THE BOARD OF INQUIRY RECONVENED ON 21 FEBRUARY1962 AND WILLIAM SHELTON CONTINUED AS A WITNESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R002200080003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 62
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2003
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 21, 1962
• Content Type: COURTFILE

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. . . . The Board of Inquiry reconvened on 21 February 1962
at 10:35 a.m. Colonel William Shelton, who appeared as a witness on 20 February,
took the stand and was reminded that he was still under oath. The meeting
continued as follows:
MR, HOUSTON: Colonel Shelton, during the time Mr. Powers was under
your command at Adana, was there anything in:his personal life or affairs that
raised any question in your mind as to his suitability for the performance of the
missions he finally undertook over Russia?
be
COL. SHELTON: My answer will have to/"no" to that, otherwise I
certainly would never have let him go on this mission. There were certain rumors,
certain hearsay things that you hear in any number of places. I have tried not to
let rumors or hearsay influence.any decisions I make. However, there are times
that I feel heresay and rumors should be checked into to see if this is actually the
that
truth. As I say, knowing/the rumors had been just that -- and after this talk with
Mr. Powers I followed him very closely - very closely. In fact, I increased my
flying time with him -- increased the number of times that I flew with him, and I
observed his landings and take-offs in the U-2 much more closely than I had in the
past. And I reviewed his training missions. And I could see no difference whatsoever,
and I am confident in my own mind that this did not affect his flying.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: I think perhaps for the record, Colonel, you
better identify, generally, the type of rumor or hearsay that you have been referring
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people on the Base that had any knowledge of this at all.
to in this testimony. As I understand, it was -- well, I'll let you state it.
Because where it appears on the record there might be some misunderstanding that
these might be rumors about his reliability as a pilot, or something of that sort.
COL. SHELTON: The rumors were in the area of his personal life.
The rumors I had heard--
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: You needn't describe the rumors, just place them
in the general area.
COL. SHELTON: It was not a rumor, I would say it was hearsay.
I don't want to leave the impression this was talked about by everybody on the Base.
This was not the case at all. In my own opinion I doubt if there were over two
MR. HOUSTON: This line of questionning is directed solely to the
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problem whether there was any personal strain that in your opinion might have
affected his performance.
COL. SHELTON: No, I'm confident in my own mind this caused no
personal strain whatsoever on him. It did not affect his flying -- I'm sure of that
in my own mind.
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MR. HOUSTON: Colonel Shelton, we will a little later on put in
precise information as to other missions performed by Mr. Powers at one time or
another, but some missions were performed while he was under your command, aside from
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this final mission?
COL. SHELTON: Well, in addition to the training missions--
MR. HOUSTON: I don't mean specifics.
COL. SHELTON: There were other missions flown.
MR. HOUSTON: I would just like your general appraisal of his
performance on those missions.
COL. SHELTON: I cannot tell you exactly how many -- I would probably
need to go back to the operational records to determine whether or not he actually
flew other missions. To the best of my knowledge I'm almost sure he flew at least
one other mission, maybe more, during the period of time I was there.
MR. HOUSTON: You had no reason to question his performance?
COL. SHELTON: No reason.
MR. HOUSTON: When you got notification of this mission which he
performed toward the end of April, you got this in the normal manner from Head-
quarters?
COL. SHELTON: This is correct.
MR. HOUSTON: Did you personally make the selection of pilots
to be available for this mission?
COL. SHELTON: Yes, I selected a primary and an alternate.
25X1 mission this was Mr. Powers and iI
(phonetic). To the best of my knowledge
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M. HOUSTON: Did you notify them personally?
COL. SHELTON: Yes.
MR. HOUSTON: And did you tell them the general nature of the
mission at that time?
COL. SHELTON: No, I ddn't tell them the general nature of the
mission. As I recall, the prime reason for notifying these people was so that they
could start their training, so they could start their route study.
MR. HOUSTON: Was there anything unusual about this mission, as
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0
COL. SHELTON: No.
MR. HOUSTON: Was there any particular basis on which you selected
these two pilots?
COL. SHELTON: Well, Powers' training records and past performances,
as far as I was concerned was outstanding. In flying this bird there is a requirement
to fly very close to the designated route. This is not easily done, because it takes
clear weather and being as high as you are and not being able to see out very well
they have to use the drift sight method of being able to see the ground. Now this
isn't too easy to fly, nor is it too easy to determine exactly where you are on the
ground, or if there is a combination of things that could go a little bit wrong,
far
that would maybe throw you a little bit/off your track, so to speak, it may not
enable you to get the best pictures possible -- so that we endeavored to fly this
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track, training missions or otherwise, as closely as possible to the designated
track in order to insure that the results would be as good as we possibly could
make them. Mr. Powers' records indicated that he was exceptionally good at this.
His records showed that he followed these very closely. Based on this and his
over-all flying ability, this was one of the reasons. that I selected him.
MR. HOUSTON: Aside from technical difficulty, is this type of flying
and duration of flights physically taxing?
COL. SHELTON: Yes, it's always taxing -- but there again this is
one of the purposes of a training mission -- this is another. reason we need to do
training, in order to stay. in condition and be familiar with the circumstances and
condition yourself to such hardships that come about.
MR. HOUSTON: And you felt he had the stamina and was so conditioned?
COL. SHELTON: Yes. He proved this in the training missions.
MR. HOUSTON: Did you accompany the group to the staging area?
COL. SHELTON: Yes.
MR. HOUSTON: Did you stay with them until the mission took off?
COL. SHELTON: Yes.
MR. HOUSTON: And you had a chance to observe Powers closely during
COL. SHELTON: Yes. In addition to this I had a fully qualified
flight surgeon that was available also, who monitored his actions very closely.
MR. HOUSTON: And there was nothing during the period in the staging
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area that raised any question in your mind--
COL. SHELTON: No, there was no question.
MR. HOUSTON: What part did you play in the briefing of the pilots
COL. SHELTON: Well, as I say, the pilots were usually already
briefed. They had gone through the training portion of the mission. However, due
to certain circumstances some parts of this could be changed at the last moment.
As I recall, there were no significant changes at the. last moment on this. If there
had been this is the time that I would personally see that the pilot was briefed and
that he understood the changes completely. I ensured that the pilot would study,
and I observed the pilot studying at the pre-strike staging base during the time he
was there.
MR. HOUSTON: Was there a good deal-of information to absorb in
COL. SHELTON: Well, I would say there is a possibility they could
probably fly without it very much, but the more knowledge he had of it maybe the
better job that he could do.
MR. HOUSTON: You mean of the exact pattern of the mission, the
navigational problems to be involved--
COL. SHELTON: In other words, at what time and in what position do
you put on one switch and take the other switch off.
MR. HOUSTON: He would have these as written instructions to check
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as he went along, too?
