MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY FROM JOHN A. MCCONE

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R002900180005-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2002
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: September 13, 1963
• Content Type: MF

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 OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR
UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY ~ ~ ~i ~ 1
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`~ ;_ -~.
~?.-
August 28, 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
John A. McCone
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
USIA recently transmitted to your Agency copies of the
attached. reports which summarize some of the overall indications
STAT
from the worldwide survey Other
reports of this series will be sent as they become available.
We would like to call these reports to your personal attention.
because we feel that the findings are very instructive in yielding a
psychological balance sheet, so to speak, of strengths and weak-
ne~ses in .America's image abroad. The indications have been brought
tq tl~e attention of the President.
~' We feel that much of the value of this kind of audit of world
opfnion lies in trend measurements of changes over time. Accord-
ingly we are presently planning a second worldwide soundin in the
Fall, timed to field a year end re ort.
Edward R. Murrow
Director
Attachments
1. Some Indications of Worldwide Public
Opinion Toward the U.S. and the USSR -
R-141-63 (R)
2. Some Worldwide Attitudes Toward
disarmament and Nuclear Issues - _
~~~ 3=_ ,
x;423 ~ ~ ~ .. ,:. ,
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT
M~R:
A~tachments being
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Group 5
Classification to be reviewed
two years after date of publication
.Research and Reference Service
SOME INDICATIONS. OF WORLDWIDE PUBLIC OPINION
TOWARD THE U. S. AND THE USSR
R-141-63 (R)
July, 1963
This is a research report, not a statement of Agency policy
CON NTIAL
Survey Research Studies
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CONFID IAL
An initial limited effort toward the measurement of "World
Opinion".conducted in 15 countries in the wake of the Cuban crisis
reveals predominantly favorable general orientations toward the UaS.,
and despite marked gains following the peaceful resolution of the
Cuban confrontation predominantly unfavorable general orientations
toward the USSR,
however, comparisons of Ua5o to USSR standing in some major realms
of competition reveal a far lase favorable pictured
In all 15 countries surveyed most with opinions see
the UoB, ahead in economic strengthq
But only in eight countries is the UoSo predominantly
judged ahead in total military strength, and in only
four is the UoSa judged ahead in military strength in
nuclear weaponse Four others were divided on this
issue and seven predominantly viewed the USSR as the
stronger4
In space standing the U,S, leads the USSR in only one
of the 15 countries surveyedo In science the it>S,
fares better l~nat enjoys a really substantial lead in
only threeo
In view of these considerable indications of Soviet strength
it iffi not surprsising that not all are convinced that tine UeSo is the
wave of the futu~?e in preeminence as a world powers The prevailing
judgment in nine ~.aeas is that the U>84 will end up the strangest in
an extended period of competition without warn But in two countries
opinions are divided on this index of long-range confidence, and in
four areas the UoSo is predominantly seen as running behind the USSR
or Communist Chinas
Finally, despite favorable general orientations, willingness to
side with the UoSo is far from general in the countries surveyed, While
there is predominant willingness to line up with the U,So vie-a-vis
Russia in eight areas, in three of these the margin is thino And in the
remainiaag six areas preference for non~alignament plus scattered support
for flea USSR outweighs allegiance to the UoSo
1 For some postmCuban trend indications of UoSe and USSR standing see
R-99-b3 "Trends in West ]~uropean l~atimates of U,S, and Soviet Strength",
and R-122-6~ ""Canrrent Trends in papa a Public Opinion Toward the Uo8 0
and the USSR"o CONP - NTIAL
i
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CONF NTIAL
The present report, and a number to fallow, mark an initial limited
step toward establishing periodic soundings of that intangible but
important entity "World Opinion". The ultimate goal is to block out for
general ld.S. government guidance the broad picture of world-wide senti-
ment about the U.S. and major issues of international relations. It will
remain the function of other specific studies to fill in details as re-
quired on issues of importance as they arise, and in countries of parti-
cular significance.
This initial effort reflects more an aspiration than an achievement
since the present extent of coverage is far from adequate to provide valid
regional and world-wide generalizations. Africa is not as yet covered, the
representation is particularly sketchy in the Near Bast, and in many etr-untriea
it is only feasible at the present time to sample capita3. or major cities,
rather than the national populations, (Details on the present samplings
may be found in an appendix.) It is hoped that future efforts will pro-
;gressively embody wider representation. In the meantime, the indications
must be read, of course, with limitations of coverage in mind,
This particular set of soundings was taken in early 1963 in the wake
of the Cuban crisis -- an event which surely qualifies as one of the major
points of reference in post-war international relations. Other international
dedelopments were also part of the context of events conditioning the present
survd.y,edgethe Sing-Indian conflict, the Sino-Soviet disagreements and the
Western disagreements about NATO and the Common Market.
In keeping with the broad purposes of this service, the reportage is
both brief and broadQ The accent is upon the tabular presentation of coun-
try and regional comparisons, the details of which readers of varied exper-
tise and interest may interpret more fully. Survey measurements constitute,
of course, only one technique of exploration to be considered along with
other sources of information in drawing conclusions.
As an aid in-ordering and consolidating the indications on various
questions a net favorable index is provided as a supplement to the usual
tabulation of alternative responses and no opinion. This index is obtained
by subtracting the percentage of unfavorable responses from the percentage
of favorable responses and yieslds a quick unitary index of the size and
direction of predominant sentiments "No Opinion" is treated as neither
favorable nor unfavorable. This index is presented only as a convenience,
not as a substitute for the original figures which yield a more comprehen-
sive picture of the findings.
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CONF ENTIAL
Since the figures presented are based upon samples they are subject
to a range of chance variation which increases as the size of sample
diminishes. Little should be made of small differences, therefore, in
the tables that follow, since they are often not reliably beyond chance
variation and even where reliable are of little material significance.
Attention should focus rather on the larger differences whose reliability
is thereby more strongly established and which, because o? their size,
are more clearly of policy or program significance.
The generalizations presented in the text endeavor to take these
statistical considerations into account. Readers desiring more precise
information on sampling or other technical details about the present
series of surveys are invited to consult the Research and Reference
Service, USIA.
Tn the interest of simplicity, and in order to keep the present
''World Opinion" paper within manageable limits, no figures have been in-
cluded bearing upon trend changes in opinion over time. Such trend indi-
cations, when available, are presented in country or regional papers.
CON DENTIAL
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CONFI NTIAL
HIGHLIGHTS
FOREWORD
I. Some General Orientations Toward the.U.S. and
the USSR
Pane
General Opinion of the U,S.
l
General Opinion of the USSR
3
Agreement of Basic Interests with the U.S.
3
Agreement of Basic Interests with the USSR
4
Confidence in U.S. Leadership
S
Consistency of U.S. Words with Actions
6
Consistency of Soviet Words with Action@~
7
II.
Some Comparisons of U.S. vs. USSR Standing in
Maior Areas of Competition
Total Economic Strength
8
Total Military Strength
9
Military Strength in Nuclear Weapons
10
Conventional Miiit~ry Strength
11
Space Standing
12
Science Standing
13
Who is Seen as the Wave of the Future
14
Siding with the U.S.
