PRINCIPAL ACTIVITIES OF OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES IN LAST HALF YEAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R003400010001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 24, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
24 October 1961
PRINCIPAL ACTIVITIES OF OFFICE OF NATIONAL
ESTIMATES IN LAST HALF YEAR
25X1
1. The past six months has been a period of exceptional
productivity in the Office of National Estimates, reflecting the many
and varied crisis situations and matters of international concern which
have required estimative judgments. The total of 54 estimates
completed exceeds the production of any similar period and actually
exceeds the annual production of two earlier years. The increase
in the production of formal estimates has been accompanied by a
large demand for estimative memoranda on a wide range of intelli-
gence and policy questions. These memoranda have been prepared
in response to specific requests of the DCI and of high officials of
the new Administration.
2. The changing pattern of high policy formulation coincident
with the beginning of a new Administration has taken place in the midst
of an almost unprecedented series of crisis situations. As the policy-
making procedures of the new Administration emerged, the intelligence
community, through 0/NE, has been called upon for a large number of
coordinated estimates on a wide variety of subjects, often with extremely
short deadlines. In addition, through the less formal "Memoranda to
the Director", the Office has been able to provide the DCI and, through
him, responsible policy-making officials, with judgments and evaluations
on matters of urgency. Finally, through participation on various Task
Forces or participation in the preparation of Task Force papers, 0/NE
personnel have provided direct support and assistance in the policy-
making process.
3. Obviously, a major preoccupation has been the Berlin
situation. Two estimates were produced on probable Soviet tactics
and timing, one on the stability of East Germany, and five on probable
Soviet reactions to proposed US courses of action. All these estimates
have been produced upon White House, State, or Defense Department
I L L EG I B request.
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4. Bloc military developments is another major estimative
field which has been given much attention during the past six months.
This is due in part to continued change in the Soviet armed forces
and in part to the acquisition of new information. In addition to the
semi-annual broad study of the entire range of Soviet military capa-
bilities, individual estimates have been produced on Soviet technical
capabilities in guided missiles and space vehicles, Sino-Soviet air
defense capabilities through mid-1966, and Soviet capabilities for
long-range attack. A new estimate was also produced on the probable
intelligence warning of Soviet attack on the US.
5. In addition to its primary function of producing and
coordinating National Estimates, 0/NE has a number of other closely
related tasks. DuringAhe past six months 0/NE has been assigned
the responsibility for a new publication - the "Weekly Survey of Cold
War Crisis Situations," six editions of which have been issued to
date. The Board of National Estimates also has the responsibility
for preparing and coordinating Priority National Intelligence Objectives
which provide guidance for the intelligence community in the allocation
of research and collection efforts.
6. Because of the special qualifications of its small staff, 0/NE
is frequently called upon to:loan individuals, sometimes for extended
periods, to other activities. For example, during most of the past
six months, 0/NE's Deputy Assistant Director has been Intelligence
Advisor to the International Conference on Laos at Geneva. Another
senior officer of 0/NE is a full-time member of the Staff of the Net
Evaluation Sub-Committee of the NSC; another has just returned from
a year's assignment to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.
A member of the Board of National Estimates has been Director of the
Policy Staff of the Disarmament Administration and of necessity, devoted
virtually all his time to this activity. Another Board member has just
returned from an important assignment with ICA. The Naval member
of the Board serves as CIA Representative to the NATO Standing Group
Ad Hoc Committee.
