EXEMPLAR YOUR PRESENTATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R002700060004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 11, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 11, 1959
• Content Type: LETTER

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
The. Vice President
United States Senate
Washington 25, D.C.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
Dear Mr. Vice President:
1 1 APR 1959
has furnished information on discussions
which Latin American delegates to the 21st Congress of the GPSU
had with Soviet officials in Moscow and Prague and with Chinese
leaders in Peiping. I am certain that this report, a copy a which
is attached, will be of interest to you.
Soviet leaders showed sensitivity to Free World propaganda
exposing their control of the international Communist movement.
It was decided_ that Communist literature would no longer make
reference to CPSU leadership and direction, or the need to defend
the Soviet Union, although the Soviets of course remain in control.
Both Soviet and Chinese officials gave high priority to the
support of Communist activities in Latin America. The Chinese,
indeed, believe that Chinese tactics can be fruitfully applied to
?
the underdeveloped countries of that area. Leaders of both
nations were encouraged by the success of the Castro revolt in
Cuba, but Mao Tse-tung cautioned that Castrols tactics should not
be mechanically imitated. Legal tactics should be tried first,
and. an increased capacity to manipulate nationalist, anti-U.S.
elements should be obtained.
A secret conference of Latin American Communists developed
a common action program emphasizing campaigns against U. S.
bases and missions. Soviet officials advocated that "U. S.
imperialism" be attacked in its own backyard, and pledged
continued aid.
POPVCDF
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Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese leaders, unlike Krushchev,
found time to talk at length with the Latin American delegates.
The Chinese contended that international tension benefits the
Communists; exploitation of such tensions forces the "imperialists"
to spread themselves thin. Chinese attacks on the offshore islands
following U. S. landings in Lebanon were cited as an example of
the successful diversion of "imperialist" forces. Mao claimed
that the United States considered Chiang Kai-shek a liability and
was ready to overthrow him.
An interesting development was Maois request that thought
be given to the union of several small Latin American countries in
one national entity, in order to strengthen the fight against
"imperialism". There is no indication that the Soviets raised
this matter with the Latin American delegates.
Plans were made to intensify the Chinese training program
for Latin American Communist leaders; tentative arrangements
to establish a network of correspondents of the New China News
Agency in Latin America were worked out. The Latin American
delegates were favorably impressed by the Chinese, probably
because of the efforts made to receive them well, and appeared
receptive to Chinese advances.
I shall appreciate it if you will restrict access to this
sensitive report.
A copy of this report has been furnished to the Special
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Acting
Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.as well as to General Goodpaster.
1 Attachment
2
Sincerely,
e
C. P. Cabe11
General, USAF
Acting Director
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OBSERVATIONS OF LATIN AMERICAN CP
DELEGATIONS TO THE 2,1ST CPSU CONGRESS
AND THEIR EXPERIENCES WITH CP CHINA
IN PEIPING
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY
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I.
THE LATIN AMERICAN DELEGATIONS IN MOSCOW AND
PRAGUE-FOR -THE-21ST CPSU CONGRESS
7
A.
Pre-Congress Meeting on-Propaganda Treatment
of Soviet Leading Role
7
B.
Special Conference of Latin American Communist
Parties
8
C.
Action Program for Latin American CP's
8
D.
Individual Meetings of Latin American CP
Representatives with CPSU Officials
12
E.
The New International Communist Publication
13
II,
LATIN AMERICAN DELEGATES ? VISIT TO COMMUNIST
CHINA
16
A.
Chinese Views on International Affairs
16
B.
MAO-on the Taiwan Problem
18
C.
MA.0 on the Liberation Struggle in Latin America
20
D.
MAO on the Unification of Small Latin American
C ountrie s
20
E.
Chinese Communist Party Training of Latin
American CP Members
21
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F. Establishment of Clandestine, Illegal CFI's Paralleling
Overt, Legal CP-is 22
G. Chinese Communist-Offer to ;Finance Correspondents
in Latin America 23
?H. Attitude of Latin American CP Representatives
toward Soviet and Chinese Communists
I. Sino -Soviet Relations
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SUMMARY
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1. This report is extremely sensitive. It contains highlight's
of the observations of Latin American Communist Party dele-
gations to the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (CPSU), and of experiences with the re,rnrniinisf Ps.r
China in Peiping after the 21st Congress, 25X1
2. Pre-Congress Meeting on Propaganda Treatment of
Soviet Leading Role. Before the Congress a ranking Soviet
Central Committee member, possibly Mikhail SuSlov, obtained
agreement from all foreign delegates that the Soviet Union and
the CPSU would no longer be depicted in Communist literature
as having a directing role and that all Communist parties should
be portrayed as independent and equal, in order to discredit
propaganda of "the imperialist and revisionist enemies" which
claimed Soviet control over Bloc states and all CP's. Coopera-
tion and mutual assistance among Communist parties supplied
or directed by the CPSU would, however, continue undiminished.
At a special conference with the Latin American delegates (see
below), Soviet Presidium member Otto V. Kuusinen pledged
effective aid to the Communist parties. Another leader pledged
"more economic aid than ever" in support of delegations to the
Seventh World Youth Festival in Vienna. Intensive private
discussions were held between Soviet officials and Latin Amer-
ican delegation leaders to iron out special problems, such as
contact methods and Soviet financial aid.
3. Special Conference of Latin American CP's. Although
the special (closed) conference of the Latin American delegates
(9-13 February) was attended by ranking Soviet "observers,"
it was formally chaired by a Cuban Communist leader. The
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Soviet observers addressed the meeting only after the completion
of its business, and made clear the highest priority of interest
attached by the USSR and the CPSU to developments in Latin
America, where "imperialism is beginning to be weakened in its
own backyard." Latin American Communist parties were re-
lieved of the need to include language about the "defense of the
Soviet Union" in their programs, but were urged to "struggle for
the liberation of their countries" and to take territory away from
the imperialist camp as the most effective aid which could be
rendered to the USSR. CP Cuba was warned that the regime may
"go to the right" just like Nasser, who had betrayed the anti-
imperialist, anti-feudal revolution.
