MEMO TO SECRETARY OF STATE FROM MCGEORGE BUNDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R002600160001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 124
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 25, 1963
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE WHITE HOUSE
SECRET
MEMORANDUM TO:
February, 25, 1963
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Director of Central Intelligence
In a follow-up to our discussion of last week, I am circulating
herewith certain documents which I think may be helpful to all
who are called upon to discuss the problem of Cuba either in
Executive Session or in public. . These documents are:
First, a compendium of the President's own principal comments
on Cuban affairs. The President's statements obviously represent
the position and policy of the Executive Branch, and witnesses
undertaking to explain the position of the Executive Branch on
policy matters should be guided by these statements.
The second major document enclosed is a report prepared under
the direction of the Director of Central Intelligence with respect
to intelligence on Cuba before.and during the October crisis.
This account represents a coordinated report, and witnesses
undertaking to discuss the matter will wish to be familiar
with it. Since the subject is highly classified, it is assumed
that witnesses without appropriate clearance will be cautious in
commenting on it, and that witnesses who are more fully informed
will take appropriate precautions as to the character of hearings
in which they discuss it. Discussion of any possible modifications
in our intelligence procedures growing out of this experience
should be avoided by any witnesses not having. direct responsibility.
Finally, I am circulating copiers of a public statement presented
by Assistant Secretary Martin on February 18. This statement is
an unusually clear and comprehensive account of the problem of
subversion, and witnesses called to testify on this subject will
wish to be familiar with the official position presented by the
Department of State.
Attachments: a/s McGeorge Bundy
Incl. 1 Compendium (unclassified)
Incl. 2 - Rpt fm DCI (TOP SECRET CODEWORD MATERIAL)
Incl. 3 - Stmt by Asst Secy Martin (unclassified)
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 25, 1963
PERSONAL
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Director of Central Intelligence
After hearing your comments on the draft
memorandum which I circulated last week,
I have decided that it is better not to attempt
such a resume of agreed guidelines, subject
at it might be to misunderstanding. Instead
I am circulating the attached memorandum
and the documents referred to therein.
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1
Some Presidential Comments
TAB 1
TAB2
TAB 3
TAB 4
TAB 5
TAB6
TAB 7
TAB 8
TAB9
TAB 10
TAB 11
TAB 12
Cuba 1
Cuban Refugees, Brigade, Activist Exile Groups
Shipping
Subversion
Withdrawal of Soviet Troops
Military Threat -i rorn Cuba
Surveillance, Verification, and No-Invasion Pledge
i uture Policy Towards Cuba
Post Mcrtem on October Crisis
Shrimp Boat Incident
Costa Rica Meeting
Americans in Cuba
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Press Conference - March 6, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, can you say whether the four
Americans who died in the Bay of Pigs invasion were employees of
the Government or the CIA?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I would say that there are a good
many Americans in the last 15 years who have served their country
in a good many different ways, a good many abroad, some of them
have lost their lives. The United States Government has not felt that
it was helpful to our interest and particularly in the struggle against
this armed doctrine which we are in struggle all around the world to
go into great detail.
Let me say about these four men: They were serving their
country. The flight that cost them their lives was a voluntary flight
and that while because of the nature of their work it has not been a
matter of-public record, as it might be.in the case of soldiers or
sailors, I can say that they were serving their country.
As I say, ;their work was voluntary.
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Press Conference - January 24, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, as you may be aware, there seems
to be some conflict on the part of history involving the Bay of Pigs invasion.
As you know-, the Attorney General says that no United States air support
was contemplated, so, therefore, there was none to be withdrawn.
Yet today, editor Jack Gore, of the Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
News, says in a group of editors who visited you on May 10, 1961, you told
them that air cover was available, but you had decided not to use it.
Mr. Gore Said you told these editors that one reason for your
decision was that Ambassador Stevenson had complained that any such action
would make a liar'out of him in the U.N. Now also today, aMr. Manuel
Penobos, who has been rather vocal for the last day or two, a member of
Brigade 2506, he says that the United States military instructors of that
Brigade promised the men that they could expect air cover. Out of this
welter of seemingly different stories, I wonder if you can set us straight on
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. There was no United States.air cover
planned, so that the first part of the statement attributed to the Attorney
General, of course, is correct. Obviously, if you are going to have United
States air cover, you might as well have a complete United States commitment,
which would have meant a full-fledged invasion by the United States in April 1961.
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What was talked about was the question of an air strike on
Monday morning by planes which were flown by pilots, B-26 planes, which
were flown by pilots based not in the United States, not American planes.
That strike, as the Attorney General's interview- in U. S. News
and World Report describes it, was postponed until Monday afternoon. I
think that the members of the Brigade were under the impression that the
planes which were available, which were the B-26 planes, would give them
protection on the beach. That did not work out. That was one of the failures.
The jets, the training jets, which were used against them were very
effective and, therefore, we were not -- the Brigade was not able to maintain
air supremacy on the beach.
"I I
So I think that the confusion comes from the use of the word "air
cover", not to talk about United States air cover as opposed to air cover
which was attached to the Brigade, some of which flew- from various parts
of this-continent, not from the United States. So I think that will make it
clear. As I said from the beginning, the operation was a failure, and the
responsibility rests with the White House.
We engaged in extensive analysis of reasons for the -failure after-
wards, headed by General. Taylor, who is now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff; in the Congress; the Senate Foreign Relations Committee conducted
an investigation, and it seemed to me that the conduct of operations in
October, 1962, were indicated that a good many lessons had been learned.
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As to the recollection of the editor, there was no such
conversation of the kind, at least, .'that has been read to me. The problem
of air cover and one of the reasons that the invasion failed may have well
been discussed, but only in the terms that I have described, because what
I have described are the facts.
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Castro Allegation Against the CIA
Press Conference -- October 31, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, .'Fidel Castro claims to have
captured some Americans whom he says are CIA agents, and he
says he is going to execute them. Is there anything at all that you
can tell us about this ?
THE PRESIDENT: No, no.
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SUPPORT Or EXILES
Press Conference -- May 22, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, are we providing any material
assistance currently to any Cuban refugee organization, any Cuban
exile organization?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we may well be, but you would have to
make the question more precise.
QUESTION: Any arms or financial assistance on a regular basis
to any specific organization?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, none that I am familiar with.
QUESTION: Mr. President, I think new legislation...
THE PRESIDENT: In addition, I don't know- whether it would be
a matter I would want to discuss here in any case, but to answer your
question, I don't think as of today that we are. But I wouldn't want to
go into details, if we were.
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GOVERNMENT IN EXILE
Press Conference -- April 24, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, another point on the exile problem.
Sir: rather in line with an admonition that you, yourself, made last September,
the Attorney General suggested the other day that the Cuban exiles should
compose their differences and speak with more of one voice, particularly in
terms of their relationship with the Government. Is there an implication
here, sir, of an approval or enthusiastic approval on the part of your Ad-
ministration toward the setting up of an exile government, a government in
exile?
THE PRESIDENT: No, we supported the arrangement of the
Revolutionary Council in order to give the exiles a voice, which we hoped
would be speaking for the exiles community, in all those matters which
affect their relations with the United States and the United States Government.
For us to agree and support a government in exile, however, is an entirely
different question, because you have -- we would want to support a govern-
ment which would strike a responsive chord in Cuba, itself. The experience
with governments in exile have not been particularly felicitous, historically
speaking. There is no evidence that exiles themselves could develop a govern-
ment which would necessarily be the government which the people of Cuba
would freely choose.
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It would seem to me what would be most valuable now would be a
greater degree of cohesion among the exiles regardless of their political
view, and there are substantial differences among them, so that they can
negotiate with us, if that is the proper word, and bring their case before
other Latin American countries, in the OAS, so that we can talk to someone
about the many problems which we face and the exiles face with 200, 000 -
250, 000 people coming into our country. But a government in exile, I think
that is a different question, and in my view, it would be imprudent today and
I don't think it would help the struggle.
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AMERICAN PRISONERS & EXILE RAIDS
Press Conference -- April 24, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, now that the 21 Americans who were
imprisoned in Cuba have been released, what do you think that the U. S.
policy will be toward exile raids in the future if no U. S. laws are violated,
and if these raids may have some military value, perhaps done in conjunction
with the underground within Cuba?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I would think a discussion of that kind of
a question, if the question is as you put it, is really not very useful to the
exiles, or to the cause of Cuba. It does not seem to me that public discus-
sion of these sorts of activities is worthwhile at this time, or beneficial.
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American Society of Newspaper Editors
April 19, 1963
MR. HILLS: The largest number of questions today are on the
subject of Cuba. Thereare a dozen or so asking, sir, if you would give
us your views or whatever you have to say about Miro Cardona and his
charges that you backed down on a promise for a second invasion, and the
other things in his statement.
THE PRESIDENT: I think the Department of State has already
made a comment which represents the views of the Government. Dr.
Cardona lives in Miami, which is the center, of course, of the exiles, the
center of their hopes. I think that a good many Cubans feel that the only
way that they can return to Cuba is by military action of the United States.
We, conscious of our obligations to our own people, our own
security, our alliances, our responsibilities, as I said, as the chief
defender of freedom all over the world, we have not determined that it is
in our national interest or in the general interest of the Hemisphere for us
to launch an invasion. Naturally, that disappoints the exiles, but as the
State Department said, the foreign policy of the United States, and however
much we may sympathize with their desire to be free, the United States
cannot launch itself into a massive invasion of Cuba without considering the
worldwide implications to other free countries and also its effect upon our
own position.
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Now, as to his charges, I don't think it is necessary to go through
them. Quite obviously, nobody in the United States Government ever informed
anyone in the Government or outside the Government, Dr. Cardona or anyone
else, that we were going to launch, committed ourselves to launch, a military
invasion with six divisions. We appreciate very much the fact that a good
many Cubans have volunteered for the American Armed Forces. I think
that they can be very valuable there. No one knows what the future is going
to bring.
But I hope that Dr. Cardona and others will realize that this is not
a struggle between the United States and the exiles. It is really a struggle
against the Communist infiltration in this Hemisphere, and while we may
disagree as to what actions we should take to remove it, and while my
reactions are somewhat different than Dr. Cardona's, I would hope it
would be possible for us to work together in the general interest. That is
the object of this Government. We want to work with Dr. Cardona and all
the other Cubans, but we must maintain the control of our policy here in
the United States and here in Washington and will continue to do so.
