U.S. POSITION AT THE FORTHCOMING EIGHTEEN-NATION DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R002900150018-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 2003
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: March 3, 1962
• Content Type: MF

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
"larch 3, 1962
From: The Director of the U.S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency
Subject: U.S. Position at tpe Forthcoming Eighteen-
Nation Disarmament Conference
This memorandum raises policy questions and proposals
whicras;kko;:.?:.iA. be decided and agreed to by the U. S. Government,
if possible, prior to the convening of the forthcoming
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference.
The issues raised below must be considered in the total
context of U.S. foreign policy. It is assumed that U.S. foreign
policy requires for its support all sources of U.S. influence,
including U.S..miiitary power. Any proposed change in the
amount or nature of U.S..military power must be evaluated in
terms of its effect on the ability of the United States to
carry out its foreign policy taking into account that the
effect of any such measure on the position of the United States
and the free world vis a vis the Communist bloc. Reductions
in U.S. military power, to the extent that those reductions
affect power needed to support U.S. foreign policy in the
present military environment, thust therefore be matched by
equa_izin changes elsewhere - is., for example, in reduced
DEPT OF STATE review(s) completed. CONF EN IAh
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Sino-Soviet capabilities - unless U.S. commitments can be
reduced.
In this connection, the high level of damage which can
be wrought by nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them
raises a special problem. At the present time, the best
estimate is that the United States has strategic nuclear
superiority in the sense that it has the ability to fight a
war with a level of damage to the civilian population as well
as to the military establishment which, although high, is
nevertheless lower than that suffered by a potential enemy.
This superiority probably has meaning at the present time in
that it is an important factor in the deterrence of Soviet
aggressions, as for example, deterrence against a land
attack in Europe. This superiority gives confidence to the
United States and its Allies, especially those in NATO that
such an attack can be deterred. At the same time, as the
total nuclear forces on each side and particularly the means
for delivering them, get larger and larger this superiority
may lose much if not all of its meaning. The U.S..must seek
to change the situation under which reliance for deterrence
and confidence is placed on the possibility of escalation to
nuclear war. The risk of such reliance over a period of time
may be a devastating war. This means that the United States
should seek to develop a policy which results in a reduction
in the nuclear destructive capability.,/in the world and also
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in the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons to
an increasing number of countries. This must be achieved
without either adding disproportionately to the risk that war
will occur or detracting from our ability to support our
foreign policy.
A. U.S. Objectives at the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference.
The United States seeks four central objectives at the
Disarmament Conference.
1. The first objective is to work out with the Soviet
Union and the other nations at the Conference a program of
general and complete disarmament including those measures to
ensure that nations can safely live in a peaceful world.
Such a program would serve as the basis of a treaty to be
negotiated with all the major countries of the world.
The United States, on September 25, 1961, submitted to
the United Nations such a program for general and complete
disarmament in a peaceful world. This program, which is
divided into three stages, indicates that the United States
would negotiate for a large number of measures which are
discussed in Sections B and C.
To achieve this first objective the United States, at
the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference, must be prepared to
give details on the disarmament and arms control proposals
given in the September 25, 1961 prograrr The U.S. must give
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details, for example, on how and to what extent it proposes
to reduce strategic delivery vehicles, and other armaments,
how it proposes to place limitations on the production of
str4egic delivery vehicles, and on the production of other
armaments, and how it proposes to verify that such reductions
and limitations are being observed.
This first objective is a long-range one. It is not likely
that it could be reached in the foreseeable future, given the
current international political situation. Hence, the United
States seeks other objectives which might be realized in
the foreseeable future.
2. The second objective is to negotiate with the Soviet
Union, as well as other countries which would be essential
to any agreement, the widest measure of disarmament which
could be implemented at the earliest pondate. In
seeking this objective the United States must decide what
disarmament measures can be negotiated separately from other
measures. In many cases such measures might be limited to
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. or to the countries of the NATO and
Warsaw Pacts. This paper proposes for consideration, for
example, such measures as: reductions in strategic delivery
vehicles; limitations on the production of such vehicles, and
reductions in and limitations on the production of certain
weapons designed to counter such vehicles;and a stoppage in
the production of fissionable material for use in weapons and
a transfer of certlain`b`} CIAfF~17P>~~`~t1~~18 from
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stockpiles for non-weapons purposes.