4. Action Program for Latin American GP's. The special
conference of Latin American delegates agreed to make more.
concrete the common action program developed for Latin America
in Moscow, November 1957. It was resolved to organize an
"anti-imperialist" People's Congress between April and June 1959;1
to render the tactics of the Communist labor federation, Con-
federation of Workers of Latin America (CTAL) more effective
by bringing together trade unions of the same type and by linking
up CTAL headquarters; and to intensify the Peace Movement
through mass meetings and suitable concrete actions or campaigns
against military budgets, U.S. bases or missions, etc. 2The
tactical objective of the program was to obtain greater popular
support. Concealment of Communist language and organizational
controls was therefore emphasized.
5. Discussion of "Problems of Peace and Socialism".
Officials of the international publication Problems of Peace and
Socialism in Prague sought to interview all foreign delegates
transiting en route to and from the 21st CPSU Congress, in order to
fulfill the mission of the publication. Problems of Peace and
Socialism is to be (a) the collective organ of all Communist
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parties and (b) a vehicle for the exchange of practical experiences
of all Communist parties in solving concrete problems, especially
new Communist methods to combat new forms of imperialist
penetration. Representatives of Problems of Peace and Socialism
levied on Latin American delegates specific requests for certain
types of articles, CP documents and exchanges, and arranged
legal and illegal communication channels.
6. Chinese Views on International Affairs. MAO Tse-tung,
LIU Shao-ch' i and other Chinese leaders, in conversations with
Latin American CP delegates in China in February and March,
followed previously expressed official or unofficial lines on inter-
national affairs.
a. They stressed the affinity of the stuatidns in the
underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America
and advocated an exchange of experience among the CP's of
these countries.
b. They maintained that international tensions benefit
cp,s and aid China because Communists, by coordinated
action, are able to distract and disperse imperialist forces
and to force them to spread themselves thin over a vast area.
They said Communist parties should not be afraid of inter-
national tension ? "we" need more of it.
7. MAO on the Taiwan Problem. On the question of Taiwan,
MAO Tse-tung explained how "Yankee imperialist aid to the
Kuomintang" was useful to the Communists as a unifying issue
which could be -used to show up U.S. imperialism and inter-
ventionism. He claimed that CHIANG's policy of fighting the
creation of two Chinas coincided with MAO's objectives of
exposing the U.S. as the "principal enemy" and exacerbating
"contradictions" between the British and Americans, and
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between CHIANG Kai-shek and the Americans. By preventing
the creation of two Chinas, MAO stated, and by avoiding UN
control of Taiwan, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was
able to "strike blows against the United States without
engaging directly in military actions with the United States."
MAO claimed that Dulles and the U.S. were aware of this,
considered CHIA.NG a liability and held in reserve a secret
provisional government to take his place by a coup.
8. MAO on the Liberation Struggle in Latin America.
MAO stated:
a. the struggle for national liberation in Latin
America had developed in a situation of international
tension during the past two years;
b. the Cuban revolution had shown that the battle
could be carried to the imperialist rear and that the
imperialists were paper tigers;
c. armed action on the Cuban model should not be
applied mechanically; Latin American Communist parties
should try legal, peaceful means first.
9. MAO on Unification of Small Latin American Countries.
MAO asked the Latin American CP representatives to consider
and to report to the CCP their views on the possibility of unifying
several small tin American countries in order more efficiently
to resist imperialism.
10. CCP Training Program for Latin American CP's?
Representatives of ten Latin American CP s made arrangements
for the dispatch of from two to five trainees per CP to a four to
six months' practical training course for future national or regional
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CP leaders which was to be organized by the CCP and would
start on 1 August. The CCP agreed to pay air transportation
costs at an average of $700 per student and gave each delegation
cash in U S . dollars for this purpose.
11. Establishment of Clandestine CP's ParallelPubli?
Known CP's. Officials of the CCP briefed Latin American CP
representatives on the need to establish a truly clandestine CP
functioning alongside the legal, semi-legal, or outlawed CP in the
same country. Their reasoning was that a publicly known CP was
vulnerable to destruction and repression. In their experience,
only a truly and permanently Clandestine Communist party paral-
leling the known CP can avoid such destruction and repression.
At the same time it can function effectively and assist with the
development of sources of funds and information.
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12, Latin American CP's to Furnish Corres ondents for
New China E.ez_. The Director of the New China
News Agency opened negotiations with the Latin American CP
representatives to establish, with their help, correspondents for
NCNA in Latin America who preferably would be CP members, or
at least trusted by the CP's. NCNA would pay $100 per month
plus expenses, for news and political coverage. NCNA would also
furnish radio receivers or purchase-mon.ey for same, in order
to facilitate daily monitoring by correspondents of the Peking
Spanish language broadcasts. NCNA desired to have "legal"
correspondents where feasible, and "-Illegal" correspondents
where the political situation was adverse. The Latin American CP
representatives took the matter under consideration and promised to
send a reply through participants at the training school (see para. 10).
13. Attitudes of Latin American CP Re resentatives to Soviet
and Chinese Communists. The attitude of the Latin American CP
representatives toward the Soviets was one of respect and auto-
matic submission, but some complained about Soviet aloofness,
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arrogance, and coldness. The Latin Americans considered
Chinese Communists to show less arrogance, greater kindness,
greater hospitality and more humility than the Soviets. They
agreed that Chinese conditions are more like those in Latin
America than those of any other Bloc country, and that much
could be learned from the Chinese Communists.
14. Reflections on Sino-Soviet Relations. In their talks
with the Latin American CP representatives both Soviet and
Chinese leaders emphasized friendship, understanding, close
relations and the absence of differences between the USSR and
China. Nevertheless, the impression was left that differences
have existed and do exist "within the family," possibly in the
ideological field. In this respect, it was significant that a
majority of Latin American CP representatives vetoed the
proposal of a Latin American delegate to hold a discussion with
the Chinese on the subject of "different roads to Socialism."