COL. SHELTON: This was part of the briefing guide. I also asked
if there were any specific questions or problems he had, was there anything there
MR. HOUSTON: Did you personally talk to him at all about the
possibility of emergencies, landing accidents, and what to do in that event?
COL. SHELTON: Yes. I personally went over with him,and the navigator,
to ensure that he understood the different routes and the different locations along
his route as to which would be his best exit, and which bases he would probably
have a better chance of reaching under certain circumstances.
MR. HOUSTON: Did you actually talk about the possibility of landing
in enemy territory?
COL. SHELTON: As I recall at this particular time, this would
have been taken care of before the pre-staging.
MR. HOUSTON: So you don't recall actually discussing it with him?
COL. SHELTON: Actually discussing with him what he would do if
he went down in enemy territory - at the pre-strike base. This is a staging base.
In other words, there is a pre-strike and a post-strike. The one that you take off
from is the pre-strike, and the one that you return to and land is the post-strike.
MR. HOUSTON: Were you the first one to inform Powers this was a
flight over Russia?
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T" I
COL. SHELTON: Yes.
MR. HOUSTON: Did you notice any particular reaction to that?
COL. SHELTON: Well, I don't think it was anything unusual, as I
recall, other than the fact that he seemed to be pleased, he seemed to be enthusiastic.
MR. HOUSTON: You didn't notice any hesitation?
COL. SHELTON: No hesitation, definitely not. This is one of the
things I always look for. If there is any hesitation at all, of course, then this
is a different matter entirely.
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COL. SHELTON: To the best of my knowledge, no. This would have to
be checked in the operational records, but to the best of my knowledge. at the time
I was there he had not flown over Soviet territory.
MR. HOUSTON: The group as a whole knew that in addition to the
peripheral or border flights that there were overflights over Soviet Russia to be
undertaken from time to time ? Did the pilot group as a whole know that in addition
to the peripheral border flights from time to time there were to be overflights over
Russia? They all knew they might be engaged--
COL. SHELTON: This is true. This was part of their job.
MR. HOUSTON: Did they think of this as a choice flight or all a
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part of their business?
COL. SHELTON: I think they would consider this a choice flight.
MR. HOUSTON: Any one of them would have been glad to get this
COL. SHELTON: This is true.
MR. HOUSTON: During your command did you ever have any pilots
who wanted to be released from the program?
COL. SHELTON: No, and I asked this question several times in pilots' meetings where there was no one there but the pilots and myself.
MR. HOUSTON: Was there during this time any reduction in the
requirement for pilots?
COL. SHELTON: No, not that I know of, to my knowledge.
MR. HOUSTON: Did you discuss with Mr. Powers the possibility of
This would indicate the reason for his pleasure?
COL. SHELTON: Well, this of course was part of his training. I'm
sure that I discussed this to a degree with him, at least the point that he had
an option to take this device with him or not.
MR. HOUSTON: The needle?
COL. SHELTON: The needle. The other part of going down in enemy
territory would have been taken care of in his pre-flight training. In other words,
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at the home base. This is one of the reasons for letting a certain pilot know --
however, he would not necessarily have to be - because this is a continual
training that all of the pilots would go through.
MR..HOUSTON: In their training at Adana the principles of Operations
Policy Letter No. 6 would be given to them as part of their training?
COL. SHELTON: This is true, repeatedly.
MR. HOUSTON: Do you remember whether you actually read the letter
to them -- you or one of the other officers? Were the pilots actually shown that
letter, do you know?
COL. SHELTON: I'm not sure whether they were actually shown this
letter or not. My Intelligence Officer would be in a better position to say this,
I'm sure.
GENERAL BULL: I have a question related to that. As we have before
us now this Policy Memorandum No. 6 -- was that the name of it?
COL. SHELTON: Yes.
GENERAL BULL: That was a policy letter to guide people like you -
the unit commanders in the field - with some leeway on your part as to what you would
impart to the pilot.
GENERAL BULL: Now did you follow that strictly? Any exceptions
to it that you know of -- in your own judgment - you didn't do that but you did do
this?
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COL. SHELTON: We followed it very closely, and as far as I can
recall I don't know of any exceptions to it.
GENERAL BULL: So the portions on destruction, and evasion, and
what to do in event of capture, and general deportment, was passed on by you, as
unit commander, to these pilots before they took off?
COL. SHELTON: I didn't personally pass it on to them, but they were
passed on through my staff officers at these training sessions. And I talked with
the pilots in general about certain items and certain activities, such as this
needle, for instance -- I would personally ask if he wanted this or not.
COL. GEARY: Was there any question in your own mind as to the
understanding on the part of these pilots as to the contents of this particular
letter?
COL. SHELTON: Yes, I'm sure each did understand the letter.
MR. HOUSTON: Would they raise questions concerning the policy
during the course of the training?
COL. SHELTON: To the best of my recollection they wanted to know
for instance if this letter really meant what it said -- all I'm saying is that
if they could they were to withhold information, but if they couldn't they were to
tell the truth -- in other words, they wanted to be sure they understood this
memorandum.
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GENERAL BULL: Do you happen to know if_there was any discussion--
in clearing up questions in the minds of the pilots-- discussions of things rather
remotely connected with the flight -- where they might go, where they might be based,
where they might escape to -- that involved other countries? Did that question come
up and was it discussed in the briefing?
COL. SHELTON: Yes. All this was classified and they were briefed
not to discuss it.
MR. HOUSTON: In the Policy Memorandum, as I recall, it was specifically
set forth - that requirement insofar as possible to keep from giving the full speci-
fications of the plane's performance at a particular altitude and range, to play
those down. Do you recall any other specific points they were briefed to do every-
thing they could to protect? I'm thinking now of knowledge -- these pilots would
have had knowledge of overflights over other countries, wouldn't they?
COL. SHELTON: Not necessarily. There might be some flights flown
that some of the pilots would not know about - there would be no reason for them to
know about.
MR. HOUSTON: If they knew about that participation in the program
by other countries were they briefed not to say this?
COL. SHELTON: To the extent this policy in Letter No. 6 goes,
that wherever possible to withhold, but if they could not withhold then they would
tell the truth.
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Powers immediately before the mission whether or not he raised any questions at all
on an understanding of his mission? Did he come forth and say: "I want to hear more
about this,? I need more information on that. Or just precisely what does this mean?
COL. SHELTON, There was a policy I had that prior to the pilot
going on thin mission - at the pre-strike base I always asked if there was any question
about his mission or were there any parts of his mission that he did not understand.
GENERAL BULL: The question was, were there any such parts that
Powers raised in this instance?
COL. SHELTON: To the best of my knowledge there were none.
GENERAL BULL: And he had the opportunity, you know?
COL. SHELTON: He had the opportunity, yes.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Colonel, as I understand it part of his instructions --
possibly the most important part -- on which he was briefed was a map - a flight
map they call it.
COL. SHELTON: Yes.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Now that map indicated where he was supposed to
fly -- it was outlined on the map where he was supposed to go on this mission, is
that correct?
