LETTER TO HONORABLE ROY R. RUBOTTOM, JR. FROM ALLEN W. DULLES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R002600110037-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2002
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: May 24, 1958
• Content Type: LETTER

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W
May 24,. 1958
The Honorable Roy R. Rubottorn, Jr.
Assi:3tant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.
.Dear Dick:
This morning, at the request of Dr. Milton :Eisenhower,
Dick Helms, J. C. King, and I called on him and gave him, a pre-
liminary briefing with respect to certain security aspects of his
trip, and showed him copies of the attached memoranda. These
reports include information received from our various Central
American stations in reply to our request for their own su r-nar
of the situation
I
re making this inquiry.
Naturally I assume that our people are being reasonably
cautious about the situation in light of the developments in connection
with the Vice President's trip, and I recognize that a good deal will
depend upon the instructions that go out to the hard core of the Corn-
munist leadership in the respective countries, and that these in-
structions will be based upon the Communist analysis of the results
pro and con of the demonstrations in South America. However, even
taking account of these factors, it is apparent that if the trip is made,
all possible precautions should be taken and measures carefully co-
ordinated, beginning right now.
Sincerely yours,
Allen W. Dulles
Director
Encl.
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SUBJECT: Proposed Central American Visit of Dr. Milton Eisenhower
1. Political groups in Panama have taken no public position
on the Nixon incidents, probably because their attention has been
centered on the critical internal political situation and violent student
rioting, which forced President De La Guardia to declare a state of
seige early this week. Most press comment on the Nixon incidents
took the position that they were unfortunate but were evidence of latent
Latin American grievances against the United States. The opinion
generally prevalent in Panama is that the incidents were not a
conspiracy by international Communism, but were directed and
exploited by the local Communist Parties.
2. Powerful nationalistic politicians have been carrying on an
increasing agitation against the De La Guardia government in an
attempt to bring about his overthrow. The present student rioting,
which has had some guidance from the Communist Party, is believed
to be tied in with the agitation and efforts of these ultra-nationalistic
politicians to overthrow the government. Therefore, while there has
been no anti-United States sentiment evident in the present student
strikes which seem to involve internal issues only, it is probable
that the Communist and other anti-United States groups would organize
demonstrations which may easily develop into violence during the
scheduled visit of Dr. Milton Eisenhower.
3. Experience in the current situation, which has resulted in
a considerable number of dead and wounded, indicates that the
Panamanian security services would be unable to prevent or control
incidents by determined groups without resorting to the use of tear
gas and arms.
4. The following are themes anti-United States groups may use
to organize anti-United States demonstrations:
a. Panama's claims to sovereign rights in the Canal
Zone and to a share in the Canal's gross income;
b. United States delay in implementing fully the Remon-
Eisenhower Treaty of 1955;
c. Blaming United States economic policies for general
deterioration of Panamanian economic situation.
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 P80BOl676R(#600110037-4
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SUBJECT: Proposed Central American Visit of Dr. Milton Eisenhower
1. Spokesmen for all political groups, except the Communist
Party, have publicly deplored the Nixon incidents, saying they were
Communist inspired and not a true picture of the deep Latin American
friendship for the United States. There has been some criticism in
the press of detrimental United States economic policies in Latin
America and the United States support of dictatorships, implying
they were the underlying causes of the Nixon incidents. The proposed
visit of Dr. Milton Eisenhower is known publicly and political leaders
are favorably inclined toward the visit. It is the general opinion,
however, that in view of the precedent established by the Nixon
incidents, and particularly if there is an unfriendly reception of
Dr. Eisenhower in the countries he visits before Costa Rica, there
will be anti-United States demonstrations in Costa Rica. However,
the Costa Rican schools are now organizing a parade in honor of
Dr. Eisenhower's visit.
2. There are approximately 20 Communists and front group
leaders capable of staging well organized anti-United States
demonstrations. There are also student segments and unorganized
hoodlum groups capable of agitation. The main Communist capability
is in labor, women's, and youth front groups. The only other known
groups capable of demonstrations are Cuban and Nicaraguan exiles in
Costa Rica, who may protest alleged United States support of the
Batista and Somoza governments.
3. It is believed that the newly elected government of President
Mario Echandi is strongly determined to prevent serious anti-United
States incidents. However, in view of the present unstable situation
in the Costa Rican security services as a result of the recent change
in government, it is believed that it would be impossible for the
government to control mob demonstrations without resorting to
extreme violence.
4. The following are themes anti-United States groups may use
to organize anti-United States demonstrations:
a. United States favoritism toward dictatorships;
b. Deficient United States economic assistance program,
i. e. , the lack of stabilized coffee prices, and insufficient
United States loans for agricultural and industrial
development.
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 Approved For Rise 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP80B01676P*600110037-4
SUBJECT: Proposed Central American Visit of Dr. Milton Eisenhower
Nicaragua
1. All political groups, except the Communists, lament the
anti-Nixon incidents as unfortunate but at the same time feel that
certain points of United States policy in Latin America were the
underlying causes of the incidents. The political opposition parties
cite United States support of dictators. Agriculturists condemn
United States cotton "dumping" and United States refusal to join
in hemispheric coffee price fixing. President Luis Somoza and
other Nicaraguan officials are favorably inclined toward the proposed
visit of Dr. Milton Eisenhower.
2. Except for the university at Leon, which would be the greatest
danger spot in Nicaragua, there would probably not be serious anti-
United States incidents during Dr. Eisenhower's visit.
3. The. determination and ability of the Nicaraguan Government
to prevent serious incidents, and to put down any demonstrations with
force, are believed to be strong.