The subject was apparently considered controversial.
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I. THE LATIN AMERICAN DELEGATIONS IN MOSCOW AND PRAGUE
FOR TIIE 21S-T CP-SU CONGRESS
A. Pre-Congress Meeting on Propaganda Treatment of Soviet
Leading Role
3
1. Three days before the 21st CPS-U Congress, "Nikolai,"
an official of the department of the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union handling relations with foreign
Communist parties, consulted secretly with delegates from all
Communist parties regarding the suitability of a formulation with
respect to the "leadership" role of the USSR and-the CPS-U -which
Kh-rushchev was to include in his report to the Congress. The docu-
ment presented to the delegates for discussion and approval contained:
a. An analysis of the declaration of the twelve Bloc
Communist parties at Mos cow in November 1957 showing
the declaration to be basically correct and to be the basis
for unity of the International Communist Movement.
b. A statement ?of the need for clarity as to the
"lead-ership" role of the USSR among the socialist states
and of the -C-PSU among the Communist-parties. It was
pointed out that the November 1957 declaration provided
the imperialist and revisionist enemies with the opportunity
to charge that the uss-R exploited the other socialist states
and that the CPSU? directed the other Communist parties.
The latter point had caused problems for many-Communist
parties: internal problems with revisionist elements and
external problems vis-a-vis the masses, the national
bourgeoisie and the bourgeois governments.
c. A statement of the need for the dilation from
all Communist literature of references to the "directing"
role of the USSR and the CPSU; also of the need for
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emphasizing the equality and independence of all the Com-
munist parties. This in no way diminished the "vanguard"
role of the USSR as the first socialist state, and of the CPSLT
as the party which established that state. Likevrise this did
not diminish in any way coordination and fraternal aid among
the Communist parties in the fight against the common enemy.
2. The docu M Li -was- prese as a "development" of the
November 1957 formulation and specifically not as a correction.
The representative ii of the Communist parties of Latin America
approved the "development."
B. 5 ecial Conference of Latin American Communist Parties
1. A special clandestine conference of Latin American Com-
munist parties was held during 9-13 February 1959 in the Institute
of Marxism-Leninism in Moscow.
2. Representatives from CP Spain and CP Portugal were
invited. They asked for fraternal support in the campaign for
the release of political prisoners.
3. In keeping with the line regarding non-direction of CPIs,
the Soviets did not preside over the conference. Several Soviet
officials, who attended as observers, addressed the conference
after its conclusiol. These were Otto V. Kuusinen, aged former
Cominterg official; the director of the Institute of Mrxism.
Leninism; the "secretary general" of the Komsomol; and a member
of the Central Committee, CPSU7
C. Action Program for Latin American GP's
1. Prior to the Latin American conference, a preparatory
meeting of the chiefs of delegations was held on 1 February 1959. It ,
was resolved that the conference should agree upon concrete action
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to be taken by the Latin American V's in further development of
the November 1957 action program regarding (a) an organized
defense of natural resources, (b) the trade union problem in Latin
America, and (c) the peace- movement in Latin America.
2. Latin American People's Congress. The conference treated
the agenda items in the above order of importance and resolved first
to organize a "People's Congress" in April 1959 aimed ostensibly at
defense of natural resources.9 The subject of defense of resources
was treated also at the 21st Congress itself. The Communist origin
of the People's Congress is to be concealed. The tactic is to have
the Congress convoked by leading figurei such as Lazar? CARDENAS
of Mexico, Fidel CASTRO of Cuba, Rornulo -BETANCOURT of
Venezuela, Jos-e FIGUERES of Costa Rica or others. All Communists
are to -attend-as "persons" and not as CF--representative-s. "Anti-
imperialist" language in organizing and -holding the Congress is
specifically to be avoided. However, the resolutions of this Congress
should be anti-imperialist in content. The aim of this tactic is to win
the broadest support possible. In developing this-Congress, impor-
tance is to-be given to the struggle against -dictatorships in Latin
America and the defense of the revolutions in Cuba and Venezuela,
and "other democratic regimes." Fraternal delegates from Asia and
Africa are to be invited. The site is to be a Latin-American country
where conditions are "appropriate." The C-ommunist parties of
Brazil, C-hile, Venezuela, and Mexico are to be in charge of the
organization of this Congress.
3. Modification of Trade Union Tactics. Second, the conference
resolved to modify trade union organizational tactics in Latin America
so as to achieve -greater unity. The aim is to seek unity in relation
to specific problems of workers in accordance with actual conditions
in each country. Latin American meetings of trade unions in the same
field of work should be proposed. In this activity, the-Confederation
of Workers of Latin America (CTAL), Latin American regional affil-
iate of the WFTU, should develop its campaign to get closer to the
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Latin American trade union movement. To facilitate the work, It
is necessary that leaders be representatives of trade union centers
actually affilined with the CTAL. For example, Victor Manuel
GUTIERR-EZ, of CTAL headquarters in Mexico City, is not truly
a re-presentative in the sense cited, despite his merits as a trade
union leader and Communist. Furthermore, CTAL headquarters
should be located in a country where it has a large mass bas-e.
Hence the CTAL leadership should be reorganized and its headquarters
transferred.
4. Strengthening of Rea-ce Movement.Third, the conference
decided that the peace movement must be strengthened. Where con-
ditions permit, the struggle should be through peace committees.
Elsewhere, the struggle should be carried out by means of concrete
actions or campaigns as, for example, activities against military
budgets, U.S.: military missions and U-.-S-. bases. A Latin American
meeting of peace partisans should be held during the first half of
1960. In order to achieve the broadest participation in this meeting,
sectarianism must be avoided. CP Argentina is charged with making
preparations for the meeting.
