LETTER TO MR. B. BOYD HIGHT, JR. FROM ALLEN W. DULLES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R003600080061-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 95
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2002
• Sequence Number: 61
• Publication Date: July 16, 1960
• Content Type: LETTER

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B. Bovd H
Wd rzraan
Duke; University Syru ,eiurzs
Bow Committee
4-61, Duke Station
Durban, lNuru, Carolina
Mx. Right:
Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee
l - DD/ I
10,
I - DCI w/ basic
l - SRS/DDI
'16 JUL 9980
/e/ Robert Ax
uoxy, Jr.
Deputy Director/Intelligence
'Coicur:
Of The Thank YOU for your letter Of
S. -Soviet cCConflict* ~ { Jung 44th j`nd the copy
'yrz'I ,si nit is errideot that You ro the record of the
za ;. x ~xxative and stimulating disco's, siczue~af gaup had . ;
pz.o,blera. 14n, Passing the this Ma, or world
Agency who will be interested inlet to 'some rneMbers of raby the guest speakers. the y
Fapera ,presented
Your enterprise in or reflected in 'The U. ,. enterprise the k
jjj t of p mender
r' ell-izlfora'tied citizens will be one most c
ble.
r Anost inx o
ie Important da assete
during the critical Years which lie ahead.
P
Ideate -.ccept nay best %%'ishes Ior the succe of
ayrzaposia sPunsored by the Duke Universit
future
y Coa unittee.
Retyped: O/ DCI/ JSE: j i
Since rely.
SIGNED
Allen v . Dulles
Director
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iZ July 1960
Comments on "The U S. ghat Conflict?
"The U.S.-Soviet Conflict'" contains the lectures delivered
by Professor Frederick Schuman of Williams Coliega, Professor
Merle F'a,insod of Harvard Ursi Burin vsrsity, and Mr. Thomas Whitney
8 a symposium organised by a student
6-8 October 1959. ,group at Duke University,
The talks of the guest speakers presented analyses, and elusions that thave con-
the then that they l h xpressed in books and articles. In view of
y ncluded Khrushchev visit to the
trends in the USSR, Professor Schuman was generally United States and
the future course of U. S optimistic about
mistakes and miscalculatior,sovia relations, stating that: "Unless further
a series of diplomatic settlements dur{ingtthe cold ng War will year be ears b
Professor F'ainsod was more
in the by
cautious about appraising ~t year el years . ;~
USSR as conducing to a rela*ation of tensions. d. Whitney
described Soviet economic advances s? Mr. Whity
States. Flis secs nd as a serious challenge to the Unt ted
guest participants a was an account Of the Xhrushchev amplified their views during discussion pesit. The
which several members of the Duke faculty joined.
It is suggested that Professor ainsod's talk on "The Co
Directions of Development" "The Cold War: (pp. 28-31) and Professor Schuman' onflict.
A Problem of Power" sentative opinions Of the twos'' 43-55) contain the s n
repre-
booklet is familiar to intelligence Officers concerned the
material in the
with Soviet affairs.
/z- --- ------- ---------------- - -
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Pint gitiierziig $u1mp-001hA 1t 0mutit?eE
BOX KM, DUKE STATION
DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA
Box KM, Duke Station
Durham, North Carolina
June 2!L, 1960
Mr. Allen Dulles
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Dulles:
The "U.S.-Soviet Conflict" was the title of a three-day Symposium held at
Duke in the autumn of this past year. The Duke Symposium Committee, in
its first annual presentation, invited three distinguished guests to take
part in the discussion: Professor Merle Fainsod, Director of Harvard's
Russian Research Center; Professor Frederick Schuman, the controversial and
stimulating Woodrow Wilson Professor of Government at Williams College; and
Mr. Thomas Whitney, a journalist of wide experience who had just completed
coverage of the Khruschev visit.
In presenting programs such as the "U.S.-Soviet Conflict,'I the Symposium
Committee, a student-inspired, directed, and financed organization, is
attempting to accomplish two objectives simultaneously: first, to provide
a background of information or thought about a particular topic or problem,
and, second, to provide a focal point for intellectual stimulation and further
study. Next November, for example, the Committee will present "Post-Christian
Man," an exploration and exposition of the values of twentieth-century man,
including such speakers as Will Herberg and Walter Kaufmann.
As someone with a particular interest in and knowledge of the "U.S.-Soviet
Conflict," you might be interested, we thought, in examining the published
transcripts of last year's program. Please accept a copy, then, with our
compliments. We should receive with interest any criticism you might have
of the program.
Yours truly,
B. ttoyJHight; Jr.
Chairman
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"THE U. S. SOVIET CONFLICT":
A SYMPOSIUM
Dr. Merle Fainsod - Harvard University
Dr. Frederick Schuman - Williams College
Mr. Thomas Whitney - Journalist
October 6-7-8, 1959
Sponsored by THE DUKE UNIVERSITY
SYMPOSIUM COMMITTEE
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SPEAKERS
Since having been graduated from college, Dr. Fainsod has been teaching
political science at Harvard University. He has also served in an advisory capa-
city for several governmental agencies, including the Office of Price Administra-
tion and the Retail Trade and Service Division. Author of several books, Dr.
Fainsod last year completed Smolensk Under Soviet Rule, a study of the transfor-.
mations of Soviet.society as viewed through the events of one city. His recent
work has centered around the Russian Research Center at Harvard, of which he is
the director.
Dr. Schuman - world-traveller, author, broadcaster, and Journalist- has
taught at the University of Chicago, Harvard, Cornell, Columbia, and California,
and currently holds the Woodrow Wilson Professorship of Government at Williams
College. During World War II he was Principal Political Analyst of the Foreign
Broadcast Intelligence Service of the Federal Communications Commission. His
most recent work on the. U.S.S.R. , Russia Since 1917 (Knopf, 1957), was displayed
this summer at the American Exposition in Moscow, but was placed under glass to
prevent visitors from reading it because it "violated elementary principles of
courtesy and hospitality."
Mr. Whitney has specialized in Soviet affairs for twenty years - ever since
he graduated from college. He worked for the Office of Strategic Services for
three years on Russian materials during the war. In 1944 he became Chief of the
Economic Section of the U. S. Embassy in Moscow. He remained in Moscow for
nine years - and from 1947 to 1953 was a Staff Correspondent of the Associated
Press in Moscow. In 1953 he joined the Foreign Desk of the AP in New York and
at present is a free lance Journlist, writing interpretive articles for the.American
and, free world press on Soviet and general world. affairs.
NOTE: In order to preserve the flavor of "The U. S.. Soviet Conflict" Symposium,
ver batim transcripts of the addresses as they were originally presented have been
preserved on the following pages.
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SEMINAR "The Conflict in Ideology" ................................1
Prof. Frederick Schuman
PANEL: Prof. John Hollowell, Prof. Merle Fainsod, Prof. Glenn Negley
AD:DRESS: "Soviet Change Since Stalin: Its Impact on the U.S.".. .....15
Prof. Merle Fainsod
SEMINAR: "The Conflict: Directions of Development".*.*.* ....... ..28
Prof. Merle Fainsod
PANEL: Prof. Frederick Schuman, Mr. Thomas Whitney
ADDRESS: "The Cold War: A Problem of Power" ...................... 43
Prof. Frederick Schuman
SEMINAR: "The Economic Race for World Supremacy" ................. 59
Mr. Thomas Whitney, Prof. John Curtiss
ADDRESS: "The Khrushchev Visit". .................................71
Mr. Thomas Whitney
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"THE CONFLICT IN IDEOLOGY"
Tuesday Seminar
Opening Remarks: Prof. Frederick Schuman, Williams College
Panel: Prof. John Hallowell, Duke University
Prof. Merle Fainsod, Harvard University
Prof. Glenn Negley, Duke University
Moderator: Boyd Hight, Symposium Committee
Moderator: This afternoon's seminar is the first scheduled event of the three-
day Symposium on "The U. S. - Soviet Conflict." You will find the schedule for
the rest of the Symposium in the program which you received.
It has become trite to say that this is an age of crisis. In fact, much discus-
sion has centered on the selection of the most important problem. The sugges-
tions have been numerous: the problem of economic survival, the problem of
race, the problem of freedom or the lack of it. But certainly no problem is more
timely, particularly on this campus, than the problem of U. S. - Soviet relations
or', as we have chosen to title it, "The U. S. - Soviet Conflict." Khrushchev
has just left and in the late spring Eisenhower plans to return his visit, and just
a month or so hence Russian students will visit Duke. The discussion we are
about to begin, then, comes at a most propitious moment.
In order to provide a basis for the rest of the program, this afternoon's
seminar is a discussion of the conflict in ideology. Our participants are Pro-
fessor Frederick L. Schuman, Woodrow Wilson Professor of Government at
Williams College; Professor Merle Fainsod, Director of Harvard's Russian
Research Center; and two Duke specialists in political theory, Professor Glenn
Negley from the Department of Philosophy, and Professor John Hallowell from the
Department of Political Science. Professor Schuman will open this discussion
with a statement to the topic; and, after this opening, other members of the panel
will comment. Toward the end of the semihar, questions from the floor will be
in order and are encouraged. And now we will begin this afternoon's seminar
with Professor Schuman.
Prof. Schuman:
Dear Mr. Moderator, dear distinguished colleagues, dear fellow-students and
fellow-teachers and friends: I begin by saying what goes without saying, but
what I will say nevertheless, namely, that it is for me a great privilege and
pleasure to be with you today and beyond today, and a double privilege and
pleasure to be accorded the honor of opening the first program of the Symposium.
Whether it will be in any sense either a pleasure or a privilege for you to be ?
here with me is quite .a different question on which occasionally I have doubts,
but I will not anticipate so early in our proceedings what the answer to that
question ought to be. When-this program was planned, it was suggested
that I talk for about fifteen minutes as a basis for discussion. It is, of course,
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dangerous ever to invite a professor to talk for fifteen minutes, because, as you
have discovered, professors always talk for fifty minutes. In this case the
danger is a double danger, because I spent part of the summer teaching in the
state of Washington on a class schedule of sixty-minute hours instead of fifty-
minute hours. However, I have confidence that the moderator will find ways
and means of stopping me at the appropriate moment.
I cannot now anticipate whether the members of the panel, or all of us
together, will arrive at any consensus of views with regard to what we are call-
ing here "The Conflict of Ideologies. " But, it does seem to me that this way of
approaching our topic and our problems may prove to be a helpful one in a sense
of :enabling us more accurately and more effectively to identify, as it were, the
eneiny or the antagonist in the recent Cold War, or the competitor in the years of
peaceful co-existence which perhaps lie ahead. I think it rather important that
we identify our rivals with as much accuracy as possible, because wrong identi-
fications are .frustrating and dangerous. I take as a text for this particular
observation a passage from one of my favorite books on world politics which
reads as follows:
'Very true,' said the Duchess, 'flamingoes and mustard both bite, and the moral
of that is "Birds of a feather flock together."' 'Only mustard isn't a bird,' Alice
remarked. 'Right, as usual,' said the Duchess. 'What a clear way you have of
putting things. ? 'It's a mineral, think,'
Alice sid, STheres s' a large
he said Duchess, who agreed very cheerfully to everything mustard mine near here. And the moral of that is "The more there is of mine,
the less there is of yours." ' 'Oh, I know,' exclaimed Alice, 'it's a vegetable.
It doesn't look like one, but it is.' 'I quite agree with you,' said the Duchess,
'and the moral of that is "Be what you would seem to be," or if you want to put
it more simply, "Never imagine yourself not to be otherwise than what it might
appear to others that what you were or might have been was not otherwise than
what you have been would appear to be otherwise.
No doubt.you will agree that mustard can be rather dangerous o dif incorrectly
angerous and
labeled and wrongly identified. Communism is surely much
certainly more difficult to label correctly and to identify rightly. So great is
the difficulty that a great number of us over the years have been more or less
content with slogans, catch-words, and cliches. Many of us have found it easy
to say and to believe, for example, that Communism is totalitarianism, that
Fascism, which many of us a generation ago also failed to identify correctly,
is also totalitarianism; and, therefore, Communism is Red Fascism, or more
simply, Communism is Fascism. According to Euclid, you will all recall, things
equal to the same thing are equal to one another. i think this is true in mathe-
matics, but I doubt very much whether it is always true in human affairs and in
politics. I'think one must make an effort, at least, to make some further dis-
tinctions and discriminations in these matters.
We have been assured for a good many years now that Communism can best
be understood by equating it with the incarnation of evil or with Anti-Christ.
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I recall about a decade ago, President Truman, in a press conference, said that
Communists are liars. This would be helpful if all Communists were liars and
all liars were Communists, but if this is not quite the case, then there are some
difficulties. But, at the same time, the then Attorney General of the United
States in another press conference said that all Communists are rodents. That
makes the problem very simple, because then all you have to do is call the
exterminators, you see. I suspect, however, that the zoologists and the taxo-
nomists might have a little difficulty with that formulation and might contend
that some confusion had developed as to the species involved.
Let me suggest to you that to approach Communism precisely as an ideology,
as a creed, as a belief-system, as a cult, may enable us to understand more
correctly the nature of our antagonist and the fundamental characteristics of the
Communist challenge or menace than some alternative procedure. I'm going to
call it a cult or a creed or a belief-system. I don't think I'd choose to call it
a religion, although some of us have done so, as you know, I'm sure. Bertrand
Russell argued some years ago that Communism, or Marxism in its current form,
is the fourth of the Judaic higher religions, by which he meant, I take it, that
it was in part derived from the Jewish-Christian tradition. But more concretely,
he seems to have meant that all of the higher religions, or most of the higher
religions, of Judaic-Christian origin always have in their symbolism the figure
of a bearded prophet. They always have a`.,sacred book, which everyone refers
to but no one ever reads. They always have a galaxy of heroes, saints, and
martyrs. They always have an apocalyptic; vision of some ultimate disaster or
catastrophe which, however, in some strange way is going to be the means to
salvation. And Marxism in its contemporary form has all of these symbols in
abundance. The figure of the bearded prophet is, of course, Marx himself. The
book that nobody ever reads is DagKapital. The heroes, saints, and martyrs
are numerous. The ideologically begotten son of Marx was Lenin. Stalin the
Terrible was Saint Paul and Saint Peter rolled into one. The present Pope is
Khrushchev, who, however, modestly subordinates himself sometimes to the
College of Cardinals ----- .
Well, one can make these analogies. Our friend, Arnold J. Toynbee, has
argued more seriously that Marxism, particularly in its Twentieth Century form
of Communism, is the major Jewish-Christian heresy of our age, meaning that
it has Jewish-Christian components in its belief-system and in its value-system,
that it is derived from the Jewish-Christian tradition. But it is nonetheless a
heresy in many respects, which Toynbee, in his usual verbose fashion, points
out for page after page in his Study of History. If I may, I shall not refer to
the enemy ideology here as a religion, but only as a cult or a creed.
I do not know at the moment whether you in the audience desire the members
of the panel here on the platform to elucidate or discuss the specific components
or elements that make up the Communist cult or creed and that make up the
liberal democratic cult or creed. I'm not going to take time to try to do that
now. I would really talk an hour and fifty minutes if I tried to do that. I will
only say that if one enumerates the various items or elements in the Communistic
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belief-system, and examines them critically, then it becomes rather simple
are
demonstrate that they are almost all of them wrong; they are incorrect;
inadequate; they are inaccurate; they are unhistorical; they are false, in short.
You can demonstrate rather easily that Marxism is psychologically wrong, socio-
logically wrong, historically wrong, that it is wrong as a system or doctrine of
of
economics, that it is wrong as a contribution to plineal science, nceerialis theory But
the state, and that it is wrong as a philosophy
This
don't be misled or deceived by the ease with which one can refute Marxism.
really has very little to do with the problems we face. Refuting Marxism is a
little like giving up smoking. According to Mark Twain, "Giving up smoking is
the easiest thing in the world. I've done it hundreds of times. " So Marxism has
been refuted hundreds of times and this has little or no effect on the faithful, or
on other people for that matter. I think it was one of the early church fathers
translate, means
who said, "Credo quia absurdu 1what is whivery ch, loosely
rue of thehat
the true test of faith is to believe
Marxist faithful as it is true of other true believers.
I think the more important question for the present and the future is the ques-
tion of what is the actual or potential market for Marxism in its contemporary
Communist form. If we can say anything about the market,
itabout s future prospects.
this cult or creed, maybe we can acquire some insight
creed
Similarly, what is the present ective market
the basis of fexperienceor the indeed
on a world scale? It seems to me o
on the basis of the very logic of the situation we have met together to analyze
and consider, we have to think of the market for contemporary Marxism as con-
sisting primarily of the impoverished, the exploited, the degraded, the desper-
assumed,
ately poor people of the world. Marx himself
would become larger andhe
Western capitalist countries the so-called proletariat
larger, and poorer and poorer, and more and more exploited, degraded, and
impoverished; and, therefore, more and more susceptible to conversion to a revo-
lutionary creed or cult of salvation. In.this Marx was obviously completely
wrong, as I suppose Nikita Khrushchev began to suspect in the course of his
travels here recently.
But unhappily. it is still true that the desperately poor of the world, the
impoverished, the exploited, the degraded, are very numerous in the world at
large, very numerous indeed. And they include many people outside of the
frontiers of the Red Empire or the Communist bloc as it is now constituted. If
we, who are disciples of the liberal democratic faith, are not more active in
the years to come in developing what we choose to call the underdeveloped
countries, and are not more effective in raising living standards in these areas
of the globe, we shall continue to face the risk of a possible extension of the
area of the Communist ideology and Communist power beyond the present lines
of demarcation. But we shall not, in my judgment, really face the danger of
any universalization of this ideology or this sytem of power, because its
market is precisely limited in the way I have tried to suggest. There is no
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market for Communism to speak of in communiUa s where people are highly literate
and prosperous and regard themselves as middle class rather than proletarian.
If one takes the view, which I choose to do, that the universalization of the
Communist ideology is for this reason, among other reasons, an impossibility
for the future, I suggest that, if we think about the matter, we will have to take
the view that the universalization of the liberal democratic ideology on a global
scale is also an impossibility in the predictable future. The market for the
liberal democratic ideology, in order to become a world market, would have to be
a market in a world in which most of the people of the world were literate, pros-
perous, and were healthy, wealthy, and wise. That time is still far off. So the
prospects would appear to be that instead of either of these rival and antagonis-
tic; ideologies becoming universal or global, they will more and more continue to
be competitors in bidding for the support and affection particularly of the world's
poor, of the great masses in Asia and Africa, and perhaps even of Latin America,
still living on the margins of subsistence.
Is this good or bad? Is this dangerous or hopeful? I put.it to you that on
the whole this is hopeful rather than dangerous, and that all parties involved will
stand to benefit from competititon or rivalry of that kind. I put it to you further
(and I see that the Chairman hasn't told me to sit down yet, but I'm going to sit
down in just a moment), that the competition or rivalry between the Marxist or
Communist ideology and the liberal democratic ideology can also be, and will,
in my judgment, in fact be a hopeful, creative, and constructive thing within the
Free World itself and within the Communist bloc itself insofar as this rivalry or
competition summons people on each side of the line of demarcation to live up
to their professed beliefs and ideals, instead of merely talking about them. We
should all be better human beings, I'm sure, in America and throughout the Free
World, if in fact we were challenged to live up to what we profess to believe
about human dignity, human liberty, racial equality, and all the rest of our ideals.
Arid if the Communists could be challenged really to live up to their best and
highest professions of a social and economic order of dignity arld equality, they
should be better off for that; and those they rule over should be better off; and
all mankind should be better off for it. So I look forward, you see, rather
optimistically to the future of the conflict of ideologies. My distinguished
colleagues here may take a very different view of the matter. I hope they do, so
we can argue about things. Thank you very much.
Prof. Hallowell:
I think that it is easier to identify Communism as an ideology than Professor
Schuman apparently does, since we have the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin,
Stalin, and most recently the speeches of Khrushchev. And I think these give
us a clear picture of. the ultimate objective' which the Communists have in
mind---namely, as a maximum:. objective, world domination and the establish-
ment of a world socialist republic with headquarters in Moscow. I see nothing
in recent history to suggest that they have abandoned this goal. As far as the
appeal being simply to the poor and the downtrodden, of course, there is a
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great deal of truth in this; but, the Communists would iike to turn such middle-
class countries as France, Italy, and Germany into Communist countries, if
possible. If they haven't been able to do so as yet, it isn't, it seems to me,
because the Communists have been reluctant to do so, but because of the defense
which the Western powers have established, the resolution they have shown to
defend Western Europe by force of arms if necessary. When it was possible
through coups d'etat and economic and political pressures and fifth-columns to
take over middle-class countries like Poland, Czechoslavakia, and Hungary,
the Russian Communists showed no hesitation. I suggest that the line of demar-
cation in Europe is there not because of any unwillingness or lack of desire on
the part of the Russians to change it, but rather because of our resolution to
defend it, if necessary, against further aggression.
I wish that Professor Schuman had emphasized that there are significant dif-
ferences between their way of looking at things and ours. As he said, the only
trouble is that it would take more than five or ten minutes to delineate these
differences. But I'd like to mention the fact that they don't believe as we do,
although we don't always live up to it, in the existence of any obsolute principles
of morality. For this reason, they have no moral compunctions about lying if
this means will serve their end. We may lie, but when we do we have a bad
conscience about it. We do have some standards by which we are able tq judge
our own actions, to criticize our own government and to criticize the foreign
policy of our government. I doubt if the Communists adhere in their ideology to
any absolute system of morality in terms of which they can be critical, or if
the people have any opportunity to be critical, of the morality of their domestic
or foreign policy. They have no standards in their ideology that tell them that
it is wrong to lie when they do. Certainly, Harold J. Laski is not noted for being
biased against the Soviet Union or Marxism, yet this is what he said in 1948:
"The passion for conspiracy, the need for deception, the ruthlessness,
the centralized and autocratic dommands, the contempt for fair play,
the willingness to use lying and treachery to discredit an opponent,
to secure some desired end, complete dishonesty in the presentation
of facts, the habit of regarding temporary success as justifying any
measure, hysterical invective by which they sought to destroy the
character of anyone who disagreed with them, these have been the
normal behavior of Communists all over the world. "
These are the words of a man who was sympathetically disposed to Marxism as
an ideology.
Prof. Fainsod:
I had thought when Professor Schuman finished his presentation that the conflict
had been resolved and we could adjourn this conference. Professor Hallowell
has reminded us that perhaps there are some issues which are not so easily
resolved. But before we leave Professor Schuman's presentation, we should
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be grateful to him for suggesting that the Soviet challenge, the Marxist appeal in
the underdeveloped countries, should'serve as a reminder of conscience and a
reminder of responsibility to us of a great deal of work to be done in this area---
work to be done in fulfilling our own aspirations. Indeed, I suppose one could
go on to say, and this may be in part what Professor Schuman had in mind, that
to the extent that the underdeveloped countries are in a position to benefit,
both from the aid which is made available to them from the Soviet side and from
our side, provided they are able to maintain their independence, this kind of
competition for their loyalty may serve as a stimulant to their own development.
I think where I got off Professor Schuman's train was the assumption that I
thought was implicit in what he said that this kind of peaceful assistance on
the Soviet side was an end in and of itself. I would assume that it represents
a stage toward a different end, that it is designed not merely to win friends but
also to lay a base for ultimate political penetration and for the realization of
their ultimate ideological world vision, that is, a world that is essentially
Communist.
And here I think there is an important ideological difference between us. I
take it we are not really looking toward an American world, at least I hope we're
not. I take it that our objectives are plural, that is to say, that we are looking
forward to a kind of world in which different systems persist. It may worry a
few of us that Mr. Gaitskell may win the election in Britain, but I don't think
it worries most of us terribly whether Britain be under a Labor Government or
under a Conservative Government. This we regard as a kind of choice that the
British have the right to make. And our concern, it seems to me, with the under-
developed countries, with India for example, is not that we want India to be
precisely like America, but rather that we want India to be independent; we
want it to be stable; we want it to be viable; we want it to meet the needs of its
own people; and that's all we want. I take it the Soviet objectives extend
beyond this.
Prof. Negley:
I agree completely with Professor Schuman that preliminary to excitement about
a conflict. of ideologies it is sensible to understand what ideology you think you
are having a conflict with. I'm not sure that we have been quite clear about
this. For the abbreviated purposes of this short discussion, I would like to
suggest four points which I think were basic and essential to Marxist philosophy,
suggesting that these are no longer held by the philosophers of the Soviet States;
I think there is a very important distinction and difference.
The first point concerns the description of the dialectic as historical process.
This dialectic contained oppositions and antitheses in terms of economic
classes. This is essential. Without this there is no Marxist philosophy. Un-
less the historical process is interpreted as developing conflicts due to the
differentiation of economic classes, then the whole structure of Marxist philoso-
phy collapses.. The second tenet predicted the autonomy of administration in
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the new society that was to come. There was to be no bureaucracy. As a matter
of fact, Marxist philosophy used "bureaucracy" as.a symbol of bourgeois politics
and legal theory. The third principle was that of the transition to the new society
by revolution. The existing machinery of the state had to be smashed. There
was no other way to do it. The Bolshevik Marxists were quite clearly opposed
to any kind of evolutionary, peaceful development of the new state. Fourth,
there was never any suggestion of compromise between these two political
systems. There was to be either one or the other. These four principles all
fit. together.
By contrast, let us look at the contemporary philosoply of the Soviet state,
as expressed in their own writing: In 1957 the editor of a Polish philosophy
journal wrote a long article on the necessity of re-examining and re-interpreting
Marxist doctrine in terms of recent and ,contemporary events in historical progress.
philosophy
This article was very bitterly
than any writers in a
the
journal which, I think, more official imprimatur of Party policy. After a rather scathing indictment of the Pole
for suggesting a change in Marxism, we have this summary by these two writers,
which I would like to read to you, reminding you 'again of the four points that
I have made: "In the past fifty years a whole series of tenets of Marx and Engels
have been re-examined in the light of the changed historical situation. Marxism
has been enriched by the Leninist theory ... " Now ,I want to stop right here.
I'm not interested in semantic swapping. If they like to say 'enriched,' I'm
perfectly happy to accept the word. I would say "revised"; but revisionism is
heresy. "Marxism has been enriched by the Leninist theory of the building of
socialism first in one country." This is a transfer, a complete change of the
interpretation of dialectical process from one of economic classes to one of the
opposition of states, not the opposition of classes. "Second, the discovery by
the Russian proletariat of Soviet rule as a form of dictatorship of the proletariat."
Well, here again we won't ask semantic questions about how the Russian
proletariat "discovered" this. The main point is that Soviet rule was substituted
for, or is taken as a form of, the dictatorship of the proletariat. We know
Soviet rule is bureaucracy. Russia is developing one of the tightest bureauc-
racies of any country in the world at present. "Third, by the theory and practice
of a non-capitalist path-of development of economically backward peoples
towards socialism." To be sure , we have the word "non-capitalist" here, but
note the expression, "path of development. 11 Not the transition by violence,,
by revolution; not that they wouldn't encourage` violence and revolution if it
served their purposes,. but they are prepared to :accept a "path of development"
of economically backward peoples, and this fits in-'-very closely with the
.. by the
emphasis of the previous speakers on economic aid. And finally, ".
theory and practice of combining the general democratic and socialist liberation
movements." This was elaborated by Stalin in a little book, The Foundation of
Leninism , better than in any other place--- the willingness to enter into an
alliance with democratic movements within these countries in order to achieve
say
the final goal of socialist liberation. About the kindest thing Lenin had
about people who advocated things like that was to call them opportunists,
which was anathema. This writer goes on to say, "No one wil ever call this
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revisionism. " I think this presents a very interesting historical circle. I don't
think it makes the Soviet state any less an oppcnent. Quite the contrary, I'm
much more concerned about this philosophy than I am about Communism. I agree
with Professor Schuman that Marxism is too easy to answer,---just. too easy. It
falls apart at the seams as a philosophy. This philosophy does not. Do you
recognize it? It's the Hegelian state, not a Marxist state in any sense. I
think that we might clarify our conflicts about ideologies if we were more clear
about the real nature of Soviet philosophy rather than to accept their professed
ideology of Marxism.