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES (NIE's) AND
SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES (SNIE'S)
PRODUCED DURING THE PERIOD 1 APRIL - 19 OCTOBER 61')
ESTIMATE
TITLE DATE PUBLISHED
SNIE 13-61 The Economic Situation 4 April
in Communist China
NIE 4-2-61 Attitudes of Key World Powers 6 April
on Disarmament Issues
NIE 11-61 Probable Intelligence Warning 6 April
of Soviet Attack on the US
NIE 60/70-61 Probable Developments in 11 April
Colonial Africa
NIE 11-5-61 Soviet Technical Capabilities 25 April
in Guided Missiles and Space
Vehicles
NIE 11-7-61
SNIE 11-9-61
Soviet Short-Term Intentions
Regarding Berlin and
Germany
The Possibility of Soviet
Nuclear Testing During the
Moratorium
25 April
25 April
NIE 15-61
Outlook for Yugoslavia
23 May
SNIE 34-2-61
Short-Term Outlook for Iran 23 May
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ESTIMATE
SNIE 42-2-61
NIE 11-8-61
SNIE 86.1-61
SNIE 2-61
NIE 24-61
TITLE DATE PUBLISHED
Short-Term Prospects in
South Korea
Soviet Capabilities for Long
Range Attack
Short-Term Prospects in Haiti
31 May
7 June
7 June
Soviet and Other Reactions to 13 June
Various Courses of Action
Regarding Berlin
The Outlook for Italy 13 June
SNIE 27.2-61 The Outlook for the Renewal 20 June
of the Azores Base Agreement
NIE 43-61 Prospects for the Government 20 June
of the Republic of China
SNIE 10-2-61 Likelihood of Major Communist 27 June
Military Intervention in Main-
land Southeast Asia
SNIE 27.2-2-61 The Outlook for Retention of 27 June
US Azores Base Rights in the
Event of Certain Courses of
US Action
NIE 3661 Nasser and the Future of Arab 27 June
Nationalism
SNIE 32-61 Prospects for Pakistan
SNIE 58-2-61
SNIE 2-2-61
Probable Reactions to Certain
Courses of Action Concerning
Laos
5 July
5 July
Soviet and Other Reactions to 11 July
Possible US Courses of Action
with Respect to Berlin
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ESTIMATE
NIE 11-3-61
NIE 38.1-61
SNIE 2-3-61
SNIE 42-3-61
NIE 80/90-61
SNIE 86.2-61
SNIE 56-61
NIE 10-61
NIE 93-61
SNIE 12.4-61
NIE 14.3/53-61
NIE 11-4-61
(Military
Annexes)
SNIE 11-10-61
SNIE 2-4-61
TITLE
Sino-Soviet Air Defense
Capabilities Through
Mid-1966
DATE PUBLISHED
11 July
The Outlook for Nepal 11 July
Probable Soviet Reaction
to a Western Embargo
The Current Regime in the
Republic of Korea
Latin American Reactions to
Developments in and with
Respect to Cuba
18 July
18 July
18 July
The Dominican Situation 25 July
Consequences of the Re-Election 1 August
of President Garcia
Authority and Control in the 8 August
Communist Movement
The Outlook for Brazil 8 August
Stability of East Germany in 15 August
the Berlin Crisis
Prospects for North and South 15 August
Vietnam
Main Trends in Soviet
Capabilities and Policies,
1961-1966
Soviet Tactics in the Berlin
Crisis
Reactions to Certain US
Measures in the Berlin Crisis
5 -
24 August
24 August
31 August
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25X6
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ESTIMATE
NIE 60/70-2-61
SNIE 11-11-61
TITLE DATE PUBLISHED
The Probable Inter-
relationships of the
Independent African States
31 August
Implications of the Soviet 7 September
Resumption of Nuclear Testing
NIE 14.2/42-61 The Outlook for Korea 7 September
SNIE 2-5-61
NIE 4-3-61
NIE 11-8/1-61
SNIE 13-2-61
Soviet Reactions to Certain 14 September
US Courses of Action
Nuclear Weapons and Delivery 21 September
Capabilities of Free World
Countries other than the US
and UK
Strength and Deployment of
Soviet Long Range Ballistic
Missile Forces
21 September
Communist China in 1971 28 September
SNIE 58-3-61 The Situation and Short-Run 28 September
Outlook
SNIE 10-3-61
NIE 11-3-61
Probable Communist Reactions 10 October
to Certain SEATO Undertakings
in South Vietnam
The Soviet Atomic Energy 5 October
Program
SNIE 11-10/1-61 Soviet Tactics in the Berlin 5 October
Crisis
SNIE 11-12-61 The Soviet Threat to Iran and 5 October
the CENTO AREA
SNIE 53-2-61
Bloc Support of the Communist
Effort Against the Government
of Vietnam
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5 October
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ESTIMATE
SNIE 2-6-61
TITLE
DATE PUBLISHED
Probable Soviet and
other Reactions to Certain
US Military Measures in
the Berlin Crisis
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19 October
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Mr. McCone
Mr. Kent left this paper and said it is
the third paper in which you may have an
interest - particularly the attachment.
10/25/61 25X1
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BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
INTELLIGENCE
NAME TITLE BACKGROUND EXPERIENCE
Sherman Kent Assistant Director and
Chairman of Board
Deputy Assistant Director
Member of Board
Professor of History at Yale
University; 1941-46: Chief,
Europe-Africa Division, R&A
Branch, OSS; Acting Director,
Office of Research and Intelli-
gence, Dept. of State; author
of "Strategic Intelligence".