5. Sp-eeche-s by- et-Observers after-Conference
a. Remarks by Kuusinen. Kuusinen stated that the Latin
American conference proved the correctness of the November
19-57 declaration of the CPIs, for the February 1959 conference
revealed-the maturity of the Latin American CP's and revealed
that no one is in a better position to resolve proble-ms and lead
revolutions than the CP's of each country, because only they are
in a position to know well the peculiar conditions in their
countries.
He remarked that the-best way to-contribute to
internationalism is for the C-P's to struggle for liberation
in their own countries, thus taking territory_away from the
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imperialist camp. It is not necessary for Latin American CP's
to include the defense of the USSR in their programs, because
the Soviets are strong enough to defend themselves. Any revolu-
tionary advances in other countries would aid the USSR since the
common enemy would thereby be weakened.
Kuusinen asserted that events in Latin America in recent
years are of great importance because they signify that imperi-
alism is beginning to be weakened in its own backyard. The Latin
American CP's should, more than ever, coordinate and unite
their efforts, and maintain firmly the principles of proletarian
internationalism, be-canse imperialism will try various ways to
counterattack, possibly through alliance with the national bour-
geoisie on the basis of concessions, or through intervention of
the Guatemala type.
Kuusinen stressed the importance of events in Cuba. He
remarked that the situation must go to the left or the right; the
direction would depend on the work of CP-Cuba inside the country,
and on the work of the other Latin American CP's in defense of
the Cuban revolutitin.. He cited, as an example of the turn to the
right, the case of Nasser, who began as the leader-of the anti-
imperialist and anti-feudal-revolution, but later betrayed the
revolution and reached agreement with the imperialists. He
added that the national bourgeoisie of Cuba may try to do the
same.
Kuusinen concluded by remarking that recent events in
Latin America -reveal that it is possible to defeat imperialism on
its own ground. The USSR and the-CPSU pay great attention and
attribute the highest importance to that fact.
b. Remarks by the First-Secretary of the Komsomol on the
Seventh World Youth Festival. In his remarks concerning the
World Youth Festival, the First Secretary of the Komsomol stated
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that the Austrian government has denied the use of public buildings
and schools. The anti-Communist organizations in Austria are
developing a big campaign against- the holding of the Festival in
. AuStria and threaten to sabotage and create serious problems for
it, Moreover, Austrian students are developing a campaign
against the Festival, and Hungarian refugees are threatening
violent measures against Festival participants and events.
The First Secretary added that in order to overcome the
above obstacles, it is necessary to mobilize the maximum number
of youths for the Festival. The organizing committee will give
greater economic aid than ever to delegations. The committee
has already determined the number of delegates per country. In
order to avoid the Communist label, funds will not be channeled
via the CP but will go to the local preparatory committee or youth
group designated by the CP. Greatest care should be taken to
avoid inclusion of provocateurs in the delegations.
D. Individual Meetin s of Latin American CP Representatives with
CPSU Officials
Individual meetings of Latin American Communist party repre-
sentatives with CPSU officials were held before and after the special
conference. All Latin American delegations or chiefs of delegations
consulted privately with the CPSU regarding their problems, espe-
cially those concerning relations, channels, and forms of contact with
the CPSU, and regarding CPSU aid of the type needed by a given-CP.
(The Soviet modus operandi in granting financial aid to GPIs was not
discussed during the special conference. Ku.usinen pledged "effec-
tive aid" to the GP's.) These private meetings were held with
Kostia,11 Spanish-speaking Soviet who maintained direct contact
with the Latin American CP delegates, and who is an official in
the CPSUs, Foreign Section (International Department) with special
responsibility for Latin. America. Kostia discussed the problems,
then referred them to the Central Committee via "N.kola,i." The
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Central Committee replied via "Nikolai" and Kostia. Some Latin
American CP-1s, for example those of Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Uruguay,
and Venezuela, held several such meetings. Possibly, they talked to
higher-ranking Soviets than Kostia or "Nikolai."
E. The New International Communist Publication
1. Officials of the new international Communist journal,
Problems of Peace and Socialism, sought to interview all foreign
Communist delegates who transited Prague en route to the CPSU
Congress.
121
2. A Soviet called "Ca,ranov, who was said to be in charge of
the new journal, made the following remarks through an interpreter
to one Latin American delegation.
a. -He described the journal's mission as that of becoming
a collective organ for all CP-'s and a vehicle for the exchange by
all CP's of practical experiences in solving their concrete prob-
lems. In particular, the journal wanted to include the experiences
of CP's in solving new forms of imperialist penetration, including
the new struggles and methods developed by CP-'s to combat these
forms.
b. He was interviewing the delegation in order to obtain
help in solving the journal's problems so that it could fulfill its
mission, which had not been satisfactorily accomplished to date.
c. He noted that different reading tastes and different
interests in various parts of the world had posed difficulties for
the journal.
d. -He-stated-that when articles are needed Iruin a CP they
should be written by a CP-member. With respect to 'articles
already published by non-party authors, if a CP finds one in
accord with the party line the party should get the author's
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-permission for publication of the article in Problems of Peace
and S-ocialism.
3. The Latin American delegation -received from "Caranov" a
blind memorandum (for retention) which set forth requests for the
periodic submission-byCP-Ls- of -data for-the new journal. These
requests are in addition to articles which may previously have been
requested of a given-CP. The new requests are related to specific
regular sections of the journal.
a. For the section In the--Communist and Workers' Parties":
submit official party documents regarding the most important
internal questions for the party, and also regarding problems of
a type not restricted to one CP only;
provide information regarding the-experience accumulated by
the party in different s-ectors of mass work, ideological work,
political training and e-ducation, press work, etc.;
send information concerning the internal life of the party.
b. For the-bibliographic section:
provide notes on new Marxist--works written on-philosophy,
econunuics, sociology, politics and cultural matters, citing not
?only the contents but also the-rnanner irr-which new theoretical
problems are treated;
recommend new books by ''pro-gre-s-sive" authors in the above
fields which the-journal should-call to-the-attention of its readers;
make proposals and indicate needs with respectto the publi-
cation-of -critical notes regarding books and-publications of a
theoretical nature --including anti-Marxist, revisionist books ?
which defend reactionary ideology, have achieved a considerable
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distribution in the country, and which should be answered.