COL. SHELTON: This is true.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: And he was instructed, because of the nature
of the plane and the mission and whatnot, to fly as close to that designated line
as possible?
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COL. SHELTON: Correct.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: So that while he was on the mission if he was
on the line indicated on his map he was carrying out orders -- and that was no
choice of his, is that correct?
COL. SHELTON: This is true.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: The fall where the plane came down was close to
the indicated flight line on the map?
COL. SHELTON: Well, not having the map here and not really knowing
exactly where the plane came down, I'd hesitate to answer this. But there was a
route map drawn, and if we can determine where the plane came down then I possibly
could answer this.
MR. HOUSTON: Judge, excuse me, but the Intelligence Officer will
describe the actual map, and then of course we will have information this afternoon
on what we know about where the plane came down, as well as the corroborating
information from whatever source we can get it.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: We will leave it with the Colonel, then, that
if the information that we get shows that the plane came down at or close to the
flight line that was on that map that Pavers had then it's clear that he was at
that spot pursuant to his instructions and orders and not by any voluntary decision
of his own.
COL. SHELTON: This is true. In other words, he had a route to fly,
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course, so to speak, that he would take corrective action to get back on course.
MR. HOUSTON: Do I understand it was commonly the case you would
have deviations you would have to correct?
COL. SHELTON: As I said before, if you are flying visually and
there happens to be a cloud cover beneath and you could not see the ground, then
there is a very good chance that you could deviate from this route without knowing
it. Now once it becomes clear and you can see the ground and you can determine
your exact position on the ground and you know it's a fact that you are off course -
then he should take corrective action to put himself back on course.
MR. HOUSTON: The point I'm making is that in the experience of
flying these missions was it not common to find some deviation that needed correction?
COL. SHELTON: Yes, because of such instances as I just cited --
this could cause a deviation.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: We have no further questions.
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From 1958 to 1960.
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MR. HOUSTON: Did you have prior intelligence training experience?
Yes.
since 1950, and attended the prescribed intelligence training courses of the Air
Force, Strategic Intelligence School here in Washington, and experience in SAC as
Wing Intelligence Officer, and in Germany as Wing Intelligence Officer.
MR. HOUSTON: Were you assigned to the U-2 Project back here to
go direct - or did you go directly--
D
I think it was March of 1958 -- the latter part of
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MR. HOUSTON: Had you briefed him on any missions prior to the
April 1960 mission?
I think so. As to any specific mission, I don't
think I could recall any specific mission. But inthe normal nature of things I
would have been involved, yes, sir.
MR. HOUSTON: Were you the Intelligence Officer for the specific
mission that was planned for late April and took place on 1 May?
MR. HOUSTON: Did you accompany the pilots and groups to the staging
MR. HOUSTON: Did you brief the pilots before they left the staging
MR. HOUSTON: Could you tell us the nature of the briefing?
Well, we had it pretty well established as a routine,
as to things we would cover on the pre-flight briefings,and after the pilot assignments
were made, and some of the preliminary planning had gone into the route anyhow, I
would get the assigned pilots into my office and we would use the available target
identification charts that we had. They were generally mosaics, fairly large scale
maps, for identification of targeting. And in the absence of any detailed photography
or mosaic maps we would study the JN charts they use for their navigation, or larger
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scale, if possible, and try to ensure they knew a specific flight path so they
would cover the flight area.
Mfg. BROSS: What is a JN map?
In addition to that, my function was more closely allied with
target identification. And then we would run over evasion and escape, limited
enemy or unfriendly country ability to interfere with the mission--
MR. HOUSTON: In that regard the capabilities of any enemy fighters,
surface-to-air missiles?
weapons. I say "limited" because over the scale of the routes they were flying
there wasn't much point in getting too detailed on the thing -- but more of an awareness
than anything else. Procedures to be adopted in the event of capture. What
alternative methods the pilots had for regaining friendly territory. Pretty well
standardized Air Force procedures insofar as who to contact, who not to contact.
A degree of terrain study, climatic and geographic conditions, and security aspects
only insofar as prisoner of war activity. Then we also covered or identified the
necessity for carrying only the minimum documents necessary for flying the mission.
And also we covered in general this Policy Letter 6 that we have been referring to.
MR. HOUSTON: Do you recall whether you actually had the Policy
Letter 6 before you at that time?
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discussing this with him. As to whether the Letter was actually in front of him
at the time, or in front of me at the time, I don't recall. I do know that of
all the pilots I talked to I was never in any doubt that they knew what the contents
of this Letter were.
MR. HOUSTON: In the discussions they revealed a thorough under-
standing, in your opinion?
Yes, sir. In fact, they seemed to know it better than
I did -- they had been associated with the Project longer and seemed to be more
knowledgeable on it than I at one point.
MR. HOUSTON: Do you believe you spoke specifically at this briefing
to Powers about what to do in event of capture?
Policy
with the policy laid down in/Memorandum No. 6?
Well, we followed a practice -- at least I did -- of
telling the pilots that if they were captured that they were of course to attempt
not to reveal any information at all, if possible -- and this usually degenerated
into a fairly general discussion as to ways and means. We would discuss Air Force
experience with PW's, and the fact that eventually almost anyone could be broken
down and compelled to talk -- and that the tactics should be to delay -- not an
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As to specifics, I don't recall. I do know that
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out-and-out lie if you're going to get caught in it, but delay your interrogators
as much as possible -- give him a limited amount of information and specifics. As to
the aircraft itself I do recall a discussion as to limitation of altitude and
performance of the aircraft. Whether this was emphasized unduly or not, I don't
really remember, but I was sure that this took place.
MR. HOUSTON: Do you recall whether you discussed any theory of
behavior as being better than another? For instance, that to be silent under
questioning or to be apparently forthright under questioning would be a better approach?
We discussed this, yes, sir -- and again the general
idea was there would be no point in being belligerent, to appear cooperative, to
give limited amounts of information under pressure -- in other words, to fence with
this man to the extent of trying to keep him off you but not to the extent where
you're lying to him and you're going to get trapped in your own lies -- to know what
you were going to say and to say it.
MR. HOUSTON: Do you remember whether you discussed any vital
information that Mr. Powers might have that was considered particularly sensitive?
Specific in terms of information? No, sir, I don't
MR. HOUSTON: What I had in mind is that I believe he had information
on certain other overflights and participation of other governments in the U-2 Project
that were considered pretty sensitive. Do you recall whether you discussed those at
all, as things that should be protected above the ordinary?
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generally the idea was to attempt to keep from revealing any knowledge he did have
or had gained, and that he should be very much aware of this knowledge.
MR. HOUSTON: What I'm thinking of, there was some information
that in event of capture would be obvious to the Russians, and on this he was under
no inhibition particularly--
MR. HOUSTON: What I'm thinking of - there were degrees of sensitivity
Yes, there were certain items, I do know, with this
idea of holding back.