15
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CONE NTIAL
I. Some General Orientations Toward the U.S. and the USSR
General Opi:nian of the U.S'.
It has often been said that great nations cannot hope to be liked.
That such a thesis is open to challenge, at least in some senses, is the
consistent indication from USIA worldwide surveys over the past decade.
With rare exceptions general good opinion of the U.3. -- for whatever
significance it has -- has clearly predominated over unfavorable feelings
in the countries surveyed -- usually by very substantial margins.
The most recent worldwide soundings, taken in the wake of the Cubart
crisis, are no exception in this resgect, with levels of net favorable
feelings (good opinion less bad opinion) ranging from a remarkable 88 per
cent in Bangkok to no lower than 36 per cent in France despite current
sharpened differences on policy.
"Please use this card to tell me your feelings about various
countries. (CARD) How about ...?"
WESTERN EUROPE
Net
Favorable
V. good
opinion
Good Neither good Bad V. bad
onin. nor bad opin. opin> onin.
No
opinion
No. of
cases
West Germany
75
24~
52~
177?
1~
*~
6
>.100?le
(1202j
Italy
68
30
41
12
2
1
14
(1200)
Great Britain
44
12
42
26
9
1
10
(1186)
France
36
6
40
34
8
2
LO
(1200)
LATIN A1~EI~ICA
Mexico City
71
15
58
16
1
1
9
( 3$9)
Buenos Aires
68
2S
45
14
1
1
14
( 481)
Caracas
66
26
44
16
3
1
10
( 401)
Rio de Janeiro
41
13
32
21
2
2
30
( 392)
NEAR EAST
Delhi
71
31
41
9
1
-
18
( 500)
Tehran
60
25
45
17
5
5
3
( 500)
FAR EAST
Bangkok
88
36
53
10
1
*
*
( 497)
Australia
81
34
49
13
2
-
2
( 830)
Saigon
79
28
53
13
2
-
4
( 493)
Singapore
57
13
49
27
4
1
6
( 498)
Japan
44
4
42
33
2
*
19
( 995)
* Asterl~ks in tables indicate leas than half of one per centi minus signs
zero per cent?
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CONF ENTIAL
General Opinion of the USSR .,,
In contrast, unfavorable feelings toward the USSR have generally
predominated in USIA surveys and only in occasional instances have been
outweighed by favorable sentiment. In the most recent measurements
following the Cuban crisis only in New Delhi and Tehran of the 15 countries
or cities surveyed did general good opinion of the USSR achieve a clear
favorable predominance.
Some predominance of favorable opinion of the USSR has been character-
istic in past surveys in non-aligned India, and moat of:~a=losa~~rhich
~?~llowed' the:~.Chinese' invas'iZin.~bf .~ndia~}ias bi;nr~~a~been.t,zdcoupad:. The
present survey is the first in Tehran and reveals predominantly favorable
attitudes toward the USSR in numerous respects, as will be reported in
this World Opinion :;series and separately.
"Please use this card to tell me your feelings about various
countries. (CARD) How about ...?"
OPINION ABOUT THE USSR
Net V. good Good Neither good Bad V. bad No No. of
WESTERN EUROPE Favorable opinion oain< nor bad opin. o~in. opin. opinion cases
France
- 7
47.
Italy
-15
4
Great Britain
-22
1
West Germany
-60
LATIN AMERICA
Rio de Janeiro
-6
2
Mexico City
-26
3
Buenos Aires
-28
1
Caracas
-33
6
NEAR EAST
Tehran
49
25
Delhi
37
6
FAR EAST
Singapore
- 3
5
.Japan
-15
Bangkok,
-22
2
Australia
-36
2
Saigon
-80
19%
35%
21~
9%
12
..100%
(1200)
15
24
22
12
23
(1200)
13
32
25
11
18
(1186)
4
23
35
29
9
(1202)
13
17
6
15
47
( 392)
13
26
33
9
16
( 389)
13
18
29
13
26
( 481)
12
16
30
21
15
( 401)
36
19
7
5
8
( SOC3)
39
25
7
1
22
( 500)
16
41
17
7
14
( 498)
8
43
20
3
26
(-995)
12
38
26
10
12
( 497)
14
22
33
19
10
( 830)
-
1
22
58
19
( 493)
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CONF NTIAL
Agreement of Basic Interests with the U.S. ...
As an index of general pro-American orientation possibly more
significant than friendly feeling, as registered on the earlier question,
is what might be termed fellow-feeling -- the extent of perceived agree-
ment between the basic interests of one's own country and those of another
nation.
This more stringent test of general attitude toward the U.B. reveals
strength in most of the countries measured, but distinct weaknesses in
some, Weakness on this index has long been present in France, a situation
which has been aggravated by the current disagreements on the future of
Europe. The low levels of fellow-feeling in Latin America compared to
high levels of friendly feeling provide serious food for thoughC, and
could suggest that much of U.B. policy if not seen as adverse to Latin
America interests, may be seen as largely irrelevant.
"In your opinion, are the basic interests of (SURVEY COUNTRY)
and those of the LI.S. very much in agreement, fairly well in
agreement, rather different, or very different?"'1
WESTERN EUROPE
Net
Favorable
Very much
in a r~,ee.
Wes t>.Geru~any
71
31~
Italy
51
27
4reat Britain
50
19
France
6
6
LATIN At~RICA
Mexico City
16
12
Caracas
0
13
Buenos Aires
- 1
19
Rio de Janeiro
-11
6
NEAR EAST
Delhi
52
20
Tehran
9
l$
FAR EAST
Bangkok
92
44
Australia
87
46
Singapore
35
14
Saigon
34
21
.?span
28
6
~' In Mexico question read ... "interest of
Fairly well
in agree.
Rather
different
Very
diff_o_
No
opinion
No. of
cases
50X
8~
2~
9..100
(1202)
39
10
5
19
(1200)
51
15
5
10
(1186}
37
28
9
20
(1200)
41
17
20
10
( 389}
31
15
29
12
( 401)
18
28
10
25
( 481)
21
14
24
35
( 392)
41
6
3
30
( 500)
34
15
28
5
( 5aQ).
51
3
*
2
( 497}
47
5
1
1
( 830)
48
19
8
11
( 498)
39
15
11
14
( 493}
40
16
Z
3b
~ 995)
xican and North American people."
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CONE NTIAL
Agreement of Basic Interests with the USSR ...
If the U.S. has some weaknesses in fellow-feeling the USSR has a
great deal more. In none of the 15 areas surveyed, including New Delhi
and Tehran which were high in friendly feeling, does the view point pre-
dominate that one's own country's interests are at least fairly well in
agreement with those of the USSR.
"In your opinion, are the basic interests of (SURVEY COUNTRY)
and those of the USSR very much in agreement, fairly well in
agreement, rather different, or very different?"1
Net Very much
Fairly well
Rather
Very
No
No. of
WESTERN EUROFE
Favorable in agr?e.
in agree.
different Jiff.
opinion
cases
France
-42
2~
16~
38X
222
22..100
(1200)
Italy
-50
2
11
31
32
24
(1200)
Great Britain
-55
1.
