STANDING GROUP AGENDA 18 JUNE MTG.: WHAT TO DO ABOUT CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R002400050007-6
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• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2003
• Sequence Number: 7
• Content Type: AG

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67-
.:'AIDING GROUP AGENDA
1 June Aitg.: i-hat to do about Cuba.
-elated papers:
1. Report from Freedom House
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WHAT CAN WE DO
ABOUT CUBA?
A Report From
FREEDOM HOUSE
20 West 40th Street, New York 18, N.Y.
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In October 1962, the world was shocked by the
revelation that the Soviet Union had established a
nuclear missile base in Cuba. The American people
were virtually unanimous in supporting the President's
decision to take prompt and effective action, regardless
of the risk, to force the withdrawal of Russian missiles
and troops.
The succession of events needs no recounting here.
What is significant is that, as of this writing, more than
a half year has gone by and the task has not been com-
pleted. In the meantime, relations between the United
States government and anti-Communist Cuban exiles
have deteriorated rapidly, dimming hopes for an early
overthrow of the Castro regime. It is urgent, therefore,
for the American people to review what has happened
and to consider what ought now to be done.
To help in this process, Freedorft House invited a
group of prominent individuals - seasoned observers and
analysts - to meet at Gould House, New York Univer-
sity's Confert.-nce Center at Ardsley-on-Hudson, New
York, April 25-27. The sessions were conducted in
association with the Citizens Committee for a Free Cuba.
This report on the sessions was prepared by Freedom
House; nothing in it is binding on any participant.
The aim is to present the exchange of opinions among
people representing different points of view, the airing
of their proposals and the consensus which emerged
from the deliberations.
Freedom House expresses its gratitude to the busy
men and woven who put aside personal interests to
attend the Conference. The list of participants is as
follows:
Mrs. Mariada Arensberg
Mr. Hal Hendrix
Mr. Leo Sauvage
Executive Director
Latin America Editor
N. Y. Correspondent
Cuban Freedom Committee
Miami Daily News
Le Figaro
Mr. William E. Barlow
Mr. William vanden Heuvel
Mr. John Smithies
Publisher, Vision Magazine
President,
Consultant on Latin American Affairs
Mr. Murray Baron
International Rescue Committee
Mr. Gerald Steibel
Labor -Relations
Mr. Daniel James
Research Institute of America
Paul Bethel
Mr
Secretary, Citizens Committee for a
.
"Cuba Research Reports"
Editor
Free Cuba
Dr. Sig Synnestvedt
,
Mr
Leo Cherne
Prof. - Harry Kantor
Latin America Specialist,
.
Executive Director
Dept. of Political Science
Foreign Policy Research Inst.
Research Institute of America
University of Florida
University of Pennsylvania
Mr. James Daniel
Brig. Gen. S. L. A. Marshall (Ret.)
Prof. Frank Tannenbaum
Roving Editor, Readers Digest
Military Writer and Syndicated
School of International Affairs,
Mr. Roscoe Drummond
Columnist
Columbia University
Columnist, N. Y. Herald-Tribune
Mr. Edgar Ansel Mowrer
Vice Admiral Charles Wellborn, Jr. (Ret.)
Mr. Christopher Emmet
Syndicated Columnist
Hudson Institute
American Friends of
Chairman
Mr. William Patterson
,
the Captive Nations
Business Executive
Prof. A. Curtis Wilgus
George Field
Mr
Miss Virginia Prewett
Director, School of Inter-
.
Executive Director
Latin America Columnist,
American Studies,
University of Florida
Freedom House
Washington News
Miss Frances R. Grant
Mr. John Richardson, Jr.
Mr. Chester S. Williams
Secretary General, Inter-American
President
Assoc. Director
Assn. for Democracy and Freedom
Free Europe Committee
Freedom House
(affiliations listed for identification onll,0
Focus on a Problem
Americans are agreed that a Soviet Cuba is intolerable
to the Western Hemisphere. The reasons bear upon
our security and freedom as well as the independence
and integrity of the other nations in this hemisphere.
The facts about Castro and Communist Cuba are
beyond debate: Six million people who won their
freedom from Batista's dictatorship found themselves
betrayed into the hands of a new dictatorship. They
are denied the right to vote, to speak, to publish - to
think. More than 100,000 Cubans have been jailed
for refusing - to accept Communism. Another 250,000
have fled, preferring exile to tyranny at home. 180,000
more are awaiting transportation and countless others
dream of escaping from the terror.
Cuba has become an overt Soviet satellite - the only
one in the ;Americas. The Castro regime deliberately
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handed over the island to the Russian dictator and
allowed it to be transformed into a launching pad for
potential military aggression against the United States
and the other countries of the hemisphere.
Present conditions do not suggest that the evil has
been abated, much less eliminated. Even if we could
be certain that every "offensive" military weapon has
been removed from Cuba, we would still live in the
presence of the twentieth century's most efficient offen-
sive weapon,- aggressive Communism itself. This time-
bomb is still to be de-fused.
Fundamental Objectives
American policy must rest on three objectives:
1. The elimination of the Soviet political and military
base in Cuba;
2. The halting of Castro-Communist subversion, sabo-
tage and guerilla warfare against Latin-American
peoples; and
3. The liberation of the Cuban nation from Castro's
brutal police state.
Americans will unite behind any program that gives
hope of achieving these goals. But what would such
a program be?
Formulating it presents certain immediate difficulties.
Public opinion, while it is clear on the basic objectives,
does not have full access to the facts. The reasons
are many. Some are founded in the requirements of
security, some rest on theories of "strategy" that may
or may not be sound. In the last analysis, however,
whatever policy is adopted will require, for its success,
the understanding of the American people and their
whole-hearted support. Indeed, it is a function of alert
citizenship to participate actively in the formulation of
policies, even if it must do so on the basis of incom-
plete information.
The Conference Agenda
The mechanics of the conference were designed to
facilitate a full exchange of ideas, help clarify differences
in approach and substance, and pave the way for the
enunciation of areas of common agreement. The agenda
was divided into three parts:
1. What We Know: the basic facts about the situa-
tion inside Cuba and among Cuban exiles, and the
views of U.S. government officials and Congressmen
as well as leaders of Latin American republics.
2. What We Do Not Know and Need to Know: the
difficulties of incomplete information about U.S. and
Latin American policies and programs. (Where possible,
conferees filled in the gaps, clarified ambiguities and
defined the areas of uncertainty.)
3. Policy and Actions: judgments on objectives and
tactics, consensus on what government policy should be
in the interests of the nation, Latin America and the
Free World, alternative courses of action.
The Department of State had been invited to partici-
pate but found it necessary to decline because "pressure
of problems relating to Cuba preclude attendance of
officers of the stature which your seminar would merit."
The Department, however, supplied the conference with
a statement for its guidance.
In view of the consensus ultimately reached by the
participants, the diversity of premises from which they
started, is noteworthy. The diversities came out clearly
in a formal opinion poll composed of 21 questions
formulated in the light of the first day's discussion. At
the time the poll was taken, 25 participants were seated
at the conference table.