Moderator: Professor Schuman, the comments so far have been, to a degree,
adversely critical. Perhaps you would like to answer some of them.
Prof. Schuman:
All of you are already well aware that I have already talked much too long. My
colleagues here are much more modest?in this matter. You will also be disap-
pointed to learn that I find myself in hearty and enthusiastic agreement with
practically everything that has been said. So I don't think we have anything to
quarrel about here. That's too bad because quarrels are always interesting and
exciting. But let me, if I may, make a few comments on certain points that have
been brought up thus far in the discussion.
I would quite agree with Professor Fainsod that the.political or ideological
motivation of Soviet aid programs to poor countries is not altruistic, or unselfish,
that all these programs are means to an end beyond merely the end of winning
friends and influencing people. They are means to an end of diminishing American
presitige and influence in these areas, and they are means to the ultimate end,
which is an article of faith on the part of all the true believers, of universalizing
the ideology.
I had a little difficulty with.what I took to be the implied proposition that
American economic aid to underdeveloped countries is an end in itself or, at
least, aims merely at a pluralistic world rather than a monistic world. I'm
sure it does. But I have a little bit the impression that if we look back over the
past ten or fifteen years, probably we here in America wouldn't have extended
any economic or technical aid to anybody abroad except for the challenge of
Communism, except for the danger that we thought we were confronted with and
were in fact confronted with. And we were prodded into doing this because it
had to be done; and it still has to be done on a larger scale by a sense of fear,
by a sense of menace, by the existence of a powerful competitor. Let me add
as a footnote to that thought only this: It is my impression that the late,
unlamented Joseph Stalin, who went to the Marxist Valhalla on the 5th of March
of 1953, made no really significant theoretical or ideological contributions to
the form of Marxism that we are talking about here. But he made some extra-
ordinary operational contributions to the ideology, 'so to speak, or to the
system, some of them of a peculiarly horrible and atrocious character. But
from one point of view, I think what we must always keep our eyes on here is
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this question: has the technique of Soviet economic planning and of Soviet indus-
trialization evolved to such a point at which this is perhaps a more effective way
of industrializing backward countries and raising living standards in backward
countries than any way we know about or any way that we have to offer? I hope
not. I'm just raising the question, but it seems to me a very vital and important
question indeed, and of the essence of the appeal of Communism--not in its
ideological sense at all but in its operational sense---to many peoples in the
desperately poor communities of the world. Now this is the form which the
challenge is more and more taking.
Now one further very brief comment, if I may make it. I quite agree with
Professor Hallowell that the Communists have in no sense abandoned or renounced
their millennial vision of proletarian revolution and salvation. They have not
renounced their aspirations for what he called world domination; and I'm perfectly
willing to accept that phrase, if you like. This is an article of faith. The true
believers never abandon any article of faith. This is true in all the ideologies
and belief-systems and cults of the world. You forget about some of them. You
may revise some of them. But you never abandon an article of faith. And this
is an article of faith; and, therefore, it hasn't been abandoned; and it will not
be abandoned. However, what seems to me important here is not the article of
faith as such, but the question of works along with the faith. What are the
works here? What are the means by which the faithful in the enemy camp con-
tinue to aspire toward universalizing their faith? And, incidentally, is it not
true of all faiths that really move peoples' minds and hearts that their disciples
do seek to universalize them? You will have noticed that Premier Khrushchev,
with or without tongue in cheek, in the course of his recent travels and his
recent utterances, kept talking of victory, not through subversion, not through
propaganda, and not through revolution. Communism, said he, was ultimately
going to triumph by out-producing capitalism, by contributing more to human
health, and wealth, and welfare than the system of the Free World has thus far
contributed. Now I don't think it matters very much whether such a spokesman
of the rival ideology is, as we say, "sincere" or "insincere" in this profession.
What matters is what is done, not what is said. And if what is done takes the
form of efforts to overtake America in production, in wealth, in prosperity, and
in welfare, this, it seems to me, is hopeful rather than dangerous. This seems
to me to represent an operational implication or application of this ideology which
could contribute to the welfare and happiness and ultimately even to the freedom
of all mankind rather than constituting a subversive menace or great danger to
our values. With that I conclude.
Prof. Fainsod:
Your remarks, Professor Schuman, really suggest a widening of the field of
discussion somewhat. It may move us from ideology as words to ideology as
a more operative thing; and, it suggests something which I think is a very,
very important part of the Soviet challenge, that is: Their degree of future-
mindedness as contrasted with our present-mindedness, their sense of guiding
their production mechanism in order to build at a rapid rate, their. glorification
at the present time of a production ethic that is contrasted with our consumption
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ethic. All of this may be extremely important Li determining who wins the race
over the years.
But there is something, I think, that your discussion obscures, and that is
a tendency to identify production, literally, with freedom. These two things
are,not necessarily the same thing. Indeed, it seems to me the Soviet pattern of
rapid industrialization is essentially a pattern of industrializing through dicta-
torship. You suppress consumption in order to concentrate on production. You
use your one party system in order to enforce that kind of suppression of con-
sumption.
Now ours is a much more difficult problem. Ours is a problem of meeting
their production challenge, while at the same time allowing all of our liberal,
democratic values free play. And, in a sense, the problem as it is projected
into the underdeveloped areas offers that kind of contrast too. I should think
it would be a very, very attractive pattern for some members of the new African
nations or the new Asian nations to borrow the political institutions of the Soviet
Union---to institute a dictatorship, to suppress consumption so that you could
emphasize industrial growth. And, indeed, you can show very great production
gains in this fashion., The Chinese have done a pretty good job of showing those
gains. Now our problem, it seems to me, and this goes to the heart of the ideo-
logical conflict, our problem is different. Our problem is one of combining these
production achievements with the free play of different kinds of forces in society,
of allowing and preserving your liberal values, preserving. the rule of law, and
all that goes with it. Now, if this is our problem, ours is much more difficult.
But, I shouldn't assume that we ought to let the issue be simply. one of who
produces more regardless of what this does to human values.
Prof. Hallowell:
I'd like to emphasize the same thing. Our quarrel with the Soviet Union, as I
see it, isn't that they have a different economic system. Great Britain now has,
in, a sense, a socialist system and we have no objection to that. Our quarrel
with the Soviet Union is not that she has a different economic system, but that
she has shown a lack of respect for human rights and those values that we call
liberal democratic values.
I think it's relevant: to bring it up again, and I would appreciate it if Professor
Schuman would comment upon the works of the Communists and the way in which
the Communist faith is translated into action. How did Communism become
established in countries like Poland, Czechoslavakia, and Hungary? Was it
simply by the example of greater economic productivity on the part of the Soviet
Union? Was it simply by persuasion and example? If so, and if they have so
much confidence in their system, why don't the Russian Communists allow the
Polish and the Hungarian peoples political independence? Why do they shoot
them down if they have given up violence and revolution and are simply relying
on the example of their greater productivity?.
Moderator: Professor Negley, would you like to comment?
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Prof. Ne le :
Well, not on ideology because we haven't talked about it yet. We seem to be
talking about the mechanics of world politics. The comments so far leave me
very pessimistic about our present status, if we are to turn our attention to that.
If one draws the obvious implication from what has been said, we are certainly
in a most unenviable position as compared with the Soviet program of aid.
We are stressing things such as respect for life, as Professor Hallowell has
mentioned. These countries never had this respect. We are stressing consump-
tion. These countries have never had consumption. Another bowl of rice is a
fantastically large and glowing prospect to them, not a refrigerator. We are at
a disadvantage in attempting to communicate these principles or values to
people in the so-called underdeveloped and, to some extent, illiterate countries,
in attempting to convince them of principles and values which are so alien to
their thinking that they make no sense. They understand the Soviet system much
better than ours. It's..closer to their own. Brutal? Yes, so are they. Ruthless?
Yes, emphasizing production at any cost, and, furthermore, the use of that pro-
duction - as was mentioned here very effectively - the use of that production
by a small elite either to get or to maintain their own power. I think the pros-
pect of American or democratic values or principles being accepted by such
countries in return for economic aid is not very promising.
Moderator: Professor Schuman, would you like to continue this discussion?
Prof. Schuman:
We've touched on a number of matters here, and I suppose that this is inevitable.
Some of these I have every reason to ,believe Professor Fainsod is going to dis-
cuss much more fully this evening, and others, including Professor Hallowell's
query about Eastern Europe, will be discussed much more fully tomorrow evening.
Modesty prohibits me from revealing the identity of the speaker tomorrow evening.
So I don't know. that we ought to bat these ideas around here further at the table.
Perhaps the moderator would prefer to open the floor to general questions and
comments.
Moderator: This" is what we had intended to do. We'll keep this very informal,
so if you'll just raise your hand for recognition,. and then if you will stand and
state your question and direct it to a particular member of the panel if you would
like for him to answer it, we can proceed.
QUESTIONS FROM THE FLOOR:
Question: There was so much talk about the conflict between democracy and
Communism, particularly in reference to the underdeveloped countries, I can't
resist putting in my two pennies worth about the opinion of an Indian about this
conflict. The situation is that if a man doesn't have any clothing, any food,
any roof on his top, this is what he wants first: He doesn't care about ideology
at all; what he wants is food, what he wants is clothing, what he wants is
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protection. The problem is then, first of all, to provide this for him in a way
that he can utilize it and continue to utilize it. He wants organized effort,
organized production. It so happens that this is the experience, in a new, unique
experiment which is completely democratic, and where the values of democracy,
the values of the individual, are being maintained. Still the productivity, the
efficiency, and the effectiveness, as far as the layman who wants these for
mere subsistence is concerned, shall be met. This is the experience today, I
think, in India, because the economy has been planned on somewhat socialistic
lines. But the liberty of the individual has been kept completely free. He has
all the same rights and liberty - and probably some more - that we can find here.
And, in view of this, I do think that some of us, at least those who are attracted
to political subjects, do look at it more effectively and favorably, but sometimes
we don't. I'd like to hear the opinion of the Chairman of the Panel, Professor
Schuman,, in regard to this, if I may.
Prof . Schuman: I concur in the observations, made by our friend from India, . but
unless I misunderstood his question., he is asking of me a question which I am
sure he is much,. much more competent to answer than I ever hope to be. Namely,
what estimate are we to make of the prospects and probable success of democra-
tic economic planning in India as a method of raising living standards and promot-
ing industrialization? I'm sure all of us here, and, indeed,. everyone throughout
the Free World who has any awareness of the problem hope most fervently that
this effort at promoting mass literacy and raising living standards and achieving
industrialization within the framework of the liberal democratic ideology in India
will.,. in the end, ' achieve, its goals, that it will succeed in its purposes. I hope
that myself. I believe that myself, but I'm not in a position to offer any informed
judgment as to the probabilities.
Moderator: Are there other questions?
Question: I'd like to direct this to Professor Schuman. Sir, as you mentioned a
number of times at the beginning of your address, you tried to oppose the Com-
munist creed and what you called the liberal democratic creed. I wonder if
you'd be willing to elaborate on that, particularly with respect to the comments
Professor Fainsod made calling it indirectly. a subject that often take to mean
expelling or reducing the American Manufacturing Association. I mean, exactly
what is it you want us to sell, what is it you are opposing to Communism? Is
it Christainty? Morality? Do you want to oppose. to one set of beliefs another set
of beliefs and demand that people accept those on their own bases? Are you
selling an economic system as'the Vice-President seemed to be selling one in
his much publicized debate with Khrushchev in Moscow? Or are we selling
what Professor Fainsod called pluralism and a general tolerance? What precise-
ly did he mean by this liberal democratic creed?
Prof. Schuman: It seems to me one of the grave weaknesses in the position of
America during the years of the Cold War, :and a possible continued weakness
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in times, to come, is that much of the time we seem to be engaged in selling noth-
ing in particular except anti-Communism. I'll agree that we should sell anti-
Communism, but when we come to the point of asking ourselves what is it
affirmatively that we are concerned with selling, if you want to use that term,
we are by no means agreed. We are in considerable confusion. We might even
deplore any full agreement or monolithic unanimity about this because we are
pluralists and believe in freedom, after all. But there is here a certain lack of
clarity, a certain lack of sense of purpose, a certain lack of affirmative goals
and objectives, a lack of will, or a lack. of means, in translating the venerable,
values, ideals, and aspirations of the liberal democratic ideology into terms
which seem relevant and effective in the contemporary world. I don't claim I
know how to do this. I don't know how to do it at all. But we had all best devote
further thought to how it ought to be done and how it can be done.
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"SOVIET CHANGE SINCE STALIN: ITS IMPACT ON THE U.S."
Tuesday Address
Welcome: Dr. Paul M. Gross, Vice-President, Duke University
Speaker: Prof. Merle Fainsod, Harvard University
Prof. Fainsod:
The historian writing a century hence about changes in the Soviet Union after the
death of Stalin will have a easier time than we in describing the world that
Khrushchev made. We are too deeply involved in fashioning our own history to
have much confidence in our capacity to view it with detachment or to divine
its future course. Even if we think we succeed in identifying the forces which
are molding the present, we cannot be certain that new impulses will not
assert themselves which transform the shape of things to come.
To see the transformations of the last few years, in perspective, we must
look to the past, for it is only against the background of the Stalinist past that
we can begin to understand Khrushchev's Russia.
The Stalinist impact on Soviet society was many-sided. In the economic
sphere the driving thrust was forced-draft industrialization. Heavy industry and
the armed forces enjoyed a prior claim on all economic resources; the result was
a lop-sided economic development in which the consumption sector of the
economy was starved to accumulate the capital for industrial expansion and the
building of military might. Power took precedence over welfare, and the great
mass of rank and file collective farmers and workers was confronted with a
chronic shortage of food, consumer goods, and housing. At the same time,
industrialization unleashed its own imperatives. The crying need for engineers
and technicians to man the new industrial plant led to an overhauling of the
educational system, an emphasis on technical training, and the growth of a new
Soviet-trained technical intelligentsia, who played an essential role in manag-
ing an increasingly complex economy. Technical dynamism was built into the
system, not only by the emphasis on technical education but also by surround-
ing the career of the engineer and manager with special privileges, perquisites,
and status in order to attract talent. Egalitarianism was repudiated as "petty-
bourgeois nonsense"; the new state elite and middle class which emerged under
Stalin largely monopolized the rewards of Soviet society.
In the political sphere, Stalinism spelled the development of a full-blown
totalitarian regime in which all the lines of control ultimately converged in the
hands of the supreme dictator. The Party became a creature of Stalin's will
and lost such policy- determinipg functions as it once possessed. Its role was
reduced to that of a transmission belt, which Stalin used to communicate his
directives, to mobilize support for them by propaganda and agitation, and to
check on their execution. Under Stalin, terror itself became a system of
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power and the secret police flourished and multiplied. The fear which its agents
inspired provided the foundation of Stalin's own security; through them he guarded
the loyalty of the Party, the armed forces, the bureaucracy, the intellectuals,
and the mass of the Soviet population generally.
These developments left their impress on Soviet society. But they also left
a legacy of suppressed aspirations with which the new rulers have had to reckon.
First, there was the widespread desire for a higher standard of life--- for
more food and consumer goods, for better housing, for more leisure, for more
adequate provision for old age and other disabilities. The most disadvantaged
groups were the collective farmers and the unskilled and semi-skilled workers,
but the pressure for improvement extended well beyond these groups into the
middle and even relatively privileged strata of Soviet society.
Second, there was the desire for greater security, for a life of stable expec-
tations, for liberation from the threat of the concentration camp and the numbing
uncertainties of constant surveillance and denunciation. As Khrushchev made
clear in his closing speech to the Twentieth Party Congress, insecurity com-
municated itself even to Stalin's closest collaborators.. "It has happened some-
times, " Bulganin is quoted as saying, "that a man goes to Stalin on his invita-
tion as a friend. And when he sits with Stalin, he does not know where he will
be sent next--- home or to jail." To read Khrushchev's speech is to sense the
terror which the lieutenants felt as they lived from day to day at the mercy of a
fickle and suspicious despot. And it is not hard to imagine how they yearned
for firm ground under their feet, and in yearning mirrored the fears and hopes of
every bureaucrat in the hierarchy. Perhaps not altogether paradoxically, the
resentment against Stalin's system of calculated insecurity was most intense
among those who had most to lose as a result of arbitrary arrest and removal,
though the cloud of fear which Stalin projected cast its shadow over the whole
of Soviet society.
Third, there was the desire for greater freedom, not necessarily or usually
freedom in the western political sense, but freedom to use one's talents and
capacities, freedom to perform one's function without fearing the consequences,
freedom to travel outside Soviet boundaries, and freedom to transcend the
Stalinist doctrinal rigidities in thinking and writing about Soviet realities.
Suppressed though these aspirations were during the Stalinist era, they were
nevertheless fermenting behind the facade of Stalinist ideological conformity.
Understandably, these aspirations found their sharpest focus in the new Soviet
intelligentsia who were coming into positions of responsibility and influence
during the latter part of Stalin's reign. Their dreams of larger autonomy, more-
over, did not necessarily involve an overt challenge to the Soviet leadership;
indeed, many of those who harbored thoughts of greater independence and
authority operated within a framework of over-all loyalty to the Soviet system
and envisaged such developments as strengthening a regime of which, after
all, they were an integral part.
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Within this context the new leadership fac-d its own unresolved problems
and difficult choices. There was the issue of the succession and how it would
be decided. There was the problem of facilitating an orderly transfer of power
and stabilizing the authority of the new regime. There was the issue of priori-
ties in economic development--- whether capital resources should continue to
be concentrated primarily on heavy industry and armaments, or whether an effort
should be made to gain popular support by expanding consumer goods output and
housing. There was the lag in agriculture, the urgent need to increase food
production to meet the demands of the rapidly growing industrial areas and to
lift living standards. There was the task of improving the machinery of adminis-
tration, of correcting the supercentralization which prevailed under Stalin, of
rationalizing administrative processes, and of reviving initiative at every level
of the bureaucratic hierarchy. There was the question of the future role of
Stalinist terror in upholding the regime's stability, whether less reliance could
be placed on police repression and more on incentives and indoctrination. There
was the question of the organization of the Communist orbit, of how future rela-
tions were to be regulated with Communist China, Yugoslavia, and the East
European satellites. And finally, there was the complex challenge of foreign
policy, of whether a detente should be sought in relations with the West and
whether Soviet objectives could not be more effectively advanced by breaking
the mold of Stalinist intransigence and embarking on a fresh course.
Post-Stalinist Developments
Compared with the glacial silences of latter-day Stalinism, the mood of post-
Stalinist Russia was one of ferment and change. Improvisation and experiment
became the order of the day. Stalin's successors revealed an awareness of the
grievances of their constituency, a disposition to go at least part way to placate
them, and a determination to rationalize and stabilize the totalitarian order and
to root it in popular support.
The first response of Stalin's lieutenants to the crisis of Stalin's death on
March 5, 1953, was to submerge their differences and to rally the forces of
.national unity around Party and government.
The "disorder and panic" which the new leadership feared might accompany
the death of Stalin did not develop. The East German uprising of June 1953 was
suppressed by the Soviet army, and scattered demonstrations in Czechoslovakia
and other satellite areas were quickly brought under control. The combination
of a firm display of power and a policy of concessions and promises served to
facilitate acceptance of the new regime and gave it a breathing space to conso-
lidate its authority.
Meanwhile, the issue of the succession remained to be resolved. In the
first weeks after Stalin's death the triumvirate of Malenkov, Beria, and Molotov
appeared to emerge as the leading figures of the new regime. The surface show
of unity and collective leadership which they maintained was suddenly shattered
when the Soviet press revealed on July 10, 1953 that Beria had been arrested and
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expelled from the Party as an enemy of the people who had sought to utilize his
control of the political police to dominate the Party and government. The purge
of Beria seemed to reinforce the principle of collective leadership, but appear-
ances proved deceptive. The election of Nikita Khrushchev in September 1953
as First Secretary of the Party Central Committee marked the emergence of a
new, star in the Soviet constellation of power. Following in the footsteps of
Stalin he utilized the great powers of his office to install his henchmen in lead-
ing Party and government posts, while at the same time espousing policies which
won him increasing support within the Presidium itself. During the next year he
gradually displaced Malenkov as the chief spokesman of the Party leadership.
The redistribution of authority was confirmed at the February 1955 session of the
Supreme Soviet when Malenkov was forced to retire as chairman of the Council
of Ministers and was replaced by Bulganin on Khrushchev's nomination. The
rise of Khrushchev did not go unchallenged. Faced in June 1957 with a hostile
majority in the Presidium, which by this time included Molotov, Kaganovich,
Bulganin, Pervukhin, and Saburov as well as Malenkov, Khrushchev took his
appeal to a special session of the Party Central Committee and emerged trium-
phant. Moving swiftly to consolidate his authority, he followed up his victory
over his Presidium opponents by ousting his erstwhile supporter, Marshal Zhukov,
in October 1957 from his positions as Minister of Defense and member of the
Presidium and Central Committee on the charge that he had "pursued a policy"
of underestimating and curtailing Party leadership of the armed forces. On
March 27, 1958, Khrushchev assumed the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers,
thus combining in his own person both the top governmental and Party posts. His
position of undisputed ascendancy was made dramatically evident in the published
proceedings of the December 1958 plenum of the Central Committee and at the
21st Party Congress which followed during the next months.
More important than the parade of personalities were the issues which agitated
the Soviet scene in the period after Stalin's death.
On the economic front, they largely centered on the priority to be accorded
heavy industry as against consumer goods and housing, and on schemes to
stimulate a substantial increase in agricultural output and to raise labor pro-
ductivity generally. Malenkov's initial sponsorship of the consumer goods cam-
paign won him mass popularity, but it also contributed to his undoing. Supported
by powerful allies in the Presidium and the military who saw the issue in terms
of power and national security, Khrushchev joined battle with Malenkov toward
the end of 1954 and succeeded in trimming down the consumer goods targets.
The signal for the resumption of the heavy industry drive which was given by
Khrushchev in his speech to the Central Committee on January 25, 1955, marked
a rededication to the goals of industrial development which Stalin had championed.
But Khrushchev also found it essential to make clear that he was not neglecting
consumer interests. During 1957 and the greater part of 1958 consumer interests
were very much in the forefront of the regime's public pronouncements. In May
1957, Khrushchev announced a bold program to catch up with the United States
in the per capita production of meat, milk, and butter. In July he promised
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"to liquidate the housing shortage in the course of 10 to 12 years." At the cele-
bration of the 40th anniversary of the Revolution on November 7, he outlined an
ambitious set of consumer targets for the 15 year plan to end in 1972. In the
spring of 1958, he initiated an ambitious program to raise the production of
chemicals and synthetics---measures that promised a substantial increase in
the supply of fabrics and other consumer goods. But the control figures for the
seven-year plan to end in 1965, which were published in mid-November 1958,
were far less consumer-oriented. The increase in the output of producers' goods
was projected at 85-88%, the increase in consumers' goods production at 62-65%.
There was a marked widening of the spread in favor of producers' goods compared
with the goals originally incorporated in the sixth Five Year Plan. Thus the
priority of heavy industry was again reasserted.
Meanwhile, energetic measures were being undertaken to increase agricul-
tural production. Beginning with his September 1953 speech to the Central Com-
mittee, Khrushchev took the lead in sponsoring a series of imaginative agricul-
tural reforms designed to lift food output. New incentives for collective farmers
were provided in the form of substantially higher state procurement and contract
prices and the subsequent merger of different types of procurement into a single
system of state purchases. Capital investment was expanded by providing addi-
tional agricultural machinery and fertilizer. Intensive efforts were made to train
needed agricultural specialists and to direct them to the countryside. Party
controls were tightened and trusted Party personnel dispatched to weak collective
farms to strengthen their management. The sown area was greatly extended by
opening up the virgin lands of Kazakhstan, Siberia, and other previously untilled
areas. Corn acreage was substantially expanded with the aim of enlarging the
livestock feed bases. Planning. was somewhat decentralized, and the collective
farms were given greater freedom in adjusting their operations to meet the farms'
delivery quotas. The state machine-tractor stations (MTS) were liquidated, and
their machinery, specialists, and skilled workers transferred to the collective
farms in the interests of unified. management and greater over-all farm efficiency.
There was a new emphasis on the rationalization of farm operations, on cost
consciousness and on regional crop specialization based on factors of economical
production. The effect of these reforms was felt in a substantial increase in
agricultural output and a marked improvement in the supply of food to the cities
as well as the countryside.
On the political front, the major development involved the reinvigoration of
the Party and the reaffirmation of its leading place in Soviet society. Under
Stalin the Party had fallen on evil days, and its role was reduced simply to
another transmission belt through which he exercised his personal dictatorship.
The purge of Beria prepared the way for a reassertion of Party direction of the
police, and the rise of Khrushchev was accompanied by a tightening of Party
controls in state administration, the armed forces, and all other sectors of
Soviet life. The effort to pour new life into the Party largely took the form of a
call for wider participation of members in Party meetings, adherence to the forms
of elections in choosing Party officialdom, and more frequent and regular convoca-
tions'of Party assemblies and governing bodies at every level of Party life. But
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the so-called "democratization" campaign operated within prescribed limits.
Like Stalin before him, Khrushchev made clear that the new leadership was deter-
mined to preserve the system of Party dictatorship,' that deviations from the
Party line would not be tolerated, and that all challenges to the monolithic unity
of the Party would be sternly rebuffed.
There were also changes in the governmental area to be noted. Perhaps the
most important was the trend toward administrative decentralization of govern-
mental operations---the delegation of greater operational authority to local
planning bodies, factory managers, and chairmen of collective farms; the transfer
of functions from the central government to the republics and from the republics
to lower organs; and the law approved by the Supreme Soviet on May 10, 1957,
establishing a network of regional economic councils to take over functions
formerly vested in a large number of central economic ministries. These measures
endeavored to correct the overcentralization of the Stalinist era, to revive initia-
tive in the lower ranks of the bureaucracy, and to stimulate greater efficiency by
bringing the responsibility for decision nearer the problems to be resolved. As
with all delegations of power, they involved some risk of weakening or under-
mining central controls, but the, Party organization retained its tightly centralized
character, and the leadership, counted on its unifying discipline to hold disinte-
grative tendencies in check.
Dramatic changes also took place in the legal arena. The series of amnesty
decrees after Stalin's death, the large-scale release of prisoners from the forced
labor camps, the abolition of the Special Board of the Ministry of Internal Affairs,
the rehabilitation, frequently posthumous, of many persons condemned as enemies
of the people during and after the Great Purge, the strengthened powers of the
Procuracy, the curbs on the security police, the enactment of a new series of
"fundamental laws" as the basis of a long-promised revision of legal codes, the
repudiation of the practice of pronouncing persons guilty of serious crimes on the
basis of confessions extracted from them, and the strengthening of other procedural
safeguards to protect the rights of the accused---measures such as these appear-
ed to augur a new era of "socialist legality" in Soviet affairs. Compared with the
dark Stalinist days, progress was registered in the direction of a more rational
and less harshly punitive legal system. But the dimensions of the "new legality"
remained subject to the caprice of the Party leadership, and both. the treatment
meted out to Beria and his associates and the sequence of Hungarian events
seemed to indicate that self-imposed legal norms would be ruthlessly swept aside
whenever the regime felt that its authority was imperilled. Despite the pruning
of the authority of the security policy, it remained a formidable power in reserve,
and no less a figure than Khrushchev felt impelled at the 20th Party Congress in
1956 to pay tribute to its essentiality and to call for a strengthening of its autho-
rity.
