FUNCTIONS OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R002500050004-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 1, 1943
• Content Type: REGULATION

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DIRECTIVE
FUNCTIONS OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
1. AUTHORITY
By Military Order of the Commander in Chief, dated
13 June 1942, as amended by Presidential Executive Order of
9 March 1943, the Office of Strategic Services was established
as an operating agency of the Government under the direction
and supervision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2. FUNCTIONS
The Office of Strategic Services is designated as. the
agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff charged with the functions
and duties described hereinafter in paragraphs 3 to 10,
inclusive.
3. SECRET INTELLIGENCE
a. The Office of Strategic Services is authorized to:
(1) Collect secret intelligence in all areas other
than the Western Hemisphere by means of espionage and
counter-espionage, and evaluate and disseminate such
intelligence to authorized agencies. In the Western
Hemisphere, bases already established by the Office of
Strategic Services in Santiago, Chile, and Buenos Aires,
Argentina, may be used as ports of exit and of entry for
the purpose of facilitating operations in Europe and
Asia, but not for the purpose of conducting operations
in South America. The Office of Strategic Services is
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authorized to have its transient agents from
Europe or Asia touching points in the Western
Hemisphere transmit information through facilities
of the Military Intelligence Service and of the
Office of Naval Intelligence.
(2) Establish and maintain direct liaison with
Allied secret intelligence agencies.
(3) Obtain information from underground groups
by direct contact or other means.
(4) Establish and maintain direct liaison with
military and naval counter-intelligence, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and other Government agencies
engaged in counter-intelligence.
4. RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS
The Office of Strategic Services will (1) furnish
essential-intelligence for the planning and execution of approved
strategic servicesix operations; and (2) furnish such intelli-
gence as is requested by agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the armed services and other authorized Government agencies.
To accomplish the foregoing no geographical restriction is placed
on the research and analysis functions of the Office of Strategic
Services, and the following specificic activities will be
x As used in this directive, the term "strategic services"
includes all measures (except those pertaining to the Federal
program of radio, press, publication and related foreign
propaganda activities involving the dissemination of informa-
tion) taken to enforce our will upon the enemy by means other
than military action, as may be applied in support of actual ned A or plarFi or R lea ei 002710 ter lA=RDI 80801676 vv25 ~~5vv~ -8of the war
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performed:
a_ Accumulation, evaluation and analysis of political,
psychological, sociological, economic, topographic and
military information required for the above.
b. Preparation of such studies embracing the foregoing
factors as may be required.
c= Preparation of the assigned sections of Joint Army and
Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS), together with such maps,
charts and appendices as may be required to accompany these
sections.
d Preparation of such maps, charts and illustrations as
may be requested by the agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and authorized agencies of the war and Navy Departments.
5. SECRET OPERATIONS
The secret operations included in this paragraph will
be conducted within enemy countries and enemy occupied or con-
trolled countries, and from bases within other areas, including
neutral areas, where action or counter-action may be effective
against the enemy.
a. Morale Subversion
The Office of Strategic Services is responsible for
the execution of all forms of morale subversion by diverse
means including:
False rumors, "freedom stations", false leaflets and
false documents, the organization and support of fifth
column activities by grants, trained personnel and supplies
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and the use of agents, all for the purpose of creating
confusion, division and undermining the morale of the
enemy.
b. Physical Subversion
The Office of Strategic Services is responsible for
of
the execution/approved special operations including:
(1) Sabotage.
(2) Organization and conduct of guerrilla warfare.
Personnel to be provided for guerrilla warfare will be
limited to organizers, fomenters and operational nuclei.
(3) Direct contact with and support of underground
resistance groups.
(4) The conduct of special operations not assigned
to other Government agencies and not under the direct control
of the theater or area commanders.
(5) The organization, equipment and training of such
individuals or organizations as may be required for special
operations not assigned to other Government agencies.
6. STRATEGIC SERVICES -- PLANNING, EXECUTION, DOCTRINE AND
TRAINING The Office of Strategic Services is charged with:
a. The planning, development and execution of strategic
services for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the development of
doctrine covering such services.
b. The training of personnel for strategic services.