Some sense of the participants' initial attitudes emerges
from the rather even division on such questions as
these:
... Does the Administration believe that Russian
troops will leave Cuba?
. . . Has Washington reached a decision not to act
except as it is presently acting?
. .. Does the Administration believe that continued
economic pressure will topple Castro?
. . . Does the U.S. Government have a policy for
liberation of Cuba?
On the other hand, there was fairly close agreement
on the following:
. .. That Castro's regime can be toppled without
U. S. military action and without an invasion.
... That the hit-and-run raids of the exiles were
contributing to Castro's difficulties.
.. . That raids not based on U.S. soil did not endanger
the peace.
To ascertain the political bias of the conferees, they
were asked to express their attitude toward the present
Administration on issues other than Cuba. Of the 25
participants, 14 declared themselves "friendly", 7 said
they were "opposed" and 4 abstained. (For a full appre-
ciation of both the temper and the substance of the
conference, the poll is reproduced as Appendix II
to this report.) In the judgment of Freedom House,
it is worth study not only as a summary of the con-
ferees' views but as a reflection of the way qualified
observers see America's current Cuban posture.
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In Search of a Policy
An American's confrontation with the Cuban problem
must begin with the question: What is our government's
policy?
Since Castro took power in 1959, and especially since
the Bay of Pigs disaster in 1961, there have been many
conflicts and contrasts between official pronouncement
and actual performance. While no one doubts the
Administration's desire to see Cuba liberated from the
grip of Communism, there is considerable concern that
far less than an all-out effort is being made in the
Caribbean to do anything about it.
Troubling Questions
From their own specialized vantage-points, the experts
at the Freedom House conference raised these troubling
questions:
1. Is American Cuban policy geared to a negotiated
`accord" with Khrushchev on the kind of Cuba with
which the United States could "co-exist"? If this is not
contemplated, why the reluctance to make public the
exchange of messages and letters between the President
and the Soviet Premier? The time seems overdue for
a full disclosure of the agreements reached and the
promises broken.
2. Under present circumstances, is the Administration
reluctant to increase pressure on the Cuban regime?
The East Coast longshoremen's union has been boy-
cotting Polish and other satellite lines that use some
of their ships in Cuban trade. Washington has been
seeking to end the boycott. The question was asked:
Why has there been no tough, iron-clad ban on the
shipment of American goods in any vessel of any line
that trades with Cuba? At the present time, a watered-
down regulation applies only to the individual ships
that deliver goods to Cuban ports, and even violations
of this weak measure are reportedly permitted.
3. At a meeting in England, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.,
is said to have described the U.S. position on Cuba in
these terms: The first objective is to clean up our own
backyard in Central and South America by vigorous
implementation of the Alliance for Progress, meanwhile
containing Communist Cuba. A second objective is to
bring isolated Cuba back into the Organization of Ameri-
can States as a chastened, cooperating member. If
this is an accurate reflection of U.S. policy and not
just a personal view, how long does Washington think
Step One will take before action can begin on Step Two?
4. Is it possible that the humanitarian mission of
James Donovan, the lawyer who negotiated the release
of the Bay of Pigs prisoners, has become something
more? Is it also a cover for Administration-approved
negotiations with Castro, looking toward some kind of
reconciliation, perhaps on the basis of a Tito-type ar-
rangement for Cuba? Castro's conspicuous entertain-
ment of Dono .,an and his son in early April 1963 sug-
gests that thi Cuban dictator may be reaching for
some kind of accommodation" with the U.S., since the
October event` may have convinced him that the Soviets
are unwilling to risk much to support him.
(Significantl_. a television interview filmed on April
24th just befo_p e Castro's departure for Russia, released
after the Free dom House Conference had adjourned,
lent credence to this assessment of Castro's policy.
Aware that by was addressing an American audience,
Castro expressed appreciation that the U.S. has "taken
some steps in the way of peace" such as "the stopping
of piratical act,; against Cuba". He indicated that these
steps might b,, the basis for better relations. "I have
looked at suet steps with good eyes," he said, adding
that the quest on of Soviet technicians in Cuba - "who
would fight w: th us against any aggressor" - might be
the subject of a three-way discussion between Cuba,
the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and not just between
the U.S. and the Soviet Union.)
These uncertainties about the direction of American
policy, wheth,=r well-founded or not, are profoundly
disturbing in and of themselves. They suggest that
actually there may be no master plan and that we are
merely improvising on this crucial cold war front. Cer-
tainly, a colic rent policy and plan of action would
have to begin i with an evaluation of a whole series
of basic relationships, including the following:
1. The relation of the Cuban problem to the other
cold war fronts.
2. Cuba's relation to the other Latin-American coun-
tries.
3. The relation of the U.S. to the other Latin-Ameri-
can countries.
4. Possible effects on the Sino-Russian conflict.
5. The fear that action on Cuba may escalate into
global w tar.
Specifically, clear-cut U.S. policies are needed in these
areas:
1. Exiles' ai~:tivities.
2. Developments inside Cuba.
3. Post-Castro Cuba.
4. Current itussian presence in Cuba.
Virtually all the discussion on Cuba revolved around
these issues. The following pages are an attempt to
organize and integrate the observations.
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Cuba and the Other Cold-War Fronts
Communism's conquest of Cuba must be viewed in
the context of the world-wide expansionist drive con-
ducted by the Kremlin, which has already led to totali-
tarian control over a third of the human race. At this
point in history, simple solutions are no longer possible.
The problem of resisting Communist expansionism is
growing more complex and less manageable all the
time. Any plan of action in the Caribbean has to
take into account conditions and potential developments
around the globe. Since we have committed ourselves
to the defense of allies in all the continents, our Cuban
policy must be consistent with those commitments, or at
least must avoid jeopardizing them.
Participants in the Freedom House Conference saw
this fact as a major preoccupation in the thinking of
those responsible for American policy. In an effort to
define Washington's current approach, several conferees
used role-playing procedures to present what might be
the views of high government officials. In substance,
they said:
"Our policy on Cuba must necessarily fit into the
larger U.S. policy of defending the free world against
Communism while avoiding war. Where certain common
interests are shared by the U.S. and the Soviet Union,
we must press for an agreement with the Soviets. In
this context, other problems may have priority - such as
reconstituting the troika coalition in Laos to prevent a
serious collapse that would have dire consequences for
Vietnam, Indonesia and others; the urgent need for con-
cluding a nuclear test ban in Geneva; and preventing
the military use of outer space. In such a framework
Cuba is not the most pressing issue. We are concerned
not only with restoring freedom to ' Cuba but also with
maintaining and enlarging freedom in Berlin. A victory
on any given front would hardly be worth while if the
price turned out to be the loss of Berlin, Iran, Vietnam
or some other sector of the global struggle. What we
do about Cuba may precipitate reactions elsewhere that
could seriously injure our wider interests.
"Nor can we forget the implications of the rift between
Moscow and Peking. At this juncture it would hardly be
wise to increase the pressure on Khrushchev and pos-
sibly make him look worse than he did when we forced
him to pack up his missiles and go home. The prospect
of another such defeat might force him, for example, to
move into Iran in order to salvage his already shaky
position as leader of the world Communist movement.