3. The third objective is to negotiate with the Soviet
Union those initial arms control measures which, even though
not involving actual reductions of armaments, would improve
ointernational security and the prospects for disarmament
progress. The United States
Government has already prepared
a list including details of many such initial measures. Th
include: the advance notification of militar ey
establishment of observation y movements, the
posts, and the establishment of
a commission to examine ways to reduce the risks of nuclear
war by accident, miscalculation or failure of communications
4. A fourth objective is to affect favorably the attitudes
and actions of both our friends and our adversaries r itudes
of whether agreement is reached. , regardless
This is not primarily a
matter of public relations.
It is above all a matter of
generating those pressures that will determine the actions
of other nations in ways which react favorably on U.S. security
and on the conduct of U.S. foreign relations. ity
in which the negotiations are conducted can The manner
of related foreign affect a number
Policy and national security problems
including:
(a) The movement toward an integrated western
Europe closely allied with the United States and
Canada in an Atlantic Community.
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(b) The opening up of the Soviet Un4onnand a
decrease in its penchant for secrecy.
(c) The development of a more responsible and
sophisticated attitude toward the problem of armaments,
especially on the part of the Soviet Union and also
some of the neutral nations which approach disarmament
with more enthusiasm than understanding.
(d) The positions taken by non-aligned countries.
B. Agreed Elements of the U.S. Position
As background for discussion of the issues remaining for
decision, it should be noted that position papers developing
our views on the following U.S. proposed measures have been
prepared and discussed with our allies in recent meetings of
the Western Five:
(1) Establishment of an International Disarmament
Organization.
(2) Reduction, during Stage I, of force levels of the
U.S. and U.S.S.R. to 2,1 million each.
(3) Establishment of a Chemical and Biological Experts
Commission to examine the feasibility and methods of halting
the production of, reducing and eventually eliminating
stockpiles of such weapons.
(4) Establishment of a Nuclear Experts Commission to
examine the feasibility and methods of reducing and eventually
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eliminating nuclear weapons stockpiles.
(5) Cessation of the production of fissionable materials
for use in weapons.
(6) Establishment of appropriate safeguards over the
transfer of fissionable materials between countries for
peaceful uses.
(7) Prohibition on the relinquishment by nuclear powers
of control of nuclear weapons or the transmigp-bn of information
or material necessary for their manufacture to any state not
owning them, with corresponding prohibition on the non-nuclear
powers not to seek to acquire such control, information or
materials nor attempt to manufacture such weapons.
(8) Prohibition on placing in orbit or stationing in
outer space weapons of mass destruction.
(9) Advance notification of the launching of space
vehicles and missiles, together with the track of the vehicles.
(10) Advance notification of major military movements
and maneuvers.
(11) Establishment of observation posts at agreed major
parts, railway centers, motor highways and air bases.
(12) Establishment of such additional inspection
arrangements to reduce the danger of surprise attack as may
be agreed.
(13) Establishment of an international commission to
recommend further measures to reduce the risks of war by
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accident, miscalculation or failure of communications.
(i4) Establishment of an international commission to study
the reduction of milita'y budgets and the use of budgets as
a supplementary control device.
C. Issues to be Decided.
Against e ac ground of objectives and areas of
agreement cited above there are several key decisions which
should be made regarding the United States position to be
presented at Geneva. These new elements constitute the main
points in the proposed United States arms control and
disarmament program. Building upon the program the United
States submitted to the General Assembly of the United
Nations September,25, 1961, they constitute a total program
which should advance all four of the U.S. objectives
stated above.
The.maj,ox issues which need to be decided are:
Should the United States be prepared to negotiate the
measures dealing.with strategic delivery vehicles as a separate
agreement?
What method of reduction should be applied to strategic
de1iVery vehicles?
What limitations should be imposed on the production and
teg*~J:.n ?, of such vehicles?
What method of reduction should be applied to other
major, armaments?
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What limitations should be imposed on the production
of such armaments?