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Press Conference -- April 3, 1963
QUESTION: Would you be willing to discuss with us, sir, the
political and military difficulties of preventing these hit and run raids by
Cuban exiles who believe they are striking a blow for freedom?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, obviously Florida is a long coast, and it
is possible for some people to go from Florida and strike at a target and
come back. We have attempted to discourage it for a number of reasons.
We believe it is ineffective. There was a raid conducted in Cuba, left
around the 17th, I think, the evening of the 17th and 18th, that shot at a
Soviet merchant ship as a target of opportunity. It returned, a number of
the people who took part in came to Washington and held a press conference.
It does not seem to us that this represents any real blow, at Castro. It
gives additional incentives for the Soviet Union to maintain their personnel
in Cuba, to send additional units to protect their merchant ships. It is not
controlled. No one in a position of responsibility knows about it. So that
it will bring reprisals, possibly on American ships. We will then be expected
to take a military action to protect our ships, which may bring a counter
action.
I think that when these issues of war and peace hang. in the balance,
that the United States Government and authorities should -- and when
American territory is being used -- should have a position of some control
in the matter. So we don't think that they are effective, we don't think they
weaken Castro, we don't think a rather hastily orgarrzed raid which maybe
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shoots up a merchant ship or kills some crewman, comes back, holds a
press conference, it doesn't seem to us that that represents a serious blow
to Castro and, in fact, may assist him in maintaining his control.
Now, I want to contrast that kind of action with action of some other
Cubans, and I don't criticize these men who took part in this. They are
anxious to see their island free, but we just don't feel that this advances
their cause. I contrast that with some others.
For example, between 400 and 500 members of the brigade who
were prisoners, who were at the Bay of Pigs, have joined the United States
Army, 200 as officers and 250 as men who are now in training, and who I
think will be very fine soldiers, and can serve the common cause. The
head of the -- the Commander of the brigade, Oliver, who is a Cuban, a
Negro, got all of his marks at 100 in joining the service. So I think there
are a good many very determined, persistent Cubans who are determined
that their island should be free, and we wish to assist them.
We distinguish between those actions which we feel advances the
cause of freedom and these hit-and-run raids which we do not feel advances
the cause of freedom and we are attempting to discourage those.
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Press Conference -- March 21, 1963
CUESTION: Mr. President, Radio Moscow said today that the
Cuban exiles who say they shot up a Russian ship and an army camp
on .Monday, that these men were hirelings of the United States and
were carrying out secret American orders. What have you to say
to this?
THIE PRESIDENT: As you know, our best information is that
they did not come from the United States. We have already indicated
that we do not feel that these kind of raids serve a useful purpose.
It seems to me in some ways they strengthen the Russian position
in Cuba and the Communist control of Cuba and justify repressive
measures within Cuba which might otherwise not be regarded as
essential. So that we have not supported this and these men do not
have a connection with the United States Government. I think a raid
which goes in and out does indicate the frustrations of Cuban exiles
who want to get back home and who want to strike some blow, but I
don't think that it increases the chances of freeing Cuba.
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Backgrounder -- December 31, 1962
QUESTION: Mr. President, do you expect trouble from the
Cuban refugees in the Miami area now, and especially this Brigade,
in view of this policy that we have towards Cuba?
THE PRESIDENT: I am sure they all want to get back to
Cuba. That is quite natural. On the other hand, the United States
has a good many other" obligations and concerns and responsibilities
all around the world. We are involved in attempting to check the
advance of the Sino-Soviet block of a billion people, so that we
have to maintain a perspective which is bound to be different from
theirs .
I am sure that they want us to move into Cuba. So, naturally,
when we don't, there is bound to be disappointment. They all want
to go home. I understand that. So I suppose they will be disappointed
until that day comes. I just think that day will come, but I don't know
when it is going to come.
QUESTION:' Mr. President, does our intelligence indicate any
significant lessening of Castro's popularity or prestige as a result
of Khrushchev',s pullback?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think it does, but I don't think it
indicates any lessening of his ability. I think one of the most difficult
problems that we have is that the Communist system does permit,
(even)
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even against substantial popular opposition, does permit a strong
degree of central control, even though public support may atrophy.
It is still possible, with a rather quiescent public to maintain, with
the police apparatus, the militia, the youth groups, and all the rest,
to maintain, even against a majority of public opposition, to maintain
control.
We have seen that in several other countries. That doesn't mean
that that control is final. After all we have been through in the last
jibe with this policy?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think in the first place -- I don't
decade, we have been through the experience of East Germany, Poland,
and Hungary, and if it hadn't been for Soviet troops, we would have
had a complete change in -all those three countries. In addition, we
had the break between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. We had the
difficulties between the Soviet Union and China.
As I say, no one can predict what the future course will be
-within and without Cuba. All we can indicate are the general lines
today. As I say, those Cubans obviously want to go home. They
left, hoping to return to a free Cuba. But we have to consider what
kind of a Cuba we will have in the future. This has to represent a
choice by the majority of the Cubans themselves. It can't be just
a matter of a change imposed by United States force.
QUESTION: Mr. President, how does the release of the prisoners
(think)
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think that the kinds of assistance tiven to Cuba to get the prisoners
out are decisive elements in the continuation of Castro's policy, baby
foods, medications, and so on. That is not the great issue in Cuba.
Secondly, I think they were hostages and, therefore, always
could be used to attempt to limit American policy. Their effort
now that Castro is making that we won't release a certain number
of relatives, unless Pan American begins to fly back again, that
is the kind of use that he makes of prisoners. He had a particularly
vulnerable target in the prisoners because of the American
responsibility for their position.
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FOR.IMMEDIATE RELE SE
DECEMBER 29, 1962
OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Mia.mi, Florida)
THE WHITE HOUSE
'RE LRICS OF THE PRESIDENT AND
MRS. JOHN F. KENNEDY
AT PRESENTATION OF THE FL.9.G OF 'THE .
2506TH 'CUBAN INVASION BRIGADE
ORANGE BOWL, MIAMI, ]FLORIDA
THE PRESIDENT. Commander, Doctor, I,,rant to express
my great appreciation to the Brigade for making the United
States the custodian of this flags I can assure you that this
flag will be returned to this Brigade in a free' Havana,
I wonder if Senor Miranda, who"preserved this flag
through the last 20 months, would come forward so we can meet him.
I wanted to know who I should give it back to.
I always had the impression -- I hope the members of the
Brigade will sit down again -- I always had the impression that
the Brigade was made up of mostly young men, but standing over
there is a Cuban: patriot 57, one 59, one 61. I wonder if those"
three. could stand so that the people of the United States could
realize that they represent the spirit of the Cuban revolution
in-its best sense.
Awl of you 'members of the Brigade, and members o.f.
their families, are following an historic road, one which has
been followed by other Cubans in other days, and, indeed, by
other patriots of our Hemisphere I.n other years - Juarez, San
Martin,. Bolivar., ..-04Higgins -m all of whom fought for liberty,
many of whom were defeated, many of whom went in exile, and all
of whom came home.
Seventy years ago Jose Martin, the guiding spirit
of the first Cuban struggle for independence, lived on these
shores. At that time in 18899 the first International American
Conference was held, and Cuba was not present. Then, as'now,
Cuba was the only state in the Hemisphere still controlled by a
foreign monarch, Then, as now, Cuba was excluded from the society
of.free nations. And then, as now, brave men in Florida and New
York dedicated their lives and their energies to the freedom of
their homeland.
The Brigade comes from behind prison walls, but you
leave behind you more than six million of your fellow countrymen
who are also in a very real sense in prison, for Cuba is today,
as Martin described it.many years ago, as beautiful as Greece,
.and stretched out-.in.chains, a prison,, moated by water.
On behalf of my Government and my country, I welcome
you to the United States. I bring you my Nations respect for your
courage and for your cause. Our primary gratitude for your
liberation must.go to the heroic efforts of the Cuban :amilies
Committee, Mr. Sanchez and others, and their able and skilled
negotiator, Mr. James Donovan, and those many. private American
citizens who gave so richly of their time and their energies
in order to save free men of Cuba from Castro's dungeons, and to
reunite you with your families and friends.
Their efforts had a signifance beyond the important
desire to salvage individual human beings. For your small
Brigade is a tangible reaffirmation that the human desire for
freedom and. independence is essentially unconquerable. Your.
conduct. and valor are proof that although Castro and his fellow
dictators may rule nations, they do not rule people; that they
MORE
(Over)
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may imprison bodies, but they do not imprison spirits; that
they may destroy the exercise of liberty, but they cannot
eliminate the determination to be free. And by helping to
free you, the United' States ha.s Ken given the opportunity to
demonstrate once again that all men who fight for freedom are
our brothers, and shall be until your country and others are
aree,
The Cuban people were promised by. the revolution
political liberty, social justice, intellectual freedom, land
for the campesInos, and an end to economic exploitation. They
have received a police state, the elimination of the dignity of
land ownership, the destruction of free speech and o_f. free press,
and the complete subjugation of individual human welfare to the
service of the stats and of foreign StateSc
Under the L lianza para el Progresso, we support for
Cuba and for all the countries of this Hemisphere the right of
free elections and the' free exercise of basic human freedoms.
We support land reform and the right of every campesino to own
the land he tills. We support the effort of- e vnry free nation
to pursue programs of economic progress, We support the right
of every free people to freely transform the economic and political
institutiorE of society so that they may serve the welfare of all.
These are.the principles of the Alianza para el Progresso.
They are the principles tire support for Cuba, These are the prin-
ciples for which men have died and fought, and they are. the
principles for which you fought and for which some died in your
Brigade. And I believe these are the principles of the great
,majority of the Cuban people today, and I amconfident that all
over the island of Cuba, in the Government, itself, in the Army,,
and in the militia, there are many who hold to this freedom faith,
who have viewed with dismay the destruction of freedom on their
island and who are determined to restore that freedom so that. the
Cuban people may once more govern themselves.
I know that exile is a' different life for any free
man, But I am confident that ypu recognize that you hold a
position of responsibility to the day when Cuba is once again
free. To this end, it is impo ^tnnt that you submerge monetary
differences in acommon united front; that the Brigade, those
who serve in the Brigade, will work together to keep alive the
spirit of the Brigade so that some day the people of Cuba will
have a free chance to make a free choice. So I think it incumbent
upon all of you who are here today to work together, to submerge
those differences which now may disturb you, to the united end that
Cuba is free, and then make a free choice as to what kind of a
government and what kind of a country you freely wish to build.
