR -ow.- FAR IR-
MINIMUM APERTURE DIAMETER
REQUIRED TO RESOLVE I METER
FROM 300 KM ALTITUDE
BAND K BAND X BAND
RADIOMETRY
!MICRON
10
I-5 1-2
1 mit'.
Figure 16
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There exist a number of possibilities for weapons which sat-
isfy a. Principal among these are:
- The solar mirror
-?
- Weather control from space
- Selective elimination of the ozonosphere
- Use of directed meteorites
In addition, for direct use in space against other spa, e
operations are the categories of focused particle weapons.
Some of the principal characteristics of one of the abc,ve
awl
"pure space weapons" are depicted in the following figure.
Basically, however, these are weapons still to be deve1oped
which require a substantial overall technological capability. It
can be predicted that at least for several years to come the nuclear
weapons will constitute the primary, if not the only, type,of prac-
tical weapon. Since this weapon can equally well be delivered -y air
breathing means or by the already developed ICBM, it does not oc-
viously fall under Category a. Let us, therefore, examine whe7:mer
delivery from space has any advantages.
First of all, we can observe that the ICBM will be fu:,
operational, in the sense of instant response, by approximate17
1963-1965. This date can be expected to hold for both power g?eups.
Without an effective counter weapon (hICBM), the fully operatioLal
ICBM is truly very close to the "ultimate weapon". We are all
familiar with the various studies conducted on the effect of it sive
nuclear attack upon the U.S. or the U.S.S.R., and their dramatieation
in the current periodical literature. It is quite obvious tha: use
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PURE SPACE WEAPONS
SOLAR MIRROR
WEATHER CONTROL FROM SPACE
SELECTIVE ELIMINATION OF THE OZONOSPHERE
DIRECTED METEORITES
FOCUSED PARTICLES
Figure 17
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IN THE ILLUMINATED AREA THE SUN'S FLUX
IS INCREASED BY: (100 --E4)
TONIC
WEIGHT: 10 TO 30 '
Km DIA.
L.\,
Figure 18
2
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of the ICBM by one group without an effective counter weapon wcttd
invite massive retaliation by the other group with the ultimate re-
sult of a mutual naticnal suicide Thus, use of the ICBM by either
the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. against each other would simply result in
the reduction of both Ewers from their present position of wor d
preeminence to the status of third rate nations,
The ICBM is thus an "ultima ratio" weapon to be used as a
deterrent only. A situation of this nature obviously leads to
stalemate as far as decisive military operations are concerned, while
not absolutely prohibiting military operations of a secondary nsture
conducted with conventional weapons. Above all, the situation is
particularly conducive to psychological and economic warfare in an
attempt to resolve the stalemate by "bloodless penetration"
To resolve this stalemate, one of the contenders mist
achieve an effective AICBM defense system. Since the other cagaot
allow this to happen, both can be expected to engage in thv
ment of such a defensive system. Barring breakthroughs in the ?Itrate-
of-the-art, any AICBM system will, of necessity, operate on the prin-
ciple of bullet-hit-bullet or bullet-against-gun and will thus iely
on two primary technological areas:
a. The spotting function (early warning, identification,
detection, and tracking).
b. The intercept function.
The interceptor vehicle, again barring a breakthrough,
must attain the same order of magnitude of velocity as the oftund-
ing vehicle_ Furthermore, the spotting complex must have sdecwite
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time to perform its functions. It is obvious, then, that the entire
defensive system is speed-sensitive. (On the other hand, a "scren"
placed at a fixed altitude above the defended area and capable (,t
volatizing offending objects would not be speed-sensitive. Such a
IIscreen", widely discussed in early AICBM work, does not appear in
any way close to practical or even conceptual realization.)
For fixed detection radius, the warning time increaser in-
versely with the terminal speed of the offensive warhead. N reduc-
tion in warning time imposes more severe restrictions upon the
de-
fense system since:
a. The probability of multiple passes against a target
decreases
b. The speed of the countermissile must be proportionately
greater not only to meet the speed of the attacker, but also to com-
pensate for the shorter reaction time since the distance at whl_h
the offending warhead must be destroyed is fixed. (To prevent .amage
to the defended area )
c, Thus, for fixed detection distance the size ot the
AICBM increases exponentially with the speed of the ICBM.
A mitigation of the exponential law can only be achievcd by
increasing the detection range of the system. In the case of a(tive
detection, this imposes a fourth power penalty upon the active Aetec-
tion system,
Generally, then, one can conclude that the effect upon a
bullet-hit-bullet defensive system of increasing terminal speed is
the following:
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A
fourth pow(-1.- increise in capability for the cete4 icn
system plus an exponent iAL increase for the intercept systetr, o?
h Zero t-)r the detection system and more-than-exfone:t. 1.
for the intercept system
Figure 19 shows rhe approximate relationship of cefensive
system capability vs terminal speed of attacking warhe,?d.
The logical development of the ultimate weapon is thus
ICBM - ATCBM - Super ICBM
Hc.w is such 4 high-speed vehicle best brought about? 7LE-
present-day ICBM system relies on the principle of ccmservation
energy: the initial speed imparted by the booster substantaaLLY
equals the terminal speed is obvious that with the purely
1istic concept, terminal speeds of roughly 6 kilometers per secrd
cannot be exceeded Any excess speed above this figure reqtires mid-
course or 'terminal boost and thus increases the size of the mis,.
Figure 20 indicates the weight of such a high speed. ICBM as
a function of terminal velocity
For earth-launched ICBMs, another possibility consists _n a
near vertical shot at near Escape velocity- by the principie ot con-
servation of energy the terminal spee-d of the re-entering mtssilo
will approximately equal the initial speed By this mcthod spds
of approximately 11 kilometers per second can be achieved w,th
greatly increased reaction time end with greatly increpsed weigh
The disadvantage of earth- firing is that the gravitational field Is
conservative: thus, WE cep only get back as much energy as we
put. into the system.