On the ideological front Stalin's successors embarked on a policy of con-
trolled relaxation. But, though they were disposed to shed Stalinist rigidities,
they insisted on maintaining the authority of the Party leadership to serve as
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the ultimate custodian of orthodox doctrine. The cultural thaw which followed
St lin's death soon encountered its limits as the quardians of ideological purity:,;
pounced on such works as Zorin's Guests, Panova's The Seasons , and Ehrenburg's
Thaw itself and followed with a not altogether successful effort to harness the
craftsmen of the pen at the Second Writers' Congress in 1954. The Twentieth
Party Congress with its denigration of Stalin spurred a fresh probing of the
:boundaries of the new freedom. This time, there is reason to believe, the Party
leadership miscalculated. Genuinely shocked and outraged by the unintended
consequences of deStalinization---the challenge of events in Hungary and Poland,
the ferment among students and intellectuals in the Soviet Union itself---they
replied in a not unfamiliar pattern---with force and terror in Hungary, with
suspicion and reluctant acquiescence: in Poland, and with a renewed war on
"unhealthy" ideological manifestations in the Soviet Union itself. The educa-
tional reforms announced toward. the end of 1958 had as at least one of their
objectives a, desire to instill proletarian consciousness in the oncoming student
generations by assuring that most of them would have the experience of physical
labor before embarking on their life work. After Hungary the swing of the pendu-
lum moved in a neo-Stalinist direction, but it did not move all the way. The
Third Writers' Congress in 1959 marked a new effort to find terms of reconciliation
with the dissident intellectuals, but the Party leadership showed no disposition
to relax its demand that Partiinost. be the dominant value in all scholarly and
creative work.
The insistence on the paramount role of the Party extended to all spheres of
life, including the military. The post-Beria' decline in the status of the security
policy was accompanied,.by many indications of the rising importance of the
military on the Soviet scene. Perhaps the most obvious was the return of Marshal
Zhukov to a position of prominence and his rapid rise to Presidium eminence.
But a display of independence on Zhukov's part led in the fall of 1957 to the loss
of all the high posts which he had previously occupied, and the military high
command was thus sharply reminded of the Party's controlling role as the ultimate
Ministry of Coordination. Meanwhile, the military strength of the Soviet Union
continued to mount rapidly. The Soviet explosion of the atomic bomb in 1949
was followed by the acquisition of the thermonuclear weapon in 1953, and inter-
continental jet bomber in 1954, and the intercontinental ballistic missile in 1957.
By outstripping the United States in achieving a long-range ballistic missile and
by taking the leadership in the exploration of outer space, the Soviet Union
scored a series of resounding successes which had their reverberations both at
home and abroad. Within the Soviet Union itself there was an upsurge of pride
and patriotism. The effect abroad was even more electrifying. There was a
sharply heightened respect for the Soviet Union's military and scientific prowess,
a crisis of confidence in Western leadership, and an increasingly vivid reali-
zation that the Communist bloc and the West were engaged in a grim race that
threatened the world With disaster.
One of the results of the Soviet Union's improved power position was to
introduce a new self-confidence and dynamism into Soviet foreign policy.
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Despite the rebuffs encountered in attempting to lure Tito back into the Communist
fold, and despite the setbacks administered in 1956 by the Hungarian rising and
the Polish quasi-revolution, with their clear indication of the underlying weak-
ness of Communist attachments in Eastern Europe, Soviet foreign policy had
many successes of which it could boast. The projection of Soviet power into the
Middle East, the rise of Communist strength in South and Southeast Asia, and
the spread of neutralism in Asia and Africa testified to the continuing momentum
of the Soviet forward thrust. Nor was the source of Soviet influence military
prowess alone. An imaginative program of trade, aid, loans, and technical
assistance was directed toward crucial target areas in the underdeveloped coun-
tries of Asia. The appeal to these nations was reinforced by pointing to Soviet
experience as a model of rapid industrial development. The attraction of an all-
embracing ideology was not neglected as Societ cultural emissaries endeavored
to present their homeland as the fulfillment of man's dream of justice, equality,
and democracy. Everywhere, the Soviet Union sought to identify itself with aspira-
tions for peace, by portraying itself as a peace-loving nation forced to arm by the
provocations and threats of the imperialistic war-mongers. The image which Soviet
policy makers projected was calculated to have special appeal- in Asia and Africa,
and the response from the Communist point of view was not unencouraging.
The shape of Khrushchev's Russi-a offered striking contrasts with latter-day
Stalinism. Inside the Soviet Union there was less emphasis on police surveil-
lance and coercion and more on positive efforts to induce loyalty by increasing
incentives and broadening the amenities available to the Soviet population. As
in the early years of Alexander II's reign, there was a loosening of bonds through-
out a society. The lot of the collective farmer improved measurably. The burdens
of the industrial workers were somewhat lightened with a reduction in the hours
of work, the lifting of old age pensions, the abandonment of the most drastic
disciplinary sanctions of the Stalinist era, more attention to the housing problem,
and a rise in real wages. The managerial and administrative elite enjoyed
greater operational autonomy and a degree of security which had been denied
them by Stalin. The intelligentsia was given a broader field within which to
maneuver, though any disposition to challenge Party tenets brought a quick re-
minder that scholars and writers were still artists in uniforms. At the same time,
the welfare concessions, the continued accent on growth, the sense of expand-
ing vistas which this communicated to oncoming generations, the pride inspired
by Soviet scientific and military achievements and the heightened prestige of
the Soviet Union in the international arena all combined to cement a bond between
the people and the regime which contrasted markedly with the fear and aliena-
tion which prevailed under Stalin. The regime remained totalitarian in its essence,
still asserting its all-encompassing authority over the whole of Soviet society
and tolerating no derogation of the monopoly powers of the Party leadership, but
it could claim that it had responded to grievances which Stalin had ignored.
The impression which Khrushchev and his associates conveyed was one of stabi-
lity and confidence, of faith in their continued ability to channel and control
the aspirations which Stalin's death unleashed. What of the impact of these
developments on the U. S. ?
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As a result of. recent changes, Khrushchev's Russia emerges as a far more
formidable competitor for world leadership than was Stalin's Russia. Its present
growth rate is markedly higher than that of the U. S.; its educational system is
geared to continued rapid scientific and technical progress; its military strength
needs no underlining while the memory of moon shots is still fresh.
Where then does this leave us? How will we respond to the Soviet challenge?
There are, of course, no certain or final solutions in this world, but if we are
really determined to prevent the expansion of the Communist power we must meet
the challenge at every level at which it presents itself.
1. Our first responsibility in a world where a thermo-nuclear holocaust is an ever
present danger is to project ourselves to the peoples of the world as a nation that
stands for peace and the peaceful settlement of disputes. This means constantly
taking the initiative ourselves on the issue of disarmament, but it also means
making clearer than we have succeeded-in doing so far that no disarmament agree-
ment is worth the paper it is written on unless it is accompanied by control or
inspection arrangements that ensure its enforcement. This is the test which
Khrushchev's recent dramatic proposal must meet. If it does not meet it, we
have no alternative except to continue to maintain a capacity for instant and full
retaliation against thermo-nuclear attack and we will have to continue to work
to reduce our own vulnerability with all the scientific and technical means at our
disposal.
2. Meanwhile we must intensify our efforts in the continuing technological race.
This means more support for science and education, more emphasis on the disci-
plines which are indispensable to survival and progress.
3. We must also quicken our rate of economic growth to keep ahead of the Soviet
bloc and to demonstrate the dynamic potential of our own system. We sometimes
overlook the extent to which. the effectiveness of our foreign policy depends on
the skill with which we manage our domestic economy. Depression, stagnation,
and economic collapse here can.-do infinitely more damage to our cause than
battalions of Communist infiltrators in France or Italy. Every time our unem-
ployment index rises, a thrill of hope. surges throughout the Communist world.
Unless we are able to maintain a healthy society at home, we shall not be able
to discharge our responsibilities abroad.
4. We should neglect no opportunity to strengthen our relations with our allies
and do everything in our power to make them impervious to Soviet disruption
They. represent the pillars which support the free world, and they are as essen-
tial to our survival as-they are to their own.
5. We must do what we can to prevent the uncommitted nations and neutral
powers from falling under Communist control. It is tempting to criticize the so-
called neutralist powers because they insist on maintaining their neutrality,
but before we do so, we might recall that most of them are following policies
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of non-involvement which we ourselves pursued for moia than a century after the
achievement of our own nation-hood. What we want is not their subordination,
but their independence. It is in our interest as well as theirs to help them
maintain their independence, to help them build strong, stable, viable economies
capable of resisting Communist penetration and subversion---and this means
economic aid on a scale much greater than we have provided so far.
6. Finally, we must continue a patient and unremitting search for a modus
vivendi with the Soviet Union, a search in which we. must make constantly clear
that we have no expansionist aims, and in which, at the same time, we must
indicate our-capacity to resist Soviet aggression if that policy should be contem-
plated by the Soviet Union.
I recognize that negotiations with the Soviet Union try the patience of a saint,
that time and again we appear to approach the brink of catastrophe before a work-
ing formula is achieved, that settlements once made have ways of becoming un-
made, and that the whole weary business has to be begun all over again. But
it is .preferable to be locked in negotiations rather than to be locked in combat.
For difficult as it is, annoying as it is, hard as it is on the nerves ---we must
somehow continue to explore ways of living together. For if we do not live
together---in a Thermo-nuclear age ---we die together. I should like to believe
that the instinct to live is almost. as highly developed among the Realpolitik
masters of the Kremlin as it is in Washington.
It would be pleasant to be able to end this discussion on the optimistic note
that there will not be another World War in our lifetime. But it would be fool-
hardy to offer any such comforting assurances. It would be equally foolhardy to
act on the assumption that war is inevitable. As Karl jaspers, one of the fathers
of existentialism, once wisely put it: "Any one who regards an impending war
as certain is helping its occurrence, precisely through his certainty. Any one
who regards peace as certain grows carefree and unintentionally impels us into
war. Only he who sees the peril, and does not for one instance forget it, is
able to behave' in a rational fashion and to do what is possible to exorcise it."
"It is of crucial significance for the course of events whether the individual
can endure to remain in suspense; or whether he flees into certainties... .The
most compelling element in our lives is the fact that we do not know the future,
but contribute toward its realization and see it loom before us incalculable in
its entirety.
The task before us then is not an easy one. It calls for bold and imaging=
tive leadership, steady nerves, and an awareness that we shall be living in
the shadow of danger for the rest of our lives. But, if I may conclude in the
words of Pericles, "the bravest are surely those who have the clearest vision
of what is before them--- glory and danger alike---and yet notwithstanding, go
out to meet it. 11, It is in this spirit that I hope we shall be able to grapple with
the problems that lie ahead.
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QUESTIONS FROM THE FLOOR:
Question: Do you think that the Soviet ideology of final world domination has
been or can be modified enough to permit the co-existence of our two systems?
Prof. Fainsod: I think, in a sense, Professor Schuman addressed himself to this
question in his last comment this afternoon. And what he was suggesting if I
remember him correctly was that if the momentum of Soviet expansion could be
checked, if the appeal of our system develops sufficient strength so that some
kind of stability arises and, if we are able to maintain this over time, that
conceivably over a long enough period Soviet ideological Messianism might erode.
It might erode not necessarily in terms of giving up the ideology, but erode as a
working principle. I think we must understand that Soviet foreign policy is not
purely ideologically determined, that is,to say, Soviet foreign policy is condi-
tioned by many factors. Ideology is one factor.in which they confront the-world.
It offers them a kind of hope or plan, but Soviet policy makers must also take
into account their resources. They must take into account the resources of their
enemy or oppponents. They must take into account their evaluations of the
intentions of their opponents. Now if the result of this rather,complex calculus
indicates that Soviet expansion is risky, dangerous, that it puts even the home-
land under a very serious threat, the balance of strength which confronts the
Soviet Union may lead to some ultimate form of stability between the two sides.
But I don't see this as something which is automatically going to be attained as
a result of negotiations between Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Khrushchev in the course
of the next year. This is not a one-blow affair. It's a long, long drawn out pro-
cess involving generations.
Question: You spoke of the necessity of having independent rather than dependent
allies and yet you advocated much increased economic aid. Is this not a contra-
diction ?
Prof. Fainsod: I don't think so. I advocated much increased economic aid and
at the same time advocated independent allies and even independent neutral
states. As I see it the aid can be extended without political strings and without.
setting as a condition that Burma, for example, support our every move. I argue
essentially that it's important to have a strong nationalist Burma, a Burma that
is capable of handling its own problems, that is non-Communist, which is what
the Burmese leadership at the moment is supposed to be, that is capable of
providing an alternative to Communism which its own people prefer. But I don't
think this is a question of buying their support. I think It's a question of simply
making it possible for them to build the kind of institutions that they would like
to build.
Question: Do you think that there is a good likelihood of a third world war?
Prof. Fainsod: I'm afraid that I've said about all that I could say on that subject.
So much obviously depends on the unknowable, the relative strengths, the
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relative achievements, the relative progress of the Soviet and Western bloc
over the next period, that it seems to me, really, not within the power of man,
to be able to answer that question. I know that I hope to do everything I can to
prevent it.
Question: Will the change since Stalin in the USSR produce ultimately a conflict
between the peoples of the USSR and China?
Prof. Fainsod: As Khrushchev said in Washington, "This is a very complicated
question. " And I think he finds it just as complicated as we do. I should say
that there are points of friction. Khrushchev is pursuing a line of policy that is,
in a sense, vitiated by the actions of China in Tibet, toward India, and so on.
This is one of those cases where co-ordination within the Soviet bloc is not
taking place very effectively. There are other potential sources of friction.
There is friction about the dimensions of economic aid which should go forward
from the Soviet Union to China. There may be friction about how China's objec-
tives in the next decade can be most effectively advanced. Shall they be sub-
ordinated to Soviet objectives? How will the two be reconciled? There are
problems of spheres of influence in terms of who takes the initiative in Southeast
Asia or South Asia. There are potential border frictions and so on. But I would
say that despite all these potential and actual sources of friction, that for the
present period the Soviet Union and China have much more to gain by maintain-
ing a united front with each other than by 'separating. And my guess is that these
differences are likely to be patched up in terms of maintaining the working agree-
ment and in terms of exerting their common power for common ends.
Question: What policy could the United States undertake, not only to contain
Communism, but to roll back its boundaries as well?
Prof. Fainsod: Well, I assume that the questioner does not have war in mind.
And, if he doesn't, it seems to me that he has to think in non-forceful terms.
And if you do your thinking in these terms, it seems to me that the possibly
fruitful efforts are those efforts which are designed to make possible a loosening
of bonds within the Soviet orbit as opportunities become available. This may
mean offering economic opportunities to which the Poles, for example, have been
responsive. It may go beyond that. I think another hopeful line of activity,
short again of force, is cultural exchange: the exchange of ideas. This applies
not merely to satellite areas. I think it applies to the Soviet Union itself, and
some of us have been engaged in these efforts. I must say that, on the whole,
the Soviet Union itself is much more interested-in using cultural exchange in
order to obtain some technical knowledge which will be useful to it, or to make
impressions by way of the ballet and the opera and so on rather than to permit
the contamination of the minds of its own people by exposing them to ideas from
the West. But it is interested in cultural exchange, and what we've been
engaged in is a kind of process of trading off.. That is, we emphasize the things
that we believe will serve our purposes and they are emphasizing the things
that they believe will serve their purposes. And we get agreements with results
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sufficiently ambiguous so that neither side knows whether it's gotten the better
of the deal. Maybe that's the secret' of successful diplomacy.
Question: What is your suggestion for a disciplined system of education?
Prof. Fainsod: Well, this is a sore subject, and I could talk a long time about
this. Let me start by saying that I don't think we work very hard in our schools.
We could work a lot harder, and I mean from the grade schools up. You visit
Soviet schools. They start in September; they go through to July; there is
relatively, little in the way of holidays; and the curriculum is filled with the
tough scientific and mathematical subjects. Our curriculum could stand a good
deal more in the way of math and science than it now has. Now don't misunder-
stand me. I represent the social sciences and I hope, the humanities, and the
last thing I would like to see is a school system that modeled itself on the
soviet schools, where, in effect the social sciences consist of indoctrination
and the humanities consist of teaching one foreign language and a little about
Russian literature with the rest of the curriculum exclusively math and the
sciences. But they're doing a great deal more in the way of math and science
than we are doing, and I think we ought to be doing a great deal more than we
are doing. And I could carry this on to much greater length, but this would be
the essence of my observations.
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"THE CONFLICT: DIRECTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT"
Wednesday Seminar
Opening Remarks: Prof. Merle Fainsod, Harvard University
Panel: Prof. Frederick Schuman, Williams College
Mr. Thomas Whitney, Journalist
Moderator: Prof. Theodore Ropp, Duke University
Moderator: This is the Duke University Symposium Seminar, Wednesday afternoon,
October 7th, 3:15.p. m. in 204 East Duke Building.
Prof. Fainsod:
I have a few remarks with which to open, after which we will hear from Professor
Schuman and from Mr. Whitney and then the discussion will be allowed to take
its course. Well, I've been asked to lead off on this most difficult of all topics,
difficult because it involves a certain element of prophecy and prophecy is one of
the most hazardous of all enterprises; and I ought to make very clear at the outset
that I have no special prophetic credentials. What I would like to do is to examine
various possible roads which U. S. - Soviet relations may take, to raise questions
as to what long term developments we would consider favorable from the point of
view of basic American interests, what we can do to promote such developments,
what the prospects are that such developments will actually take place.
Now one possibility that we must consider, though I wish we didn't have to,
is the possibility of war, intentional or unintentional, between us and the Soviet
Union. Neither side presently wants war, and the balance of terror in terms of
thermonuclear destruction operates as something of a barricade against war. But
it's a precarious protection in a fluid situation. But, at the moment, until and
unless a satisfactory disarmament agreement is achieved, it's about the best
protection we have. Even though neither side wants war, there is always the
danger .of the unintended war, the expansion of the local into the general conflict
--the kind of problem raised by Korea, Indo-China, Berlin, Suez, Lebanon,
Laos, Formosa---future incidents which we cannot now foresee. And one of the
questions which, I think, we ought to put in the forefront of our discussion is
whether we can develop techniques for containing these local conflicts, for
confining them to the arena of negotiation; and, I need hardly say that this
problem becomes infinitely more difficult as the nuclear club expands or is permit-
ted to expand. And I. ought to add that there is always the danger of the accident,
of the bomb that is dropped because of a misreading of intelligence, the pre-
emptive strike that is launched because one or the other side decides that the
enemy is about to move or has moved. Against such accidents there are no
absolute protections. About all that,can be done is to take every precaution and
to make sure that weapons are under responsible control.
Now putting war aside for a moment, I should like to call your attention to
a second perspective, what I would call the Khrushchevian perspective, that
over the years there will be an increase in the relative strength of the Soviet
bloc vis-a-vis the Western bloc, that, as the strength and alleged superiority
of the Soviet system becomes manifest, the will to resist in the West will
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decline and the attraction of Communism throughout the world will increase.
Along the way, as Khrushchev sees it, there will be a breakup in the system of
Western alliances, a great upsurge of neutralism, an increase in the strength
of indigenous Communist forces in Asia and Africa and then in Europe, and finally
a series of Communist take-overs, country by country, with the Soviet bloc be-
coming increasingly powerful and the United States becoming increasingly isolated
until finally. Communist power overflows the globe. Now obviously one of the
questions with which we must concern ourselves here this afternoon is whether
this perspective is a valid one, whether there are lines of action that can be
taken that will prevent it from coming to realization. I'm sure that we will want
to touch on this theme in our discussion.
Now another perspective is that we succeed in stabilizing our relations with
the Soviet Union; that we maintain a precarious balance of power between the
blocs; that our common interest in survival leads us to resort to negotiation
rather than force; and that, over time, we succeed in using time as effectively
as the Russians have in the past; and that the effect of this kind of prolonged
balance will be to lead the Soviet leadership to abandon the Khrushchevian per-
spective. Now if that is to happen, there would have to be a kind of evolutionary
development in the course of which the Soviet regime gradually sheds its Messianic
militancy and becomes something of a status quo instead of an expanding power
and is content to adjust its differences with other powers within the framework of
the nation states system.
Now, as an indication of the reality of such an evolution, we would have to
look for certain supporting developments within the Soviet Union---the decline
in the importance of Messianism as a basis for Soviet policy, the emergence of
government policies which put more .emphasis on welfare rather than on power
objects, the development of an educational system which stresses the human
values which we and they share in common instead of emphasizing the profound
gulf which divides us. We would want to look for freer traffic in ideas with the
West, an attrition of censorship, freer access of Soviet citizens to Western
publications, and more freedom for Soviet citizens to travel abroad and for non-
Soviet citizens to circulate freely in the Soviet Union. And we may well ask
what we can do to promote such a development. I assume first that our policy
must emphasize the strengthening of .the free world against Communist expansion,
that this will set the conditions for the abandonment of Communist Messianic or
imperialist goals and will contribute to a possible re-consideration of party
dogma and ideology. It means, I think, also maintaining a certain posture of
willingness to accommodate what we conceive to be legitimate Russian national
interests, thus, perhaps, giving aid and comfort to such elements in the Soviet
Union as are prepared to move toward a more limited perspective of Soviet goals.
It means, I think, also persisting in our search for a mutually acceptable dis-
armament plan in order to make our peaceful intentions clear and perhaps also
to reinforce aspirations or pressures inside the Soviet Union in favor of accom-
modation, in favor of a greater stress upon welfare as opposed to power objec
tives. It means, also, making maximum effort to use cultural exchange and
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similar programs to achieve a freer circulation of Western ideas in the Soviet
Union.
Now you may well ask what are the prospects, for such a development. I see
them, at best, as a very long term affair. This is not a transformation that is
likely to take place over night. It depends very much on whether we succeed
in our efforts to contain the spread of Soviet expansion, whether certain forces
inside the Soviet Union are given sufficient scope so that they begin to exert
their pressures for stability, security, and peace. I have in mind the pressures
of this new state middle class of the Soviet Union, seeking to widen its freedom
of action, looking for a more orderly and efficient society, free of police pressure,
looking for contacts with the outside. I have in mind the rising expectations of
the masses for more food and consumer goods and housing and leisure. And I
have in mind the desires of many people within the Soviet Union for peace, for a
letup on pressure. And I have in mind also the spread of education, the possi-
bility that this may, over time, ignite critical faculties and lead to a demand for
wider participation in the processes of decision making.
Yet I can see these same factors operating negatively if Western efforts to
contain the spread of Soviet power fail. If those efforts fail, I think we can
expect to see a reinforcement of the Messianic elements in the Bolshevik creed,
the belief in Communism as the wave of the future; and I would hasten to add
that there are very powerful internal forces, party orthodoxies, the grip of the
party stalwarts on the internal power machinery, which stand in the way of this
kind of evolution even as a long-term affair. And so, while I think I would state
almost as an article of faith my belief that over the long term the forces of freedom
within the Soviet Union have more perspective, I would suggest that it is by no
means a sure thing, that, at the best,' it is likely to be a slow evolution, and
over the short term, party controls, the totalitarian pattern, will still remain very
powerful.
Now there is still, it seems to me, a fourth. possibility---a Soviet regime
which remains basically totalitarian, a one-party state, but which grows weaker
rather than stronger over the years. And here again it depends on what we do
with the time at our disposal. If our own policies should stress, over the next
decades, a high rate of industrial growth, if,we should succeed in keeping
scientific and military supremacy, keeping ahead in the race, if we should
succeed in promoting social progress, economic strength, and political unity
in the free world, we may well find ourselves in a much stronger position than
we now foresee. And in-,terms of promoting this. kind of development, I assume
also that we would want to give maximum encouragement short of war to such
disintegrated forces within the Soviet orbit as exist---nationalist movements, move-
ments in the direction of national Communism, of independence. I think the encour-
agement of such forces can take the form of moral support, offers of economic assist-
ance, cultural exchange. There is certainly something to build on here. We'_ve
seen enough, in terms of the events of '56, the Hungarian events, developments
in the Polish orbit, the pull out of the orbit of the Yugoslavs, to recognize that
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over the long
ere is a good deal of smoldering restofenationalism thattmanydthought had been
rm, it may well be that these forces
tpressed will continue to assert themselves and become quite powerful.
It is, I think, also worth pointing out that there are internal
which may operate to he
viet Union itself, aspirations for a better way of life,
npose some brake on the Soviet rate of industrial growth. if itrate But, if. the Sriviet
adership is able to persist with its present plans, of indust
shin the Western o ld result in tsrcatch-
rowth continues to be large, larger than that prevailing
E its attention to scientific and industrial development within i rag up with the West, if it should contain the
for complacencye fIn cesecent years we n
orbit, then we will have very little ground iaven't done very well, and assuming that we don't do better
ff intiee future nthaen s with
ve have done in the recent past, assuming that internal develop situtation may oviet orbit do not seriously disrupt while we grown elatively weaker. I
in which the USSR grows relatively stronger
can't stress enough that there is nothing inevitable
do with the time and which
says this must happen. It depends on what neat
which have been placed at our disposal, and those resources are still very great
.
indeed.
prof. Schuman:
I know that all of you will join me, and I'm se Whitney
ing a iz-
presentation of the broad
that Professor Fainsod has given us a masterly
I would at thi
s time alternatives which lie ahead. In my ewvery brief and aise a very broad question
like to amplify a bit one aspect of presentation he made
with regard to another aspect of it. At the dbeginning of his
the comment that in the absence of a e most of us believe that, those
remain the best protection that we have. I suppos but, with a little reflec-
tion least, who a not to pacifists that under the technological, scientific, and us, at ion o on the matter, it s e see p
nuclear ar
far political conditions prevailing in the world, massing have, could beua formula for ms,he suic de of
presenting the best protection that we hav lease, Lewis
mankind. May I commend to your reading, as required reading p entitled "The
Munford's' article in the current Atlantic Monthly (October, ion as
any Morality of Extermination. " I would raise
with which
twe are confront d can a serious rational analysis of the problems and dangers
really justify a belief that armaments offer professor Fainsod concurred, butrlet
security. More than that (and I think here e
me put it just a little differently), it seems to me that the dangers of a contin-open
conflict uation of the arms race do not lie primarily likelihood of
he Soviet Union.
intentional or unintentional, between the
The dangers of a continuation of the arms ac,first, ~ progress ve expansion of directions,
both of which have already been mentioned: i is alread
imminen the membership of the thermonuclear suicide csee,France,i and Ch nay a d thent?
No doubt, within years and months, we shall
possibly Sweden and state after state after state acquiring thermonuclear
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weapons., When the government of Egypt, and the government of Indonesia, and
the government of Pakistan, and the government of the Dominican Republic all
have thermonuclear weapons, then all the bets are off and you had better write
off the human race, it seems to me. This is a major danger.
The second major danger, and this is already with us, is that the possibility
of national decision-making in questions of war and peace is already passing
out of the hands of national decision-makers. In the epoch of the ICBM,'when
there is already the prospect of a fifteen minute warning of enemy attack, there
is no possibility of national decision-making. Decisions then have to be made
by nervous, jittery interpreters of blobs on radar screens, by nervous, jittery
technicians at missile bases, by bomber pilots, etc. If we really intend to let
this happen, we and the Russians together, then, again, I shall become a
pessimist and despair of the human future.
The other broad question I would raise is whether What Professor Fainsod
called the Khrushchevian perspective was altogether adequately characterized
by his observations regarding it. I defer to his judgment in these matters and
to what I think is probably.his superior knowledge of the record of the Khrushchev
perspective, but it has seemed to me that the emphasis he has placed upon his
view of it might conceivably be in need of qualification and possible correction.
He seemed to imply, if I heard him aright, that the fundamental objective is still
a Messianic objective, the fundamental purpose is still world domination or
world conquest or the universalization of the Communist creed and Communist
system of power whereby in the end all the rest of us are to be subjugated and
done in by the enemy. I had thought that Premier Khrushchev, in hips various
public utterances, here as well as in many utterances in the Soviet Union, had
put the matter just a bit differently. I am not now referring to the slogan or
phrase of peaceful co-existence as such. This may have a variety of meanings.