Is the inclusion of the Chinese required in an agreement
on Stage I restricted to strategic delivery vehicles, or in
an agreement including both strategic de'.,v ry vehicles
anc' major other armaments?
1. Reduction of strategic delivery vehicles, reduction
of weapons to counter such ve_:.i ~,les, and limitations on
production and testing.
{,a. ljt,:i.o U nitcec should propose one of the
fo1iu)w .7.1 i,wo alternatives for accomplishing the initial
reduction of strategic delivery vehicles of the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R. in Stage I. (The same formula could be
applied to other countries possessing such vehicles, e.g.,
the United Kingdom.)
Alternative A
There would be a dual reduction with respect to
strategic delivery vehicles, both by 30% of the total number
of such vehicles and by 30% of the total strategic nuclear
destructive capability. The following delivery vehicles
would be considered as "strategic nuclear delivery vehicles":
All armed combat aircraft with an empty weight of more than
15,000 kg., and all surface-to-surface and air-to-surface
missiles with designed range of more than 300 km. The exact
manner of reducing destructive capability has not been
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worked out, but a preliminary investigation suggests that an
adequate criterion might be some function of the gross loaded
weight of the delivery vehicles, aircraft and missiles being
subject to the same weight formula.
If Alternative"A"is adopted one of the following methods might
Method 1 be selected dealing with production:
Within the agreed limits of allowed levels of
vehicles, production of new and improved vehicles
would be restricted to 10 percent per year of the
inventories existing at the beginning of each year.
Since new and improved vehicles would be produced
under this alternative, some testing would be
required. Production and testing of vehicles for
peaceful purposes would be permitted within
specified limits and safeguards.
Method 2
Production would not be limited except to the
extent that the total number of vehicles and the
total destructive capa9ity of these vehicles,
.reduced to the extent provided above in Alternative
A, be exceeded. Within these limits there would
be freedom to vary the mix. To the extent permitted
by these limits of production, testing would also
be permitted. Production and testing of vehicles
for peaceful purposes would be permitted within
specified limits and safeguards.
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Alternative B
There would be a reduction by 30% in each and every
type of strategic delivery vehicles as defined under
Alternative A, above (e.g., B-52, B-47, Badger, Bison,
Atlas,Titan, SS-5, SS-6, etc.)
There would be a complete cut-off in production of
all strategic delivery vehicles except for necessary
replacement in kind and supply of spare parts. This
alternative would also require complete cessation of
testing of all new designs or components. Production and
testing of vehicles for peaceful purposes would be permitted
within specified limits and safeguards.
b) The United States should propose that restrictions
be placed in Stage I on the production, deployment and
testing of anti-missiles missile systems by the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R. The United States should also propose
that existing weapons to counter strategic nuclear
delivery vehicles would be reduced in the same manner
as the strategic delivery vehicles themselves.
c): Although the initial U.S. position should be that
reductions would apply only to the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.,
the United States should'~see; at an early date agreement
with NATO countries on ways in which reductions of strategic
delivery vehicles could be made on a NATO vs. Warsaw
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2. Reduction of all major armaments
In making proposals for reducing all major armaments
of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in Stage I the United States
should adopt one of the following two main alternatives
which are related to the alternatives listed under paragraph
1, above, with respect to strategic delivery vehicles.
Nuclear warheads and weapons of chemical and biological
warfare are not included in this discussion because the
problems of inspecting stockpiles of such weapons are
considered so great as to place them in another category
for purposes of their reduction and control. For this
reason the U.S. program for general and complete disarmament
proposes that international experts commissions on nuclear
weapons and on chemical and biological weapons be created
to determine the feasibility and means for accomplishing
the verified reduction and eventual elimination of the
stockpiles of these weapons.
Alternative A
If Alternative A of paragraph I is adopted with respect
to strategic delivery vehicles then the other major arma-
ments might be reduced by one of the following two methods:
a. There would be a 30% reduction in the total number
(and perhaps, simultaneously, in the total gross weight of
armaments in certain of the various categories, particularly
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in combatant ships) in each of the following categories:
(1) Armed combat aircraft (between 2500 and
15,000 kg. empty weight);
(2) Tanks;
(3) Armed cars and armored personnel carriers;
(Jr) Iz: c orr ~_121'ac;c: tr01-i stir. and aerodynamic
missiles, and free rockets
with range capabilities i-,:i,,
tics 300 km.