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DIFFICULTY OF DEFENSE SYSTEMS
RELATIVE UNITS
106
105
104
102
10
TERMINAL VELOCITY OF ATTACKING WARHEADS
COST OF DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS
VS
L. /
ANTI SAT'-,--ALBBM
'
J 1'
0.1 I 0 100 KM/SEC
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TERMINAL VELOCITY
KM SEC
20
10
LAUNCH WEIGHT OF SUPER ICBM VERSUS
TERMINAL VELOCITY
WARHEAD 10 MT
ISP = 400
10
I I 1
100 1000 10,000
WEIGHT, EARTH - TONE,
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To t, , the principle of econoTy_of force we mu et s
particular conditions (;-c phenomena which allow us to operatt wi:-
"leverage
_
One such obvious set of conditions is the operatior fr--T1
an earth-orbiting space station,.
It is obvioui th c missile previously stored within :It
space station can be made to impact earth with but a neglig.lble
expenditure of fuel ThE terminal velocity will depend on the
tion's orbit: for ner crbits, terminal velocities of roughly
kilometers per secc,nd, era for far orbits of up to 11 kilorapters
per second can be expeLteco The difficulty of this sybtem t1 t(
all the materials composing the station and the weapon*, themselves
have to be lifted from eerth onto the station itself: thus What
one gains in potential energy is exactly matched by an equal exten-
diture in kinetic energy from earth with no net advantage ever tle
super-TCBM system To truly obtain an advantage, we should visualize
a space station capable of genereting, without burden upon _earth,
its own offensive system
Fortunately, such a base is available in the earth
satellite, moon Energy-wise, the moon is in a particularly fcr-
tunate situation since it lies at the fringes of the etrth's gr,-
vitational field and has thus high potential energy further the
moon appears to possess practically all the raw materials required
to create a self-aufticitnt weapons sytem
Bomba dmet from moon to earth can be perf)rmed in a rfluber
of ways, with, however, two limiting cases:
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a The maximum terminal velocity maneuver which a3so ids
maximum reaction time
b The minimum reaction time maneuver, which also yieft,
minimum terminal velocity,
It should be noted that maximum and minimum here are r_a-
tive to the total velocity reserve of the rocket employed Fig?r-e
21 indicates the terminal velocities achievable as a ferction
total reserve velocity of the Lunar Based Ballistic Missile Fis;are
22 shows the weight in earth-tons of the Lunar Based Ballis7ic M.s-
sile required to achieve specified terminal velocities
We remark here that the construction of a bast on he Toon
capable of generating its own military materials including
structures and rocket fuels, will successfully break the postula:ed
ICBM-AICBM stalemate because it will nullify the AICBM systim de
veloped against an earth-launched ICBM. However, the LBBM is wc-..:tn-
while if and only if, a successful AICBM system is devElld. Should
this not be the case, the LBBM is a recialsiaLAys_l_s. in tha it ie rely
drr
increases the threat without offering any effective defensive ca. 1-
bilities
Figure 23 shows the reaction time of an LBBM used ,gairp:
earth, These long reaction times serve only to emphasize tie coi-
cept of the LBBM as an ultimate weapon of strategic destruct:ior
It should be noted that the LBBM, more than the ICBM, rps-
sesses the slojaiiily of recall Figure 24 indicates A typical
LBBM minimum energy maneuver in which the LBBM is initially ain'ti
at circling the errth and returning to moon orbit At poin. A
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TERMINAL VELOCITY
KM/SEC.
IL IL I I I
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10
10
Figure 21
MOON?EARTH BOMBARDMENT
TERMINAL VELOCITY OF LBBM
20
TOTAL AV KM/SEC.
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TERMINAL VELOCITY
30? KM/SEC
20 ?
10 ?
1VIIN3014N00
MAX. VELOCITY
MANEUVER
ICBM
FUTURE
10
AICBM
NOW
WEIGHT OF L BBM
VERSUS TERMINAL VELOCITY
MOON? EARTH BOMBARDMENT
WARHEAD: 10 MT
Isp . 400
160 1000 WEIGHT, EARTH TONS
e
r
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TRANSIT TIME, DAYS
5
4
3
2
MAX. VELOCITY MANEUVER
REACTION TIME OF LBBM
MINIMUM TIME MANEUVER
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2.0
TOTAL A v K M/SEC,
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A
LAUNCH
1/71_2)
DECISION POINT /
BOMBING
TRAJECTORY
RETURN TRAJECTORY
RECALL CAPABILITY OF LBBM
Figure 24
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appreciable time after launching), the path can be correctec to
direct bombardment maneuver. Thus, launching LBBMs in the riinifi.tm
energy mode will create the added psychological bonus of sekeral
days of threat time upon the adversary.
Moon base thus satisfies a number of the basic stret_e_EL.
priLlsiples', its construction would definitely allow the US
maintain the initiative by leap-frogging the slow devel opmer t oE
the AICBM and gaining an assurance for the future, It certain1,-/
satisfies the principle of economy of force in that a small missile
crew could from moon base, control the world. It satisfies the on-
cept of11191___aliti by the possibility of recall. It satisfies th-2
principle of IE.E.E.EiLt because the LBBM can be launched from ,:he srk
side where rocket exhausts are invisible, and can be coated beca_ e
of vacuum conditions with radiation-absorbing materials. Tie 1,1- t
burst of speed in the maximum velocity maneuver need only occur t
the very last phase before impact. The enemy is thus forcec to
tect and track a microscopically small target launched at ar uti,