I am rather thinking of his constantly growing emphasis on productive efficiency
and capacity to improve living standards as the way whereby,.in his view, Com-
munism is ultimately to prevail. And that emphasis seems to me hopeful and
rather significantly different from the earlier Communist emphasis on Messianic
universalism to be achieved in other, perhaps more conventional, ways.
It has also seemed to me that in many, many aspects of domestic policy the
Khrushchev regime is already demonstrating that it is yielding to the internal
pressures of which Professor Fainsod spoke. And adding all this together, it
would seem that possibly the Khrushchev perspective, as here in process of
re-interpretation, might be a little more hopeful than some of the other alter-
natives that Professor Fainsod referred to. But I'll let it go at that and simply
raise the question, on which I'm sure he will want to comment later.
Mr. Whitney:
Let me take up right at the point at which Professor Schuman left off, the
Khruschevian view and his suggestion of a new interpretation of this, with a
few personal observations from the recent trip of Premier Khrushchev. I myself.
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have come away from this trip, after watching the man in action at fairly close
range and fairly intensely for quite a while, with the feeling that this man was
a very, very determined man, that he himself has a great deal of confidence in
the position of the Soviet states that he represents, that, on the one hand, he
was convinced that this was perhaps the most important reason that he was here:
that a war in this particular era would mean total devastation. But, at the same
time, I feel that he was convinced, ultimately and completely, of the superiority
of the Soviet system, the Soviet economic system and the Soviet political system.
He was a man who was here, on the one hand, to warn against the danger of total
destruction of total war, and, on the other hand; to proclaim what he really be-
lieves is the coming victory of the Soviet system on a world scale. And if we go
back to one of his little speeches in which he himself describes his own early
sentiments and views about the Soviet regime, he said he didn't know at that time
(this was back in the early days after the revolution), that if he had been asked
at that time to define what Soviet power meant, he wouldn't have been something that promised a
define it, but that he knew it was good, that it was
better future. Perhaps we can transfer this same frame of reference to him right
now at the present time if he were asked to spell out exactly what he means by
victory of socialism on a world scale. He wouldn't be able to spell it out, but
he knows it's there. He feels it is there. He is a man who feels he is riding the
wave of the future. I'think that it's important to keep in mind not only how we
may feel and the possibilities that may exist, but how the other side, or the man
who is in control, looks at the situation.
Now Professor Fainsod spoke of his fourth line of thinking, fourth o on ibility.
He emphasized, and I think very, very correctly, that very much
we do with the possibilities at our disposal. Perhaps, today in our discussion we
were emphasizing what the other side could do or the possibilities for movement
and development of the other side, and not enough the other side of the equation
which is, after all, us. Talking about the direction of development,. and the
possibilities for the future, we.are in that future just as much as the Russians
are. We are as much a part of the equation as they are. One thing has come
home to me repeatedly in recent,years, and that is this: That many times we think
of the Russians as having many secret weapons at their disposal, but when we
get down. to it in the end, it seems tmeWthat they only have one e think that the reason that we are on
at their disposal and that is a purpose.
behind in the field of missiles and earth satellites is scientists, that we don't
have enough-scientists or that we haven't devoted enough resources to this field.
The fact of the matter is that we have plenty of scientists. - What we have not had
is a plan. What we have not had is leadership. What we have not had is a pur-
pose.
The Communist purpose may indeed, as
drive toward world domination, ber
as it can be defined within the framework of a
a very bad purpose. But it is a purpose, and it is a purpose against which can
be tested every individual expenditure of effort that takes place in the Soviet
Union and within the Communist orbit. When it is a question of deciding whether
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steel shall be allocated to produce more passenger automobiles or to produce
other types of equipment or goods, a decision can be reached with reference to
a purpose and to a plan. And, I would remind you that we live in a day when in
order to realize something fifteen years from now, we have to start working at
it today, that in the earth satellite field perhaps this most emphatically becomes
apparent: what will be done ten years from now is determined by what is in the
planning and development stages today. There isn't a single large corporation
in this entire country that would get along without planning and programming in
its ordinary everyday activities to the extent that the United States government
gets along without these. So I say that Professor Fainsod is very right to
emphasize that we do have within our own control at least one-half of this equa-
tion and that very much depends on how we use our possibilities.
Prof. Fainsod?
Perhaps I might comment on the two ppints that Professor Schuman raised. You
remember that he raised questions as to whether this balance of terror was really
any kind of protection at all, and whether we weren't eventually faced with
disaster at the end of the road. And he also raised questions about the Khrush-
chevian perspective and the accuracy' with which it had been reported.
On the first point, it certainly was not'my desire to glorify the balance of
terror as the best way of running the affairs of the world. This is a very, very
disagreeable choice. The question which, I think, I would have to put to
Professor Schuman and to anyone else is this: Assuming that we are not able to
agree on terms of disarmament that give adequate consideration to Soviet security
and to our security, what is the alternative except this balance of terror? I
would infinitely prefer success in the disarmament negotiations as a way of
escaping from the balance of terror. We've been engaged in such negotiations
for quite a long time. We've sought a degree of security we've been unable, to
achieve. The negotiations are going to go on. I hope they continue. I think
they deserve our very best and most serious efforts. But pending a degree of
success in them, what is the alternative? Now this is a very, very disagreeable.
choice, but I put the question.
Now on the broader problem of the Khrushchevian perspective, I think Professor
Schuman is quite correct in reporting that Mr. Khrushchev, in his speeches in the
United States, featured this great competition between the two systems as a race
in produptive efficiency. Indeed, he said he did not want to impose Communism
on any other country. This was a matter for the free choice of the people who
are concerned; they will decide in their own way whether to choose Communism
or not. And, if,. of course, you accept Mr. Khrushchev at his own word, you
would want to modify my description of the Khrushchevian perspective. I don't
accept his speeches at face value, and, indeed, I think 'I could show you many
quotations from Khrushchev where he speaks very, very differently. One might
consult some of his speeches at the Party Congress to round out his picture
of the Khrushchevian world. So. I ,think the differences between us must be de-
fined in terms of our respective willingness to accept the speeches he made
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I regret to say, prepared to accept them. I
here at :Face value or not. I'm not,
see his objectives as extending beyond awml egtori t IfrI were willi g to accept
ful commercial competition or production c P e fu that, I think I would have much less to worry about s r then cture, and
thiI
world.
accept the optimistic posture with which Professor
prof. Schuman-
comment Let me comment briefly on Professor ibel eve t he Khrush hev per pact a to be
Let
face
ungenerous comments. I do not myself shchev
value a question of whether to take the words of Comrade raga drthat as the problem in my
not to take them at face value. At least I ianic
creed
have own thinking. All true believers in every e reed and using the same words for-
continue using the semantic devices of
s -
decades, generations, and centuries after they have lost all practical or opera
others.
n
more d fficult que tion,tosme a i
tional meaning. Khrushchev is no differen in
more important question, and, to be sure, of which Professor Faisod
this: are the internal pressures inside Soviet society, economi spoke, pointing in the direction of a shift of emphasis politically and
which are
cally? Are the internal pressures in the Communist
very real, likely in the months and years ahead to prevai ,holders om long, to
become imperatives which the top level Communist
makers must fully take into account if their system to dsurviv irect an flo Iuris
and are these pressures likely to point in a more hopeful insod
think suggesting? I think the answer to that is 'Yes-.'Mayb inger to ybe that
his thinking is
the answer is 'no.' Maybe my thinking is wishful
wishful thinking; I don't know. But it seems to me it is not a question of te
of the kinds of internal and condition the futureres
sincerity of Mr. Khrushchev. It is a question
and external pressures which will presumably shape
direction of Communist policy.
,On the other question: What is the alternative to the balance of terror, if ome of
them we cannot agree on disarmament? There are arnkerralternative. sThere is the
quits' unpalatable to many of us. There is the Q
alternative of those who say that under modern conditions and in terms of te
Christian ethic, all reliance on balance of terror, all reliance on military violence, e
includ is now not only immoral, but it is suicidal. And some of tie a considerable school
ing some non-Quakers, particularly in Britain where unilateral of thought of this kind, say the alternative to the balance terror us abandon
disarmament. Let us disarm. Let us disarm without agreement. Don't misunder-
stand our me, armaments,and cease relying on organized military force.
that doesn't happen to be quite. my position, but I think that it is sivery respectable position asdtha very logical e years go onposition defensible po-
tion, become more logical, more
as
indeed. And d I think
defensible, and more. plausible, and more palatable to more and more people.
If we are so stupid together, we and the Russians, that we can come to no
agreement about the limitation of armaments and the ending of the arms race,
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would it not be better then, under these conditions, to address ourselves to more
immediate, concrete questions as to what the obstacles are from a shorter run
point of view, rather than from a very long run point of view, in the way of some
mutually acceptable and workable accords that would take us into the whole future
of Germany, of Berlin, of Eastern Europe, the satellites, as well as disarmament?
I don't know that we can cover the whole field or that we ought to try. But let
me make this observation: It seems to me that from the record thus far of these
protracted, agonized, and involved negotiations for some kind of arms agreement,
two major obstacles have loomed up and are still very much with us in the way of
any kind of even limited accord. One of those obstacles is the American search
for a 100% foolproof inspection and control system which cannot conceivably be
evaded or violated. The other obstacle is a psychological, political, and ideolo-
gical obstacle, if you like, which stems from past Russian experience, which has
been a very tragic experience indeed---the obstacle posed by the psychological
inability of Soviet power-holders and policy-makers to accept any such kind of
system of inspection, or even to contemplate it seriously, on the basis of a series
of assumptions which have some validity in past Russian experience. This is the
primary source of the deadlock, it seems to me.
What can be done about it? I would hope that it would prove possible on the
part of farsighted and able statesmen to arrive at some kind of middle ground,
that it would prove possible, as, indeed, Mr. Khrushchev himself has repeatedly
said, that the Soviet authorities will accept some form of inspection and control
with regard to some types of armament which we would regard as possibly accept-
able:, even though it wouldn't be 100% foolproof. Nothing in this world is 100%
foolproof and those who seek 100% security are fools anyway. This is not to be
had. I Would think it would also be conceivable that Americans might come to
accept something less than 100% security, since the quest for 100% security
actually means zero security or no security whatever, you see. And maybe a little
security is better than none. So I would not despair of the possibility of success
in some effort at limiting armaments by agreement. But the obstacles are very,
very formidable. As for the other problems, let's leave them for later.
QUESTIONS FROM THE FLOOR:
Question: Would it not be better to divert some of the capital presently going into
military expenditures to aid for the underdeveloped areas of the world?
Prof. F'ainsod: As you pointed out, the problem of accumulating savings is not
one that is easily managed through democratic processes. You point out that the
way out for underdeveloped countries in terms of minimizing sacrifices while
preserving possible democratic paths of development lies through a massive
foreign aid program. You suggest that financing such a foreign aid program would
involve a necessary curtailment of. military expenditures. *1 don't know that that
necessarily follows. I have the impression that if we wanted to pay higher taxes
or if we wanted to limit some of our luxury expenditures, we could find additional
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resources for foreign aid which wouldn't seriously cramp our military expenditures.
But I would go out to meet you to this extent, by pointing out that there are cer-
tain areas of the world where we have, in a sense, put our wager on military
formations where it seems to me that those military formations have very, very
dubious value indeed. And the same kind would field infinitely greater fruit in termsdevelop-
ment projects of one kind or another wou f
le,
of a vigorous and stable local society. I have in mind could mention Pakistan,
I would agreepat
and there are many other places that one could least with a substantial part of what you have said.
Question: Professor Fainsod, you said something about the Soviet Unions b a am
ing less of a power nation--the hope for the Soviet Union to "webecome of
lfare state" the
so nation and tio that the United States has?become out of fear; and, if so,
sorrt t o of welfare nation n
what possible purpose. could it serve?
Prof. Fa n= What I had in mind, and perhaps Ishould have in spelle it out a
little bit more, was the diversion of capital from investment and armaments toward investment in housing,
living of the peoples There aoether
things which would improve the standard of aspirations for such improvement, and to the extent that such aspirations are
politically effective, the government may feel compelled to supply more in the
way of consumer goods, housing, et al, than it had before. This would leave less
for heavy industry and for armaments.
fine producing
Question: If they are able to concenttate
so that they after
a suitable arsenal of ICBM's or such,
or offensive nation and possibly able to concentrate on consumer goods, what,
would happen then?
Prof. Fainsod: Well, I think they are trying to get the best of both possible
worlds. But, I think they find it, at their present stage of development, a very the s
even ye
plan an cramping business. As I said last night, if Ythe sixth five year planaryou findd
look at it in terms of what they announced in
that the projected increase in consumer goos is not so they feel that the great
priority still must
earlier plan. And I assume this means that
go toward the ICBM's and the heavy industry to support it. But as they grow, of probl one can contemplate a period th ~ might gross t national producte diwhich videy where to ,
sketched where they have a much larger
they can take care of the ICBM's and also take care of the consumer goods. To
the extent that they supply consumer goods, I think that they will be giving
themselves a stronger underpinning of support in their own population.
Question: Mr. Whitney, there was something you said that perturbed me a bit.
Perhaps I misunderstood, and I wish you would clarify it. You mentioned that
one of the advantages that the USSR has over us is the fact that" they could
,i!jll
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allocate their resources efficiently and apportion what they had where it Nvould
serve them best. And you suggested that we were at a disadvantage because
we don't have the same way of allocating resources. Are you suggesting that we
ought to adopt some similar way of allocating resources or are you thinking of a
particular way in which we ought to plan and use part of our present expenditures
for future purposes?
Mr. Whitney: I think I said that the Soviet Union does a great deal of planning
on a totalitarian basis and we do practically none at all. I mean this is an
extreme contrast. The Soviet Union as a totalitarian state has certain advantages.
Let us start with the.mere fact that a totalitarian state every single organiza-
tion making up that state must direct all of its activity in accordance with the
overall plan of activity provided from the,top. This can lead, of course, in itself
to a certain number of inefficiencies. Our system, in which an individual organi-
zation or an individual himself can go off in one or another directions, perhaps
the diametric opposite from that in which the state itself is proceeding, has some
inefficiencies and yet it has some virtues, too, because it provides for a certain
amount of competition and.a certain amount of efficiency. I am not suggesting
that we adopt a totalitarian pattern based on that of the Soviet Union. I am
suggesting that we begin to start planning and programming ahead and try to
see where we are going twenty years from now, and that might be the beginning
.of democratic wisdoms, because we aren't going to have a democracy very long
unless we do.
Question: What significance do you attach to lack of a regular method of succeed-
ing to power within the totalitarian state, such as the Soviet Union?
Prof. Schuman: Well, actually, ladies and gentlemen, Professor Fainsod can
speak with much more authority on this than I can. I think he would disagree with
what I am about to say. Let me say it anyway. This is a very serious and real
problem and has always been so in the Soviet state. I have been impressed with
the fact that the other two members of the panel have thus far referred to the
Soviet regime as still a totalitarian state, and I should concur. I think in this
they are correct. But neither of them has referred to the totalitarian regime as a
totalitarian police state, and there are good reasons for this, namely that the
arbitrary power of the political police to seize and arrest or imprison and execute
ordinary citizens under suspicion has been very greatly curtailed, if not altogether
abolished. If it has been possible to mitigate and modify and almost remove the
police state aspect of the Soviet system, it seems to me in the longer future it
is conceivable that this may cease to be even what we have been calling a totali-
tarian system. It is conceivable to me that further liberalization and democrati-
zation of the regime may lead to various methods (they won't be American methods,
to be sure) whereby there can be brought into the process of national policy-mak-
ing and national planning some elements.that even we would recognize as demo-
cratic and responsive to public sentiment and various group interests. But on
the more specific question, I would only say this: there has, it seems to me,
been perceptible progress in the last six years, or particularly in the last five
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years, in the methods employed by the top level Communist power-holders in
dealing with opponents, in dealing with criticism,
di distinction between having provision
succession. I think there is an important
the back of your head and being sent to Outer Mongolia as Ambassador, as Mr.
Molotov was, or an important distinction between being strangled in the cellars
of the GPU and being made President of a cement plant in Central Asia, as
Kagonavitch was, on the basis, apparently, of a debate and vote in the Central
Committee of the Party. By my lights, this represents progress, and I hope for
further progress in that direction.
Mr. Whitney: You raise the questioniof succession as a weakness in the system,
yet there has.been a succession which did take place. Over a period of three or
four years. a new leadership managed to stabilize its position with the introduction
of considerable change in the political line and did W it w without any
justified before
enormous amount of bloodshed. I think that while
Stalin died in wondering how succession was going to take place, and while we
are quite justified at the present time in pointing to the lack of a weakness mpletel the
regularized system of succession as a weakness or a possible
system, we would do very well
tokeep ivery mind
successfully and to immediate
consider whether
that there has taken place a succession
it won't be possible for them to be as successful in carrying out the next succes-
sion also without bloodshed.
succlateression
Prof. Fainsod; While we're celebrating the peacefulness of this years
some I
might remind you of a little history. Lenin .died in 24. Fi of the leading contenders were still in the Politburo. - Trotsky was still alive.
Indeed, there was very little bloodshed
He was exiled to Alma Alta, and so on.
in this early period. The period of bloodshed didn't come until the mid-thirties
and the Great Purge. As a matter of fact, we've had more bloodshed in the early
years after Stalin's death than .we had after Lenin's death ---Beria executed and
a number of his associates..
But I think it's a little early to. be
Now I'm not prophesying more bloodshed.
absolutely sure. ? Around the streets of Leningrad this February you had rumors
of Malenkov's death. I don't know whether he's dead or not, and I don't know'
that many of these people who were spreading these rumors have. any knowledge
about it. What we do know is that he hasn't been seen. ? Some of these other
people have- Molotov, Shepilov, and a few others. ~ So far the record of blood-
shed in this regime largely involves the Beria crew, so-called, and it involves
a good deal of bloodshed in Hungary, a great deal.- And we shouldn't be too
sure that the last word h
powers of the policee. must salute
ve been made to curb this
have.
salute the efforts that
them as healthy manifestations,. but rm not myself quite ready yet to write the
Soviet Union off as. a police state..
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Question: Mr. Whitney, I understand that Mr. Khrushchev had a very wrong
opinion of the United States. Do you think his visit changed this opinion, and
if so, do you think there will be any accompanying change in Soviet policy?
Mr. Whitney: Well, it's of course impossible to get inside of Khrushchev's
muddled head. One can catch glimpses, of course'. To some extent it's evident
that Khrushchev has many misconceptions about-America, that he had them before
he came, that he had them while he was here, and he still has. them now. He's
gone away with them. That was, I say, to be expected. At the same time I
would say, on the basis of what I could see, there was an impact of America:on
Khrushchev during his trip. This was also to be expected. Even if we suppose,
as I think, that he expected to come to a sort of wonderland and be impressed,
nevertheless, the actual fact of being here, the actual fact of seeing America,
even if it was mostly through car windows and from lecture podiums, this still had
an effect on him. And I would suppose that the thing that had the most effect on
him was that he got, in general, not too bad a reception from the people and that
this affected his emotional reactions towards America as a country and towards
Americans as a people. I think that this will have an effect, some of.it short
range, some of it long range. I think it will have an effect, even,. on Soviet
policy. I shouldn't over-exaggerate that, but Ithink that it will or has already.
Prof. Fainsod: I think I would agree in general that this has been a healthy
visit, healthy in the sense that it gives him an exposure to a variety of exper-
iences that he hasn't had up to this point. I think also that it was healthy in.
the sense that it symbolizes his willingness and our willingness to discuss, to
keep the lines of communication open,, for certainly if we do. not live together we
will die together.
Question: Outline for me, Professor Schuman, if you will, the internal and
external political and economic situations and tensions between Russia and Red
China and their possible effect on future Sino-Russian relations.
Prof. Schuman:' A small order, sir, a small order. All three members of the panel
have been asked this question or similar questions many, many times before'many,
many audiences, and not one of us knows the answer. But in self-defense, by
way of concealing ignorance, I have a stereotyped answer, which is not very
good but which I think is true, so I shall offer it to you. My stereotyped answer
is that we should not expect any serious cleavage or rift or potential conflict
about anything at all between the Soviet Union and Communist China so long as
the present pattern of United States policy toward China remains what it is---a
complete embargo on all trade, a complete embargo on.all travel, a complete
refusal to enter into diplomatic relations, a complete refusal to even consider
the admittance of Communist China into the United Nations. I don't know how
long this pattern will continue, for my crystal ball isn't that good. United States
policy-makers continued something like that pattern, not nearly so extreme to
be sure, for sixteen years after the Russian Revolution. We've continued to
boycott Communist China for ten years, maybe we'll continue for sixteen years,
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maybe we'll continue for thirty-two years, may,ie we'll, continue for sixty-four
years. I don't know. All I feel I know is that for as long as we continue this
policy, it will be fatuous to assume any serious cleavage or rift between Moscow
and Peiping. I trust you will agree Ihave successfully evaded the question.
Mr. Whitne : I personally feel that the pattern of Soviet-Chinese relation doesn't
necessarily depend on American-Soviet relations. It is conceivable to me that
there could be a serious break between the Soviet Union and Communist China,
though I consider it unlikely, unlikely for a very long time at least, even in a
period when we have practically no relations of any kind with Communist China.
I agree, however, with Professor Schuman, in that we are doing everything we
possibly can in order to keep the Communist Chinese and the Soviet Union working
together. Our conduct toward China.is almost designed to that end. In a sense,
one can make out a case that Stalin wanted it that way, and led us into that posi-
tion, and we stayed very co-operatively.
Question: Professor Fainsod, in your report you did not mention the U. N. Do you
think it's possible that within the future some of this conflict will be resolved
through the U.. N. , either as a diplomatic body or through the strength of the U. N.
itself ? _
Prof. Fainsod: If I omitted the U. N. it is not because I do not attach considerable
significance to its role. I think of the U.. N. both as an arena in which we con-
front each other, the Soviet Union and the United States, and at the same time,
an arena in which, conceivably, pressures can be exerted to adjust differences
between us. And it may well be that, if, over the years, the U.N., in one form
or another, is strengthened, this introduces an additional element that will serve.
to facilitate adjustment of conflicting aspirations. I think we've sought at
various points to use the U. N.; we tried. to use it in the Korean conflict; we
attempted or are attempting to use it in Laos over the objection of the Soviet,
Union; and, I hope that we will -continue to use it.
Question: Professor Fainsod, what is the possibility of using the United Nations
for Russia and the United States getting together through the United Nations?
Prof. Fainsod: Well, I see no objection myself. This has been suggested to
the Russians on several occasions. I think the first person who made the sug-
gestion was Adlai Stevenson on his first visit to Russia. He got a rather cold
reception. I don't know that we ourselves have been up. to this point very , .
enthusiastic about it. But I conceive of aid, say, to the underdeveloped nations,
as being much more acceptable under the U.N. . aegis than It is under either of
the Super Powers.
Moderator: At lunch, Professor Schuman, who, after all, has prophet's creden-
tials going back a long, long way,. said that he was used to making speeches
on why war was not going to break out at the present time, and that he would
gladly summarize this in a couple of sentences.
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Prof. Schuman: You should now realize, in case you are not aware of the fact,
that if one spends thirty years in making forecasts about the probable shape
of things to come in world politics and his batting average is not too bad, every-
body will forget about all the wrong forecasts he made and only remember the
right forecasts. So if you want to go into the crystal ball business, bear this
in mind. So I disclaim, really, any powers of prophecy in these matters.
The argument that World War III will never be fought, reduced to its very
simplest terms, is that in the post-World o have a pattern f world
war.
important ingredients are lacking in order good,
One could ennumerate these ingredients, but there isn't time for that. I'll put it
to you that on the basis of the whole historical record there has never been a war
between Great Powers, except under circumstances in which the policy-makers
and strategists on one side or the other, and very often on both sides, were sure
in advance in their own minds that they had a decisive margin of superiority over
the prospective enemy, and quite sure in their own minds that they had devised
a winning strategy for victory. To be sure, most of them were proved to be wrong,
but this is an essential ingredient for any really good war. This ingredient is
lacking now. It has been lacking since 1945, and it has. been particularly lacking
since 1949.
It is not possible for Soviet policy-makers or American policy-makers to make
any even half-plausible assumption that our side has a decisive margin of. superi-
ority and that we have a strategic plan for winning the war. There is none. I'm
sure there is none. I haven't searched through the drawers of the Pentagon; I have
no access to them, but no such plan is there. It can't be there in the nature of
the situatiori. Because it's not there, during all these years of the Cold War,
neither side has ever pushed any demands on the other for decisive positions or
components of power which it thought that the other side would resist by force.
This hasn't happened during the whole period of the Cold War. The most beauti-
ful example, of course, was the Berlin-blockade of ten years ago. There were
those, including at one point General Clay, who said to President Truman,
"Let's send a tank column into Berlin from Frankfurt." And Harry said, "No,
Lucius. No tank column into Berlin. The Russians might shoot at the tanks."
So no tank column was sent. We resorted to the airlift, instead. I don't know,
but I would guess that one or another of the Soviet commanders of anti-aircraft
batteries all around Berlin may have gone to the Kremlin and said to Uncle Joe,
"Comrade Stalin, would it not be a splendid idea to shoot down the Anglo-
Americanski airlift." To which Uncle Joe must have' -Said, "Nyet, nyet, nyet I
That would be a very bad idea. The Americanskis might shoot back." There was
no shooting involved. The Russians lost this -particular round, if you will rem-
ember, with no shooting. Well, I just mention that as a typical instance of the
pattern of world power relationships between the Super Powers during the whole
last fifteen years. And that's still the pattern. Therefore, no World War III.
Moderator: With that prophesy from a very good prophet, I think, perhaps we
should draw this meeting to a close. We should give a particularly big hand to
Professor Fainsod because this is his last appearance before us.
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"THE COLD WAR: A PROBLEM OF POWER"
Wednesday Address
Speaker: Prof. Frederick Schuman, Williams College
Prof. Schuman:
Dear Mr. Chairman, dear Miss Moderator, dear colleagues and collaborators on
the Duke University Symposium Committee, dear friends and neighbors; we find
ourselves met together at the midway point, or perhaps a little beyond the midway
point, of this Symposium program. We also find ourselves met together at the
midway point, or perhaps a little beyond the midway point, of another sequence
of events that we have met here to consider and discuss and evaluate. We are
met together, I feel very confident, in a time for rejoicing. And I venture to invite
you to join me in rejoicing and in considering the source of our rejoicing and in
examining anew the tangled problems of a still troubled world which must be
resolved if our rejoicing is to be justified and to be finally fulfilled.
We meet to rejoice because we know, whatever our doubts and puzzlements
may be, that the rulers and policy-makers of our divided world in East and West
alike have, in the Year of Our Lord 1959, finally resolved to make peace, and to
keep the peace, instead of continuing on the tragic course of the past dozen years
or more, which', if persisted in, could have had no other result than the thermonu-
clear co-annihilation of the human race. It is, to be sure, a sorry comment on
our times that we should rejoice over the fact that the practitioners of the art of
statecraft at long last should have decided in this year, our year of rejoicing, to
choose life rather than death for all of us, to choose survival rather than extinc-
tion, to choose peace rather than war. Who but madmen, could have made any
other choice? And yet we live in a century of madmen, many of whose ghastly
miscalculations and monstrous decisions have repeatedly threatened our common
civilization with irreparable, ruin and with the mass suicide of mankind. During
the dark and dismal years of the.Cold War, this threat has repeatedly been posed
in a form far more menacing to human survival than ever before in human history.
Therefore, let us rejoice that the threat has been lifted, and that we are now
irrevocably and irreversibly on the road to life and safely out of the valley of the
shadow of death.