(5) All artillery, and mortars and rocket launchers
over 100 mm, in caliber; and
(6) Combatant ships with standard displacement
over 400 tons of the following classes: Carriers, battle-
ships, cruisers, destroyer types and submarines.
b. As a further feature and within the above context
of a 30% overall reduction, there might be a stipulation that,
bJ az.zt7.7a I_ zt r. c E r,.: the U. S. would be willing to make a
lar ;e:c cut, -In some categories of weapons if it were permitted
to make a sm.i cut in other categories. The U.S. should
also willing to make additional reductions in categories
iti._r,,,hich it has larger numbers of arms than the U.S.S.R., if
the U.S.S.R. would be willing to reciprocate in the categories
in which it has larger numbers than the U.S.
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c. Under either of the above alternatives, there are
two ways in which production and testing might be limited:
Method 1
Within the agreed limits of allowed levels of
weapons, production of new and improved weapons
would be restricted to 10 percent per year of the
inventories existing; au the beginning of each year.
Since new and improvo d vehicles would be produced
under this alternative, some testyn[, would be
required.
Method 2
Production would not be limited except to the
extent that the total number of weapons reduced to
the extent provided above in Alternative A could not
be exceeded.
Alternative B
:Lf Alternative B of paragraph 1 is adopted, with respect
to delivery vehicles, then the other major armaments
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would be reduced by the same method adopted for that alternative,
i.e. by a 30% reduction in each and every type of armament.
There would be a complete cut-off in production of all
armaments, except for necessary replacement in kind and
supply of spare parts. This alternative would also require
complete cessation of all new designs or components.
Note: Summary Comments on Basic Issues Included in
Alternative Methods of Reduction of all Armaments
Are Attached as Appendix A.
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3. Method of reduction
The United States should consider Stage I, for any measure
or group of measures which it is proposing for Stage I, would
three
be divided into/one-year steps. During the first part of
each step (e.g. the first three of six months) one third of
the total weapons to be reduced during Stage I would be placed
in depots under international supervision. During the second
part of each step, verification of retained levels would be
undertaken and the deposited weapons would be progressively
destroyed.
The same staging would be applied to force levels, in the
release of nne third of the personnel to be reduced during Stage?~I
occut.-I.rnj; in the first part of each step, and in the verification
of retained levels occurring in the last part of each step.
4. Relationship of Communist China to disarmament
The United States should be prepared to undertake in
Stage I any of the above-mentioned proposals for reductions
in strategic delivery vehicles and other major armament,>, and
for the reduction of force levels to 2_1 million without
inclusion of Communist China.
5. Separability of certain measures
The United States should be prepared to agree to separate
measures involving reduction of strategic delivery vehicles,
reduction of other major armaments, and the cut-off of production
of fissionable materials for use in weapons. The United
States should not, however, agree to reduce force levels
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without a satisfactory reduction in conventional armaments,
nor to transfer fissionable materials to non-weapons purposes
without a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials
for use in weapons. These measures are in addition to those
listed in Stage I all of which are considered separable.
6. The nature of an inspection system
The inspection system to be recommended by the United
States must provide satisfactory verification that the
strategic delivery vehicles and other armaments retained do
not exceed agreed levels and that no clandestine production
facili exist. The degree of inspection required depends
on a number of factors including the amount of disarmament
involved in the particular measure adopted and the extent of
qualitative break throughs which might be anticipated due
Kati lack of ' ar;jitations on the development and the production
of new types of weapons.
The U.S, is studying a series of methods by which sampling
techniques (including possible inspection by geographic zones)
may bE used as part of the inspection process.* There should
be in the immediate future field tests in the U.S. of various
techniques and methods for inspection. Methods of inspection
are based upon the following principles:
a. There must be a declaration of existing levels of
forces, armaments and activities which are to be limited
in Stage I.
A preliminary report on the inspection is contained in
Appendix B.
