AERIAL RECONNAISANCE OF THE U.S.S.R.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R002500100004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: .SA/PC/DCI - Mr. Bissell
SUBJECT: Aerial Reconnaissance of the U.S.S.R.
SUMMARY
1. Aerial reconnaissance of the U.S.S.R. may be accomplished in
the predictable future by three methods: overflights, balloons and
an earth satellite. Research and development on related projects
is interrelated and complementary. Since these projects are rapidly
advancing to operational stages several major problems are raised
that concern the entire intelligence community.
2. This paper reviews the projects that show most potential at
this time. Each of the three areas is summarized in three sections:
present status of related projects; a discussion of the problems and
implications of the work for the entire intelligence community; and
suggested actions for the Director of Central Intelligence, which
entail two basic decisions and several minor problems.
3. The first major question is whether or not the pioneer
reconnaissance promised by balloon operations (Project GRANDSON) should
be supplemented with specialized aircraft overflights. The indica-
tions are that the type photo reconnaissance of most value to the
intelligence community requires overflight operations. If so, the
production of suitable aircraft should be encouraged and plans should
be made concerning photo requirements, priorities, and possible
political repercussions of overflight operations.
NAVY review(s) completed.
NRO and USAF review(s) completed.
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4. The second question is whether or not an earth satellite vehicle
(Project FEED BACK and others) offer cold war gains that would justify
launching a general purpose satellite on the first suitable occasion,
the International Geophysical Year, 1957-58, being a unique opportunity.
If so, tentative requirements should be established as soon as possible.
INTRODUCTION
1. The value of intelligence based on direct observation of the
Soviet Union is self-evident. There are three methods now being studied
that may enable direct surveillance of the U.S.S.R. by photographic or
electronic means. They are: (a) stripped or specialized aircraft,
(b) balloons, and (c) an earth satellite vehicle (ESV). As projects
dealing with these devices advance, several issues of importance to
the entire intelligence community are raised:
a. Do current projects for direct observation of the U.S.S.R.
promise to fill the requirements of the intelligence community; should
they be revised, or encouraged; or should new projects be designed?
b. What requirement and priority problems are raised as the
above projects reach operational stages?
c. What provisions are being made to process fully and
quickly any information that is obtained?
d. What preparations are being made or should be planned to
take full advantage of cold war benefits to the U.S., if a satellite
project materializes before a similar Soviet project, and how important
are these benefits?
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f. Does the immense potential of overflight operations as a
means of collection intelligence for the entire intelligence community
justify encouraging the production of a few specialized, high performance
aircraft?
STRIPPED OR SPECIALIZED AIRCRAFT
STATUS
1. Overflights with conventional, stripped aircraft have certain
operational limitations which usually permit intelligence collection on
only the peripheral areas of the U.S.S.R. and her satellites. Operations
with this type aircraft have been generally utilized thus far in support
of ground clandestine operations, gathering ELINT information incidental
to their mission, and overflights of the Operation FERRET and LAROP type.
Maximum reliability and safety of overflight reconnaissance of interior
areas of Russia would probably require specially designed aircraft.
2. In the past year the Air Force requested plans from Bell,
Lockheed and Martin for reconnaissance aircraft for special missions
over the U.S.S.R. Lockheed produced complete designs for an aircraft
designated the 11CL-28211.
3. The CL-282'is of radical design. The fuselage is based on
an existing fighter but has a specially designed nose to carry the
required cameras. The gas tanks have been integrated into the large,
gliderlike wings to increase take-off strength. It uses a skid
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I Lockheed was very enthusiastic about the plane and
promised delivery of one model one year from date of order. However,
A-r Force technicians concluded thatthe ship did not have a large enough
safety factor to authorize production.
