MEMORANDUM TO THE OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD FROM F. M. DEARBORN, JR.
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80B01676R002700040019-1
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 11, 2005
Sequence Number:
19
Case Number:
Publication Date:
January 24, 1958
Content Type:
MEMO
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CIA-RDP80B01676R002700040019-1.pdf | 308.89 KB |
Body:
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G l f~
THE WHITE hOUS.t
aahington
z~ ONF IT3.: NT JAL
January 24, 1958
MEMORANDUM TO THE OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
I would like to discuss the attached memorandum at
tomorrow's meeting.
:i . M. Dearborn, Jr.
Special Assistant
to the President
NSC review(s) completed.
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I"f'1RTC. )'nvt-T ";A T.
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,ONFWENTlAL,
January 24, 1958
DUM TO THE OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
In 1953 the Jackson Committee recommended that the Psychological
Strategy Board be abolished and the Operations Coordinating Board formed,
because the "psychological" aspect of policy Is not separable from policy
but inherent in every diplomatic, economic or military action. My
experience with the OCB confirms the soundness of the fundamental
philosophy of the Committee's recom endation. However, I think it is
evident that In 1953 Communist strategy was based on military and sub-
versive aggression which has since been shelved, perhaps temporarily,
for a strategy directed to achievement of Communist aims through
political warfare, exploiting the democratic electoral process, and
economic warfare, both waged under the guise of peaceful and competitive
coexistence. If so, we are now at a stage in history where the term
"cold war" provides for the first time a reasonably accurate description
of the nature of the struggle and where the operating agencies of the U. S.
Government have a responsibility to reexamine the adequacy of our
machinery to meet the challenge of this new Communist strategy.
Since its beginnings, the OCB has had the duty of advi with the
agencies concerned as to: their operational planning responsibilities
with respect to national policies; the coordination of operational plans;
the timely and coordinated execution of such policies and plans; and the
execution of each security action or project so that it shall make its full
contribution to the attainment of national security objectives and to the
particular climate of opinion the T. S. is seeking to achieve. It has also
had the duty of initiating new proposals for action within the framework
of national security policies in response to opportunity and changes in
the situation. The Board is not limited to advising with the agencies
concerned when it comes to new proposals for action but is, rather,
directed to initiate them.
I think the 0CB is in general performing its advisory duties as to
operational planning and execution in a satisfactory and increasingly
useful manner; but I think that we have tended to consider the contri
bution of actions or projects to foreign climate of opinion in a rather
haphazard way, and I do not believe that we have taken nearly enough
advantage of our authority and duty to initiate now proposals directed
to what one might call targets of opportunity.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAA.L
It is a temptation to separate the psychological aspects of fighting
the cold war from what seems to be the parely operational concept of
initiating new proposals for action, but to do so would result in further
diversification of effort. The Jackson Committee report, the 1955
Rockefeller Panel report on Psychological Aspects of United States
Strate and the current Rockefeller Brothers Fund report on the
Military Assects of International Security all emphasize the essential
"wholeness" of psychological impact and foreign policies, programs
and actions.
The problem then is not, to my mind, one which can be solved by
creating separate organizations for psychological strategy and for over-
seas actions, although I am afraid that some who have been concerned
by our seeming lack of attention to foreign climate of opinion effects or
to counteracting Communist moves may advance this solution, but,
rather, is one of making the 0013 a better mechanism for marrying
action and opinion.
This mechanism ultimately should be such as can, in addition to
its other duties: anticipate and counteract foreseeable Communist
actions; anticipate the effect and take psychological advantage of
proposed U. S. actions; decide quickly the need for, and ways to, react
to unanticipated Communist moves; initiate, and encourage the
initiation by others, of Ideas for waging the cold war; consider the
timing of planned U. S. actions and projects in order to achieve maximum
impact; suggest information themes to complement U. S. actions or
projects, and themes to complement actions; and, above all, provide
means by which U. S. cold war moves or reactions to Communist moves
can be speeded up when necessary.
1. As a beginning and on a trial basis, I recommend that the
`jCf form a kind of watch committee to meet with me once a week to
bring forward suggestions for anticipation of forthcoming events or for
reaction to events forecast or known through intelligence and other
sources, and, in general, to discuss matters within the broad outlines
of the preceding paragraph and propose appropriate action thereon.
The committee members should be charged with finding out if responsible
agencies are in fact considering the points raised, or, if not, if
consideration has been given to them, and action taken or decided
against. Between meetings the members would serve as agency points
of contact for interim matters.
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The suggested committee should not have strict terms of reference
or any fancy-sounding name. Until it is tried out, it is impossible to
define Its duties or functions accurately, but it should not become a
staffing committee or engage in operational planning. Summaries of
matters taken up by the committee should be reported in the Weekly
Activity Report and Board action requested when needed. Members
of the committee should have sufficient rank to attend their agency
daily high-level staff conferences and security clearance to receive the
daily State and CIA Intelligence reports.
2. Although my concept of the tasks which might be undertaken
by the suggested committee is broad, it will not be able to undertake the
important duty of evaluating programs. Assuming, as we must, limited
resources and a growing demand for competition with the Communists
in the economic field, I believe that the Board should give early
consideration to providing an evaluation system which would meet the
current need for allocating priorities in overseas programs. The
balance of military as against economic assistance; the emphasis to be
put on regional programs; and the kind of programs best suited to a
particular country or region's state of development are areas which also
need evaluation.
3. Agencies which do not participate regularly in the NSC
process do not appear to be sufficiently aware of the effects of their
programs and official utterances on foreign opinion. This problem Is
not within 0-1`1' 'a jurisdiction, but I believe we should assist USIA in
its efforts to persuade these agencies to seek advice on achieving
favorable impact or minimizing unfavorable reactions overseas from
statements or actions originating with them. Essentially, this is a
matter of improving existing liaison procedures to make sure that
USIA has advance knowledge of forthcoming statements and actions
and is given the opportunity to make suggestions concerning them.
4. 1 have not listed in this memorandum suggestions for
regaining the cold war initiative because I believe that the primary
need is to provide means to ensure their prompt consideration.
F. M. Dearborn, Jr.
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