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ointr y would divide ,~_'c self into an agreed
r_ur:lber Of appropriate zones,. acid during each step
would provide the IDO with the total levels of forces,
armaments and activities within each zone.
C'.. One or more of these zones would be subject to
unannounced complete inspection in an agreed time
period (with the additional possible requirement that
once a zone were chosen for inspection it would remain
open to further inspection).
d. In production facilities where production has been
entirely :..i.opped, only periodic spot inspections would
requ red. But resident inspectors would be stationed
at a1.1. facilities in which production of limited items
would be continuing.
e. Verification of the destruction of weapons and of
the disc= : _ge of personnel would be conducted at
l_cc vocal inspection system. Such a system might be
independent of an IDO, or the national inspection teams would be
authorized to act as agents of an IDO.
rle United States Delegation to the 18-Nation Disarmament
Conference should be authorized to discuss on an informal
basis with the Soviet Union and other countries the concept
of a sampling inspection system including possible inspection
by geographic zones.
7. Transfer of fissionable material from past pr!dduction to
non-weapons purposes.-*
The U.S. would offer to transfer from past production
to non-weapons purposes 40,000 kg. of weapons grade U-235
provided the Soviet Union also transferred the same amount.
In making this proposal the U.S. would strongly urge that if
the Soviet Union did not favor this formula it put forth a
formula of its own... This proposal is linked to a cut-off in
production of fissionable material for use in weapons.
e ques on of the fusionable material, tritium, raises
a special problem. Some means will have to be found of ensuring
that the material can remain in U.S. production for both weapons
and peaceful purposes,
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As an alternative, in view of intelligence estimates
which postulate a relative disparity in the magnitude of
stockpiles of fissionable material in the hands of the
U.S. and the USSR, the United States could offer to transfer
a greater amount than that specified for the USSR. Such a
proposal would be an indication or would give public indication
of our superiority in this field and have the added psychological
effect of U,;, c~t.rnestness to make a substantial move="11_n the
disarmament direction. Under this philosophy the U.S. could
propose to transfer 60,000 kgs, of weapons grade U-235 provided
the USSR transferred a total of 11.0,000 kgs.
8. Research and development",
she U,S. should oppose any measures limiting military
research and development in Stage 1, c .~;cept for limits on
field testing including preparations for such testing, of certain
weapons covered elsewhere in this paper. Our opposition bh.ould
be based. 'on the difficulty of verifying suers, a measure and of
distinguishing between research and development for military
and for peaceful purposes. We should be willing to explore
the possibi1.:1.tI cr_, c>i: limiting military research and development
in the later stages of disarmament.
9. t7 o"".1-ti-on regarding Stages 11 and III
One of tho advances in the U.S. position which the
September 25, 1961 plan represents is a willingness to negotiate
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the widest possible area of agreement and not limit di.scust:!.o:.?
merely to Stage I. In order to blunt possible Soviet charges
that we do not stand by that position as well as to make our
presentations relevant to the staged September 25 plan, even
though we emphasize the details of Stage I, the U.S. should
indicate the following as what it envisages beyond Stage I:
"The U.S. looks upon Stage I as a period in which
roughly one-third of the over-all program leading to general
and complete disarmament will be achieved. In general the
approach agreed upon for the various measures in Stage I
should, with appropriate modifications, be continued
for the corresponding measures in subsequent stages.
Thus, as we resolve various Stage I problems, even though
as is recognized in both the Soviet and U.S. plans, various
matters relating to subsequent states will require study.
during Stage I. We view Stage Ilas a period in which
those states which had been participants in Sta,,,,c I would
accomplish roughly the,second-third of the program of
general and complete disarmament, recognizing th_`~; we
might as a result of the negotiations agree that _i.n cert^i_n
fields we would advance further in Stage II than uwo,-
thirds of the way while in other fields it would be wiser,
or necessary, Po proceed more slowly. Our choices in.
this regard would be helped by our effort to resolve
some of the Stage I problems.
At the same time, the United States would have to
insist that various problems relating to peacekeeping
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measures should be resolved before th% of Stage IT,
and final disarmament measures in Stage III must be
conditioned on the putting into effect of strong
peacekeeping machinery.