"As realists, we know there is no automatic virtue
in just doing something: consider the Bay of Pigs and
the trouble we're having in Vietnam. And we have to
take cognizance of the handicaps imposed by our very
strength - the restraints on our freedom of action that
flow from our giant size in comparison with the Cuban
pigmy. Rough action would alienate world opinion.
In any case, even our friends in Latin America are
opposed to what they call `intervention.' Certainly, the
reaction during the Bay of Pigs misadventure demon-
strates that a program of direct action by U.S. forces
would be even less palatable than action by the Cuban
freedom fighters - and that would be so despite a quick
success and moderate casualties on both sides.
"We are committed to getting Soviet troops out of
Cuba as fast as possible. Some Sovietologists tell us we
can probably do it more quickly by reducing rather
than increasing the pressure on Khrushchev. Meanwhile,
we are isolating Cuba from the rest of the hemisphere
and discrediting its "revolutionary" image among Latin
Americans. We are slowly strengthening our OAS allies
and reinforcing their ability to maintain internal security.
Over the long haul, we hope to achieve our goals
through a successful Alliance for Progress.
"Those who demand a commitment to immediate
Cuban liberation are simply ignoring the unacceptable
risks that would be involved. After all, we have a com-
mitment to the eventual liberation of Eastern Europe,
but those who pledged in campaign speeches to make
good on it soon found out that they couldn't fulfill
this promise without risking a global war, in 1956,
Radio Free Europe and even the official Voice of
America were criticized for having encouraged the Hun-
garians to revolt under the misconception that outside
help would be forthcoming.
"The risks of precipitant action cannot be dismissed.
To go to the brink and then be forced to retreat rather
than accept the dreaded next step would be disastrous.
Even the political opposition which condemns a policy
of caution, does not advocate military action in Cuba.
Its leaders have been quick to disavow the few who call
for blockade and invasion."
Such is the point of view apparently prevailing in
Washington, as the conferees reconstructed it. It repre-
sents the considerations that seem to trouble the Ad-
ministration as it picks its way across the heavily mined
terrain of foreign policy.
Opinion at the conference was predominantly pes-
simistic that such consideration could get anywhere.
As one participant put it: "The United States wants
Cuba to be free, but does not want Cuba to become
free. We are eager for the result that is sought; but we
have no stomach for the actions needed to achieve it."
Concededly, there was good reason during the first part
of 1962 (before October) for U.S. officials to be appre-
hensive over the effect on Berlin, Laos and Vietnam
if this country challenged Soviet arms shipments to
Cuba. The most significant aspect of the brilliantly
executed confrontation in October-November, however,
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was that it did not trigger Soviet actions in Berlin or in
other places where Soviet capability existed.
The lesson of October-November confirms the thesis
that action in the Caribbean ripples out to distant
shores and sensitive regions. But even more important,
it emphasizes dramatically that indecisiveness in the
Caribbean can have the most deleterious effects on our
alliances, especially NATO and SEATO. Inaction on the
Cuban front will only be taken to mean a U.S. unwilling-
ness to run risks in defense of others. If the U.S.
accepts Russian intrusion at its own doorstep, where
the Soviet military posture is weakest, how can Euro-
peans expect the U.S. to risk nuclear devastation to
repel a Soviet attack in Europe where Soviet military
power is greatest?
Indeed, American resistance to Soviet military penetra-
tion in the Caribbean is a prerequisite to restraining the
the Soviets from an adventure in West Berlin. Defend
our interests close to home, and we reinforce rather than
endanger our outposts in more distant places. Blur
our purpose and commitment in our own hemisphere,
sow confusion between words and deeds about Cuba
and we can only damage American objectives around
the world.
Cuba in Context: Latin America's Future
Thoughtful observers are by now aware that Cuba
is the Western Hemisphere base from which the Com-
munist knife is aimed at the soft underbelly of the
hemisphere - Latin America. A long history of economic
and political errors has filled Central and South America
with internal discontent, thus making it vulnerable to
conquest by external forces. How many more Cubas
can we sustain?
Time is a vital factor. There are hopeful, pro-
democratic forces at work, but they are in a deadly
race with the destructive, totalitarian forces. Decisive
to the outcome will be the length of time it takes to
dislodge not only the Russian troops but Communism
itself from Cuba. The mere survival of the Castro
regime is a factor of great importance. It strengthens
the Communists in other Latin American countries and
creates an image of Communist invincibility. It en-
courages the trend toward neutralism, already pro-
nounced in some countries, with increasing numbers of
Latin Americans saying, "If the United States is willing
to tolerate or co-exist with a Communist Cuba, why
shouldn't we?" It also encourages an equally dangerous
trend toward extreme rightist dictatorship.
The spawning of more neutralist or militarist govern-
ments in Latin America, in reaction to the continued
existence of the Castro regime in Cuba, can threaten the
United States' objectives of preserving and enlarging
freedom. "Coexistence," on the one hand, may lead
to "coalitions" which ultimately produce one-party rule,
while rightist dictatorship gives the Communists a moral
pretext for carrying out their tactics of conspiracy and
helps polarize public support in their direction.
History doe not operate in smooth uni-directional
lines. Developments are the product of a given equilib-
rium between rival forces. The presence of Castroism,
viewed as a telnporary phenomenon, has generated some
wholesome reactions in Latin America, which should
not be dismissed. The delivery of Cuba to Khrushchev
as a military, base added considerably to the disen-
chantment of many Latin Americans who had originally
considered Castro a genuine patriot fighting foreign
economic exploitation. Even before October Castro had
paid some price for his betrayals - ranging from unful-
filled promises to hold elections to the public confession
that he had been a Communist all along but had con-
cealed the fac while seeking popular support. But now
Soviet domin;ttion of Cuba has made it plain that
Castroism is not a nationalist liberation movement. Poli-
tical labor and business leaders, editors, intellectuals and
students whose hostility to Batista's dictatorship made
them sympathetic to Castro, have been disabused.
Military office^s who might have been tempted to seek
a deal with "tike wave of the future" have been sobered
by the purge: and executions that followed Castro's
accession to power.
The volatili y of the poverty-stricken Latin American
masses is another matter. It is difficult to predict the
direction in v hich their pent-up resentments are likely
to explode in a period when old institutions are dis-
integrating arid. new claimants are demanding power.
Army take-ov-_crs, like those in Peru and Guatemala,
are in the historical Latin American pattern. They are
the traditional response when power centers are threat-
ened or when chaos seems imminent. To be sure, in
some situatio) s the military play a legitimate role in
preventing a minority from seizing power. But U.S.
policy must take into account the fact that the Com-
munists often find oppressive rightist regimes more use-
ful than liberal or anti-Communist leftist governments.