14
3$
32
1S
(1186)
West Germany
-87
-
1
21
67
11
(1202)
LATIN AMERICA
Rio de .laneiro
-43
3
5
38
13
41
( 392)
Buenos Aires
-65
2
2
62
7
27
( 481)
1Kexico City
-7$
-
4
20
62
14
( 389)
Caracas
-80
-
1
8
73
18
( 401)
NEAR BAST
T1?lhi
- 5
6
24
27
$
35
( 500)
Tehran
-13
9
28
24
26
13
(( 500)
FAR EAST
:?span
-52
-
3
36
19
42
( 995)
Singapore
-66
1
7
37
37
18
( 498)
Bangkok
-71
-
8
42
37
13
( 497)
Saigon
-72
-
*
3
69
28
( 493)
Australia
-84
1
4
31
58
6
( 830)
1 In Mexico question read ... "interest of Mexican and Russian people."
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CONFI TIAL
Confidence in U.S. Leadership ...
How next does the U.S. fare in the area of international leader-
ship? The indication from the latest surveys in the aftermath of the
Cuban crisis is that favorable attitudes predominate in 13 out of the
15 areas surveyed. The exceptions are Tehran where opinions are divided,
and France where unfavorable attitudes prevail.
"Haw much confidence do you have in the ability of the U.B. to
provide wise leadership for the West in dealing with present
world problems -- very great, considerable, not very much, or
very little?"1
WESTERN EUROPE
Net
Favorable
Very
rR eat
Consid-
erable
Not very
much
Very
little
No
opinion
No. of
cases
West Germany
66
37~
38~
89.
1~
16
..100
(1202)
Italy
46
24
37
10
5
24
(1200)
Great Britain
1$
16
35
25
$
16
(1186)
France
-l6
5
28
32
17
18
(1200)
LATIN A1rKERICA
Buenos Aires
47
37
25
9
6
23
( 481)
Caracas
28
26
31
17
12
14
( 401)
Mexico City
27
4U
15
18
10
17
( 389)
Rio de Janeiro
20
12
27
12
7
42
( 392)
NEAR FAST
Delhi
31
15
28
6
6
45
( S00)
Tehran
- 3
12
30
29
i6
1.3
( 5.00)
FAR EAST
Australia
54
27
47
14
6
6
( 830)
Baigon
49
33
38
17
5
7
( 493)
Bangkok
47
22
50
23
2
3
( 497)
Singapore
21
12
38
20
9
21
( 498)
Japan
13
5
32
19
5
39
( 995)
In Australia question read " ...ability of the U.S. leadere to handle present-
day world problems wisely ..."
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CONE` NTIAL
Consistency of U.S. Words with Actions ...
Tested next on a factor related to leadership -- consistency of
word with deed -- the U.S. appears to have a favorable net balance in
ali but two of the areas surveyed. French views are divided on U.S.
credibility, and for reasons that need exploration Tehran .views. are .
clearly negative in the net. In some of the other countries where the
net favorable reading is positive but low the situation also invites
further study.
'"Would you say that what the United States does in world
affairs generally agrees with what it says, or that its
actions differ from its words too often?"
WESTERN EUROPE
Net
Favorable
West Germany
56
Great Britain
Italy
3;5.m.=~
29
France
0
LATIN AMERICA
Buenos Aires
26
Mexico City
16
Caracas
15
Rio de Janeiro
12
NEAR EAST
T~elhi
38
Tehran
-20
FAR EAST
Bangkok
82
Saigon
73
Australia
53
Singapore
41
Japan
LO
71'7.
58
51
34
47
50
47
33
52
34
86
79
71
64
34
15~
14
..100%
(1202)
23
19
(11$6)
22
27
(1200)
34
32
(1200)
21
32
( 481)
34
16
( 389)
32
21
( 401)
21
46
( 392)
14
34
( 500)
54
12
( 500)
4
10
( 497)
6
15
( 493)
18
11
( 830)
23
13
( 498)
24
42
( 995)
No No. of
Agrees Differs opinion cases
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CONF NTIAL
Consistency of Soviet Words with Actions...
The Soviet reputation for consistency of word and deed is negative
in the net in all the 15 area: surveyed, even to a degree in New Delhi
and Tehran despite predominantly favorable general opinions of the Soviet
Union.
"ktow about the USER -- would you say that what Soviet Russia
does in world affairs generally agrees with what it says, or
that its actions differ from its wordB too often?"
WESTERN EUROPE
Net
Favorable
Agrees
Differs
No
opinion
No. of
cases
France
-28
19~
47~
34
..100X
(1200)
Italy
-35
15
50
35
(1200)
Great Britain
-41
19
6U
21
(1186)
west Germany
-70
5
75
20
(1202>
LATIN AMERICA
Ri,o de Janeiro
-18
14
32
54
( 392)
Caracas
-35
18
53
29
( 401)
Buenos Aires
-40
7
47
46
( 481)
Mexico City
-60
11
71
18
( 989)
NEAR EASiT
Delhi
- 9
26
35
39
( 500)
Tehran
-19
32
51
17
( '500)
FAR EAST
Singapore
-19
30
49
21
( 498)
Japan
-29
11
4(?
49
( 995)
Australia
-51
lb
67
17
( 830)
Bangkok
-52
11
63
2b
( 497)
Saigon
-,70
1
71
28
( 493)
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 Approved For Release 2002/08/28: CIA-RDP80B 6768002900180005-9
CONFIDENT L
II. Same Comparisons of U.S. vs. USSR Standing in Major areas of
Competition
The indications from a series of questions may now be considered,
which are designed to ascertain how far the Soviet challenge to U.S.
primacy has made inroads into world opinion.
Total Economic Strength ...
Soviet efforts to faster the image of a strong Soviet economy have
not as yet made any really appreciable inroads into U.S. standing in this
domain, The U.S. leads in total economic strength by large to very large
margins in all the areas surveyed including the two -- New Delhi and
Tehran -- which were predominantly favorable in-their general opinion of
the USSR.
"All things considered, which country do you think is ahead
in total economic strength at the present time -- the U.S.
ar the USSRZ"
WESTERN EUROPE
Net
Favorable
U.S.
USSR
Neither/
E ug,al
No
Opinion
No. of
cases
_
West Germany
81
83?~
29G
4'~
11
..100%
;(1202)
Italy
63
69
6
4
21
(1200)
France
61
69
8
6
17
(1200)
Great Britain
47
57
10
3
30
(1186)
LATIN AMERICA
Mexico City
77
81
4
-
15
( 389)
Caracas
71
78
7
1
14
( 401)
Buenos Aires
60
66
6
5
23
( 481)
Rio de Janeiro
37
46
9
1
44
( 392)
NEAR_EAST
Tehran
6~,
81
12
2
5
( 500}
Delhi
63
68
5
1
26
( 500)
FAR EAST
Saigon
90
90
*
2
8
( 493)
Bangkok
87
89
2
3
6
( 497)
Singapore
70
76
6
$ :
10
( 498)
Australia
62
70
$
7
15
( 830)
Japan
56
63
7
6
24
( 995)
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 Approved For Release 2002/08/28: CIA-RDP B01676R002900180005-9
CONFIDE IAL
Total Military Strength ...