MR. BROSS: You have already identified the performance of the
aircraft as one area to be withheld if possible.
MR. BROSS: Any other technical aspects -- the competence of the
Yes, this was not to be discussed, if at all possible.
This was part of the technical data of the aircraft. Of course, the assumption was
the cameras would be destroyed with the destruct and there wouldn't be any problems.
Was this an assumption?
a
It was/pretty well-understood thing the destruction
of the aircraft would take care of this and the pilot would be relieved, therefore,
of really facing this problem. However, I recall -- I don't know whether I talked
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to Powers specifically on this -- I don't know -- but I do know in discussing
capture with some of the pilots I had no doubt they were well aware a discussion
of the functioning of the equipment was something they should not discuss, and
most of them -- well, I'm sure they were well aware of this.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN; How much did the pilots know about the camera
degree of knowledge. However, in association with it and having seen some of the
results of it they could draw some pretty good conclusions on it.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: They weren't briefed on the structure and capacities
and what not of the camera?
what they had to do to make the thing function.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: That would be the extent of their briefing?
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: They were going to fly certain missions and do
certain things, and the plane was loaded so that if they moved certain levers
it would do certain things.
concerned was that they ensure it was turned off and on at the specified times.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Could one of these pilots have sat down and
sketched the structure of one of these cameras?
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I don't think they could.
MR. HOUSTON: In that connection, do you happen to know whether
Powers had any background or training in photography?
No, sir, I don't.
MR. BROSS: I understand that specifically Powers had seen the
results -- I think there was testimony to this effect yesterday -- that Powers had
seen or had probably seen the results of photographic surveillance, presumably as
a result of one of his own missions. Was this likely to be true?
Well, I don't think so. I don't know.
MR. BROSS: What I'm trying to get at was really whether a pilot
would normally be familiar with the state of the technical competence of the
photographic equipment and would appreciate the degree of excellence of this
photography and would generally be familiar with what this photographic equipment
could accomplish at the altitudes at which it was functioning.
that they did have at their disposal.
COL. GEARY: Do you happen to know if this testimony -- was this
a result of a training mission that they showed him--
MR. BROSS: I think somebody testified yesterday that Powers didn't
know much about the technical make-up of the cameras and photographic equipment but
that he had seen the result of the photography and therefore was aware of the most
sensitive aspect of this Project, and that was the very high degree of technical
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competence which had been accomplished.
MR. HOUSTON: I think the testimony was that he had seen the
results of training flights.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Let me pin down this one further thing. Assume
that the pilots knew or certainly assumed that if they were instructed to fly a
certain height over a certain territory, and pull certain levers which they knew
operated cameras, they assumed they were taking pictures and the pictures were good
enough to cause the command to send somebody to do that. In addition to that,
so far as you know, they didn't know anything about the technical, mechanical
make-up of the camera?
No, sir. Most of them were interested in the fact
that we have a good piece of equipment here and it will turn in the results we are
after -- and that was about the extent of the feeling.
MR. HOUSTON: Do you recall whether or not you briefed Powers on
what specific enemy capability he might expect to encounter in the way of fighter
aircraft or surface-to-air missiles and their probable effectiveness?
was as to types of aircraft, types of fighter aircraft, and as to possible types
of surface-to-air missiles. As to precise location of these, no. As to performance
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capabilities of the fighters, yes.
JUDGE PREPrYMAN: What was he told about the possibility of
his being shot down?
limp p. 25
we had at that particular time indicated that there was very little likelihood,
or practically none, of a fighter intercept. There was some likelihood, but remote,
a
of/surface-to-air missile.
MR. HOUSTON: Do you happen to recall whether Sverdlovsk was
mentioned as a possible SAM site? Surface-to-air missile site.
No, sir.
the briefing since the route was all established we ran over the entire route, and
Sverdlovsk of course happened to be there, and it was annotated as a possible missile
site, but that was just a part of the general briefing - no particular point was made
of it.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Was it known to intelligence -- known to you at
that point that while a surface-to-air missile site so far as he was concerned, where
he was going to fly and at what height, that a surface-to-air was a possibility?
25X1 I I I think at that time, sir, as far as my knowledge was
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concerned, it was considered a remote possibility but a possibility.
Did he understand the significance of this, to
Of surface-to-air missiles?
Yes.
I'm sure he did, but I don't think that he or any
other pilots. were particularly concerned about ground offenses.. They had great
faith in the aircraft, they had great faith in the planning of these missions, and
I don't really think that many of them were deeply concerned about defensive activity.
They were aware of it but not concerned particularly.
MR. HOUSTON: Did I understand you to say that you were the one
that briefed him on what should accompany him in the form of documentation?
MR. HOUSTON: What was he authorized to carry in the way of
MR. HOUSTON: Let me start off -- was he instructed not to have
remember specifically what he was instructed not to carry or to carry. He was
to have his identification as a -- and this is something I'm not too sure of -- I
think it was as a civilian--
What was he authorized?
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No, sir. I'm trying to remember, and I can't
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[ Mr. 25X1
a photograph)
Yes, sir. This is what I'm referring to -- not DAF.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Let's describe it for the record.
appears in a group of photographs in the publication entitled "The Trial of the U-2"
put out by Translation World Publishers, which, from its photograph, is identified
as a Department of Air Force civilian identification card bearing the name -- and
there is a partial obliteration but c-i-s G. Powers -- the first four letters of
Francis are eliminated. This is a description of the picture. Was this card one
he was authorized to take with him?
You use the term "authorized", and I'm not sure in
my own mind as to what -- I'm trying to recall -- what specific documentation an
individual was authorized, what the form was or which. They had two forms, as I
recall, one was the normal Air Force ID card and the other was a NASA-type card,
and specifically as to which of those two was authorized, or which he was told was
authorized, I really can't say -- but going back two years, I would say in order to
keep the Air Force out of it it would have been the NASA card he would have been
authorized.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Well, if he was found with this card on him after
the flight, would you say that the card had been authorized? Was this one of the
cards that would have been authorized?
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JUDGE PRETTYMAN: In other words, you cannot tell us whether or
not he was authorized to have this card?
imp p. 28
I can't answer -- I can't say that.
No, sir, I can't recall whether he was or was not.
Did he have a NASA ID card?
Whether Mr. Powers had that or not, I don't know.
Was his cover story NASA?
Yes, as an all-weather aircraft.
Did you brief him on his cover story?
Yes -- this was Policy Letter 6.
And this was NASA -- he was to say he was a NASA
I haven't seen that Policy Letter for two years,
and I don't recall what it said.
MR. BROSS: The question here is the cover story that he was to
adopt inside Russia. The cover story he used in other parts of the world might
well be one thing -- he might say he was a NASA pilot under certain circumstances --
but you might give him different instructions as to how to behave and what to say
if he were picked up in hostile territory. And the question here is: What documents
was he authorized to carry and which story was he instructed to tell to the Russians?