The Brigade is the point of the spear, the arrow's
head. I hope they and the members of their families will take
every opportunity to educate your children; yourselves, in the
many skills and disciplines which will be necessary when Cuba is
once more free.
Finally, I can offer no better advice than that given
by Jose Martin to his fellow exiles in 1895 when the hour of .
Cuban indepedence was then at hand. "Let the tenor of our words
be," Martin said, "especially in public matters, not the useless
clamor of fear's vengeance which does not enter our hearts, but
the honest weariness of an opporessed people who hope through
their emancipation from a government convicted of uselessness
and malevolence for a government of their own, which is capable
and worthy. Let them see in us," Martin said, "constructive
Americans and not empty bitterness."
Gentlemen of the Brigade, I need not tell you how
happy I am to welcome you here to the United States, and what a
profound impression your conduct during some of the most diffi-
cult days and months that any free people have experienced --- what
1M'.10 RE
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a profound impression your conduct made upon not only the
people of this country, but all the people of this Hemis-
phere. Even in prison you served in the strongest possible
way the cause of freedom, as you do today.
I can assure you that it is the strongest wish
of the people of this country, as well as the people of
this Hemisphere, that Cuba shall one day be free again,
and when it is, this Brigade will deserve to march at the head
of the free column.
MRS. JOHN F. KENNEDY: It is an hop-or for me to be today
with a group of the bravest men in the world, and to share in
the Joy that is felt by their families who,, for so long, lived
hoping, praying, and waiting.
I feel proud that my son has known the officers.
He is still too.young to realize what has happened here, but I
will make it my business to tell him the story of your courage
as he grows up. It is' my wish and my hope, that some day he
may be a man at least half as brave as the members of Brigade
2506. Good luck.
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Press Conference = December 12, 1962
QUESTION: Mr. President, I wonder if you could bring us
up to date on what is being done to get the prisoners out of Cuba, and
whether you think it is in the national interest to give food and medicine to
Cuba to get these men back?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, this is being done by the private
committee.
QUESTION: But is that in the national interest? Do you favor
that, sir ?
THE PRESIDENT: It is being handled by a private committee
composed of the families of the prisoners, and a committee of which General
Lucius Clay and others are members, and I am very sympathetic to their
efforts.
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REDUCTION IN FREE WORLD SHIPPING TO CUBA
Press Conference -- February 14, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, sir, before the Cuban shipping orders
were issued, there was quite a discussion about our pleas to our allies to
have their shipping companies not let themselves be used as vessels to
carry goods from Soviet Russia to Cuba. When your shipping orders came
out, there was no: mention of penalty or policy on that.
Will you tell us why?
THE PRESIDENT: There has been a substantial reduction. I
think the number of free world ships going into Cuba in January was about 12.
So our order has just gone out. There has been about a 90 percent drop in
free world trade in the last two years to Cuba. Free world trade to Cuba,
that is Latin America, Western Europe and ourselves was about 800 million
two years ago. It is down to about 90 million. I think it is going to be
reduced further. Our proposals have just gone into effect and there has been
a substantial reduction in free world shipping to Cuba in the month of
January, as I said it amounted to only 12 and is steadily declining.
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TRAINING OF LATIN AMERICANS IN CUBA
Press Conference - March 6, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, as you prepare for your visit
to Costa Rica this month, there seems to be a position there among
the Central American countries in Panama that the United States
should take a more active leadership in attacking the problem of Cuba.
I wonder if you could give us some of your thoughts about how you
think this project should move along that you might find it possible
to discuss with your colleagues there in San Jose?
THE PRESIDENT: Well one of the matters of course that is
of interest to us is the question of the movement of people in and out
who might be trained by the Communists in Cuba for guerilla work or
even subversion in other parts of the hemisphere. This is an action
which must be taken by each of the countries in Latin America. We
are making proposals to them bilaterally. There has been an OAS
Committee which has reported on the need for control. Now it is
up to the Latin American countries, I would hope in common consultation
as well as individually, to take those steps which will control the
movement of people in and out. So we will know who they are, why they
are. going, what happens to them when they get there, when they are
coming out, and what happens to them when they come out. This is the
kind of thing which each country finally has to do itself because it is
rt of the element of sovereignty that the control of movement is
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within the country of citizenship, but we are bringing this to the.
attention of the Latin American countries as perhaps one of the most
important things we can do this winter. In addition, there have been
other things which-have been done on trade, diplomatic recognition and
all the rest. I think we have indicated very clearly that what we feel
is the wisest policy is the isolation of Communism in this hemisphere.
We would hope that the countries of- Latin America with us will
participate actively with us in that program.
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REPORT OF THE SCCS OF THE OAS
Press Conference - February 14, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, the Special Security Committee
of the Organization of American States has reported a much more serious
threat to the peace and security of the American Republics than it did when
this committee was authorized at Punta del Esta last January, a year ago.
In view of that, I wonder if there is anything you have in mind that these
American Republics could and should be doing at this time to meet that
threat in a collective way?
THE PRESIDENT: I think the part of the report which is most
significant is the emphasis they put on subversion in the Continent, the
movement of men and perhaps money against the constituted governments.
That is a matter which the United States Government is giving its greatest
attention to this winter, the question of the lessening not only of the subversion
that may come from Cuba, but from other parts of the hemisphere.
I consider that our primary mission for the hemisphere this
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SUBVERSIVE TRAINING. OF LATIN AMERICANS
IN CUBA -
Press Conference -- February 14, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, most of the Cuban dialogue has
been confined'to military personnel and military operations. Does the
Government have any information on the nationals of the Soviet Bloc who
may be in Cuba to train the Cubans in sabotage and subversion and political
penetration of the Latin American countries?
THE' PRESIDENT: I am sure that among the technicians or
military people there, or para-military, there are those who are anxious
to stop the flow- in and out of those who may be the beneficiaries of those
QUESTION: Do we have any idea of the number or any idea how
we can stop them?
THE PRESIDENT; Well, the problem is to get the cooperation
of other Latin American countries in limiting the flow in and out, at schools,
colleges, which also includes political indoctrination. I think there were
1, 200 students from Latin America that went into Cuba last year.. I am sure
a good many of them were politically indoctrinated; some of them obviously.
were given training in more direct forms of political action.
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I don,'t think we should regard, however, the Communist threat
as primarly based on Cuba, the Communist threat to the Hemisphere. There
? is a good deal -- there is local Communist action unrelated to Cuba which
continues and which feeds on the hardships of the people there, northeast
i
Brazil and other places. So that Cuba is important, but even if we are
able to stop this kind of traffic we will still deal with the native Communist
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Press Conference - October 31, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, can you tell us how many Russian troops
there are in Cuba now and what you --
THE PRESIDENT: No, I don't think we can ever give a precise figure.
All I can say is that the numbers have steadily reduced, and in the last two
months there have been further reductions and since the first of January there
has been a marked decrease in the number of troops in Cuba, according to all
our intelligence estimates. I cannot give you a precise number that are there,
but I can give you a general trend.
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TROOP WITHDRAWAL
Press Conference - August 20, 1963
QUESTION: Going back to your earlier answer on Cuba, can you say
what our estimate is of how many troops have been withdrawn?
THE PRESIDENT: It is difficult for us to say precisely. But based
on the information we have about outward movements and inward movements
it is the judgment of the Intelligence Community that there has been a re-
duction in the last 2-1 /2 months.
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TROOP WITHDRAWAL
Press 'Conference - August 20, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, can you bring us up to date, sir, on the
Soviet troop strength in Cuba? Has there been a net reduction in recent
weeks and months?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, there has been a decline in the last -- since
my last conference, I think we discussed it about two months ago. The in-
telligence community judges that there has been a decline, and the primary
emphasis of those who remain now is in training, and not in concentrated
military units.
But there are still Russians there, and this is still a matter of con-
cern to us.
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WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS
Press Conference - April 24, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, Senator Keating says that according
to his information there has been no reduction in the number of Russian
troops in Cuba. He said several thousand have left; several thousand have
arrived there, with no change in the over-all number since November. Would
you care to comment?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. I have already said the best information we
have from the intelligence community, and I rely upon the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency as chairman of the intergovernmental intelligence
community for the information which I have given publicly. We attempt to
ask any Congressman or Senator who has information to the contrary for his
sources so they can be evaluated. I have stated that our information was, I
think the last time we met, that 4, 000, we thought, left in March, and that no
substantial number had come in this winter. There is some evidence that some
have left in April, but not a large number. Of course, the equipment itself
seems to still be there, however, so that I would think there has been some
reduction this winter in the number of Russian personnel on the island. There
has not been a substantial reduction in the equipment. There has been no
evidence, however, of any substantial introduction. It is not, in my opinion,
-a great question, as to whether there is 17, 000, 15, 000, 13, 000. There are
still important elements, still on the island, and there is still Soviet equip-
ment still on the island. So I don't think Senator Keating and I are debating a
serious question, unless there is a challenge on one side or the other of good
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faith, and I am sure there isn't. It is our best information that 4, 000 or
5, 000 have left since January, and that there has not been an equal number
come in. In fact, much, much less, 300 or 400 at the most. That is our
best evidence and I repeat it as it has been gathered by our intelligence
sources.
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WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS
Press Conference -- April 3, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, two weeks ago you said you wanted to
wait until the end of March before taking another look and saying something
about the Soviet troops in Cuba. Do you have any new, information for us on
how- many have been pulled out and what can be done to get the rest of them
out ?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we estimate that 5, 000 Soviet troops left
in November, immediately with the missiles, and with the bombers. And
we estimate that in the last month approximately 4, 000 Soviets have left.
If we accept the figure which was always a rough calculation that there were
21, 000, 22, 000, Soviets there at the height of the crisis, we could get some
idea of where approximately we think the figures are today.
It is bound to be a generalized figure because it is impossible to take
a detailed head count. That still leaves some thousands on the island. We
hope they are going to be withdrawn and we will continue to observe very
closely in the next days, the immediate weeks ahead, whether there are
going to be further withdrawals which, of course, we wish for.
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you have any accurate information on the number of Russian troops
Press Conference - March 6, 1963.
QUESTION: Mr. President, three related questions. Do
who have been removed from Cuba? Are you satisified with the rate
.of troop removal and was there in the Russian aid memoir any
suggestion or provision for verification of troop removal?
THE PRESIDENT: No, 'the answer to your question would
really be no to all of them.