Worldwide opinion is leas favorable in respect to total military
strength. In eight of the 1$ areas surveyed the U.9. is pzedominantly
seen as ahead; but in four areas -- France, Buenos Aires, Japan, and
Singapore -- opinions are rather evenly divided; and in three areas --
Great Britain, Tehran and Australia -- the USSR is more often judged
ahead in total military might.
"All things considered, which country do you think is ahead
in tatal military strength at the present time -- the U.S.
or the USSR?"
WESTERN EUROPE
Net
Favorable
U.S.
USSR
Neither/
Equal
No
Opinion
No. of
cases
West Germany
34
50~
16%
18%
16
..100
(1202)
Italy
20
39
19
14
28
(1200)
France
- 4
24
28
19
29
(1200)
Great Britain
-15
26
41
7
26
(1186)
LATTN AMERICA
l~texica City
18
50
32
2
16
( 389)
Ria de Janeiro
15
32
17
5
46
( 392)
Caracas
13
38
25
17
20
( 401)
Buenos Aires
6
25
19
18
38
( 481)
NEAR BAST
Delhi
20
39
19
8
34
{ 500).
Tehran
-16
33
49
5
13
( 500)
FAR EAST
5a3gon
5$
59
1
20
20
( 493)
Bangkok
47
60
13
13
14
(.497)
Japan
3
31
28
13
28
( 995)
Singapore
- 2
28
30
22
20
( 498)
Australia
-12
25
37
14
24
( 830)
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 Approved For Release 2002/08/28: CIA-RD 80B01676R002900180005-9
CONFIDE AL
Military Strength in Nuclear Weapons ...
Of the two major components of total military strength -- nuclear
weapons vs. troops and non-nuclear weapons -- it appears to be the
former that poses the greater problem for the U.S. military image, In
military strength in nuclear weapons only four of the 15 areas surveyed
predominantly judge the U.S. ahead, four others are close to evenly divi-
ded, and in seven the USSR is more often judged as being the stronger.
Why two such close and presumably well-informed allies ae Great
Britain and Australia should be predominantly inclined to see the U.S.
behind the USSR in military strength, both in nuclear and conventional
components, particularly invites further study.
"All things considered, which country do you think is ahead
in military strength in nuclear weapons at the present time
-- the U.S. or the USSR?"
Net
bl
S
U
USSR
Neither/
Equal
No
Opinion
No. of
cases
WESTERN EUROPE
e
Favora
.
.
West Germany
35
46~
11%
267.
17 ..100
(1'L02)
Italy
3
28
25
18
29
(1200)
France
- 5
24
29
20
27
(1200)
Great Britain
- 8
26
34
10
30
(1186)
LATIN AMERICA
Mexico City
12
46
34
4
5
16
47
( 392)
(
Ria de Janeiro
0
24
24
Buenos Aires
-11
18
29
20
33
( 481)
Caracas
-12
23
35
22
20
( 401)
NEA., R EAST
Delhi
S
32
27
7
34
( 500)
Tehran
-32
26
58
4
12
( 500)
FAR EAST
Saigon
56
59
3
20
1$
( 493)
Bangkok
38
50
12
26
12
( 497)
Japan
-19
20
39
12
29
E 995)
Singapore
-24
21
45
16
18
( 498)
Australial
-25
20
45
17
18
( 830)
1 Tn Australia query was phrased "...i atomic and other nuclear weapons..."
CON ENTIAL
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 Approved For Release 2002/08/28: CIA-R 80B01676R002900180005-9
CONFTD IAL
Conventional Military Strength ,..
In conventional military strength -- troops and non-nuclear weapons
-- the U.S. appears to fare better, with the viewpoint prevailing in
nine areas that the U.S. is ahead, fn three that the USSR is ahead, and
in three close to evenly divided.
"All things considered, which country do you think
in troops and non-nuclear weapons at the present
is ahead
time -- the
USSR?"
h
e
U.S. or t
Net
S
U
USSR
Neither/
Equal
No
Opinion
No. of
cases
WESTERN EUROPE
Favorable
.
.
Italy
19
3$%
19~
9%
34 ..i00%
(1200)
France
- 2
26
2$
13
33
X1200}
2
West Germany
-15
25
40
14
21
)
(120
Great Britain
-20
20
40
7
33
(1186)
LATIN AMERICA
Mexico City
23
51
2$
-
21
( 389)
Caracas
22
42
20
13
25
( 401)
Rio de Janeiro
20
35
15
3
47
( 3g2)
Buenos Aires
5
25
20
10
45
( 481.)
NEAR EAST
D~;elhi
16
35
19
5
41
( 500)
Tehran
3
40
37
4
19
( 500)
FAR EAST
Saigon
30
42
12
20
26
( 493)
Bangkok
22
45
23
14
18
( 497}
Japan
18
33
15
12
40
( 995)
Singapore
14
38
24
14
24
( 49$)
Australia
-10
25
35
14
26
( 830)
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 Approved For Release 2002/08/28: CIA-RC~80B01676R002900180005-9
CONFIDE IAL
Space Standing ...
In the 15 areas covered in the present early 1963 surveys only in
one, Saigon, does the opinion prevail that the U.S. is ahead in space
developments. Although in a few areas opinions are not far from even-
ly divided, in most instances the USSR is seen in the van by large to
very large margins,
'`'All things considered, which country do you think is ahead
in space developments at the present time -- the U.S. or
the USSR?"
Net
ble
F
S
U
USSR
Neither/
Equal
No
Opinion
No. of
cases
WESTERN EUROPE
avora
.
.
West Germany
- 6
29%
35~
22~
14
..LOO;r
{1202)
Italy
-34
14.
48
12
26
(1200)
Great Britain
-46
13
59
8
20
(1186)
France
-63
5
68
13
14
(1200)
LATIN AMERICA
Mexico City
-10
36
46
3
15
( 389)
Rio de Janeiro
-22
18
40
6
36
( 392)
Buenos Aires
-35
10
45
20
25
( 481)
Caracas
-37
16
53
18
13
( 401)
NEAR EAST
Delhi
-45
11
56
5
28
( 500)
Tehran.
-89
4
93
1
3
( 500)
FAR EAST
Saigon
18
35
17
26
22
( 493)
Bangkok
- 8
29
37
29
5
( 497)
Australia
-55
11
66
12
11
( 830)
Japan
-63
6
69
7
18
( 995)
Singapore
-75
3
78
11
8
( 498)
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 Approved For Release 2002/08/28: CIA-RDP~0B01676R002900180005-9
CONFIDE
Science Standing ...
Tn science generally the U.S. fares better but enjoys a really
substantial lead in only three areas of the 15 surveyed.