"Stage II, therefore, would include a continuation
of the reduction process as well as of the prohibitions
instituted in Stage I. In addition, during Stage II,
the following additional measures would be undertaken.
(a) In the light of the studies of the CBR Experts
Commission undertaken in Stage I, the production of
CBR weapons would be halted and the existing stocks
would be progressively reduced to the minimum levele
that could be agreed upon for the end of Stage Ito
(b) In the light of the studies of the Nuclear
Experts Commission undertaken in Stage I, stocks
of nuclear weapons would be progressively reduced
to the minimum levels that could be agreed upon
for the end of Stage 11.
(c) Agreed military bases and facilities would
be dismantled or converted to peaceful purposes.
The numbri? of bases to be Included in this measure
would depend upon the scope and nature of reductions
in military capability agreed upon for the second
stage.
(d) Limitations and reductions applied in Stage I
to military personnel in active service would be
extended to cover reserve forces.
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(e) Limitations and reductions schedules for armaments
would be extended to cover those smaller armaments not dealt
with in Stage I.
(f) Such agreed continued production of such armaments
as nuclear delivery vehicles as might be permitted during
Stage I would be discontinued at the beginning of Stage II
except for agreed replacement in kind.
(g) Those states not included in the Stage I disarma-
ment process would be included in Stage II.
10. Cessation of Nuclear Tests
A separate paper is being prepared with respect to the United
States position concerning cessation of nuclear tests.
11. Regional Arrangements
No proposals are being presented at this time on original
arrangements for Europe and other areas of the world, as no arms
limitation measures on that subject have been agreed upon.
12. Peace-Keeping Measures
The United States has no specific positions regarding the
exact steps and the timing of such steps which should be taken
to strengthen the peace-keeping functions of the United Nations
and other international institutions in order to assure that
international disputes can be solved peacefully as disarmani nt
progresses.
'ON,ENTIAL
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 A~penApproved For Release 2003/05/05
Summary Comments on Basic Issues Involved in
Alternative Methods of Reductio of Armaments
1. An across the board cut of .30 per cent in all armaments of the
U. S. and the USSR in a first-stage disarmament program of three years.
Such a policy would tend to maintain U. S. strategic nuclear
superiority, to the extent that it now exists and has meaning in the
future. At the same time such a policy would freeze U. S. conventional
inferiority with respect to the Soviet Union.*
To the extent that the United States must rest its defense of Western
Europe on a policy based on a first nuclear response to a large conven-
tional attack, such an across the board cut would force a continuation of
that policy. It would not only preclude redressing the conventional
imbalance by means of a balanced disarmament program, but would also
probably affect adversely the U. S. ford gn c L:ioy f encouraging NATO
countries to increase their conventional strength, since the U. S. con-
ventional strength would not be allowed to increase. Nor would the
conventional strength of our NATO allies be allowed to increase if they
were party to the agreement.
Strategic superiority is defined as having sufficient~ndlear
retaliatory power (in terms of numbers of weapons and also in terms of the
advantage of having that power dispersed in the United States, in Western
Europe, on the oceans, and to some extent on overseas bases other than
Europe) that the U. S. would suffer less damage than the Soviet Union in a
nuclear exchange, assuming even a first strike on the part of the USSR.
Conventional inferiority is defined as lacking the strength in armed
manpower and in conventional land armaments, particularly in tanks, armored
personnel carriers, artillery, and mortars, and the ability to deploy conven-
tional armaments on the continent of Europe to fight and win or even to deter
a substantial Soviet land attack in Europe without using strategic nuclear
retaliatory power.
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2. A reduction of 30 per cent in the strategic delivery capacity
of the United States and the Soviet Union, without reductions of other
armaments.
Such a reduction would, other factors being equal, permit a continua-
tion of the superiority of the U. S. in strategic nuclear weapons and
would result in no reductions of the conventional armaments of the USSR.
Also, if the reduction was achieved in a way in which some weapons improve-
ment could take place, it would enable the United States to continue to
pursue a defense policy of hardening its strategic nuclear delivery force.