16 years total
11 years - CIA
/I
Faculty member, New York
University; member of Planning 25X1
Staff of Lt. Governor of 25X1
served with OSS in Far
East; CIA Representative to 25X1
Staff Asst.
to National Security Council 18 years total
Planning Board; Chief, Esti- 14 years - CIA
mates Staff, 0/NE. -4- 6-
Vice Chairman of Board Rhodes scholar. Professor of
History,
University; US Naval
Reserve, 1943-48, European
Theatre.
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13 years total
13 years - CIA
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BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
NAME
TITLE
BACKGROUND
INTELLIGENCE
EXPERIENCE
Member
25X1
Professor of History,
World War II, Secretary, JIG;
senior Army member, Joint In-
telligence Staff; CIA Representa-
tive on Net Evaluations
Subcommittee of NSC; holder of
21 years total
Legion of Merit and Order of the
14 years - CIA
25X1
British Empire.
It
Member
Practiced law in New York City;
served with OSS and State Depart-
ment; former General Counsel,
10 years total
10 years - CIA
(0
25X1
Member
Faculty member, Cornell University,
Williams College, and Wells College;
25X1
member, Current Intelligence Staff,
OSS; Chief, Publications Division,
ORE/CIA; National War College;
25X1
Chief, Far East Staff, 0/NE; CIA
liaison with I
15 years total
DCI representative on 14 years - CIA
Net Evaluations Subcommittee of NSC. s--
25X1
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25X1
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BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
NAME
TITLE BACKGROUND
INTELLIGENCE
25X1EXPERIENCE
Lieut. General,
USAF (Ret.)
Member
Admiral, USN Member
Major General,
USA (Ret.)
Member
tit
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25X1
Service
familiarity.
4 years - CIA
0?1?01.
Service
familiarity
10 months - CIA
25X1
Service
familiarity
7 months - CIA
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25X1
25X1
BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
NAME
TITLE
BACKGROUND
INTELLIGENCE
EXPERIENCE
Member
Member
Member
25X1
13 years total
9 years - CIA.
10 years total
10 years - CIA
:12
25X1
Reporter,
faculty member, Western Reserve
and Princeton Universities; editor,
German Foreign Office Documents,
Department of State; Chief, EE/USSR
staff, 0/NE; US Navy, 1942-46,
Southwest Pacific and Japan.
Practiced law, New York City; War
Production Board; economic asst.
to European Bureau of State Dept. in
charge of UK and Irish affairs; Special
Asst. to DCI for OCB; detailed to
White House Staff.
Faculty member,
; staff member, Brookings In-
25X1
4,
stitution; Military Intelligence, War
Dept., GS, 1944-47; CIA Representative
Fellow, Center
for International Affairs, Harvard;
DCI Representative on Net Evaluations
Subcommittee of NSC; Chief, Estimates
Staff, 0/NE.
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17 years total
14 years, CIA
411,tea,-t,
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KEY 0/NE STAFF PERSONNEL
INTELLIGENCE
NAME TITLE BACKGROUND EXPERIENCE
25X1
25X1
25X1
Chief, Estimates
Staff
Chief of Eastern
Europe Staff
Former writer and editor.
World War II Army combat
intelligence officer. Attended 17 years total
National War College, 1957-58. 14 years - CIA
Graduate work in economics;
pre-Agency experience as news-
paper reporter and editor.
Served in 1958-60
with special assignments at
1959 Geneva Foreign Ministers
Conference and 1960 Summit
Meeting.
Chief of Latin Former history professor at
America-Africa Staff Williams, Oberlin, and
World War II
Naval intelligence officer.
Special liaison assignments to
1955-57
and 1959-60.
Foreign Relations.
Cr'D
'
Council on
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10 years - CIA
12 years total
9 years - CIA
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
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KEY 0/NE STAFF PERSONNEL (Page 2)
NAME
TITLE
BACKGROUND
INTELLIGENCE
EXPERIENCE
25X1
Chief of Near East
Staff and Staff Officer
in charge of Weekly Su
of Cold War Crisis
Situations
Chief of Far East
Staff
Chief of Western
Europe Staff
Trained as historian and
archivist. World War II
rvey communications
intelligence officer.
Special liaison assignment
to
1957-58 and intelligence
aide to US UN Delegation
during Suez crisis.