RUSSIAN TROOPS
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V.TITHDtp.AV.TAL OF SOVIET TROOPS
Press Conference -- Iv arch 2I, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, did the Soviets honor their
commitment on withdrawing troops from Cuba and where do we go
from here?
TEE PRESIDENT: We estimate that they have withdrawn
approximately 3, 000 troops in these past weeks. We are waiting to
see whether more will be withdrawn, as we would hope they would
be. The month of March is not finished yet and we should have a
clearer idea as to what the total numbers should be in the coming
days.
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WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS
Press Conference - February 21, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, now- that the Soviets apparently
have agreed to remove some of their troops from Cuba, do you feel that
you should press for the removal of the remainder of the Russian troops
in view of the fact that if they leave without their weapons, that these weapons
will fall into the hands of the Cubans themselves?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, I would think we have indicated
very clearly that we would find it difficult to accept with equanimity a
situation which continued Soviet troop presence in Cuba. I think we have
made that very clear. There has been, as I said, a series of withdrawals
.of missiles, planes, and some men. We' will have to wait and see now in
the coming months, and we will continue to work on the matter as we have
over the last four months.
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.1, V
U. S. VIEW ON,SOVIET TROOPS
Press Conference -- February 7, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, what, if anything, do you propose
to do about the continued presence in Cuba of the Soviet military personnel?
Are you just going to let them stay there?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, as you know, we have been carrying out
a good many policies in the last four months, since October. We were able
to effect the withdrawal of the missiles. We were able to effect the with-
drawal of the planes. There has been a reduction of 4500 in the number of
personnel. That was done by the United States being willing to move through
J
a very dangerous period and the loss of an American soldier.
The continued presence of Soviet military personnel is of concern
to us. I think the actions the United States has taken over the last four
months indicate that we do not view the threat lightly.
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WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS
Press Conference -- February 7, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, Mr. Khrushchev apparently gave
you some reason to believe last October that the Soviet military personnel
were going to be withdrawn from Cuba. That hasn't happened. My question
is: Is there any official dialogue going on now to find out why the Russians
are still there?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, as I say, there has been this reduction
which we already described. In addition, as Mr. McNamara described
yesterday, a picture of some evidence of some equipment being moved
out. This is a continuing matter which is being discussed, obviously, with
the Soviet Government, and we would expect that we would have clearer
information as to the prospects as these days go on. But it has not been
completed, and quite obviously in that sense is unfinished business.
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WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS
Press Conference -- February 7, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, according to the recent remarks of
Secretary Rusk, he said Mr. Khrushchev indicated that Soviet troops would
be removed from Cuba in due course. Do you feel you have a commitment
from Mr. Khrushchev in this regard, and what do you take due course to
THE PRESIDENT: That is -what we are going to try to, find out.
That was the statement that was made. As I say, that is why I think in the
coming days and weeks we may have a clearer idea as to whether that means
this winter or not. That is a matter of great interest to us.
QUESTION: Do you feel you have a commitment, sir, from Mr.
Khrushchev?
THE PRESIDENT: I have read a statement of Mr. Khrushchev's
that these forces would be removed in due course, or due time. The time
was not stated and, therefore, w?e are trying to get a more satisfactory
definition.
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WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS
Press Conference - February 21, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, ;;.;come French newspapers seem to
be convinced that there is a quid pro quo arrangement between Washington
and Moscow on removal of troops and other matters. Could you indicate
what sort of diplomatic leverage this government has used to bring about
the troop withdrawal?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. I think on November 6th, in a letter
to Mr. Khrushchev, I indicated that the continued presence of troops as
well as the bombers were a matter of great concern to us, and he wrote back,
as I said before, in November, saying that in due course or in due time that
he planned to remove those troops which were necessary to the defense of
the offensive weapons.
We have been back to him on this matter several times, most
recently by Mr. Rusk and Mr. Dobrynin, and Saturday Mr. Dobrynin gave
the message which has been already announced. So that we have kept at
it, indicating that we believe it creates tension in the Caribbean and also
makes it more difficult for us to adjust our other problems between the
Soviet Union and the United States as long as this is being used as a military
base by the Soviet Union.
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MILITARY BUILD-UP IN CUBA
Press Conference -- May 22, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, there is still quite a lot of discussion
in the Congress, Senator Lausche among others, on the increasing
build-up militarily of Cuba. Is there anything you can say that would
be in any way encouraging about the removal of the Russian troops
there, or of the military situation in Cuba?
THE PRESIDENT: We do not have any evidence of increasing
military build-up of the Soviet Union. I think in previous press
conferences I have given an answer in response to the question of how
many Russians were there and how many with regard to the withdrawal
of Soviet troops. We have no evidence there is an increasing military
build-up. There has not been a satisfactory withdrawal as yet. That
is quite true, but we have no evidence that there is a number coming
in larger than going out.
QUESTION: Pardon me, sir. I was thinking more in terms of
military equipment going into Cuba.
THE PRESIDENT: I understand that. We have no evidence that
there is an increasing military build-up in Cuba. The intelligence
community has not found that.
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ESTIMATE OF THE MILITARY THREAT
Press Conference -- February 7, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, in your view, do you believe
that the Cuban threat, militarily, has increased, decreased or
stayed on status quo since the removal of-the offensive weapons?
THE PRESIDENT Well, there has been,, since the re-
moval of offensive weapons, a reduction of 4, 500 people,
we estimate. So to that degree the threat has diminished.
And, of course, it is substantially different from the kind
of threat we faced in October when there were offensive missiles
and planes preseht. There still is a body of Soviet military equip-
ment and technicians which I think is of serious concern to
this government and the hemisphere. But there has not been an
addition since.the removal of the weapons, there. has ' not been
an addition, and there has been the subtraction of that number
of personnel.
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OFFENSIVE WEAPONS ARE THE THREAT
Press Conference -- February 7, 1963
QUESTION: Now that I have your answer, I think the
answer is that you do not think that it is a great military threat,
but rather a threat in these areas that you speak of?
THE PRESIDENT: The military threat would come if
there was a re-introduction of the offensive weapons. But
the kind of forces we are talking about,which are 6, 000, do
not represent a military threat. Cuba is a threat for the
reasons that I;have given, but it is a threat -- I don't want
to give the whole answer again -- but it is a threat for the
reason I tried to explain to you.
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Press Conference -- February 7, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, Defense Secretary McNamara
apparently failed to convince some Republicans that all offensive
weapons are withdrawn from Cuba. What more, if anything, do
you believe the Administration can do to convince some of the
critics ?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I don't know what more we can do.
Mr. McNamara went to great length. As he pointed out, he exposed
a good deal of information, and also he went further than under,
ordinary conditions we would have liked to have gone in telling
our story.
Now, he has asked, and I endorse, and Mr. McCone has
asked, that if anybody has any information in regard to the presence
of offensive weapons systems or, indeed, the presence of any
military force or weapons on the island of Cuba, I think they should
make it available to General Carroll, who is in charge of intelligence
for the Defense Department -- if they would turn the information over.
Now, we get hundreds. of reports every month, and we try to
check them out. A good many of them are just rumors or reports, and
even some of the members of Congress who have come forward either
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refuse to say where they heard the information or provide us
with reports which do not have' substance to them.
Now, I cannot carry out the policy of the United States
Government -- on the question if obviously there were offensive
missiles found in Cuba contrary to Mr. Khrushchev's pledge, it
would raise the greatest risks, much greater, in my opinion
thanwe faced in October, and we faced great risks in October.
But to take the United States to that path, to persuade our allies
to come with us, to hazard our allies as well as the security of
the free world, as well as the peace of the free world, we have
to move with hard intelligence. We have to know what we are talking
about. We cannotjbase the issue of war and peace on a rumor or
report, which is not substantiated, or which some member of
Congress refuses to tell us where he heard it.
This issue involves very definitely war and peace, and when
you talk about the presence of offensive weapons there, if they are
there, I think the Soviet Union is aware and Cuba is aware that we
would be back where we were in October but in a far more concentrated
way.
Now, if you are talking about that, and talking about the kinds
of actions which would come from that, it seems to me we ought
to know what we are talking about. It may be that there are hidden
away some missiles. Nobody can prove, in the finite sense, that
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they are not there, or they might be brought in. But they are
going to have to be erected, and we continue complete surveillance.
They have to be moved. They have to be put onto pads. They have
to be prepared to fire. Quite obviuosly, if the Soviet Union did
that, it would indicate that they were prepared to take the chance
of another great encounter between us, with all the dangers.
Now, they had these missiles on the pads and they withdrew
them, so the United States is not powerless in the area of Cuba,
but I do think we should keep our heads and attempt to use the best
information we have. We have got, I think, as Secretary McNamara
demonstrated -- we are taking the greatest pains to try to be
accurate, but wet have to deal with facts as we know them, and not
merely rumors and speculation.
Now, as I said, these things may all come about and we may
find ourselves again with the Soviet Union toe to toe, but we ought
to know what we have in our hands before we bring the United States
and ask our allies to come with us to the brink again.
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THE MILITARY THREAT IS NOT PRESENTLY THE REAL THREAT
Press Conference --- February 7, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, to go back to Cuba, you have said
that the presence of Russian forces on the island are a matter of
concern. I would like to ask this question, sir: Do you think that
Cuba is a serious military threat to the United States?
THE PRESIDENT: I think we ought to keep a sense of
proportion abo?tthe size of the force we are talking about. We
are talking about four groups 1, 100 to 1, 200 men each. These are
the organized military units. That is about 6, 000 men. Obviously,
those forces cannot be used to invade another country. They may
be used to maintain some sort of control within Cuba, but obviously,
are not a force that can be used externally. And in addition, Cuba
cannot possibly, it lacks any amphibious equipment, and quite
obviously, our power in that area is overwhelming.
I think the big dangers to Latin America, if I may say so,
are the very difficult and in some cases, desperate, conditions
in the countries themselves, unrelated to Cuba. Illiteracy, or
bad housing, or mal-distribution of wealth, or political or social
instability -- these are all problems we find, 'a diminishing
exchange, balance of payments difficulty, drop in the price of
their raw materials upon which their income depends. These are
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all of the problems that I think are staggering to which we ought
to be devoting our attention..'
Now, I think Castro has been discredited in the past months
substantially, as everyone of our surveys in USIA show. One of
the reasons has been the missile business and also the presence
of Russian forces which, in a sense, seem to be police units.