This factor is related to the timing of an agreement. An agreement which
went into effect within the next year, and which allowed no changes in the
mix of weapons held, would leave the United States without the production
and deployment of its planned force of Minuteman and Polaris. With this
timing and if the U. S. determined that a disarmament agreement should in
no way be allowed to interfere with the building of such a strategic force,
particularly in the early stages of any disarmament agreement, the U. S.
might want to be able to reduce strategic delivery vehicles in a way which
would permit this kind of a strategic force to be built. If, however, an
agreement did not go into effect until sometime in 1964 at the earliest
the United States would have achieved to a considerable extent the harden-
ing and invulnerability of its strategic force and thus would not have the
same need to build into the disarmament agreement provisions allowing a
variation of the mix in strategic vehicles.
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-3-
A reduction in strategic delivery ve $ ]es alone would also enable
the United States to continue to build up its conventional strength, and
would be more effective in encouraging our allies to a similar course.
Such a policy would tend, therefore, to increase reliance on local con-
ventional defense and decrease reliance on a nuclear first strike response
to a Soviet conventional attack.
3. A reduction of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and conventional
armaments based on a trade-off of some U. P. strategic superiority for some
USSR conventional superiority.
Such a policy would involver(reducing the U. S. strategic nuclear
delivery strength vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in return for reductions in
Soviet conventional strength vis-a-vis the United States. It could involve
some reductions in both strategic and conventional weapons by the U. S. and
the USSR, but with each country taking a larger cut in those armaments in
which it had the larger amount.
A disarmament measure based on some trade-off of strength implies that
the U. S. would try to reduce its reliance on a first nuclear strike in
response to a conventional attack, by reducing the Soviet superiority in
conventional strength and by being willing, in return, to reduce U. S.
strategic strength.
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 Appendi)kP$ roved For Release 2003/05/0
WAMME
PreliYM.riary Report on the Inspection Process
1. An effective inspection system for arms control can be
devised provided:
a. Certain detailed. technical features and requirements
can be determined by field tests of principal airborne and
ground-based inspection techniques at the earliest practicable
date. A field test project, under conditions of priority
authorization, can be organized and implemented over a period
of about 18 months from date of funding. Detailed technical
data will initially become available about six months after
project initiation.
b. The terms of the treaty are generally designed to
facilitate inspection; particularly with respect to limitation
of inspection for clandestine activities to suitably defined
geographic zones or other acceptable sampling schemes, and to
detailed declarations from all country participants regarding
those items to be controlled.
c. Reductions in armaments are sufficiently gradual so
that the accuracy of the results of inspection during the early
stages of the agreement is not required to be as high as those
during later stages.
2. Although we cannot be specific in the absence of actual field
experience, research thus far permits a reasonably accurate understand-
ing of the general characteristics of the probable inspection system
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and a basis for informed major judgment as to the system's capabilities
and limitations. These characteristics are as follow:
a. Declarations from all country participants of the
numbers and (at least) regional locations of all activities
which are to be controlled. Such declarations are necessary
if the size and cost of an inspection system are to be of
reasonable magnitudes, since it is a great deal easier to confirm
or disprove than to acquire all necessary information on the basis
of treaty-provided capabilities. Further, the substantial cumula-
tive fund of unilateral intelligence can be fully utilized in order
to examine the accuracy of declarations as an initial indication
of the good faith of the other side.
b. Inspection for clandestine deployment and production
activities, as well as the monitoring of declared deployed;',
armament and major transport centers, should be carried out on
the basis of a scheme of progressive zonal inspections, or some
other suitable scheme of sampling the territory of the inspected
country. The very substantial savings which this approach permits
would not impose, we feel, a significant reduction in the capabili-
ties of an inspection system to deter treaty violations on a
country-wide basis, provided the inspecting 'country is free. to
choose, without warning, any zone from the scheme of zones formu-
lated by the other side in accordance with agreed criteria.
c. Inspection of key production facilities for weapons
systems, the total number and location of which are to be
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included in declarations, should be carried out on a country-
wide basis to facilitate verification of these declarations and
to prevent illegal production.
d. An inspection system of closely integrated airborne and
ground-based elements is required if the necessary geographic
coverage and interrelated detection capabilities are to be
achieved.