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7. WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT
The Office of Strategic Services will be responsible
for the progressive and orderly development of operating pro-
cedure and the characteristics of special weapons and special
equipment for special operations not assigned or pertinent to
other U.S. Government agencies. When approved by the Office of
Scientific Research and Development, such special weapons and
special equipment may be developed by the Office of Strategic
Services in collaboration with the Office of Scientific Research
and Development. The characteristics having been so established
will be presented to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, War
Department General Staff and the Vice Chief of Naval Operations
for transmittal to the appropriate supply agency for further
development or procurement. Weapons, equipment and supplies for
the Office of Strategic Services will be programmed and pro-
cured in accordance with the pertinent Joint Chiefs of Staff
directives and current Army and Navy instructions based thereon.
8. CONTACT WITH FOREIGN NATIONALITY GROUPS
The Office of Strategic, Services is authorized, in con-
sultation with the Department of State, to maintain contact with
foreign nationality groups and individuals in the United States
for the purpose of obtaining information.
9. COMMUNICATIONS
The Office of Strategic Services shall be responsible for
the planning, organization and operation of essential communica-
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tions required for field and training activities in connection
with approved projects. Existing communication facilities will
be utilized wherever possible. The programming and procurement
of communications equipment will be made only after approval
therefore has been secured from the Assistant Chiefs of Staff,
G-4, War Department General Staff, or the Vice Chief of Naval
Operations, depending on which service has primary interest in
the particular type of communications equipment under consider-
ation.
10. LIAISON WITH OTHER AGENCIES
The Office of Strategic Services is authorized to
maintain liaison with other interested Government agencies.
11. COORDINATION OF STRATEGIC SERVICES PROGRAMS
Strategic services programs are supplementary to and
must be coordinated with military programs. To insure this, a
planning group to act as a joint medium shall be set up in
the Office of Strategic Services for supervising and coordinating
the planning and execution of the strategic services programs.
The Office of Strategic Services Planning Group shall consist of:
ate One member appointed by the Secretary of State, two
members appointed by the Chief of Staff, U.S.Army, two mem-
bers appointed by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and
Chief of Naval Operations, and four members, including the
Chairman, appointed by the Director of Strategic Services..
b.. The members of the Office of Strategic Services Plan-
ing Group shall be available for full-time duty and shall be
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c. An Advisory Committee comprising representatives
from the Office of Economic Warfare, Coordinator of Inter-
American Affairs, Treasury Department and from time to
time representatives of such other Government agencies
as may be called upon to serve, shall be set up to serve
with the Planning Group, either as individual members or
as a committee when requested by the Chairman of the Group,
to consider matters affecting the respective agencies
represented on the Committee. Members of the Advisory
Committee will advise the Planning Group as to how their
respective agencies can be of assistance in insuring the
success of strategic services plans.
d. All major projects and plans for strategic
services will include measures for political, cultural and
economic pressures to be applied. In the case of economic
pressures the projects and plans will indicate only the
results desired from the Office of Economic Warfare.
e. All major projects and plans for strategic
services will be integrated with military and naval programs
by the Office of Strategic Services Planning Group and,
after approval by the Director of Strategic Services, sub-
mitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Joint Staff
Planners for final approval.
12. GENERAL PROVISIONS
a. Interchange of Information.
The Military Intelligence Service, the Office of
Naval Intelligence and the Intelligence Service, Office of
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Strategic Services, will provide for the complete and free
interchange of information, evaluated as to creditability
of source, required for the executive of their respective
missions.
b. Security Control.
The timing of strategic services measures initiated
in the United States is subject to the direction of Security
Control.
c. Control by Theater Commanders.
All activities within organized theaters or areas
are subject to direct control by the commander concerned who
is authorized to utilize the organization and facilities of
the Office of Strategic Services in his theater or area in
any manner and to the maximum extent desired by him.
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it`f411
MEMORANDUM OF ESTABLISHMENT OF
SERVICE OF STRATEGIC INFORMATION
Strategy, without information upon which it can
rely, is helpless. Likewise, information is useless un-
less it is intelligently directed to the strategic pur-
pose. Modern warfare depends upon the economic base --
on the supply of raw materials, on the capacity and per-
formance of the industrial plant, on the scope of agri-
cultural production and upon the character and efficacy
of communications. Strategic reserves will determine the
strength of the attack and the resistance of the defense.