Former international
relations professor,
Council
on Foreign Relations, and
author of book on Southeast
Asia.
Former professor of
political science at
and author of two books on
French government and
politics
1
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11 years total
8 years - CIA
25X1
25X1
8 years - CIA
25X1
4 years - CIA
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KEY 0/NE STAFF PERSONNEL (Page 3)
NAME TITLE
INTELLIGENCE
BACKGROUND EXPERIENCE
25X1
25X1
DCI Representative Doctorate in international
on Net Evaluations affairs and pre-Agency
SubCommittee experience in economic
research at Brookings
Institution. Attended
National War College 1958-59
On leave from Doctorate in Russian
duties as Chief of diplomatic history.
Far East Staff for
study of Sino-Soviet
affairs at St. Antony's
College, Oxford University.
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9 years - CIA
11 years - CIA
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17 May 1960
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT; U -2 Incident
1_ Attached is the statement which Mr. Dulles said would
be distributed for guidance to the members of the Senior Staff for sub-
sequent briefing their subordinates as appropriate.
2. Also attached for convenient reference s.re the unclassified
statements of the President, Vac Secretary of State, Senator -Johnson, and
Representative Cannon.,
P
Distribution:
DCI l copy of each)
SlAsst, to r`f7.1,
Cal, StanleyGrog
25X1
5/Asst. to DCL.,
r, .J.
25X1
E0/DC1, Mr.
Asst. to DCI,
Asst. to DCI,
Asst. to DCI,
DDCI
25X1
1G Acting),
D DS
A/ DDS
SSA/DDS
25X1
SIDDS(Actg,
(EXECUTIVE REGISTIIY FILE nv-E--
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25
25
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D/Commo
D/Personnel
ID/Security
13/Training
Comptroller
D/ Logistics
Gen. Counsel
Med. Officer
DEVI
A/DDI
D/PIC
C/00
OCR
ONE
ORR
OSI
OCI
OBI
C/OPS/DDP
C/I&R
TSD
SA/CA/DDP
C/CA
AC/DPD
C/FI
C /CI Staff (Acting).
C/I0
C/SR
CrEE
CiWE
C/WP
C/FE
C / NE
C/AF
0/DDC,
2
S -E C.* ? R E T
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SECRET
Background on the UZ Incident
I. All of you are well informed on the reports in the press of
the last two weeks involving this Government and in particular CIA in high.
altitude reconnaissance of the USSR. The extent of such reconnaissarezeTe'. -
and the amount of information has not been revealed and will not be revealed.
The quality of the material is high.
2. Arrangements have existed for technical exploitation of the
materials procured by these means, as well as for the use of the information
derived, in furtherance of the responsibility of the Director of Central Intel-
ligence to the President and the NSC and the responsibility of other intel-
ligence chiefs to their superiors?
3. Because of what has happened, some may feel that the
materials we have acquired and the information derived therefrom should now
be made widely available in the Intelligence Community. This is not yet
possible. However, a study is unclet way to devise, if possible, the practical
means of making the maximum possible amount of information available on a
need-to-know basis as in the case of other highly sensitive materials. In
this study we are faced not only with the problem of maintaining essential
control of the products of reconnaissance but also. of not jeopardiziAg ;future
efforts.
4. You are requested not to discuss this itsformation with
persons outside of the Intelligence Community.
S. You are further requested to use caution in discussion of this
information within the circle of Intelligence and with others officially concerned.
SECRET
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President Statement on U2 Incident at News Conference, 11 May 1960
U-2 incident.
I have made some notes from which I want to talk to you about this
A full statement about this matter has been made by the State
Department and there have been several statesmanlike remarks by leaders of
both parties.
For my part, I supplement what the Secretary of State has had to
say, with the following four main points. After that I shall have nothing further
to say---for the simple reason I can think of nothing to add that might be useful
at this time.
The first point is this: The need for intelligence-gathering activi-
ties. No one wants another Pearl Harbor. This means that we must have know-
ledge of military forces and preparations around the world, especially those
capable of massive surprise attack.
Secrecy in the Soviet Union makes this essential. In most of the
world no large-scale attack could be prepared in secret, but in the Soviet
Union there is a fetish of secrecy and concealment. This is a major cause of
international tension and uneasiness today., Our deterrent must never be
placed in jeopardy. The safety of the whole free world demands this.