25X1 I I Well, as you are aware, the way that thing goes there
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are several different possibilities in that Policy Letter on the cover story he would
use, depending on various circumstances, and as to which one - right now I can't
tell you that it was No. 1, No. 2, or No. 3 he was instructed to say or to tell.
But I do know that in general I think I can say that he was instructed to tell that
story appropriate to that overflight, and had an understanding of that Policy Letter.
MR. BROSS: But you don't remember specifically what he was told
with respect to a cover story for use inside Soviet Russia?
sure of the full, detailed cover story as written, although I read the thing several
times and knew at that time, but right now I can't recall the details of it.
MR. BROSS: But you are reasonably certain that there was a cover
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imp p. gr3o
you could take the story that Powers told when he was captured and check it back
against what his instructions were?
trial itself I do recall that at that particular time in listening to the radio
broadcasts there was no particular concern on my part that he had deviated from the
story he was told to give -- at that particular time -- I remember this distinctly -
he was following in general the story that he was told to give under the circum-
stances -- in other words, I didn't get the impression that he was violating it.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: What instruction was he given as to what his status
would be if he came down in Russian territory on this flight?
From the published newspaper-type things and the
That he was a civilian pilot and had wandered off
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JUDGE PRETTYMAN: When he came down. He didn't have a prisoner of
war status, did he?
Oh, what his actual status was?
that of practically nothing -- that he was on his own at that point.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: I wonder if they told him, in connection with his
status if he came down on the ground, what his rights were?
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on his own insofar as any rights were concerned -- he had no Geneva Convention
rights or anything of that nature - he was strictly on his own -- there was no POW
status as such.
25X1 I I I told him that the needle was there, and it was his
option to take it or not to take it, it was his option to use it or not to use it.
We took the device apart and suggested that there were several methods of using the
thing. As far as concealment, that as a good luck charm it may be allowed on him --
the interrogator or the captors would allow him to keep it as a good luck charm.
But that there was an alternative, that he could take the pin portion out and put it
in the hem of his clothing, or something of this nature. That he could use it as a
self-destruction device or as a weapon, if the occasion called for it, and at his own
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option -- it was strictly his option as to how he handled it.
MR. HOUSTON: Did he express any personal views as to the needle
I hesitate to answer specifically, because I don't
recall -- I know that in discussing it with all the pilots there were several views
expressed, and as to what Frank's actual view was, I would hesitate to be specific
and say whether it was use it or not use it.
P.R. HOUSTON: You just don't recall?
No. There were several strong feelings on both sides
of the fence as far as the device itself was concerned.
MR. HOUSTON: It might help to refresh your recollection -- I'd
like to read from OPERATIONS POLICY LETTER NO. 6 (dated 9 December 1957), paragraph
4.c., on the conduct and procedures in event of capture, as to their status:
(Reading) "They (the pilots) will be advised to represent themselves as civilians,
to admit previous Air Force affiliation, to admit current CIA employment, and to make
no attempt to deny the nature of their mission."
25X1
1 7 Yes -- this is what I didn't remember - whether the
CIA part was a part of that instruction.
MR. HOUSTON: It is my understanding that the NASA story would be
used in other circumstances.
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imp p. a33
three different alternatives, and I don't recall the line of demarkation between
MR. HOUSTON: This is the specific language in event of capture,
I don't have any doubt that that was understood.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Anything further?
MR. BROSS: I can't remember, Judge, whether was asked 25X1
flight which was in any way unusual. If this question has not been asked, I would
No, sir.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Is your answer no that you don't remember, or no
that he didn't exhibit any--
hen left the stand and
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MR. HOUSTON: What was your relationship to the U-2 Program?
Adana, Turkey -- the navigator.
MR. HOUSTON: When were you assigned, when did you reach there,
and how long were you there?
there until March of 1961.
MR. HOUSTON: During that time you were responsible for planning
the actual flight tracks for missions?
I :A
The instructions came to us in a message which we
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recovery base. They would give us instructions between various points as to where
camera. I then would take this message and plot on maps such as these, which are
JN charts, the actual geographic positions of the various turning points, and letter
them as they were designated in the message. These points would then be checked at
least three different times by myself, and witnessed, and on all overflights Colonel
Shelton personally checked these coordinates to be sure the track we had drawn on
these flight charts was the track Headquarters had sent us. We used different colors
on the charts--
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Let me understand this -- when the pilot took
off on a flight his flight was indicated on a series of cards such as you have
there? It was not on just one map but on a series of cards such as these?
Yes, sir, the number and showing the general direction.
Here for example on Chart 5 there was an arrow, so that the pilot could always orient
the map so he was looking in the direction of the flight line and the general path
of the aircraft. On this particular mission we used eight cards because of the
length of the mission.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Actually four cards with charts on front and back.
25X1 I I Yes - four. And these were orientated as far as
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turning the switches on and off. And in addition to the orientations which are on
these cards we would compute celestial navigation positions for him to use to observe
with his sextant, and to be able to get his position celestially should there be
an undercast condition which prevented him from visually fixing himself during the
flight. In addition to this we also planned true heading checks for every four
minutes of time throughout the entire mission, so that should the compass fail he
could, by setting in the azimuth of the body, steer himself celestially throughout
the mission.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Now actually on the date of this flight - May 1,
1960 - what was the condition? Was there an undercast or was the ground in sight
for the entire flight or--
the weather forecast for the route. We also obtained winds. And these winds were
put on the pilot's green card or flight plan, and the annotations regarding the
weather was placed on his chart.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: On these charts - these cards?
On these cards. And I actually don't know - it not
being available -- but from an interview I have had with Mr. Powers he indicated
cloud cover from departure base up to about this position [pointing to 69,000 feet
on chartJ. We debriefed him on that weather. We also had available to us from
Headquarters' supply sources radio stations within the Soviet Union with our
frequencies and call signs listed. These were placed on the chart and we were able
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2/21/62 imp P. 18,37
to give him radio bearings to the stations, which he could use to determine his
course or "track", as we call it, in the event of an undercast or sextant failure.
And these were made available to the pilot.
Now after the track had been checked out and certified that
it was correct, at a time designated by Colonel Shelton the pilots were allowed to
see this track and study it. Because the maps of the JN size or scale are not
sufficient for proper target study, we then allowed the primary and the alternate
pilot to make any target notations that he desired on his chart, since he was the man
that was going to fly the mission and he could read his own writing better than mine,
and any notations that he thought would help him we allowed him to place on these
charts. And this they did. This was usually done at the Base at Adana before we
went into staging operation. But whenever we arrived at our advance base, the
night before before the pilot went to sleep he reviewed his route and studied the
targets and refreshed his memory with any notations that he wanted to, regarding the
targets, at that time.
JUDGE PRETI'YMAN: When you say "targets" what do you mean? Do you
mean the places at which he was to take the pictures?