And in our rejoicing let us'bless those who have been sufficiently courageous,
virtuous, and far-sighted to resist temptation and deliver us from evil. Let us
bless them in the spirit of the greatest sermon of all time, the Sermon on the
Mount preached by Jesus of Nazareth 1,928 years ago, in which, at the very out-
set, he said, "Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy; Blessed are
the pure in heart, for they shall see God; Blessed are the peace-makers, for
they shall be called the children of God. "
Since we find ourselves met together in the midst of the Jewish high Holy
Days, let us also pay deference to our Jewish neighbors and friends; let us also
bless the peace-makers in the spirit of Rosh Hashana, the Jewish New Year,
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celebrated last weekend, inaugurating the days of penitence and leading to Yom
Kippur;, the Day of Atonement, during the coming weekend. Let us recall in that
connection, in this time of rejoicing, the words of "a great prophet of Israel,
Ezekiel, spoken 2,506 years ago:
"When 1 bring the sword upon a land, if the people of the land can
take a man of their coasts and set him for their watchman, if he
seeth the sword come upon the land, he blow the trumpet and warn,
the people, then whosoever heareth the sound of the trumpet and
taketh not warning, if the sword come and take him away, his blood
shall be upon his own head. But if the watchman see the sword come
and blow not the trumpet, and the people be not warned, if the sword
come and take any person from among them, he is taken away in his
iniquity but his blood will require at the watchman's hand. "
Let us rejoice that the watchmen of our world, after long delay, have seen the
coming of the sword and blown the trumpet of peace and have warned the people
and have not failed in their duty. Let us bless those, whatever our doubts and
reservations may be, who have significantly contributed to the end of the night-
mare of World War III and to the dawn of a new era of peace.
With all due blessings to those here unmentioned, let us bless Dwight D.
Eisenhower for breaking with the past by inviting the Number One Communist of
the world to visit the United States. Let u5 bless Nikita S. Khrushchev for break-
ing with the past and persistently asking for an invitation to tour America. Let
us bless Secretary of State Christian Herter and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko
for contributing to the outcome, along with Ambassadors Menshikov and Thompson.
Let us bless Harold Macmillan for going to Moscow last February. Let us bless
Richard Nixon for going to Moscow last summer. Let us bless even Soviet Deputy
Premiers Anastas Mikoyan and Frol Koslov for visiting America last winter and
spring and paving the way for later journeys. Let us bless "Chip" Bohlen, former
United States Ambassador in Moscow, "exiled" to Manila but now recalled to
Washington and almost certain to accompany President Eisenhower to Russia
next year. Let us bless George F. Kennan, also former Ambassador in Moscow,
and also in a sense "exiled, " but I hope ultimately to be recalled to public
service.
The time is ripe for reassessing the origins and the course and the lessons
of the Cold War, the lessons already learned and the.lessons still tb be learned.
Let me ask you to join me in an effort at reassessment. Within the time at our
disposal we shall by no means be able to cover all the ground, but we can cover
some of the ground and that will be better than covering none of the ground.
It is a curious fact that,- although many books have been-written on many and
various aspects of the Cold War, no book has been written or, at any rate, r1p
book has been published, dealing with the Cold War as a whole, with one
exception. - A British newsman, Kenneth Ingram, published in 1955 a short
journalistic volume entitled, .History of the Cold War. My friend, Professor
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Nashville
but at last reports
ssee Deana Frank Fleming onted four- vo ume h sit ryrof the Cold WarTen,ne
a detailed led and docu me
he was still unable to find a publisher.
At all events, what we have been calling the Cold War did not begin fifteen
years ago in 1945 in the aftermath of World-War II and of the Yalta and Potsdam
Conferences. It began forty-two years ago with the Russian Revolution of 1917,
which brought the Communists to power throughout most of the old Russian Empire.
The Communists were then convinced that the Russian Revolution would inevita-
bly be followed by worldwide revolutionj and that it was teir duty to assist
non-Communists and anth Communists of thehe
inevitable to come to pass. The nWest were then convinced that the Soviet regime would inevitably collapse and
that it was their duty and their mission to assist the inevitable to come to pass.
Both sides, along with almost all other statesmen and people,: then shared what
Norman Angell, way back in 1910, had called "The Great Illusion," namely, the
belief that under Twentieth-Century conditions national interests can still be
served by war. Furthermore, Communists then believed that Communism could be
extended by war, and anti-Communists believed that Communism could be destroy-
ed by war. Both were wrong. Within ten months after Russia's October Revolution,
Soviet Russia and.the.West were at war, and the war was, not a cold war but a
hot war marked by many' casualties and considerable destruction.
Be it remembered, lest we forget what no Russian ever forgets, that this war
was not begun by Communists sending armies against the West, but by the West.
sending armies against Soviet Russia. In 1918 and 1919 American oops killed.
Russians and were killed by Russians on Russian soil, along with British troops
and French troops and Japanese troops and Polish troops and a good many others
in another somber chapter of Russia's age-old tragedy of attack and invasion
.from abroad. The legacy of mutual fear, suspicion, and hatred which has nourished
the Cold War of the 1940's and '50's originated in a hot war between East and West
ou may recall, was a dead-
in 1918, 119, '20, and '2 1. The. outcome of this war, y
lock or stalemate. The United States and the Allied Powers failed to destroy the med Soviet regime, and were obliged to a mmbandon
ortsubve tt anyiof the capitalist s~atesae,
The Communist rulers failed to unde
and were obliged to defer or give up their hopes of world revolution.
Problems of power in international politics can be dealt with in one of two will upon or
ways: either by violence,
force; or by ba gaining, in which both ss des compro-
mise the other b by armed mise their differences or agree to disagree within the framework of a negotiated
.modus vivendi. The first of these ways is the way of war.: The second of these
ways is the way of diplomacy. When to is evidentto all that eventuates in
impo e
a deadlock or stalemate in which its will upon or destroy the other by armed force, then only one other way is left
for dealing with problems of power among the Great Powers of our world---the,
way of diplomacy, an ancient and honorable art which, when wisely practice
Is the art of maintaining peace among rival sovereignties in a State System
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lacking World Government. These are simple truisms or self-evident statements
of the obvious. But for forty years or more many Americans have been unable or
unwilling to understand or act upon these eternal verities of. international rela-
tions, and at times, although rather less consistently, Russian policy-makers,
particularly in the last years of Stalin's autocracy, have been equally obtuse and
blind to realities and to choices.
Take note, if you will, of two simple and obvious corollaries of the truisms
of which I am speaking. The first is that in order to practice diplomacy, it is
necessary to have diplomatic relations with those with whom you expect to
practice diplomacy. Otherwise, obviously, no diplomacy is possible. Russians
have always known this. Americans have enormous difficulty in getting this
through their heads, as is shown by American refusal for sixteen years to enter
into diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia, and by American refusal in our time
to enter into diplomatic relations with Communist China or North Korea or North
Vietnam or Eastern Germany. The second corollary is that in the practice of
diplomacy, one cannot, if one aims at agreement, always say 'no' or 'nyet' to all
the proposals and suggestions of the other side. One must sometimes say 'perhaps'
and one must occasionally say 'yes.' This too, Americans seldom understand, and
Russians sometimes do not understand. All of this, of course, recalls the old
riddle which asks the question, "What is the difference between a diplomat and
a lady?" I'm sure most of you know the answer to that one. The old answer is
that if a diplomat says 'yes;' he means 'perhaps,' and if he says 'perhaps,' he
means 'no,' and if he says.'no,' he's no diplomat; whereas, if a lady says 'no,'
she means 'perhaps.,' and if she says"perhaps,' she means 'yes,' and if she says
'yes,' she's no lady. To be sure, this leaves our lady diplomats in something of
a dilemma.
Back in the early 1920's all these things were well understood and acted upon.;
in the Soviet Russia of Lenin, Chicherin, and Litvinov, and in most of the other
major countries of the world, with the exception, of course, of the United States.
The result was the establishment of diplomatic relations, the practice of diplomacy,
and the negotiation of a modus vivendi or a pattern of peaceful coexistence be-
tween Russia and the West.. That pattern of coexistence endured for almost twenty
years to the mutual advantage of Russia and the West, with no violence and no
serious threats of violence and no cold war. That pattern would unquestionably
have continued indefinitely, even down to the present day except for the Great
Depression of the 1930's which Marxists mistakenly assumed was a vindication
of the Marxist analysis of capitalism.. In the course of the slump, millions of
Germans and Japanese found their souls by losing their minds, and collectively
embarked, under the leadership of madmen, upon national programs of mass
murder and mass suicide.
The Cold War, as we have known it for the past dozen years or more, actu-
ally had its genesis, believe it or not, in the divergent responses of the Soviet
Union and the Western democracies toward the common challenge of Fascism
in the 1930's. Now you may find this difficult to believe, but if you will bear with
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me in a bit of power politics analysis here I am sure you will agree that this
was, in fact, the case. Let us proceed backward in time by way of establishing
certain causal relationships among crucial events and decisions in world affairs.
And then, very briefly let us proceed forward in time by way of showing how
inexorable logic reveals that A is followed by B, and B is followed by C, and C
is followed by D, etc.
The Cold War began in the late summer and fall of 1945, immediately after
the surrender of Japan, with early repeated and emphatic American and British
protests against the imposition of Soviet hegemony and Communist.,power on
Eastern Europe north of Greece and east of the Elbe and the Adriatic. This vast
and alarming extension of Russian power into Central Europe and the Balkans was
alleged in Washington and London to constitute a Russian violation of the Yalta
and Potsdam agreements of 1945, although I think it might be more fairly regarded
as a Russian violation of the Anglo-American interpretation of these highly ambi-
guous and imprecise agreements, and not a violation of the Russian interpretation
of the agreements. This expansion of Russian power was also alleged to consti-
tute a new "totalitarian enslavement" of the peoples of Eastern Europe, who must
somehow be "liberated" and given the blessings of Western democracy---despite
the fact that most of them had never known either liberty or democracy in the
Western sense and despite the further fact, alas, that the Western Powers, then
and now and always, had no power. at all to liberate these people from Communism.
This alarming expansion of Russian power was also interpreted, you will recall,
to mean that the Soviet power-holders and policy-makers were embarked upon a
program of military conquest of all.of Western Europe and, indeed, of all the
world. This was untrue, but those of us who said it was untrue received little
thanks for our attempt to set the record straight.
How and why did this condition of affairs come about? How and why did it
come about that Russian power was extended into the middle of Europe? It
came about very simply because Hitler and his psychopathic colleagues and
followers, having conquered Western Europe and having failed to conquer Britain,
decided in 1940 and '41 to attempt the conquest of Russia. It came about because
the Russians finally defeated the Nazi Wehrmacht before Moscow in 1941 and at
Stalingrad in 1942 and '43, at an utterly appalling cost in life and property repre-
senting at least ten times the casualties and material losses suffered in World
War II by all the other United Nations combined. It came about because Russian
armies fought their way westward to Berlin and Budapest and Vienna and Prague
and the Adriatic before Anglo-American armies were able to fight their way through
France into Western Germany. It came about because America and Britain were
unable to establish any effective second front against Hitler's Reich, despite the
African and Italian campaigns of 1942 and '43, until the Normandy invasion of
1944, with the Russians, meanwhile, bearing almost the entire burden of the war
In its European theater.
And why were the Western powers unable until the last months of a six-year
war to contribute more effectively to Hitler's defeat and to occupy more of Europe
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before the Russians occupied it? The answer surely lies in the so-called "Peace
of Munich" of September, 1938, twenty-one years ago, whereby the Western
Powers betrayed Czechoslavakia and, in effect, gave Hitler a free hand in Eastern
Europe and the Balkans, partly in the hope that he would attack Russia and leave
the Western Powers at peace. The meaning.. of Munich, as a few of us pointed
out at the time, was that the Western democracies, in a mistaken quest for peace,
were surrendering Eastern Europe, and that Eastern Europe would therefore pass
under Nazi control or be partitioned between Germany and Russia or possibly
pass under Russian control, if Hitler's efforts to conquer Europe and Russia and
the world should possibly fail.
All of these things came to pass in succession. The Western Powers did not
surrender Eastern Europe at Potsdam or Yalta,. or on. the bloody and long-delayed
beachheads of Normandy in 1944. They surrendered Eastern Europe at Munich in
1938. In international politics, as in our personal affairs, decisions have conse-
quences, and these consequences are often Irrevocable. The consequences of
Munich were irrevocable. They are with us today and they will be with us for a
long time to come. The Cold War originated in Russian determination, thus far
successful, to capitalize upon these consequences, and In Western determina-
tion, thus far unsuccessful, to undo or reverse these consequences. The matter
is as simple as that. And if the Cold War is now happily approaching its end,
this is because the policy-makers in East and West alike are now disposed to
accept the consequences of power politics. during the last twenty years, since
the risks of not accepting them are far, far greater than the risks of accepting them:
Now let's look very briefly at this sequence of events, decision, and conse-
quences in chronological order instead of reverse chronological order. In the
1930's the policy-makers of the Soviet regime responded to the menace of Fascism
by joining the League of Nations in 1934, by negotiating military alliances with
France and Czechoslavakia in 1935, and by trying in every possible way to organ-
ize an anti-Fascist coalition which would have sufficient power to deter the
Fascist leaders of Germany, Italy, and Japan from unleashing war, or if need be,
to bring them to defeat speedily and at relatively small cost in the event that
their madness should lead them to unleash War in any case. But all Soviet efforts
toward this goal came to nothing because the policy-makers of the Western
democracies in the 1930's, meaning France and Britain (since for all practical
purposes the United States during these tragically wasted years had no foreign
policy at all) preferred to appease the Fascist leaders by giving them their way
in Asia, in Africa, and in Europe in the persistent hope that they would either
keep the peace or would attack Russia.andAeave the West alone. The so-called
"Peace of Munich" constituted the culmination of this process. Russia was not
invited. Russia was not represented. Neville Chamberlain and Eduard Daladier
met with Hitler and Mussolini for the purpose of surrendering Czechoslavakia to
Hitler. In this endeavor they were highly successful despite Czech determina-
tion, up to a certain point, to fight for nat .onal survival and despite Russian
willingness to come to the defense of Czechoslavakia. Mr. Chamberlain, who
was never willing to go to Russia, flew three times to Hitler's Germany in the
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summer of 1938, apparently on the principle that "if you don't concede the first
time, fly, fly again."
After Munich, all was well from the point of view of the Munichmen. All was
well until Hitler, in March of 1939, expunged and annexed to the Nazi Reich the
helpless remnant of Czechoslavakia and made it perfectly clear, as he had written
in Mein Kampf, that he was resolved to conquer Poland and to subjugate the
Western democracies before undertaking the conquest of Russia. Western alarm
coincided with Russian proposals to make a new effort at a Grand Alliance to .
resist Fascist aggression. But as it turned out, in the spring and summer of 1939,
British and French policy-makers were unwilling to enter into any alliance with
the Soviet, Union on any terms which made sense in the. circumstances of the time.
The result was the Stalin-Molotov-Hitler-Ribbentrop Pact of August 23, 1939,
contemplating in its secret protocol a partition. of Poland and a division of Eastern
Europe into German and Soviet spheres of influence. ? One week later World II
began with the Nazi invasion of Poland on the 1st of September, followed two days
later by declarations of war on Germany by France and Britain, neither of whom had
any capacity whatever to defend Poland against the Nazi invaders.
. Now since we are engaged here in demolishing the illusions of the tragic past
and considering the degree to which such illusions have now been abandoned or
are still effective in shaping human attitudes and acts, let us notice the fallacy,
repeated thousands of times In the Western press, that Stalin unleashed World
War II by his pact with Hitler in August, 1939,. thereby allegedly giving Hitler
the "green light" to invade Poland by assurances of Russian neutrality and even
c-operation. This view, despite all repetition, is a myth and a falsehood.
The voluminous records of the Nuremburg War Crimes Trials make it perfectly
clear, with abundant documentation leaving no room for doubt, that Hitler and his
political and military intimates decided in late April and early May of 1939, four
months before the Nazi-Soviet Pact, to invade Poland on the 1st day of September
of that year. This decision was as fixed and final and irrevocable as any such
decision can ever be. It was, of course, highly secret. But it was known through
secret channels to top level policy-makers in London, in Paris, and in Moscow.
Stalin and Molotov in Moscow still hoped to negotiate a workable Anglo-Soviet
Alliance against Hitler's Reich. Chamberlain. ar~d Halifax; Daladier and Bonnet
refused to negotiate any workable alliance with Russia against Hitler's Reich.
Stalin and Molotov were thus left with two choices: to do nothing; or to make a
deal with Hitler whereby half of Poland passed under Soviet control. They chose
the latter alternative in preference to the former on the reasonable assumption
that the former would be more dangerous to Soviet safety and survival than the
latter. In this they were surely right, by the pragmatic test of results which is
the only test there is .for decisions in foreign policy. But by the same test they
were surely wrong in acquiescing passively in 1940 and '41 to the Nazi conquest
of Western Europe in the fatuous hope that the Soviet Union could somehow there-
by buy peace and safety.
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The Roosevelt Administration in Washington, in spite of loud and powerful
isolationist opposition, realized that the Nazi conquest of Western Europe and
the attempted Japanese conquest of Eastern Asia represented a mortal threat to
all other Powers and all other peoples and must be resisted even at the risk of
war.. Resistance was offered through "lend-lease" and other devices to the
Fascist program of world conquest, and it led to war with the Fascist Caesars in
their final and fatal madness in attacking the United States. Stalin, Molotov,
and their colleagues offered no resistance, and no provocation, and belatedly
discovered what they should have known from the outset: that in.any case Russia
would be attacked and invaded and almost done to death.
However, I am often inclined to believe that no very useful purpose is served
for the present and the future by rehashing the mistakes and the crimes of the
past. Those mistakes and crimes were very widely and generously distributed in
all the capitals of the world in the 1930's and '40's. I would say only this, that
during the 1950's many Americans, most Americans I believe, and many West
Europeans, have been making the mistake of supposing that we are still living in
the 1930's, and have been making the further mistake of assuming that Communism
and Fascism are identical, and that diplomatic negotiations with Communists in
the 1950's would prove to be as disastrous as were diplomatic negotiations with
the Fascists in the 1930's.
This familiar analogy is wholly false, and is a major source of most of our
troubles and frustrations and dangers during the postwar Cold War between East
and West. But the pattern of power implicit in the Cold War, and, indeed, the
source of the Cold War, emerged from the agonies and tragedies and long belated
triumphs which followed the decisions of the Fascist Caesars in 1941 to attack
Russia in June and to attack America in December of that fateful and hideous year.
The invasion of Russia, more than the attack on Pearl Harbor, proved to be, in
the end, an act of final and fatal madness for the potentates and policy-makers
of the Fascist triplice.
Soviet policy-makers were determined to perpetuate this result of World War
II as protection against any future occurrence of the monstrous miseries suffered
by the Soviet peoples during World War II. Anglo-American policy makers were
determined to reverse this result of World War II as protection against any future
recurrence of totalitarian attempts at the conquest of Europe and the world.
Russian fears and Western fears were alike unjustified by the facts, as a few
of us again tried to point out during the years of danger. But policy-makers in
particular, and people in general, do not think and feel and act in terms of the
facts. They think and feel and actin terms of their interpretation of or illusions
about the facts, and often in terms of their false analogies and their fears, all
of which are quite understandable. The Cold War was and is a product of the
mutual and reciprocal fears and illusions and false analogies and misconceptions,
some of which, at least, we are now happily in the process of correcting, over-
coming, and transcending.
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The very essense of the Cold war, in my own mind (if you will pardon a
personal reference), was epitomized in a little incident at the National War Col-
lege in Washington way back in 1947 in a panel discussion following a lecture
I had been invited to give there. The Chairman of the panel discussion was
Mr. Maynard Barnes of the State Department, recently American Minister to Com-
munist Bulgaria and already an ardent Cold Warrior. Mr. Barnes opened the
discussion by saying, "The problem we face is not new, but ol~, Russian troops
are in Central Europe. Russian troops have many times been in Central Europe
before. They have always had to be driven out. Russian troops are in Central
Europe now. They have to be driven out. This is our problem. " Before I could
make the obvious comment, Mr. Barnes was interrrupted by a very distinguished
diplomatic historian, Professor Arnold, Wolfers, then of Yale and a member of the
permanent staff of the National War College. Said Professor Wolfers, "Mr. Barnes,
what are you saying? It is true that Russian troops have been in Central Europe
many times before. They were in Berlin in 1760, " and then he reviewed the record
a bit, "but when have they ever been driven out? They have always been re-
called home on the basis of negotiated agreements among the.Great Powers. When
have they ever been driven out?" Mr. Barnes thought, and thought, and thought,
and he could think of no such instance. Professor Wolfers was, of course, cor-
rect. Finally,. Mr. Barnes said, "Well, it doesn't make. any difference. The
Russian troops have to be driven out anyway. " Obviously it makes all the differ-
ence in the world, in our time the difference between life and death for all man-
kind, as to whether Russian troops in Central Europe are to be driven out by force,
which, incidentally, is quite impossible, or are to be withdrawn ultimately on
the basis of a negotiated accord among the Great Powers dealing with one another
as equals and each granting quid pro quo for concessions granted by the other side.
By the spring of the year 1953, it had become obvious to a few of us, who try
to follow these matters with some care, that the Cold War had become a totally
senseless and highly dangerous conflict which had to be ended by negotiated
accords among the Great Powers., meaning in the first instance the United States
and the Soviet Union as the greatest of these Powers. This conviction was re-
inforced by the removal from this vale of tears in early March of 1953 of Josef
Stalin, and by his deposit on his bed of repose next to Lenin in the tomb in Red
Square. For it is clear from the record that Stalin in his later years had become
a psychopathic victim of paranoia with whom no meaningful diplomatic negotia-
tions outside of Russia, and no meaningful human relations inside of Russia,
were any longer possible.
A new leadership in the Soviet Union offered new possibilities. By the
Spring of 1953, which was six years ago, and many years before the advent of
the ICBM's, the Sputniks, or the Luniks, it was already abundantly clear that
neither America nor Russia could impose its will on the other by armed force,
and that any effort to do so could result only in the mutual destruction of both,
and the end of our civilization, and quite possibly the suicide of the human race
itself. Therefore, to revert to the obvious truisms with which we began, it was
clear by 1953 that there was no tolerable alternative to a revival of diplomacy
and a negotiated settlement of the Cold War.
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A week or ten days ago I was going through some old files and I discovered a
rather interesting article in The Nation of New York in the issue of June 20th, 1953,
entitled "Cold War's End." This purported to be a prophetic article forecasting
peace in Korea, peace in Indo-China, a treaty for the neutralization of Austria,
a Summit Conference, ultimate solution of the German problem, and much else, all
of which could have come to pass, and should have come to pass, within two or
three years after 1953.
Some of these things did come to pass, but not all of them. It transpired that,
in some respects, this prophetic article was prematurely prophetic. A truce in
Korea was signed in late June of '53, and a truce in Indo-China was signed in July
of '54, an Austrian treaty was signed on the 15th of May in '55; a Summit Confer-
ence met in Geneva of '55; and there was every prospect of a negotiated settle-
ment of the Cold War by the end of that year. And then something went wrong and
the Cold War was resumed instead of being terminated as this article had forecast.
You will, of course, understand that considerations of modesty forbid me to name
the author of the article.
Now what went wrong in 1955? Various things went wrong, including a number
of mistakes and miscalculations by policy-makers in both Washington and Moscow,
and also in London, Paris, Budapest, Cairo, and elsewhere. And among the other
things that went wrong, President Eisenhower's heart attack of September of 1955
left him temporarily incapacitated and left the direction of American policy in the
hands of a Secretary of State, who, among his very many and great virtues, was
addicted to the vice of opposing any negotiated settlement. He is now departed
and in peace, and of the dead we speak no evil. Let us only notice that if a
comprehensive East-West settlement, or even a partial settlement, had been nego-
tiated in the late months of 1955, there would, I am confident, have been no
violence in Hungary and no violence at Suez and Sinai in the fall of 1956. A double
tragedy could have been avoided, and the thousands who were slain would still be
alive.
It is later than you think. 1959 is a good deal later than 1955, but happily not
too late. Unless further mistakes and miscalculations are made, the Cold War
will be ended by a series of diplomatic settlements during the coming year or
years; some of them may take longer. No one in his senses would undertake to
forecast the details of those settlements. Even though some of you think by now
that I am no longer in my senses, I am going to pretend that I am and I'm not
going to try to forecast these things.
I leave you with a brief formulation of two lessons learned, and five lessons
yet to be learned. The rulers of Russia have, I believe, learned, whether they
choose to admit the fact or not, that the Marxist analysis of capitalism is simply
wrong with no basis whatsoever in the realities of our times, particularly in the
United States. They have also learned that Communism will never liberate or
subjugate or unify all the world, and that Communism's future fortunes in the
world cannot be served by propaganda or subversion and least of all by war, but
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can be served only by demonstrating that the Communist system can contribute-
more, eff 6 ctively than other systems to human health and wealth and happiness,
and, ultimately, to human freedom. This remains to be demonstrated, but I think
they have learned that this is what they have to try to do.
The policy-makers, and, I think, most .of the people of America, have learned
that war as a weapon of national policy has now become wholly unthinkable, intol-
erable, and impossible, and that peace requires that Americans deal with Russians
not as fools, nor as knaves, nor as scoundrels, nor as incarnations of evil, but
as human beings, and as equals with interests.and aspirations similar to, and
quite compatible with, American aspirations and interests. These things, I think,
have been learned.
Beyond this, much remains to be learned by Russians and Americans alike,
including the ultimate lesson that enduring peace in a world community requires
effective law in a world community, and that this will finally require agreement
on some limited and workable form of World Government, probably through a
development of the United Nations in that direction. But apart from this ultimate
lesson there are, it seems to me, several other lessons closer at hand which I
believe will have to be learned.
First, we must learn that no unification of Germany is possible except through
some form of disengagement, disarmament, and neutralization in Central and
Eastern Europe. This concept or formula is not a product of Russian.wickedness
or Soviet or Communist conspiracy. This idea was first advanced at the Summit
Conference in Geneva by Anthony, Eden, Prime Minister of Great Britain, in July
of 1955. It has since been endorsed and advanced by a great variety of people
in East and West alike. It was put into concrete form by Adam Rapacki, the
Foreign Minister of Poland, in November of 1957 and advanced in several variants
in '58 by the Polish Government. It was endorsed by Khrushchev. It has the full
support of the British Labor Party and of many Conservatives, of the German Social
Democrats, and, I think, of the more thoughtful foreign commentators on world
affairs in our own country. But, of course, it has been flatly rejected over'and
over again by our policy-makers in Washington. I repeat, we must learn that no
re-unification of Germany is possible apart from some form of disengagement,
neutralization, and disarmament in Central 'and Eastern Europe. The position to
which we have adhered, or our policy-makers have adhered, for ten long years
now, the position that Germany is to be unified by what would amount to the
annexation to Western Germany of Eastern Germany, .and that this re-unified
Germany is _to be heavily re-armed with American assistance and ultimately with
thermonuclear weapons, and that this re-unified Germany is to be allied with
the Western powers against Russia, bears no. relationship to the realities of our
world. This notion is wholly, utterly, and totally unworkable. . No Russian
goverrjment in. a thousand years would ever dream of accepting it in any event.
Second, we must learn that no liberation of the satellites from Russian con-
trol is possible except through some form of disengagement, neutralization, and
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disarmament in Central and Eastern Europe. Given some form of agreement in that
direction, then eventually some form of liberation of the satellites will, I think,
become possible. Without that, not possible.
Thirdly, we must learn, we and the Russians together, that no agreement on
disarmament is possible through dramatic Soviet schemes for the abolition of all
arms and weapons within four years or through continued American insistence on
100% foolproof schemes for inspection and control, which are technologically and
politically impossible. Agreements to reduce armaments can be furthered, in my
judgment, only by a negotiated settlement of political problems through the practice
of diplomacy among peoples, and by the resultant diminution of mutual fears and
suspicions, and the advent of mutual trust and confidence. Way back in the fall
of 1945, in commenting on the problem already then posed of the international con-
trol of atomic energy, Prime Minister Clement Attlee of Great Britain said, "Where
there is no mutual confidence, no system of control can work." This is true.