"A11 things considered, which country do you think is ahead
in scientific development at the present time -- then U.S.
or the USSR?"
WESTERN EUROPE
Net
Favorable
U.S.
files t Germany
47
58~,
Tta1y
4
31
Great Britain
-11
26
France
-l3
23
LATIN Al~lERICA
Mexico City
8
44
Buenos Aires
7
30
Rio de Janeiro
5
29
Caracas
2
35
NEAR EAST
Tehran
11
49
Delhi
2
33
FAR EAST
Saigon
40
48
Bangkok
24
44
Japan
- 5
29
Australia
-12
26
Singapore
-14
29
Neither/
Equal
No
Opinion
No. of
cases
16%
l5
..L00~
(1202)
13
29
(1200)
10
27
(1186)
19
22
(1200)
2
18
( 389)
20
27
( 48i)
7
40
(-392)
17
1S
( 40.1)
4
9
( 500)
8
28
( 500)
23
Z1
( 493)
30
6
( 497)
12
2.5
( 995)
18
18
( 830)
14
14
( 498)
11?~
27
37
36
36
23
24
33
38
31
8
20
34
38
43
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 Approved For Release 2002/08/28: CIA- 80B01676R002900180005-9
CONF NTIAL
In view of the considerable impressions of Soviet strength in the
preceding comparisons, it is not surprising that not all are convinced
that the U.S. is the wave of the future in preeminence as a world power,
7~he prevailing judgment in nine areas is that the U.S. will end up the
strongest in an extended period of competition without war. But in two
countries opinions are divided on this crucial index of long-range con-
fidence, and in four areas the U.S. is predominantly seen as running be-
hind either the USSR or Communist China. Moreover, the significance of
the divided or adverse sentiment is underscored when it is observed that
it encompasses such important countries as France, Great Britain, Japan
and Australia.
Also significant in the indications below is the growing thrust of
Communist China, In not less than 3 areas -- France, Australia, and
Singapore, about as many see Communist China as the strongest power 25
years hence as cite flee U.S. or the USSR.
"If the T.S., the USSR, and China settle down to competition
without war for tine next twenty or twenty-five years, which
of the three do you think will end up as the strongest?"1
WESTERN EUROPE
Net
Favorable
U.S.
USSR
China
All
Egua_1
No
Opinion
No. of
cases
West Germany
46
59~
8?~
5~
9~
19
..1007?
(1202)
Italy
17
3$
16
5
12
29
(1200)
Great Britain
- 1
31
23
9
6
31
(1186)
France
-19
14
17
16
16
37
(1200)
LATI~1 AI~dERICA
Mexico City
31
58
22
5
2
13
( 389)
Buenos Aires
17
39
18
4
-
39
( 4$1)
Rio de Janeiro
17
37
13
7
4
39
( 392)
Caracas
8
37
23
6
5
29
( 401)
NEAR T~AS~
Delhi
26
46
18
2
2
32
( 500)
Tehran
-34
23
47
10
7
14
( 500)
FARFAR ~AS'T
Saigon
52
58
2
4
10
26
( 493)
Baxxgkok
46
62
10
6
9
13
( 497)
.Tapan
- 4
23
24
3
4
46
( 9.95)
Singapore
-1G
21
20
17
24
18
( 49$)
Australia
-19
22
21
20
11
26
( 830)
In Australia question read +'If the U. ., Russia and Communist China settle
dawn to peaceful co-existence -- this, competition in trade, without
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CONFID IAL
Siding with the U.S. ...
Impressions of Communist strength, both now and in the future, may
nat be among the Least of the factors engendering a disinclination to
side with the U.S. in the cold war. In any case despite high levels of
friendly feeling and considerable fellow feeling of interests in agree-
ment, willingness to side with the U.
The somewhat less inclusive and perhaps more precise concept of
general nuclear disarmament appeals to the large majority everywhere
surveyed, from almost 100 per cent in Italy and France down to the
order of two out of three in Rio de Janeiro.
"What about nuclear disarmament? Would you favor or not favor
the abolition of nuclear weapons throughout the world?"' Except
in Delhi and Tehran, asked only of those who did not indicate
approval of general and complete disarmament.)1
Net
ble
r
F
or
Fa
Oppose
No
n
Opinio
No . of
cases
WESTERN EURAPE
a
avo
v
_
_
Italy
95
96%
1%
3 x,..100%
(1200}
France
93
95
2
3
(1200)
West Germany
80
84
4
12
(1202)
Great Britain
75
84
9
7
(11$6)
LATIN AMERICA
Caracas
83
90
7
3
( 401)
Mexico City
82
87
5
8
( 389)
Buenos Aires
74
84
10
6
( 481)
Rio de Janeiro
50
65
15
20~'
( 392)
NEAR EAST
Tehran
Delhi
FARFAR BAST
73
68
77
72
4
3
19
25
( 500)
(' 50#7)
Singapore
77
84 ` _
7
9
(`'498)
Saigon
77
79
2
19
( 493)
Australia 2
71
81
10
9
( 830)
995
Japan
70
71
1
28
)
(
Bangkok
61
76
15
'~
( 497)
1 This question procedure assumes that approval of the whole -- complete
disarmament -- includes approval of the part -- nuclear disarmament.
In some instances this may not be true, and to this extent is a limita-
tion on the. figures shown.
2 In Australia, question was phrased: "How would you feel about an agree-
ment to abolish atomic and other nuclear arms? Would you favor ar op-
pose a worldwide agreement to abolish al nuclear arms?'"
CONF NTIAL
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 ' Approved For Release 2002/08/28: CIA-RD~0B01676R002900180005-9
Would Oomplete Disarmament Require an International Police ]Forge? ...
Among those favoring general and complete disarmament the
viewpoint everywhere prevails that such a state of affairs would
require an international organisation with its own police force.
"Do you think that general and complete disarmament would
or would not require an international organisation with
its own police force?" (Asked of those favoring general
and complete disarmament)
WESTERN EtJRC?PE
Would
require
Would not
require
Not
asked
No No. of
oyinion cases
France
52%
9%
20%
19~ .,100% {i200)
Italy
50
11
16
23 (120U~.
w~~t Germany
47
9
30
14 (1202)
great Britain
43
4
44
9 (1186)
LATIN Ai~$RICA
Buenos Aires
54
4
34
8 ( 481)
Mexico City
45
18
29
8 ( 389)
Oaracas
43
20
30
7 ( 401).
Rio de Janeiro
37
11
15
37 ( 392)
NEAR EAST
Tehran
65
7
23
5 ( ~~pa
Delhi
39
3
46
12 ( 500)
FAR EAST
Singapore
49
8
38
5 ( 498)
Saigon
37
2
59
2 ( 493)
Japan
3~
4
52
10 ( 995)
Bangkok
27
7
64
2 ( 497}
Australia
25
12
59
4 ( 830)
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 Approved For Release 2002/08/28: CIA-RD~B01676R002900180005-9
CO ENTIAL
II. Some Reactions to More 9~pecific Proposals
Arms_Control Agreements for Europe and Latin America ...