25X1 I I No, sir. But for example on this chart, which is Chart 5,
you see we have a flat line that comes up and turns in this manner. Now on this
map there may not be the actual annotation of a dam and a large lake, which appeared
to us from other sources or from larger maps, or there may have been some buildings
that we received target charts for which were of prime interest, and he would then
annotate the building as it appeared in relation to airfields, towns, bridges, and
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he put it on this chart in pencil, so he was sure as he was flying along he
could refresh his memory and line himself up with the building as he had placed
it on the map.
JUDGE PRE`ITYMAN: Then when you use the word "target" in this
connection what you mean is observable features on the ground which he could use
to check his course so as to know whether he was on course or not?
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: You don't use it in regard to the places where
he was supposed to take a picture?
No, sir. The camera was on all the time.
GENERAL BULL: They would just bring the charts up to date with
the latest navigational data.
some cases, and they were bringing them up to date, that is correct.
In the morning before the flight while the pilot was pre-breathing -
which means that for at least two hours before scheduled take-off the pilot was
breathing oxygen -- I took these mission charts and gave them to the pilot, and he
studied them again, and if he had any recommendations or questions, or anything of
this type, we would then bring his charts up to date for him -- but normally they
didn't. We gave him then the actual time that it would take to fly a leg, the
heading that he should fly -- and this was all stamped right on his chart so that
he didn't have to refer back to his flight log, or if a flight log fell on the floor
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2/21/62f---Imp p..lO',31
and he couldn't pick it up -- as may have happened -- all of the data he needed to
fly the mission was on the chart, although we did like to have him record some
data for us, for debriefing purposes, on his flight card, which is and was referred
to as the green card.
MR. HOUSTON: Had you briefed Mr. Powers on any other missions?
No, sir. The debriefing team was employed, for
example on this mission while I was with the launching party, at Peshawar -- the
debriefing team was headed by other people, and
Not other overflight missions, but I had debriefed him
on training missions very often.
MR. HOUSTON: Did you find he understood his briefings?
MR. HOUSTON: And did you debrief at the end of missions?
as the Intelligence 25X1
MR. HOUSTON: Did you form an opinion as to his navigational ability?
From a navigational sense, or overall?
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2/21/62 MP P .,A *0
fly test flights for us after an aircraft engine had been changed, etc. And I
know he was regarded in the Unit as about the best pilot we had.
MR. HOUSTON: You were with him in the immediate period before take-off?
MR. HOUSTON: Did you discuss with him anything besides the flight
plan? Did you discuss any possibilities of mishap?
No, I didn't discuss any possibilities about any mishaps,
but I was the custodian of "the silver dollar",as we referred to it, on his transport
from Adana to Peshawar, and it was in my custody at the time we were in Peshawar, and
therefore just before Frank got into the aircraft I took the silver dollar from its
location and offered it to Frank. At first when I offered it to him there was a
hesitation on his part, and he shook his head indicating that he did not want to take
this--
now. And as I started to walk away from him he then tapped me on. the shoulder, and
I turned around, and he indicated he would take it, so I gave it to him and he put
it in his pocket of his flight suit. I then asked him again if there was anything on
the mission that he had any questions about, and he indicated everything was fine.
He took the flight packet which had his map and flight data with him and went out
and put it in the aircraft.
MR. HOUSTON: Did you accompany him to the aircraft?
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2/21/6"imp p. 41
Well, I accompanied him part way to the aircraft --
maybe four or five steps. The aircraft was in the hangar and the pre-breathing van
was in the hangar -- and he walked up the steps and I patted him on the back and
said, "I'll see you later, Frank."
MR. HOUSTON; Were there any incidents in these final sessions,
that come to your mind at all, that raised any question in your mind about the mission
or about Powers?
I have a paper here, forwarded over Mr. 25X1
Cunningham's signature, which is stated to be a summary of operational activities
for Francis Gary Powers, describing them in general and then listing actual flights
by date, area, nature, and flying time. Can you tell me where this information
could be obtained?
and from flight records that are available to us up in the office on H Street.
MR. HOUSTON: You would have the actual originals of those flight
MR. HOUSTON: Judge, I suppose we could verify this further, but
if you think that is an adequate identification, if it's acceptable to you I would
propose to have this as an exhibit for the record.
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JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Why don't you just put it in as an exhibit. I
don't see any need for further verification of it. And if any questions should
arise--
. This SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES from James A. 25X1
Cunningham, Jr., Acting Chief, DPD-DD/P, addressed to
19 February 1962, was then entered in the record as EXHIBIT 14 . . . .
JN charts we did prepare for the pilots, on this scale map, a global navigation chart,
an emergency map -- in event of emergency the pilot then would have a heading and
fuel figures available, and time enroute, to all the various places as Colonel Shelton
selected for us. And this map was not mounted on a board, and was made available to
the pilot and which he carried folded in his flight coveralls. The pilots did assist
in the making of this map, and Frank did have this with him at the time he took off.
MR. BROSS: For escape or evasion?
25X1 I I Not escape and evasion, but supposing he runs into
engine trouble and he wants to get out of Russia as soon as possible.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Could I ask you one or two questions about this,
to make sure I understand it? Looking at Card No. 1, and turning over to Card No. 2,
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it is written on here in crayon, with an arrow pointing to a certain point on the
flight line, the words "Mode 1 on". Then further along the line the words "Mode Stby" --
which I assume means standby.
And the camera had two modes that were available to us -- one mode is scanning. from
horizon to horizon--
JUDGE PRETTYMANh I don't care about the details of it -- but this
mode has something to do with the camera? It tells him to do something with the
camera?
Yes, sir. And on his original flight log, then, I
computed the time after take-off he was to do this, so that if he encountered an
undercast then by dead reckoning he would turn the camera on, because there are times
when they can get some photographic value even out of clouds.
JUDGE PRETT"YMAN: Now this second one says "mode standby". Then
the next thing that appears is on the next card - "Mode off" - "Mode Standby". I
suppose then this standby means turn it off at that point?
25X1 I I It isn't really off, because they keep the heaters on
so that the camera has heat,and ensures operation when he does go back, for turning it on.
JUDGE PRETT'YMAN: But the points shown on here are the points at
which you particularly wanted him to take a picture?
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Yes.
GENERAL BULL: I have noted in the Tape 1 recording of Mr. Powers'
interview this reference -- and he was talking here about the time after he had left
the plane and was on the way down -- "I remembered that I had a map with escape - not
escape routes but showing routes to - in a southern part of my course, showing routes
from there to Turkey from various points along my course in case something
small pieces and just threw it out in the air." This was the sole reference to
that. What would prompt that particular security action on his part? Was that
probably the most important document he had, of a security nature anymore than
this type of--
map would have brought into the trial some of our allies who were allowing us to use
their bases under emergency conditions. And by destroying this map, of course, he
removed any evidence of this that could have been brought out when he was captured.
GENERAL BULL: Would it bring them in anymore than these maps he
was using on this chart?