The ultimatl~ success of the Alliance for Progress may
hinge on whef-her Latin America can be persuaded that
Castro is not here to stay, and Communism will not
spread to ot`ier Latin republics. Unfortunately, the
Communist challenge has not yet convinced a majority
of the more conservative Latin Americans to accept the
reforms essential to the success of the Alliance. The
effect of that challenge has been, rather, to encourage
a massive flight of capital from Latin America and to
discourage nrw investment there, thus contributing to
further econc=mic deterioration and reducing the Alli-
ance's chance,-: of success.
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American policy seems geared to the thesis that we
can defeat Communism by defeating hunger, poverty
and disease in Latin America, and that all we need
is time to accomplish the latter. The reality is that
the attainment of a higher standard of living does not
necessarily preclude Communism, as demonstrated by
the very case of Cuba, which before Castro was one of
the two or three most advanced countries in Latin
America. At bottom, we are engaged in a two-front
struggle against both Communism and poverty, at the
same time. If Communism remains in control of Cuba
indefinitely, it will have proved its permanency in the
Western Hemisphere before the reform battle can be
won. On the other hand, the mere erasure of Com-
munism from Cuba would not, by itself, automatically
insure orderly social and economic progress.
U.S. Relations With Latin America
These considerations brought the conferees to an
examination of American policy vis-a-vis the countries
south of the border. Despite the fear of Communist
expansion, Latin America still considers U.S. interven-
tion an anathema. The question was whether this
factor has not been given undue weight, distorting our
relations with Latin America generally. Over-sensitivity
to the charge of interventionism, based on fear of offend-
ing our friends, may now have reached the point where
we are alienating support or weakening the hemisphere
because of our restraint.
The conference members therefore discussed these
questions in the framework of concrete situations.
For example:
1. In 1947, the United States and Latin America
joined in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assist-
ance, more popularly known as the Rio Treaty, which
established a mutual-security system, based on the
formulation that an aggressive act against one is an
aggressive act against all, to be met by economic, politi-
cal and military sanctions. At Punta del Este in 1962-
before the Russian military base in Cuba was revealed
- the United States pressed for strong resolutions, which
were adopted by the Organization of American States,
specifically applying the Rio Treaty to the Sino-Soviet
intrusion into the hemisphere. Why did not the United
States rest a forthright policy of eliminating the missile
bases in Cuba on those OAS resolutions? Can the U.S.
entertain the idea of deals with Khrushchev and/or
Castro, involving coexistence with a Sovietized Cuba or
even a Titoist Cuba, without repudiating the Rio and
Punta del Este positions and in effect the whole inter-
American system?
2. Since December 1962, according to reliable reports,
President Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela has wanted
to go before the OAS to document the story of Castro-
supported sabotage and terror against his country. The
immediate objective would be to induce the five OAS
members that still maintain relations with Cuba -
Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, Chile and Bolivia -to end
their ties. It is reported that the U.S. has been stalling
off the Venezuelan action. If the reports are not true,
the question remains whether the U.S. has been using
its full influence to persuade the five to break relations.
The issue is a practical one. If the five states permit
Cuban embassies to operate in their countries, the sub-
version will spread throughout Latin America under
the shelter of diplomatic immunity, and subversives
trained in Cuba and the Soviet bloc will be free to
undermine other nations.
The Fear of Escalation
Undoubtedly, much of American policy is based on
genuine fears - not only the fear of consequences in
other areas of the cold war, or of the reactions in Latin
American countries, but also the fear that decisive action
might escalate into a global, nuclear war. This is not
an irrational fear, and it cannot lightly be dismissed.
But it is precisely because we are living in a world of
risks that leadership is necessary. Whoever would give
guidance to others must be capable of assessing the
risks, and then of acting. In a risk-less world there would
be no need for leadership.
In his speech of October 22, 1962, President Kennedy
said that the greater risk lay in not acting. He con-
cluded that strong action involved the lesser risk.
Whatever happens, the same task will remain: to
follow the line of the lesser, more manageable risk.
In evaluating the hazards of weak versus strong action,
the Freedom House conferees cited the following ques-
tions as most relevant:
1. To what extent will the risk of nuclear war increase
with the passage of time, in view of the relative
increase of Soviet nuclear capabilities?
2. What will be the effect of American vacillation in
Cuba on other sensitive fronts of the cold war?
3. What will be the world-wide psychological impact
of continued taunting propaganda by Castro and
the Soviets?
4. What are the probabilities that the Cuban Com-
munist base will be used against us in the future
under unpredictably changed circumstances?
5. What will be the probable effectiveness of the
Cuban Communist base in undermining other
Latin American governments, with a consequent
spread of Communism in the hemisphere?
The net effect of examining such factors is to suggest
that a simple policy of risk-avoidance can lead only to
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the certainty of a worsening position for the United
States. Indeed, it is more likely that an improvement of
our position will occur only from a process of intelligent
risk-taking.
This was demonstrated in the October confrontation.
The Administration took manageable risks rather than
accept the certainty that the nuclear balance would
swing in Russia's direction and that Khrushchev's capa-
bilities for blackmail and attack would be increased by
the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. Unfortunately,
while it was clearly willing to take risks in order to
obtain a Soviet pledge of an inspected withdrawal of
the missiles, there was no willingness to take the risk
of a follow-through. Is there any practical value in run-
ning risks to gain a pledge, and running no risks to
enforce it?
The fear of escalation, while it might logically deter
certain types of all-out action, has distorted the judg-
ment of our decision-makers on more limited action and
narrower sectors of strategy and tactics.
U.S. Policy on Exile Activity
The conferees were especially troubled by the deteri-
oration in the relations between the U. S. government
and the Cuban exiles, whose principal concern is to find
ways and means of liberating their country. Does this
development foreshadow an ultimate conflict between
the freedom-fighters' objective of liberation and an Amer-
ican policy of containment? This disturbing question
underlay the discussion of American policy toward the
Cuban exiles.
Arguing that there has been no consistency of pur-
pose or action in our government's relations with Cuban
activists in exile, conferees cited these specific items:
. .. We can understand the legal and technical
reasons for withholding the use of U. S. territory
as a base for launching raids against Cuba and
against Soviet shipping bound for Havana.
But why was it considered necessary to depre-
cate as "irresponsible, ineffective and danger-
ous" the raids and supplying missions that
originated outside the U. S.? Is this not incon-
sistent with our official position that the Cubans
themselves must get rid of the Castro dictator-
ship? Does it mean that the Administration dis-
approves of the rebel action in the mountains
and their use of sabotage against Castro? If we
favor such action, can we expect the Cubans
to proceed without our help and in the face of
our public condemnation? In any case, what
are anti-Castro Cubans in exile or inside Cuba
to conclude?
.. . Miro Cardona and his Council had urged
Cuban exiles to enlist in the U. S. Army for
training. Thousands of young Cuban exiles, in-
cluding many of the Bay of Pigs veterans, did
so. Why' What official representations led
them to believe that joining the U. S. Army
would offer them the best way of fighting for
a free Cuba?
. .. Reports of Central Intelligence Agency
collaboration with the exiles seem to suggest a
conflict of policies and activities within the Ad-
ministration. Has CIA at times followed an in-
dependent line in conflict with that of the State
Department?