(1) The airborne portion of the system must include
negotiated provisions for continuous (subject to weather
limitations) medium and low-altitude aerial reconnaissance
of zones chosen for inspection. Surveillance aircraft must
be provided a multisensor capability including, but not
limited to, photography, infra-red sensors and radar sensors.
Both airborne and ground-based computers would be used in
the analysis and synthesis of the acquired data. The
principal duties of the airborne component would include:
(a) detection of illegal movements out of chosen zones,
(b) verification of declared deployment activities and
the location and characteristics of declared production
facilities, (c) surveillance of transport centers (airfields,
major rail, road, and port centers), (d) detection of pos-
sible clandestine production or deployment activities within
zones requiring, in many cases, confirmation by ground-based
inspection operations. Within existing technology but with
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improvements in the state-of-the-art which can be achieved
within 12 to 18 months under priority conditions, airborne
surveillance operations can acquire a day, night, and all-
weather capability to detect, and in many cases to identify
ground activities down to object sizes of not over a few
square feet. Airborne operations could be staged from bases
outside the country being inspected but at considerable
probable cost to the effectiveness of inspection capabilities
of the system as a whole.
(2) The ground-based portion of the inspection system
would require two kinds of operations: resident inspectors
at declared production facilities (country-wide) and major
transport centers (airfields, rail, road and port centers
within zones and on zone boundaries); and mobile ground
inspection teams which would verify declarations of deployed
armament (within zones) and would patrol throughout the
chosen zone in order to detect clandestine deployment and
production activities. These teams would discharge the
latter function on the basis of independent reconnaissance
capabilities or upon indications of illegal activities
furnished by the airborne organization or other (e.g.,
unilateral intelligence) sources. With the redundant
coverage provided by air and ground surveillance of production,
deployment, and transport activities, relatively small numbers
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of inspectors would be required at declared production
facilities (in tl2e hundreds). However, effective control
of transport centers will employ rather larger numbers of
inspectors (in the thousands).
e. If a scheme of zonal inspection were to be adopted, for
purposes of verifying declared deployment activities and detecting
clandestine deployment and production activities, the interval
between the time a zone is chosen for inspection and the arrival
of inspectors within the zone will be a period during which detec-
tion capabilities are lowest. If ground-based and airborne activi-
ties are staged out of a central base within the country being
inspected, the duration of this period of maximum vulnerability
should not exceed several hours. A moratorium on all movements
across boundaries of the selected zone during these hours would
materially decrease the vulnerability. During this time, it would
be necessary to rely on unilateral intelligence capabilities to
detect illegal movements out of the zone tole inspected. On the
other hand, we do not feel that such movements are possible to a
significant degree, provided the country which is to be inspected
has no prior knowledge of the zone which is to be chosen and is,
therefore, unable to prepare for evasive actions.
3. ACDA feels that the combined capabilities of such a system would
be quite substantial and would permit implementation of a comprehensive
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 Approved For Release 2003/05/0
disarmament treaty with a high level of assurance that significant degrees
of evasion would be detected and identified. Our confidence does not
derive from the capability of any single sensor or technique but rather
from the overall capabilities. of the system as a result of interactions
between the numerous inspection techniques and the redundant coverage
permitted by integrated sub-systems, plus recent development in the
computer art which permit rapid synthesis of readings from many sensors
and sources into a single result.
4. Preliminary figures indicate that an inspection system employing
the d.tbntry-wide and zonal char4ct*ristics described above might be imple-
mented with perhaps a 10,000 to 25,000 man organization for coverage of
the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries. On the other hand, if all
inspection activities were to be implemented on the basis of country-
wide inspection of all activities subject to control, the inspection
organization would probably require a staff of the order of 50,000 to
100,000 people. Either figure, we feel, is subject to substantial variation
(perhaps up to 50 per cent) depending on the actual detection sensors and
related states-of-the-art which are achievable at existing levels of
technology within the near future. Our judgment in this regard is condi-
tioned by the premise that appropriate research and development programs
are instituted and carried out with the indicated sense of urgency.
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 Approved For Release 20006Q5/8,5,,,
676R002900150018-8
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 Approved For Release 2003/0510` ;~~IABD?5001676R002900150018-8
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