So that what I think we should concern ourselves with -- quite
obviously, is Cuba, but Cuba as a center of propaganda and possibly
subversion, the training of agents -- these are the things which
we must watch about Cuba. But in the larger sense, it is the
desperate and in some cases, internal problems in Latin America,
a
themselves unrelated to Fidel Castro whose image was greatly
tarnished over-a year ago, which caused me the concern and why
I regard Latin Am erica as the most critical area in the world
today and why I would hope that. Western Europe and the United
States would not be so preoccupied with our disputes, which
historically may not seem justified, when we have a very, very
critical problem which should concern us both in Latin Amer ica.
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NATURE OF THE WEAPONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVIETS OF
INSTALLING OFFENSIVE WEAPONS
Press Conference--- February 7, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, do you feel that it is possible
that the defensive weapons now going into Cuba or there now,
could be used for offensive purposes: For example, could not
a defensive missile be used or launched from a PT boat or some
other vessel?
If you do find this to be true, do you feel that any action
would be required?
THE PRESIDENT: The range of the missiles on the Komar, the
twelve Komars, I think, is, I believe, 18 miles. So we would
not regard that as a weapon which would be used in an attack on
the United States. If there is going to be that kind of an attack on
the United States, then you would have an attack from places other
than Cuba, and much larger weapons than a Komar torpedo boat
. can carry. Then you are talking about the willingness of the Soviet
Union to begin a major war. If the Soviet Union is prepared to
begin a major war, which will result in hundreds of millions of
,casualties by the time it is finished, then we all face a situation
which is extremely grave.
I do not believe that that is what the Soviet Union wants,
because I think they have other interests. I think they wish to
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seize power, but I don't think they wish to do so by a war. I
therefore doubt if a Komar torpedo boat is going to attack the United
States very soon. It is possible -- it is possible -- everything is possible.
After our experience last fall, we operate on the assumption while
hoping for the best, we expect the worst. It is very possible that
the worst will come, and we should prepare for it. That is why we
continue our daily surveillance. It is possible, conceivable.
We cannot prove that there is not a missile in a cave or that
the Soviet Union isn't going to ship next week. We prepare for
that. But we ' will find them when they do, and when they do, the
Soviet Union and Cuba and the United States must all be aware that
this will produce the greatest crisis which the world has faced in
its history.
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SOVIET MILITARY OPERATIONS IN CUBA
Press Conference-- January 24, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, there are new reports of a
Soviet military buildup in Cuba. I wonder if there is any truth
to this report and if it might pose a threat to our intelligence
operation there, our surveillance.
THE PRESIDENT: No, we have been conducting continued
surveillance. The best information we have is that one ship has
arrived since the October crisis, which may have arms on it,
possibly military cargo. But there has not been a military buildup
in that sense of the equipment.. coming in from outside 'of Cuba.
There is no evidence that this ship carried any offensive weapons.
Now,, on Cuba itself, there are still -- we think that probably
about 4500 Soviet technicians who were connected with the offensive
weapons were withdrawn after the late October agreement. We
figure there are still approximately sixteen or seventeen thousand
Russians there, that the Soviets are continuing to operate the SAM
sites and other technical pieces of equipment, and there are some
organized units, the same organized units we have described before,
which are still on the territory of Cuba. They.. are exercising, building
some barracks. That is the kind of activity which is going on. There
is no influx of military equipment, other than the ship and, as I
say, our scrutiny of Cuba is daily. .
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SURVEILLANCE AND THE U. N.
Press Conference -- February 7, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, because we depend so much on
photo reconnaissance, what would be our position if the President
of Cuba should forbid that and perhaps take a protest to the United
Nations about what you call our daily scrutiny over their territory?
THE PRESIDENT: I would think we would deal. with that
situation when it comes. up . This is a substitute, in a sense,
for the kind of on-site inspection which- we hope to get and which
was proposed by the Secretary General of the United Nations at
the time of the October crisis. The United States cannot, given
the history of the last fall, where deception was used against us,
we could not be expected to merely trust to words in regard to
a potential build-up, so we may have to face that situations but
if we do,. we will face it.
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1'r
 11-1
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ON SITE INSPECTION AND NO-INVASION PLEDGE
Press Conference - February 7, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, what is the Administration's
position now about the on-site inspections that you were insisting
upon in October? Is that now a dead letter?
THE PRESIDENT: That is right. Cuba did not agree to
on-site inspection unless there was inspection of the United States,
which we did not agree to, as part of that was the question of
the no-invasion pledge, and the rest. So there has been no on-site
inspection and I don't expect to get any, and I don't expect Cuba
will agree to the kind of on-site inspection that would-give us more
assurances than we have at the present time through photography.
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NO-INVASION PLEDGE
Backgrounder - December 31, 1962
QUESTION: I wonder if we can explore the Cuban situation a
little, 'sir, particularly in view of the language you used Saturday. This
was widely held by some Cubans and some Americans to be holding out a
new degree of hope of U. S. backing for either an internal upset, or
possibly another invasion. Can you tell us how you look'at the Cuban
THE PRESIDENT: No, I think the language that I used seemed
to me to be in accord with what I. said at the press conference on November
19th or 20th in regard to the Castro regime, our hostility towards it, our
hope for a change in the government in Cuba. It was also an effort to answer
the arguments that Castro and others might make that the United States
wanted to return to the status quo. Part of the speech that was perhaps lost
sight of was to indicate what our political viewpoint was towards Cuba, what
sort of a Cuba we hoped to see develop in following a change in orientation.
I didn't say anything about an.invasion of Cuba and the United
States has no intention, unless there is some aggressive act by Castro,
obviously,,. of launching a war against Cuba or an invasion of Cuba.
QUESTION: What is the status, Mr. President, of the language
about no invasion, the pledge of no invasion".
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THE PRESIDENT: As you know-, our pledge was balanced off'
by some assurances of Khrushchev. I think the November press conference
indicates our opposition to Castro. It is the policy of the United States to
work fpr a change in the Communist regime in Cuba. It is not our intentioh,.
under present conditions, to invade Cuba, obviously, or to begin war against
Cuba, providing Cuba lives in peace with its neighbors, or providing Cuba
does not engage in aggressive acts.
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INSPECTION
T.V. Interview - December 16, 1962
MR. HERMAN: Would there have been 'any breakthrough if there
had been international inspection of Cuba allowed, do you think,
astart, a. thin edge of a wedge?
in the world, for example, in North Korea, or anyiace elxe,
TH PRESIDENT: No, I don't think-that would have materially
affected it, because I don't think we would have gottdn the kind
of inspection which really is necessary, because a totalitarian
system cannot accept the kind of inspection which r'ea3ly is
desirable. What you are really saying is that Cuba be opened,
the Soviet Union be opened. They are not going to'open.it,'
because'a totalitarian system must exist only inVecrecy.
MR. HERMAN: Have t a inspections that, we have had anywhere
given you any hope..'that .it. will work as a system?
THE: PRESIDENT: ..No,,, the, camera I think, is actually; going to
be our.. best inspector, . . , . :r..
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OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND VERIFICATION
Press Conference -- December 12, 1962
QUESTION: Mr. President, could you define for us the term
of offensive weapons in the context of the Cuban situation, and
are you satisfied that such weapons no longer are in Cuba ?
THE PRESIDENT: I would refer you back to the exchange of
letters between Mr. Khrushchev and myself for::: our definition
of offensive weapons.
On the second part of your question, it is our best judgment
that the missiles have been removed from Cuba, and the planes.
Now, these things are never 100 percent, and it is for that reason
that we are insisting on verification, or if, we can't get the kind of
international inspection, we will continue to use our own method
of verification, which we believe gives us assurance against a re-
introduction of these weapons into Cuba,, and I?think that the methods
we are using to determine the status of military activity in Cuba-
are very effective, and are being used frequently.,
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STATUS REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREEMENT
WITH SOVIET UNION AFTER REMOVAL OF IL-28's
Press Conference -- November 20, 1962
THE PRESIDENT: I have several statements.
I have today been informed by Chairman Khrushchev that all
of the IL-28 bombers now in Cuba will be withdrawn in 30 days.
'He also agrees that these planes can be observed. and counted
as they leave. Inasmuch as this goes a long way towards reducing
the danger which faced this hemisphere four weeks ago, I have
this afternoon instructed the Secretary of Defense to lift our naval
,quarantine.
In view of this action, I want to take this opportunity to bring
the American. people up to date on the Cuban crisis and to' review
the progress made thus far in fulfilling the understandings between
Soviet Chairman Khrushchev and myself as set forth in. our letters
of October 27 and' 28. Chairman Khrushchev, it will be recalled,
agreed to remove from Cuba all weapons systems capable of offensive
use, to halt the further introduction of such'weapons into Cuba, and
to permit appropriate. United Nations observation and supervision
to insure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments.
We on our part agreed that once these adequate arrangements for
verification had been established,. we would remove our naval
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quarantine and give assurances against invasion of Cuba.
The evidence to date indicates that all known offensive missile
sites in Cuba have been dismantled. The missiles and their
associated equipment have been loaded on Soviet ships. And
our inspection at sea of these departing ships has confirmed that
the number of missiles reported by the Soviet Union as having
been brought into Cuba, which closely corresponded to our own
information, has now been removed. In addition, the Soviet Govern-
ment has stated that all nuclear weapons have been withdrawn from
Cuba and no offensive weapons will be re-introduced.
Nevertheless, important parts of the understanding of October 27th
and 28th remain to be carried out. The Cuban Government has not
yet permitted the United Nations to verify whether all offensive.
weapons have been removed, and no lasting safeguards have yet
been established against the future introduction of offensive
weapons back into Cuba.
Consequently, if the Western Hemisphere is to continue to.
be protected against offensive weapons, this government has no
choice but to pursue its own means of checking on military activities
in Cuba. The importance of our continued vigilance is underlined by
our identification in 'recent days of. a number of Soviet ground combat
units in Cuba, although we are informed that these and other Soviet
units were associated with the protection, of offensive weapons
systems, and will also be withdrawn in due course.
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I repeat, we would like nothing better than adequate inter-
national arrangements for the task of inspection and verification
in Cuba, and we-are prepared to continue our efforts to achieve
such arrangements. Until that is done, difficult problems remain.
As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed
from Cuba and kept out of the Hemisphere in the, future, under
adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the
export of aggressive Communist purposes, there will be peace in
the Caribbean. And as I said in September, "We shall neither
initiate nor permit aggression in this Hemisphere. "
We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and
other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba nor
our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be
truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent
to launch a military invasion of the island.