. .. Attorney General Robert Kennedy ap-
pealed to the Cuban exiles to unite in one or-
ganizatiot_i with which the U. S. government
could consult. Does this mean that the Ad-
ministration disapproves of CIA's experiment
in favoring certain Cuban factions which has
merely increased the disunity? Does the At-
torney General's statement look towards the
recognition of a government-in-exile?
The answers to these questions are uncertain, but
they sustain the impression that American policy toward
the Cuban exiles has lacked consistency and has not
contributed toward their unity essential for the fight
against Castro.
Policy on. Post-Castro Cuba
American policy should not limit itself to the over-
throw of Castro. The attitude of the U.S. toward the
long-range future of Cuba is itself a major strategic ele-
ment in the 6.ght to end the Communist regime.
Discussion among the conferees revealed that little is
known about the Administration's orientation on this
question. To be sure, it would be tactically unwise for
the U.S. to appear to take any action imposing or sup-
porting a specific type of regime. The very concept of
democracy held by the U.S. prohibits such a course of
action. Moreover, as a practical matter, any candidate
"selected" by the U.S. to succeed Castro would be re-
jected by Cuban public opinion long before he reached
Havana.
Nevertheless, intelligent policy, used as a guide for
action, must have some orientation on the possible alter-
natives that will be available, or probable, when Castro
is driven from the scene. These possibilities, which
American policy must takes into account, include:
1. A Titoist Communist State in Cuba. There are in-
dications that this result might be acceptable in certain
American quarters. There appear to be some who even
believe that a modus vivendi could be worked out
with a Communist Castro if, like the early Tito, he
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breaks all ties with the Soviet Union and ceases to be
a tool of its foreign and military policy.
2. A Democratic Socialist State. This would be a
regime in the tradition of the Western Socialist parties
which are anti-Communist but seek to resolve economic
problems on the basis of government planning and con-
trols. Pressure for such a form of government might
grow inside Cuba after Castro is overthrown, the ob-
jective of the people being to retain certain welfare pro-
grams and socialized industries rather than restore a free
enterprise economy.
3. A Liberal Democracy. Another choice might be a
social, economic and political system resembling that of
Western democracies in its fundamentals, but adapted
to Cuban conditions.
It is conceivable that Cuban exiles in the U.S. could
reconcile their differences and join with the resistance
forces inside Cuba to form a provisional government.
Much would depend upon the composition of the forces
which topple Castro.
American policy, of course, must not seek to impose
any regime on Cuba as a substitute for the present one.
The danger is that its actions in relation to the exiles in
the U.S. will be interpreted as favoring or opposing one
or more of the alternatives, when in fact no formal deci-
sion has been reached. The effect might then be to
produce exactly the opposite of the one we might ulti-
mately find preferable.
The Soviet Presence in Cuba
Despite the political retreat by Khrushchev during the
October-November crisis, there is no reason to believe
that the Russian dictator has abandoned his hopes of
maintaining a Soviet base only 90 miles from U.S. shores.
That "Fortress Cuba" is a military threat in the Western
Hemisphere is beyond question: it is operating as the
training ground for guerilla warfare against Latin Amer-
ican republics and as a center for the spread of subver-
sion, terror and sabotage.
The latest Soviet aim in Cuba is to use the island as
a base for medium-range missiles which could completely
circumvent U.S. warning systems and keep a large part
of the hemisphere and the U.S. under the constant threat
of nuclear attack. (This subject has most recently been
treated in the "Summary of Major Findings" on the
Soviet build-up in Cuba by the Preparedness Investigat-
ing Sub-committee of the Senate Committee on Armed
Services, May 9, 1963.) In the absence of verified and
precise knowledge of the conditions inside Cuba, Amer-
ican policy must be predicated on the assumption that
the danger is real and will persist.
Other Soviet aims in Cuba have been achieved:
1. Castro has been supplied with the latest weapons
to fend off an invasion from without or an uprising of
the people from within. What still remains is for the
Russian experts to train Cuban Communists in handling
these weapons. According to some military opinion, this
will take four to six years. The Castro regime argues
that it has the right, as a sovereign power, to invite mili-
tary assistance from a foreign country.
2. Cuba has been converted into a Communist West
Point for the training of officers intended to lead military
attacks on existing regimes. The island will eventually
be the arsenal of Latin American revolutions, from which
swift military support can be given to the creation of
new Cubas."
3. With its 150 operational jet fighter bombers, which
have a substantial range, Cuba is in a position to control
the air over a number of small, near-by countries. (It is
reported that some policy-makers in Washington find
comfort in the fact that all this lethal equipment is under
the control of Soviet officers rather than the hard-core
Castro-Communists who incline toward the more reckless
views of the Chinese.)
American policy at the present time is focused, how-
ever, on the issue of the missile build-up in Cuba. There
is little confidence that Khrushchev has actually carried
out his pledge of last October-November. Russian credi-
bility was completely destroyed by the fact that the pre-
lude to the crisis was a direct face-to-face lie by Foreign
Secretary Andrei Gromyko to President Kennedy on the
very subject of missiles in Cuba. In the absence of on-
site inspection, there can be no certainty that all the
missiles and nuclear warheads have been removed. Some
could have been installed, in caves from which they can
be fired with perhaps as great precision as missiles from
an underwater Polaris. Moreover, the Soviet troops and
technical advisers, even if we accept the lowest estimate
of their numbers, can accomplish significant secret prep-
arations, partly protected by darkness, cloud formations
and other similar impediments to aerial surveillance.
After the Kremlin took such large risks to execute the
build-up, one does not have to be of a suspicious nature
to wonder what 12,500 to 30,000 Russian military per-
sonnel would be doing in Cuba.
Continuance of the status quo - the uncertainty about
the missiles and the absolute certainty of the Soviet Army
presence - obviously has strong implications about our
global position and could lead to even more serious con-
sequences than we have already suffered. Both President
Eisenhower and President Kennedy have categorically de-
clared that a Communist base in this hemisphere would
never be tolerated. The fact that a Soviet base is now
being tolerated can lead the enemy to the kind of mis-
calculation that might be disastrous. A misreading of our
equivocation could induce probing adventures elsewhere.
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Also, our acceptance of the situation could be taken as
some justification for the Chinese view that strong-arm
methods do work in dealing with the "degenerate de-
"
mocracies."
But most serious of all, the continued presence of
Soviet military forces in Cuba could provide the very
spark that ignites a nuclear war. The U.S. has warned
that it will not stand by and allow Soviet forces to quell
an uprising in Cuba as they did in Hungary. Any inci-
dent - a bar-room brawl with Soviet soldiers in Havana,
a flare-up of tempers over a child run down by a Soviet
jeep - could lead to Russian shooting, even in self-
defense. As long as Russian troops are in Cuba, peace
is endangered by the possibility of an accident. Emo-
tions in this country might well make it impossible for
any administration to control the consequences, which
could escalate into nuclear war.