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4. When the Latin American delegation was transiting Prague
en route home-from-Moscow, it was again interviewed by an official
of Problems of Peace and Socialism. This time the interview was
conducted by another Soviet (name unknown) via an interpreter called
"Simoniev," also a Soviet. The official requested that the CP submit
articles for the journal on the following subjects:
a. the organizational consequences within the CP of what
had proved to be an undue reduction in the number of paid, full-
time CP functionaries;
b. information on the revision of the CP's statutes, including
the reasons for the revisions, the effects, etc.;
c. official party documents on past as well as future party
Congresses.
5. In the same interview, arrangements were also made for
communications between the CP-and the headquarters of the journal
in Prague. Because the C-P involved feared mail interception, it was
advised to forward three copies of all articles in the following manner:,
(a) one copy to the drop address of a neighboring CP; (b) one copy to
the official address of the journal in Canada;") and (c) one copy to the
official-address of the journal in London!3 The possibility of sending
a copy via the journal's office in Rome was mentioned but not agreed
upon.
6-. It was also agreed thxt a test of sending mail directly to
Prague would be made. This would be done by mailing three cards
directly to a personal addressee at Sadava 3, Prague 6, the journal's
official address in Czechoslovakia. One card was to be sent every
fifteen days. Receipt of the cards would be acknowledged.
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II. LATIN AMERICAN DELEGATES' VISIT TO COMMUNIST
CHINA
A. Chinese Views on International Affairs.
In late February and early March 1959, a group of Latin
American Communist party leaders travelling in Communist
China after the 21st CPSU Congress was given a briefing on
international affairs by MAO Tse-tung, LIU Shao-ch'i and other
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders. The principal points
made by the Chinese Communist leaders in these briefings
follow.
1. The situation in Latin America is similar in many
ways to that in the countries of Asia and Africa.
a. Latin America countries, like those in Asia
and Africa, are underdeveloped economically and have
been the victims of both direct and indirect interven-
tion by the imperialists.
b. Although a certain degree of industrialization
has been achieved in Latin America., this development
has not been accompanied by a corresponding growth of
capitalistic political and social forms. State power in
these countries continues to be in the bands of feudal,
comprador -bourgeois, and bureaucratic bourgeois
forces.
c. Countries in these areas are often dependent
upon one-product economies a,nd have served primarily
as sources of raw materials for the economies of the
imperialist world.
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d. The revolution in the countries of these areas
is still in its first stage, that is, the anti-imperialist,
anti-feudal revolution. The immediate task is the
completion of this first stage.
e. The countries of these three areas now serve
as a main support of the economy of the imperialist
world. Together they represent a majority of the
population of the world and control the greater part of
its territory and natural resources.
2. As a consequence of these similar conditions and
problems, it follows that the exchange of experience among
the Communist parties of these areas is of great value to
all of them. By coordinated action Communists are able to
distract and disperse the imperialist forces over a vast
area.
3. From this it may be seen that a policy of main-
taining international tensions is beneficial to Communists.
Communists should not fear tension. "We need more of
it," said one Chinese Communist leader.
4. The CCP has applied the principle of tension in
the case of Taiwan, Quemoy and the Matsus. When the
imperialists have intervened in underdeveloped countries,
the Chinese Communists have come to the aid of these
countries by drawing off the imperialist forces. Lebanon
is an illustration of this policy.
? 5. In the same way, when tension is created in other
parts of the world, by events such as the stoning of Vice
President Nixon, the revolutions in Cuba and Venezuela,
the expropriation of the Suz Canal, the imperialist inter-
vention in the Middle East, and so on, it is helpful to the
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Chinese Communists. MAO Tse-tung and LIU Shao-ch'i
both then added, "...and in this Mr. Dulles is our ally. "
B. MAO on the Taiwan Problem.
MAO Tse-tung explained to the Latin American repre-
sentatives Chinese Communist policy on the question of Taiwan.
1. The conflict over Taiwan is a continuation of the
Chinese civil war. In this it is plainly different from-the
situations in other divided countries such as Germany and
Korea.
2. Although Yankee imperialist aid to the Kuomintang
has delayed the final Chines-e -Communist victory, -that aid
serves to demonstrate to the peoples of China, of Asia and
of the. whole world, the imperialist and interventionist
character of the U.S.A. The realization of this provides
the basis for unity in Asia and for the anti-imperialist
struggle in the dependent countries of Africa and Latin
America. It serves as a noose around the neck of the
imperialists which is drawn tight by the Communists when-
ever it serves their purposes in the policy of world tension.
Dulles, who understands this very well, would like to undo
the noose, but the CCP will not permit him to do so.
3. The CCP, besides making use of the contradic-
tions between itself and the United States, also utilizes
and exploits the contradictions which exist among its
enemies:
a. between British and American imperialism
--
the British need to trade with China and therefore
oppose the American military policy;
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b. between CHIANG Kai-shek and the U.S.A.;
c, between the U. S. A, and countries which are
peace-loving even though anti-Communist and which
_therefore opperse -the -American military policy.
4. These contradictions are exploited by the CCP
with the intention of isolating the U.S.A. as the principal
enemy and target for attack. Thus the CCP "joins with"
the CHIANG Kai-shek clique in opposing the creation of
"two Chinas" and refuses to participate in meetings and
organizations such as the U.S. -controlled UN which are
attended by representatives of CHIANG's clique. In this
way friction is maintained between CHIANG and the
U.S.A.,. thus preventing the latter's escape from the
noose. By this policy the CCP can ignore the decisions
? of the UN and enjoy complete freedom of action.
5. Communist China does not desire at this time
to join the UN. The Soviet Union speaks for her there
and exercises the veto in China's behalf.