Yes, because the only bases we show here is the
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MR. HOUSTON: Would it show anything froo the north?
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It did show on here two alternate bases in the north,
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Let the record show: when he said "this map"
in case at a certain point -- for example when he reached Archangel --
distances the actual effect the wind will have on a flight. It is also difficult
to predict whether the fuel consumption will be as planned. Therefore, starting at
approximately Archangel we did have alternate routes acros
if his fuel was not as we had computed it, he could cut across. And these were on
the JN charts which he carried in the aircraft with him.
MR. HOUSTON: So by destroying that what he really protected was
indications of cooperation on the southern border?
It is very difficult to predict over these great
GENERAL BULL: Would you say that was a sound and logical reaction
of a man trying to protect the security of the flight?
MR. BROSS: I would like to ask -- I think the'testimony which we
have heard so far has been certainly confusing, and I think conflicting, as to whether
or not Mr. Powers had made previous overflights over Soviet bloc territory. Does the
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record of his operational experience indicate that he had made a previous flight
over Russia, or not?
MR. HOUSTON: The record indicates a total of 19 flights over the
Middle East, and one flight over the USSR - photographic reconnaisance - in 1957.
available -- that he took off from Pakistan and flew across China, and about the point
he would be penetrating the Soviet Union his instructions were if he could not see a
large lake, due to cloud cover, he should return -- and this I believe is what
happened -- he was to return, and he did return because he could not see the checkpoint,
in accordance with the instructions as. given to him.
MR. BROSS: This is another flight -- apart from the flight flown in
MR. HOUSTON., This was the one in 1957.
MR. BROSS. I'm a little confused as to whether there were two flights.
MR. HOUSTON: Only one over the USSR. This one was not a deep
penetration, because in accordance with his instructions he turned back when he saw
cloud cover over the area.
MR. BROSS: This was not another flight -- the one over China?
MR. HOUSTON: The one over China first and he came back after he
reached the Soviet border?
MR. BROSS: My understanding now is that the first overflight in
which Mr. Powers flew over Soviet territory was the flight flown on 1 May 1960.
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e on
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MR. HOUSTON! That appears to be correct, from the records, yes.
then left the stand and Colonel Shelton
MR. HOUSTON: We called Colonel Shelton to identify a document.
Colonel Shelton, I have here a document which I would like you
to take a look at and see if you can identify it.
COL. SHELTON: This is a document showing the summary of that mission.
MR. HOUSTON: You are personally familiar with this document?
COL. SHELTON: Yes.
MR. HOUSTON: Did you prepare it?
COL. SHELTON: Yes -- I signed as preparing officer.
MR. HOUSTON: What signature is on that document?
COL. SHELTON: That is correct.
MR. HOUSTON; When was this document prepared?
COL. SHELTON: 27 May 1960.
MR. HOUSTON: And what is the nature of the document?
COL. SHELTON: This is a summary of events that took place, in the
particular
order of their happening, concerning this/mission.
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MR. HOUSTON: And the purpose of this summary was what? In other
words, was this requested by Headquarters?
COL. SHELTON: Yes, this was a result of a request by Headquarters.
MR. HOUSTON: And this was an official dispatch to Headquarters?
COL. SHELTON: This is correct.
MR. HOUSTON: I'd like to submit this dispatch, as Exhibit 15, to
the Board as a summary--
JUDGE PRETTYMAN, Let it be so marked and put in the record.
dated 27 May 1960, was then 25X1
entered in the record as EXHIBIT 15 . . . .
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Now, Colonel Shelton, this is a report by you
pursuant to an instruction from Headquarters?
COL. SHELTON: That is correct, sir.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Does this report contain only material known to
you, or does it contain material that you gathered in an effort to prepare this
report? In other words, did you interview other people, and what not?
COL. SHELTON: This is material gathered by all available sources.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN., Gathered by all available sources and put together
by you for official purposes?
COL. SHELTON: Yes, sir.
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GENERAL BULL! Would you call that your post-flight analysis of
the flight, or evaluation of the flight?
COL. SHELTON: No, sir, I wouldn't say that. I'd say that this is
a summary of events that took place during this mission.
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I I Not including the mission, though -- up to the
point of take-off?
COL. SHELTON: Yes, up to the point of take-off.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN., Only to the point of take-off?
COL. SHELTON: Yes.
MR. HOUSTON: In effect, Judge, it summarizes much of the testimony
we have had this morning -- the briefings that took place--
COL. SHELTON: Well, it takes in, for instance, unusual personalities
that were in the Adana area since 1 April -- of course, this is included in this.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN., But it only goes up to take-off time, is that
right? It doesn't purport to contain anything that happened after take-off time?
COL. SHELTON: This is true.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN, It doesn't show, for example, who might have said
what, or who was around, etc., at Peshawar after the flight had taken off and been
gone an hour or so?
MR. BROSS: What was the purpose of this? This was a security
assessment, was it? - in effect?
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COL. SHELTONi Of course, since May 27th of 1960 - it's hard to
remember. All I can do is say the subject of this is a summary--
MR. BROSSI I noticed you referred to the fact that the document
included statements as to whether there were unusual people in the vicinity, and
what not, and from that I gathered what Headquarters was interested in was if there
was any evidence of attempts to get at Powers before the flight, or any unusual
events which would influence people's judgment as to what might have happened on the
flight.
COL. SHELTON: This I don't know.
MR. HOUSTON: It's a detailed chronology of events, and also a report
of things and events that might or might not be related to the mission, that were
developed after the mission.
25X1 I s one of the officials who helped prepare
the request from Headquarters to Col. Shelton. He might be able to shed a little
light on the Headquarters' need for the summary.
MR. HOUSTON: I don't know whether we need to go into that.
JUDGE PRE'PTYMAN: I want to make sure I understand this. As I
understand it, we are looking at a paper now where the last account in it is the
take-off of the flight from Peshawar?
MR. HOUSTON: No, sir. The last thing discussed here is an appraisal
of Powers' intelligence knowledgeability. This is one of the peripheral subjects
covered, in addition to the chronological order of events leading up to the take-off.
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JUDGE PRET'I'YMAN: Then let's take the chronological order of events
leading up to the take-off -- at take-off this report stops, is that right?
COL. SHELTON: Let me read it -- the first paragraph is an
introduction, the second paragraph is sequence of events, the third paragraph is
briefings, the 4th is personal and professional equipment, the 5th is personnel
participating at staging areas, the 6th is Powers' personal factors, the 7th is unusual
personalities in the Adana area, the 8th is aircraft and fuel, the 9th is Powers'
intelligence knowledgeability, and paragraph 10 is conclusions.
JUDGE PRET'TYMAN: Now my question is simply this. The flight took
off at Peshawar, is that right?