Reactions were explored in Western Europe and in Latin America
to arms control agreements embracing these particular areas. In
Europe reactions were predominantly favorable by large margins for an
agreement between the Western Powers and the Soviet Bloc providing for
some degree of ~-i,ssarmament ,in ~urgpe.: I~ satin, q~sexica approval;pre-
daminated, but was lases widespread for an international agreement that
would limit any further build up of arms in Latin America.
"Would you approve or disapprove of an agreement between
the Western Powers and the Soviet Union and its European
allies. providing for some degree of disarmament in Europe3"
WESTERN EUROPE
Favorable
France
59
Great Britain
55
Italy
44
wept Germany
34
Approve
Disapprove
opinion
cases
66%
7~
27...100%
(1200)
63
$
29
(1186)
59
15
26
(1200)
57
23
20
(1202)
"Would you approve or disapprove of an international agreement
that would limit any further build up of armaments in Latin
America?"
'
LATIN AMERICA
Net
Favorable
Caracas
34
Buenos Aites
33
Mexico City
12
Rio de Janeiro
7
No No. of
Appr?ve Disapprove o ip niot~ cases
62% 28% laJ...100% (
401)
56 23 21 (
481)
48 36 16 (
389)
31 24 45 (
392)
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 Approved For Release 2002/08/28: CIA-RDP8
Banning Nuclear Tests ...
The issue of inspection in the banning of nuclear tests was explored
with results suggesting predominant worldwide support for the U.S. posi-
tion. Favorable views prevailed in 12 areas, opinions were divided in
New Delhi acid were adverse in the net only''in Tehran and Japan.
"Now on this card we find two people expressing different
views about banning nuclear tests (CARD)."
Mr. A. says: "The U.S. should enter into an immediate agreement with the
Soviet Union to ban nuclear testing even if the Soviets will not permit
as much checking in both countries as the U.S. requests f.n order to
verify that the agreement is kept."
Mr. B. saysa "The U.S. should not enter into an agreement with the Soviet
Union to ban nuclear tests unless the Soviets agree to as much checking
in both countries as the U.S. feels necessary to verify that the agreement
is kept."
"Do you agree mare with T?Zr. A< or more z~rith Pir~ A.?"
Net favorable
~ !~., .
`,'
C~ualified
No '
I,1o.,~of
~rJ.ESTERN EUROPE
B minus A
T?:r. A.
I~:r. B.
answer
o inian cases
Great Britainl
~
~
-
.. 0~
Italy
Francel
28
26
22
28
50
5~
3
a~
25
18
(1200)
(1200)
~Je st Germany
18
30
I~$
1
21
(1202 )
LAT?N AMERICA
Buenos Aire
58
9
67
1
23
( x.81)
Mexico City
t~7
19
66
-
15
( 389)
Caracas2
3~.
26
60
-
l!~
( x.01)
Rio de Janeirol
30
8
3$
-
5~.
( 392)
1 In Great Britain, Rio, Mexico City, and for part of the sample in France an
earlier less specific version of the question was used. "A main reason why
there has been as yet no U.S.-Soviet agreement to ban nuclear tests is that
the U.S. wants checking by international inspectors on each other's soil,
and the Soviet Union opposes this because they say it will lead to spying."
"Should the UaS. enter an agreement with the U.S.S.R. to stop testing with-
out such inspection, or should the U.S. continue to insist upon such
inspection as part of any agreement?"
2 In Caracas question was phrased "Here are two persons talking about the
prohibition of nuclear testsQ With which of them are you in agreement?
In agreement with 'Person A' in favor of U.S. entering agreement with
Russia to stop testing nuclear tests without inspectors on each other's
soil. Iri agreement with 'Person B' a U.S. should insist on inspection
as part of any agreement. ?P
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ontinued)
 Approved For Release 2002/08/28: CIA-RDP 0167680029001.80005-9
CONF TI.AL
(Continued from preceding page)
"Now on this card we find two people expressing different
views about banning nuclear tests (CARD)."
Mr. A. says: "The U.S. should enter into an immediate agreerrrent with the
Soviet Union to ban nuclear testing even if the Soviets will not permit
as much checking in both countries as the U.S. requests in order to verify
that the agreement is kept."
Mr. B. says: "The U.S. should not enter into an agreement with the Soviet
Union to ban nuclear tests unless the Soviets agree to as much checking
in both countries as the U.S. feels necessary to verify that the agreement
is kept."
"Do you agree more with Mr. A. or more with Mr. B.?"
Piet favorable
(B minus AZ P?r. A. Mr. B.
Delhi
Tehran
-1
-12
FAR EAST
Saigon
63
Bangkok
51
Australia
1t7
Singapore
38
Japan
-13
27~
26~
37
25
11
71~
2l
?2
21
68
21~
62
29
l6
Qualified
answer
No No. of
o inion ~ cases
l~7~ ..load (
500 )
12
26 (
~~~)
2
13 (
x.93 )
2
5 (
t~97 )
-
11 (
8301)
3
11 (
1~9$)
2
53 (
995)
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C ONF TIAL
III. Beliefs and Expectations About Nuclear War
Some of the beliefs and expectations associated with the near
universal desire for at least same degree of arms limitation reveal
rather marked indications of pessimism, but also yield evidence that
world opinion remains hopeful of avoiding nuclear destruction.
Is Nuclear Disarmament possible? .,.
That people are far from sangaine about future prospects is evi-
dent first in estimates of the passibility of abolishing nuclear weapans.
Though sentiment overwhelmingly favors such a course, the indications
from 10 areas where the question was paced is that far fewer think it
is achievable. Taking the returns all together, opinion is close to
evenly divided if not somewhat negative on the average.
"Do you think it will be possible or not passible to abolish
nuclear weapans throughout the world?~~
WESTERN BUROFE
Net
tim~stic
~
Fassible
I1at
Fossible
No
+~ ina.on
No. of
cases
France
~~
31~-
2
, . I00 ~
1200
Italy
11
1-.7
36
17
(1200)
Great Britain
2
~4
~.2
7.t{.
(1186)
west Germany
1
~5
~~
11
(1202)
LATIN AI~~~ERICA
~~~~exico city
- ~.
~.5
1~6
9
( 389)
Caracas
- 2
~3
!~5
12
( ~Ol)
Ria de Janeiro
~- 3
3t~
37
29
( 392 )
Buenos Aires
-7.3
3~
47
19
( x.81)
NEAR FAST
Delhi
(not asked)
Teh~.nan
FAR EAST
( !P YI )
Japan 1
-27
23
50
27
( 995)
Australia
-3?~
29
63
8
( 830)
Bangkok
Saigon
Singapore
(not asked)
( ~~ ~r
( 'r #1 )
In Australia, question was phrased "Do you think it will be possible or
impossible to abolish all atomic and other nuclear weapons throughout
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CO IDENTTAL
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CONF TIAL
Would Nuclear Bambs Be Used In a New World War? ...