As the Secretary of State pointed out in his recent statement, ever
since the beginning of my Administration I have issued directives to gather, in
every feasible way, the information required to protect the United States and the
free world against surprise attack and to enable them to make effective prepara-
tions for defense.
My second point: The' nature of intelligence-gathering activities.
'Below the Surface?
These have a special and secret character. They are, so to
speak, "below the surface? activities. They are secret because they must cir-
cumvent measures designed by other countries to protect secrecy of military
preparations.
They are divorced from the regular visible agencies of government
which stay clear of operational involvement in specific detailed activities.
?
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President Statement Statement Cont2d
These elements operate under broad directives to seek and gather
intelligence short of the use of force---with operations supervised by responsible
officials within this area of secret activities.
We do not use our Army, Navy or Air Force for this purpose, first
to avoid any possibility of the use of force in connection with these activities,
and second, because our military forces, for obvious reasons, cannot be given
latitude under broad directives, but must be kept under strict control in every
detail.
These activities have their own rules and methods of concealment
which seek to mislead and obscure---just as in the Soviet allegations there
are many discrepancies. For example, there is some reason to believe that
the plane in question was not shot down at high altitude. The normal agencies
of our Government are unaware of these specific activities or of the special
efforts to conceal them.
Third point: How should we view all of this activity?
Distasteful but Vital
It is a distasteful but vital necessity.
We prefer and work for a different kind of world---and a different
way of obtaining the information essential to confidence and effective deterrents.
Open societies, in the day of present weapons, are the only answer.
This was the reason for my "open skies" proposal in 1955, which
I was ready instantly to put into effect.:--to permit aerial observation over the
United States and the Soviet Union which would assure that no surprise attack
was being prepared against anyone. I shall bring up the "open skies" proposal
again at Paris---since it is a means of ending concealment and suspicion.
My final point is that we must not be distracted from the real issues
of the day by what is an incident or a symptom of the world situation today.
This incident has been given great propaganda exploitation. The
emphasis given to a flight of an unarmed non-military plane can only reflect a
fetish of secrecy.
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-3-
?i;
rt-stdn Sttenm Cont
.?.
Thr real are the c;;;:iet, wi!1! he working on at flit- summit--
.10,14:,-A-nt', search to N,Yeutiolvs affecting Germany and Berlin and the whote
r,,,rigeo East-Wesi relatione, including the reduction of secrecy arid 4uspicion,
Frankly; I am hopefut that we may make progress on these great
issiies, This i what we mean when we speak of "working for peace? "
Itristter.;
And as I remind you. I will have nothing further to say about this
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The New York Times
Washington, May 9, 1960
HERTER STATEMENT ON U4 FLIGHT
On May 7 the Department a State spokesman made a statement
with respect to the alleged shootiag down of an unarmed American
civilian aircraft of the U-2 type over the Soviet Union. The following
supplements and claifies this straement as respects the position of the
United States Government
Ever since Marshal Stalin shifted the policy of the Soviet Union
from wartime cooperation to post-war conflict in 1946, and particularly
since the Berlin blockade, the forceful take-over of Czechoslovakia and
the Communist aggressions ir Korea and Vietnam, the world has lived
in a state of apprehension with resp et to Soviet intentions.
The Soviet leaders have almost complete access to the open
societies of the free world ars1 supplement this with vast espionage
networs:s. However, they Iv.ep their own society tightly closed and
rigorously controlled. WitA the development of modern weapons carry-
ing tremondously destruct:ye nuclear warhea.ds, the threat of surprise
attack and aggression pre;ents a constant danger. This menace is en-
hanced by the threats of :sass destruction frequently voiced by the Soviet
leadership.
Western Proposals Recalled
For many yea./ the United States in company with its allies has
sought to lessen or even to eliminate this threat from the life of man so
that he can go about Us peaceful tusiness without fear. Many proposals
to this end have bee/ put up to the Soviet Union.
The Presiient's "Open Skies" proposal of 1955 was followed in
1957 by the offer cf an exchange of pround observers between agreed
military iru3tallatons in the United 3tates, the U.S.S.R. and other
nations that migla wish to participese. For several years we have
been seeking Os mutual abolition o:* the restrictions on travel imposed
In the Soviet tion and those which the United States felt obliged to
institute on a reciprocal basis. Mere recently, at the Geneva disarma-
ment confer ice the United States las proposed far-reaching new measures
of cont rollei disarmament.