6. By preventing the creation of "two Chinas" or
the establishment of UN control of Taiwan and by main-
taining a state of tension in the Taiwan area, the CCP is
able to strike blows against the US.without engaging in
direct military action with US.forces.
7. Mr. Dulles understands very well the advantages
that this policy obtains for the CCP. He realizes that
CHIANG Kai-shek is an obstacle to American interests.
Therefore the US is planning to overthrow CHIANG
through a coup to be carried out by a Chinese officer who
has already been trained in the US. The U.S.A. also has
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a secret provisional government ready to take over after the
coup.
C. MAO on the Liberation Struggle in Latin America.
MAO Tse-tung also analyzed the progress of the
national liberation movements in Latin America during the past
two years.
1. He pointed out that these movements have all
developed during a period of international tension. 14
2. The success of the armed revolution in Cuba
showed that it is possible to carry the struggle to the
imperWist rear, that notions about imperialist superi-
ority are superstitions, and that ideas that th.e Latin
Americans are not able to struggle against the imperial-
ists and their puppets are incorrect. The victory of a
small revolutionary force over the much .larger forces
of the imperialist puppets in Cuba shows again that the
imperialists are "paper tigers. "
3, Although the CCP approved of the armed revolu-
tion in Cuba,. it was not MA0's intention to direct all Latin
American Communist parties to undertake similar action.
Peaceful and legal means should be tried first. The time
for armed struggle will be determined by the conditions of
imperialist oppression rather than by the Communists own
decision.
D. MAO on the Unification of Small Latin American
Countries.
MAO Tse-tung also raised the question as to whether
the division of the Latin American area into a number of small
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countries had not helped to make them easy prey for the
imperialists. He asked whether the Latin American repre-
sentatives had given this question any thought and whether they
considered the possibility of uniting several of these small
countries into one larger one which would be better able to
resist the imperialists. He asked the Latin Americans to
meditate on this point and to report their conclusions to the
Chinese Communist Party. 15
E. Chinese Communist Party ,Training of Latin American
CP Members.
1. Representatives of the Communist parties of
Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Panama, Peru, Salvador, and Venezuela
individually asked Chinese Communist Party leaders in
Peiping, during the last week of February 1959, to make
possible the sending of party members to study under CCP
direction.
2. LI,16 member of the Department of Foreign Rela-
tions of the, CCP, and other officials of the CCP called
the representatives of the above-mentioned parties together
and advised them that the Central Committee of the CCP
had decided to prepare a four to six months course for
Latin American CP students. The course will be based on
practical_ experiences of the Chinese Revolution. Its aim
will not be to teach general Marxist-Leninist theory, for
that can be leaxned in any country. Consequently, students
selected should be leadership cadres of genuine quality-.
The CCP will pay all costs including air transportation to:
China. All students should be in China by July 1.959 at the
latest in order to begin the course by 1 August 1959.
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3. The Latin American CP officials then asked the
CCP representatives how many students each CP would
send; the number stated in the reply ranged from two to
five students. Each CP was required to present air
transportation "budgets, " that is, the cost of travel from
its respective country to Prague, from which 'city the
students would be flown to China. via Moscow. The day
before the departure of the Latin American CP delega?
tions, CCP officials gave each a sum of dollars (U. S.) in
cash., without a receipt, to cover the transportation cost
of each proposed student from that CP. The amount varied
but the average, was about $700 per student. The Latin
American CP representatives stated that they would send
the following number of students: Guatemala, five;
Salvador,. three; Honduras, three or five; Costa Rica,
three; Panama., two; Bolivia., five; and Peru, three.
The number proposed by the GP's of Venezuela, Colombia,
and Ecuador,. was uncertain but would vary from two to
five students each.
F. Establishment of Clandestine, Ulega.l CP's Paralleling
Overt,
Legal CP s.
1. An official of the CCP spoke to the Latin American
CP representatives in Peiping in late February 1959. He
stressed the need for clandestine activity carried out by an
illegal CP functioning parallel to a legal or semi-legal CP
in the same country. The knowledge of the existence of the
illegal CP must be limited to members of the Central
Committee of the legal CP, and better still, to only a few
of them. The illegal CP should never surface, even if
conditions of legality permit. When part of the illegal CP
or one of its members loses contact, by reason of investi-
gation or repression, the "lost" unit or person should not
seek to reestablish contact with the illegal CP. The latter
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will make contact at a suitable time. If a long time passes
and no contact is made, the "lost" unit or individual should
join the overt, legal CP without ever mentioning the illegal
CP. The illegal CP should be organized in highly compart-
mented form to avoid destruction when part of it is dis-
covered.
2. It was pointed out that the CCP used this system
successfully, especially in Shanghai. The director of the
electric power plant in Shanghai on 7 March also affirmed
the necessity of having a parallel illegal CP. He stated
that without it, the CCP could not have accomplished
"great things." LI, member of the Department of Foreign
Relations of the CCP, stated on 9 March in Peiping that a
truly clandestine CP, operating alongside a legal CP, is
essential to avoid disaster brought about by total repres-
sion. He added that the illegal CP is in a good position for
organizing, apart from its normal tasks, financial sources
for both illegal and legal CP's,. and sources of information
of all types.
G. Chinese Communist Offer to Finance Correspondents
Latin America.
1. Early in March 1,959, in Peiping, the Director of
the New Chinese News Agency (NCNA) stated to Latin
American Communist representatives that the Agency
desired to establish correspondents in Latin America,
and asked assistance in solving the problems involved.
He described the conditions set forth by the Agency.
2. Correspondents should be persons- trusted by
the respective Communist party, and preferably should
be members of the CP. They should be, as-often-as
possible, journalists persons ass ociated with journalism,
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or at least individuals with sufficient talent for the job.