4. A second aircraft, a stripped-down version of the reconnaissance
Canberra (RB-L7), has been suggested by Martin Aircraft. It would have
months from date of order. Existing modified Canberras are the most
readily available, high performance reconnaissance aircraft. 25X1
5. Several other projects are still in the research phase, but
do offer other possibilities. Guided missiles and
are examples. This survey has not studied them in detail because their
reliability and capability have not yet been determined. The
high performance aircraft have also been omitted, but
should be considered in any overflight planning.
DISCUSSION
1. Although it is believed that the Air Force has ordered a few
modified Canberras, under current plans they will not receive a suitable
aircraft in time to observe the 1955 Kapustin Yar missile launchings.
If national policy and requirements had been clearer on the overflight
problem, it might have been possible to obtain photographic intelligence
on Kapustin Yar next year.
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2. The advantages and the problems of overflight missions have
been under consideration for some time. The Air Force fully appreciates
the necessity for intelligence that can be gathered by overflights for
both its own mission and the mission of the intelligence community.
However, the Air Force is justifiably cautious because of two aspects
of overflight missions:
a. The Air Force correctly takes the view that the openly hostile
character of extensive overflight activity has political ramifications
and risk which should be recognized and accepted.at a high level before
USAF takes on the operational problem. Unless this issue is clarified
they are undoubtedly very hesitant to increase overflight activity.
The political consideration of overflights should include not only the
impact within the Soviet sphere, but also repercussions on our allies,
the neutralist states and popular opinion in the United States.
b. The Air Force cannot risk personnel, expend funds and
material, unless the intelligence gain is clearly and authoritatively
established. Research and development activity on specialized projects
outside their assigned mission requires full justification. They now
have two projects (GRANDSON and FEED BACK) underway to accomplish aerial
reconnaissance which do not involve some of the hazards of overflight.
In addition the Air Force standard safety and engineering requirements
for aircraft are very high, making the production of limited use,
highly specialized ships difficult and expensive.
3. There are four groups directly concerned with overflight activity,
whose interrelation is not clear, although on a working level they are
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probably well known to each other. They are the NSC, the JCS Rainbow
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ACTION
1. The Air Force would certainly welcome any further clarification
or political sanctions in the development of national policy on overflights.
2. Although both strategid and defensive airpower as well as the
entire intelligence community urgently need photographic and ELINT
reconnaissance of the U.S.S.R, the Air Force is not prepared to lower
its operational standards unless a directive comes from a very high
level. If this is done, the overtly hostile nature of overflights and
their impact on the cold war is clearly outside the Air Force mission.
Also, DDP/PP officials of this Agency should formally establish liaison
in order to be fully informed and prepared for the cold war effects
mentioned above. The Air Force would undoubtedly welcome assistance.
3. Within its mission, the Air Force would definitely have diffi-
culty justifying the production of a limited number of highly specialized
aircraft. However, the Air Force would undoubtedly cooperate fully in
such a venture if the need is established by a higher authority and
funds made available.
1. As a result, U.S. overflight policies and plans should be based
on the expected success of other attempts at direct observation. If the
proper agency, which would probably be the IAC, feels current sources
and plans are sufficient, no action is suggested.
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5. If it appears advisable to extend overflight activity, a
decision on the production and operation of a specialized aircraft should
be made at a level that would eliminate confusion in the USAF. The NSC
is the sole organization with the authority to consider its many aspects.
To get decisive action on any changes the Agency might propose in either
plans or policy, NSC action will be required, although it would be
best if the parties most directly affected were first informally consulted.
6. From the interest of the Agency, specialized aircraft overflights
are essential to obtain completely adequate photo intelligence of
strategic areas of the Soviet Union. Pioneer reconnaissance as planned
by Project GRANDSON (see below) will require subsequent detailed
photography to get adequate scale, resolution, stereo-overlap and con-
trolled coverage. Consequently, it is to our interest to encourage the
authorization of special aircraft that can take detailed, large-scale
photos immediately, once the pioneer reconnaissance is done. Such
aircraft would have to be ordered now if they were to be available for
immediate use upon receipt of Project GRANDSON's results, assuming
the project progresses as planned.