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NYnes, Wa,1?hington, 9 Mv-ity 9t0;1 /Herter StAternew. or 13.,..Z Sligh-t
c. ontamedt
It is powesible thA,t ?..b.e. Soviet leder3 liAve a different version
td that,, however unjustifiedly, they feat- uttitek froart the West,
but this io hard to reconcile with their corlinu4,1 re.:ection of our
tepe7,te,n proposide for effeeti.ve zneAeure*,; Ag&Unist. 131,111)-ciXe 4ttd,c4
Ar-d for effective inspection,ef disarerno,rneat ro.elt,f4UYeS,
I will 1,4',y frankly thIlt. it is urn5kr:ceptable that the Soviet polkic4-1
systezn. slild be given an oppeprtunity to toake secret prelumtions to
5.ste the free world with the choice of p),bject surrender or nucleAr
,tiestr,i,?.;tion?
ResEtrisibitity Noted
_......? --
The Government of the I.i&ited Stites we:old be derelir,t to it
rcEspciagibility net only to the Americari people but to free peoples
everywhere if it did nct, in the hil)Peuce of Soviet, eooperAtion? ttke
sedi. measures 1.VS il.TCO possible uni1,q4erally to le seat and to overcome
,this danger of surprise attack, .in frAct, the United Stides k4,!ii, not And
does not shirk this repo,isibility.
In accorflatie with the 1%.,2,ti3rifi1 Seeurity Act of )941', the
Peesident has put into effect since tht.,-! beginning of his Adrre4tistre.,t1w$
iirectives to 0.`ther by every pessibl,t nae,Ins the iniorcni4.11,Drt required
o-oo protect the, United States And the free world Again5t surp2ile zttm.ck
And to enable them to rriake effective pkeparktions for their defer.ecl
Under these directives programs 17.4Ave been developed 6,ncl put
into cperlition which liztve included extensiveeri4l servoillazwe
unArtned ci3O,1kIn Aircraft, normally 2f 4i..peri,obef.4 clutracte but
on ne:msion by penetratior,? Specific mi ion of these unttred
civfliiAircrwl:t he not been sulttject to llretoidential 4wthoriAltion.
St-e.,fiet :tskotIves Questioned
The fact th,--kt such N,Vai?,a1 taking ithire lr-ss :,4pp47, emtly
been a CiVeret to the Sc,viet leitderahip, 011C1 the question ind.n)ed
lat.4S to why tat this paerticular juncture '7iney. seek t enplcit:
pl'esent !iAM g.=1 propiAgandel iKAtle irk the cold
A
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Times, Washington, 9 May 60, Herter Statement on 1.1-2 Flight tre,rilinue(r,
TW.s, Government had sincere,ly hoped and continues to hope that
in., thc eorning meeting of the heads of government in Paris, Chairman
1.uheltv would lbe prepared to cooperate in agreeing to effective
nneasures which would remove this fear of sudden mass destruction
from the iminds of people everywhere.
Far from being damaging to the forthcoming meeting in Paris,
this, incident should serve to underline the importance to the world
ol e?e,rneet ttempt there to achieve agreed and effective safeguards
a..gainst surprise attack and aggression.
At my request and with the authority of the President, the
director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Honorable Allen W.
Deities, is today briefing members of the Congress fully along the
foregoing lines.
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Congressional Record, Vol. 106, No. 85, May 10, 1960
Senator Johnsons Statement on the U2 Incident
Mr. Johnson of Texas. Mr President, this is certainly a time in
which Americans?and people everywhere?must keep their heads. We can-
not afford hysteria, panic, or hasty and ill-advised action.
There are many unanswered questions about the incident of the
American plane that was shot down over the Soviet Union. These are serious
questions which will have to be considered very carefully by Congress and by
the American people.
But it is doubtful whether the answers will be forthcoming immediate
ly. There are too many facts which are not available and which will be avail-
able only when the Soviets permit a cool and realistic appraisal of what happened
in their airspace.
Furthermore, it is always difficult to come to objective conclusions
in an atmosphere of sanctimonious statements and threats against other nations.
It is ridiculous for Nikita Khrushchev to profess such shocked surprise over
efforts to gather information.
When Mr. Khrushchev visited this country last year, I do not think
he impressed any of us as being a man who is naive. By that, I mean naive about
what his own country has been doing for many, many years.
The incident, of course, will be assessed with great care and all
of its implications will be explored carefully. But meanwhile, we cannot lose
sight of the overriding reality which confronts us immediately.