Precisely because the situation endangers peace, and
because it threatens Khrushchev's policy of coexistence,
there is some leverage in persuading the Russians to
withdraw. But this can be done only if the U.S. persists
in applying pressure.
A Consensus for Action
Readers of this report are aware of the diversity of
views that were brought to the conference table at Gould
House. Early in the proceedings, a formal opinion sur-
vey had made the conferees conscious of their differ-
ences, the significance of which was explored thoroughly
in the ensuing sessions. Ultimately, however, the in-
cisive, and often pointed, debate revealed an extra-
ordinary amount of agreement on fundamentals. (A
listing of alternatives will be found in Appendix I at
the end of this report.)
It should be underscored that the following effort to
state a consensus is not intended to suggest unanimity
on all its components. The task of formulating crucial
policy is never really completed, and those who con-
tribute to it render their greatest service by expressing
dissents, probing for weaknesses and asserting their own
personal insights.
The Lack of Public Information
It was recognized that the implementation of policy
may sometimes call for a withholding of information
when publication might automatically defeat the objec-
tive. But the conferees felt that the effect of current
practice was to hinder the formation of American public
opinion rather than obstruct the enemy. Many partici-
pants indicated their belief that some kind of negotia-
tions were being conducted off-the-record in the effort
to balance the interests of one sector of Western defense
against the interests of another.
It was acknowledged that the President alone was in
possession of the fullest body of information, while others
who seek proposed courses of action must do so with
less than complete knowledge. In a free society the con-
cerned citizen has no other alternative but to proceed on
the basis of the limited information available.
At the same time, it is a legitimate and essential de-
mand on the part of the citizen that his government
clearly expound its policies and thus expose them to the
wholesome influence of public debate. Such an exposi-
tion, to be constructive, must be conducted in an atmos-
phere of bi-partisanship which has been missing from
recent discussions in which both parties have been seek-
ing political advantage. A bi-partisan approach, of
course, cannot be invoked merely for the convenience of
the party in power, any more than the difficulties created
by our adversaries abroad may be properly used as am-
munition in political campaigns. Nor should national
debate be suspended by bi-partisanship, the function of
which is to nourish discussion by providing conditions
favorable to intelligent appraisal. Certainly no political
party has a right to utilize a period of great national
anxiety and difficulty to further narrow party purposes.
Every American who ventures to suggest a policy on
Cuba must recognize that there is an enormous differ-
ence between presenting the most intelligent critique
of policy and actually carrying the awesome responsi-
bility for the consequences. The effect of such awareness
should be to temper forms of expression but it should
not reduce the personal responsibility of the citizen to
seek and advocate solutions for our national problem.
Definition of the American Commitment
Both political parties seem to be united on the objec-
tive - freedom for Cuba. To carry out appropriate
measures will call for a national unity such as prevailed
in the October crisis. But we must be prepared for the
fact that future measures will have to be more numerous,
more involved, perhaps more onerous and surely less
dramatic, requiring a longer period of application than
the quarantine during the Fall of 1962. Bi-partisan
consultations are needed now to reach a broad, long-
range understanding.
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This is possible, however, only if the Administration
recognizes that it is responsible for providing leadership
in a national discussion of the Cuban problem. It must
supply the needed facts and it must clearly articulate
the country's objectives.
No responsible American doubts the desire of the
Administration to see Cuba ultimately free and mean-
while to prevent Castro from spreading Communist
dictatorship to other parts of the hemisphere. It can
certainly be assumed that Washington is committed to
eliminating the Soviet political and military base from
Cuba eventually and to blocking Sino-Soviet ambitions
in Latin America. What is needed is a commitment to
urgent and immediate action, unambiguously expressed
to the nation and the world. It is imperative that our
people, our allies, and especially our enemies, clearly
understand that this government intends to use all its
power to achieve the objective.
All must know that we not only want a free Cuba but
we are determined to help it become free - without
undue delays. Any doubts on this score must be dis-
pelled - for example, by publication of the correspon-
dence between Khrushchev and the President during and
following the October confrontation. So long as the
record is withheld, there will be rumors and apprehen-
sions, at home and abroad, about our Cuban commit-
ment. There must be no gap between word and deed.
Providing Leadership
Because the Cuban issue deserves high priority and
as an evidence of the intention to act decisively, the
Administration must assign top national leadership to
concentrate on this area of national concern. The ap-
pointment of an outstanding personality to a Federal
post on Cuban or Latin American affairs will symbolize
the importance we assign to the problem and should
help to improve our performance. Arrangements should
be made to call together Department of State personnel,
both incumbent and retired, who know the problems
and can communicate effectively with our OAS allies
to win support for U.S. policies and actions.
The Alliance For Progress
Thoughtful Americans support the Alliance for Prog-
ress. Experience demonstrates that the Communists can-
not be defeated in their drive for world domination by
purely defensive action or negative opposition. The
justification of the Free World lies in its promise of a
better life to the individual. For millions of hungry,
illiterate people, living in mud-huts and doomed to early
death, freedom means, above all, a chance to work and
live in dignity. Their yearning for escape from hardship
makes them an easy prey for the demagogue who holds
out glittering prospects under Communism.
Every effort must be made, through the Alliance for
Progress, to raise the living standards of Central and
South America. But the program will succeed only if
the people can see and feel the advances. Unfortunately,
so long as Communism can use Cuba as a base for sub-
version, economic progress will be sabotaged by the
Communists, on the one hand, or strangled by Rightists
who use the threat of Communism to oppose essential
reforms. Awareness of these obstacles should lead us to
increase, not diminish, our zeal for strengthening the
economies of our neighbors to the South. We must be
prepared for an up-hill struggle against reaction, cor-
ruption and Communism - all foes of an effective Alli-
ance for Progress.
But there may be an even more serious danger to the
Alliance for Progress - our own illusion that it can suc-
ceed by itself. The Communists can destroy faster than
others can build. The Alliance for Progress must there-
fore not be considered as a substitute for direct, militant
opposition to Communism. It is but one of the weapons
that must be brought into action. The Marshall Plan did
not really take hold until NATO provided a shield
against the military threat of Communism. So too the
Alliance for Progress needs an Alliance for Freedom as
a shield against Communist violence and sabotage.
The achievement of progress in Latin America will
require the development of local leaders, dedicated to
freedom and capable of standing as "a wall of dedicated
men" against the inroads of totalitarian tyranny. Theirs
will be the task of combatting the agents now being
trained in Cuba and Russia. Even after the liberation of
Cuba, Latin America will be confronted by a formidable
disruptive force because of those who have already been
taught Communist subversion and guerilla warfare in
Castro's and Khrushchev's schools of revolution. They
will be defeated only if the Free World is defended by
trained men who possess the skills of democratic leader-
ship.
The activities of the Alliance for Progress - such as
the labor institutes now under way - must be enlarged.
The OAS should be encouraged to set up additional
training centers in democratic countries like Costa Rica
and Venezuela, with U.S. supported facilities and teach-
ers. We must fight Communism with trained minds as
well as good hearts.