7. This Agency has levied one specific requirement on the Air Force
for photo reconnaissance of Kw ustin Yar. This request is still in
channels and will require an overflight.
BALLOONS
STATUS
1. The Air Force has a "Balloon Pioneer Reconnaissance System",
Project GRANDSON, that is scheduled to become operational in October 1955,
though launchings may be delayed. The project plans to provide wide area
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search of the U.S.S.R. using primarily photographic techniques, but is
also adaptable to ELINT electronic devices. GRANDSON is currently in
research and development stage and is being supervised by Col. John Kay,
Air Research and Development Command. Operational plans are being prepared
by the Operations Planning Group, Headquarters, USAF, under Colonel
Russell Berg. Operational responsibility will rest with the Headquarters
Command, USAF, under Brigadier General Ross. A final decision will
probably be made by the NSC, if GRANDSON has not already been considered.
2. Requirements are for 3,000 balloons, which allows 500 spares.
It is planned that they will be launched
for the balloons to cross the Soviet Union. They can stay aloft from
8 to 9 days. At 155 degrees East longitude the VHF code signals begin
and a recovery operation is planned using C-119 cargo planes. It is
estimated that of all those launched 75%, or 1875 balloons, will cross
the U.S.S.R. and that 40%, or 1000 balloons will be recovered. With
each balloon carrying two cameras with 500 feet of film, and a recovery
figure of LGO%, it is estimated that processing could be required for
about 1,400,000 photographs.
DISCUSSION
1. Because the intelligence that this projectpromises to collect
is of widespread interest to the entire intelligende community, arrange-
ments should be made to process, interpret, and distribute the photos
most expeditiously. Two processing studies are underway. The Air Force
Cambridge Research Center has a contract on this problem with the Boston
University Photographic Research Laboratory and ORR/D/GP has gathered
data in support of OSI interests.
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2. Since the course of the balloons cannot be controlled, the
problem of requirements and priorities does not arise until the first
results have been received. At that time this Agency may wish to place
some priorities in processing, especially if this is to be a lengthy
operation. Also, if it is decided to construct some specialized aircraft,
priority should be given to the photos over areas selected for subsequent
detailed overflight reconnaissance.
3. The impact of this operation on the cold war should be anticipated
and be softened as much as possible. As indicated above, it is almost
certain that about 25% of the balloons will be recovered within the Soviet
Union--a problem that may not yet have received exhaustive Air Force
consideration.
4. As in the case of overflights, GRANDSON provides the Soviet Union
with a powerful cold war weapon. Any cover we might provide should be
thoroughly investigated.
The suggestion has also been made
to conduct the project overtly and provide some-scientific data for
international use. The cover problem has already received some considera-
tion by the DD/P.
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6. In OSI conversations with Air Force their full cognizance of
the vital importance of this project to the entire intelligence community
was most evident. General Samford not only knows our interest but also
very firmly expressed his own personal determination that the project
was going to satisfy the entire communityts requirements. This very
cooperative attitude has been verified in talks with Mr. Fred Ayer,
Mr. Trevor Gardner, General Putt, General McCormack, General Schriever,
and Colonel Kay. Consequently, it is expected that the Air Force will be
most receptive to any suggestions that we might have to offer.
7. The reconnaissance that this project would provide is important
enough to merit every encouragement and assistance we can provide.
Anything we can do to expedite GRANDSON should be offered to the Air Force
as soon as
ACTION
possible.
1. Since Project GRANDSON has progressed almost to completion under
Air Force auspices, our interest should be stated tactfully and inoffensively.
However, in view of the otherwise unobtainable information that may be
procured, it is even more important that the interest of the entire
intelligence community be clearly established and that this project
operate as successfully as possible.
2. Indications are that the Air Force will certainly take a
cooperative view and appreciate any guidance or help we may offer.