In short, the record of recent weeks shows real progress
and we are hopeful that further progress can be made. The
completion of the commitment on both sides and the'achievement
of a peaceful solution to the Cuban crisis might well open the
door to the solution of other outstanding problems.
May I add this final thought. In this week of Thanksgiving,
there is much for which we can be grateful-as we look back to
where we stood only four- weeks ago--the unity of this Hemisphere,
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the support of our allies, and the calm determination of the
American people. These qualities may be tested many more
times in this decade, but we have increased reason to be confident
that those qualities will continue to serve.
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Cuba and the Test Ban Treaty
Press Conference -- September 12, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, what significance do you see in the
failure of Cuba so far to sign the treaty? Do you think specifically that this
reflects any new friction between Cuba and Russia? Also, I was wondering
whether it is satisfying to be called more imperialistic by Castro than
Eisenhower was.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, lately, I have had so many things said about
me that I thought that what Castro said was not particularly bad. He is at-
tempting to demonstrate he is an independent figure. That is what he is at-
tempting to do. I think probably he may sign finally. I don't know. We made
it very clear in my letter to Senator Dirksen that if there is any breach in the
treaty which involves Cuba, that appropriate action will be taken.
Therefore, this is a gesture of protest against what is obvious. But
I don't put much significance on it. As far as what he says, I think it would
be -- I don't know.
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Cuba and the Test Ban Treaty
Press Conference - August 1, 1963
QUESTION: Do you feel that the relaxation of cold war tensions re-
sulting from the test ban treaty might in any way affect relations between
Cuba and the United States?
THE PRESIDENT: I don't know what the next step in regard to relax-
ation of tensions are. We can't predict it. I described it as the first step
in a long journey, so I don't think we should make any presumptions about
what the future will bring. I think we should maintain our strength. I don't
think we should cut our defense budgets. I think we should pursue, however,
the next step and the next step to see if we can bring about a genuine d'etat --
we don't have that yet -- a genuine one, which covers a broad area.
What we have now is a limited test ban agreement, and we should realize
it as an important step but only a first step.
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Accomodation With Castro
Press Conference -- Jp4y 17, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, do you see any indications that
the Castro Government is seeking a more relaxed relationship with
the United States, and, if so, are we prepared to meet them in that?
THE PRESIDENT: No, I have seen these verbal statements
but I have seen no evidence. As I say, I think the United States has
indicated very clearly that we do not accept the existence and cannot
coexist in the peaceful sense with a Soviet satellite in the Caribbean.
So I don't see that any progress is going to be made along these lines
as long as Cuba is a Soviet satellite.
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INVASION
Press Conference - September 12, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, the American Legion meeting in Miami
adopted a resolution today asking the United States to "proceed boldly alone" to
end the Communist rule in Cuba, if the other hemisphere nations do not assist
us, and they say that we cannot have co-existence with Communism in this
hemisphere, and that there has been a lack of effective action by our govern-
ment since the Castro regime began back in 1959. Could you comment sir?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, we have taken every step we. could short
of military action to bring pressure on the Castro regime -- shipping, trade,
all the rest. It has been relatively isolated in this hemisphere. It is quite
obvious now that it is a Soviet satellite, Mr. Castro is a Soviet Satellite, Finally,
though, once you get beyond these words, you finally talk about military invasion
of Cuba. That I do not think is in the interest of this country. I regard that as
a most dangerous action, and incindiary action which could bring a good deal of
grief not only to the people of the United States, but to Western Europe and
others who are dependent upon us. I do not think that is wise. Those who ad-
vocate it should say it, but I don't agree with it.
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Accomodation With Castro
Press Conference -- July 17, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, you stated that the United States
would never agree with co-existence with Cuba as long as it was a
Soviet satellite. If the Soviet troops left Cuba and if Cuba started
moving towards a Titoist type situation, do you see the possibility of
perhaps co-existence?
THE PRESIDENT: It is very difficult to base a future policy on
presumptions which are not today realized. The fact of the matter is
that the Soviet troops are there. The fact of the matter is that Cuba
does follow a satellite role, and that is what we consider unacceptable
to us. I would hope that the situation some day would change.
5aa
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GUANTANAMO
Press Conference -- May 22, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, the Republicans have charged that
some kind of agreement exists or may exist some day for our abandon-
ing Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. Could you comment on that please,
sir ?
THE PRESIDENT: I think that charge indicates, as some people
suspected before, that there was some political motivation in some of
the attacks upon our policy with regard to Cuba. That of course is
completely untrue. It has never been considered. It will not be done.
And to raise that with no evidence merely because we happen to be
putting in an accoustical center for improving our underwater detection
system in Bermuda and strengthening a naval base at Puerto Rico,
from those two actions it was deduced we must be giving up Guantanamo.
I would hope that we would find a good deal more realism in the Repub-
lican conversations about foreign policies, because that is untrue. They
know it is untrue. But it may be the sort of thing we are going to hear
now for the next 18 months.
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OAS
Press Conference -- April 24, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, there has been suggestion in the
Congress that the Government, the United States Government, might use
more effectively the vehicle of the Organization of American States in the
Cuban problem. I know there have been certain things done there already.
I understand that we are now prepared to go to the OAS shortly with a plan
for intensified security measures. I wonder if you could discuss those
and also whether you think there is general support among the Latin
American countries for such a program.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - Out of the San Jose meeting some pro-
posals came which were amplified by the Managua meeting for providing
additional security, which will be presented to the OAS. In addition, the
whole Alliance for Progress will pass through the OAS machinery. The
efforts we are taking on surveillance is a result of an action of the OAS. So
I think the OAS is very active, even though I think we recognize the par-
ticular responsibilities we bear because of our geography and also because
of our military strength.
9
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American Society of Newspaper Editors
April 19, 1963
MR. HILLS: I would like to read two others here, also on the
question of Cuba.
If Castro remains in power. for another five years, will the United
States continue in its refusal to deal with his government?
The second one is: Two years ago tomorrow, Mr. President, you
stood here and told us Fidel Castro's days were numbered. You said, "Our
restraint is not inexhaustible." You said "We must not let the inter-
American doctrine of non-interference conceal or excuse a policy of non-
action. "
Now, sir, Communist domination of Cuba is, if anything, more
complete than two years ago and is stiffened by Russia. Many Americans
believe our policy towards Cuba is indeed one of non-action. What can you
say to persuade them that this is not so? When, if ever, is our restraint
going to come to an end?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I hope our restraint or sense of respon-
sibility will not ever come to an end.
Now, on the general question, since the last two years, the United
States has taken a good many actions to contain the spread of communism in
the Hemisphere. A good many nations in the Alliance for Progress, the
Punta del Este Declaration, the San Jose Declaration, a number have broken
off diplomatic relations; only five continue with Cuba.
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The free world trade has dropped from $80 million to $5 million,
and an effort has been made since the San Jose conference to work with
other countries to control the movement of personnel in and out of Cuba.
It is quite obvious now to the Hemisphere and to the world that Castro
is only a Soviet satellite. Every study, every meeting, shows a sharp
deterioration in the image he once had as a great nationalist leader and now
he is generally regarded in the Hemisphere as having sold out to the Com-
munist movement and has now become a spearhead for the Soviet advance. In
addition, the United States maintains a constant surveillance. We have
indicated that we would not permit any troops from Cuba to move off the
island of Cuba, and fly offensive action against any neighboring country. We
have indicated also that we would not accept a Hungary in Cuba, the use of
Soviet troops against Cubans, if there was any internal reaction against
Castro. In many ways, we have attempted to isolate Cuba and to indicate
our determination to continue that policy until Cuba is free.
Now after we have done all those steps, there are two additional
policies which could be carried out. I think that when those talk about Cuba,
we ought to say what we want to do. We shouldn't say, "Well, let's do
something," or "How long is our restraint going to last?" I would think the
two remaining policies are (1) a blockade which, of course, brings us once
again to a confrontation with the Soviet Union; and the other would be an
invasion of Cuba. In my judgment, it would be a mistake to carry out either
of those policies today.
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No one predicted with certainty what was going to happen last fall.
I don't know what is going to happen anyplace in the world. Therefore, I
think that we should maintain our strength and our determination, but I
don't think that it would serve the interests of the United States or our allies
to carry out an invasion or blockade under these present conditions.
The United States is responsible for the independence of dozens of
countries reaching from South Korea to Berlin, responsible for Western
Europe. It is responsible for the major struggle against the Communists in
our own Hemisphere, for six percent of the world's population. We carry
tremendous burdens. I do not think we can indulge ourselves at this point,
if that is the proper word, in concentrating all of our material strength in
one section of the world, and be indifferent to its consequences elsewhere.
I don't know -- I don't accept the view- that Mr. Castro is going to be
in power in five years. I can't indicate the roads by which there will be a
change, but I have seen enough, as we all have, enough change in the last 15
years to make me feel that time will see Cuba free again, and I think when
that happens the record will show that the United States has played a sig-
nificant role. But for the present, and for a great power which carries
worldwide responsibilities, I think our present policy is the right one.
If the American people decide differently, then, of course, they
have an obvious remedy, but for now we intend to follow this policy.
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POLICY TOWARDS CUBA
Press Conference -- April 24, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, would you care to address yourself to
criticism expressed by some Republicans, including Mr. Nixon recently,
about the Administration's attitude toward Cuba, and suggesting, perhaps,
that we are not taking as firm a stand toward them as we should?
Would you care to speak to that, sir?
THE PRESIDENT: No. I know there is a good deal of concern in
the United States because Castro is still there. I think it is unfortunate
that he was permitted to assume control in the 1950's and perhaps it would
have been easier to take an action then than it is now. But those who were
in position of responsibility did not make that judgment.
Now, as to what the present situation -- We have, as you know, with-
out going through the entire list we have -- and the other countries of the
free world have -- cut free world trade in the last three years from 800
million to 80 million. We are working with the OAS to set up an organization
which will limit the movement of protectional guerrilas in and out of Cuba.
We have -- the OAS have -- almost diplomatically isolated Castro in this
Hemisphere. I think the members of the OAS have made it very clear that
Marxist-Leninst and the Soviet presence is not a matter which is acceptable
to the people of the Hemisphere. We have been working through the
Alliance for Progress to prevent a repetition of the Cuban incident. We
have made it very clear that we would not permit the movement of troops
from Cuba to another country for offensive purposes. We maintain surveil-
lance. We do a good many things.