4. The detention of agitators during Dr. Eisenhower's visit
would undoubtedly result in embarrassing publicity for the Somoza
Government and the United States, and in view of this and the
minimum risk of violence it is believed that any detentions would
be inadvisable.
5. The following are themes that would probably be used by
anti-United States groups to organize demonstrations:
a. United States support of dictators;
b. United States economic policies in Latin America;
c. United States exploitation of natural resources in
Latin America.
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 Approved For Rose 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP80BO16761 2600110037-4
SUBJECT: Proposed Central American Visit of Dr. Milton Eisenhower
1. Leaders of non-Communist political groups were generally
shocked at the Nixon incidents. President Ydigoras and members of
his cabinet are extremely worried over the scheduled visit of
Dr. Milton Eisenhower in view of (a) the growing Communist threat
and the recent return of many Communist exiles; (b) the mood of
defiance toward public order as evidenced by the recent student
strikes; and the effect, or the power of suggestion, of the Nixon
incidents. Since his election in January 1958, Ydigoras has become
increasingly unpopular in almost all political circles as a result of
his almost complete lack of leadership and his failure to counter the
increasing Communist threat. There have already been reports of
plots to overthrow him and rumors that he is "mentally incompetent. "
Leaders of the leftist Partido Revolucionario have predicted that if
Dr. Eisenhower visits Guatemala in the near future, he will be given
an unfavorable reception with Communist-inspired demonstrations.
Ydigoras has pointed out that June would be an especially bad month
because it is the traditional month for student riots and has suggested
that it would be preferable for Dr. Eisenhower to visit the other
Central American countries first and not arrive in Guatemala before
July.
2. A leader of the Partido Revolucionario predicted that the
demonstrating group would initially be Communist-inspired and small,
perhaps 100 people, but that the demonstrations would be infectious
and might spread into larger and more serious disorders. The
number of dangerous agitators who should be detained during
Dr. Eisenhower's visit is quite high, and the Guatemalan Government
does not have the ability to effect such detentions, and even if it did,
the resultant publicity would be extremely embarrassing to the already
unpopular Ydigoras government.
3. There can be no doubt of the capability of the Communist
Party and student groups to create serious anti-United States incidents
during the visit of Dr. Eisenhower.
4. It is believed that the Guatemalan Government does not have
the ability to prevent serious anti-United States incidents, and would
probably not have the ability nor determination to put them down by
resorting to extreme violence.
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SUBJECT: Proposed Central American Visit of Dr. Milton Eisenhower
Guatemala
5. Grievances used in such demonstrations would probably
be alleged United States imperialism and intervention in Guatemalan
affairs; and the alleged United States sponsorship of the overthrow
of the Arbenz Government in 1954.
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 Approved For R Zse 2003/0` 12$:. pIA-RDP80B0167602600110037-4
SUBJECT: Proposed Central American Visit of Dr. Milton Eisenhower
1. Reactions of Salvadoran political groups to the Nixon
incidents have been mixed. Most groups condemn the brutal and
uncouth treatment of Nixon and believe the incidents were Communist
inspired and unfortunate. Some believe the anti-United States feeling
stems from the drastic post-war drop in heavy United States purchases
of strategic materials during World War II. People in various political
parties, including some government officials, are critical of Nixon for
having gone to Caracas and of the United States government for having
permitted him to enter Venezuela in view of the well-known unstable
political climate there. Salvadoran opposition non-Communist political
parties are considered weak and not likely to engage in anti -United States
incidents, although it is possible they may do so for the purpose of
embarrassing the incumbent government.
2. The Salvadoran Communist Party, through manipulation of
student groups, is capable of creating incidents of violence during
Dr. Eisenhower's visit. However, they may be discouraged from
doing so by the Salvadoran Government. threatening that any use of
violence will be met with force.
3. The Salvadoran Government, under the leadership of President
Lemus, is relatively stable and believed to be capable of preventing
violence without resorting to violence. It is also believed to be
determined to resort to force if necessary and capable of doing so
effectively.
4. The following are themes anti-United States elements may
use to organize demonstrations:
a. Sympathy of Salvadoran students with those in Caracas
and Lima;
b. Charge that United States deals only with governments
and the wealthy, and is not raising the living standards
of the poor;
c. Blaming United States for low coffee prices which result
in reduced income for El Salvador; etc.
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 Approved For Rose 2003/01/29 CIA-RDP80B0167612600110037-4
SUBJECT: Proposed Central American Visit of Dr. Milton Eisenhower
1. Among the minority of Hondurans who gave the Nixon
incidents more than momentary notice, there has apparently been
no crystallization of opinion by political groups, except for the
Communists. Most Hondurans feel the incidents were deplorable,
but cite Nixon's own press comments as explanation of why and
how it happened.
2. The Communist Party in Honduras is fairly strong, and
its activities are centered principally on the north coast in the large
fruit companies there, and among the student groups in Tegucigalpa.
June 11 is Students' Day in Tegucigalpa, a traditional occasion for
the expression of anti-United States feelings. Also labor negotiations
with the United Fruit Company begin in June. Therefore, there is
a strong indication of general popular unrest during late June. The
Communist Party of Honduras is believed to be thoroughly capable
of organizing anti-United States demonstrations, and especially in
this climate of unrest. The detention of agitators who would probably
be active during Dr. Eisenhower's visit is believed to be inadvisable;
it would probably cause, rather than prevent, such incidents.
3. In addition to the danger of Communist agitation, political
opposition parties in Honduras now control the military and security
forces and there is a chance that irresponsible politicians may attempt
to embarrass each other by creating incidents.
4. The ability of the Honduran security forces to prevent large-
scale demonstrations or to put them down promptly if they do occur,
is doubtful. Their ability to do so if Dr. Eisenhower goes to the
north coast is extremely doubtful.
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