This was true then and it is true now: "Where there is no mutual confidence, no
system of control can work. " I might add here as a footnote, in case you have
forgotten '(this is not very encouraging I grant you, but it states the fact), there
has been only one instance, or one and one-half instances, if you prefer, in the
whole history of modern diplomacy of an international conference aimed at the
reduction of armaments by international agreement among equals which has sus-
ceeded in coming to an agreement for the reduction of armaments by international
agreement among equals. Only one, or one and one-half, has succeeded. All
the rest have failed totally. I refer, of course, to the Washington Naval Disarma-
ment Conference of 1921-22 and the later London Conference of 1930, which dealt
with cruisers. This is the only case of international agreement among equals for
disarmament. There was no provision whatever made for any inspection or control.
All the parties abided by the agreement and it was carried out in good faith for
fifteen years.
Fourth, we must learn that we here in America will, in fact, need in the years
ahead an economic substitute for the Cold War. Even though many of our business
leaders may tell Mr. Khrushchev, "No, the problem Is very .simple. We don't
need an economic substitute for the Cold War, " I submit to you that we will need
an economic substitute for the Cold War and that we. should all of us be devot-
ing far more thought to this problem than we have.been doing thus far.
And fifth, (and finally, you will be glad to know) and still far off, very far
off I fear, we must learn that in the long run no stable and secure world settle-
ment will be truly possible without the participation of China, because China
embraces one-quarter of the human race, with a population far larger than that
of the United States, Russia, and Western Europe put together.
Can we learn these lessons? I believe so. We must learn them or perish.
Therefore we can learn them if we will resolve to chart our course toward fruit-
ful life rather than continue on a course toward universal death for ourselves
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and our children. Let us then help ourselves, as we are trying to do here, to
learn, let us help our leaders to learn, let us help our Russian neighbors to learn,
because the more we learn, the more true it will become that "Blessed are the
peace-makers, for they shall be called the children of God."
QUESTIONS FROM THE FLOOR:
Question: Why should we trust Khrushchev any more than we should have trusted
Hitler?
Prof. Schuman: We should not. In international affairs, we should not base
agreements on trust. This is nonsense. You must base agreements on some
assumption of what your interests are, and what the interests of the other party
are, and what the dynamics of action are on both sides, not on trust. No trust
is involved here.
Why should one assume that the interests of the. power-holders in the Soviet
Union are substantially different than the interests of the power-holders in
Hitler's Reich? Well, there are some simple and obvious reasons for assuming
that. there is a major difference here. , The power-holders in. Hitler's Reich were
completely dependent for maintaining themselves in power and for maintaining
full production and full employment in the Germany of.the 1930's on armaments,
preparations for war, conquest, exploitation of conquered peoples, and exter-
mtnation. This is how they lived. They couln't live. otherwise. The power-
hal.ders in the Soviet Union are not operating in that kind of economy or that kind
of society. They can, with relative ease, and it would be enormously to. their
advantage to do so, shift their resources from armaments to consumer's goods;
and they are not living in a context in which they are inexorably driven toward
foreign expansion, aggression, and war, as Hitler and the. Japanese warlords were.
I hope we can get that distinction through our heads. It is of vital importance.
Question: Would you please list the other reasons of this afternoon why the
elements of war are not present today?
Prof. Schuman: For the benefit of those of you who were not present at the panel
discussion of this afternoon, reference is made to a facetious request of the
Chairman of this afternoon for me to reiterate in two minutes the substance of
an hour and one-half lecture entitled, "Why World War III Will Never Be Fought?"
I couldn't quite do it in two minutes, nor can I do it here in two minutes. But
at all events, maybe in three minutes, Miss Moderator. The argument rests on
the following assumption: That on the basis of historical experience, in our
State System, and even in earlier State Systems, in order to have a good, satis-
factory, worthwhile world war, there are at least five prerequisites that must
be present in the pattern of world affairs. You must first have the Powers divided
into hostile coalitions. You must secondly have an arms race under way in which
each tries to gain military superiority over the other. You must, third, have a
series of incidents which act as sparks to set off the explosion. You can spell
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this out for yourselves in the background of 1914 and of 1939. Thus far in terms
of these three preconditions of a world war, we've been doing extremely well in
the last fifteen years. We have the Powers divided into hostile coalitions. We
have the most supercolossal arms race of all time. And we have had incidents
almost every week,---planes shot down, border disputes, whatnot.
But we need two other things for a war between Great Powers. You need one
Power or group of Powers making demands on the other Power or group of Powers
for positions and components of power which are deemed decisive on both sides
for future power, and which the other side will resist by force. And fifthly and
decisively, you need the policy-makers and strategists on one side or the other,
or usually both, in a position where they are able to entertain plausible or par-
tially convincing beliefs in the military superiority of their own side, and to
concoct strategic plans for winning the next war. There has never been a war in
human history in which one side or the other or both, usually, did not entertain
at the top level of policy-making a conviction or illusion of "our" superiority over
"them" and a plan or program of a strategic nature by which "we" are going to win
the war. Always, this.
This is now lacking. This has been lacking in the Cold War for fifteen years,
and it is still lacking. It is not possible for anyone in his right mind in Wash-
ington or Moscow to entertain any illusion of military superiority or to concoct
any plan for winning the next war. This is not possible. I can't tell you why
unless you want to give me another hour. But it's not possible, and it's less
possible in 1959 than it was five years ago or ten years ago. Therefore, the two
great Power blocs have never, in all these years, made demands on one another
for positions or components of power which the other side would resist by force.
This has never happened. The Korean War is no exception, for, alas and alack,
President Truman and Secretary Acheson and even General Bradley and some others
in January, 1950, gave the impression to the world that the United States wouldn't
defend South Korea. This was an error, but that impression was given. There
has never been any Communist aggression against any frontier area which the
United States said it would defend by force. And the United States and its Western
allies have never taken any military action against any frontier area which Moscow
said that it would defend by force.
Why? I've given youthe reasons. This will not be. Therefore, none of the
incidents ever leads to war. And therefore, the arms race and the grouping of
the Powers is, in a way, rather irrelevant. However, actually I'm sorry that I
recapitulated this thesis because the usual effect of this argument is to make
people complacent and make them apathetic. We have no right to be complacent,
and the worst thing that could possibly happen in American-Soviet relations in
the months and years ahead is any kind of complacency or apathy on the part of
the American public. It seems to me that we owe it to ourselves, and to the
world at large, and to posterity, to grapple most seriously and think most
seriously and clearly, if we can, about the kinds of problems and issues that
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will continue to confront us. Otherwise, we can'have no assurance against some
ultimate catastrophe.
Question: On what terms can or should trade be resumed with Russia?
Prof. Schuman: Well, you are all aware that in recent years commerce between
the United States and the Soviet Union has"been negligible. I believe KhrushrhPvv
in one of his addresses said you could carry all the goods between the twokcoun-
tries in t'yo or three ships. I believe our total exports to Russia last fear were
1/10th of 1% of all our exports over the world, and Soviet exports here were half
of 1% of Soviet exports. . Why is it so negligible, particularly in view of the fact
that way back in the 1930's there was a considerable volume of mutually advanta-
geous trade between'.the two countries? It is negligible primarily because the
things the Russians want to buy here: are almost in every case things still on the
strategic embargo list. They are alleged to be of use in war or of use in the
strengthening of Soviet military potential, and therefore, their export is forbidden.
That's part of the problem.
There. are various other aspects of the problem: debt questions, questions of
credit, perhaps too technical to go into here. But I think without any question
the primary obstacle to an expansion of American-Soviet trade, which in my view
would be to the great advantage. of everybody concerned, is the prevailing official
view, translated into legislation and into administrative orders and acts banning
the export of all kinds of things, that increased trade between the United States
and Russia would somehow redound. to Russian advantage and American disadvan-'
tage.
By the same logic, we ban all trade with China, on the assumption that such
trade would redound to Chinese advantage and American disadvantage. Of course,
anyone who has had Economics 1 - 2 knows better than that---that all trade is to
the advantage of both parties, including the party to which. there is the least
advantage. I believe that'we shall ultimately have to learn also to modify this
misconception of the function of international trade.
Question: Will greater reliance on long range weapons make disengagement of
standing forces in Europe and subsequent unification of Germany more possible?
Prof. Schuman: That is an interesting question, ladies and gentlemen. But I
presume that ought to be referred to a military historian or military specialist,
neither of which I am. Therefore, I can offer only a layman's answer to this.
There is one sense in which all weapons and all armed forces and all- strategies
and tactics are already completely obsolete. By that I mean we have reached a
point at which war can no longer be used as an instrument of policy, because
recourse to war with the weapons available means the. end of the human race.
I think it means no less than that if we envisage a general, prolonged thermonu-
clear war. This being so, perhaps it's not too helpful to make distinctions be-
tween various kinds of armaments, but I take it the questioner has in mind
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something which is a possibly hopeful thought, that is, that insofar as the mili-
tary planners of the two great Super Powers are more and more successful in
perfecting intercontinental ballistic missiles with thermonuclear warheads which
can hit, any target 5,000 miles away, insofar as this is the reliance for defense
and security, the uses of conventional armies, navies, and air forces becomes
more and more questionable. What do you need armies, navies, and air forces
for if you are going to fight the next war that way? Maybe then, in this sense,
the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles might help to promote reduction
of, and disengagement of, standing forces in Central and Eastern Europe. Of
course, there's a rub to this on both sides. On our side the rub is that the
strategy of NATO from the beginning has all been based on the immediate use of
atomic weapons at the onset of any new hostilities. Any disengagement or consi-
deration of the hope expressed in this question would require considerable re-
thinking of the function and task of NATO, as I suspect it would require equal re-
thinking on the part of Soviet strategists and planners of the whole structure of
the Soviet armed forces. But let's be cheerful and assume there is a little hope
in the question posed here.
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"THE ECONOMIC RACE FOR WORLD SURPEMACY"
Thursday Seminar
Opening Remarks: Mr. Thomas Whitney, Journalist
Remarks: Prof. John S. Curtiss, Duke University
Questioners: Julie Campbell
Warren Wickersham
William Mauer
Moderator: Marian Sapp; Symposium Committee
Moderator: This is the Duke University Student Symposium, Thursday afternoon,
October 8th, at 3:15 p.m. in the Union Ballroom.
Mr. Whitney: The title of the seminar for today is "The Economic Race for World
Supremacy." There is certainly more and more of a consciousness in this country
and abroad of Soviet economic accomplishments. One testimony to this is a recent
work put out by a joint economic committee entitled "A Comparison of the United
States and Soviet Economies." It consists of papers submitted to the joint
Economic Committee of the United States Congress, and it's only Part I of this
particular work, and I can certainly recommend it as being a very interesting and
worthwhile series of studies on Soviet economic growth' as compared with that of
the 'United States.
Let's start our discussion today by looking at a few Soviet economic accom-
plishments. It was recently, announced by Secretary of the Central Committee
Mikhail Suslov in his speech in Peiping that the Soviet Union this year will pro-
duce, and this was said at a time when almost ten months of the year were over,
60 million metric tons of steel, 129 million metric tons of oil, 261 billion kilowatt
hours of electric power, and over 500 million metric tons of coal. This isn't any
mean accomplishment. This puts the Soviet Union well in first place in.-the world
in coal production. It puts the Soviet Union far into second place in the produc-
tion of steel and electric power in the world, and third in the world in production
of oil. It's very interesting also that the increases in output that the Soviet
Union will register this year in its production of key'commodities are considerable.
For instance, in the case of steel, according to Suslov, production will increase
5 million 100 thousand tons over last year---that is in one year's time. Electric
power will increase 23 billion kilowatt hours in output this year over last year.
And in the case of petroleum the increase will be 16 million metric tons. Now
these are just figures to you, but to try to put them in a little more concrete terms
let me state it this way; that an increase in output of this magnitude in the case
of steel means that in every five years the Soviet Union, if it can maintain such
an increase over a period of five years, adds as much steel production to its
existing large production as is made by West Germany, the third ranking steel
producer in the world. The addition each year of 23 billion kilowatt hours of
electric power to the existing large Soviet production of electric power means
that Soviet power production is increased as much every two or three years as
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the existing power production in England and France. The addition of 16 metric
tons of petroleum production to the Soviet Union's existing production of petroleum
means that every three years the Soviet Union is adding as much to its existing
production as the total output of Saudi Arabia, at least an amount in that general
area of magnitude, Saudi Arabia being one of the largest oil producers in the world.
This is no mean accomplishment.
Now let us add to that one other important fact, that is that as you study the
Soviet economy, as you look back at the history of the Soviet economy, it will
become apparent to you that production increases are being achieved in the Soviet
Union, and have been achieved in almost all the years of peace in the Soviet
Union every year. Sometimes these increases are larger, and sometimes they are
smaller, so far as the statistical measurement of total production goes. There is
much discussion among American economists as to whether the Soviet gross pro-
duction index for industry does not exaggerate Soviet accomplishments. ,Never-
theless, the fact remains that in each year there is undoubtedly an increase in
industrial production in the Soviet Union, year after year and regularly. And in
the case of each important commodity this is also the case. Some years in the
case of steel an increase of only 2 million metric tons was achieved in the Soviet
Union, and sometimes as will be the case in this year, it will be as much as five
million tons. Yet the fact remains that there has been an increase even in those
years in which planned production has not been attained. The morement is
regularly and steadily up. This is something that cannot be said of our own
economy, certainly, because, as you know, we move to a certain extent in fits
and starts.
It's all, very.well to talk about tons of steel and billions of kilowatt hours of
electricity, but let's also talk about some specific objects that are being built
in the Soviet Union in the present time as examples. This year when Vice-Presi-
dent Nixon visited the USSR, one of the cities he saw was the booming metropolis
of Novosibirsk in Siberia; and one of the things he visited at Novosibirsk was a
site outside the city itself. It was an area that had been smoothed over by bull-
dozers, and where construction crews were at work on a large scale, and what
Nixon and the newspapermen who were with him saw was in embryo a new, great
center of world science. It's a city which, at least as far as I know, doesn't
yet have even a name. It was started, I believe, two years ago. Up to that time,
it was just woods alongside the reservoir that has been formed by the electric
power dam across the Ob river. In about two years time more it will be a boom-
ing city of scholarly and scientific work. There will be there thirteen major
research institutes, almost every one of them devoted to work in the field of the
physical sciences and mathematics. Some of the most important Soviet scientists
are already there starting their organizational work in their new institute. There
will be a university there which will, in part, prepare people for research work
in this new science city. There will be a factory for the production of labora-
tory equipment. There will be a library with four million volumes in its initial
collection. This will have risen on a place where there was nothing several
years ago. There isn't the slightest doubt that it will, in ten years time, rank
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alongside Leningrad, Moscow, and Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Cambridge,
England, as one of the world's great science research centers. This is being
built right now, at the present time, and it was not there a few years ago.
Another project in Siberia which-Vice-President Nixon didn't see was in its
own way as great a project. Over on the Angara River at a small place called
Bratsk, there is being built the greatest hydroelectric station in the world. The
Angara River flows out of Lake Baikal and into the Yenisei River and it has one
particularly useful characteristic which makes it potentially one of the world's
greatest
out hydroelectric ela because ittflohas a very steady flow year ws from Lake Bakal and
year out from season to season
forms a tremendous reservoir. And because of this and beoause there is a very
rapid fall in the level of the river, this means that a dam built across the Angara
River can produce hydroelectric power at a very, very cheap rate. The rapids
where this dam is being built was a complete wilderness a few years ago. Now
there is a teeming city populated by young people who have been sent out there,
perhaps not all of them willingly, but at any rate they are there, to build this
dam. The dam is at the present time well under way. It will probably be produc-
ing power in another three to four to five years, if not earlier. The total capacity
of the power produced will run in the area of 4, 500, 000 kilowatts. -?This is more
than twice the capacity of Grand Coulee in Washington, which, until a few years
ago, was the largest hydroelectric dam in the world. And this project is right in
the middle of a total wilderness. This cheap electric power will flow over power
lines to areas of Soviet Eastern Siberia and Central, Siberia which have not had
adequate electric power up to now. The power will be used, along with power to
be produced from other electric. power stations projected in the same area, along
with electric power to be produced from coal and perhaps from nuclear power, to
create one of the world's new, great industrial areas, and, I repeat, in an area
which is right now a wilderness, an area which will turn out an enormous quantity
of chemical products---aluminum, metals, coal, an area which has all the natural
resources and which will in twenty to fifty years time rank with such industrial
areas as our own Pacific Northwest, as the Ruhr, as one of the great productive
districts of the world.
Let's take another Soviet accomplishment that I talked about yesterday in
an economics class. It isn't an accomplishment yet, but something that is
being done. While Khrushchev was here in the United States,: a decree was
,issued in Moscow, a decree of the Central Committee and the Council of Minis-
ters of the USSR and the Soviet Trade Unions.. It was front page new in Pravda
and yet I doubt whether it was reported in more than a few papers in this country
because of the fact that the Khrushchev visit was getting so much attention.
What is this decree? This is a decree which is intended to complete or carry
on further the process of transfer of the Soviet workers from an eight hour work
day, which they had in the post war period, an eight hour work day, and a six
day week, to a seven hour work day, again, six days a week. ? A reduction of
their, work week from the area of 48 hours to 42 hours. - And, eventually, as it
has been stated by Soviet authorities, they plan to reduce it to 40 hours. After
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all, -we're used, most of us, to offices and factories aad the like that work already
on a forty hour week and in some cases on a thirty-five hour week. But how does
something like this look to people like Indians, let us say, or others who come
from countries where the eight hour day or, for that matter, even the six day week
is something still to be dreamed about, something that hasn't been achieved.
This is something that is being done, the process of transferring to the seven
hour day will be completed, if this plan is carried out, by the end of next year.
The moral of these things that I have just been talking to you about is that the
Soviet Union has achieved a good deal, as is obvious from its moon rocket, but
the Soviet Union isn't resting on its laurels. The Soviet Union is doing things at
the present time which will bear fruit years and decades from now. But that's
not the only point to be made about the Soviet Union. Last week Premier Khrushchev
arrived in Moscow on his TU-114 airplane and the next day took off for Peiping.
This airplane, I think it's the biggest passenger airplane in the world---it's abso-
lutely enormous, as you remember, when Vice-Premier Koslov came here last June
he had to descend on a ladder because there wasn't any ramp available at Friend-
ship Airport in the United States tall enough to get up to the plane---it's an
enormous and a very, very effective and efficient plane. It made the trip back
with Vice-Premier Koslov from Washington to Moscow in a little less than ten
hours, which is a very fast flight, indeed, with an average speed of over 800
kilometers or 500 miles an hour. This is the plane that Premier Khrushchev travels
in, I suppose one of the finest fruits of the aircraft industry of the world, even
perhaps superior to the first jet plane that ever went into passenger service and
stayed in it anywhere in the world, the TU-104, also a Soviet plane. Premier
Khrushchev, when he traveled over his country, could look down from this most
modern plane,- down below to the Soviet earth, and what did he see? He saw a
land where there were practically no roads at all, little dirt trails over the hori-
zon with deep holes where Soviet trucks can get stuck up to their axles and over
without any trouble at all. Once in a long, long while, maybe a paved road. The
Soviet Union, which has one sixth of the world's surface, has fewer modern paved
highways than the state of New York or the state of Pennsylvania by itself alone.
Jet transportation in the sky above and no roads down on the earth below. This
in a way epitomizes a great deal of what is in existence in the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union is a land of contrast. And I will cite an example that I cited
in Dr. Hoover's class yesterday: If you go from the airport Vnukovo into Moscow
(it's only about twenty miles outside of town), there are still left along that
highway a few villages, and you will see in these villages log cabins. It has
been a long time since there was a President of the United States born in a log
cabin. We don't have any more log cabins, or very few. But it wouldn't be at
all impossible for many years to come if Prime Ministers of the Soviet Union
were to have been born in log cabins, because almost all of rural Russia is made
up of log cabins. They are made in very much the same way that they were made
in the times of Ivan the Terrible or a thousand years ago. Logs are taken, rough
hewn, notched, put together very effectively and very efficiently with rather
primitive tools, and with moss in between for insulation---and that is Soviet
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rural construction in the middle of the 20th century. But, if you were to go on
toward Moscow on the road between the airport and the city, you would see a
kind of queer looking T- shaped thing sticking out of the top of the roof of a log
cabin, and you would ask your Intourist chauffeur, "What is that?" And he
would say, "Oh, that is a television aerial." And true enough, it wouldnt be
like any television aerial you had ever seen or had, but it would be a television
aerial and every one of those aerials would. represent a television set down below
in that cabin. And most of them have televison aerials on them. So there you
are. The construction methods of the 13th century alongside the electronics indus-
try of the 20th century. Again, that is Russia.
There isn't any one truth about the Soviet Union. The truth about the Soviet
economy does not lie exclusively in nuclear power plants, in atomic ice-breakers,
in moon rockets. It also lies in elevators which still don't work in many parts of
the country. Even though the situation has improved, it still lies in roads that
don't exist, in life which is in many respects still on a very primitive level, where
even running hot water is still a luxury which many people have never experienced
or heard about.. And this is something that you must always keep in mind when
you read about the Soviet Union or' when you think about its economic progress.
And yet,. the fact is that the Soviet Union has hit. the industriai-4ackpot of
the 20th century in the biggest possible way, and is exploiting this situation to
the utmost. It has opened that wonderbox of nucleonics, electronics, and auto-
mation, modern industrial chemistry, and all the rest of it that has given us the
good things which make our American life so interesting and attractive. The fact
that in the Soviet Union so many of these good things of life have not yet filtered
down to the average Soviet consumer doesn't mean that the techniques and the
talents for using those things are not there. They are there. It is true that. the
Soviet Union is producing nearly three times as many engineers as we are per year.
And the problems of use of natural resources ultimately come down to only one
thing in the final analysis---skilled people, people able to make something out
of nothing. And that is what the Soviet Union has.
As for us here in the United States, because our subject here is "The Econo-
mic Race for World Supremacy, " well, it's obvious, I think, to all of us that we
aren't standing still. Things aren't getting worse, certainly. Things are to
some extent getting better from year to year. We aren't standing still, Yet,
if you stop to look, we aren't running either. In a way, you know, this topic
is a very interesting one: "The Economic Race for World Supremacy. " Now we're
here talking about this, but are there people in Washington, do people in Wash-
ington in the important positions in the government, do people in key positions
in industry in our country, do the influential people who make the important
decisions in the country think that we are in an economic race with Russia for
world supremacy? Do they think of this as a race? Do they worry whether Russia
catches up with us in electric power production, for instance, which is perhaps
the most valid single index of industrial progress that one can think of in the
world today? Well, my contention would be that they don't think of it very much
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in these terms. It's a little bit like the race for space. Until the Soviet Sputnik
got up there, and it was apparent just what a tremendous psychological impact
this was having, until that moment we weren't in the race for space. In fact,
even after that moment, leaders of our government said that we were not running
a race with the Soviet Union, and thereupon immediately started to run a race.
By this time, we were an awful long way behind. And I just was noticing in the
New York Times the other day that Dr. York, who is one of our leaders in the
space field, puts it this way. He said, "The Soviet lead in rocket propulsion
can be traced to the fact that the Soviet Union embarked on a strong, systematic
program of rocket development of 1945, while the United States did not get going
with a crash program until 1954. " "As a result of this head start, " he said, "the
Soviet Union by 1957 had developed a rocket with an initial thrust of 600 thousand
to 800 thousand pounds for space research. " ".In the United States, " he pointed
out, "the Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile with 360 pounds of thrust is only
now becoming available for space missions." "Ultimately," Dr. York, said,
"this country's chances of catching up with the Soviet Union in space rocket
propulsion depend largely upon the Saturn rocket, a cluster of rocket engines pro-
ducing 1- million, 500 thousand pounds of thrust. " The Saturn rocket is under
development by the Army Ballistic Missiles Agency of Huntsville, Alabama. Not
mentioned by Dr. York was the fact that the fate of the Saturn project is still
somewhat uncertain because of budgetary-and organizational review of the space
program.
Are we in the space race? I mean the-question is open. Nobody knows
whether we're in it or not, because nobody has decided whether we are. The
United States, likewise, up to the present time hasn't shown much signs that there
is any such race for economic world supremacy. Let me conclude these introduc-
tory remarks by saying that as long as we don't recognize that there is such a
race, then it's very difficult to see how we stand very much chance of keeping
ahead in the long run.
Moderator: Thank you Mr. Whitney. Dr. Curtiss, I believe, has some remarks.
Prof. Curtiss:
First of all, I want to present some material supporting the views of Mr. Whitney
regarding the rapid growth of the Soviet economy. In 1930 American steel produc-
tion was 35.5 million short tons; Soviet steel production was 4.7 million tons.
The ratio thus was about 7.1. For 1940 the corresponding figures were 47.4 and
20.1 million tons, or almost 2 1/2 to 1. In 1958; which was a poor year for us
because of the recession; we produced 89 million tons of steel; and the USSR
produced 60 million---or about. three to two. Thus in the period between 1930
and 1958, the Soviet Union had cut our lead in steel from over seven to one to
merely three to two. Surely such rapid progress on their part indicates that we
have an effective competitor.
In discussing Soviet economic development one of the first questions we
should consider is the validity of Soviet statistics. While there have been
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considerable differences of opinion on this point, I think that the majority of roduc students of Soviet economics feel that C nt of its 1948 outputdeclares
without gpving the
tion of coal or oil for 1949 was 108 per
1948 figures, or states the quantity of output in terms of rubles, these figures
being for example, ad and
must be used with great caution. The statistics on value output,
are of little value unless we know the value of the ruble that
On the other
unless we know the prices of the various items that are being made.
produc-
hand, it is generally held that when the Soviet
or e oil or so many billion kilowatt-hours
tion of so many million metric tons of coal of electricity, these figures are fairly reliable. Over the years the figures of
this sort have been fairly. consistent, and the government itself uses them, so e these figures command respect. When Soviet unfavorable,
no figures at all.
government, instead of lying about them,
Mr. Whitney mentioned to me the case of Soviet population estimates after
World War II. For a long time there were
hundrefinally, million, the USSR announced
slightly exceeded the pre-war figure of two
that its population was estimated at 200, 200, 000.
My main topic is Soviet agriculture, about which nothing
lands in et been s id.
In 1930 Stalin compelled the Soviet peasants to pool their
farms in order to achieve a more productive agriculture. The peasants, however,,
were very reluctant to turn over their livestock to the collectives,
reives, and tsotmany
of them killed and ate their cattle before they joined.
numbers of cows, sheep, and pigs were cut by one-fourth or over, and it took
many years to make good this loss. Also, while the government supplied much
farm machinery to the collective farms and urged modern methods, the. peasants
received little for their labor. The government compelled
for which the government
of their crop to it in the form of compulsory delivie
paid little, and the prices paid for the balance
hard tfor the collectivesh~gSo the gh
to make it profitable for the peasants to work
peasants grew little more'on the collective farms than the governmoel prom a led owing
them to grow, and instead preferredarden plots for themselves energy
Thus, while by
crops and livestock on their own garden
the outbreak of the German-Soviet war in 1941
of agriculture, it st lldlagged far
somewhat and had made good the earlier l
behind industry.