Newt it is evident that the larger proportion of the people sur-
veyed believe that nuclear bombs would be used rather than avoided in
a new world war. Dissent from the general trend is particularly marked
in France where the ma3ority (61 percent) feel it unlikely that nuclear
bombs would be used in a new world war.
"If a new world war broke out -- which naturally nobody desires
-- do you consider it more likely that nuclear bombs would be
used or do you consider it more likely that both sides would
avoid using nuclear bombs?"1
WESTERN EUROPE
Net
timistic
Nuclear
bombs
would
be used
Nuclear
bombs
would not
be used
No
o inion
No, of
cases
France
37
~
~
1 ..100
1200
west Germany
16
33
!~9
18
.(1202)
Italy
9
37
!~6
17
(1200)
Great Britain
5
?~0
I~5
15
(1186}
LATIN A2~RICA
I~~exico City
$
!~l
!~9
10
( 389)
Buenos Aires
- 5
1~1~
39
1?
{ x.81)
Caracas
- 9
~.6
37
17
( ~.Ol)
Rio de Janeiro
-36
56
20
2~,
( 392 )
NEA
Tehran
-3~ ~;
61
27
12
( 500)
Delhi.
-3!~
51
17
32
{ 500)
FA 'Z ~ "
Saigon
- 7
!~5
38
17
( 193 )
Australia
- 9
1~9
1~0
11
( 830)
JaP~
-31
53
22
25
C 995)
Singapore
-35
61
26
13
( l~98)
Bangkok
-37
6!~
27
9
( 1197)
1 In Australia question was phrased "Naturally, nobody wants another world war
-- but if one does come -- do you think atomic bombs and other nuclear wea-
pons are likely to be used -- or do you think both aides are likely to avoid
using them?"
CONF NTTAL
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CONF ENTIAL
Wou1.d Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons Escalate?...
And if nuclear bombs are used at the beginning only on the
battlefield9 the strongly predominant opinion -- where this question
was asked -- is that such use would eventually escalate tc~ the nuclear
bombing of c3.tiesq
rrSo~ pule say that ~.f nuclear weapons are ud on' a
battlefield it will eventually end in nuclear bombing of
cities. Others say that this would not happen. Which is
closer to your opinion?n
Net
Bomb-
ing of
Would
not
No
No. of
tinTESTERN EUROPE
~~
0 tam~Lst3.c
titles
ha~en
o~zni
o
n
?
cases
It'a'
?~~'
~
_
17~
~
,~
,
lb ~
100
1200
Great Britain
-62
73
u
..
16
{1186)
West Germany
-6~.
76
12
12
(1202)
Free
-70
77
7
16
(1200)
LATIN AMERICA
x~~exico C .ty
- 9
!~0
~9
11
(389 )
Rao de Janeiro
-10
37
~7
36
(392)
Caracas
-28
56
28
16
(x.01)
Buenos Aires
-~56
68
12
20
(I~$1)
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CONF ENTIAL
Is One Likely to Survive a General Nuclear War? ...
A11 this leads to the conclusion that chances for survival
are deemed slim if-wars are not brought to an end. UJithout a single
exception in the is areas surveyed the viewpoint predominates by large
to very large margins that ane is not likely to survive a world con-
flict involving the use off' nuclear weapons.
"If there was a general nuclear war, is it your feelings
that you personally would be likely to survive or not?"
WESTERN EURO?E
`Net
0 t~imist_ic
Likely
Survive
Likely
not to
Survive
No
o i~ nion
No. of
cases
Wes~Germany
~-~~
~$,~
~
23 ~;..
100
2 2
Great Britain
~( ~
8
70
2.2
(118b )
France
-65
7
73
20
(1200)
Italy
-69
7
76
17
(1200)
LATIN AMEaRICA
ILi.o de Janeiro
-5S
12
67
21
( 392 )
Buenos Aires
-5$
11
70
19
( t~81)
Caracas
- 72
$
$0
12
( l~Ol )
Mexico City
-81
1~
85
11
( 389)
NEAR EAST
h.~'i
-~3
lt~
57
29
( 500 )
Tehran
-57
10
67
23
( 500)
FAR EAST
Australia
-i~3
1~
58
27
( 830)
Bangkok
-53
18
71
11
(`.497)
Singapore
-6,~
7
72
21
( x.98)
Saigon
-65
11
76
l3
( x.93 )
Japan
-73
1~
77
19
( 995)
1(?
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Despite these bleak views the large majority apparently sti~.l
retain the expectation -- which may be as much a hope _- that nuclear
war is not inevitable, and that the countries of the world will get
together in time an some way to avoid such a happening. In every
one of the 15 areas surveyed on this point this streak of optimisim
predominates by a large margin over those who have resigned themselves
to the inevitability of nuclear war.
"All things considered, da you believe that a general nuclear
war is inevitable some time in the future, or do you believe
that the countries of the world will get together in time an
some way to avoid such a happening?"
Net
Nuclear tiv~ar
I~7ill k:e
No
No. of
WESTERN EUROPE
Optimistic
2nevitable:
Avoided
opinion
cases
Italy
76
6;0
82,E
12~ .
.1000
(1200)
France
75
5
80
15
(1200)
Great Britain
65
8
73
19
(1186)
West Germany
ZATIN ATfIERICA
58
12
70
18
(1202)
Buent~s Aires
77
~:
81
~.~
( X81)
Caracas
71
10
81
9
( ?~Ol)
Mexico City
67
11
78
11
?( 389)
Ric de Janeiro
67
9
66
2~
('39.2)
NEAR EAST
Tehran
68
9
77
1!t
( ,00
Delhi
!.~
15
59
26
( 500
FAR EAST
Bangkok
~$
1$
76
6
( G.97)
Saigon
50
1~.
6~.
22
( x.93)
an
Ja
t
7
1
1
5$
31
p
Singapore
~
1~1
.
22
63
15
( 995)
~.98
Australia ~-
, 36 .
21~
60
16
~
~
830
.fin ~~ustrnl.a_~~. cjuest:i.on ~,-as ~hrase~~ "nl~_ things consir"ered_, do ~rou be~.a_eve s.
tia~orldwa_de :nuc:l..es.r tear ~.s cer-Lain ~Go h~ ppe~n sot~~etia~le 7. i"1 ~i;}ie J'u-Lure .
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' CONF TIAL
This basic hopefulness may well have been inspired in some
cases, and strengthened in others, by the outcome of the Cuban
confrontation which was predominantly interpreted in all areas
as diminishing the likelihood of nuclear war.
"All things considered, do you think the effect of
the recent Cuban crisis has been to increase or
decrease the likelihood of nuclear war in the near
future?"
WESTERN EUROPE
Net
Optimistic
Increase
Decrease
No Dif- Nat No
ference (Val. )Asked apinivn
No. of
cases
West Germany
55
5~
b0~
-~
11~ ?.4~.. lOC~
(1202 )
Great Britain
51
2
53
22
18 5
(1186)
France
46
3
49
-
lb. 32
(1200)
Italy
3$
5
43
-
3$ ]~.~.