This need grows all the more urgent because Com-
munist attacks on the weak spots in Latin America in-
crease the danger of a resort to military dictatorships like
the Peralta junta in Guatemala. Such a trend would
multiply our difficulties and jeopardize the cause of
freedom. We cannot afford to be caught in the cross-
fire of a battle between the extremists. To escape such
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a dilemma, we must take timely action in buttressing
a system of inter-American democracy. Our need is for
knowledgeable leadership in all our embassies and
agencies in the field as well as at the top. Only by
putting our best men in strategic posts can we hope to
handle the explosive situations if and when they occur.
Aid to the Cuban Exiles
Cuba's proudest hope is the resistance of its patriots
to Communist domination. No act of the American
government should downgrade their courage; every pro-
nouncement should aim to uplift the morale of freedom-
loving Cubans everywhere.
We have a considerable responsibility for helping the
exiles to achieve unity in their own ranks. We injure
such unity if we play favorites among factions. We must
encourage all groups to select responsible leaders with
whom the U.S. government can cooperate for the com-
mon cause. Through every possible channel, we must as-
sist the organized underground inside Cuba, bringing to
bear our extensive resources and experience.
Exile and underground activity has many values. Not
the least is the fact that it warns the Soviet interven-
tionists that seizure of other men's countries will bring
inevitable retaliatory action. If Communists can promote
phony "wars of liberation", we can and should support
real ones.
The presence of Cuban refugees in the United States,
now numbering about 250,000, presents us with a rare
opportunity. These men and women are the only major
group of exiles since World War II who have any reason-
able prospect of an early return to a liberated homeland.
Cuba's problems will not end with the overthrow of
the Communists. If those problems are solved by a
future democratic regime, a powerful blow will have
been struck for liberation everywhere behind the Iron
Curtain. Thus, we contribute to the oppressed people in
Cuba and all the satellites when we provide special study
opportunities to the refugees now within our shores. By
training them in the fields of democratic government,
public administration, industrial and agricultural man-
agement, defense, public safety and order, public educa-
tion, we can lay the foundations for a wholesome future.
The Taking of Risks
Underlying the discussion of policy and action was the
question: What risks are Americans willing to take in
response to Communist expansionism and which policy
is likely to minimize the risks?
We are most in danger of Communist attack, whether
from Peking or Moscow, when our indecision suggests
fear, weakness or ineptness. We are safest when our
adversary realizes that we are clear about our objectives
and determined in pursuing them.
Timing is, of course, a crucial factor in assessing risk.
The Freedom house conferees tended to the view that
the risks later will be more formidable than the risks
now. Even on the assumption that time is inevitably on
our side, which we do not accept, one cannot be san-
guine about a sovietized Cuba that brings a large portion
of the U.S. and the Western Hemisphere within easy
range of Communist missiles and nuclear warheads.
The conference was aware that the major premise of
present policy is the assumption that action on Cuba
must be delayed because of risks to our position else-
where in the world. But the conferees were impressed
by the fact that the U.S. position in October, far from
provoking Communist adventures, forced the Soviet
leaders to act with greater caution everywhere. In the
context of the Sino-Soviet dispute, American toughness
justifies Khrushchev's position of restraint, while any
evidence that the U.S. is a "paper tiger" would
strengthen M bm's call for aggression.
In any case, if choices must be made as to where we
should take bold stands, Cuba is the most logical place.
The Soviet Union has over-extended itself geographically
by reaching into the Caribbean. Of all the fronts on
which we fact' each other, Cuba is militarily Russia's
weakest, and our strongest. The only Russian chance for
success in such a contest would be to convert the local
conflict into a general war - clearly too fearful a price
for so small a prize. Moreover, military opinion considers
the risk of general war in the near future relatively small
because the Kremlin knows that it could not win. The
record already shows that the Soviets have almost always
backed away from action that might lead to general war
when the U.S. has taken a firm stand, as in Cuba last
October and in Berlin since Khrushchev issued his
original ultimatum in November 1958.
The risks of inaction, however, must be spelled out
also in terms of the impact on the non-Communist world.
There is the risk - indeed, almost a certainty - that in-
action will encourage neutralism. If the U.S. can accom-
modate itself to the indefinite perpetuation of a Com-
munist regime in Cuba, why should not the rest of Latin
America? And the consequence will be a steady seepage
of Communism into the other islands of the Caribbean
and the other Latin countries of the hemisphere. At the
same time, in Europe and Asia, countries contiguous
with the Iron Curtain will have every reason to ask:
If the U.S. dare not uproot Communism from its own
doorstep, how can we expect _ it to risk anything on our
behalf?
The freeing of Cuba, not ultimately but soon, must be
the aim of U.S. policy implemented by a practical pro-
gram of action.
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Conclusion: The People and the President
The men and women who assembled at the invitation
of Freedom House were sympathetic to the heavy bur-
den carried by the President of the United States and
his advisers. Theirs is a fearsome responsibility in these
days of civilization's great dilemma,
As we were meeting, Haiti became a close second in
the Caribbean developments of deep concern to the
United States. Southeast Asia is engaging our attention
and costing American lives. Berlin is always in the
wings, The complexity of these inter-related problems
must not be minimized by those who seek to be helpful
in the finding of solutions. Our chosen leaders should
be able to count on the cooperation of all Americans in
the effort to solve the gigantic problems confronting the
nation and the world. And they have a duty to do all in
their power to create a spirit of national unity that will
prepare us for the crises ahead.
Both the cooperation and the national unity can be
achieved only if the people have access to relevant in-
formation, study every suggested solution, and develop
a consensus for action. Our leaders must keep us in-
formed of the facts and their plans for the future; we
must keep our leaders informed of the people's judgment
and willingness to sacrifice.
This is the discourse of democracy. Only through such
an interchange between the people and their govern-
ment can America find the way toward freedom and
peace in the difficult days ahead.
A Panorama of Alternatives
From the vantage point of their own contact with the
problems of Latin America and the cold war, the con-
ferees attempted to formulate their personal conclusions
within the framework of these parameters:
1. Questions of High Policy
a) What do we regard as indispensable?
b) What is intolerable?
2. What costs and risks are acceptable in achieving
our objectives?
3. How much action, and what kind, is needed and
feasible on the part of -
a) The United States?
b) Cuban exiles?
c) The underground in Cuba?
d) The Organization of American States?
e) NATO?
4. What mix of measures would be most effective,
including -
a) Refugee training for service in a liberated Cuba?
b) Propaganda and psychological warfare?
c) Economic isolation of Cuba?
d) Support of sabotage and rebel forces?
e) Aid to insurrection?
f) Para-military and military actions?
Freedom House commends this formulation to other
discussion groups as a helpful tool in studying one of our
most urgent problems. Its use in the sessions of this
conference proved profitable in laying out at least a
partial list of alternative policies and "action points".
They are listed here, not as points advocated by the
conference or even by the individuals who presented
them but as evidences of the fact that a frank facing of
our position reveals many directions - of varying merit,
to be sure - in which we can go. Many of the proposals
are contradictory in some respects or even mutually
exclusive. They nevertheless help to illuminate the areas
in which decisions must be made consciously rather than
by default.