Steel and gasoline constitute these reserves as much as do
men and powder. The width and depth of terrain occupied
by the present day army exacts an equally wide and deep
network of operative lines. The "depth of strategy"
depends on the "depth of armament."
The commitment of all resources of a nation, moral
as well as material, constitute what is called total war.
To anticipate enemy intention as to the mobilization and
employment of these forces is a difficult task. General
von Bernhardi says, "We must try, by correctly foreseeing,
what is coming, to anticipate developments and thereby to
gain an advantage which our opponents cannot overcome on
the field of battle. That is what the future expects us
to do."
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Although we are facing imminent peril, we
are lacking in effective service for analyzing, compre-
hending, and appraising such information as we might
obtain (or in some cases have obtained), relative to
the intention of potential enemies and the limit of the
economic and military resources of those enemies. Our
mechanism of collecting information is inadequate. It
is true we have intelligence units in the Army and the
Navy. We can assume that through these units our fight-
ing services can obtain technical information in time
of peace, have available immediate operational informa-
tion in time of war, and, on certain occasions, obtain
"spot" news as to enemy movements. But these services
cannot, out of the very nature of things, obtain that
accurate, comprehensive, long-range information without
which no strategic board can plan for the future. And
we have arrived at the moment when there must be plans
laid down for the spring of 1942.
We have, scattered throughout the various
departments of our Government, documents and memoranda
concerning military and naval and air and economic
potentials of the Axis which, if gathered together and
studied in detail by carefully selected trained minds,
with a knowledge both of the related languages and
techniques, would yield valuable and often decisive
results.
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. Critical analysis of this information is as
presently important for our supply program as if we
were actually engaged in armed conflict. It is un-
imaginable that Germany would engage in a $7 billion
supply program without first studying in detail the
productive capacity of her actual and potential enemies.
It is because she does exactly this that she displays
such a mastery in the secrecy, timing and effectiveness
of her attacks.
Even if we participate to no greater extent
than we do now, it is essential that we set up a
central enemy intelligence organization which would
itself collect, either directly or through existing
departments of Government, at home and abroad, pertinent
information concerning potential enemies, the character
and strength of their armed forces, their internal
economic organization, their principal channels of
supply, the morale of their troops and their people
and their relations with their neighbors or allies.
For example, in the economic field there
are many weapons that can be used against the enemy.
But in our Government, these weapons are distributed
through several different departments. How and when
to use them is of vital interest not only'to the
Commander-in-Chief but to each of the departments con-
cerned. All departments should have the same informa-
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To analyze and interpret such information
by applying to it not only the experience of Army and
Naval officers, but also of specialized, trained re-
search officials in the relative scientific fields
(including technological, economic, financial and
psychological scholars), is of determining influence
in modern warfare.
Such analysis and interpretation must be
done with immediacy and speedily transmitted to the
intelligence services of those departments which, in
some cases, would have been supplying the essential
raw materials of information.
But there is another element in modern war-
fare, and that is the psychological attack against
the moral and spiritual defenses of a nation. In
this attack, the most powerful weapon is radio. The
use of radio as a weapon, though effectively employed
by Germany, is still to be perfected. But this per-
fection can'be realized only by planning, and planning
is dependent upon accurate information. From this in-
formation, action could be carried out by appropriate
agencies.
The mechanism of this service to the various
departments should be under the direction of a
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Coordinator of Strategic Information, who would be re-
sponsible directly to the President. This Coordinator
could be assisted by an advisory panel consisting of
the Director of F.B.I., the Directors of the Army and
Navy Intelligence Service, with corresponding officials
from other Governmental departments principally con-
cerned.
The attached chart shows the allocation of
and the interrelation between the general duties to be
discharged under the appropriate directors. Much of
the personnel would be drawn from the Army and Navy
and other departments of the Government, and it will
be seen from the chart that the proposed centralized
unit will neither displace nor encroach upon the FBI,
Army and Navy Intelligence, or any other department
of the Government.
The. basic purpose of this Service of Strate-
gic Information is to constitute a means by which the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, and his Strategic
Board would have available accurate and complete enemy
intelligence reports upon which military operational
decisions could be based.
Washington, D. C.
June 10, 1941
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