(1200)
LATIN AMERICA
Caracas
16
14
30
-
42 14
( 401)
Buenos Aires
15
8:'
23
8
52 9
( 481)
Rio de Janeiro
14
!~
18
3
71 ~.
( 392)
Mexico City
9
15;
24
7
52 2
( 389)
NEAR EAST
Delhi
3b
~
41
-
40 14
( 500)
Tehran
27
22
49
-
- 29
( 500)
FAR EAST
Australi~~
32
5
37
28
25 5
( 830)
,i~
Singapore
32
lb
48
-
- 3b
( 498)
Bangkok
25
25
50
~-~ 25
( 497)
Japan
20
8
28
-
37~ 2'r
995)
Saigon
17
14
31
-
- 55'
( 493)
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CONF ENTIAL
IV. U.S. and Soviet Peace Efforts
Ts America Doing All It shou7.d to Prevent War? ...
Whatever difficulties people see in attaining arms control and a
stable world peace, there is no general inclination in the 10 areas
surveyed 'on `this issue to blame the U.S. for lack of trying. On the
contrary the opirLion predominates -though by only a limited margin
in France -that America is doing all it should to prevent a new
world war. .
~~Is America doing all it should do to prevent a new world war?rr
WESTERN EUROPE
Net
Favorable
Yes
Italy
63
73~
West Germany
59
73
Great Britain
27
5S
France
13
talc.
LATIN AMERICA
Mexico City
51
?1
Buenas Aires
3ta
55
Rio de Janeiro
26
~.8
Caracas
25
~~
No No . ~f
No o inion cases
lob 17~ ..100 (1200)
lt~ 13 (1202)
28 17 (1186)
31 25 (1200)
20 9 (389)
21 2~, (l~81)
22 30 (392)
30 15 (t~01)
NEAR EAST
Delhi. (Not Asked)
Tehran n n
FAR EAST
Australia
50 70 20 10 (
830)
Japan
ta.~ 57 13 30 (
995)
Bangkok
Saigon
(Nat Asked)
" "
Singapore
" "
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C OP ~ ENTIAL
Is the TTSSTt Doing A11 2t Should to Prevent Tr1ar?...
2n contrast, Soviet standing tends to be negative in the net
on this general index, though in the aftermath of Cuba considerab7.y
less adverse than it has been in past years. In Japan post-Cuban
judgments of Soviet peace efforts are particularly favorable to the
USSR., outweighing negative vietirs by a subs-Lantial margin of 2~ per
cent.
"FTow about the USSR -- is Soviet ~~ussia doing all it should
do to prevent a new vaorld war? ~~
WESTT~I~N EUt~.OPE
i~Tet
Favorable
Yes
A1o
T1o
o anion -
Tdo. of
cases
Italy ....._.,._
?...-_..~
-~--~0.',
33 0
27 ..100`
12 p)
France
- 1
36
37
27
(1200)
Great Britain
-12
33
~5
22
(11$6)
Z~~est Germany
-36
22
s$
20
(1202)
LATIN ANI~RICA
Rio de Janeiro
-12
2s
37
3$
(392)
Buenos Aires
-17
~4
1~1
35
(x.81)
Caracas
-21
30
~1
19
(~,Ol)
Mexico City
-2$
29
57
1~.
X389)
NEAR Ia;AST
Delhi
Tehran
(Not Asked)
u a
FAR EAS T
Japan
25
~.,~
20
35
C 995 )
Australia
-27
29
56
15
("$30)
Bangkok
Saigon
Singapore
CNot Asked)
~~ rr
+d n
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 ry
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Is .America Likely t~o be Trigger Happy with Nuclear Bombs? ,..
Finally, in a more specific test of American dedication to peace,
it may be seen in the two regions surveyed that only limited minorities
subscribe to the charge that America is likely to be trigger happy in
the use ~of nuclear bombs, However, the extent of such views in Britain
though outweighed by contrary judgments is appreciable, and marks one
of the few occasions where criticism of the U.S. is greater in Britain
than in France,
1tDo you believe that one can rely on America using nuclear
bombs only in an extreme emergency, or do you believe that
America might be too rash in using nuclear bombs?'~
Net
Favorable
Would Use Only in
an Extreme Emergency
Might
Use Rashly
No
opinion
No, of
cases
6
~
4%
2~
..100
2ooj
(
!
~~.
l
15
2
31
1
(1200)
58
26
16
(1186)
(
65
9
26
~-~l)
~
67
20
l3
389)
~.7
a.li.
39
( 392)
West Germany
?7
Italy
50
France
39
Great Britain
32
LATIN AMERICA
Caracas
68
Buenos Aires
56
Mexico C~,ty
~.7
Rio de Janeiro
33
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 CONF1`I~EAtf IAL
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APPENDIX - SAMPLING SE~tARY
Western Europe
Place
Coverage
Cases
Survey Dates
In.sti:tute
Britain
National
1186
Jan 19 - Feb 11, '63
Social Surveys (Gallup Poll),
Ltd., London
France
National
1200
Jan 24 - Feb 8, '63
Institut Francais d`Opinion
Publique, Paris
W,Germany
Pational
1202
Jan 30 - Feb 20, 'b3
DIVO, Bad Godesberg
Italy
National
1200
Feb 5-25, 'b3
Societa Internazionale per le
Ricerche di Mercato, Milan
Latin America
Mexico
T~9exico City
389
February '63
Int'1 Research Associates,
S.A. de C.V., Mexico City
Brazil
Rio
'392
February 6-21,'b3
Instituto de Pesquisas de
Opiniao a 1.~ercado, Rio
Argentina
Buenos Aires
481
Feb-March '63
Instituto IPSA, Buenos Aires
Venezuela
Caracas
~4~J1
February '63
Int'1 Research Associates,
C.A., Caracas
Sotae Continents
These are the same long
established national
samples that have been
earlier used for West
European regional reports.
More extensive urban sar.:p=
ling, and rural sanplinc~ is
possible but was foregone.
in the initial worlovride
series in the interest of
economy and because of a
concurrent .seven-nation
urban and rural survey on
a broad range of issues.l
l See USIA report R-110-63(R), "The Economic and Political Climate of Opinion in Latin America and Attitudes Toward
the Alliance for Progress," June 1963, CONFTDENTIAL.
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 C~J.'i:'I a:?IAL
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Near East
Place Coverage Cases Survey Dates Institute Some C~as~c.~-cs
India New Delhi 5v^u ~.iarch 1-15, 'ti53 Indian Institute of Public lgbl electoral rolls ~:crc
Opinion, New Delhi used to select r~sponcertc.
All Harts of metro~~o? ita_~
Delhi except Shahdra (:'ti'?~sre
illiteracy is high) anu D~l~~i
Cantonment (vrhere up-to-date
lists vrere unavailable) were
representedo Women are under-
represented in the sample due
to difficulty in reaching
them and elicitincr coo?;eration.
Respondents vrere c~ra~J_1 from
Iran Tehran 5C0 April 1 - i.iay 10, ' 63 '