TOP-LEVEL DECISIONS:
1. Insist as a basic premise that Castro-Communism
must go or be defeated.
2. Seek to co-exist with a Communist Cuba beaded
by Castro or some other ruler.
HEMISPHERIC POLICY:
1. Reassert the Monroe Doctrine, or a modernized
version.
2. Announce U.S. support for all dedicated democrats
who fight for freedom against dictatorship any-
where in the hemisphere.
3. Proclaim a hemisphere-wide right of self-determi-
nation, accepting any democratic decision on the
form of government and social system so long as
"human rights and fundamental freedoms" are
observed.
4. Help to organize a Latin American Treaty Organ-
ization (LATO) outside the OAS, which would
welcome all. non-dictatorial states willing to ally
themselves for purposes of military defense after
the pattern of NATO. (It is assumed that several
of the larger Latin American states would be
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reluctant to join, and that dictatorships like Haiti,
Paraguay, etc., would be barred.)
5. Rally non-governmental organizations throughout
the hemisphere, including business groups and
labor unions, for freedom and social justice.
6. Declare that the U.S. opposes Communist penetra-
tration but not revolutionary social change in Latin
America.
DIRECT PRESSURE ON CUBA:
1. Assert a policy of collective measures against Cuba
based on a rigorous implementation of the Rio
Treaty, the Bogota Pact and the Punta del Este
Resolutions.
2. Repeal or amend the U.S. Neutrality Acts.
3. Organize a tight OAS embargo against trade, com-
munications and travel between member states and
Cuba - any states rejecting participation to forfeit
U.S. aid.
4. In cooperation with Venezuela, exert effective pres-
sure on the five OAS members still maintaining
diplomatic relations with Cuba to sever their ties.
5. Withdraw U.S. recognition of the Castro govern-
ment.
6. Propose an OAS study of the steps deemed neces-
sary to achieve the objective of a free Cuba.
7. Impose comprehensive sanctions on shipping to
include all vessels of any line that uses as much
as one of its ships in the Cuban trade.
S. Use pre-emptive buying to tighten the noose on
Castro's economy.
9. Press OAS to impose the same quarantine on Com-
munist Cuba as it did on Trujillo's Dominican
Republic.
.10. Citizen groups in this country should cooperate
with Free Cuba Committees in our sister republics.
11. Press NATO countries to curtail the sale of any
goods to the Iron Curtain countries of the type
being supplied to Cuba by the Communists.
12. Quarantine Cuba against receiving any weapons,
whether called offensive or defensive.
13. Quarantine all shipments of petroleum to Cuba.
14. Promote the organization of an OAS task force
and prepare an OAS invasion force to be used as
a last resort.
AID TO ANTI-CASTRO CUBANS:
1. Arm and assist Cuban freedom fighters inside and
outside of Cuba; encourage sabotage and raids.
2. Help establish bases for Cuban rebels outside U.S.
territory.
3. Publicize the extent and character of current
Cuban resistance.
4. Launch a major propaganda effort through all
media, calling for public support of a Radio Free
Cuba.
5. In cooperation with Cuban exiles, start OAS work
on "winning the peace" in a free Cuba.
6. Help to organize a Cuban government-in-exile.
POST-CASTRO CUBA:
1. Create OAS machinery for governing liberated
countries and conducting elections u ..der pre-
planned rules, to be available for action in Cuba,
Haiti and elsewhere.
2. Provide opportunities for qualified Cuban refugees
to receive advanced training in their fields and to
conduct studies on problems they will face in a
liberated Cuba.
3. Prepare plans for the political, social and economic
future of a free Cuba.
4. Declare that Cubans must and will choose their
own force of government.
REMOVING TEE RUSSIANS:
1. Announce that the removal of Soviet troops from
Cuba has first priority in America's agenda.
2. Adopt a formal decision that Soviet troops and
"technicians" must be repatriated within a stated
time or face measures of expulsion.
3. Impose an OAS "quarantine" or blockade if neces-
sary to expel Soviet forces or bring down the
Cuban Communist regime - any states rejecting
participation to forfeit U.S. aid.
4. Establish OAS teams to inspect all ships bound
for Cuba.
14 Approved For Release 2003/05/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002400050007-6
 Approved For Release 2003/05/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002400050007-6
Opinion Survey on Cuban Policy
The following questions were formulated by a sub- Qualified; (3) No; (4) Qualified No. The qualified replies
committee in the light of the first day's discussion. were intended to indicate the respondent's degree of
Participants were requested to indicate their views by conviction about his views. During the poll, 25 partici-
choosing among four possible replies: (1) Yes; (2) pants were present.
TABULATION OF RESPONSES
1. Has Washington reached an agreement with
the USSR on Cuba?
2. Is Washington interested in reaching an
agreement with the USSR on Cuba?
3. Is Washington fully committed on a policy
to bring down Castro in practical terms?
4. Does the Administration believe that Russian
troops will leave Cuba?
5. Has Washington reached a decision not to
act except as it is presently acting?
6. Does Washington wish an exile Cuban
government?
7. Does Washington hope to pry Castro loose
from the USSR?
8. Does Washington have a plan on Cuba?
9. Does the Administration think it runs a
serious risk of losing the 1964 election if
Castro remains?
10. Can Castro's regime be toppled
(a) without U.S. miliary action?
(b) without an invasion by the U.S.?
11. Do President Betancourt of Venezuela,
former President Figueres of Costa Rica
and others want sterner U.S. action than
presently exists?
12. Would Brazil and Mexico be ready to
support such action?
13. Can Castro-Communist subversion in Latin
America be contained without action larger
than presently exists?
14. Is it U.S. policy to oppose widespread and
organized internal sabotage against Castro?
15. Is the U.S. opposing oil refinery sabotage
because former and future U.S. properties
arc involved?
16. Were the hit-and-run raids contributing to
creating difficulties for Castro?
17. Did raids not based on U.S. soil endanger
the peace?
18. Does the Administration count on or believe
it can isolate Cuba?
19. Does the Administration believe that con-
tinued economic pressure will topple Castro?
20. Is Washington's concern with nuclear raids
(a) a significant cause of inaction?
(b) or is it a rationalization to support its
present policy?
21. Does the U.S. Government have a policy
of liberation of Cuba?
Qualified
Qualified
Yes
Yes
No
No Abstention
0
7
9
2
7
17
5
0
0
3
3
5
11
3
3
5
7
8
1
4
6
6
9
2
2
1
1
20
2
1
9
8
3
3
2
1
5
13
4
2
4
2
13
2
4
10
11
3
0
1
21
1
0
0
3
19
2
0
1
3
4
13
2
1
5
2
2
19
1
1
0
7
12
2
4
0
1
11
4
9
20
2
1
0
2
1
2
18
1
3
10
9
0
2
4
4
6
9
4
2
5
8
5
2
5
8
7
2
2
6
4
6
8
4
3
Apart from Cuba, how many in this room are friendly to the Administration; or
opposed to the Administration?
Friendly: 14 Opposed: 7 Abstention: 4
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