The. German invasion in 1941 and 1942 did. immense damage Soviet
kigric 1
ture by destroying vast quantities of farm machinery and
It took years to
much livestock, as well as killing great numbers of peasants.
complete Soviet recovery after the war. In additon, Stalin continued the policy
of giving the peasants relatively little for their crops, so that they did not find
it worthwhile to work extra hard. In addition, if a collective farm made excep-
tional progress, the tax officials, as Khrushchev later said, pruned it as
gardeners prune shrubs in parks. . Hence, by Stalin's death in 1953 Soviet. agri-
above the 1928 level,
culture was producing crops not much over in 1928.
and number of livestock was no greater
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Khrushchev, who was much interested in agriculture, determined to introduce
new policies in order to improve the situation. In September, 1953, he made a
speech in which he proposed that the low prices paid to the peasants for their
compulsory deliveries of produce be raised drastically---five times for cattle and
poultry, and doubled for milk and butter. Payments for potatoes and vegetables
were raised by 255-'40%. In additicn, the government would pay 30% more for its
purchases of meat, and 50% more for milk. In order to stimulate the raising of
livestock, Khrushchev insisted on a vast increase in the planting of corn. Where
the climate would permit the growing of corn for grain, hybrid seed from the
United States should be planted, to obtain much higher yields than before. In
the colder regions, he ordered the growing of corn to provide silage for winter
fodder for cattle. Thus corn has always played a big part in Khrushchev's farm
program. A great expansion of production of mineral fertilizer was another of his
demands. Finally, he embarked on a huge effort to plow up millions of acres of
virgin soil or other idle land in Western Siberia and Central Asia to gro vast
quantities of wheat.
In later years Khrushchev introduced other new farm policies. In 1958 he
ordered an end to all compulsory deliveries of farm produce, so that the govern-
ment would pay for all it bought at the market price. The collective farmers now
receive their pay in cash instead of in crops, as formerly. The collectives also
enjoy much more autonomy than before in making their own decisions. ? Moreover,
in 1958 the government arranged for the collective farms to buy and use the farm
machinery, which up to that time had been owned by government Machine-Tractor
Stations.
These various measures have had much success. Millions of young men and
women have gone to open up the virgin lands, and with machinery supplied by
the government some eighty million acres have been planted. - While the harvests
have not all been good, on the whole the USSR has produced much more grain
than ever before.. Also, thanks to the stress on raising corn and silage and to
the new zeal of the peasants induced by the greater returns for their labor, there
has been a sharp gain in the number of livestock and in their productivity. By
1957, Khrushchev was emboldened to announce the goal of overtaking the United
States in respect to per capita production of milk, butter,' and meat, and in 1959
he announced that the USSR was already producing more milk and butter than the
United States (although not more per capita). Soviet meat production is less
favorable, however, as it is now little more than half that of the United States.
In general, it can be said that, while Soviet agriculture is much less efficient
than ours, it has already done much to raise its efficiency and may be on the
way to new successes. We are still ahead, but our lead is. being challenged.
QUESTIONS FROM THE FLOOR:
Moderator: Thank you very much Dr. Curtiss. I was wondering if there are any
questions now which the audience would like to address to Mr. Whitney.
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Question: Mr. Whitney, in the early part of this week the National Planning
Association in Washington released a report in which it stated that the announced
goals of the Soviet government concerning overtaking U. S. production in industrial
output by 1965 was beyond the realm of practicality, and it stated a number of
reasons for believing that the Soviet Union will be forced to slow down during this
period. It stated, among other reasons, three on which I'd like for you to comment:
(1) A labor shortage which is believed to be attributable to the extensive war losses
during World War II and also to the decrease in the birth rate during that period;
and (2) it also mentioned the fact that the necessity for replacing equipment which
was just now beginning to wear out will be more extensive than at any time during
the past; and, (3) it also mentioned the problem of increased pressure for consumer
goods by the Soviet people and that this has already been conceded by the Soviet
leaders and will continue to be a thorn in their side in the goal for industrial
expansion.
Mr. Whitney: Would you cite the exact phraseology of their overall conclusion
for me ?
Questioner: Well, in other words, the conclusion was that the officially announced
goal to match U. S. industrial output by 1965 was outside the bounds of practical
possibility. It also stated at the end of the report that these conclusions should not
lead to a sense of complacency on the part of the American citizenry.
Mr. Whitney: Let's deal with this business of catching up, that is, the stated
goal of catching up with the United States by 1965. I myself have not seen this
particular report. I've seen a number of reports of this same sort, along this same
general line which do come out with the conclusion that there's nothing to worry
about. There's no reason for us to get discouraged because they aren't going to
catch up with us anyway. Typical of this is one right here, a study put out by a
group which was headed by Professor Nutter of Virginia which said that there is
no definitive evidence that the -Soviet economic system has been able to generate
more rapid growth over the long run than the traditional private enterprise system
of the West. Now as far as this report of the National Planning Association is
concerned, in the first place, the Russians have never said anywhere in black
and white that they intend to catch up with us by 1965. They have never set out
anywhere in black and white the date by which they intend to overtake the United
States. Even if they did, it would be a very difficult thing to measure because
overall strength, unlike one particular item, isn't so easy to measure. It would
presume some kind of overall index figure, and the kind of index figures that the
Russians use are the most gyestionable portion of their statistics practice, and
they have been seriously questioned by American economists. But it seems to
me that, in general, this report of.the National Planning Association represents
a type of approach to this problem which is going to increase complacency and
make it more of a surprise than it's otherwise going to be on that bright day when
we wake up and find that they are about sixty miles ahead of us. . And we've done
this often in the past.. That is to say, we've waked up to find that there was a
new earth satellite weighing two tons more up in the air, and here are we way
down here with little apples or grapefruit or whatever it is we've got.
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I don't mean to belittle our programs, but we're behind, period. And at the
same time, we can find people even today, despite the statements by Dr. York
and other people, who say we are ahead of them in space research, that while
our satellites aren't so big as theirs, we get more information from them. True
enough, we haven't hit the moon yet. And I don't know how you can get around
that fact. I don't know how you can get around the facts of Soviet economic
progress by any kind of verbiage or any kind of sophistry. It's true that the
Russians face a serious labor problem. It's true that this problem is due to the
fact that there was a very low birth rate during World War II, and that kids who
would ordinarily have been born if their fathers hadn't been killed or at the front,
would now be entering the ranks of Soviet labor. When it says there is a labor
shortage, it doesn't mean that the Soviet labor force is going to decrease. There's
a labor shortage in relationship to labor demands, to the demand for labor. Given
the fact that there has been a large scale capital investment program, they would
be able to use a number of million more hands with their lathes than they will
have coming into their labor force. This is what that labor shortage amounts to.
It doesn't amount to a decrease in their labor force. This isn't the type of a
shortage which is going to cause their economy to slide backward. And not even
the National Planning Association says that it will.
So far as the question of replacement of losses, . that is to say, the replace-
ment of wastage in industry of lathes, machinery, equipment which has been
worked too long already probably, this is an important problem for them. Much
of their equipment which came from before the war, during the war, and immedia-
tely after the war is going to have to be replaced. Again, it is nothing that cannot
be done. I mean it's not a problem of such magnitude that it is. going to cause
them to slip backwards.
Increased pressure for consumer goods---the interesting thing about this
particular item is that there is increased pressure for consumer goods and as
there becomes more consumer goods there is more incentive to work harder, so
that labor productivity, which is the main problem in the Soviet economy, in the
Soviet .Union in its race with the United States, is assisted by increasing avail-
ability of consumer goods because it provides increased incentive. I believe
that the conclusion to this report inevitably will lead.-to the type of complacency
that the authors say they want to avoid. That's my comment.
Question: Mr. Whitney, we've been talking about statistics and their reliability.
To what extent can we rely on Soviet statistics?
Mr. Whitney: Well, this is the general question of statistics in the Soviet
Union. Dr. Curtiss gave an answer on his part even before you asked the ques-
tion. And I agree with Dr. Curtiss to a very great degree. You stated in your
question, if I understood you correctly, that there is a great lack of statistics
in the Soviet Union. Well, let me put it this way: Right now there is a flood
of statistics. There was a complete drought up until 1956, but right now the
government is beginning to put out enormous volumes of statistics, not all the
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statistic's that everybody wants by any means yet. But now it has become a pro-
blem of too many instead of too few---too many compared to the people who are
trained to examine them. So it's no longer'a question of not having statistics.
Point Number 2: I would agree with Dr. Curtiss when he said that, in general,
the Soviet practice (I'm not talking about other Communist countries, particularly
China) is when they don't want to reveal something, they don't so much put out
fake statistics as just keep their mouths shut about it. They don't say anything
about it. Oftentimes, by knowing this practice you can find out what is going
on in the Soviet Union in a negative sense. You watch not what they talk about,
but what they don't talk about. And so often you find that what they don't talk
about is something that things are bad in. For some reason, in the Soviet psycho-
logy things always have to go up, even golf scores. I mean, literally, things
have to go up. If they stop going up, they don't mention it. For instance, Suslov,
in his report to Peiping this year, doesn't talk much about Soviet agriculture.
Why not? Well, we know that they've had it rough in the Ukraine. We don't know
how serious it is. Certainly, there is no famine. Nevertheless, the fact remains
that if you watch these things you can tell to some extent by what they don't say
what is going on.
In general, I feel that the Soviet statistics that we get are the same ones,
when we get them at all, that are being used by Soviet government authorities.
Now they have a certain number of defects. This particularly applies to, and
you have to use them with caution, their overall index figures. Let us say the
index of industrial production... There isn't any simple way of calculating this
thing. This is an extremely difficult statistical calculation.. All of you who are
studying economics know this, I'm afraid, better than I do probably. This is
an extremely difficult statistical calculation which tries to put into one number
the entire complexity of industrial production. And there are many,. many ques-
tions that arise. Let us say, suppose, you want to compare production today
in the form of some number with production in 1913. Well, there are a lot of
things that.are produced today,, like television sets and all kinds of modern
devices that were not produced at all in 1913. So what value do you give these
things, because the comparison is very important. Well, or let's say they only
produced a few of them in 1913. This is the kind of problem that has come up
in Soviet statistics. Generally speaking, I do not think that Soviet statistics
are so unreliable. - Some of our economists-have gone much too far in their read-
justment of Soviet industrial indexes, I consider. It's a very difficult thing to
readjust another government's statistics.
Question: If.we assume that we are in an economic race, and we do have some
means of winning this race, and we come to the conclusion that we have lost;
then what effect would that have on the American system in the eyes of the
world?
Mr. Whitney: Now this is a relevant question. The question is: What differ-
ence would it make anyway? Up until the present time, or at the present time,
the general measure of state power that is used by everybody in the world is
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economic. We may talk a great deal about morality and the moral force, but when
it gets down to brass tacks, it is always a question of counting the tons of steel
and counting the kilowatts of electric power and counting the things that are
produced, that go into the aggregate called power. One of the reasons is that
these are the same things that go to make up military power. To be sure, we are
in a new age, a new military age, where we have weapons that seemingly are of
such power that they could counterbalance great economic strength. There's a
good deal of argument about the importence of production. I think thatcneof the
most perceptive works that has been published recently which discusses this is
The Affluent Society by John Kenneth Galbraith of Harvard. He comes.to the con-
clusion that production doesn't really matter anyway, that we don't need'to'worry
about production anymore. I disagree with him very radically, because :when-we
are outproduced we won't have to ask the question whether we have lost. It will
begin to become apparent to us in so, many different ways and will become appar-
ent to the rest of the world simultaneously that we will know we have lost.without
having to reduce it to an index figure. It can mean, as it means right now, a moon
rocket up there, when` we don't have one yet. It can mean a government that has
been bought ten years from now because we don't have as much money to lay on
the line as the Russians. It can mean, if you have more,;goods, you have more
money; you can spend.more money on subversion, you can spend more money on
espionage; you can spend more money on arms; you; can spend more money on
everything. These things become evident very quickly*+"e'The Russians right now
even, when everybody knows that they have maybe 50% of our economic production,
our economic capacity, are doing, very well in the political race with us, not just
because they have this production, but because they do pretty well in using it
to its maximum effectiveness. When they have as much as we have,.I'm afraid
you won't even have to ask that question.
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"THE KHRUSHCHEV VISIT"
Thursday Address
Speaker: Prof. Thomas Whitney, Journalist
prof. Whitney:
clap
I was tempted for a minute, after
the Khrushchev ~riphwas Khrushchev
in a very real sense,
myself for myself. You know,
an adventure in communication or attempt at communication between Russians and
Americans. And let nobody underestimate
the the best way If cothat uldtillu illustrate
communicating very simple ideas. Perhaps hrushchev
hims
, but to one o with a.story that doesn't really referwere travel around in hislentourage overf
the forty Soviet correspondents who
the country. This correspondent, who was the head of the foreign section
puzzled
of the Soviet Union's leading newspapers, came to me with a very, very
look on his face one day and in his hands he had the front page of a San Francisco
t to
newspaper. There was a banner headline across the top, and he held this "Giants
me and said, "How can you translate this for me?" I read to myself,
Crush Dodgers." He said, "Is this some kind of gang warfare that has broken
out here?" I was, of course, able to explain to him very quickly what the head-
e
line meant in terms of Moscow soccer teams.
what was going on in the United
across his face, and, at last, he had understood
States; but, up to then, he was very, very worried about the situation as it was
developing out there on the West coast.
Nikita Khrushchev had his own problems in communication, and some of them
were problems that arose simply from questions of translation, even though he had
with him a young man, Alex Troyanovsky, who studied at the Friend's School in
Washington for three years and then at Swarthmore College, son of a former Soviet
Ambassador to the United States, and Victor Sukhodrev, also a very able young
man who has studied in England. In spite of the fact that he had both of these
boys along with him who were nearly bilingual, how much of Nikita whwaen-sthere
was a great question in my mind as to
across to his American audience.
I was sent on the trip by the Washington Post, because, among other things
I do know Russian, and it was felt that, knowing Russian, I would be able to
get more of what was going on. And, in a that sense, this was correct. Here's a
d Khrushchev at the National
little example of one of the questions Press Club in Washington, and the way the whole thing worked out. The ques-
tioner asked (the question was read in English), "How soon does the Soviet
Union expect to send a man to the moon?" Alex Troyanovsky y-took this question
and he translated it. In translating it, he used a word in Russian when he came
to the verb 'send' which doesnmean eraWhen doe1st but means he 'throw.' The
Union expect
question came across to Mr. Khrushchev,
to throw a man to the moon?" Mr. Khrushchev looked a little puzzled for a
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Moment, and then he went on and gave his answer. He said, "We in the Soviet
Union don't believe in throwing our people around, " or words to this effect. And
he gave a little dissertation of approximately a paragraph on how the Soviet Union
doesn't throw its people around. And then he got down to the question and said,.
"And as to when we expect to send a man to the moon," and as you see, by this
time he had gotten back to where we had started from in the first place. I've
forgotten now what the answer was, but it was clever enough and it evaded the
question, of course, as one might expect.
At this point, Troyanovsky had to translate back into English Krushchev's
answer which had been based on a misunderstanding, based on a mistranslation
by Troyanovsky in the first place. Now I don't know how many of the people in
the hall knew what'was going on or how many of the people in the radio audience,
but it was a pretty mixed up little question and answer session. . And that's just
one sample of a number, I wouldn't say of similar things, but it's a sample of the
difficulty that one encounters in communication from one language to another
simply and purely from mistranslation.
In that same session, the same day, /ilex Troyanovsky made another mistake.
Somebody asked, "What new proposals does the Soviet Union have.... ?" I think
it was on Berlin.. Troyanovsky translated: "What new problems does the Soviet
Union have... ?" Well, it took Khrushchev a while to get around to discussing
proposals after having been asked what problems the Soviet Union has, and I
don't know how many of his American audience realized that he hadn't understood
the question, through no fault of his own. But at any rate, he more or less did
an answer---another illustration of the difficulties of translation.
Then, too, you know, there is no such thing as a perfect translation. Those
of you who watched Mr. Khrushchev on TV, I think, got a good deal of the spirit
with which he spoke. He would answer in Russian, and then there would come
the translation. So often, as the translation came, even though it was a techni-
cally competent translation in most cases, somehow or another the punch got
lost. Yet this translation was the one that was used as the text that was printed
in the New York Times, the Washington Post, and all the other papers with
printed texts. This was the official English text, the text that was delivered.
I can give you an example of the kind of phraseology :that Khrushchev used
that didn't come across. There was a question in the last session that he had
at the National Press Club, the second press conference, the one the afternoon
before he made his final speech on NB:C and then took off for Moscow. He had
been asked at this press conference whether the Soviet Union would be willing
to expand trade in consumer goods with the United States. Now, I don't think
it was intended in this way by the person who asked the question, who represented
a newspaper known as Womens Wear Daily, which is chiefly interested in consumer
goods, of course. I don't think it was realized by the person who asked the ques-
tion that this was kind of a tender point with Mr. Khrushchev because he could
buy consumers' goods here right now and what he wants is producers' goods, it
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did arouse a slight asperity on Mr. Khrushchev's part. And he immediately came
back and said, "You'll have to realize that the Soviet Union is no colony." And
then, as I remember, his phraseology went like this and I'll give it to you in my
own translation---a literal translation word by word---"If you want to sell sausages
and shoes, then that's no merchandise. If you want such a buyer, go look some-
where else. " The translation of Alex Troyanovsky came out something along the
following lines, "If you should want to sell us sausages and shoes, you will not
find a market for those goods in our country.. Now the essential' thought is there---
you can't sell us sausages and shoes---but it hasn't got the punch that Khrushchev
had.
I was asked by my managing editor before the trip broke up, who wanted me
to compare Khrushchev: "To whom is he comparable in our own political firma-
ment?" He certainly is not comparable to Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the aristo-
crat who spoke always as an aristocrat. He certainly is not comparable to
Winston Churchill, the great man of literature and letters as well as politics, a
man who always speaks in beautiful, well-rounded phrases. He is not comparable
to President Eisenhower. It seemed to me that he was most of all comparable, in
some ways to Harry Truman. Now I know that this is something that neither of these
two men would like. And since I would like to hope that both of them will be
cordially disposed toward me, I hope that neither one of them reads. the article
in which I compared them to each other.
So why did Nikita Khrushchev want to come. to the United States? And what
did he get out of it? What did we .get out of it, if anything? And what should be
our opinion on this unique venture in international-diplomacy which I suppose has
no parallel anywhere, at any time. Well, Niki certainly wanted an invitation for
a long time, and it certainly had been obvious for a long time that he wanted to
come to the United States. Why? Well, let's start with a couple of personal
reasons. The first of these is his own political prestige in his own country.
S top to think for a minute: the United States is the country which occupies 'a
particular place in the minds of Soviet citizens, be they Communists or non-
Communists. It's a sort of a combination of dreamland and Hades, at one end of
the scale and the other. It's an enemy and a friend. It's a sort of a fetish and
it's a sort of a bugbear. And this is the Never-Never land that no Soviet premier
had ever visited. Certainly, Khrushchev, who if he is trying to do anything is
trying to be different than his predecessors - both Lenin and Stalin, was anxious
to be the first premier to come to the United States. Let's put it in social terms.
He, in a way, is a nouveau riche, a social upstart in the world. I don't mean
that he thinks of himself particularly in this way, at least not in a conscious
manner, but he certainly is. The Soviet regime, even though it's forty years old,
is relatively new among the regimes and systems of this world. And it's chief
hasn't been invited to the big house yet. And he has been waiting for the day
when he could wangle himself an invitation. So that he could walk across the
threshold of the big house because once he walked across that threshold he knew
he had arrived. And everybody else would know that he had arrived. He was the
new rich waiting for an invitation to join the big club. And this was it. That's
one reason he wanted to come.
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I think almost as important as any other thing,, including very cogent political
reasons, in Nikita Khrushchev's wanting to come to the United States was his own
burning curiosity. This guy is a man who's got a great big bump-of curiosity on
his head. He's the kind of a guy who always wants to stick his fingers into the
machinery to see what makes it work, and to stick his nose into. everything and
find out how it's going on. He has listened, in his life, to so much about the
United States one way and another, from one direction and another, saying one
thing and another, certainly, he wanted to come to the United States, if only to
be able to say to all the people who talked to him about America, "Well, you know,
when I was in America Ike said to me. . . "' and then to go on for five minutes telling
his co-conversationalists about America. He. certainly was curious to get a
glimpse, and I don't think he had any intent even when he started seeking an invi-
tation, of making what you might call a real exploration thoughout the country.
It was partly a matter of just being here, partly a matter of what he could see from
the car windows and the railroad trains. But he wanted to see it, and he wanted
to see it in the worst possible kind of away..
But then there are also important political reasons why Nikita wanted to come
to the United States. I don't think we have to picttre him as being a great altruist
in order to come to the conclusion that Nikita Khrushchev, on the basis of the
reports which his nuclear scientists and nuclear experts have furnished on their
tests of hydrogen bombs, to assume that he has realized that peace is not an
optional thing in the world anymore but a necessity. One can wonder about the
leaders of China---they don't know anything about thermonuclear weapons. But
Khrushchev does. He's talked about it cs11)ccasion. He must realize that there
is a desperate need .for. peace, that war does mean mutual destruction of both
warring sides, that there isn't any way that he can destroy the United States in
such a fashion as to be absolutely guaranteed against a total destruction of the
Soviet Union, and vice versa as far as the United States is concerned. There
must have been a motive of trying to seek peace. And as I watched him going
around the country, I could see him time and again, it seemed to me there was,
perhaps the word "sincere" is never applicable to an experienced politician and
particularly to a Communist, but it does have some meaning---I think he was try-
ing to get across his own plea for co-existence. And I think' that's one. of the
reasons he came.
There are real reasons as to why this might mean something to the Soviet
Union itself. His whole program since Stalin died or since he came into the
reins of power has been to ease tension inside the Soviet Union, to assist the
gradual development of living standards alongside a cataclysmic growth in
economic strength. And what stands in his way of doing more and doing faster
in this direction? Obviously, expenditure on arms. Can he reduce expenditure
on arms as long as the United States is fully armed? Or well armed? The answer,
of course, is no. And yet there might always be the possibility of seeking and
getting some kind of a disarmament agreement or some kind of rapproachement
which would permit him to cut his arms expenditures? And right now is a parti-
cularly important time for this. . Why? Because right now in these years there
would be coming to age the young people, the men and women, and particularly
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the boys, who would have been born if there had been no World War II, but who
were not born because there was such a war, because their fathers were dead
or at the front. And there's a gap in the Soviet manpower framework, so to speak,
most going
of perhaps as many as five million young people in the age groups that
to come to maturity in the next few years. This age gap has already gone
of the way through high school and these would be the people who would be able
to add to Russia's military and economic power, but they won't be there. Now
this would be a good time to reduce the strength of the armed forces, another
good reason to try to seek a rapproachement with the United States.
And then, of course, you know being a good Communist politician one must
always have a couple of strings in:one's bow
unawareness of exactly what he isme
here. Maybe he can lull us into a kind of u
up to and what the Soviet Communists are about. There is no harm in trying, after
funda-
all. This is another good reason. But the reason,
so far, except perhaps his
mental than any of these things that I have mentioned
own curiosity, is one other thing that hasn't been mentioned too much in connec-
tion with this trip. If the Soviet Union faces West, to the United States, which
is a powerful nation indeed, a nation which at one time and another has been
allied with the Soviet Union, which in recent years has been extremely hostile
to the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union also has another power to consider in the
world on its eastern borders. I'm referring to Red China. There are, after all,
some 700 million people in Red China. There is a long border between the Soviet,
Union and Red China. There is the semi-continent of Siberia, which is not empty
but is sparsely settled, which belongs to the Soviet Union, in between European
Russia and Red China. I think that certainly fear, and this may, be in part uncon-
scious or subconcious, fear of Red China is one of the factors behind the attempts
of the Soviet Union at a rapproachement with America. In my opinion, and I
should add this immediately, the Russians don't have the slightest intention of
breaking up their alliance with Communist China if they can help it. But what I
think they fear very much is the long range growth prospects of China, and they
want to open a bridge to the West just in case. I think Deputy Premier Anastas
Mikoyan had this very much in mind when he came here last January. I think
Khrushchev had it very much in mind here last month.
Well, that's the Soviet side. In the meantime, what was on the American
side to change the atmosphere in such a way as to make it possible for Nikita
Khrushchev to visit America. Well, there are certainly several factors that we
could mention that are of considerable importance. By no means the least of
these was the fact that John Foster Dulles died early this year. Dulles had cer-
tainly, it seemed to me, stood firmly. against the President's participating direct-
ly in negotiations on a summit level ever
for Eisenhower himself to inject
With the passing of Dulles, it became possible
his own personality into the international political scene.. And the more.he saw
of the international political scene, the more he enjoyed what he saw. And he,
himself'has.-a:great deal of the responsibility and credit, I believe, for issuing
the invitation to Nikita Khrushchev. I wouldn't say that this had.entirely taken
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place.without political considerations. There is, after all, an election next year,
and I assume that there are leaders at the top of the Republican Party who have
pointed out to the President, and his immediate advisors, how interesting a role
could be played in the 1960 election by a very determined effort to achieve a
settlement of differences with the Soviet Union.. At the same time,` again, we
come back to the question of the meaning of the word "sincere" so far as experi-
enced politicians are concerned. I believe that the President was very sincere
in attempting to play, or taking on himself the role of peacemaker, in taking on
an assignment during his last year in office to try to arrive at some easing of those
very considerable and difficult problems which divide the East and the West.
Then, to far as the United States itself is concerned, it seems to me there is
a factor,I mentioned on the Soviet side of the equation. Behind much of what we
do, it seems to me, is our own fear, in the long run, of Red China. And I believe
that one of the reasons it was thought to be by no means unintelligent at this point
to have Nikita Khrushchev in this country as our guest, was that we ourselves
would not have burnt all our bridges to that other great power of the world---the
Soviet Union.
This,, then, it seems to me, was the immediate political and personal back-
ground. And how shall we evaluate this trip and its results'? I think that there
are a good many points that can be made about it. I followed the whole Khrushchev
caravan for two weeks and it was, I must say,, quite an experience. I should tell
you before I go further, about my one exclusive interview with Nikita Khrushchev.
It took place in Iowa on the field of farmer Roswell Garst. - Mr. Garst had decided
that when. he went out onto his fields he would invite all the correspondents to
accompany himself and Mr. Khrushchev. He told me about his decision earlier
that morning, and I hadn't bothered to explain to him what was likely to happen,
but I had some idea because I had been on the fields of Iowa before covering news
stories, and I knew what could happen with 300 eager photographers and corres-
pondents, and, sure enough, it happened. It is what has become known in Iowa
history as the Donnybrook of Farmer Garst's cornfield. Photographers were piled
up on top of each other. Farmer Garst himself was snapped as he picked up a root
of corn to throw at the photographers to get them away so he could show Mr.
.Khrushchev his corn. The mounted police were seen riding down on the news-
papermen, whereupon one of them yelled: "The Cossacks are coming! " Mr.
Garst's one row corn chopper, and this is the correct technical term, came tear-
ing down the row on top of about fifty enterprising newspapermen. Fortunately,
it did not chop up any of them. And, in the midst of this, I had my interview with
Mr. Khrushchev. I had come up from behind through the corn, and Mr. Khrushchev
was at the edge of the corn patch. And there was I-with my head over his shoulder,
and he was looking rather amused at this -spectacle of mayhem and violence spread
out in front of him.' I noticed a corn cob in. front of him, and didn't know what
else to do,, so I addressed him in Russian and said, "How do-you like this corn?"
And sure enough he was interested in the corn., He didn't pay any attention to
what was'going on out in front of him, and he gave me a little lecture on corn.
He a,plained to me that this corn in this field was planted not only too thick,
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but that there was much too much stalk and not enough corn. And about that time
move o, but I had I g t my picture scored
the mayhem began to catch up with us and we had to
by exclusive interview with Nikita Khrushchev. Meanwhile,
splattered all over front pages all over the country because there in the most Khrushch popular news photo of the day were lAmbassador
un asLodge,
an unidentifiedtSov et security ev,
and a character identified in the Ban
agent.