The IAC is probably the most appropriate agency to consider the problem
of priorities in processing GRANDSON photos. Any subsequent exploitation
of the results by overflights, which would require authorization for a
special aircraft, would have to come from the NSC. Once the members of
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the IAC are cognizant of the operation, each can be prepared to take
immediate and full advantage of the pioneer photographs. However, because
the project is so far advanced, it seems advisable that a responsible
representative of this Agency should first discuss the matter informally
with appropriate Air Force officials.
3. The DD/P has established liaison with Air Force intelligence
officials to provide any possible cover and to prepare for propaganda
repercussions based on balloons recovered within the U.S.S.R.
EARTH SATELLITE VEHICLE (ESV)
STATUS
1, Research and development in this field is not fully coordinated
and secondary to guided missile projects, though the leading authorities
are undoubtedly in frequent, informal contact. The position of the military
seems to be that they cannot justify large efforts in this direction in
terms of their own mission but they are keenly interested. They would
probably do the work if funds were available and a requirement was
established outside the Department of Defense. Nearly all of the
components of a successful launching now exist though no Servide has
apparently carried a project beyond planning stages.
2. The main Air Force effort is centered on Project FEED BACK, a small,
100-pound satellite designed to provide television reconnaissance of the
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U.S.S.R. for a period of several weeks. Most of the basic studies were
made by the Rand Corporation (R-262, edited by
advance copy in OSI). FEED BACK requires a two-stage rocket vehicle
based on the ATLAS missile to reach an orbit of about 300 miles altitude.
Project FEED BACK would take about seven years to complete subject to
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final development of the ATLAS missile. Presently available guidance and
television systems would suffice. The development and launching of the
first FEED BACK satellite is estimated to cost ~p160 million. The satellite
would circle the earth every 90 hours, obtaining television pictures at the
rate of 100,000 per day or more. Within a few weeks it could cover all
U.S.S.R. territory of interest to U.S. intelligence agencies.
3. In the last two months the Air Force Requirements Committee
has established a requirement for FEED BACK on the recommendation of the
Secretary of the Air Force. Colonel Cooper and Colonel Cleveland, Office
of the Assistant for Developipent Planning, Deputy Chief of Staff, HQ,
USAF, are familiar with thesd plans and Lieutenant Colonel Genez, HQ,
ARDC, has been working with the Rand Corporation.
4. A second major satellite proposal has been made by Dr. Werner
von Braun, Technical Director, Guided Missile Division, Redstone
Arsenal. In about 24 months or less he believes it would be possible
to launch a 10-pound satellite in orbit using the REDSTONE missile for
the first stage plus LOKI rocket clusters for the last three stages. All
elements required for this satellite are currently developed and in
production. Dr. Von Braun's other schemes are quite similar but are
designed to use the advanced REDSTONE missile which will not be available
until 1956.
5. The third major satellite proposal has been made by Dr. Fred
Singer, a consultant of ONR and Associate Professor of Physics at the
University of Maryland. His Project MOUSE plans to launch a 100-pound
package in an orbit 200 miles from the earth. He would utilize
existing Army rockets. Dr. Singer minimizes the military value of
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MOUSE which he envisages to be used primarily for gathering basic
scientific data. He is particularly interested in launching the satel-
lite for the International Geophysical Year, 1957-58.
6. The Navy has also shown great interest in ESV proposals. It
is believed that they currently have several ESV studies underway. Very
recently ONR obtained consent from the Army to use the REDSTONE missile,
which indicates they are thinking along the lines suggested by Dr. Singer.
DISCUSSION
1. The establishment of priorities should be considered, probably
in the IAC, although the satellite would remain aloft long enough and
would be sufficiently invulnerable to make this a secondary problem.
As in the other projects, preparations should be underway to process the
information for the entire community's use.
2. Since balloons and overflights promise to provide aerial
reconnaissance of the Soviet Union sooner than ESV, the main benefits
of launching an earth satellite would be prestige and constant
surveillance. It should be clearly understood that a small ESV launched
at an early date to reap cold war benefits would gather only basic
scientific data and would not have reconnaissance value.