COL. SHELTON: This is true.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: And does this summary or this report contain
anything about unusual characters around the flight take-off at Peshawar? I just
want to identify this document. I'm just curious to know whether Headquarters wanted
a report on Peshawar after the flight took off. I suppose there were some people
there -- everybody didn't drop dead at Peshawar -- what did they do? Did they wait
around? Did they all get on a plane? What happened? Something happened.
COL. SHELTON: This is not in this report.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: That is the answer, then, to my question -- it's
not in this report.
MR. HOUSTON: Would you like any testimony from Col. Shelton on that
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JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Colonel, were you there?
COL. SHELTON: Yes, sir.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: I would be interested in a very brief account of
what did take place after the flight took off. After the plane took off what did
everybody do? What happened?
COL. SHELTON: Everyone then went to the hangar where we had our
lodging, etc., that we had stayed in the previous time. We stayed there and started
preparing our fly-away kits for the trip back to home base, at the same time waiting
for instructions as to when and where we would go. These kits were loaded on the
support aircraft. This take a period of one to two hours to load up. And everyone
then remained in the general vicinity of the aircraft waiting for instructions to
return to home base.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Was there a base detachment that stayed there at
MR. HOUSTON: You mean a permanent--
COL. SHELTON: Permanently? No -- not from our base. Now there is
a Pakistan base - a base is what it is, and it's a fighter base and of course they
have permanent people there. But none of our people from Adana, my unit, were there
permanently.
MR. HOUSTON: You just go in for the purposes of the mission?
COL. SHELTON: It's just a staging base.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Now when your Detachment took off for home --
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what kind of a detachment, composed of whom, was left there at Peshawar?
COL. SHELTON: No one.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: I thought you just said--
COL. SHELTON: It belongs to the Pakistans, and there is a permanent
base for them, so it's maintained by the Pakistan Air Force.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: When you left they were still there?
COL. SHELTON: As far as I know they were, yes, sir.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: That detachment saw this flight take off?
COL. SHELTON: I wouldn't say it was a detachment -- it was a
base complement of people.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: The base complement of people -- they saw the
COL. SHELTON: Which flight? The one that Powers took off? I
have to assume that some people did, yes.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: There was no effort made by anybody, as far as
you know, to ascertain whether there at Peshawar in this base complement there were
any odd people or any odd occurrences, or anything of that sort?
COL. SHELTON: Well-
COL. GEARY: Judge, I may be able to shed some light on that,if I may?
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: It just arose in my mind because Headquarters was
very anxious to get a report on any odd characters around Adana -- I just wondered
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in whether there was a possibility that somebody had it all set up there to notify
somebody when this man took off?
COL. GEARY: That is a possibility you can never discount under the
COL. SHELTON: I would like to say this, that from the time that
this Detachment left Adana until the time that it arrived back at Adana that both
me and the security people who were along with the Detachment were on guard for
any unusual activity or personnel that might be involved. There was a limited number
of contacts with base people, and I personally did the majority of these. The other
people of my Detachment stayed within the small hangar area. So if there had been
any unusual personalities within that general area, then we would have discovered this,
I feel sure of this, from a security standpoint. Now if they had been on another
part of the base, then we would know nothing of this.
MR. BROSS: I think the question that immediately occurs is whether
or not some member of the Pakistani Air Force or the other Pakistani in the neighborhood
or in the area could have, having seen this flight take off, communicated this fact
to the Soviets or elsewhere without our knowing about it?
COL. SHELTON: I'm sure it could have.
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I was assigned to the Program in November of 1958, I
went overseas the 1st of December, arrived in Turkey, as I recall, about the 5th of
December, and I was constantly on duty with the unit from that time until August
of 1960 0
1 :1
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as to the kind of operation that was being carried out it was evident -- because
I had had some experience in the field of high altitude support already, past
experience, so there would have been no special problems to me from the medical
aspect.
I
MR. HOUSTON: And from that time on until the mission at the end
of April you were the medical officer who would be responsible for recommending or
reporting on Mr. Powers' physical condition?
MR. HOUSTON: Did you conduct frequent examinations, or how did you
Well, it was a very small unit I was supporting, and
the arrangements were informal, but I had daily contact with all of the pilots -- I
was available to them at all times, 24 hours a day, and I'm sure that I had at least
daily contact with every one of the pilots.
MR. HOUSTON: Would you make special examinations or tests before
they engaged in a mission?
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I saw the pilot usually something like 12 to 18
hours before every mission launch time, at which time we had a short conversation,
generally just dealing with his health status, whether he had any problems that he
was aware of, and I'd usually do a brief EEG examination, and this would again be
repeated prior to the time he would start his pre-breathing, which was two hours
prior to launch time.
MR. HOUSTON: You would accompany the pilots to the staging area?
1 :1
1 :1
Yes, I attended him constantly.
MR. HOUSTON: Did you also have responsibility for their mental and
emotional status?
That would be part of my observational responsibility,
to be able to make a medical assessment of such.
MR. HOUSTON: Could you give the Board a medical assessment of Mr.
Powers' physically and emotionally, in general, and then specifically your opinion
of him at the time you last saw him before the take-off on this May 1 mission?
Mr. Powers was in excellent physical health during
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discussed by the witness -- they were not put in the record. Do you
think they should be?
MR. HOUSTON: I'm sorry - this was an oversight. I meant to ask
the Board whether they did want them in the record.
MR. BROSS: I'm not clear exactly what they are.
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They are a reproduction of the actual mission.
The Russians have it -- parts of it.
ever prepared one -- and this Frank took with him.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: You prepared one set and he took that with him on
the flight. Do you know what happened to that?
I I
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JUDGE PRETTYMAN: In other words, you couldn't copy the original
but these were reconstructed?
MR. HOUSTON: You went through the same process this. time that you
had done originally in Adana?
MR. BROSS: You still have in your files the original Headquarters
JUDGE PREITYMAN: I think you might state that in the record --
identify them as four documents, by Exhibit number, and then describe them as
Id escribed them, as reconstructed from the original--
MR. HOUSTON: Four documents, listed as EXHIBIT 16-A, B, C, and D,
which are maps of the area from Pakistan across Russi and on the maps
are traced courses for the flight of May 1. The originals of these maps not being
available, these courses were reconstructed from the original data, which was also
used to construct the original ones used by Mr. Powers. They therefore duplicate
the material taken by Mr. Powers on his mission. There were, however, on the originals
the notes made by the pilot, Mr. Powers, at the time of his briefing, which notes
are not included in these Exhibits.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: I think we might add there, Mr. Houston, that it's
testimony that except for the exception you have just noted, these
cards do reflect accurately the cards that were given to Mr. Powers prior to the May 1, 1960)
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The celestial computations are not on those cards,
the radio annotations are not on those cards, and the emergency routes cutting
off from Archangel and Murmansk and alternates to the northern base are not on
those cards. But the route is accurate.
JUDGE PRETTYMAN: And with the exceptions you have just noted,
they are otherwise accurate reproductions?
. . . . The meeting recessed for lunch at 1:00 p.m.
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