The Agency will pay a salary of $100 per month, plus the
costs of dispatching the news. Correspondents would have
the following obligations: 1) send to the Agency a minimum
of fifteen news items per month pertaining to their country,
2) send photographs regarding important events, when
possible, 3) listen daily to "Radio Peking" Spanish lan-
guage broadcasts, and 4) issue a monthly information
bulletin if political conditions in the country permit. The
Agency is willing to supply a radio receiver, or money to
purchase one.
3. The Chinese News Agency made arrangements
with individual Latin American CP delegations regarding
channels (forms, means) for dispatching news, sktgries
and expenses, since c4onditions in the Latin American
countries were not ut;iform. In countries such as Venezuela,
Cuba, Colombia, and Uruguay, where legal conditions exist
for the establishment of correspondents openly, normal
channels of communication (cables, letters) directly to and
from the Agency will be used. In countries where the
political situation is adverse, the clandestine correspondent
of the Agency: 1) will be a CP member and 2) will send,
his news airmail to a "legal" correspondent in a nearby
country. The latter will then cable the news to the Agency
as if it were produced by him.
4. The Agency expressed willingness to advance the
salaries for the correspondents to be namedfixi Latin America.
Several Latin American CP delegations indicated that a
definitive reply to the Agency's proposals would be sent via
the students which the CF's are to send to China next July
for training.
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H. Attitude of Latin American CP Representatives toward
Soviet and Chinese Communists.
1. With reference to the Soviets, the attitude of the
Latin American CP representatives was one of respect and
submission. They generally remained silent in the presence
of high-ranking Soviet officials and approved anything said
without daring to ask questions. The Latin Americans spoke
well of the Soviets. They consider the USSR and the CPSU
the most advanced and capable state and CP, respectively.
They admire the Soviet economic and technical advances
and marvel at Soviet ballets, music, and painting. In com-
parison with the Chinese Communists, they consider the
Soviets less courteous and less well-mannered, and lacking
the humility of the Chinese. They remarked about the
difficulty encountered in getting to see high-ranking Soviets.
2. A number of specific cases were cited in support
of the above observations. When "Nikolai" brought forth
the document regarding the "leadership" role of the USSR
and the CPSU for approval by the Latin American CP
representatives, prior to its inclusion in the Khrushchev
report one representative said it would be difficult to give
an immediate reply as the problem was profound and
required deep thought. The other representatives turned
and looked as if a sacrilege had been committed. In
another instance, a representative from CP Brazil said in
China, "The Soviets are arrogant, and lack the simplicity
and humility of the Chinese." He cited the fact that LIU
Shao-ch'i lit his cigarette and served him a meal, and
stated, in contrast, "A Soviet marshal, is a Soviet marshal."
Gilberto VIEIRA White, Secretary General of CP Colombia,
stated that one could respect and admire the USSR, but
that one fell in love with China. Pompey() MARQUEZ
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Rodriguez, Secretary General of CP Venezuela, stated that
Chinese kindness was unlimited. They did everything well
and win one completely. In China one really learned, and
one felt the affection of comrades.
3. An the Latin American CP representatives agreed
that the Chinese were better hosts; won the hearts of
visitors; taught much; were humble; and said great things
with simple words. Further, Chinese conditions were more
like those in Latin Arne rica than are those of any other
Socialist country; hence it was there that advantage should
be taken of experience, for the benefit of Latin America.
I. Sino-Soviet Relations.
I. The Soviets constantly stressed the importance of
unity of the entire Socialist camp, and of friends14 and
aid among the Communist parties of the world. They
singled out especially the friendship, understanding, and
close relations between the USSR and China, which the
imperialist and revisionist enemies desired to poison.
2. Koatia, an official of the Department of the
Central Committee CPSU handling relations with foreign
CP's, personally passed on to the Latin American CP
delegates the CCP invitation to visit China. He recom-
mended that they accept since the weather there was better
than in Moscow at the time. He remarked that they could
tour the USSR upon their return when the weather was
better. Kostia himself took them to the Chinese embassy
in Moscow for their visas, and spoke highly of the Chinese
people, adding that one learned. much from a trip to China.
3. Kuusinen spoke of the "indestructible" Sino-Soviet
friendship in his address to the Latin American CP delegates?
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after the special clandestine conference during 943
February. Lidiya Petrovna,17 secretary to Kostia,
spoke highly of Chinese painting, dances, and courtesy.
Other Soviet interpreters made no mention of China.
4. Victor (mnu),18 Soviet interpreter who met the
Latin American CP representatives upon their return to
Moscow from China in March, queried them regarding
their impressions. They replied, "Magnificent!", to
which Victor said, "That is what all visitors to China say.
It is a great country."
5. With, reference to expressions by Chinese officials,
LIU Shao-ch'i stated at a reception given by the Central
Committee of the CCP for the Latin American CP repre-
sentatives in Peiping on or aboUt 23 February that the
USSR was the bulwark of the Socialist camp. The CPSU
was the vanguard of the International Communist Move-
ment. The USSR had given enormous aid to China in the
fields of international affairs, economy, technology and
military matters. For that very reason China is obligated,
as proletarian internationalism requires, to aid other
countries and other Communist parties. Those who
believed that differences exist between China and the USSR
and that they can become enemies were mistaken. (Similar
statements were made by MAO and other top Chinese
officials.)
6. The directors of various factories visited in China
stressed the valuable aid received from their Soviet friends.
Many people in the streets, especially children, warmly
greeted the Latin American CP representatives as "Soviets."
7. Despite the foregoing, it was the impression from
so much talk of friendship that differences had existed and
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do exist "within the family," between the USSR and China,
possibly in the field of theory. On one occasion a Latin
American CP representative proposed that the Chinese be
requested to dislcuss the concept of the "different roads to
socialism," and also "peaceful means of transition"; this
proposal was vetoed by a majority of the Latin American
CP representatives as being a delicate matter concerning
which there have been many differences.
Comment. prep-
arations are currently under way to organize the Congress
around the issues of economic development, national
sovereignty, disarmament and international cooperation.