It is whether this incident will become an excuse and an alibi for
sabotaging the summit conference.
Within a very few days, our country is going to enter negotiations
with the Soviet Union in an effort to relax the very tensions that have brought
about this kind of an incident. It is difficult to imagine those negotiations as
having much success if they are to be conducted in this kind of an atmosphere.
If Nikita Khrushchev is going to spend his time taunting the United
States over what he considers the blunders it has made and threatening other
countries on the basis of facts which have not been clearly established, there
will be little time to talk about the real problems which divide the world.
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-2-
Senator Johnsons Statement on the UZ ::.nciderat 1(Cont'd)
Those problems cannot be traced back to the. fact that nations
seek to extract information from each other. Espionage and inte'Lligence
gathering are not something that cause the cold war, They are merely by-
products of the cold war?something that follows logically when nations can-
not trust each other,
Whatever may be his motivations, it is obvious that Nikita
Khrushchev has handled this incident in such a way as to draw attention
away from the real problems. We must get hack to those problerns?of
people, of armaments, of respect ?or the integrity of smaller nations?if
the eeumnit conference ha e any meaning.
If blunders have been made, the American people ca?-?n be.: certain
that Congress will go into them thoroughly. But this ii something that should
be done objectively and not merely as a panicky reaction to Soviet charges.
And I think that one point should be crystal clear. Nikita
Khrushchev cannot use this incident in such a way as to divide the Ameritan
people and to weaken our national strength. The American people. are. -enited
in a determination, to preserve our freedoms and we ar e not going to be
shaken from that course, or we a.ze not going to be divided in this critical
hour,
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Congressional Record
Vol.106? No, 85, 10 May 60
STATEMENT BY REPRESENTATIVE CANNON
ON U-2 INCIDENT
Mr. Chairman, on May I the Soviet Government captured,
1, 300 miles inside the boundaries of the Russian Empire, an American
plane, operated by an American pilot, under the direction and control
of the Central Intelligence Agency, and is now holding both the plane
and the pilot.
The plane was on an espionage mission authorized and supported
by money provided under an appropriation recommended by the House
Committee on Appropriations and passed by the Congress.
Although the Members of the House have not generally been
informed on the subject, the mission was one of a series and part of
an established program with which the subcommittee in charge of the
appropriation was familiar, and of which it had been fully apprised
during this and previous sessions.
The appropriation and the activity had been approved and recom-
mended by the Bureau of the Budget and, like all military expenditures and
operations, was under the aegis of the Commander in Chief of the Armed
Forces of the United States, for whom all members of the subcommittee
have the highest regard and in whose military capacity they have the
utmost confidence.
The question immediately arises as to the authority of the sub-
committee to recommend an appropriation for such purposes, and
especially the failure of the subcommittee to divulge to the House and
the country the justifications warranting the expenditure and all details
connected with the item at the time it was under consideration on the
floor.
The answer of the subcommittee is?absolute and unavoidable
military necessity, fundamental national defense.
During the Second World War the United States succeeded in
breaking the Japanese naval code. Through this incredible good fortune
the U.S. commanders were able to read every order transmitted from
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Statement by Representative Cannon continued
Tokyo and all interfleet communications. This advance and intimate
information had much to do in preparing the way and increasing the
effectiveness of our great victory in the battle of Midway which broke
the power of Japan in the Pacific. But some incautious member of a
congressional committee or its staff leaked the information to a reporter,
and 30 minutes after the next edition of his newspaper hit the street Japan
changed her naval code and all further advantage was lost.
This appropriation, and its purpose, is justified by honored and
established precedent. This subcommittee, including the same personnel
with the exception of two members who have since died, was the same
committee which for something like 3 years provided in the annual appro-
priation bills a sum which finally totaled more than $2 billion for the
original atomic bomb. Session after session the money was provided,
and the subcommittee visited Oak Ridge where the work was in progress
without any Member of the House with the exception of the Speaker of the
House being aware of this tremendous project or the expenditure of the
money. According to the testimony of all military authorities that bomb
ended the war and saved the lives of not less than half a million men who
would have had to be sacrificed in the conquest of Japan. No one has ever
said that the subcommittee was not justified in expending an amount that
eventually aggregated more than the assessed valuation of some of the
States of the Union for that purpose.
Espionage has been throughout recorded history an integral part
of warfare. Before occupying the Promised Land Moses "by the command-
ment of the Lord" sent out from the wilderness of Paran. 10 men under the
direction of Joshua to spy out the land.