3. As the cold war progresses each major scientific advancement
takes on magnified importance. The satellite will certainly be the
greatest scientific advancement since the hydrogen bomb. This contribu-
tion to psychological warfare is of direct interest to the entire
intelligence community, not only because of the positive contribution,
but also because of the importance of embarking on this project with
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overtly peaceful intentions. Hence, it may very likely be in the
national interest to promote exLsting plans from a very high level in
order to make certain that the United States does not suffer a major
cold war defeat.
4. The International Geophysical Year, 1957-58, offers a unique
opportunity. The event has the necessary prerequisite of international
organization and recognition, both to assist in the operation of the
project and to present it to the world in a favorable light. A missile
launched during that year would be used solely to gather scientific
data concernin communications, meteorology, cosmis rays and aerodynamics.
It would be presented in an atmosphere of scientific progress and brother-
hood that would minimize the propaganda value to the U.S.S.R. If the
U.S.S.R. should choose to attempt countermeasures to such a satellite,
it would put itself in a position of opposing the progress of the
international scientific community. In addition a successful launching
would reaffirm the superiority of Western values and methods in the
world of science, which have been questioned in view of the rapid
Soviet scientific advancement.
5. The launching of a small satellite in 1957 or 1958 would not
handicap the success of FEED BACK. FEED BACK is designed to record
and transmit its television data using tape, which is transmitted on
receipt of a codedsignal to stations in North America (via a high
frequency, directional beam). As noted above, it is doubtful whether
or not they would attempt to counter an international project and, if
they did, it is equally doubtful whether they could be effective. The
U.S.S.R. could learn very little from simply observing the passage of a
small satellite.
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ACTION
1. It is proposed that the DCI consider sending a letter to the
President (draft, Attachment 1) recommending that a tentative requirement
be established for the development of an ESV in the International Geo-
physical Year under the overt sponsorship of the National Science Founda-
tion. The letter should be accompanied by a short explanation of the
ESV problem (Attachment 2), and of the Soviet/U.S. stage of ESV develop-
ment (Attachment 3). As is stated in these attachments, it is most
important that ESV development for international purposes be as free as
possible from any military onus as well as inter-service rivalry. Once
the great importance of ESV in the cold war is strongly stated, our role
will be filled and it will remain for the suggested scientific bodies
to proceed.
2. A decision must be made by the end of this year if we are to
try preparing an ESV by 1957. A brief study made by experts in this
field, which would include such men as Dr. Von Braun, Dr. Singer,
Dr. Du Bridge, Dr. Killian, and Dr. Vannevar Bush, could determine the
feasibility of this project very quickly. If the. project is received
favorably and is completed bebre a similar U.S.S.R. project, interested
elements df this Agency should be advised to prepare to take full
advantage of our achievement and to counter expected Soviet accusations.
3. If the President established a tentative requirement for a
small ESV in 1957-58, it is suggested that the select scientific group
be appointed by the Scientific Advisory Committee of ODM which would
determine the feasibility of the project in conjunction with the Depart-
ment of Defense and the National Science Foundation. The Foundation
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would be a suitable sponsoring agency and official U.S.representative
for international liaison and planning. The Department of Defense
would be responsible to them for developing an appropriate ESV for
launching in the International Geophysical Year. It is believed an ESV
could be launched without violating the security of our missile
development.
.. If it is decided not to push launching of a small satellite
by 1957-58, the present. plans of the military should suffice to produce
an ESV suitable for constant surveillance in the period 1960-65.
However, the Soviet Union also possesses a similar capability and
could succeed in putting an ESV in orbit before the United States does.
Because the U.S.S.R. has very little difficulty in collecting the
intelligence an ESV would produce,by more direct methods, her gain
would be almost completely in prestige and publicity.
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