Aside from the episode in t the State Department who helped out by giving
the organi-
zation credit to some of the people in
zation of the Khrushchev tour. And first of all to Foy Kohler, who was given an
almost impossible task---namely, to. organize the tour with inadequate authority,
or at least with what seemed to me was very little authority. to beE he b dy e Sewell, fall horning in on. it, and Foy was the man who was expected t
he wasn't the fall guy.. He did a wonderful job. But the whole episode illustrates
some of the problems of our own form of government, and some of the problems of
dealing ,with the Russians.
for example. Premier Khrushchev was
Let's take one little aspect of this trip,
invited here by the President of the United States. No more had the invitation
Mikhail Menshikov,
been announced than the Soviet Ambassador in this country, Mr.
sometimes known as "Smilin' Mike, " grabbed the ball and started running down the
field with it. and nobody stopped him. As soon as it had been announced in the
press that Khrushchev had been invited to this country, invitations began to pour
in to Menshikov, who has many contacts in this country which he has acquired dur-
ing his several years here as Ambassador, and who had certainly been thinking
about the eventuality and possibility of this trip, since it was one of his chief
assignments to get this invitation. So Mr. Menshikov began to accept these invi-
tations. The State Department, Mr. Kohler, and these other people didn't know
that they had been accepted until some days later Mr. Menshikov would come over
and say, "Oh, well we can't do anything on that day because I, " he didn't say 'V,
"because Prime Minister Khrushchev has accepted an invitation to have luncheon
with Mr. Eric Johnson on that day. Well, I think personally that it would have
been possible with clever management
be channeled through the White House,t
and an insistence that all invitations to
have kept this under control. But it was not kept under control. The result was
this: Khrushchev saw in the United States not what he, Khrushchev, wanted to
see necessarily. I don't know what he wanted to see,. and I don't know that any-
body else does either. He didn't see what President
thought it would be advantageous
see either. He saw what Ambassador Menshikov
from his, Ambassador Menshikov's, point of view for Khrushchev to see. And
naturally Ambassador Menshikov wanted to show off to Khrushchev his own contacts
that he had cultivated in the United States and accepted the invitations of those
groups and those people who were familiar to him. And among other things, and
I presume this was on instructions from Moscow, this is a rather natural thing
and one that could be expected, the
there
intensity and difficulty, so that United
States, but a speaking tour of extraordinary
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was practically no time for Mr. Khrushchev to do anyt}+.ng. There was very little
time for Mr. Khrushchev to do anything but make public speeches at the rate of
two and three a day. Even given his fine physique and his great endurance and
his unquestioned patience, in many respects, this was a great strain on him.
Now another thing that happened in connection .with this trip also became
apparent very quickly: security considerations were allowed to override almost
every other consideration from the very start;. The Soviet Security General, who
bears equal responsibility with any American authorities on the subject, came to
the United States almost as soon as the invitation had been accepted, and imme-
diately went into conference with American security authorities and was in on all
their arrangements from the very start. Security people are the kind of people who
if you ask them will such and such a. thing be secure will always answer "no, "
because if you make them accept the responsibility there never is such a thing as
perfect security anywhere for anybody, And yet. this was precisely what was done,
and as a result many things that could have been done, it seems to me, were wiped
off the list because they were vetoed on the security level,. many of them by the
Soviet security authorities themselves. Instead of having worked out the schedule
and then giving this to the security people. and saying, "Now work out your secu-
rity, " or "Provide the maximum security you can, (which Is all they ever provide
anyway and it's not much), . they were given almost a veto right on,many things.
This went to absurb lengths. .
Now I believe.in security for Premier Khrushchev. I believed in security for
Deputy Premier Mikoyan when situations were permitted when he was almost hit
by' eggs,and could have been hit by other things as well, in Detroit and Chicago
and then San Francisco. Now this sort' of thing went to the other extreme:. I
suppose that Premier Khrushchev has gone back to the Soviet Union thinking that
the United States is a militarist state in which nine-tenths of all the people are
in uniform, because nine-tenths of the people he -saw, were in uniform, and he
saw mostly their.back sides.. He was literally surrounded at every point by a
human wall, not even mentioning the photographers and newspapermen. The
security men were, usually much closer to him. I remember very well on his train
from Los Angeles to San Francisco, our train had a highway patrol escort. . Now
what does a train loaded with security officers need a highway patrol escort for?
We had a helicopter escort that day. When he arrived in San Francisco there was
a helicopter up there about a mile, surveying the scene, to keep order. What
could that helicopter possibly have done in case of an attempt on the. life of
'Prime Minister Khrushchev? I wonder; I still wonder. In New York, when he
arrived he was taken to a baggage compartment.of the Pennsylvania Railway Sta-
tion, and there, in a scene resembling the most horrendous scences from Dante's
Inferno, he was greeted by the representatives of Mayor Wagner. I happened to
notice that as the meeting.broke up, Henry:Cabot Lodge, our Ambassador to the
United Nations, was escorted to his car by three, uniformed patrolmen who tripped
over each other on the way. There were so many policemen and security people
In the picture that they literally got in, their own way, and everybody else's way,
and Khrushchev's way, and made themselves a. first class security problem---
there were simple so many of them.
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Now as I say, I believe in security. I believe in providing maximum security.
But in anything like this you take a chance to start with and you're not going to
get rid of it by having a few more cops around. We should have accepted the risk,
have provided as much security as could have been provided without interfering
with other objectives of the trip. In fact this is what we came to anyway. He
took a chance. He accepted the invitation.. Anybody takes a chance when they
go anywhere, even when they cross the street. And as it was, you know, he got
stuck in an elevator, even though it had been checked the day before, in the
Waldorf Astoria.
Another criticism I have of our handling of the trip---and I say this on my own
authority. I don't know the inside story on this---it seems to me that in a certain
sense, in the trip arrangements, American politics were allowed to enter in a way,
into the choice of the individual who accompanied Khrushchev about the country.
I'm. referring to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge. - Ambassador Lodge is a very able
person, and has represented our country very effectively in the United Nations for
several years. I don't'?hink, however, that he was necessarily the best choice
as the President's personal representative in escorting Prime Minister Khrushchev
about this country. - One of-'the reasons that I don't think that he was the best
choice is that I, and this is my own personal opinion and I say it on my own
authority and I have no inside information on this, particularly none from Ambassa-
dor Lodge himself, I have the feeling that he has, perhaps, some political aspira-
tions; that maybe there might.have been in the back of his mind the idea that by
accompanying Khrushchev around the country, and by entering into what might
have gone down in history as, had it continued very long, as "The Great Debate, "
he might have gotten himself a nomination for Vice-President on the Republican
ticket. I know in any case, that he sought this job himself, and, of course, he
was given the job. Now this point. that I'm making illustrates another aspect of
the trip which I didn't like as an American. It seemed to me that as we went
around on this trip, which certainly was one with momentous consequences,
momentous consequences for the future as well as for us today, there were many
too many groups and individuals latching on to this for its publicity value in order
to puff up their own little enterprises or operations. Well, let's give an example
since we're going to be frank about it. I suppose that the motion picture Can Can
got at least two or three million dollars worth of publicity when Nikita Khrushchev
came out with the great pronouncement that it was an immoral movie. What could
have been.better for this motion picture? The cost to Twentieth Century Fox, I
am told, of putting on, on a Saturday at overtime rates, the dry run of the scene
from Can Can that they put on for Khrushchev wa3 something on the order of
$64, 000.00 including the cost of the. banquet for 300 film stars and goodies for
all,the correspondents in another studio. I think, however, that in a sense the
damage to American prestige by putting Khrushchev before this particular scene
from this particular picture was probably a great. deal more than the two or three
million dollars it might be worth to, Twentieth Century Fox in publicity for their
film. I say this with reason. I have looked at the French magazines that have
covered this trip and I know from what my foreign colleagues told me on the trip
that this episode was something they latched on to. - After all, you know, many
I1-
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of our Indian colleagues and many of our British colleagues, and other European
and Asian journalist, when you get right down to the bottom of it, don't really
love either the Russians or the Americans. And when there is a chance, I don't
say they do this with a vengeance or malice aforethought, but when there is
something that makes both sides look absurd, they aren't too hesitant to grab on
to it. And this little picture of Nikita Khrushchev being shown the dancing girls
from Can Can and pronouncing the whole scene immoral was a beautiful little
vignette to them of the coming Soviet - American world and they took advantage
of it and drove this home all over the world. Here are the barbarians at work.
Another example---something which concerns people for whom I have a great
deal of respect and regard and among whom I have at least one good friend---the
labor leaders in San Francisco, Mr. Reuther and Mr. Carey and the rest. You'll
remember that Khrushchev had angled for an invitation by George Meany, the
President of the AFL-CIO. He didn't get it. Of course, Mr. Meany is against
receiving any Russians anytime, anywhere. And Mr. Reuther, Mr. Carey, and
some other of the Vice-Presidents and executive officers of the organization which
was having its convention at the Cow Palace in San Francisco, did invite Mr.
Khrushchev to a dinner, a private dinner---I say 'private' in quotation marks for
there was never any dinner that was any more public---because as soon as the
dinner ended out trooped all the eight A. F. L.-C.I.O. Vice-Presidents who had
been present at the dinner, and Mr. Reuther came out and gave us a version of
what had happened during the course of the evening, a version which was at least
so complete that it had been obvious that they had, if not taken it down with
stenographic notes, at least taken it down with very elaborate notes and had
intended to make it public from the start. Now the most interesting thing about
this version was that it differed very radically at some points, including one very
crucial quotation, from a version that was given out the next day by the same
group in mimeographed form. Now I recommend to your reading the Khrushchev -
Reuther conversation because it was certainly one of the most interesting ones in
the entire trip, one of the most interesting documents the trip turned out. But I
couldn't help but feel that Mr. Reuther was, at his press conference, going a
little bit out of his way and perhaps playing a little bit of havoc with this thing
we call the truth in order to prove that he was just as good. end stalwart an anti-
Communist as Mr. Meany, who wouldn't see Mr. Khrushchev. Perhaps I could
be wrong, perhaps I'm too cynical in my interpretation of the motives.
Mayor Poulson down in Los Angeles certainly knew what he was doing when
he stuck his neck out in his introductory speech to Mr. Khruchchev and got it
chopped off. He was certainly looking for a little publicity. What does this go
back to? If you remember, when Vice-President Nixon went to Russia, and let
me say that the Vice-President handled himself very well in the Soviet Union,
very, very well indeed---I have a great deal of respect for the way he handled
himself on his tour in that country ---when he was in the kitchen of the little
American house with Prime Minister Khrushchev, there developed a great discus-
sion. This discussion became the hottest news story of the day, and Mr. Nixon
certainly got wonderful publicity out of this argument with Prime Minister
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Khrushchev. As a result, the impression grew up among American politicians that
the way to get ahead in politics was to take on Mr. Khrushchev and have a good
knock-down, drag out argument which everybody would watch on television, and
prove how you could stand up to this Communist devil. And this was the sort of
a psychology with which this trip started, and which led, it seems to me, at one
point, to a rather sad situation.
Now there was another aspect that fitted right in with this. L don't know how
to explain this and I don't know how it even actually worked out. When Khrushchev
arrived in Washington, I was at the airdrome along with about 100 other news-
papermen to see him come in and then we came in buses behind his cavalcade
into -town, and along the way there were many people waiting out to see this
Communist leader, who was coming along with President Eisenhower. The crowds,
as we could see, were not falling all over themselves. They weren't cheering
tremendously when he went past. They were being very quiet, no great noise, no
great enthusiasm, but certainly no particular coolness, at least none that I could
notice. Yet the headlines blossomed out unanimously all over Washington that
day, in the afternoon papers and in the New York papers, "A Chilly Reception for
Khrushchev. " Why? I know there had to be something written about it. I trace
a certain amount of this back to the coverage by one of the radio networks of the
procession. This particular network had a group of commentators out who were
competent and experienced people, and they were ahead of the cavalcade as it
came down, and they would report as the cavalcade went along on the mood of the
crowd. They picked people who weren't particularly enthusiastic. In general,
their report was along the line that.this was a chilly reception. As the reception
came along, there were people in the crowd itself who had their little portable
radios along and they heard these broadcasts about a half a mile ahead of them.
So in a sense, they already knew what their own mood was. Now mind you, this
isn't brainwashing in the Communist pattern. It's not a line put out by the State
Department, certainly. It wasn't anything that was really very evident. Yet this
sort of a line got spread around -about the trip, and I think it did a certain amount
of damage for a period, particularly until things got changed.
Now another thing about this trip. Newspapermen always complain no matter
what arrangements there are for them. This is a truism. I've never yet been on
a trip where they weren't ready to scalp whoever were the authorities who were
in charge of the trip. I've never yet been on a trip when they weren't threatening
the most drastic action on the part of their editors at home unless such and such
was done promptly. So it's very difficult to satisfy us journalists. But, never-
theless, on the particular trip in question, I think a good many of the complaints
were quite justified. - Why do I think they were justified? We were provided with
access to a fair number of the events. - We were provided with transportation and
hotel rooms, of course, our newspapers paid for it,~ and so on. But this was
organized for us. But on the trip, as it developed, the people who were sent
along to handle the press relations, to handle the press aspect of the trip, were
lower eschelon people in the State Department who had themselves very little
authority. Now they were very wonderful people and they worked like dogs.
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And, with one exception, they went all the way out to.try to help us out. But
what seems to have happened is that although this man Khrushchev was a guest
of the White House, the White House Press Secretary, Mr. Hagerty, instead
of taking the job on himself as only he could have, or, at least, of turning it
over to the Chief of the Press Section in the State Department to arrange to work
out the problems of coverage of this most difficult story, it was turned on down
to lower ranks. The result was almost exactly what you could expect in such
a situation---the kind of chaos that occurred out in Farmer Garst's cornfield.
Was the press to blame for this? I say "no," but the press was perhaps in part
to blame for it because the press doesn't govern itself very well in the best of
situations. But, I say that if there had. been press mamagment at the proper level,
this sort of thing would not have happened or would not have been so 'bad, and
there would have been many less problems in the press coverage of the story.
Some of these remarks that. I have made, particularly on security and on the
press aspect of the trip, bring up another thing, and that is that our government
doesn't really have any organizational setup to.handle something like this. What
do we have? We have the State Department. The State Department is something
that operates abroad. It doesn't have very many people in this country. Its
security people represent a minimal staff, actually. The White House was in on
it, but the White House doesn't have a setup to handle this sort of thing, even
though this man was a White House guest. The result is that everybody is
brought in on the act---the Army, helicopters from the Marines, I suppose the
FBI, although they weren't obvious, the Secret Service, the security people from
the State Department, the local police. forces.. And in security problems in, let
us say, the San Francisco area, eight jurisdictions of organization involved in
the security arrangements. .
Well, it's very difficult to co-ordinate that many different organizations under
our particular political setup. This raises: the question of whether we should
undertake such things unless we can provide for the proper organizational handl-
ing of them. Now in considerable measure it was the type of defects in handling
the organization of the trip that I have just mentioned here that led to what I will
now call "the crisis of Los Angeles." And let's go back just a bit to get the
picture of how this developed. At Mr. Khrushchev's first talk in the United States
at the National Press Club, the first question. he was asked was one, you might
say, with a real vicious curve. You perhaps remember it. You perhaps saw it.
It was, in any. case, the repetition of what was supposed to be a joke about his
relationship to Stalin during the period of Stalin's purges and other crimes, which
in essence, depicted him as a coward, which very possibly he was, and maybe
this is why he was sensitive. And then he was asked to comment on this. This
was the first question he was asked in the United States. His family was there.
He didn't take it as a joke. It hadn't even been asked as a joke, when you get
right down to it. He held himself back and, those of you who saw it may remember,
he held himself in, he.-:controlled himself, but he was really very angry. Then this
session passed over and it really wasn't so very bad. Then in New York at the
Economics Club there was another incident. He was asked a question. He
started to-give an answer which evaded the question, and there were boos and
there was heckling from the crowd. He was tired. It was the end of a long day,
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and he sort of blew up. He said, "Well, look 'zere, I'm the Premier of the Soviet
Union and if you don't want to listen to me, I can go." It wasn't clear whether
he meant I can go home, or I can go back to my room. But at any rate they quieted
down and he gave his answer. But this was another danger sign. And then the
following morning of the day after that, when he left New York, he complained
that he hadn't been permitted to drive through the workers' quarters in New York.
I suppose he had wanted to go through some of the slums in Harlem on the way
to the airport and somebody had vetoed it. In any case, he had put in a complaint.
On the way out to Los Angeles he had asked to go to Disneyland. Now this is a
subject that has attained great fame. Personally, I've never seen anything like
this: the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union complaining that he had not been
allowed to go to Disneyland. The trip had been set up for his wife and his family
and at the last minute he had asked to be included in it. As far as I can make out,
what happened was this: the Los Angeles police chief put his foot down. This
was not in his jurisdiction. Disneyland was in the next county, Orange County,
and the Los Angeles police chief said: "No, I will escort you to the county line
and then I will leave you. I will leave you to the tender mercies of the Orange
County sher_fi. " And the people who were in charge, including General Zakharov
himself, were unwilling to go on to Disneyland on this basis, and they told
Khr:.?shchev that he couldn't go to Disneyland. Whether anybody ever told him,
really, why he couldn't go, nobody will ever know. But it led to his famous
explosion. Then later that night came the worst one of all when Major Poulson
of Los Angeles had the effrontery to mention again that phrase, which apparently
is one which he doesn't like to be 'reminded of, the "We will bury you" phrase.
He'd already explained what he meant by this phrase once in Washington, and
here it was being thrown at him again by somebody whom he resented because the
man had greeted him at the Los Angeles Airport with a mere two sentence greeting,
very brief and very curt. And he again exploded, and this time he threatened to
go back to the Soviet Union, in essence, if the harassment of him didn't cease.
And I saw this scene, and I believe that he was very sincere when he made this
threat. This, I believe, was something that he intended to do, and had the
harassment continued, I think he would have left and gone back to the Soviet
Union. But the warning signal by this time finally went out, and everything went
smoothly from there on.
The situation that developed there wasn't by any means all the American
fault. After all, if Khrushchev did not receive the treatment of a dignity which
he demanded, it was partly at least, because he didn't conduct himself in such
a way as to inspire dignified treatment. If he didn't enjoy it when he got involved
in banter with Spyros Skouras, it was partly because he himself interrupted Spyros
Skouras and he himself engaged in banter with him. This was a man who was for
the first time in an alien country, I mean in this particular country, who hadn't
yet acquired a very ,good feel of how his audience was reacting and how he him-
self should react. But we can certainly say one thing about him, and that is
that though he himself doesn't always invite dignified treatment, he is very
sensitive to affront to his dignity. If we want to put this in terms of the Ameri-
can vernacular, he's a guy who can dish it out but he can't always take it.
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And I think that this is one of the important conclusions, believe it or not, that
comes out of this trip. We now know more about this man than we ever, knew
before. For instance, we know that he is a highly emotional man who can get
himself carried away in a situation. We know that he is a compulsive talker.
There were times when I thought he couldn't stop. And I wondered what Gromyko
thought, an educated man who's sitting there watching him unable to bring his
sentences to an end. He kept going on, and he kept getting deeper everytime
he went further, it seemed to me. I never will forget the image of this man in
Los Angeles, unable, as it seemed to me,. to keep from going on. And this is the
guy we have to deal with in international affairs, this is the man who has peace
and war, a very large part of the decision, in his hands. So we now know a great
deal more about him than we knew before.
Now I have some other points I wanted to cover, but it seems to me that it
is getting pretty late and perhaps we. can cover some of these things in the
question period. But, in conclusion, my own observations, again I stress that
this is my own personal view, on the Khrushchev trip: It seems to me that the
trip begins, for better or worse, a new era of Soviet - American relations. And
I think that, basically this is a good thing. Sooner or later.there had to be an
attempt made to settle Soviet - American differences by peaceful methods and this
is it, this is the start, this is the beginning. But it's only very fair to point out
that this new era in which we have entered is going to be very tricky and very
dangerous for the United States, and it's going to call for the most clever and
wise handling of ourselves. And as I think you can gather from my observations
on this trip, it seems to me that American leaders, the American leadership, and,
in a broader sense, the American people as a whole, have not yet grasped how
difficult a problem the United States faces in trying to deal with the Russians
without losing our shirts.
Thank you.
QUESTIONS FROM THE FLOOR:
Question: Have you any predictions about the reception of Eisenhower in Russia,
and what may be the results of his visit there?
Mr. Whitney: I think that the question of the results is really a little too much
on the crystal ball side, particularly since he isn't going to go there until next
June, so let me pass on that one. But my predictions on the reception of Eisen-
hower in Russia are these: that he will be welcomed there with a very 'warm and
wholehearted .welcome, and that there will be, it seems to me, no attempt to
create a reciprocal situation in which he is heckled. This is my guess. In other
words, I think that the Soviet government will do what its natural tendency would
be to do anyway, and that is, since he is a guest, to treat him with the greatest
of hospitality, having in mind that for those who want to think back to the recep-
tion of Khruschev'in this country, this will probably be the best way of showing
-up, certain aspects of the treatment of Khrushchev here in this country, as far
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.as international opinion is concerned. I think he will get a very good reception
from the public and from the government.
Question: In 1975, do you think the U. S. will be closer to Red China or to Russia
in its diplomatic relations?
Mr. Whitney: Well, I hope you don't come' around in 1975 and hold me to this. My
guess is that we will be closer to the Soviet Union.
Question: Something on a similar subject. Harrison Salisbury of the New York
Times predicted eventual war between Russia and Red China, with the U. S. sup-
porting Russia. Please comment.
Mr. Whitney: Well, I think:I should correct that statement. I don't believe that
Harrison Salisbury did predict an eventual war between Russia and Red China, as
anybody thinks that he did. To point out the exact passage and the exact words,
--I think I know the article to which you refer,--this article was a part of his
recent series on the Soviet Union, in which. he inferred hostility, or growing
hostility, between the Soviet Union and Red China. I think, in my talk, I have
already indicated that there is on the part of the Russians a good deal of fear of
the growing power of Red China. This is combined with a great desire to keep a
close alliance with them, but also, to attempt to keep bridges open to the West,
just in case. I don't think the relations are very cordial or very good, but neither
do I think our own particular foreign policy, is of a type which is likely to drive
any wedges between the two countries.
Question: Khrushchev said after his arrival in Moscow that some. people in the
U. S. are making the President's task for peace very difficult. Would you elaborate,
please, as to whom these people are?
Mr. Whitney: Well, I don't think we need.to accept Khrushchev's word for any-
thing. Let me try to approach this from a slightly different direction. - Why is it
that Khrushchev said, after his arrival in Moscow,--and before his departure from
the United States for that matter,--that the President faces a somewhat more
difficult task in working out a rapprochement with the Soviet Union than he,
Khrushchev, does. I think,that this is a very natural thing on the part of Khrush-
chev: to leave himself a way out, in case things don't work out, or let us say,
maybe thinking even that they won't work out, that there won't be a rapproche-
ment, that things will fall down. Then he can blame it on these people who are
causing so much difficulty between the Soviet Union and the United States. Who
are they, in his mind, or in the lexicon of Communist ideology? These are the
monopolists of Wall Street, making more profits, unwilling to convert their fac-
tories to peace-time uses. They are the gangsters of the pen, including myself,
who have a vested interest in the Cold War. They are anybody whom the Soviet
Union doesn't happen to like at that particular, moment. This leaves him a way
out --a retreat.
85
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Question: A different personality here. How did Mrs. Khrushchev impress you?
Did you feel Mrs. Eisenhower treated her coolly, as the President indicated?
(Mr. Whitney; As the Press indicated.)
Mr. Whitney; Oh, I don't know about Mrs. Eisenhower and Mrs. Khrushchev.
I think Mrs. Eisenhower did everything she could and that she should have had
to do, in order to make Mrs. Khrushchev.'.s stay here more pleasant. Mrs. Eisen-
hower has never personally sought to build up social capital on the basis of her
husband's position. Mrs. Khrushchev impressed me, as I suppose she impressed
everybody, - most favorably. I had a chance. to talk to her several times. . She's
a delightful person--I mean, I'm sure she* is a dedicated Communist just like her
husband, but she's a person who--well, she's a typical Slavic mother, who
admires her husband endlessly, and you could catch these glimpses as she would
look up at him with so much. admiration- -her warrior on his white steed, this was
her man. She was really very,: very..charming, indeed.. And incidentally, she was
his best selling point in. this country, it seemed to me. .So many people felt that,
after all, if a woman like this can like him he.can't. really be. so bad.
Question; Do you think that Mr. Khrushchev's visit here will make. him think
twice before starting anything that might lead to World War III?
Mr. Whitney; I would think that even before he came he. would have thought. twice.
The question in my mind is whether he will think three times.
Question: How free.are. correspondents, especially Americans and English, to
move about in Moscow and Russia, in general?
Mr. Whitney; Foreign correspondents are at the bottom of. the ladder. Insofar as
residents of the Soviet Union are concerned, in every respect, that is, the ones
.who live there all the time, the ones who reside there. I'm not talking about those
who go in on special trips. Unfortunately, though they-have at the present time
much greater facilities for travel than.they used to have under Stalin, they still do
not have complete freedom of travel. They can make trips but they have to ask the
permission of the Press Department of. the Ministry of Foreign. Affairs, and they
have to go through Document. Control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs before they
can move from one city to another. This handicaps. their movements and, quite
aside from censorship, which is another one of the burdens they bear, they do
have a difficult time moving around the country. Still, it is a lot better than it
used to be.
Question; A question which might be of much interest today. Do you think the
invitation to Khrushchev had any connection with the British elections, insofar
as our planning was concerned?
Mr. Whitney: No, I don't. I.think that Ike had enough to-do to think about
American elections.
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Question: Do you think President Eisenhower is backing down on his and our
stand on West Berlin?
Mr. Whitney: No, I don't think that Eisenhower is backing down on his or our
stand on West Berlin. I think what is becoming apparent as a result of the
Khrushchev trip is that there is somewhat more room for negotiation on this sub-
ject than most of us had realized hitherto. Now that the results of the Khrushchev
trip are known---namely, that, according to Eisenhower and Khrushchev both,
the time limit has been lifted on the Soviet threat to conclude a separate peace
treaty with East Germany, it becomes apparent that we probably will be willing to
negotiate on the question of West Berlin. And let's look at this for just a second;
there are, as Khrushchev has pointed out, two Germanys, as long as the Soviet
wants to keep these two Germanys apart. The situation in West Berlin is to some
extent a slightly anomalous situation. Soviet demands as they have boiled down
over these periods of negotiations for the establishment of a free city of West
Berlin, are not necessarily demands that would impair the freedom of the people
of West Berlin. At least the Soviet approach to this is something that can be, I
believe, discussed. I think this has become apparent, and is one of the good
things that has come out of this trip.
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THE SYMPOSIUM COMMITTEE
The Symposium Committee consists of representatives from major campus organi-
zations, the faculty, and the administration. The entire cost of the Symposium
is borne by student organizations. Beginning with the Symposium this year, the
committee will sponsor an annual Symposium in a field of vital interest to the
University Community. We.thereby hope to provide a continual intellectual
challenge as well as a forum for the interchange of ideas.
Boyd Hight - Chairman
Helene Millar - Secretary (YWCA)
Chuck Virgin - Treasurer
Fred Andrews - Chronicle
Byron Battle
Jim Brown - IDC
Pat Dunigan - Student Forum
Judie Durstine
Tom Gnuse - Engineer's Council
Dick Hansen - Student Union
Norris Horwitz
Sarah Hunter
Glenn Ketner - MSGA
Kathy- Mason - NSGA
Buzz Nelson
Mary Rhamstine
Carol Rickard - Panhel
Robin Robinhold
Marian Sapp - WSGA
Mel Thrash - YMCA
Les Wasserman
Miss Barbara Benedict
Dr. Thomas Cordle
Dr. Frank DeVyver
Mr. Charles Dukes
Mr. William Griffith
Dean Marcus Hobbs
Dean Marianna Jenkins
Dr. Weston LaBarre
Mrs. Ella Pratt
Dr. Herman Turk
Dean Charles Ward
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