2. I iComment.
anti-U.S. campaigns were emphasized at this conference.
3.
omment. "Nikolai" was described as a Russian;
member of the Central Committee of the CPSU; about
5'9"; thin build; about 50 years; blue eyes with slight
oriental fold; wore oval, metal-rimmed spectacles;
straight, very light brown hair parted on left; straight
thin nose, flaring of nostrils; serious expression; thin
lips; Slavic appearance; well-dressed; no particular
distinguishing features or mannerisms. He spoke only
Russian at the Latin American CP conferences, using
interpreters, and appeared to be acquainted with some
long-time Latin American CP leaders such as Luis
CORVALAN Leppe (Chile), Pompeyo MARQUEZ Rodriguez
(Venezuela), and Pedro SAAD (Ecuador).
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'Comment. Photographs of Mikhail Suslov
appear to correspond to the above description.
4. I ommento Otto V. Kuusinen, once prominent
in the Comintern, is a member of the CPSU Presidium and
Secretariat. He was elected to these posts in the reshuffle
of party leaders in June 1957. Since his election, he has
figured prominently in meetings with foreign Communists.
5. akornment. This is G. D. Obichkin. The
Institute of Marxism-Leninism (formerly the Institute of
Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin) is attached to the CC/CPSU
and is the CC's leading center for research on the history
of the CPSU and the international workers' movement. It
collects, studies and publishes documents and materials
on the founders of Communism.
6. I JCommet. Presumably at this date the
Komsomol "secretary general" (actually First Secretary)
was V. Y. Semichastny. Semichastny succeeded A. N.
Shelepin (now head of the Committee of State Security) in
the Komsomol post in April 1958. In March 1959, however,
Semichastny was replaced by S. P. Pavlov as Korns'omol
head.
7.
!Comment. This Soviet was known as "Rurnianski"
and was described as follows: Sex: male; color: white,
pale complexion; age: about 50; height: about 5'9";
weight: about 170 lbs.; build: robust and heavy; hair:
light brown, abundant, long waves; moustache: none;
eyes: color not known; did not wear glasses; features:
heavy, Slavic, thick nose; voice: deep, strong; language:
spoke Russian at the Latin American CP conferences.
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Comment. Possibly identical with. ekse
Matveyevich Rumyantsev, who is Editor -in-Chief of the
international Communist journal, Problems of Peace and
Socialism.
8. ,omrnent. A Latin American regional
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anniversary celebrations in November 1957 afforded a
remarkable illustration of the extent of CPSU direction of
the Communist movement in Latin America. The head of
the Latin American sector in the CPSIPs Foreign Section,
who presided over the meeting, stated flatly what the Latin
American CPis must do in the future. He told them that
they must: (a) achieve greater interchange; (b) improve
their support of each other and their "solidarity" on various
issues; (c) step up the peace movement and hold a peace.
conference in Argentina during 1958; (d) spread anti-
American sentiment in every country and "mobilize" the
Latin American people against American imperialism;
(e) plan to hold a conference in 1959 to coincide with a
scheduied meeting of the Organization of American States
(OAS), for the purpose of opposing OAS resolutions; and
(f) by the middle of 1958, hold a conference of the CP's of
the northern portion of Latin America, to include CP's from
Panama. to Canada. The Mexican and Cuban CP's were
given the task of organizing this conference which was to
parallel a conference of the southern CP's which had been.
held earlier. The Latin American CP's worked hard to
fulfill these directives during 1958.
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25X1 9. L Ifomment. CP Argentina during 1648 May
1958 sponsored a peace congress in Buenos Aires, planned
previously in Moscow, under the title of the "Argentine
Congress for International Cooperatiod, General Disarma-
ment, and National Sovereignty. " The meeting decided to
sponsor a "congress of the peoples of Latin America" in
Buenos Aires from 4 to 7 December 1958. This date was
later changed to April 1959. Recent information indicates
that suggestions are being solicited for an alternate site
for the Congress because of the stiffening anti-Communist
posture of the FRONDIZI regime.
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omment. Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ, a
Secretary of the CTAL, is also Secretary General of the
General Confederation of Guatemalan Labor (CGTC). The
CGTC was dissolved by the Guatemalan goverurnent in June
1954 fol1owing7the fall of the ARBENZ regime, but main-
tains a nominal existence in exile.
'Comment., Kostia has been a CPSU contact
for Latin American Communists for .several years. In the
summer of 1958 Kostia told a Latin American Communist
that he and another Soviet were in charge of all CPSU rela-
tions with Latin America. The two men had divided the
area into ten countries for each with Kostia having Mexico,
Argentina, Paraguay, Panama. and Central America.
'Comment. This may refer to Korionov, who
has been reported to be the Secretary of the journal's
Editorial Board after serving previously in the CPSU's
Foreign Section with special responsibility for the Western
Hemisphere. He may be identical with Vitali G. Korionov,
journalist. The journal's Editor-in-Chief, A. M.
Rumyantsev, at the time of the interview was in Moscow to
attend the 21st CPSU Congress.
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Comment. In both Canada and the UK, the
journal is published under the name of World Marxist
Review.
I:omment. This point was presumably
intended to tie the Latin American movement in with the
principle described in A-3, above.
omment. This is interesting in the light
of the storm raised by the 2 March 1959 issue of Time,
which suggested the partition of Bolivia.
Comment. The chief of the CCP liaison
department for Latin America has been reported as LIU
Tan-fu and also as LI Tan-fu. An interpreter with this
department has been reported as LI Tong-che. LIU (1,7)
Tan-fu is reported to speak fluent English but it is not
known whether he speaks Spanish.
romment. Lidiya Petrovna (frequently
referred to only as Lidiya) has been a contact of Latin
American Communist for several years. She has been
described as an interpreter/guide who works under
Kostia.
Comment. His identity is not known.
Kostia reportedly has several interpreter/guides
working under him. Be sides Lidiya, others have been
identified as "Alexis" and "Vladimir".
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