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Now?, coming down to the question which is rather sidestepped, that
is if the United States should go to war in order to remove Castro, that
nettle is not grasped, and it would seem to me that we have pretty much done
all of those things that can be done to demonstrate hostility to the concept of
a Soviet satellite in the Caribbean except take these other steps which bring
in their wake violence and may bring a good deal of worldwide difficulty. If
they are advocating that, then I recognize that as an alternate policy, but if it
is merely a policy which says that we should do something without defining it,
except perhaps as I have said, unleashing the exiles, which cannot do the job,
it seems to me that we deserve in a question of this importance a good deal
more precision in our prescriptions for its solution.
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OIL BLOCKADE
Press Conference - March 6, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, Ambassador, or former
Ambassador Guillermo Belt, the Ambassador from Cuba. to the
United States in the old days, said in a lecture at Georgetown
Visitation Conve nt last Sunday that Castro would not be able to
survive two weeks if he was denied Soviet oil. - I wonder if there
isn't something that you can do about this, or maybe bring greater
pressure on some of our allies who are shipping Soviet oil in their
ships to Cuba ?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but those are not our figures. There
isn't any doubt that over a long period of time that denial of oil would
.make a difference. To deny the oil would require, of course, a blockade,
and 'a blockade is an act of war, and you should be prepared to go for
it. I think we indicated last October that in periods where we considered
the United States was in danger, we were prepared to go as far as was
needed to remove that danger, and we would, of course, be willing
always-to do so again, if we felt there was a situation which carried
with it that kind of danger to the United States.
But yot,~ should not be under any impression that a blockade is- not
an act of war, because when a ship refuses to stop, and then you then sink
the ship, there is usually a military response by the country involved. We
are attempting to persuade NATO and other countries not: to ship to Cuba,
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but the primary source of shipments into Cuba are bloc ships, and at'
this time we do not believe that war in the Caribbean is to the national
advantage.
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NEGOTIATIONS WITH CUBA
Press Conference - March 6, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, yesterday UN Secretary General
U Thant received a letter from the Cuban Foreign Minister in which
Roa hinted that the Cubans might like to discuss the resumption of
friendly relations with us. I wonder if you think that this might be
possible, and if so, what. conditions would have to be met first?
THE PRESIDENT: I understand the note had some reference
to it from Havana but the note actually delivered from the U. N. did
not have any such reference. We have had no indication that there is
a desire to resume friendly relations with us. We have said on many
occasions that we regard the present Soviet presence in Cuba as
unacceptable to us and we regard the Communization of Cuba and the
attempt to subvert the hemisphere as matters which are not negotiable.
I don't see any evidence that there is in prospect a normalization of
relations between Cuba and the United States.
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ELIMINATING COMMUNISM
Press Conference -- February 7, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, what chances do you think or do
you believe there are of eliminating communism in Cuba within your term?
THE PRESIDENT: I couldn't make any prediction about the
elimination. I am quite obviously hopeful it can be eliminated, but we have
to wait and see what happens. There area lot of unpleasant situations in
the world today. China is one. It is unfortunate that communism was
permitted to come into Cuba. It has been a problem in the last five years.
We don't know what is going to happen internally. There is no obviously
easy solution as to how- the Communist movement will be removed. . One
way, of course, would be by the Cubans themselves, though that is very
difficult, given the police setup.
The other, way would be by external action. But that is war and
we should not regard that as a cheap or easy way to accomplish what we wish.
We live with a lot of dangerous situations all over the. world. Berlin is one.
'There are many others. And, we live with a good deal of hazard all around
the world and have for 15 years. I cannot set down any time in which I can
clearly see the end to the Castro regime. I believe it is going to come,
but I couldn't possibly give a time limit. I think that those who do sometimes
mislead. I remember a good deal of talk in the early '50's about liberation,
how Eastern Europe was going to be liberated. Then we had Hungary, Poland,
and East Germany and no action was taken.
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The reason action wasn't. taken was that they felt strongly if they
did take action it would bring on another war. It is quite easy to discuss
these things and say one thing or another ought to be done. . But when they
start talking about how, and when,' they start.talking about Americans
invading Cuba and killing thousands of Cubans and Americans, with all the
hazards around the world, that is a very serious decision, and I notice that
that- is not approached directly by a good many who have discussed the
problem.
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General Policy Towards Cuba - Invasion & Internal Situation
Backgrounder -- December 31, 1962
QUESTION:- There has been some suggestion that our policy
now is going to verge towards co-existence and the implication in that
phrase seems to be that we are going to be more peaceful than before, or
more friendly.
THE PRESIDENT: I think the press conference statement, plus
the speech I made the other day, I think, indicates that that is not our
policy. We are opposed to Communist control of Cuba, to the intimate
association of the Soviet Union, and we hope for a change. American
policies are directed toward that end and will be. No one can predict what
is going to happen in Cuba, but I think all of the last 20 years have been
filled with situations which were unpredictable. Nobody would have predicted
a year ago, or two years, or perhaps three years ago, that we would have a
war between the Chinese and the Indians.
There are a good many things which have happened in the last
three or four years which could not have been predicted in '57 and '58. No
one can predict what the exact course of events will be in Cuba, what movement
will take place there. So I think that all we can set down now is, a general
attitude of the United States towards Castro, which I think we have indicated
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our opposition to Castro, and also an indication of our willingness to support
any free choice that the Cuban people may make following Castro, to hold
out a hope to the people in Cuba, in and out of the government, that the
United States would be sympathetic to a change within Cuba. We can't, it
seems to me, under present conditions, go further than that.
QUESTION: Are we ready to provide any more help to those
inside Cuba who may be anti-Castro?
THE PRESIDENT: What kind?
QUESTION: In any fashion; that is, beyond moral encouragement?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think, ? as I say, the United States is
not planning to support an invasion of Cuba. We have made that clear. There
may be other things.
QUESTION: I was thinking of non-invasion; that is, of elements
within the country who might be interested in guerrilla action or other unrest
that might eventually lead to Castro's overthrow. I wonder if we may now be
prepared
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think it would probably not be helpful to
go into a discussion of it. As I said, I think all I can indicate today is that we
oppose the regime for the reasons which have been given, and that we cannot
predict with certainty what the future course of events will be in Cuba.
We have indicated that we are not planning to declare war on Cuba,
or begin an invasion of Cuba, if Cuba, itself, does not engage in aggressive
acts against other members of the Hemisphere.
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QUESTION: Mr. President, how- do you define aggressive acts?
Would that include or exclude subversion in other countries?
THE PRESIDENT: Well,; I think we will just let it go with the
language I have used.
QUESTION: Is it your hope, then, sir, that Castro may fall of
his own weight or that people inside may revolt?
THE PRESIDENT: I don't know-. I don't think we can tell. I
don"t know. We can't tell what is going to happen.
QUESTION: Mr. President, is this what you are trying to do, to
let the Cuban people know- that if they get something going on their own, that
'-_ we -are all for it ?
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think we want to be in the position of
looking as if we are encouraging a -- I think I would have to limit myself to
saying that the United States is opposed to the regime, that it is not planning
to invade Cuba, providing Cuba, itself,, conducts its policy within the
limitations which we have given. But we are also anxious that the Cuban
people and those within and without the armed forces of Cuba and the government
who desire a Cuba which is not closely tied to the bloc, who may desire a Cuba
which is different from the pre-Castro Cuba, that the United States is
sympathetic to that.
I can't tell what is going to happen in Cuba or in the Caribbean. This
is all we can do, it seems to me, at the end of this year,. . Nobody can predict.
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QUESTION: Mr. President, you said at one point a few- minutes
ago that we would not support another invasion. You meant that not only would
we not invade them, but we would not get involved in the backing of another
invasion?
THE PRESIDENT: I think really that is an academic question,
because who can invade Cuba? I mean, there is no force that can carry
out a successful invasion of Cuba if the United States was not involved in it.
The United States, as I said at my press conference in November, the United
States is not planning to invade Cuba, and no other countries can engage in
an invasion of Cuba because it would be a major military effort.
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General Policy Towards Cuba - Invasion & Internal Situation
Backgrounder -- December 31, 1962
QUESTION: Mr. President, does our intelligence indicate any
As I say, no one can predict what the future course will be within
and without Cuba. All we can indicate are the general lines today. As I
say, those Cubans obviously want to go home. They left, hoping to return
significant lessening of Castro's popularity or prestige as a result of
Khrushchev's pullback?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think it does, but I don't think it
indicates any lessening of his ability. I think one of the most difficult problems
that we have is that the Communist system does permit, even against sub-
stantial popular opposition, does permit a strong degree of central control,
even though public support may atrophy. It is still possible, with a rather
quiescent public to maintain, with the police appratus, the militia, the youth
groups, and all the rest, to maintain, even against a majority of public
opposition, to maintain control.
We have seen that in several other countries. That doesn't mean
that that control is final. After all, we have been through in the last decade,
we have been through the experience-of East Germany, Poland, and Hungary,
r
and if it hadn't been for Soviet troops, we would have had a complete change
in all those three countries. In addition, we had the break between Yugoslavia
and the Soviet Union. We had the difficulties between the Soviet Union and China.
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to a free Cuba. But we have to consider what kind of a Cuba we will have
in the future.' This has to represent a choice by the majority of the Cubans
themselves. It can't be just a matter of a change imposed by United States
force.,
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General Policy Towards Cuba - Invasion & Internal Situation
Backgrounder -- December 31, 1962
QUESTION: Mr. President, right after the Cuban confrontation
with the Soviet Union, there was considerable discussion about this having
been a turning point in our relations with the Communists. Do you see,
since then, any evidence of changes that are going to be long-term?
THE PRESIDENT: As I say, I think our problem is -- well, in
the first place, I think the promise of communism has been exposed as a
failure in many ways. I don't overstate that. In some ways they have been
able to mobilize their resources quite effectively for a given purpose. But
I would say that the bubble, or the concept of communism is an almost
inevitable development in history which I think was more generally held after
Sputnik and after '57 and '58, which was the time of the great leap forward,
Cuba, after the revolution in Cuba, in, say, '59, when it began to move in a
more obvious hostility to the United States, and in the Communist direction, I
would say that since then the glow- has gone out of it.