Anano nation in the history of the world has practiced espionage
more assidoously than Russia. The United States and every other allied
nation today literally swarms with them. Within the last few weeks we
sent to the Federal penitentiary at Atlanta a Russian spy convicted in
Federal court who was regularly transmitting information directly to
Moscow every night. Their spies stole from us the secret of the atomic
bomb. Every Russian embassy and consulate has today time and again
the number required for routine diplomatic and consular service. When
we were at Oak Ridge we were told there were so many Russian spies
there that only by a policy of strictest compartmentalism were they able
to maintain the integrity of their work.
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Statement by Representative Cannon continued
The need for espionage in this instance was exceptional and
compelling. At the close of the world war in which we had saved
Russia from complete subjugation we were surprised to learn that while
all other nations were disarming and returning to a peacetime status as
rapidly as possible, Russia was feverishly driving her factories and
continuing to increase her armament at top speed. Simultaneouely they
announced that communism and free enterprise could not live in the
same world.
Every effort has been made by American administrations to
reestablish conditions under which we could discontinue excessive ex-
penditures for armament and divett these vast sums to business and
humanitarian purposes. But each year Russia has become more arro-
gant and threatening and more demanding.
Under our American ideals and system of government, a declara-
tion of war against any nation, however provocative, is unthinkable. Our
military authorities have no choice but to give any enemy the advantage of
first attack and then depend on massive retaliation for defense. The
Communists have taken every advantage of this situation.
In modern warfare surprise is a tremendous advantage. Less
than a week before the Communist attack on Korea a congressional
committee from this House returning from Seoul reported that perma-
nent peace had been established and the latcl was returning to prosperity.
There was no shadow of war; not the slightest cloud appeared on the
horizon. The sudden rush of a vast army of well armed, we/ trained,
and well munitioned Communists across the border made it necessary
for us to throw precipitately into battle raw and untrained troops who
were wholly unable to protect themselves or hold their positions. And
there followed one of the most disastrous period in the history of American
arms.
During the hearings on this appropriation for the last Z or 3 years,
I have each year asked the CIA reprebentative before the committee,
"How could the enemy mobilize an army of such sire and accumulate
hundreds of tons of supplies and munitions and the transportation facilities
necessary for its movement without our learning that such an attack was
in prospect?"
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StAternent by Representative CAnnon continued
And each year we iiAve u,dmoriished the Authority, the CIA, that
it must meet future situAtions of this charActer with effective
toid thern, "This mist not happen esvins, and it is up to you to Acc
tlist it 0(pes not happen again' "; that the American forces must be 4pprised
of :1...ny future preparation ?o tk in time to meet it. And the plAn they
were following when this plane VEYA8 t4ken? is their answer to th4A demand,.
And I wAcnt to take advf,*nte.ge of the opportunity to compliment and
thank Director Allen W. Dulles and his rem.arkable corps for the scim)rAble
vow,y in which they lxa.ve net the ii5tuAtion through these Iter yeArs.
They Are entitled to the highest corrimendottion 1:iy the Dep?Artment,
the Co re', and the America people.
WC CATillOt perrt auo":.,her Kore?1 We r:??.tnnot t.:3,ke the risk of
k7me.,1 nwtion...3-11 devastation which rnight involve every American
Wecxct take the risk of the cf::72.fleco.;!:nces whic17, wcrald
,'.71V4ck f?torn mcrosn the Rtissin. 'borders, And sice the Russi4ns refuse
coo.per4,te in our elfort,,.t.,: est,.biiska pertrnerat pee?refuise ever to
agree to ethical gti.riciarta5 of -we have no choice but to .;.aretc.,.ct
our Nio U our people thrgii. the Ni,g,e-old methods of del'eruce et? long
.i.n uue by the C:ortimuttists theuriselixee, 1.kitiot we wake tomorrow, or do riot
tor:ioprov.:? 4,g reault our failure 1:o know in time whAtt they are
The world hi Leen i-so.pw,117zd 'by vicirruat vimlictiven.euz; of
t-I3-? ? thev's dehu.ncia1.ion. }TS ytrgt:er,r1-4,-/ tha,ri.:4A!,te:tied the of.
te Unit,:te State& ;1 U.pi nd1.Rundet-ir,g?fli lavy is incited by the
At, it it neither stupid 1:lutirie.rin.g. On 1.11r, cori.trwry it, .6,,Le
;?surl:etici,J1