On the other hand, there still is this ability to maintain the police
structure quite effectively. As I say, we have seen evidences where it
cracked in the 50's, and without Soviet intervention, it would have cracked
completely in these countries. I don't overstate it, but at least in Cuba, so
far, and North Viet-Nam, North Korea,' they have not been able to maintain
their power.
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But nobody can sit here today and say what is going to happen
in Cuba. No one could say six months ago that what has happened in the last
six months was going to happen. So I don't think we are able to lift the
curtain on Cuba and say that this is going to happen month by month. That
doesn't mean that with the frictions and tensions which a Communist system
of government brings, a sort of wholesale exodus of the refugees, is only an
example of the tensions that are there.
I would say that I believe that Cuba is going to be non-Communist
sometime. There still is this problem of having great distress throughout
the world, great poverty, a terribly..low? standard of living, which give the
Communists an alternative to present dark reality and then when the
Communists get in, even though they fail, because of the police apparatus, they
are able to hold their power. That is one of the big problems we have.
If we get a free choice made after the Communists get in, you have
no worries, because I don't think they can do the job of delivering. But they
.can maintain their power pretty effectively, as is being proved in several.
areas of the world. I would say that is the matter of greatest concern, our
ability to get them out, once they are in, even though they fail to deliver.
QUESTION: What about the strain that the Cuban confrontation
has put on - -
THE PRESIDENT: But your question was about what changes. I
don't know-, but I think that probably, as I say, we have had two or three
major clashes with the Communists which could have escalated. Laos, if we
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 M r^ ~
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hadn't gotten a cease-fire, might have escalated. Cuba could have escalated.
Berlin, when he stated at Geneva that he was going to take Berlin, that
could have escalated.
In 24 months we have had three situations which could be very
dangerous. That is rather unhealthy in a nuclear age. I don't think we can
say that Cuba is the turning point or the changing period, but I do think that---
the fall of 1962, the Sino-Indian struggle, the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Soviet-
United States clash over Cuba, is bound to have its effects, even though they
can't be fully perceived now.
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THE RIGHT TO INVADE & THE U. N.
Press Conference -- November 20, 1962
QUESTION: Mr. President, sir would you please clear up for
us our relationship with the United Nations ? If we wanted to invade Cuba, if
we wanted to take unilateral action in any way, could we do so without the
approval of United Nations?
THE PRESIDENT: Well,, I don, think a question -- you would
have to really give me a much more. detailed hypothetical question before
I could consider answering it, and even under those conditions it might not
be wise. Obviously, the United States, let's use a hypothetical case, which
is always better. The United States has the means as a sovereign power to
defend itself, and of course exercises that power. It has in the past and
would in the future. We would have to hope to exercise it in a way
consistent with our treaty obligations, including the United Nations Charter.
But we of course keep to ourselves and hold to ourselves under the United
States Constitution and under the laws of international law-, the right to
defend our security, on our own, if necessary, though as I say we hope to
always move in concert with our allies, but on our own if that situation was
necessary to protect our survival or intergrity, or other vital interests.
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1 10
Secret Agreement with USSR
Press Conference - September 12, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, in a Chicago speech last night,
Senator Goldwater said there are not ten men in America who know the full
truth about Cuba, all the facts of the test ban treaty, or the commitments
made on behalf of this Nation with governments dedicated to our destruction.
He seems to be hinting that you made secret agreements both in the Cuban
settlement last fall, and to obtain the test ban treaty.
THE PRESIDENT: No, that is not ---
QUESTION: Could you say unequivocally that there were no
commitments or would you care to comment on Senator Goldwater's comments
THE PRESIDENT: There are no commitments, and I think
Senator Goldwater is at Ieast one of the ten men in America who would know
that is not true. I think there are a good many other men. The fact is, as
you know, we offered to have the correspondence on the test ban treaty made
available to the leadership of the senate. It stands on its own. So I can tell
you very flatly there were no commitments made that have not been discussed
and revealed. I think most people know that.
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INTELLIGENCE GAP
Press Conference - March 6, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, of late, some of your
Congressional critics have started to charge that your Administration
has been deliberately withholding important information on the Cuban
situation. Among the claims that have been made is that your Central
Intelligence chief, John McCone, actually knew before October 14th
that the Soviets had planted offensive missiles in Cuba. Is there
anything that you can say on this?
THE PRESIDENT: No, I have seen charges of all kinds, one
day distinguished Republican charges that it is all the CIA's fault,
and the next day it is the Defense Department's fault, and the next
day the CIA is being made a scapegaot by another distinguished leader.
faa-t and so furiously. Mr. Arens said the other day that the testimony
So that we could not possibly answer these charges, which come so
by the Air Force before the committee indicated- that we knew all about
this October 10th, even.though General LeMay made it very clear in.
the same testimony that the. Air Force didn't have such information.
So we are not in a position to answer these.
I think in hindsight, I suppose we could have always perhaps
picked up these missile bases a few days earlier,. but not very many
days. earlier, because the missiles didn't come in,' at least in hindsight
it now appears, until some time around'the middle of September. The
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installation began at a later date. They were very fast, and I think
the photography on the same areas, if we had known that missiles
were going in, 10 days before might not have picked up anything. The
week before might have picked up something. In the pictures taken
October 14th were only obvious to the most sophisticated expert. It
was not until the pictures taken really the 16th and 17th that you-had
pictures that would be generally acceptable. So this was a very
clandestine and fast operation. So I,feel that the intelligence services
did a very good job. When you think that the job was done, the
missiles were discovered, the missiles were removed, the bombers
were discovered, the bombers were removed, I don't think that anybody
should feel that anything but a good job was done,. But I think we can
always improve, and particularly with the advantage of hindsight. I
1
am satisfied with Mr. McCone, the intelligence community, the
Defense Department and the job they did in those days particularly
taken ,in totality.
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SHRIMP BOAT INCIDENT
Press Conference - February 21, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, would it be possible to say, sir,
in the event of future attacks upon our shipping in the Carribean whether
we would turn to the doctrine of hot pursuit?
THE PRESIDENT: I would prefer to leave our status as I have
described it, and to make judgments as they come along. We have made it
very clear now that the United States will take action against any vessel or
plane which attacks our planes or vessels. But the details of those standing
engagements, I think, can wait on events. But there will be an initial
response. How far the pursuit would go, and all the rest is a matter which
I think the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary
of State, we all might consider as the stiuation develops, and as we see
whether .today's action was an isolated incident, the result of a pilot decision,
or was a deliberate decision by the Cuban Government which forecasts other
attacks. I would think we. have got+a clearer pattern, then we could make a
judgment on whether hot pursuit should be carried out to the shores of Cuba.
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Press Conference--- February 21, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, the Defense Department announcement
on the incident in the Florida Straits said simply that the MIG's fired near
the shrimp boats.
THE PRESIDENT: That is correct.
QUESTION: And you used the term "attack." Did these MIG's
attack the boat and miss or did they harass the boat?
THE PRESIDENT: That is a -.?? I don't think we have the answer
to that question. I think the shots came within -- what? 40 yards of the
boat. I would think, if you are on the boat, that is regarded as an attack,
and whether they were trying to hit the boat or whether they were merely
attempting to target practice -- all these things, I think, we will have to
look at in the next day or so.
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SHRIMP BOAT INCYDENT
Press Conference - .February 21, 1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, in view of the action of the Cuban
MIG's in firing on this tw?o-man shrimp boat, is the Government making an
inquiry as to the possibility that this may have been the fate of the Sulphur
Queen, the industrial tanker which. left Beaumont on the 2nd of February and
has not been heard from since the 3rd of February?
THE PRESIDENT: We have no information that that is the
reason. Certainly, we would examine it,, but we have no information.
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SHRIMP BOAT INCIDENT
Press Conference - Fbruary 21, .1963
QUESTION: Mr. President, today's incident, sir, has caused
some people in Congress again to say that the rocket firing proves that the
Soviet weapons in Cuba are not defensive. Will this incident cause the
Administration to re-evaluate its definition between offensive and non-offensive
weapons?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. I think we made that very clear.
When we are talking about offensive weapons, we are talking about weapons
which have the capacity to carry great damage in the United States, bombers,
particularly missiles. A MIG, with its rather limited range, is not regarded
ordinarily as an offensive weapon, and the attack which took place on this
vessel, which was lying in the water and which did not, as I understand,
carry any flag, was relatively -- it was 40 miles or so off the coast of Cuba.
I don't think that that changes our definition.
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POST MORTEM ON OCTOBER CRISIS
T. V. Interview - December 16, 1962
THE PRESIDENT:', No, but I do think at least that Cuba, as l
think the speech this week, which was as important speech, has
made Mr. Khrusbchey aware o: the dangers of the United States
and the Soviet Union clashing over an area of vital importance.
So that I think is a. very salutary fact. - But I. don't think we
are about to seea _ whole change in Communist policy.
MR. :E1?MAN: During the Cuban crisis when there was an
oiler of inspection inside Cuba by Premier Eirushchev, did you
have any hope that there might be a breakthrough, a start to
achieving some kind. of peace between our two systems, so that we
can work on our own problems?
THE PRESIDENT: No, I don't think that is there yet. Now,
it may come in time. .
MR. .HEMIAN: Did you have hope. when it was offered that it
might actually come about? .
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POST MORTEM ON OCTOBER CRISIS
T. V..Interview - December 16, 1962
.:.in the case of Cuba. And the United States finds.,it'..difficult'to
,
o
in which h3a said he was going to support wars f libera
and I said this is the way for the United States and.the'Soviet
Union to end up indirect cow rontation, which is what happened in
Cuba. You cantt have too many bf those, because we are not sure
on every occasion that the Soviet Union will withdraw as they did
MR. HERMAN: But there was an occasion when,;you were in
---contact, he spoke to you, he told you his-very interesting version
of the absence of all missiles in euba, of- the absence .of all
offensive missiles in Cuba. Now, rota were in contact. What did
you have to do? Did you have to get up and grit your teeth and
walk around the chair?
T, c, PRESIDENT: No, I read to'him my September statement,
in.which we said we would take action if,tbey put missiles in.
He did not respond. That is why I say, we are quite a long way
'from being -- Mr.Khrushehev and I are in the same boat in. the
sense of both having this nuclear capacity, and also both wanting
to protect our soeietLes. Where we are not on the same wave is that
the Sovietsexpand their power and are determined to, and have
demonstrated in Cuba their willingness to take great risks, which
can only bring about a direct collision. Now, I spent a whole.
day at Vienna talking about hisIspeech he made, an January 6; 196.1,
n
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